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Cultures of (Dis)remembrance and the Effects of Discourse at the Hiyoshidai Tunnels¹

Justin AUKEMA

This paper examines the early postwar history of the physical remains of World War II through the example of Keio University’s Hiyoshi Campus. During the war, the Japanese Imperial Navy’s Combined Fleet used this site as their headquarters, and they built a massive underground tunnel system there. Furthermore, after the war, the campus was confiscated and used by the U.S. Occupation Eighth Army until 1949. Yet this history of the Hiyoshi Campus was almost completely forgotten until the late 1980s. This paper argues that the reasons for this lie in the postwar history of the site and the university. Namely, Keio intellectuals in the early postwar sought to portray the school as an historical pioneer of liberal democracy in Japan. Yet in this historical rewriting, instances of liberal cooperation with militarism such as Keio’s wartime past became inconvenient truths, and the physical wartime remains on campus, as visible reminders of this past, became unwanted and undesirable anachronisms. In this way, the paper argues that the forgetting of war sites such as the Hiyoshidai tunnels was, in some ways, a byproduct of the creation of a liberal-democratic postwar Japan.

Keywords: war sites, World War II, Keio University, Hiyoshi Campus, Fukuzawa Yukichi, Koizumi Shinzō, liberalism, GHQ, postwar, forgetting

Introduction: Cultures of (dis)remembrance

Since the late 1980s there has been a growing interest in the material remains of World War II, called sensō iseki 戦争遺跡 (war sites) in Japan.² This war-site boom reflects a broader global focus on what Pierre Nora identified as “sites of memory” (lieux de mémoire), where “memory takes root in the concrete, in spaces, gestures, images, and objects,” as well as on

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¹ The author would like to thank John Breen and the two anonymous reviewers at Japan Review, as well as Peter Seigenthaler and Laura Hein for their support at the 2017 Association for Asian Studies annual conference.

² For instance, a search of Japan’s leading daily, the Asahi shinbun, for the terms “sensō iseki 戦争遺跡 and its abbreviation “senseki 戦跡 yields 2,690 hits between the years 1980 and 2016. In addition, from 1990 to 2016, the number of war sites preserved as bunkazai 文化財 (cultural properties) under the Bunkazai hogohō 文化財保護法 (Law for the Protection of Cultural Properties) rose from 1 to 267. Most of these have been preserved at the local and prefectural levels. See Han 2016, p.4 for figures from 1996 to 2012 and Dehara 2017 for numbers through 2016.
what Jan Assmann and John Czaplicka called “cultural memory” objects, whereby memory is objectified in “texts, rites, [and] monuments.”3 Japanese scholars Jūbishi Shunbu and Kikuchi Minoru explained this phenomenon when they said that war memories are “moving from ‘people’ to ‘things,’” and they indicated that war sites can be used to pass on war memories in lieu of direct survivor narratives.4 War sites have also joined a larger discourse on “heritage,” which Laurajane Smith described as “a social and cultural practice […] of meaning and identity making,” and which Brian Graham indicated as “that part of the past which we select in the present for contemporary purposes, be they economic, cultural, political or social.”5 This paper investigates the history of one war site to receive attention in this context: five kilometers of concrete bunkers lying mainly under Keio University’s Hiyoshi Campus in Yokohama and known as the Hiyoshidai chikagō (Hiyoshidai tunnels). From 1944, this was the headquarters of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s top command, the Combined Fleet (Rengō Kantai 連合艦隊), and from here they directed some of the war’s deadliest battles, including the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944 and the Battle of Okinawa from April to June 1945. They also sent young men, as well as former Keio students, to their deaths on suicide missions as members of the tokkōtai (Special Attack Corps) and ordered the battleship Yamato on its final, doomed mission from the site.6

This paper argues that the Hiyoshidai tunnels have been shaped by various competing and changing discourses on the war and the larger biographical identity of the Hiyoshi area (mainly the Keio University campus), and that, in addition to forming an essential part of the tunnel’s history, these discourses have had heterogeneous and cumulative effects on the physical object of the tunnels themselves, as well as on their place in historical memory. By focusing on what was lost and what was gained as historical discourses changed over time, this paper identifies a process it referred to as “cultures of (dis)remembrance” which it defines as the dual forgetting and remembering of objects in discourse.7 To paraphrase Michel Foucault, objects, material, or otherwise, exist in discourse and discursive contexts.8 This includes war sites like the Hiyoshidai tunnels, as well as sites of memory, heritage sites, and cultural memory objects which, borrowing a phrase from Laurajane Smith, can be described as being “constituted by discourse,” or even, as David C. Harvey noted, being “the material consequences of discourse.”9 Congruent with this is the idea that memory itself is at least partly discursively constructed.10 Therefore, as discourses change over time, objects change along with them and are alternatively remembered and forgotten. Put another way, cultures of remembrance (Erinnerungskulturen) are transformed into cultures

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4 Jūbishi and Kikuchi 2002, p. 3.
6 Hiyoshidai Chikagō Hozon no Kai 2011, pp. 30-40.
7 The author would like to thank Linh Vu for her assistance in coining this term. This paper follows Stuart Hall in defining “discourse” as “a group of statements which provide a language for talking about—that is, a way of representing—a particular kind of knowledge about a topic” (Hall 1993, p. 291).
8 Foucault wrote, for instance, of “the regular formation of objects that emerge only in discourse” (Foucault 1982, p. 53).
10 Nigel Hunt wrote that “memory itself is constructed partly through narrative and the social context” (Hunt 2010, p. 5).
of (dis)remembrance when the object of one discourse is replaced with that of another.\footnote{For more on Erinnerungskulturen, see Erll 2011, p. 49.} In this way, discourse engenders both physical and mnemonic effects on sites and objects. At the same time, as Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer indicated, sites and objects continue to “show traces of [the] differing discourses and ideologies” that comprise them.\footnote{Wodak and Meyer 2009, p. 10.} Moreover, these traces of past discourses and cultures of (dis)remembrance are cumulative and together form what Marie Louise Stig-Sorensen and Dacia Viejo Rose recognized as a site’s larger “biography of place” and biographical identity.\footnote{Stig-Sorensen and Rose 2015, p. 13.}

The paper discerns three cultures of (dis)remembrance in particular that shaped the fate of the Hiyoshidai tunnels. The first centers on the support of Keio officials like school president Koizumi Shinzō 小泉信三 for Japan’s wartime aims, and the ways in which they used the thought and image of their school’s founder, the Meiji-era intellectual Fukuzawa Yukichi 福沢諭吉, in the service of the wartime Japanese state. The paper refers to this as a “Fukuzawa as patriot” discourse and indicates that it formed an important discursive context in which the Hiyoshidai tunnels were built under the Keio campus. The second focuses on the U.S. occupation of the Keio Hiyoshi campus in the immediate postwar and the efforts of Keio officials like school president Ushioda Kōji 潮田江次 to have the campus returned. In their petitions, Ushioda and others again invoked Fukuzawa Yukichi, but this time they downplayed the earlier militaristic uses of his thought and instead portrayed him as a pioneer of liberal democracy in Japan. The paper refers to this as a “Fukuzawa as modern liberal” discourse and suggests that within this discursive context Hiyoshi’s wartime roles and the physical traces of war there were overlooked and marginalized. The third culture of (dis)remembrance relates to a reevaluation in the late 1980s of the Hiyoshidai tunnels as “invaluable heritage” (kichō na isan 貴重な遺産) for World War II. Proponents of this “heritage discourse” like the Hiyoshidai Chikagō Hozon no Kai 日吉台地下壕保存の会 (The Association to Preserve the Hiyoshidai Tunnels; hereafter APHT) actively worked to confront and uncover the wartime history and memories of the tunnels. At the same time, they competed with the cumulative effects of prior discourses at the site.

1. “Fukuzawa as Patriot” Discourse and Hiyoshi’s Wartime History
Keio school presidents Kamata Eikichi 鎌田栄吉 (served 1898–1922) and Koizumi Shinzo (served 1933–1947) were active in promoting the prewar assumption in Japan that the purpose of education was to serve the goals of the nation-state. Accordingly, they were both devoted proponents of Japan’s wartime aims and efforts. Koizumi especially penned many nationalistic pieces praising the Japanese empire and denouncing the enemy British and Americans. In fact, many intellectuals supported the war.\footnote{For instance, Waseda University president Tanaka Hozumi 田中穂積 and other Waseda-based intellectuals actively supported the state’s wartime goals, including endorsing mass arrests of left-wing students (gakuseigarti 学生狩り) and the idea of gakusei-do 学生道 which encouraged students to sacrifice themselves for the state; see Kitagawa 2017 and Mochizuki 2017.} However, what made these Keio elites different was that they utilized the thought and image of their school’s founder, Fukuzawa Yukichi, to orient the purposes of education toward a militaristic and nationalistic agenda. This section argues that this discourse—what can be termed...
a “Fukuzawa as patriot” discourse—formed an important historical and discursive background for the school’s dispatch of students to the war front, for its loan of the campus to the Imperial Japanese Navy, and, ultimately, for the construction of the Hiyoshidai tunnels.

Although overt militarism was hardly the main purpose of Fukuzawa’s thought, his objective of a strong and independent Japanese nation-state was predicated on support for the armed forces. This was because Fukuzawa envisioned a symbiotic relationship between individual and national liberty: on the one hand the state guaranteed and protected individual liberty while, on the other hand, the individual defended the liberty of the state. Hence Fukuzawa’s focus on educating a national citizenry with a “spirit of individual independence” and his dictum that “persons without the spirit of personal independence will not have deep concern for their country.”

Fukuzawa also made this the founding principle of Keiō Gijuku (the precursor to Keio University), which he established in 1858, and it was inherited and codified by subsequent generations of Keio graduates and leaders. In 1900, for instance, Fukuzawa’s pupils compiled the Shūshin yōryō (Moral Guidelines), a collection of their teacher’s instructions. Based on the idea of dokuritsu jison (independence and self-respect), the guidelines encouraged students, as dutiful national citizens, to render their services to state and military institutions—the guarantors of individual liberty. One passage explained that, “We, the Japanese people, must never forget that, men and women alike, it is our responsibility to devote our lives and property to fight enemy countries and to protect our national independence.”

However, the limitations on personal freedom implicit here were tested amid growing calls for democratic political enfranchisement and social equality in the 1910s and 1920s. In response, Japanese elites argued that patriotic loyalty to the nation trumped individual liberty. Education Minister Okada Ryōhei, for example, expounded in 1917 that the purpose of national education was “to produce obedient and loyal subjects filled with a spirit of defending the Japanese nation.” Okada implemented this view via the Rinji Kyōiku Kaigi (Special Council for Education) and the 1918 Daigaku-rei (University Ordinance) which stated that the purpose of universities was to train “academic skills required by the state” and to inculcate a sense of “national ideology.”

At the same time, some asserted that Fukuzawa’s concept of dokuritsu jison was a prerequisite for patriotic devotion, and that it could serve as an alternative to socialism, communism, and individualism. In 1920, Keio president Kamata Eikichi, for instance, wrote that students “must not be deceived by deceptive ideologies nor follow the group blindly,” and instead “must […] realize the spirit of freedom, and independence and self-respect (dokuritsu jison).” Kamata carried his ideas to the highest levels of national leadership, serving as Education Ministry head from 1922 to 1923, member of the Sūmitsu-in (Privy Council) from 1927, and later head of the Teikoku Kyōiku Kai (Imperial Council on Education) in 1932.

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15 Fukuzawa 2012, pp. 20–21.
16 Keiō Gijuku 1900.
17 Cited in Yamasaki 2017, p. 69.
18 Daigaku-rei 1918.
19 Kamata 1920.
20 Inoue 2013, p. 131.
Kamata’s patriotic interpretation of independence and self-respect (*dokuritsu jison*) as a means to strengthen the foundations of imperial rule intensified following Japan’s military take-over of Manchuria in 1931. Writing in 1933, for example, he lauded the Japanese people for their long history of “patriotism and loyalty to the emperor,” and pointed to Japan’s “unbroken line of emperors,” as elements which formed the essence of the *kokutai* 国体 (national polity) and made Japan unique from other nations. 

Moreover, Kamata echoed Fukuzawa’s belief that victory in the Sino- and Russo-Japanese Wars had gained Japan independence and self-respect on the global stage, and he proposed applying the concept of *dokuritsu jison* to the current world situation: “When there is a state emergency, we must sacrifice ourselves and devote our services to the state. [...] It is our duty as loyal citizens to maintain a spirit of patriotic service at all times, whether in war or peace.”

When Japan instigated full-scale war with China in 1937, Keio leaders supported the war and applied Fukuzawa’s thought to this end. Keio’s president from 1933 to 1946, Koizumi Shinzō, for example, had personally known Fukuzawa as a boy, and his deep knowledge of Fukuzawa’s works gave him the reputation of being the direct inheritor of Fukuzawa’s thought among Keio students. In a 1937 article in the campus newspaper, *Mita shinbun* 三田新聞 (hereafter *MS*), for example, he praised the actions of Japanese soldiers: “You are still young, but if the war grows larger the state may require your services on the battlefield. Should this come to pass, I expect that you, too, will bravely advance forward under a hail of bullets with the same patriotic vigor and unswerving loyalty as

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21 Kamata 1933, p. 161 181.
23 Kōyama 2003, pp. 93–94.
our troops are currently doing today.” Moreover, in the same article he cited Fukuzawa’s letter of encouragement to his friend Kimura Kaishū’s son, Kimura Kôkichi, a naval officer in the Sino-Japanese War (1884–1885). Fukuzawa told Kimura to “fight courageously” and not be afraid to die in battle, since he would look after his aging parents. Koizumi held this up as exemplary behavior: “This is what we national citizens must say to our troops as they go off to battle.”

In October 1943, the Japanese government removed the draft exemption for college students and lowered the conscription age to twenty. This resulted in masses of students being called up, including nearly five hundred from the Hiyoshi Campus alone. The same month that Keio students were leaving for the front, the prominent intellectual Maruyama Masao wrote an essay in the MS titled “Fukuzawa ni okeru chitsujo to ningen” (Order and Humanity in the Thought of Fukuzawa Yukichi). Maruyama argued that, to maintain true order, national citizens must internalize the politics and the goals of the state as their own goals. He connected this to Fukuzawa, for whom the biggest obstacle confronting a strong nation-state had been the lack of an “autonomous personality” among the Japanese people; as a result, they viewed politics and the state as largely outside themselves. Maruyama argued that for the Japanese nation to succeed, people must first attain a level of “individual subjective freedom.” In this sense, Maruyama echoed Fukuzawa’s belief that liberalism and individualism were not only compatible with nationalism, but even a prerequisite for it. Fukuzawa “was a nationalist, precisely because he was an individualist. The state was facilitated by the internal liberty of the individual,” he wrote.

Not all public intellectuals in wartime Japan shared these views of Fukuzawa. For example, in March 1944, Tokutomi Sohō attacked Fukuzawa’s idea of independence and self-respect (dokuritsu jison), saying that it was nothing other than individualism which threatened to “wipe out beautiful Japanese customs.” Two months later, Koizumi refuted Tokutomi in the pages of the MS by invoking Fukuzawa’s dictum that a spirit of independence was a requisite for a deep concern for patriotism. Later that year, Koizumi wrote numerous highly nationalistic articles in major Japanese newspapers that mocked the Americans and British and encouraged Japanese civilians to fight to the death. “There can be no compromise in this war [...] There is no other option left available but to fight,” he wrote in one article. “All morality during time of war stems from the belief in and hope for victory,” he continued. Koizumi encouraged civilians to have an “unyielding spirit of fearlessness,” insisting that such spirit could not be granted externally, but rather must spring up from within individuals themselves.

The physical landscape at Hiyoshi was transformed in the context of such discourse and rhetoric, and, reflecting Koizumi’s 1941 statement that “our schools must be the last
The Hiyoshidai Tunnels

For instance, the white outer walls of the campus buildings were painted black to avoid detection by U.S. planes. Moreover, after October 1943 most students had left for the front, paving the way for Keio to lease the campus to the Imperial Japanese Navy in March 1944. By mid-1944, the Navy’s Combined Fleet had been decimated, and, no longer able to command the war from the sea, the navy began instead to prepare for a final battle on the mainland by moving its headquarters inland. In this milieu, Keio’s Hiyoshi Campus was a prime choice for the Combined Fleet’s new headquarters since it was close to both the Navy Ministry in Tokyo and the naval base at Yokosuka, it was on a high plain suitable for sending and receiving wireless transmissions, it had ample hill space for building underground tunnels, and it had many sturdy buildings already in place, which could be used immediately. Moreover, the idea to use the campus as a military base came from former Keio graduates within the navy, and it was sanctioned by President Koizumi who had “no objection to the navy using the school.”

It was in this climate that the Navy came not only to use the Hiyoshi Campus buildings above ground but also, with the labor of approximately two thousand military and private construction workers and up to seven hundred Korean laborers, to construct nearly

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32 Mita shinbun 1941.
33 Keiō Gijuku 1964a, pp. 905–906.
35 Two firsthand accounts confirm this. See Maeda 1993 and Masui 1994; cited in Masui 1994. In addition, the foremost scholar of Keio’s wartime history, Shirai Atsushi, wrote that it was Koizumi’s personal intent for the navy to occupy Keio (Shirai, Asaba, and Midorikawa 2003, p. 92).
five kilometers of underground tunnels below the site from August 1944. Eventually over one thousand people came to work at Hiyoshi under the command of the Combined Fleet’s Admiral Toyoda Soemu, and it was from here that the navy directed some of the Pacific War’s deadliest battles, including the Battle of Leyte Gulf (October 1944) and the Battle of Okinawa (April–June 1945). Moreover, the navy sent countless youths, including mobilized students from Keio’s Hiyoshi Campus, on suicide missions as members of the tokkōtai forces from the site. One Keio student recruited for such a suicide mission was Matsuura Kiichi, who narrowly survived after his plane ran into foul weather and was forced to turn back. “I thought that there was no choice but for me to give my life in a tokkō attack,” he recalled years later. “As long as we were at war, I felt that there was no way I could refuse death.”

2. “Fukuzawa as Modern Liberal” and Hiyoshi’s Postwar Identity

The historical and social frameworks for remembering dramatically changed following Japan’s defeat in the Asia-Pacific War and, consequently, so did discourses and memories surrounding the Hiyoshidai tunnels. From 1868 to 1945, Japan’s foremost aim had been to “strengthen the foundations of imperial rule.” However, the U.S. occupation from 1945 to 1952 set the country on a new course: namely, to “strengthen democratic […] and liberal political tendencies,” to abolish “militarism,” and to “modify the feudal and authoritarian tendencies” of the government and society. The Americans initially perceived the Hiyoshi Campus as a symbol of the militarism they were trying to eradicate, and, thus, the U.S. Eighth Army confiscated the campus in September 1945, and used it as a barracks and technical-training school until October 1949. Meanwhile, during this time, Keio students, teachers, and school presidents Takahashi Seiichirō and Ushioda Kōji, appealed to the U.S. forces for the return of their campus. In their petitions, these Keio academics argued against Hiyoshi’s past as a military headquarters and the “Fukuzawa as patriot” discourse that accompanied it, instead suggesting that the true “spirit of Fukuzawa” and, hence, of Keio itself, lay in the school’s role as the historical pioneer of liberal-democracy in Japan. In other words, they adopted a revised “Fukuzawa as modern liberal” discourse to emphasize that the occupation of the Hiyoshi Campus was not only mistaken, but that it was also counter-productive to American aims for the reconstruction of the country.

36 Hiyoshidai Chikagō Hozon no Kai 1993, p. 15.
37 Toyoda was one of the main architects of Kikusui Sakusen (Operation Kikusui) which involved suicide attacks, including tokkō planes and the Battleship Yamato, in the Battle of Okinawa, and he often personally greeted pilots before their fateful departure. The Asahi shinbun 朝日新聞 of 12 April 1945 reported Toyoda issuing tokkō attacks from unspecified Navy HQ tunnels and proclaiming, “the fate of the nation rests on the outcome of this battle” from the site. The same article discussed final transmissions from tokkō pilots being received at these Navy HQ tunnels. Firsthand accounts confirm that it was the signal room in the Hiyoshidai tunnels where these last transmissions were received (Hiyoshidai Chikagō Hozon no Kai 2011, pp. 37–38).
38 Endō, Kanetake, and Sasaki 2009.
39 From the 1868 Charter Oath (Lu 1997, p. 308). The 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education likewise clarified that the purpose of education was to reinforce a hierarchical and patriarchal relationship between emperor and subject, while the 1941 Way of the Subjects minced no words, declaring: “The life and activities of the nation are all attuned to the task of giving great firmness to the foundation of the Empire” (Lu 1997, pp. 343 and 435).
41 Mita shinbun 1946b.
The reshaping of Fukuzawa’s image and Keio’s postwar identity began soon after the war’s end. A May 1946 article in the MS titled “Fukuzawa Yukichi yori hajimeyō” 福澤諭吉より始めよう (Let’s begin again from Fukuzawa Yukichi), emphasized that “Fukuzawa is the life of this school”: “It is imperative that we understand what the spirit of Fukuzawa really means and begin again as a school from this.” Similarly, an August 1946 editorial titled “Gijuku no fukkō o ronzu” 義塾の復興を論ず (Concerning the Rebuilding of the School), had this to say:

During the war, the spirit of Fukuzawa was used for militarism. After the war, people continued to invoke Fukuzawa’s name and thought. In our current situation it is no longer necessary to deny Fukuzawa’s emphasis on individual freedom. Why then hasn’t Keio used this opportunity to become more democratic? […] We must move on from this position of keeping Fukuzawa’s thought in limbo and understand what the spirit of Fukuzawa really means. Moreover, we must overcome interpretations which distort his thought.43

In other words, the editorial staff refuted the prewar “Fukuzawa as patriot” discourse as a “distort[jion]” and instead implied that the true “spirit of Fukuzawa” was closer to the shared postwar vision of U.S. and Japanese liberals.

This revised vision of Fukuzawa proved useful to Keio officials as they petitioned GHQ for the return of the Hiyoshi Campus. In November 1946, acting Keio president, Takahashi Seiichirō, wrote to General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), stating that the release of the Hiyoshi Campus would “be a great contribution to the reconstruction of Japan under the culture of democratic and liberal basis of which the Keio has been the pioneer and champion in Japan since its establishment of about ninety years ago by the well-known Yukichi Fukuzawa.” 44

The next opportunity for the school to argue for the return of the campus came in May 1947. In that month, the postwar Japanese constitution was enacted, and it enshrined the goals of liberal democracy in Japan. Keio administrators and students used this event, which coincided with its ninetieth anniversary celebrations, to emphasize that the ideals embodied in the constitution and the goals of the U.S. occupation were identical to the historical tradition of the university and its founder. Moreover, they argued that the continued military retention of the Hiyoshi campus was unnecessary and even damaging to the goals of the U.S. occupation. The ninetieth anniversary ceremony was preceded by a 20 May 1947 special edition of the MS which featured articles connecting Fukuzawa to rebuilding the university and Japan. One article proclaimed that “Fukuzawa’s thought is the torch that can guide Japan.”45

In another article, Suzuki Yasuzō 鈴木安蔵, the legal scholar who led the Kenpō Kenkyūkai 憲法研究会 (Constitution Research Association), and influenced the GHQ draft of the constitution, condemned the wartime uses of Fukuzawa’s thought as mistaken.46

42 Mita shinbun 1946a.
43 Mita shinbun 1946b.
44 Takahashi 1946.
45 Mita shinbun 1947b.
46 For more, see Hahm and Kim 2015, pp. 142–43.

Figure 4. Emperor Hirohito waves to the crowd at Keio University’s 90th anniversary ceremony, 24 May 1947. Courtesy of the Fukuzawa Memorial Center for Modern Japanese Studies.
Instead, he emphasized Fukuzawa as a liberal reformer who could lead the way for Japan’s postwar reconstruction.

During the war, some people selectively drew on the early thought of Fukuzawa and his writings to portray him as a “patriot” and a “nationalist.” Of course, this is not an entirely inaccurate portrayal. However, it is a mistake to ignore the fact that, more than anything, the primary theme that runs through all Fukuzawa’s earlier work is his contributions to enlightenment in Japan; namely, a focus on anti-feudalism, anti-absolutism, freedom and equality, and the role of autonomy and independence in the construction of a modern citizen.47

Keio officials and prominent figures similarly used their school’s ninetieth anniversary ceremony on 24 May 1947 as a stage to appeal the “Fukuzawa as modern liberal” discourse and called for the return of the Hiyoshi Campus. Keio president and Fukuzawa’s grandson, Ushioda Kōji, for example, declared in a speech that, since its inception, Keio had attempted to “uproot feudalistic thinking in the minds of the people and implant independent, autonomous thought,” and had “fought military governance and defended freedom and people’s rights.”48 He concluded that “the school must now, in the spirit of these traditions, work to lead the people,” and that its attempts to rebuild the school were for the benefit of democracy in Japan and world peace.49 Emperor Hirohito, who also attended the event, echoed these sentiments when he said: “Certainly the school faces numerous hardships from the war in regards to carrying out education and managing the university. Yet I hope that it would take to heart the spirit of Fukuzawa Yukichi and contribute to the rebuilding of Japan.”50 Following this, there were cheers of “Long live the emperor” (Tennō heika banzai 天皇陛下万歳) and a singing of the national anthem.

The same narrative continued after the May anniversary ceremony. A September 1947 MS editorial, for instance, downplayed the university’s wartime responsibility and, instead, cast it as the unwitting victim of both Japanese and American militarism.

During the war, our Keio University, which was committed to carrying on the democratic principles of Fukuzawa Yukichi and to protecting academic freedom, was forced to lend the Hiyoshi Campus to the Imperial Japanese Navy. Because of this special circumstance […] the Hiyoshi Campus was confiscated by the U.S. Eighth Army.51

Eventually, in January 1949, Ushioda and Keio professor, Kiyooka Eiichi 清岡瑛一, another of Fukuzawa’s grandsons, carried such “Fukuzawa as modern liberal” discourse to SCAP’s doorstep when they directly petitioned General MacArthur for the return of the Hiyoshi Campus. Attached to their written petition was a memorandum to MacArthur that mentioned that Kiyooka especially “wished also to be sure that you were aware […] that

47 Suzuki 1947.
48 Keiō Gijuku 1964b, p. 15.
49 Keiō Gijuku, p. 15.
50 Keiō Gijuku, p. 17.
51 Mita shinbun 1947d.
[Keio] is often considered as the cradle of intellectual freedom and democracy in Japan.” SCAP ultimately heeded Keio officials’ arguments, and in March 1949, MacArthur wrote to the Commander of the Eighth Army commanding him to vacate the Hiyoshi Campus by 1 October, 1949. “The prolonged retention of Japanese education facilities is inconsistent with the basic occupational objectives for the rehabilitation of the Japanese educational system. The necessity to release such facilities for educational purposes is paramount,” he explained. Later, a July 1949 letter from SCAP Headquarters to Ushioda explained that the campus would be promptly released “in order to hasten the democratization and rehabilitation of the Japanese educational system.” SCAP fulfilled its promise and returned the Hiyoshi Campus to Keio on 1 October, 1949.

Thus, on the one hand, the successful employment of the “Fukuzawa as modern liberal” discourse achieved the return of the Hiyoshi campus. Yet it also led to cultures of (dis)remembrance, on the other hand, when Hiyoshi’s wartime past was discursively replaced by accounts of Keio’s modern history of liberalism. Furthermore, it resulted in traces of militarism like the former navy tunnels being erased from the physical and mnemonic landscape at Hiyoshi. Throughout the 1945–1949 reversion movement, for instance, contributors to the MS spoke nostalgically of a beautified and idealized prewar and wartime Hiyoshi Campus to compliment the image of the school as a leader of scholarly independence. The author of one 1947 article wrote that “we will never be able to forget our fond memories of the fresh green grass and the blazing white buildings of the Hiyoshi Campus where years ago we freely learned, played, and became close friends.” Likewise, another MS article from that year titled “Wasureenu oka” (The Hiyoshi Campus we Can’t Forget) included a description of the campus as a “place where the young blood of the students boiled as they studied and played.” Others from 1949 contained references to “our dear old Hiyoshi” or “our beloved old campus.” In addition, on the eve of the October 1949 campus reversion, one student reporter for the MS wrote that the walls of Hiyoshi campus buildings, which had been painted black during the war to avoid detection from U.S. bombers, were being repainted white:

As if to wash off the filth (aka) of the long war, Building Two is being repainted white. It seems that Building One is scheduled to receive the same treatment. The time toward the end of the war when this building was painted black and the stink of the black coal tar assailed us as we studied seems like a dream now.

In the author’s description, the repainting of the Hiyoshi Campus signified the removal of the tangible and intangible traces of war, which they likened to a black, tar-like “filth” that was now being forgotten like a bad “dream.”

In the same way, after the 1949 campus reversion, Keio administrators moved to rid the campus of the navy tunnels. In 1952, for example, Ushioda petitioned the Japanese

52 Ushioda 1949.
53 MacArthur 1949.
54 Rehe 1949.
55 Mita shinbun 1947a.
56 Mita shinbun 1947c; Mita shinbun 1949a; and Mita shinbun 1949b.
57 Mita shinbun 1949b.
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The government to “restore the area to its original state,” citing safety concerns: “The tunnels will pose a tremendous hindrance when we lay the groundwork for new buildings that we are planning to build in the area in the near future.” In another petition in 1956, Ushioda wrote that the tunnels had been built “without Keio’s approval or permission,” and that, “left as they currently are” they posed “a clear problem for education at the university, since children are playing in them, and unsavory characters are even using them as a place of lodging.” Based on these things, he requested that the government provide funds to fill in the tunnels with cement and cover the entrances with concrete.

Ushioda’s arguments were generally accepted during the following decades of high economic and urban growth. In 1974, for instance, the national government implemented the Tokushu Chikagō Taisaku Jigyō (Measures for Special Underground Facilities) to fill in former military tunnels and air raid shelters under residential and urban areas. These measures were popular among the public and in the media, which worried about such structures collapsing. News articles like one from 1973 in the Asahi shinbun titled “Kiken! Senjichū no chikagō” (Danger! Wartime Tunnels), for example, urged the national government to get rid of such underground structures. Similarly, a 1975 article in the Yokohama yomiuri (横浜読売) called

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58 Ushioda 1952.
59 Ushioda 1955 and Ushioda 1956.
60 See Itō 2014. This program has continued to the present. As of 2013, the Japanese government has identified 8,458 such underground structures. There is no equivalent measure or program to protect or preserve such places.
military remains like the Hiyoshidai tunnels “troublesome objects” (やっかいものです yakka mono) and praised removal efforts as “long overdue cleanup from the war.” Such places, it stated, were finally being “filled in […] along with the bad dreams of war.” In this context, in 1975 and 1979 Keio University secured funds from the national government to fill in portions of the tunnels with concrete.

3. The Hiyoshidai Tunnels as Contested Heritage

The first major challenge to the effacement of the Hiyoshidai tunnels came in 1989 when Keio High School teacher Terada Sadaharu and 128 others, including salarymen and housewives from the community, formed the APHT. The group’s timing was not purely serendipitous—already from the 1970s civic war experience (戦争体験 sensō taiken) recording groups had touted the need to preserve wartime testimony for future generations. Indeed, amid a background of a rapidly aging wartime generation, the question of how to overcome forgetting (風化 fūka) and pass on (語り継ぐ kataritsugu) war memories was a perennial question for many in Japan. In this climate, the APHT was at the forefront of a national war site preservation movement to reassess the physical remains of war as “invaluable heritage” which offered “living historical testament to the Asia-Pacific War,” and could be used to narrate the war in place of firsthand survivor accounts. As Terada wrote:

62 Yokohama yomiuri 1975.
63 Yokohama yomiuri 1975.
64 See Ono 1975; Kusakawa 1975; Takakuma 1975; and Keiō Gijuku 1975.
65 See, for instance, Yomiuri shinbun 1971.
Today, more than forty years after the end of the war, over half of the population has no experience of the tragedy that was the war. Moreover, there are fewer members of the wartime generation alive who can directly narrate their experiences. [...] Likewise, every day more wartime objects are disappearing, and these things invite a situation wherein mankind may once again go down the foolish road toward war. Therefore, since it’s impossible for the wartime generation to remain alive forever, we must instead [...] leave objects that can inspire future generations to think about the war. 

The “heritage discourse” employed by the APHT found widespread support in the public and media, and, as a result, their membership grew to a high of 730 in 1995. In addition to conducting monthly guided tours, publishing a quarterly newsletter, and holding “peace exhibits” displaying historical materials, the group petitioned Keio University and the local and national governments to preserve the Hiyoshidai tunnels as a shiseki 史跡 (Historical Site) under the Law for the Protection of Cultural Properties. At the same time, relevant authorities continued to view the former navy headquarters as troublesome reminders of an inconvenient past rather than as heritage. In 1990, for instance, Yokohama City concluded that the tunnels were “extremely dangerous” and advocated that they “immediately be filled in,” and the “entrances shut off.” The city also noted that the site’s owners (chikensha 地権者), the largest of which it identified as Keio University, had a mostly negative view of the wartime remains. “It is questionable whether the owners would give permission to use the tunnels,” explained a city report that year. The report also said that the owners were opposed to preserving the Hiyoshidai tunnels as an historical site or, for that matter, even to raising “awareness of the existence of the tunnels,” since these things could cause an “increase of visitors,” interfere “with daily life in the area,” and prevent “buildings from being built above ground.” Thus, the notion of the Hiyoshidai tunnels as heritage was, to borrow a phrase from Laurajane Smith, “inherently dissonant and contested.”

Nevertheless, the “heritage discourse” had a major impact by connecting Hiyoshi to broader global and national movements to preserve the negative heritage of war and atrocity. After joining the UNESCO World Heritage Convention in 1992, for example, Japan designated the country’s most infamous war site—the Hiroshima Peace Memorial (Genbaku Dome)—a World Heritage Site, around the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II in 1995. That same year, the national government began its Kindai Iseki Chōsa 近代遺跡調査 (Survey of Sites from Modern History), which included former military sites like the Hiyoshidai tunnels. Moreover, in 1997 more than eighty groups from around the country formed an umbrella organization called the Sensō Iseki Hozon Zenkoku Nettowāku 戦争遺跡保存全国ネットワーク (Japanese Network to Protect War-Related Sites) for the purpose of preserving war sites as cultural properties.

70 Yokohama-shi Kōhoku-ku Kusei Suishin-ka 1990, p. 16.
72 Smith 2006, p. 4.
73 See Meskell 2002 and Rico 2008 for more on “negative heritage.”
74 Asahi shinbun 1997.
Against this background, Keio revised its stance toward the Navy headquarter remains. In 2001, the school allotted four million yen to partly restore sections of the tunnels and, for the first time, allowed the APHT to conduct guided tours of the site from Keio property. As a result, the number of visitors on these tours increased dramatically, from 499 in the year 2000 to 1,130 in the year 2002. At the highest point, the APHT led 2,732 people on forty-eight tours of the tunnels in one year. Furthermore, when the planned construction of a new gymnasium on the Hiyoshi Campus threatened to pave over three newly-discovered tunnel entrances in 2008 and 2009, the university invited an outside panel of experts to survey the site and assess its historical value. The panel reported to the university that:

In addition to serving as important materials for studying modern Japanese history, the Hiyoshidai tunnels are cultural properties with high academic and educational value, and they can act as a catalyst for communicating war memories to future generations. [...] It is extremely rare for this kind of cultural property to be found in a university campus, and, therefore, rather than view their presence as a hindrance [...] Keio should be proud to possess such important cultural heritage. [...] The school should use this opportunity to actively promote use of the tunnels for academic research and education.76

Keio accepted the advice of the panel, ultimately moving the planned gym location sixty meters to avoid destroying two of the tunnel entrances. This move can be seen as a symbolic acceptance by the university of the “heritage discourse” in general.

While the broadened “heritage discourse” thus gained the Hiyoshidai tunnels new legitimacy, it also garnered them fresh opponents. Scholars have noted the increased difficulty of incorporating heritage sites of atrocity and suffering, in particular, into national narratives of self-identity.77 Similarly, Natsuko Akagawa’s indication of the Japanese government’s employment of beautified cultural heritage as a tool of cultural diplomacy and for “the projection of Japanese nationalism” abroad, can be said to come at the expense and erasure of negative heritage like the physical remains of war.78 In this context, citing safety concerns and questioning their value as cultural properties, Yokohama City ignored the pleas of the APHT, and filled in sections of the Hiyoshidai tunnels on private land with concrete between 1999 and 2000.79 In the same way, the city allowed a construction company to pave over another section of the tunnels on private land near the southeast edge of the Hiyoshi Campus in 2013. Keio University professor Andō Hiromichi blamed Yokohama City for the destruction of the site, saying that their “passive stance in recognizing the tunnels as […] cultural properties (bunkazai)” invited the situation.80 The author of one 2013 Tōkyō shinbun article extended this critique when he said that the national and local governments were unwilling to preserve as cultural properties

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76 Cited in Arai 2010, p. 3.
77 See, for instance, the essays in Logan and Reeves 2008.
78 Akagawa 2014, p. 28.
79 Takahide 2000.
80 Furusawa 2013.
the “negative heritage” (*fu no isan* 負の遺産) of war that was “linked to the deaths of many Japanese citizens.” At the same time, APHT president and Keio High School teacher, Onishi Akira 大西章, indicated that Keio University was also still grappling with the negative legacies of past militarism. The school has “yet to build a museum or resource center that would offer information about the tunnels,” he explained, and he continued: “The tunnels and that part of war history are hardly taught in classes at the school.”

**Conclusion**

The contested nature of the Hiyoshidai tunnels as heritage stems from the cumulative results of past discourses, each of which were connected to the site’s larger biography of place and, especially, its historical identity as Keio University’s Hiyoshi Campus. As discourses surrounding the Hiyoshidai tunnels changed and competed for dominance, they selectively engaged in a dual process of forgetting and remembering which this paper referred to as “cultures of (dis)remembrance,” as well as engendered tangible transformations to the physical and mnemonic landscape at Hiyoshi. The paper noted three discourses that had particular effects on the tunnels. The first was a “Fukuzawa as patriot” discourse employed by prewar and wartime Keio elites like Kamata Eikichi and Koizumi Shinzō who utilized the thought of their school’s founder, Fukuzawa Yukichi, to foster patriotic loyalty to the nation and in the service of the state’s wartime goals. The paper argued that it was in this discursive background that Keio prepared its students for war, lent its campus to the Imperial Japanese Navy, and in which the Combined Fleet build its headquarter tunnels on the Hiyoshi Campus. The second was a “Fukuzawa as modern liberal” discourse utilized in the immediate postwar by Keio president Ushioda Kōji and others who emphasized Fukuzawa’s role as a liberal modernizer in the hopes of regaining their confiscated Hiyoshi Campus from the hands of the American occupiers. Yet this discourse formed a culture of (dis)remembrance when its proponents overlooked or downplayed past militarism at Keio and the prior application of Fukuzawa’s thought for wartime aims. Moreover, the paper indicated that the “Fukuzawa as modern liberal” discourse facilitated the erasure of the material traces of bygone militarism, like the Hiyoshidai tunnels, from the physical and mnemonic landscape at Hiyoshi. The third was a “heritage discourse” used from the late 1980s by the APHT who advocated saving the site as a means to transmit war memories and tales to future generations. However, Keio University, Yokohama City, and the national government have been cautious about or even opposed to the *heritagization* of the tunnels as cultural memory objects for the war. In this way, the notion of the Hiyoshidai tunnels as heritage has struggled for dominance and recognition against the successive and ongoing effects of past discourses and cultures of (dis)remembrance, some of which have sought to purge the former navy headquarters from history and memory.

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81 *Tōkyō shinbun* 2013.
82 Aukema 2013.
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