

Preface

By the first years of the twentieth century, the grab for colonial territories around the world by the imperialist powers had gone about as far as it would go. Apart from some Islamic and Southeast Asian countries, it had become rare for one nation-state to impose colonial control over another nation-state.¹ In Northeast Asia, Japan's annexation of Korea was one of those exceptions. As Japan, a late-blooming imperialist power, sought to establish control in Korea, it inevitably ran up against the resistance of a young and fierce Korean nationalism still in its formative stage. From the outset, maintaining peace and public order in Korea became a priority for the colonizer and remained so throughout virtually the entire period of colonial control. It was almost axiomatic, in those circumstances, that the agency responsible for internal security and keeping the public order stable on a day-to-day basis—the police—should acquire a central role in the colonial administration of Korea.

The time frame of this book is the period from around 1905, when Japan made Chosŏn-dynasty Korea a protectorate, until 1919, the year of the insurrections that came to be called the Samil Uprising or the March 1st Movement.² The uprisings that took place that year set in motion a shift, from a police system dominated by Japanese gendarmes (*kempei*) operating during the first phase of the colonial period to a civilian police system. As a political history, this study traces changes in the police system in colonial-period Korea, and from the perspective of social history, it examines the real conditions of everyday life in Korea under the all-seeing, controlling watch of the colonial police.

Not one volume on Korea's modern history fails to make some reference to the prime role of the police in Japan's management of the colony. The police are described as the "military arm of Japanese imperialist domination of the Korean people," and the kempei-dominated police system (*kempei keisatsu*) as being "at the center of Government General politics in Korea." One work tells us that throughout the colonial period, the dictates of Japanese imperialist ambitions compelled "increasingly harsh military and police repression in the face of ... the clash between the Korean people and Japanese imperialism."³ At the end of 1920, of the 36,450 people employed by the Japanese Government General in Korea and affiliated agencies and bureaus, those attached to the Central Police Bureau (Keimukyoku) and provincial police departments numbered 18,550, or 50.9 percent of the total.⁴ In other words, about half of the personnel who staffed Government General agencies were employed in some aspect of police work or police management. In short, one cannot even begin to talk about Japan's colonial administration of Korea without mentioning the police.

Despite the wide recognition of the importance of the police, however, almost no

authoritative studies have yet appeared that give a clear, detailed, and substantial picture of the process of change in the police system in the administration of colonial Korea and the political circumstances that affected those changes, or of the role the police played in the management of Korean society. A few articles give brief historical overviews that trace changes in the structure of the police system,⁵ but there have been almost no attempts to carefully analyze the process of change and to consider it in the broad context of the colonial governing policy, thus enabling assessment of the police system and its modifications during that phase of Korean and Japanese political history. In other words, almost no one has produced a clear, authoritative account of the history of Japan's colonial policy in Korea as seen through the filter of the police. For that reason, at the outset I will briefly discuss the background of the neglected state of research, which has persisted despite the important part the police played in Japan's colonial rule.

In the first place, research on the colonial administration as a whole has focused much more heavily on the anti-Japanese resistance and nationalist independence movements than it has on Japan's policy of colonial rule. The colonial administration per se has been definitely a secondary concern to most researchers, especially in the Republic of Korea (ROK). On the other hand, scholars in both the ROK and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) have pursued the history of nationalist movements with passion and vigor. Apart from any question of its merits, it may be that the strong nationalist focus arises from a practical need to recover an ethnic identity, something that was deeply scarred by the Japanese rule of the country.

Moreover, even though studies of nationalist movements, which are definitely in the mainstream of research in modern and contemporary history, can derive confidence by claiming a "just cause," delving into colonial policy dredges up issues that are potentially much more sensitive. Consider the following passage written by a journalist:

To imagine people of the past as people of flesh and blood, not as hammy devils in silk capes, is to humanize them. To humanize is not necessarily to excuse or sympathize, but it does demolish the barriers of abstraction between us and them.⁶

Those words were not written about some colonial regime, but about Nazi war criminals from a post-World War II vantage point; yet to a researcher on colonialism, they have relevant implications. Just as I do not pigeonhole colonial rulers simply as "devils," neither do I intend any comparison with Nazis. What I want to suggest is that, in trying to get into the minds of people who are in the position of dominating others so as to discuss their thinking rationally and objectively, one has to proceed carefully, contending with some heavy psychological constraints. Whether one is Japanese or Korean, many of those studying Japan's colonial policy and administration in Korea have probably felt that kind of psychological constraint. Something like a taboo still hovers over research on

the policies and practices of Japanese colonial rule. It calls forth a certain self-imposed restraint which continues to show up in “a historiography of the pre-1945 period that is often driven by emotion and is virtually Manichaeian in its stark depictions of Japanese oppression and Korean opposition.”⁷ (To be sure, this simple dualism seems to be increasingly less pronounced recently.)

Perhaps I make too much of this point. Still, while the colonial police has been essentially defined as “the center of Government General politics” and “the military arm of imperialist domination of the Korean people,” the fact remains that virtually no study has pursued the specific mechanisms and means by which police activities were put into practice.⁸ The consequence is a tradition of research on colonial policy and practices focused heavily on highlighting and denouncing the repressive nature of the colonial police. There can be no doubt that pervasive violence characterized one aspect of Japan’s colonial administration, and on that point the traditional approach has been of value in providing an account of those circumstances in occupied Korea. At the same time, I cannot help but see an inherent defect in the traditional research, an oversight that blinds the researcher to many different ideas and the possibility of additional or alternative views. I, too, have committed such oversight. All of us working in this field must be prepared to carefully consider those options when we set about analyzing policy.

As for why the history of the police is still not recognized as a self-contained field of study, one reason may be the existence of special problems in the nature of the police organization and its functions. Generally speaking, in the political science paradigm of the nation-state, the police is an enforcing agency subject to the will of the state; seen only as the physical equipment behind the execution of national policy.⁹ Today in both Japan and Korea the image of the police remains tied to the nation concept. As long as the police organization in colonial Korea is considered in those terms, it will continue to be regarded as unrelated to policy formation and decision-making, nothing more than a secondary facility charged with enforcing and implementing policy tasks imposed from above. If that is the case, the police does not present a terribly compelling object of study for research in the history of colonial administration.

If, indeed, people see the police in history simply as ‘enforcers,’ I would argue that such a view stems from a kind of presentism, whereby a contemporary image with all its ahistorical assumptions is superimposed, out of context, on the past, making no accommodation to the different historical conditions. The context of colonial rule is conditioned by domination of one nation over the people of a different nation, and in such circumstances, the internal security concerns of peace and public order have to be at the top of administration priorities. In the case of colonial Korea, this is transparently symbolized by the fact that the Central Police Bureau was not, as it was in metropolitan Japan, one office within the Korean Ministry of the Interior, but was instead a bureau under the Government General on the same level with the industrial, judicial, and other

bureaus. (That arrangement was put into effect after the 1919 reform of the Government General organization. Until 1919 the Central Police Headquarters [Keimu Sōkanbu] was an independent government office.) More than a few chiefs of police in Korea had close ties with the governor general and were deeply involved in policymaking. Akashi Motojirō, for example, the first head of the Central Police Headquarters in Korea, was clearly overstepping the bounds of his administrative duties when he made repeated proposals to Governor General Terauchi Masatake regarding the idea of an invasion of China.¹⁰ Maruyama Tsurukichi also, as head of the Central Police Bureau in the early 1920s, faithfully executed Governor General Saitō Makoto's "divide and rule" policy. After he left Korea Maruyama was given an influential role in forming a new cabinet when Saitō took office as prime minister of Japan.

In any case, such factors have held back police studies, and even though the past few years have seen solid progress in historical research on colonial policies and a flowering of new approaches, work on police continues to stagnate. A detailed discussion is beyond the time-frame of this book, but let me mention one topic that has recently engaged scholars studying the 1920s and has become an important element in the development of research in this area. That is the multilayered character of the Government General's "divide and rule" policy, which was intended to deal with the anti-Japanese resistance and pro-independence forces by keeping Koreans divided among themselves.¹¹ Scholars have been studying that policy from a number of new angles and have come up with an argument that has gained considerable influence, namely that a "bargaining" and "public sphere" relationship sometimes developed between the Government General and popular movements, allowing the possibility of greater fluidity in their interactions.¹² In addition to working out new ways of analyzing the policy formation process, historical scholarship is also looking anew at the implementation side and reexamining Korean reactions at that time to the way policies were carried out. The idea of "colonial modernity," for example, contains hypotheses set up to gain a more complete understanding of how far and the ways in which Koreans, in their everyday lives, assimilated modern structures and ways of ordering their lives introduced by the Japanese colonial administration. Yet, while the topic is acknowledged as important, even these lines of research rarely give careful analytic scrutiny to the work of police administration. One reason is the relative paucity of relevant and productive research materials.¹³

Benefiting from diverse new perspectives being applied to studies in this area, scholarly debate on the decision-making process in the colonial administration of Korea and on the relation of colonial policy to the Korean people and society is reaching a point where a degree of relativity has begun to penetrate the original image of "brutal colonial rule carried out for unilateral ends." In the case of the colonial police, however, the traditional historical image stands unrevised. The police in Korea is still seen monolithically as the core of a violently repressive system of control and has not attracted

the interest of scholars in this field.

The period I focus on here begins with the military administration taking shape around the time of the Russo-Japanese War and extends through the period when Korea's police organization was dominated by the *kempeitai*, roughly the first ten years of the colonial period. It was that decade that produced the powerful image of "brutal colonial rule carried out for unilateral ends." My primary concern is not specifically to refute that characterization. Rather, I believe that such an image congeals, becomes frozen in time if we cannot get beyond it, and so my main purpose is to move on by presenting a fuller, more nuanced account of the era in its other dimensions. Thus I take up the new parameters and wider horizons that have been opening up in research on the history of colonial policy. With such considerations in mind, I approach this study primarily from two angles.

First, I use the police as a window to trace the historical course of colonial rule in Korea. This approach is based on my premise that the police, more than being simply a physical agency functioning to ensure stable colonial administration, was itself an actor in colonial policy formation. That allows a perspective that helps to clarify precisely who was involved in policy decision-making. So far, no matter what the field, studies of policy making in colonial Korea have tended to see the policy-making actor as a somewhat fuzzy "Government General," or alternatively as the individual governor general. It seemed to me that those studies never consciously set out to clearly define who formulated policies and what ideas and plans they had. I saw a need, therefore, to rethink the conventional approach and try to ferret out the thinking behind colonial policies, often referring to the actions and thoughts of individual members of the police bureaucracy.

Second, I attempt to delineate the police and the Korean people and society by looking at them through the lens of their interactions. Viewing the police as an actor in policy formation enables us to consider a much wider array of policy concepts and objectives. As a consequence of taking such a perspective on the police and the people, one no longer automatically assumes that colonial rule in Korea, enforced by the police, was always, uniformly and unexceptionally repressive. While I certainly do not deny the brutality of the colonial police, what motivated this study was my perception that additional dimensions remained to be examined, and on that basis I investigated areas of police activities apart from just the physical violence, and looked carefully into the ways and the extent to which the police insinuated themselves into the daily life of Koreans. I refer readers to the series of studies by Obinata Sumio on the modern Japanese police for further discussion of these important issues. Although the topics they deal with are somewhat different from the ones in this book, I have included pertinent references to Obinata's work.¹⁴

Outline

This book is structured around two pivotal junctures when large institutional changes took place in Korea: annexation by Japan in 1910 and the March 1st Movement of 1919. I examine the motivating ideas behind changes in the police system at each juncture from the perspective of political history, and I also attempt to identify the distinctive approach taken by the police to control the Korean people during the comparatively long span (1910–1919) between them. Let me explain the reasons for deciding on this particular division.

Beginning in 1880, well before the annexation in 1910, the Japanese consulate in Korea had its own consular police. A unit of the Japanese gendarmerie (*kempeitai*) was also stationed in Korea in 1896, and in 1905 an advisory police agency (*komon keisatsu*) was established there. In June 1910, on the eve of annexation, these independent agencies were brought together to form what was called the *kempei keisatsu*, thus reshaping the Korean police organization so that it was dominated by the *kempeitai*. For the first ten years of the colonial occupation this kempei-dominated police organization functioned as the mainstay of Japan's "military rule" in Korea. In 1919, the kempei keisatsu was violently unsettled by the fiercest anti-Japanese pro-independence insurrection yet seen in the colonial period. That was the Samil Uprising, often referred to as the March 1st Movement. One immediate effect was the shift from a kempei-dominated to a civilian police system, and throughout the 1920s the police were responsible for implementing certain aspects of a purportedly more enlightened administration, what was called Japan's "cultural rule" in Korea. Police practices instituted in the 1920s were carried over into the next decade, but by the early 1930s the groundwork was being laid for the shift to a wartime footing. As Japan's war with China intensified, police work was brought more closely into line with the needs arising from the steady advance toward total war. Increasingly, police work centered on the job of leading the Korean populace to a better understanding of the emergency and enforcing tight wartime economic controls.

Changes in the police organization, and in the main work of the police administration, as shown in Figure 1, present a rough parallel with changes in the numbers of police staff and offices.

As a whole, while the figures show a consistent upward trend, large growth spurts occur at three junctures: at the time of annexation, immediately after the Samil Uprising, and again in the early 1930s. The surge in the early 1930s was different from the two before, having a less acute slope and lasting longer. The reasons for that difference stemmed from the two factors I mentioned earlier, that it represented continuity from the 1920s and at the same time a steady shift toward a wartime economic and political system.

Chapter One gives the political and historical background and relates how proposals

and ideas were examined and brought together to become the basis for the police apparatus formed after the Russo-Japanese War, and it covers the development of the police system until the annexation. Chapter Two describes how, during the same period, Japanese officials employed by the Korean government carried out an extensive study of the police system in British-occupied Egypt. This chapter includes a discussion of that material from the viewpoint of comparative history. Chapter Three focuses on the kempei-dominated police system in the 1910s. It reexamines the system and analyzes the Government General's perspective on public order in Korea. It also describes the circumstances surrounding the daily work of police in the local regions. Drawing on data from a survey on popular feelings conducted by the kempei keisatsu, Chapter Four analyzes perceptions by Korean people regarding Japan's colonial rule and the international situation. Chapter Five takes up the reformation of the police system after the Samil Uprising, the political process of that change, and historical factors in the period that preceded it. Finally, after discussing important high-echelon personnel changes in the police organization, an increase in numbers of police personnel, and the response by Koreans to the restructuring of the police system, I offer a reevaluation of those changes in the police organization.

To risk repeating myself, the police in Korea under colonial rule is a field that remains undeveloped by scholars in Japan. It lags way behind British research on the colonial police, for one. Already in the 1950s British scholars studying the history of the empire were producing work that would become the foundation for later research in the history of the colonial police. They built up an impressive body of work on the organization and administration of the police in each of England's colonial possessions, and recent efforts to reevaluate and revise those studies have produced some good results.¹⁵ Research on the Japanese empire can boast no such achievements; to produce solid contributions to work in police studies, we can only start from scratch, little by little unearthing basic material pertinent to the colonial police and determining its value in understanding the history. Beyond what this book could cover, there remain many more topics that await basic research and numerous questions waiting to be addressed.

Thorough research on those topics and questions is hampered primarily by the uneven quality and disparate amounts of available source materials and their different levels of information and detail, all of which vary depending on the time period and events. Hence it is impossible to produce a narrative that is consistently well-developed throughout. This problem of source materials affects, for example, the depiction of actions taken by the police during one phase to deal with the anti-Japanese uprisings for independence, and it makes it difficult to describe in any detail the increasingly wide range of activities assigned to the urban police. For that reason, because I could not present a full-fledged analysis, except when necessary I did not deal at length with special-status colonial police personnel, mainly non-Japanese who were brought into the police organization, such as

Figure 1. Numbers of Police Personnel in Korea during the Protectorate and Colonial Periods, 1904–1944

	Korean police								Consular police			
	Director general	Bureau chief	Police affairs officers	Superintendent/inspector/patrolmen	Superintendent	Inspector	Patrolmen	Total	Superintendent	Inspector	Patrolmen	Total
	Korean	Korean	Korean	Korean	Japanese	Japanese	Japanese		Japanese	Japanese	Japanese	
1904	1	1	13	2,235				2,250		22	232	254
1905	1	1	13	1,713	8	22	79	1,837		20	248	268
1906	1	1	26	2,713	17	43	603	3,404	5	35	459	494

	Korean police								
	Superintendent		Inspector		Sergeant		Patrolmen		Total
	Japanese	Korean	Japanese	Korean	Japanese	Korean	Japanese	Korean	
1907	21	12	75	54	255	124	1,162	2,052	3,755
1908	23	7	85	66	228	107	1,320	2,551	4,387
1909	14		115	80	203	131	1,684	3,088	5,315

	Civil police													Total
	Director general	Bureau chief	Police affairs officers		Superintendent		Inspector		Assistant inspector		Patrolmen		Assistant policemen	
	Japanese	Japanese	Japanese	Korean	Japanese	Korean	Japanese	Korean	Japanese	Korean	Japanese	Korean	Korean	
1910	1	13	2	1	30	14	167	101			2,053	181	3,131	5,694
1911	1	13	2	1	30	14	167	101			2,092	169	3,417	6,007
1912	1	13	2	1	25	7	160	81			2,118	173	2,816	5,397
1913	1	13	2	1	26	7	164	87			2,133	247	3,055	5,736
1914	1	13	2	1	27	7	165	92			2,213	236	2,904	5,661
1915	1	13	2	1	26	8	165	92			2,137	237	2,890	5,572
1916	1	13	2	1	26	9	176	124			2,131	232	2,906	5,621
1917	1	13	2	1	26	9	179	131			2,024	230	2,819	5,435
1918	1	13	2	1	26	8	180	130			1,909	228	2,904	5,402
1919		13			34	10	304	113	556	40	7,387	6,935		15,392
1920		13			37	12	360	125	653	73	9,452	7,651		18,376
1921		13			40	14	369	140	718	268	11,028	8,160		20,750
1922		13			41	14	377	140	730	268	11,028	8,160		20,771
1923		13			40	14	369	105	718	200	11,028	8,160		20,647
1924		13			37	11	333	95	611	170	10,131	7,057		18,458
1925		13			37	11	333	95	611	170	10,131	7,057		18,458
1926		13			41	11	333	95	611	170	10,131	7,057		18,462
1927		13			41	11	333	95	611	170	10,131	7,057		18,462
1928		13			41	11	333	95	624	170	10,296	7,087		18,670
1929		13			49	11	340	95	650	170	10,346	7,137		18,811
1930		13			49	11	340	95	650	170	10,346	7,137		18,811
1931		13			49	11	332	88	603	156	9,604	7,913		18,769
1932		13			48	9	338	86	604	154	10,163	7,913		19,328
1933		13			48	9	338	86	604	154	10,163	7,913		19,328
1934		13			48	9	339	87	605	155	10,144	7,926		19,326
1935		13			48	9	339	87	605	155	10,227	7,926		19,409
1936		13			50	9	347	87	641	155	10,411	8,011		19,724
1937		13			60	8	370	89	688	157	11,030	8,227		20,642
1938		13			62	9	388	89	738	157	11,784	8,542		21,782
1939		13			65	9	412	86	791	136	12,980	8,572		23,064
1940		13			73	9	465	85	894	136	13,178	8,414		23,267
1941		13			80	8	454	76	822	129	12,138	7,799		21,519
1942		13			79	6	439	70	811	123	12,473	8,194		22,208
1943		13			77	8	482	75	881	127	13,307	7,758		22,728
1944		13			94	9	497	87	851	195	8,005	8,541		18,292

Kempei				
Commissioned officers	Warrant officers	Noncommissioned officers	Privates	Total
Japanese	Japanese	Japanese	Japanese	
9		46	256	311
6	5	45	262	318
12	5	45	222	284

Population per policeman
3,523

Kempei					
Commissioned officers	Warrant officers	Noncommissioned officers	Privates	Auxiliaries	Total
Japanese	Japanese	Japanese	Japanese	Korean	
41	13	120	623		797
64	19	517	1,798	4,234	6,632
83	22	543	1,783	4,392	6,823

3,276
1,370
1,259

Kempei engaged in ordinary police duties					
Commissioned officers	Warrant officers	Noncommissioned officers	Privates first class	Auxiliaries	Total
Japanese	Japanese	Japanese	Japanese	Korean	
77	2	186	742	1,012	2,019
78	18	675	2,525	4,453	7,749
78	18	675	2,525	4,473	7,769
112	20	753	2,470	4,603	7,958
112	20	753	2,460	4,626	7,971
112	20	753	2,417	4,627	7,929
112	20	751	2,501	4,657	8,041
111	20	750	2,514	4,737	8,132
112	23	758	2,484	4,601	7,978

2,010
1,140
1,206
1,175
1,195
1,222
1,225
1,248
1,281
1,126
954
855
867
885
1,004
1,018
1,034
1,049
1,052
1,059
1,075
1,093
1,079
1,097
1,115
1,128
1,129
1,092
1,047
967
1,019
1,148
1,187
1,173
1,416

Sources: Numbers of police personnel for 1904–09 were compiled from the Residency General of Korea ed., *Tōkanfu tōkei nenpō* [Residency General Annual Report of Statistics], 1904–09, and *Kankoku shisei nenpō* [Annual Reports on the Administration of Korea], 1904–09; Iwai Keitarō, ed., *Komon keisatsu shōshi* [A Short History of the Advisory Police], Korea Central Police Bureau, 1910; and Matsuda Toshihiko, “Kaisetsu: Chōsen kempeitai shōshi” [A Short History of the Kempeitai in Korea], in *Chōsen kempeitai rekishi* [History of the Korea Kempeitai], vol. 1, unpublished material; reprint, Fuji Shuppan, 2000, p.4. Numbers of police personnel for 1910–40 are compiled from Government General of Korea, ed., *Chōsen Sōtokufu tōkei nenpō* [Annual Statistical Report of the Government General of Korea], 1910–1940, and those for 1941 and 1942 from Police Bureau, Government General of Korea, *Dai 84-kai teikoku gikai setsumei shiryō* [Explanatory Materials for the 84th Imperial Diet Session], December 1943 (*Chōsen Sōtokufu teikoku gikai setsumei shiryō* [Government General of Korea Explanatory Materials for the Imperial Diet], vol. 8, reprint, Fuji Shuppan, 1994). Figures for 1943 are from Control Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Home Affairs, *Chōsen oyobi Taiwan no genkyō* [Current Conditions in Korea and Taiwan], July 1944 (Mizuno Naoki ed., *Senjiki shokuminchi tōchi shiryō* [Materials of War-time Colonial Administration], vol. 6, Kashiwa Shobō, 1998), and figures for 1944 from Government General of Korea, *Dai 86-kai teikoku gikai setsumei shiryō* [Explanatory Materials for the 86th Imperial Diet Session], December 1944 (*Chōsen Sōtokufu teikoku gikai setsumei shiryō*, vol. 10). Another source referred to was Namiki Masato, “Minzoku undō, keisatsu” 1 [Popular Movements and the Police], “Shokuminchiki Chōsen shakai keizai tōkeiteki kenkyū” [A Statistical Study of Society and the Economy in Colonial Korea] (1), *Tōkyō Keidai Gakkaishi*, No.136, June 1984. The population figures used to calculate the per capita number of police personnel are based on, for 1906–38, Mizoguchi Toshiyuki and Umemura Mataji eds., *Kyū Nihon shokuminchi tōkei* [Statistics of Former Japanese Colonies], Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha, 1988, p. 256; for 1939–43, Nam Chosōn Kwado Chōngbu [South Korean Provisional Government] ed., *Chosōn t’onggye nyōn’gwan 1943* [Annual Report of Statistics in Korea, 1943], 1948; and for 1944, Government General of Korea, *Dai 86-kai teikoku gikai setsumei shiryō*.

Notes

1. The figures for number of superintendents and inspectors in civil police for 1910–18 do not include kempeitai members assigned to those posts.
2. The bureau chief (*Keimu buchō*) of civil police was renamed Division Three chief in 1919, and Provincial Police Department chief in 1921.
3. The figures for number of personnel for 1941, 1942, and 1944 given in this table are current personnel.
4. “Policemen” in the column “population per policemen” is based on an aggregate of police personnel of all types listed in the table.

the Korean kempei auxiliaries or Koreans working as civilian police assistants. Those Korean civil police officers and gendarmes are closely related to another issue, and that is the frequently-debated questions surrounding the kind of continuity—there was at least some—that was maintained between the colonial police and the post-liberation Korean police organization that took its place after 1945.¹⁶ I chose not to discuss that and other issues in the present volume, not because I consider them of secondary importance, but precisely because they are too important to be taken up and treated as peripheral for lack of adequate study. A more complete understanding of those questions must await dedicated, sustained research before they can be satisfactorily explained.

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- 1 D.K. Fieldhouse, *Colonialism 1870–1945: An Introduction*. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981, pp. 13–15.
 - 2 Some people call it the Samil Uprising, and others call it the Samil Movement or the March 1st Movement, and others, the March 1st Independence Movement. In this book, we use March 1st Movement and Samil Movement.
 - 3 See Pak Kyōng-sik, *Nihon teikoku shugi no Chōsen shihai* [Japan’s Imperialist Domination of Korea], vol. 1. Aoki Shoten, 1973, p. 42; Kim Un-t’ae, *Ilbon chegukchuūi ūi chosōn chibae* [Japanese Imperialist Rule in Korea], revised edition, Pagyōngsa, 1998, p. 187; and Nakatsuka Akira, *Kindai Nihon no Chōsen ninshiki* [Modern Japanese Perceptions of Korea], Kenbun Shuppan, 1993, p. 121.
 - 4 Data from the 1920 issue of the Government General’s annual statistical report, *Chōsen Sōtokufu tōkei nenpō* (1922). Moreover, because included in all these police figures are engineers and interpreters, there is a numerical discrepancy from Figure 3.
 - 5 Sō Ki-yōng, “Kūndae Han’guk kyōngch’al haengjōng kujo ūi kwanhan yōn’gu (1894–1945)” [A Study of the Structure of Police Administration in Modern Korea, 1894–1945], *Tongguk taehakkyo nonmunchip (inmun; sahoe kwahak p’yōn)* [Collected Essays (Humanities and Social Sciences), Tongguk University], no. 10, July 1972; Namiki Masato, “Minzoku undō, keisatsu” 1 [Popular Movements and the Police], “Shokuminchiki Chōsen shakai keizai tōkeiteki kenkyū” [A Statistical Study of Society and the Economy in Colonial Korea] (1), *Tōkyō Keidai Gakkaiishi*, no. 136, June 1984; Ching-chih Chen, “Police and Community Control Systems in the Empire,” in R.H. Myers and M.R. Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Colonial Empire*, Princeton University Press, 1984; Sō Chae-gūn, “Ilche ūi kyōngch’al chōngch’aek” [Imperial Japan’s Police Policy] in Kukusa Pyōnch’an Wiwōnhoe [National Institute of Korean History] (ROK), ed., *Hanminjok dongnip undonsa* [History of the Korean People’s Independence Movements], vol. 5, 1989; Kim Min-ch’ōl, “Ilche singminji-ha Chosōn kyōngch’alsa yōn’gu” [A History of the Police in Korea under Japanese Colonial Rule], Kyōngghi University M.A. thesis, 1994, and “Singminji T’ongch’i wa kyōngch’al” [Colonial Rule and the Police], *Yōksa pip’yōng*, no. 24, February 1994. Works dealing with the police in Korea since ancient times include Han’guk Kyōngch’alsa Pyōnch’an Wiwōnhoe [Korean Police History Editorial Committee], ed., *Han’guk kyōngch’alsa* [Korean Police History], vol. 1, Nae-mubu Ch’ian’guk [Police Bureau, Korean Ministry of the Interior], 1972; Hō Nam-o, *Han’guk kyōngch’al chedosa* [A History of the Korean Police System], Tongdowōn, 1998; and Yi Hyōn-hi, *Han’guk kyōngch’alsa* [A History of the Police in Korea], Han’guk Haksul Chōngbo, 2004. Of these, the first largely lists documents and materials and lacks historical analysis, and the latter two

contain little discussion of the colonial period.

- 6 Ian Buruma, *The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan*, Farrar Straus & Giroux, 1994, pp. 85–86.
- 7 Carter J. Eckert, “Total War, Industrialization and Social Change in Late Colonial Korea” in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945*, Princeton University Press, 1996, p. 39.
- 8 Like the police, the Korean army has been regarded as a prime instrument of repression used by the Japanese colonial administration, and research in this area, also, is sluggish. See the introduction to Yim Chong-guk, *Ilbon ’gun ūi Chosŏn ch’imnyaksa* [History of the Japanese Army Invasion of Korea], Ilwŏl Sŏgak, 1988.
- 9 Harold D. Lasswell, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How*. New York: Peter Smith, 1950, p. 54. L. Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, Monthly Review Press (New York), 1971, p. 26.
- 10 See Matsuda Toshihiko, “Ilbon yukgun ūi chungguk taeryuk ch’imnyak chŏngch’aek kwa Chosŏn” [Colonial Korea and the Japanese Army Plan for Continental Invasion], *Han’guk munhwa*, no. 3, June 2003.
- 11 Kang Tong-jin, *Nihon no Chōsen shihai seisakushi kenkyū: 1920 nendai o chūshin to shite* [Studies on the History of Japan’s Administration of Colonial Korea: The 1920s], University of Tokyo Press, 1979.
- 12 Kim Tong-myŏng, “Shihai to teikō no hazama: 1920 nendai Chōsen ni okeru Nihon teikoku shugi to Chōsenjin no seiji undō” [Between Colonial Rule and Resistance: Japanese Imperialism and Korean Political Movements in Korea in the 1920s], Ph.D. dissertation, University of Tokyo Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 1997; Namiki Masato, “Chōsen ni okeru shokuminchi kindaisei, shokuminchi kōkyōsei, tai Nichi kyōryoku” [Colonial Modernity in Korea, the Colonial Public Interest, and Collaboration with Japan], *Kokusai kōryū kenkyū*, no. 5, March 2003.
- 13 Kim Chin-gyu and Chŏng Kun-sik, eds., *Kundae chuch’e wa singminji kyuyul kwŏllyok* [The Modern Actors and the Power of Colonial Regulations], Munhwa Kwahaksa, 1997, p. 28.
- 14 Three relevant studies by Obinata Sumio are *Tennōsei keisatsu to minshū* [Emperor-system Police and the Japanese Populace], Nippon Hyōron Sha, 1987; *Keisatsu no shakaishi* [A Social History of the Police in Japan], Iwanami Shoten, 1993; *Kindai Nihon no keisatsu to chiiki shakai* [The Police in Modern Japan and Local Communities], Chikuma Shobō, 2000.
- 15 Sir Charles Jefferies, *The Colonial Police*, London, Max Parrish, 1952. A study critical of Jefferies’ basic paradigm is David M. Anderson and David Killingway, *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1930–1940*, Manchester University Press, 1991. On the history of research on police administration in the British empire, see the information in pp. 1–15 of Anderson and Killingway.
- 16 An Chin, “Mi kunjŏng ki kukka kigu ūi hyŏngsŏng kwa sŏnggyŏk: Kun, kyŏngch’al kigu ūi hyŏngsŏng kwa chaep’yŏng ūl chungsim ūro” [The Formation and Features of the State Organization during the American Military Administration Period: With Focus on the Formation and Reorganization of the Military and Police Organizations] (*Haebang chŏnhusa ūi insik*, vol. 3, Han’gilsa, 1987), and “Mi kunjŏng kyŏngch’al ūi hyŏngsŏng kwajŏng kwa kŭ sŏnggyŏk e kwanhan koch’al” [A Study of the Formation and Features of the American Military Administration Police] in Han’guk Sahoesa Yŏn’guhoe [History of Korean Society Study Group], ed., *Haebang chikhu ūi minjok munje wa sahoe undong* [Ethnic Problems and Social Movements after Independence], Munhak Kwa Chisŏngsa, 1988.