

Introduction: Globalization, Localization, and Japanese Studies in the Asia-Pacific Region

Volume 2

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The present volume is the second of three published by the International Research Center for Japanese Studies on the theme of globalization and localization in the Asia-Pacific region. The authors—all of whom live and work in the region or in Japan—consider how, directly or indirectly, the experience of the events and forces emblemized by the terms globalization and localization has affected this part of the world. They also offer clues for understanding how the experience of globalization and localization has influenced the way Japanese studies are conducted and perceived.

I commented briefly on definitions of globalization and on the aims of the scholars whose essays were collected in the first volume, and for the benefit and convenience of readers who do not have that book in hand, I repeat my comments here (although I omit notes; for references, please see volume one).

The term “globalization” came into widespread use in the 1990s, although it can be found in the literature of marketing as early as 1983, and it has antecedents in the notion of “globalism,” which has been in circulation much longer. It denotes a protean concept, “a process, a condition, a system, a force, and an age,” as Manfred B. Steger has put it. In contemporary parlance, Jan Aart Scholte has observed, globalization is used to convey four general conceptions that overlap and complement each other, namely internationalization, liberalization, universalization, and planetarization. Economic historian Jeffrey G. Williamson identifies two important features of the late twentieth century as characteristic of (economic) globalization: high-volume flow of capital and labor across national frontiers and booming commodity trade, and he observes that these were accompanied by “an impressive convergence in living standards, at least within most of what we would now call the OECD club.” Definitions of globalization describe it as the diffusion of people, capital, goods, information, and ideas across regions and continents, a process accompanied by an increasing degree of interdependence and integration between economies. Frequently globalization is understood to imply the flow of information and patterns from the West to the rest of the world—to be a synonym for Westernization or Americanization. Historical sociologist Sonoda Hidehiro warned us to be aware of the hegemony of the point of view of the northern hemisphere in much of the discourse about globalization, remarking that this discourse primarily takes place in and involves participants from the northern hemisphere; he suspected that insufficiently examined assumptions about the economic and cultural “leadership” of advanced Western nations get in the way of analytical understanding of the phenomenon. Regional experience suggests that while many modern societies seem to be trending in the same direction, toward convergence on patterns of existence that some observers believe are

“universal,” at the same time differences rooted in local cultural particularities cause significant variation in the pace and degree of convergence. This variation has been labeled “glocalization,” although this term has not been as widely accepted by academic writers as “globalization” (nor has it been legitimized by inclusion in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*). Roland Robertson used the word “glocalization” in several articles in the mid-1990s to denote the local adaptation of material and cultural products that come from outside, which is one common and important aspect of globalization. Robertson, a sociologist, remarks that he drew on a Japanese marketing term in formulating his understanding of glocalization; the word *dochakuka* (to indigenize) “draws attention to the simple proposition that every idea coming from outside into a context has to be adaptable to that context.” Glocalization—this process of adaptation to particular circumstances—transforms globalization, he argues, compromising ideas and products that were “previously thought of as homogenizingly triumphant and standardizing.”

In these pages, for the most part, the authors do not explicitly engage the theoretical discussion about globalization and localization, but rather they deal with concrete examples of interactions between cultures (or simply between Japan and other societies and/or nations in the Asia-Pacific region). Awareness of the notions of globalization and localization, however, informs the authors’ thinking at many points.

Globalization and the importance of region are treated in the first two chapters that follow. Purnendra Jain, in “Japan and a New Asian Order,” assesses Japan’s present position and possible future role in the region. That nation’s economic success in the wake of the devastation and defeat in war made it an economic and political role model for many Asian nations in the late twentieth century. Today, however, Japan stands at a major crossroads in its relations with these nations, which have now also successfully modernized. No longer *the* Asian leader, Japan has become an Asian leader. Rapid and complex changes—in the politico-economic and security environment externally and in the politico-economic and social environment domestically—present new and very different challenges to Japan-Asia relations. Japan’s central foreign policy challenge is how to balance support for the U.S. as its key ally across the Pacific, while maintaining and possibly expanding its influence in Asia. The Japanese foreign-policy vision in the twentieth century focussed primarily on East and Southeast Asia and essentially truncated Asia at the Burma border. Twenty-first century circumstances require Japan to look westward into South Asia, with India as the principal concern, and into Afghanistan and Central Asia. Japan faces unprecedented foreign policy dilemmas. Its firm strategic alliance with the U.S. alienates possible partners that do not support the current U.S. unilateralism and prefer some other arrangements. China has emerged as a regional power, and India is gaining leverage for regional influence as its economic power grows. Japan is in the throes of taking a more comprehensive approach to involvement in world affairs, expanding its geographic reach and range of engagement. Military involvement is already part of this approach, even if the nation’s peace constitution is yet to fully catch up. As its capacity to use economic might to assert regional leadership is on the wane, Japan must

rely on diplomacy, and regional and multilateral institutional frameworks appear all the more strategically important. It is little wonder that Japan has begun to warm to India and to build relations with its distant Asian neighbor as it proceeds carefully to manage this new Asian order.

Kawakatsu Heita takes a long view of the world historical significance of the Asia-Pacific region. Digesting major trends from the sixteenth century to the present, he characterizes that part of the world as “the pivot of globalization.” Maritime Asia—his term for the region including the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asian seas, China Sea, and the lands that lie on these seas—was the source of culture and goods that stimulated both the West and Japan to develop and eventually to carry out the industrial revolution in Europe and the “industrious revolution” (Hayami Akira’s term, accepted by Kawakatsu) in Japan. East Asian systems developed quite independently of the West, Kawakatsu points out, recapitulating a thesis that he has advanced in publications in Japanese. In our own day, he maintains, Maritime Asia holds the potential for creating a new civilization. After an interval of decline and colonial domination, the region has come once again to have great economic significance and to be a base for vigorous commercial activity.

Popular culture has become firmly established as a field of scholarly inquiry, and in our own time, the variety and diffusion of popular culture(s) cannot be comprehended without reference to transnational flows. The next two chapters of this book treat various aspects of popular culture in the context of globalization.

Anthropologist Tanaka Masakazu observes that the concept of globalization is commonly understood to imply the flow of information and patterns from the West to the rest of the world, that is, it stands for Westernization or Americanization. But for the non-West, he notes, localization is the result of an interactive process in which the non-West is not merely a passive victim; it represents a form of resistance to globalization. In his essay, he examines a key site of such interactive encounter, namely cross-cultural male-female relations, specifically between Japanese (primarily female) and U.S. military personnel (primarily male) from 1945 to the present.

Alexander C. Bennett and Duncan R. Mark practice and study Japanese budō traditions. They are also involved as participant observers in the dissemination of Japanese martial arts outside Japan. Here they examine the spread of one of these arts—Shōrinji *kenpō*—and its rise to great popularity in Indonesia. They first explain the Japanese background of this form of swordsmanship, and then they go on to report on its contemporary reception and localization in a nation where it does not have long historical roots. Emphasizing commonalities with other arts and practices that have traditionally been excluded from the category of fine arts, we can conceive of martial arts as belonging to the sphere of popular culture. Bennett and Mark venture an analysis of the motivations of Indonesians who practice Shōrinji *kenpō*, and suggest that martial arts are an example of Japanese (popular) culture that readily lend themselves to globalization.

Aspects of everyday life are treated in essays here by Raphaella Dwantari Dwianto, Scott North, Eyal Ben-Ari, and David N. Wells. The first of these, by Dwianto, examines the activities and nature of the *chōnaikai* 町内会 (or *jichikai* 自治会). This neighborhood organization is, in theory, the self-governing association of the community. In actuality

it often functions as a channel of information and initiative from the central government, Dwianto emphasizes. Here she considers *chōnaikai/jichikai* in urban communities where the wave of globalization has been stronger than in non-urban areas.

Labor and employment patterns are changing in every society that participates in today's world economy. Drawing on government statistics, interviews, anecdotal accounts, and sociological literature, Scott North contemplates the consequences of declining long-term employment on Japanese society. He puts the emergence of "freeters" in Japan into global context, noting that there is a worldwide trend toward contingent (i.e., non-permanent) work. The term *furītā* was coined in the late 1980s—cobbled together from the *katakana* renderings of the English word "free" and the German "Arbeiter" ("worker," with the latter word taken as someone engaged in "*arubaito*," meaning part-time employment)—to refer to a category of temporary, low-wage, usually hourly, employees. Since the bursting of the economic bubble, many Japanese businesses have changed their employment practices and have ended policies of permanent employment in an effort to be more competitive. In 1992 roughly 80 percent of the labor force was employed full-time. Today more than a third of Japanese workers are freeters. The effects of this rapid transformation are profound and far reaching. This essay asks how the global trend toward contingent work and the freeter ideology of temporary work are remaking the identities, ways of life, and expectations of urban Japan's working class. Freeters' ways of life and expectations are famously different from older Japanese generations. One of globalization's most potent manifestations has been a spreading uniformity of cultural strategies for organizing economic activity, and this is transforming employment and the division of labor in Japan. Japanese male employment, which was formerly hailed for consisting largely of relatively stable long-term employment with salary and benefits adequate to support a family, is becoming increasingly unstable, temporary, and contingent as Japanese firms restructure to remain internationally competitive. Women are working more, taking less time out to have and raise children, or avoiding marriage altogether. North's analysis is given an extra fillip of interest by the fact that many of the phenomena that he identifies in Japan have parallels in other countries caught up in the process of globalization.

In a chapter with the beguiling title "Eating to Become Japanese," Eyal Ben-Ari, an anthropologist, describes the place of food and the activities that occur at mealtimes in daycare centers for Japanese children. Eating practices in two Kyoto facilities where he conducted fieldwork, he reported, are "one of the central methods for turning children into 'civilized social beings.'" In Japan, Ben-Ari holds, food "is related to inculcating a sense of group belongingness, absorbing notions of responsibility, mastering self-control and self-reliance, and learning the organization and aesthetics of 'typical' needs." He concludes that notions about food and health in Japan (the notions that are put into practice in daycare centers as well as in homes) are bound up with beliefs about the virtues of traditional Japanese culture and ideas about Westernization and industrialization.

Putting food into a different context and drawing primarily on Russian sources, David N. Wells introduces an interesting series of cross-cultural encounters between Japanese and Russians in which cuisine figured prominently. The subtitle of his chapter,

“The Role of Food and Drink in the Russian Discovery of Japan,” states the object of study very clearly. As does Ben-Ari, Wells refers to social theorists such as Lévi-Strauss on the centrality of food preparation in culture. Citing many Russian accounts from over two centuries from the end of the seventeenth century to just before World War I, Wells illustrates how food was employed in hospitality on both sides, what Russians thought of the flavors and presentation of Japanese cuisine and how their views evolved over time, and how Russians’ early practical worries about obtaining enough food gave way to an “ideologically and culturally determined perspective” that assumed European superiority.

My own chapter in this book examines the views on Southeast Asia of an influential Japanese banker in the period between the two World Wars. Inoue Junnosuke, the former governor of the Bank of Japan and later the highly influential minister of finance in the Hamaguchi and Wakatsuki cabinets (1929–31), toured British Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies for nearly two months in 1928. A member since 1916 of the Board of Councilors of the Nan’yō Kyōkai, an association of influential men that promoted research on and interest in the Nan’yō (literally “South Seas,” a region broadly understood to include the South Pacific as well as what we today call Southeast Asia, and sometimes even the southern part of China), Inoue can be seen as a spokesman for the Japanese business establishment and especially for the banking industry. On his return from Southeast Asia, he gave speeches in a number of places around Japan in which he surveyed the possibilities and warned of some of the dangers of business activity in the British and Dutch colonies. He was quite optimistic about the prospects for Japanese business and finance to flourish there, even while he acknowledged difficulties arising from global economic conditions and from the particular circumstances of the microeconomies and geopolitics of East and Southeast Asia. His views echoed positions that had been articulated earlier in the monthly *Nan’yō Kyōkai zasshi* and other publications of the society. My research leads me to see Inoue as an exemplar of Japanese businessmen who were disposed to be internationalist and cooperative throughout the prewar years. Accepting the structures of British and Dutch colonial rule as “real world” conditions, many businessmen tended, as did Inoue, to overlook or minimize cultural matters while emphasizing economic matters. Their outlook contrasted with the ideology of southward Japanese imperial expansion (*nanshinron*) that gradually gained force and came to be dominant by the late 1930s. Their views can be seen to prefigure the worldview of those who have embraced globalization as desirable in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

In the concluding essay in this volume, John Clark inquires whether contemporary Japanese art has been fully absorbed into the global “world-system” or remains bifurcated into domestically-oriented and internationally-oriented sectors. He analyzes the participation of Japanese art as a national exercise in the Venice Biennale and related exhibitions, and then gives us a critical reassessment of how Japanese art was shown internationally in other thematic exhibitions in the 1980s and 1990s. He examines the international positioning of Japanese contemporary art in recent exhibitions such as the first Yokohama Triennale in 2002 and the Kwangju, Busan, and Shanghai Biennales in 2004. The Japanese reaction to theories of multiculturalism and resistance to Eurocentricity are

of particular interest to him. Resistance to the privileging of European culture is shown by (and is in part a byproduct of) Japanese translation culture, in Clark's view; in Japan, Western knowledge systems, including those for art, have been incorporated through the medium of translations into the Japanese language. Resistance to Eurocentricity also arises from an urge to find in Japanese identity an ethnic specificity for life forms, Clark says, and this has long been associated especially with aesthetic discrimination. With the movement of and new identities for art producers and mediators (artists and curators), and with many Japanese residing overseas at least temporarily, identification with the national has atrophied somewhat. Globalization, as Clark sees it, thus has weakened the distinction between "Japan" and its "Others" (usually thought of as "Euramerican"). The Japanese experience of exhibiting at Venice, carefully (if bureaucratically) planned and executed, indicates that globalization of a domestic art world is only achieved as the result of a long series of contacts at the national and international levels. Taking a comparative look at some recent developments in Korean and Chinese art and the involvement of those nations in international exhibitions, Clark concludes that in the Korean and Chinese art worlds, globalization has yet to occur on the scale that it has in Japan.