

NICHIBUNKEN MONOGRAPH SERIES No. 2

# ISLANDS OR SECURITY? JAPANESE–SOVIET RELATIONS UNDER BREZHNEV AND ANDROPOV



KIMURA HIROSHI



NICHIBUNKEN

International Research Center for Japanese Studies

Kyoto, Japan, 1998







**ISLANDS OR SECURITY?  
JAPANESE-SOVIET  
RELATIONS UNDER  
BREZHNEV AND  
ANDROPOV**



NICHIBUNKEN MONOGRAPH SERIES No. 2

ISLANDS OR SECURITY?  
JAPANESE–SOVIET  
RELATIONS UNDER  
BREZHNEV AND  
ANDROPOV



KIMURA HIROSHI



NICHIBUNKEN

International Research Center for Japanese Studies

Kyoto, Japan, 1998

## Transcription of Names

The Hepburn system of romanization is used for Japanese terms, including the names of persons and places. Long vowels are indicated by using the macron. Russian terms are transliterated by using the system of the United States Board on Geographic Names. Chinese terms are romanized by using the pinyin system. The Wade-Giles system is used, however, for certain place-names outside mainland China. As for the romanization of Korean terms, the McCune-Reischauer system is used.

With regard to Japanese, Chinese, and Korean personal names, we have followed the local custom of placing the family name first.

© 1998 by the International Research Center for Japanese Studies

All rights reserved by the International Research Center for Japanese Studies. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission, except for of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews.

First English edition published December 1998  
by the International Research Center for Japanese Studies  
3-2, Oeyama-cho, Goryo, Nishikyo-ku, Kyoto 610-1192, Japan  
Phone: (075) 335-2222  
Fax: (075) 335-2091 (Research Department)  
Web site address: <http://www.nichibun.ac.jp/>

Production by The Chogin Business Service Co., Ltd., Tokyo

Printed in Japan  
ISSN 1344-4972



# CONTENTS

Foreword	<i>xi</i>
Preface	<i>xiii</i>
Acknowledgements	<i>xv</i>
Introduction	<i>xix</i>

## PART ONE

### WHAT MAKES JAPAN AND THE SOVIET UNION “DISTANT NEIGHBORS?”

#### Chapter 1 BASIC DETERMINANTS OF JAPANESE–SOVIET RELATIONS 1

1. Background Factors 2
  - (1) Geographic Proximity 2
  - (2) Economic Complementarity 4
  - (3) Culture and Historical Heritage 6
2. Basic Framework: Politico–Diplomatic Factors 8
  - (1) Systemic Differences 8
  - (2) U.S.–Soviet Relations 10
  - (3) Sino–U.S. and Sino–Japanese Relations 13
3. Perceptions, Policies and Foreign Behaviors 15
4. Issues and Disputes 19

## **Chapter 2 APPROACHES TO NATIONAL SECURITY 21**

1. How to Solve International Conflicts: Legacy from World War II 21
2. Basic Views on National Security 26
  - (1) Different Philosophies of Life 26
  - (2) Is Security Indivisible? 28
  - (3) Means to Achieve Security 33
  - (4) Self-Reliance or Alliance ? 40
3. Contrasting Views on Military Forces 46
  - (1) Maximize versus Minimize 47
  - (2) Outward-thrusting versus Inward-looking 51
  - (3) Political Functions 55

## **Chapter 3 JAPANESE AND SOVIET VIEWS ON TERRITORY 61**

1. Concept of "Inherent" Territory 65
2. What Determines Boundaries? 70
3. The Value of the Northern Territories 75

### **PART TWO**

## **SOVIET POLICIES TOWARD JAPAN: WHY WERE THEY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE?**

## **Chapter 4 SOVIET POLICY TOWARD ASIA 83**

1. Soviet Perception of the Changing U.S. Policy Toward Asia 84
2. Soviet Approach to Asia 86
3. Unsuccessful Outcome: Its Reasons 89

## **Chapter 5 SOVIET STRATEGY AND TACTICS TOWARD JAPAN 93**

1. The Importance of Japan 93
2. Decision-Making Structure 96

3. Perceptions, Objectives and Strategy 99
4. Separation of Japan from the U.S. 102
5. Prevention of Japan's "Globalization" and "Remilitarization" 106
6. Attempts to Improve Relations through Bargaining  
("The Carrot") 110
  - (1) Trade and Fishing 111
  - (2) Northern Territories 113
7. Accommodation with China 114
8. Military Buildup and Bluff ("The Stick") 118
9. Interaction of the Determinants 121

### PART THREE

## THE DETERIORATION IN JAPANESE-SOVIET RELATIONS

### Chapter 6 JAPANESE AND SOVIET NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR: THE SPRING 1977 FISHERIES TALKS 129

1. A Chronicle: December 1976-May 1977 130
2. Negotiating Behavior and Cultural Differences 132
  - (1) "Negotiation from Weakness" vs. "Negotiation from Strength" 132
  - (2) "Nontactical Approach" vs. "Every Available Means" 138
  - (3) Reactive vs. Initiatory Behavior 145
  - (4) The Russian Way of Compromising 149
3. Negotiating Behavior and Cultural Similarities: Non-Western "Rules of the Game" 155

### Chapter 7 THE CONCLUSION OF THE JAPAN-CHINA PEACE TREATY (1978): SOVIET COERCIVE POLICY AND ITS LIMITS 159

1. Significance of the Conclusion of the Treaty for the Soviet Union 159
2. Soviet Attempts to Prevent the Signing of the Treaty 164

3. Japan's Responses and the Assessment of Soviet Policy	168
4. Why the Soviets Failed	171
5. No Concessions on the Northern Territories Issue	173
6. Proposal of a Substitute Treaty	178
7. The Soviets' Immediate Reactions	180
8. Japan as a Victim	183
9. Prevention of an Anti-Soviet Tripartite Alliance	187
10. Limits of Improvements in Sino-Japanese Relations	190
11. Rationale for Improvement in Soviet-Japanese Relations	192
12. Did Moscow Really "Retaliate" Against Tokyo?	196
13. Deployment of Troops on the Disputed Islands	199
 <b>Chapter 8</b>	
<b>CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE FAR EAST: THE SOVIET PROPOSAL AND THE JAPANESE RESPONSE</b>	<b>203</b>
1. Are CBMs Applicable to Asia?	204
2. Different Geographic Circumstances	206
3. Different Negotiating Circumstances	208
4. Psychological Factors	211
5. Moscow Wants Legal Document	214
6. Asian Collective Security Scheme or Any Other Treaty	220
7. Soviet Offensive and Japan's Counter-Strategy	224
 <b>PART FOUR</b>	
<b>A CHANGING WORLD ENVIRONMENT</b>	
 <b>Chapter 9</b>	
<b>THE IMPACT OF THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN (1979)</b>	<b>237</b>
1. Zigzagging Between Two Policy Alternatives	238
2. Cooperative Policy Toward the U.S.	242
3. Economic Sanctions: Difficult Implementation	246
4. Soviet Perception of Japan	248

5. "The Pacific Basin Concept": Three Major Soviet Criticisms 251
6. Soviet Tactics: Sympathy, Bluff, and Material Incentives 256

**Chapter 10 FROM CLOUDED TO "SOMEWHAT CRYSTAL": SUZUKI TO NAKASONE 261**

1. Japan's Puzzling Policies 262
2. Causes of Ambiguities 269
3. Nakasone Yasuhiro and the United States 273
4. Self-Confidence and Comprehensive Approach 277

**Chapter 11 ANDROPOV'S POLICY: ANY CHANGE? 281**

1. Continuity in Basic Attitude 281
2. More Military Buildup in the Far East 286
3. Diplomatic Offensive with SS-20s 289
4. Andropov's New Proposal 293
5. An Agreement on Non-use of Nuclear Weapons 295
6. Shooting-down of KAL 007 298
7. Impact of the KAL Incident 300

**CONCLUSIONS 307**

Notes 315

Selected Bibliography 373

Subject Index 387

Name Index 399

