During the period between the Russo-Japanese War and the annexation of Korea, as Japan pressed on in its colonization of Korea, the police organization was modified or restructured in a number of ways. In this chapter we will examine those changes and the effects they had.

Those years were a time of constantly shifting conditions, outside Korea and within its own borders, and views on how to maintain order and security in the country varied considerably. The result was the emergence of a complex arrangement of multiple police organizations existing at the same time. So far studies on the police, for the most part, have not clearly depicted the police apparatus as a whole but have taken the static approach of simply lining up changes made in the several different police organizations and showing them as parallel developments. Specific differences among the various agencies and the characteristics of each have been well documented in previous work, and while I mention those differences, my main objective in this chapter is to link them together and show them as an organic whole. Thus I examine how leaders in politics and in the police regarded public order, peace, and security, for it was their concepts and images that determined how the whole police apparatus would take shape.

In the years before Korea’s annexation, when Japan was, piece by piece, imposing a colonial order on the country, the police were significant as an agency for maintaining public peace and order, but we must also look at the police at this time within the framework of the ongoing colonization process. Questions that have interested scholars so far have tended to center on the ways in which the Japanese police systems helped to hamstring Korea’s first attempt to modernize itself, and the kinds of resistance and opposition they met from the Korean people. With research focused on those areas, it is not surprising that few serious efforts have been made to deduce a relationship between changes in the police organization and Japan’s colonization policy. Research in fiscal policy and practices during the same period has been extremely productive, showing, for example, how Japanese tax reform was in part a tactic furthering the objective of wresting administrative control from the provincial bureaucrats under the Korean monarchy. In the case of the police, as well, we must ask how the organizational changes and revisions were related to the system of provincial control that Japan was trying to establish in Korea, and in turn, at what points the police organization had direct connections with the
Chapter One

prime objectives of Japan’s policy, Korean annexation. It seems to me that scholarly work in this field is now at a stage where we have to examine such questions.

With that as my analytic focus, I will begin by laying out three types of police organization that existed side by side in this pre-annexation period, as represented in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Organizational Changes of the Pre-Annexation Police in Korea (1876–1910)

Korean Police

- June 1894 Central Police Headquarters (Kyŏngmuch’ŏng) set up during Kabo Reforms
- (Feb. 1894 First Japan-Korea Convention)
- Feb. 1905 Advisory police set up
- (Nov. 1905 Second Japan-Korea Convention)
- Feb. 1907 Japan-Korea Police Mutual Aid Agreement
- July 1907 Advisory Police abolished
- Nov. 1907 Residency (Rijichō) Police absorbed into Korea Police
- July 1909 Agreement on the Delegation of Civil Police Power

Consular Police

- (Feb. 1876 Japan-Korea Treaty of Amity)
- April 1880 Consular Police set up
- Dec. 1905 Reorganized as Residency Police

Japanese Gendarmerie (Kempeitai) in Korea

- Jan. 1896 Provisional Kempeitai
- Dec. 1903 Reorganized as Korea Kempeitai
- Oct. 1906 Reorganized as 14th Kempeitai
- Oct. 1907 Reorganized as Korea Kempeitai
- Oct. 1907 Akashi Motojirō becomes head of the Korea Kempeitai
- June 1910 Memorandum Concerning the Relegation of Korean Police Affairs
- June 1910 Organization of Residency General Police Force Officers and Police Stations (The kempei-dominated police system established)

Note: Korea also had police forces—under extraterritorial jurisdiction—in the international settlements of Western countries with which it had diplomatic relations as well as in the Chinese settlement in Korea, but they are omitted here.

Of the three, the first was a Korean government agency. This was the Korean civil police force, which the Japanese side was able to penetrate from the inside with the backing of Japanese advisers and vice-ministers in the Korean government. Following a European model, Korea set up its first civil police force in 1894–95 as one part of broad structural changes known as the Kabo Reforms, carried out in the aftermath of the 1894 Tonghak Rebellion. Korea’s “enlightenment” reform cabinet was installed after a forced regime change occasioned by Japanese troops occupying the palace, but despite constraints stemming from its provenance, the new regime planned to usher in a modern system of government that would extend to the police. From the sixteenth to the latter nineteenth century, there was no clear distinction between the military corps
and the police force. Within the central government were the Left and Right Policing Bureaus (p’odoch’ŏng), which supervised military personnel; in the provinces, some of the local magistrates (sulyŏng; later they became army generals Chinyŏngjang) doubled as security officers (T’op’osa). In July 1894, in line with a restructuring of the State Council (Ŭijŏngbu), the old Policing Bureaus were abolished. The next month saw the establishment of Kyŏngmuch’ŏng (Central Police Headquarters) and a civil police force staffed by police supervisors (ch’ongsun), patrolmen (sun’gŏm), and others. The Kyŏngmuch’ŏng was directly attached to the Ministry of the Interior and was independent from Seoul (Hansŏng), and it managed police matters and fire-fighting in the capital. Originally the Korean reformers planned to limit the authority of the police to intervene in the everyday lives of the people, and they had intended to make the police an auxiliary agency whose main purpose would be to help maintain stability of civil government. Because of pressure by Japanese advisers, however, it was turned into a police force authorized to use extreme political violence, like the police in Japan.4 For a short time from 1899 into 1901 the Kyŏngbu (Central Police Department) was established as a new agency on the same level as the Ministry of the Interior, and it had exclusive management control of police affairs in the capital and in the provinces.

The provincial police were reorganized according to the May 1895 restructure of the regional system. In the new system, the provincial governors (kwangch’alsa) were in charge of police affairs under the general supervision of the interior ministry, and police were assigned even to the counties (kun), which were the smaller administrative units. In this way a national civilian police system with centralized authority was created, but the reality on the ground did not match the formal system. At that time county magistrates (kunsu) held the strongest sway in regional administration, having authority over the police and judicial affairs, and their hold was tenacious. Dismantling the power of the county magistrates continued to be a priority of the reform of regional administration right up until the annexation.

The second type of police force in Korea was the consular police. It was introduced in 1876 after the signing of the Kanghwa Treaty (Japan-Korea Treaty of Amity), by which Japan’s foreign ministry acquired certain extraterritorial rights from Korea, including the right to exercise consular police powers. The consular police was considered necessary to keep control over Japanese living in Korea.5

The first consular police unit was sent to Pusan in 1880. After the Sino-Japanese War it was expanded and the number of officers hovered at around 120 to 130 until the start of the Russo-Japanese War. Their main job was to protect and control Japanese nationals living in Korea. Their duties included clamping down on crime, prostitution, and so forth by Japanese in the Japanese concession, and to provide cover and protection to them when they left the concession. During the war with Russia, some in the Japanese government proposed taking consular duties away from this police unit and placing the
unit under a [Japanese] home ministry official in a post specifically designed for that function. However, the Second Japan-Korea Convention (Ulsa Treaty) of 1905 provided for Rijichō offices under the Residency General (Tōkanfu), and the consular police were moved to its jurisdiction. Finally, in November 1907, there were further changes in organization: all police officers under the jurisdiction of the Rijichō were, formally, employed by the Korean government and were integrated into the Korean police force.

The third type of police, distinct from the two civil police forces, was the Japanese military police or gendarmerie (kempeitai) attached to the Japanese army stationed in Korea. The first kempeitai to be sent to the Korean peninsula was a unit temporarily deployed in January 1896 to protect the Seoul-Pusan military telegraph line. The installation of this cable was begun after the renewal of the Undersea Cable Treaty of 1885 between Japan and Korea, and it was completed in 1888. A tentative joint agreement between Japan and Korea signed in August 1894, during the war with China, made the cable a part of Japan’s interests, but there was no stipulation regarding deployment of kempei (gendarmes) to protect the cable. Only with the Komura-Waeber memorandum of May 1896 (between Komura Jutarō, vice-minister for foreign affairs, and his Russian counterpart Karl Waeber, allowing both countries to meddle in Korean affairs) was it decided to keep kempeitai units in Korea. The memorandum also said that “the total number of military police may not exceed 200 men,” but beginning in 1897 that number rose to about 220–230 by the time of the Russo-Japanese War. Starting in 1907, after Major General Akashi Motojirō was made head of the kempeitai, Japan’s gendarmerie in Korea grew steadily stronger. Right away Japan took over control of police powers from the Korean government, using an agreement between Japan and Korea of June 1910 “concerning the delegation of police authority.” Soon thereafter, citing revisions in the “system of the Residency General police and police stations” and other justifications, it put all police authority in Korea under Japanese jurisdiction. At the same time, all police agencies were joined together and placed under the kempeitai, thus creating a strong kempei-dominated police system.

Previous studies have not elaborated on the relative weight of each of those three types of police, but we can get some idea of the movements that took place by examining the data in Figure 3, which show numerical changes in personnel. We can see that the agencies where Japanese police were the most numerous in absolute numbers were not the same every year. In 1904–05 the largest number of Japanese police were in the kempeitai, and in 1906–07, the largest number were in the Korean national police organization, but during 1908–09 the balance shifted back to the kempeitai. (Overall, the numbers of consular police were comparatively small.) Thus there emerges a picture of shifting directions in the police apparatus between the middle of the Russo-Japanese War and annexation, the preponderance of Japanese police moving from kempeitai to Korean civil police force and back to kempeitai. Below I will elaborate the circumstances and effects
of those shifts in the police agencies responsible for keeping order, and then consider
them in relation to Japan’s policy as it colonized and finally annexed Korea.

Figure 3. Fluctuations in Number of Personnel in Police Agencies, 1904–1911

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1904</th>
<th>1905</th>
<th>1906</th>
<th>1907</th>
<th>1908</th>
<th>1909</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1911</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korean police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police officers (Japanese)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>1513</td>
<td>1656</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2266</td>
<td>2305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police officers (Korean)</td>
<td>2250</td>
<td>1728</td>
<td>2737</td>
<td>2242</td>
<td>2731</td>
<td>3299</td>
<td>3428</td>
<td>3702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2250</td>
<td>1837</td>
<td>3404</td>
<td>3755</td>
<td>4387</td>
<td>5315</td>
<td>5694</td>
<td>6007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Kempei           |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Kempei (Japanese) | 311  | 318  | 284  | 797  | 2398 | 2431 | 1007 | 3296 |
| Kempei auxiliaries (Korean) | —    | —    | —    | —    | 4234 | 4392 | 1012 | 4453 |
| Total             | 311  | 318  | 284  | 797  | 6632 | 6823 | 2019 | 7749 |

| Consular police  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Police officers (Japanese) | 254  | 268  | 499  | —    | —    | —    | —    | —    |

Sources: Same as cited in Figure 1.

Notes
1. The “Korean police” was merged into the kempei-dominated police system in June 1910. Figures in the 1910 and 1911 columns of “Korean police” in this table represent civil police personnel under the kempei police system.
2. The “Kempei” was merged into the kempei police system in June 1910. Figures in the 1910 and 1911 columns of “Kempei” represent the number of kempei personnel engaged in ordinary police duties.
3. The “Consular police” became Residency (Rijichō) police in November 1905.
4. The reasons why the number of kempei in the year of 1910 is much lower than in both the previous and the following years are discussed in Chapter Three.

1. Japan’s Korea Garrison Army and the Kempeitai in Korea, 1904–05

Some attempts were made around 1900 and later to reduce the rising friction between Japan and Russia after the Sino-Japanese War. For a while, the most promising route seemed to lie in a proposal known as the Man-Kan kōkan, the “Korea-Manchuria tradeoff.” In exchange for a Japanese guarantee to keep out and not to interfere with Russia’s activities in Manchuria, Russia would get out of Korea and not interfere in Japan’s activities there. Each side would recognize the other’s exclusive control in the respective regions—Japan in Korea, Russia in Manchuria—but in the end their conflicting interests got in the way and neither side would yield. Japan felt the friction with Russia more keenly than Russia did, and the failure to resolve it simply hardened Japan’s determination to secure exclusive military control in the Korean peninsula. This was to be a prime objective in the war against Russia. In December 1903 the Japanese cabinet decided on the policy line “that Japan should take toward China and Korea upon the rupture of negotiations with Russia.” It confirmed that Japan would maintain the outward form of an offensive and defensive alliance with Korea, but “whatever kind of thing we confront, we will of
necessity use force to get it under our control.”

With the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, Japanese increasingly saw the Korea Garrison Army (formed in March 1904) as the future backbone of Japan’s military control of the country. On 17 February 1904, for example, a week after hostilities had opened, Ijichi Kōsuke, military attaché to the Japanese legation in Korea, sent a proposal to General Headquarters in Tokyo to set up a “Government General for the peninsula.” He proposed appointing a military general or lieutenant general as “governor general” to administer departments within the Government General to handle Korea’s diplomatic and military affairs, transportation, internal affairs, and almost everything else, with the purpose of “commanding the legation and the Japanese forces garrisoned in Korea, and carrying out the huge task of managing Korea.”

Again, in the first part of 1904, Lieutenant General Saitō Rikisaburō, first chief of staff of the Japanese army in Korea (the Korea Garrison Army), drew up a position paper, the gist of which was that Japanese forces in Korea should be a defensive army vis-à-vis other nations (especially Russia), and at the same time function to maintain public peace and order so that Japan’s colonization program could continue, while whittling away at Korea’s own military capability. In that paper, which is thought to have influenced policy decisions made in Japan, Saitō argued that “there should be an army general headquarters in Seoul to maintain control over military installations in Korea and the military units stationed there,” and he strongly urged that the general headquarters “be the head office for colonial management.” He recommended further that troops be dispersed and an army company be stationed in every province in order to provide “strong backup” for Japanese working or living in Korea.

Some of Saitō’s thinking behind that paper can be gleaned from a letter he wrote to Nagaoka Gaishi, vice chief of staff. He wrote, “I believe that Korea cannot be fully controlled by civil officers…. If we do not have a system where diplomats perform their duties under a military commander, what we are trying to do in Korea, where only coercion is effective, will not work.” Saitō believed that military force was going to be the most effective means of establishing control in Korea, and that it was imperative to give decisive power not to civil organizations but to the Japanese army in Korea.

Thus, while differing in nuance, ideas calling for colonial rule with heavy military overtones, with the Japanese garrison army as the focal point, were already formulated by the first part of the war against Russia. From there, effectively ignoring the Korean government, the Korea Garrison Army set about seizing the functions of the police for the sake of peace and stability in the peninsula.

By and large, Japan’s military tactics in Korea were successful; the army did not encounter serious Russian resistance, and at the end of 1904, the first army division sent from Japan had reached the banks of the Yalu river. The Korean people were another story. Already there had been violent outbreaks when the army expropriated land for
military bases, installations, and a railroad, and riots erupted in protest against labor conscription. Popular uprisings had occurred all over the central and southern parts of the country, especially in Kimpo, Yŏngin, Koyang, Sihŭng, and other towns around Seoul, and from around August 1904, they spread to the north as well. In response, in July 1904 the commander of the Korea Garrison Army had notices declaring “military regulations” (martial law) posted on all the main railroads and near the telegraph lines, and in November they were put up everywhere in Korea. Previous research has established that the action imposing martial law was carried out unilaterally without any kind of consultation or agreement with the Korean government, and several times during the war the list of regulations was revised and expanded, and the rules strengthened. At this point we should look carefully at the position the Japanese army in Korea took toward the existing authority of the Korean government, an issue that relates to the army’s image or concept of rule. In other words, I want to examine how the Korea Garrison Army dealt with a situation where, in the process of executing martial law, it encroached on the authority of the Korean police force.

Under the martial law, each town and village was responsible for maintaining the security of the railroads and electric and telegraph lines within its boundaries, and criminal offenders as well as anyone covering for them were subject to capital punishment. At the same time, informers were paid for valid information. Some executions under this law were actually carried out in Ch’angwŏn county, Kyŏngsang-namdo, and Ch’angsŏng county in P’yŏngan-namdo, whereupon the Korean government protested. They claimed that the punishments were too harsh and were determined on the basis of unfair trials stacked against the defendants in a process that trivialized human life. The Korean government demanded that their own officials be present at such trials to ensure fairness. When the martial law regulations were first prescribed, Korea Garrison Army commander Haraguchi Kensai commented, “We try generally to be conciliatory in our policies toward the Korean people, but we have to be very severe in punishing anyone who willfully, with malign intent, sabotages the activities of the Japanese army. We have posted notices stating the punishments throughout the areas where damage to electric power lines is heaviest, between Seoul and Wŏnsan and between Seoul and Ŭiju.”

The punishments meted out under Japan’s martial law were supposed to furnish a kind of object lesson by making examples of people who took hostile actions against the Japanese army. In such a system of regulations and punishments, it was possible to conduct trials without fairness or justice, which is exactly what happened. When the Korean government protested, the Japanese brush-off was blunt: “This is not something your government should claim as a right.” Between July 1904 and October 1905, in an independent court martial conducted by the Japanese military police, no less than 257 Koreans were sentenced, 35 of whom were executed.

In addition to martial law, the Korea Garrison Army imposed especially tight military
restrictions in certain targeted areas. In one instance, they carried out their own “military policing” of Seoul (that was July 1904; beginning in April 1905 the same level of control was extended to Chŏnju), and in another, in October 1904 a “military government” was set up in Hamgyŏngdo, where there had been fighting between Japanese and Russian army contingents. In these cases, also, the authority of the Korean police was pointedly ignored. The Korean government demanded that the kempeitai not be allowed to use the powers of the gendarmerie to clamp down on newspapers and other publications, writing, student and academic meetings, and to carry out weapons searches, and so on. At first such demands were just dismissed, but then military policing activities were ratcheted up further. In January 1905 the Korean government was informed that “from now on, officials of your government, including your military and police personnel, are strictly prohibited from recklessly engaging in the police duties of preserving public peace and order.” The same month the Korean government expressed apprehension that the Japanese were infringing upon the sphere of the Korean police by extending the activities of the gendarmerie to the areas of security and peace preservation, but the Japanese side refused to desist.\footnote{16}

As for Hamgyŏngdo, where military government had been imposed, the Japanese side made it clear that, “We regard this territory as an occupied zone, and therefore we retain the right to do as we deem necessary concerning the appointment and dismissal of provincial governors and county magistrates.”\footnote{17} Once military government was put into full operation, Koreans were informed that “only those persons who understand the Japanese language are eligible” to apply for positions as local government officials. Koreans who were to take office had to get approval from the commander of the Korea Garrison Army, and if they did not thereafter act as the Japanese army wished them to, they would be confined, and so forth. In these and other ways, the attitude of the army was highhanded and the methods coercive.\footnote{18} And the Japanese side faced a variety of obstacles. In one instance, Korean county magistrates were abducted by the Russian army, and others simply ran away to avoid the situation. The Korean government itself lodged objections to Japanese army intervention in local government in localities where Japan had imposed military government, and it tried to thwart Japanese plans in other ways, like moving county magistrates into other jobs.\footnote{19}

Amid protests from both Korean government officials and the Korean people as Japan pushed ahead with its military administration, the kempeitai took on more police functions. The strength of the interim kempeitai sent to Korea before Japan’s war with Russia was about 220 men, but in March 1904 when it was placed under the command of the Korea Garrison Army, it was increased to 329 men.\footnote{20} Writing in connection with the increase in numbers, Korea Garrison Army Chief of Staff Ōtani Kikuzō submitted an opinion paper (May 1905) to Imperial Headquarters expressing the view that kempeitai officers were much more effective in controlling Korea than other Japanese policing
organizations. For the consular police, who dealt only with matters relating to Japanese nationals in Korea, to venture into the sphere of the Korean police was off-limits, but this did not apply to the kempeitai: “Martial law allows [the kempeitai] to strictly regulate everything related to public peace and order, regardless of whether the people concerned are Koreans or Japanese.” Thus, Ōtani argued, the kempeitai would be more effective in establishing and extending Japanese authority.21

Considering their achievements in the Russo-Japanese War and afterward, it was natural that the Japanese side should formulate a concept of public peace and order centered on the Japanese army in Korea and the kempeitai. As early as May 1904, soon after the war began, a cabinet decision adopted the Plan for Military Installations in Korea (TaiKan shisetsu kōryō). The first section of the plan laid out the postwar policy line: “Even after peace has been restored, it will be necessary to retain a considerable number of troops in the country.” In September 1905, after the peace between Japan and Russia had been signed, a number of Japanese involved produced written opinions and memos essentially supporting this approach. Having analyzed the anti-Japanese resistance activities by local militias known as the “Righteous Armies,” Chief of Staff Ōtani recommended that the situation be left alone for a while: “We have shown the Koreans that currently they do not have the capacity to put down even a small partisan uprising, [and] we should keep the situation [the Japanese military administration] as it is for the time being.”22 Ōtani tried to turn the anti-Japanese resistance movement to his advantage by using it as grounds for keeping Japanese troops in Korea. Around the same time, he sent a memo to the General Staff Office arguing for the continuation of martial law.23 In another memo of November that year addressed to Resident General Itō Hirobumi, Hasegawa Yoshimichi, commander of the Korea Garrison Army, compared the Japanese civilian police with the kempeitai. He thought the latter would be much better equipped to take over all police powers from the Koreans: “It is my firm belief,” he said, that “now, for a certain period of time, we are best advised to rely heavily on the military administration (gunsei) and the force of the military police; at least during the transitional period, we can let the kempeitai alone exercise all the powers of the police.”24

To sum up, in the early stages of the Russo-Japanese War, the garrison army saw itself as the leading force in the colonization of Korea, and it used martial law to take police actions on its own, exclusive of other agencies. By the end of the war, the Korea Garrison Army was confident that it would become the axis of a concerted move to remove all powers from the Korean police and take over those functions. However, this idea in its original form never saw the light of day. Early in 1906, Itō Hirobumi, who had been appointed resident general in Korea, squashed it.
2. Police Advisers and Itō’s Ideas on Peace Preservation

Instead of showcasing the fact of Japanese military rule held firm by the garrison army and the kempeitai, Resident General Itō preferred the back-door approach of manipulating and operating from inside the ranks of the Korean police. To understand his ideas on this, we must go back a few years to the starting point of Japan’s intervention, that is, the time when police advisers were first installed.

The time was December 1894, and Inoue Kaoru, the Japanese minister in Seoul, was attempting to use the Kabo Reforms to put through reforms of the Korean government system. As part of that effort, Takehisa Katsuzō, a deputy inspector of the Japanese Metropolitan Police Department, was sent to work under the Kyŏngmuch’ŏng in the employ of the Korean government as the first police adviser. Right away opposition arose in the Korean government to the Japanese-style police system that Takehisa wanted to establish in Korea, and the difficulties escalated when King Kojong made his famous escape to the Russian legation in 1896. When a pro-Russian regime was formed, the government reforms were frustrated, and in February that year Takehisa was dismissed. He had been in his post barely more than a year. He was followed by police advisers from Russia, France, and Great Britain, but none of them was employed for more than a short period.

Looking back over this history, we do not encounter a permanent professional police adviser until later, 1904, when Japan’s war with Russia was well underway. On 20 December that year, Hayashi Gonsuke, Japan’s minister in Korea, sent a report to Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō concerning “the use of police affairs advisers and provincial government offices.” In it he said,

It is my opinion that an effective way for Japan to gradually take over the authority of the Korean police is to have the Kyŏngmuch’ŏng hire as adviser one of the more skilled deputy inspectors now working in Japan…. We should have this person handle administration of the Korean central police, and at the same time, we should place a Japanese supervisor and several police officers in each of the thirteen provincial governors’ offices. That way, we can put local police affairs in good order.

That approach to taking over the Korean police would have meant putting Japanese police personnel in Korea’s central and provincial police agencies at the same time. Behind this proposal, it is said, was the work of the Korean government: sensing the danger in a situation where “the Japanese kempeitai are doing all the work of the police,” the Korean government felt the need to strengthen its own police force, and they consulted with Hayashi about the possibility of employing a Japanese police adviser. In February 1905 the Korean interior, foreign, and finance ministers made an agreement with the chief of
The Police and Korea’s Colonization after the War with Russia

The first section of Japan’s Metropolitan Police Department, Maruyama Shigetoshi, who accepted a “contract of employment as adviser for police affairs.”

Four other Japanese police officers besides Maruyama were employed by the Kyŏngmuch’ŏng.

The basic policy of the police affairs adviser was to “make reforms in the way police affairs are conducted in Seoul first, and then to apply those reforms in the provinces.”

For Seoul, one Japanese police captain was assigned to each of the five police stations located within the precinct. The idea was to go about reform at the center by gaining control of the palace police, thus allowing the Japanese to cut off Emperor Kojong (his title was changed from “king” to “emperor” in November 1897) from the Righteous Armies; this made it possible to reduce the number of Korean policemen and achieve cost-cutting at the same time, while allowing an increase in the number of Japanese policemen. Reforms were also carried out in the Korean police academy, where Japanese police officers were employed.

The work of the police advisory group began with changes in the system and operation of the Korean metropolitan police. As Hayashi’s report of December 1904 indicated, the plan was to take over the entire system by parallel moves to gain control of Korea’s central and local police agencies at about the same time. Police Adviser Maruyama was strongly in favor of proceeding that way, as we shall see later, but in the end, it was decided to take control of the Seoul police organizations first. How did this change of plan come about?

One reason might lie in complications caused by organizational changes in Korea’s police system. At the beginning, the police affairs advisory office was set up within the Kyŏngmuch’ŏng, which was Seoul’s metropolitan police agency. In 1900, the Kyŏngmuch’ŏng was made into a hugely powerful police department (Kyŏngbu) with jurisdiction over all police affairs in the country. (In 1901 the name was changed back to Kyŏngmuch’ŏng, but it retained its wide-ranging authority over the country’s police agencies.) In March 1905, however, a Korean Central Police Bureau (Keimukyoku) was set up within the Korean Ministry of the Interior (Naebu), and this bureau assumed management of all local police affairs. The jurisdiction of what had been until then the Kyŏngmuch’ŏng was sharply curtailed and subsequently included only the capital. In short, soon after the police adviser was hired, the authority of the agency to which he was assigned was drastically reduced. The Japanese response was to move the headquarters of the police affairs adviser in October 1906 to the Central Police Bureau within the Ministry of the Interior. The intent was to integrate management of central and provincial police affairs and to step up monitoring of Korea’s interior minister, but these organizational changes caused a long delay in implementing the original plans.

In this instance, it appears that Korean government efforts to strengthen and “rebuild the power of their own police” involved a tactic aimed at “limiting the power of the police adviser” by placing him in the “empty position of guardian or witness.”
addition to trying to contain Japanese influence within the police system, Koreans used other means to resist Japanese control. Sin T’ae-hyu had been Korea’s national police commissioner (Kyŏngmusa) since 1896, and four months after the advisory system was set up, he resigned his post. He continued to give out instructions and orders to the police station chiefs from his own home, thus demonstrating his intention to continue fighting the police advisers.32

Another reason that the Japanese project did not go as planned might have been because of the relationship between the Korean police and, apart from the police advisory group, other police agencies, in particular the kempeitai. As described in the previous section, by the last stage of the war with Russia, real control in maintaining public peace and order was held by the kempeitai attached to the Korea Garrison Army. In March 1905, one month after the police advisory group was established, Ochiai Toyosaburō, chief of staff of the garrison army, proposed to Hayashi Gonsuke that when more Japanese police officers were brought in, “For convenience’s sake, in all police matters related to public peace and order, I want policemen to work under the direction of the unit commander in the same jurisdiction.”33 That would have placed the policemen directly under the kempeitai chief, and the foreign minister vetoed the idea for the time being.

At the end of May, moreover, Army Minister Terauchi sent a proposal to the foreign minister for a meeting between the garrison army commander and the Japanese minister to Korea to discuss “the relation between the kempeitai and the Japanese [consular] police officers on the one hand, and Japanese police working in the Korean police force, on the other.” It was decided in July to “leave things as they are” until they could get a better idea of how affairs in Korea were going.34 So by dint of its military strength, the Japan’s army in Korea kept its grip on power, and it was unwilling to let the civil police function as anything more than an auxiliary agency. The police affairs advisory office, for its part, felt itself to be seriously short-handed and was trying to expand the contingent of advisory police officers. In August 1905 Hayashi noted in a report to the foreign minister how “regrettable” it was that by themselves, the police advisers “cannot move quickly enough; it is unfortunate, but we need the help of the Japanese kempeitai or backup from the consular police.” Hayashi said he thought they should “hire as many Japanese policemen as possible and place them in key locations so as to facilitate increasingly substantive improvements in the police.”35

Finally, Japanese planning was affected by disagreements between the police advisers and the financial advisers. In early 1905 about the time when the police adviser Maruyama took up his post, a problem of priorities emerged: it was agreed that both financial and police agencies needed updating and modernizing, but which one to tackle first? Megata Tanetarō, who had been appointed financial adviser in October 1904, wanted to give priority to fiscal affairs. That area needed restructure, he believed, and it should be done by “people with professional military backgrounds chosen from among officers
working at the [Japanese] Ministry of Finance,” and he got Hayashi to agree. Maruyama took the opposite position. In his view, they should first “set up the police organization as the central agency, and work related to taxation and so forth can be attached to it.” Megata and Hayashi’s idea, he observed critically, was “putting the cart before the horse.” This problem was finally resolved by sending financial advisory officials in June, July, and August to each province to work under the provincial governors, and at the same time posting about 50 police officers in each province. To the police advisory group, these numbers were way too low—less than half of what they had originally envisioned; they had wanted to increase the police contingent in each province to 130 men. As the police advisers described it, provincial police were so few that, “Take one step outside the capital….and there might as well be no police around at all.” At that time Japanese police officers in the provinces were authorized only to monitor Korean local governors. If, they realized, the Japanese could not control the local regions by themselves, there was no hope of taking over ruling power in the provinces.

It is important to recognize that the core difficulty for the police advisers was not the rivalry with the financial advisory group. Korea’s financial affairs were not in good order, but it was understood from the beginning that the drastic reforms and ideas for improvement put on the table by the advisers would cost more than was available. Moreover, while the financial advisory group had ostensibly assumed direction of Korea’s finances, it had not yet begun reform of the tax system, and that was the key to control in the provinces. Japan’s most serious problem at that time, therefore, was that it could afford to send only a small number of advisers to work in and with Korean agencies. And it had little else to fall back on.

As 1906 began, the expansion of the police advisory group allowed it to begin breaking out of its constraints and take central place in the police organization, while actively moving on toward eventual control over the provinces. The event with the biggest impact at this time was Itō Hirobumi’s appointment in March 1906 as the first resident general of Korea.

The Úlsa Treaty of 1905 and its provision for a resident general represented a significant advance in the colonization process. Article 3 stipulates that the resident general would primarily be “taking charge of, and directing matters relating to diplomatic affairs,” but in a meeting with the Privy Council before he left to take up his post, Itō indicated that he intended to become actively involved in the inner workings of government in Korea. The resident general, he said, “is in one respect a leader and adviser, and must work to improve the administration of Korea.”

Regarding police advisers, until then they were hired from the Japanese foreign ministry and the Japanese metropolitan and prefectural police departments, and in Korea they remained under the direct jurisdiction and accountable to their home employers. All that changed in June 1906, when they were put under a single chain of command headed
by the resident general.\textsuperscript{42} By this, the advisory police and the Rijichō police (formerly consular police) were placed together under the resident general, and the following year the two organizations concluded a mutual assistance agreement, which served as the basis for a partial integration of the two. (See Figure 2)

Itō’s own ideas concerning public peace and order were another crucially important factor at this time. In the first place, and central to the nature of the Residency General and the Rijichō, Itō himself was a civilian, but, critical of the rising power of the military, he demanded that the resident general be given absolute authority over the military forces.\textsuperscript{43} One result was that among those in active service in the military police reserves, 184 men below the level of non-commissioned officer were dismissed, and the number of kempeitai branch stations was cut way back from 56 (as of October 1905) to 32.\textsuperscript{44} In August 1906, the punishments stipulated under martial law were reduced and capital punishment was abolished. In a parallel move, after consultation with the commander of the Korea Garrison Army, Itō had the name of the Seoul precinct police changed to the Supreme Military Police (Kōtō gunji keisatsu). He also removed the ban on all popular movements, which thenceforth could be held if advance notification were submitted. (The Supreme Miliary Police were abolished in November 1907.)

Doubtless, these measures were motivated partly by a wish to respond to the outrage among Koreans provoked by Japan’s naked grab for military control, and also by fear of censure from other countries. At the beginning of an address delivered to members of the Korea Garrison Army when he assumed office, Itō warned the men, “Now that peace has been restored, the movements of the Japanese army in Korea will be the object of intense scrutiny by the governments of the world and the personnel of every foreign country that has a legation in Korea.” He urged them to be extremely careful in their conduct.\textsuperscript{45} Further, soon after he arrived as resident general, he personally called for a “conference on the Manchuria problem,” at which time he pointed out that keeping a military government in Manchuria just as though it were still wartime would invite protest from Great Britain and the United States, and “the repercussions will reverberate indirectly in negative opinions about conditions in Korea.”\textsuperscript{46} Moreover, since Korea was under his own jurisdiction as resident general and Japan’s military control was as firmly entrenched as in Manchuria, Itō must have worried that the situation in Korea would provoke as much protest from Great Britain and the United States as Manchuria had. In addition, the Japanese army’s fear of retaliation by Russia had diminished, and Japan decided to cut the four army divisions in Manchuria and Korea to only two, beginning in 1907. (Only one division in peacetime formation was deployed in Korea.) This development presumably backed Itō’s Korea policy.\textsuperscript{47}

Clearly Itō wanted to avoid direct military control, but in face of the security needs of peace and order in Korea, how did he think that was possible? What means did he envision to realize such a policy? Let us consider the first session of the Council for
the Improvement of Government (Shisei Kaizen Kyōgikai) held between Itō and the members of the Korean cabinet (13 March 1906). This council, which convened regularly to discuss reform politics, provided a venue for Itō and the Japanese advisers to keep pushing the Koreans to act on their promises of reform. Itō explained his goals for “improvements in government” and his ideas on how he wanted to handle popular complaints and discontent. Speaking of police matters, he said that there was no way to avoid stationing Japanese troops in Korea for the time being, but “we are thinking that in the future it will be possible to gradually strengthen the Korean police and reduce the use of military force…. We do not intend to reduce the number of troops, but our aim is to use the army mainly as a defensive force… For keeping public peace and order, we wish to use the police as much as possible.” Concerning prospects for the Korean police, “Certainly we cannot be satisfied with the situation as it is now,” he said, and added that, “We wish to assist the Korean police, and we believe that the Korean police can be greatly strengthened by using Japanese police officers.” In other words, Itō planned to move the main responsibility for public peace and order from the military to the police, and at the same time use Japanese police advisers to enhance the capabilities of the Korean police. Finally, because at this time Itō believed that “we should make the police advisers the heart of the police organization,” the kempeitai saw this as the start of a period when its own size and power would be “reduced,” at least for the time being.

Itō Hirobumi wasted no time. Soon after he took up the post of resident general in 1906 he set out to see the people and make the contacts he needed to put his plans into action. He urged Korea’s interior minister Yi Ji-yong to consult with the Japanese police advisers, and he sought Police Adviser Maruyama Shigetoshi’s estimate of how many police were necessary in the provinces. These efforts led to two expansions of the police force—in June 1906, the first phase of augmenting police affairs staff, and again in July 1907. Those upgrades increased the number of Japanese police by about 1,200 men and Korean police by more than 1,000. Ever since the police advisory system had begun, the size of the Korean force had been falling, eroded by dismissals and reductions in numbers. Two rounds of layoffs had reduced the number of Korean patrolmen (sun’gŏm) from 1,523 to 750. Resident General Itō believed it was better policy to enlarge the Korean police force, but in the end, the two-stage expansion of the police organization increased the number of Japanese police by more than 20 times the previous level, while the number of Korean police rose about 2.5 times.

Police stations numbered about 450, or one or two per county, which can hardly be called dense, but even then the increases in police personnel certainly reduced the relative weight of the kempeitai (whose name became the 14th Kempeitai in October 1906). The kempeitai returned to their peacetime formation, and between October and December, 200 kempeitai officers were dismissed (Chōsen shinpō, 22 October 1906). As noted earlier, it was during this period that the number of civil police surpassed the
number of Japanese gendarmes stationed in Korea. Naturally the army and the kempeitai took the lead in quelling most of the confrontations with the Righteous Armies; they were the ones who broke Min Chong-sik’s seizure of Hongsŏng, Ch’ungch’ŏngdo (May 1906) and put down the uprising led by Ch’oe Ik-hyŏn in Sunchang, Chŏllado (June 1906), for example, but it was the police advisers who presided over all day-to-day police affairs. It was decided at that time to “gradually replace the kempeitai with police advisers in those regions where military forces are not necessary.”

What connection did the more powerful police presence in the provinces have with ongoing moves to colonize Korea more thoroughly? In the eyes of the Residency General, they confronted a formidable problem in the drive to establish provincial control nationwide, and that was the widespread misuse of office by local Korean government administrators. Local officials representing the Korean monarchy functioned as police, judiciary, and tax collectors all at once “used judicial and police methods to extort personal property under the pretext of taxes owed or some other claim.” In a speech to Japanese judicial officers in the employ of the Korean government, Resident General Itō gave voice to just such a perception of provincial government and the direction he believed reforms should take.

“In Korea,” he said, “government officials also act in a judicial capacity … there is no clear separation between judicial affairs and the usual business of government.” As a countermeasure, he told the officers, “You must take into your own hands real control over judicial matters, even if, for the time being, it means using the names of the provincial governors in handing down judgments.” Even beyond judicial affairs, he went on, “I expect to see the same approach in all manner of business here … Dealing with Korea’s fiscal matters, we will formally use the names of Koreans in carrying out the work, but the ones who will actually be in charge and get things done will be Japanese … The same goes for police affairs.”

The problem, as Itō saw it, was the concentration of judicial, tax, and police powers all in the hands of local functionaries of the Korean monarchy below the level of provincial governor (particularly the county magistrates), and his challenge was to find a way to transfer those powers to Japanese. There was also a close connection between the immediate need to strip those local officials of their powers and the task of fortifying the police.

The first step was to gain solid control of the local police agencies. The advisory police insinuated themselves into the system by aligning their branch offices and substations with the Korean counterparts, so that, for all practical purposes, “Even though they had different names, they amounted to the same thing. The form and functions [of the advisory and Korean police] were the same.” In many cases they were housed together in the same buildings. As for most of the Korean police supervisors (ch’ongsun) appointed during the expansion, “It doesn’t matter what kind of people they are, as long
as they know the Japanese language.” And as the ranks of the Korean police steadily filled with strutting men proud to “curry favor with Japanese constables,” the number of criminal police officers with valuable administrative experience continued to shrink as more were discharged.56 The point was to encourage a sympathetic attitude toward Japan among the Korean constables.

We should also mention how Korean administrators were constrained in their exercise of juridical and police powers, or in some cases partially divested of those powers. “It is fundamentally wrong,” Ito said at a meeting, “that provincial governors or county magistrates—people who are administrators—should conduct trials.” He believed that all judicial authority should be taken away from local government officials, that there should be a complete separation of executive and judicial powers.57 The expansion of the police staff in 1906 enabled the formation of a system in which “provincial governors have to work with the branch representative of the police advisory group in handling all civil and criminal suits.”58 Rising complaints were heard from all over the country: “The Japanese police… are interfering with trials conducted by the provincial governors and they are handing down unfair judgments.”59 The next year Itō went further, ordering that provincial governors and county magistrates cease carrying out investigations; that practice “must be changed, and all such activities will be done by the police. That is, the police will do all the work of the prosecution.” He thus suggested the need for additional police for that purpose.60 Regarding prosecution and pronouncing judgment, the former was put into the hands of the Japanese police, opening the way for a total separation of the judicial and executive functions. (That separation was formally accomplished in 1907 by the Third Japan-Korea Convention.)

Last, there was the matter of tax powers. According to the “System for Tax Officials” issued in September 1906, revenue officers were appointed and put in charge and the county magistrates were pushed out of the tax collecting business. At the same time the financial advisers requested the police advisers to keep in close contact with the staff of both advisory groups regarding opposition expected from the county magistrates and others, and they requested police protection whenever tax money was transferred from place to place or when financial advisory branch staff traveled. Asked to take on these functions, the police advisers notified their local branches and told them to ensure close cooperation between the financial and police advisers.61 One feature of the second, 1907 phase of the police expansion plan was the provision for “increased staff at the national treasury revenue offices and local financial administration offices, in 130 locations across the country.” This measure was taken in response to concerns that, “Police contingents are at hand in places where there are provincial governors and we can prepare for riots and such, but in other places, isn’t it too dangerous to handle money?”62

The above outlines how, after Itō Hirobumi became resident general, police advisers were moved into the center of the peace-keeping system in Korea, and they were also
given the bulk of the work to strip the monarchy’s provincial administrators of their powers. As the police presence in the provinces became more extensive, the type of work they did grew in scope and importance. Starting with the first moves to extend police authority in the provinces, one key objective was to broaden the range of police activity: “If police advisers can be positioned to help govern the provinces, which are not well run at present, they must be enabled to go beyond their usual functions.” According to documents dating from after the abolition of police advisers (October 1907), while Japan was trying to secure control in the provinces, the Korean police were given “excessively many” duties apart from monitoring publications, public gatherings, association, and other police work associated with maintaining peace and order:

Naturally, they were involved in forestry, civil engineering, promotion of industry, weights and measures examination, as well as education, tax collection, protection for postal service staff and traveling officials, and they did bailiff duty by delivering writs of execution … they also helped with prison matters…”

It is widely agreed that at least before World War I, in the Japanese colonies of Taiwan and Korea, and in the Guandongzhou Leased Territory, the half-baked nature of Japan’s structure of rule in the provinces in combination with determined local resistance helped create a system where a large part of the administration was carried out by the police. In the case of Korea, the first buds of a police organization imbued with that particular colonial character were already in evidence in the early stage of the Residency General.

3. Escalating Confrontations with the Righteous Armies

In July 1907 the Korean emperor Kojong sent a special envoy to the Second World Peace Conference in The Hague to claim before the European states that the Japan-Korea protectorate convention signed in 1905 was invalid and to elicit support, but the delegation was refused entry to the conference on grounds that Korea lacked diplomatic status as an independent state. That secret mission presented an opportunity for Japanese political leaders to push for more extensive control in Korea. In Tokyo, at a meeting of the genrō (elder statesmen) and cabinet ministers convened to discuss matters in Korea, Elder Statesman Yamagata Aritomo and War Minister Terauchi Masatake both thought the best plan was to take power by means of a signed agreement, abolish the advisers, and assign Japanese to the major posts in the Korean government. The Third Japan-Korea Convention that was subsequently concluded did away with the advisory police and laid a path for Japanese to become officials in the Korean government.
In August 1907 the police adviser Maruyama Shigetoshi was named head of the Korean Metropolitan Police Department (Kyŏngsich’ŏng, the police organization for the capital, which replaced the former Kyŏngmuch’ŏng in July), and that November about 1,300 Japanese who had been police advisers were hired by the Korean government to serve directly under Korea’s Central Police Bureau (in the Ministry of the Interior). Matsui Shigeru, until then Resident in Pusan, was made head of the Central Police Bureau, and in January 1908 the provincial governors were notified by the interior ministry that the Central Police Bureau chief was now in direct command of the provincial police, able to bypass the provincial governors. In these ways the Third Japan-Korean Convention placed Japanese in the heart of Korea’s police organization, giving shape to a system of “Korean police that in reality was Japanized” and centralizing power with the Japanese chief of the Central Police Bureau at the apex. Indeed, at that time, anti-Japanese rioting had become too intense even for the considerably reinforced civil police to handle. The very ferocity of the opposition forced a change in the entire police system.

The disbanding of the Korean military corps in August 1907 offered an opportunity for the Righteous Armies, many of which operated like guerilla bands, to enlist free-float soldiers who had been discharged from the army. The participation of those soldiers increased the fighting power of the militia immensely and remarkably quickly. Resident General Itō decided to counter the surge by augmenting the Korea Garrison Army. Adding to the customary one division stationed in Korea, an infantry brigade was dispatched from Japan in July 1907, a cavalry regiment in October, and two infantry regiments in May 1908.

In the fall of 1907, however, the policy changed to focus on bolstering the Korean kempeitai rather than sending more soldiers from Japan. On 9 October 1907 the Chosen shinpō reported that army leaders “considered the opinions of Resident General Itō and Major General Murata [Murata Atsushi, military attaché at the Residency General]” and decided to “halt the dispatch of troops from Japan and instead augment the kempeitai.” Kempeitai records contain the following elaboration:

Korea’s type of insurgents…keep hiding and emerging, disappearing and reappearing, and that way they can avoid the brunt of our attacks. When we chase them south, they turn up to the north. Routed from a village, they vanish into the hills, and you can’t tell them apart from ordinary people. There is no really effective way to deal with them.

So instead of an initial concentrated deployment, we formed units as small as possible and spaced them out; but because of the nature of army troops, it is difficult to maintain discipline when they are deployed in small units … we urgently needed kempeitai actions at this time. The kempeitai forces have merits of their own; they can be deployed with more precision, and so they can provide more than enough
backup to compensate for shortfalls in the other armed forces.\textsuperscript{68}

Although the regular army had been seeking methods to respond to the rapid maneuvers of the highly mobile bands of guerrilla fighters, there were limits to how small the units could be and still maintain discipline. Instead of the army, therefore, it seemed tactically more effective to give the kempeitai the major role in suppressing them. In Japan, furthermore, the expansion of the army after the Russo-Japanese War had necessitated large-scale organizational shifts, and even deciding which soldiers would be sent to Korea was proving difficult. In any case, following the new policy, in October 1907 kempeitai personnel rose from 288 to 782, and in March 1908 their numbers soared to 2,000. The Japanese sought to move against the Righteous Armies “by deploying [kempei] in small, mobile units, step by step.”\textsuperscript{69}

In a further development, the Residency General’s Rijichō police (formerly the consular police) were absorbed into the Korean police organization in November 1907, completely integrating the two. (See Figure 2) This measure, which might at first seem unrelated to the kempeitai, was the result of “informal negotiations carried on between the resident general and the minister concerned [Finance Minister Sakatani Yoshio]” aimed at redirecting to the Korean gendarmerie, beginning the next fiscal year, over 400,000 yen that the absorption of the Rijichō police would save the Residency General in police-related expenditures.\textsuperscript{70} Because of the larger numbers employed in the expanded kempeitai, during October to December 1908, the kempeitai were involved in more confrontations with guerrilla resistance groups than were the troops of the Korea Garrison Army. (See Figure 4)

One person who worked as hard as or even harder than Itō to bolster the strength and position of the kempeitai was the kempeitai chief Akashi Motojirō. Asked by Itō to recommend a candidate, General Terauchi had nominated Akashi for the post of kempeitai head. Akashi’s appointment was followed by a rapid succession of moves to
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strengthen the kempeitai. Rather than elaborating on the expanding scale of the kempeitai, which is treated in most studies of this period, here I will consider some issues that have not yet received such attention. First, we should examine how the responsibilities of the civil police and the kempeitai were coordinated during the period between Akashi’s appointment and the first half of 1908.

That problem began with Imperial Ordinance No. 323 “Concerning Military Police Stationed in Korea” issued around the time when Akashi became head of the kempeitai. Article 1 of the imperial order stipulates: “The main responsibility of the military police stationed in Korea will be police duties relating to the maintenance of public peace and order. They [military policemen] will serve under the resident general and will also perform police functions subject to direction from the supreme commander of the Japanese Army in Korea.” That order shifted the primary focus of the gendarmerie from their original police duties to peace preservation.

Akashi used the stipulation as a lever to shape the police organization. He conveyed his interpretation to Matsui Shigeru, head of the Korean Central Police Bureau: “This stipulation entrusts to the kempeitai the responsibility to carry out the maintenance of public peace and order within Korea, and since the Korean police are under the protection of Japan, naturally they will obey the commands of the kempeitai.” From the start, when he was appointed kempeitai chief, Akashi already had conceived a fairly well-developed prototype for the kempeitai-led police system that later materialized when the civil police also were placed under the chain of command of the kempeitai. For Matsui’s part, even while he worried that a Japanese imperial order was not enough to legalize absorbing the Korean police into the kempeitai, he stressed the need to further Japanize the Korean police. Nonetheless, securing a firm grip on the means to suppress the militias had enhanced the position and influence of the kempeitai.

In November 1907 Korean Prime Minister Yi Wan-yong sent a communication to Resident General Itō: “We request the assistance, when necessary, of the Japanese military police stationed in Korea in executing the police authority of the Korean government.” As he navigated the kempeitai into the center of the peace preservation system, Itō approved the request and notified Akashi to that effect. Thus the Korean government also helped to push the integration of the kempeitai and the civil police. In fact, faced with the serious problem of dealing with the anti-Japanese insurgency, they had reached a point where some level of unified command was patently necessary. It seems that the idea of shifting the authority over police affairs from the civil to the military side and placing them under the Korean metropolitan police chief was already afloat in August 1907 (Taehan maeil sinbo [Korea Daily News], 20 August 1907). Also, in the field where the real action against the uprisings was taking place, patrolmen and kempeitai officers, with their different chains of command, often found themselves at cross-purposes and enmeshed in misunderstandings, for example, concerning the treatment of guerillas who
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surrendered (Taehan maeil sinbo, 12 January 1908).

This problem was partially resolved by a May 1908 agreement between the Korean government and the Residency General. It stated, in part, “In order to suppress the bandits, circumstances presently require the coordination of the actions of the three organizations: the Korean police agency, the garrison army in Korea, and the kempeitai. Therefore the Korean police agency also should be placed under the direction of the Supreme Commander of the Imperial Army stationed in Korea. To that effect this agreement was concluded with the Residency General.” A system was created whereby one or two members of the civil police, the Korea Garrison Army, and the kempeitai met on a daily basis at army headquarters and shared information about the militias. A temporary unified military command was formed by placing the civil police together with the kempeitai under the command of the Korea Garrison Army. As for the kempeitai, its emergence at the center of the entire security and peace-keeping system signaled a shift to a new phase that began when Korean nationals were brought in as auxiliaries in mid-1908.

Regarding the Korean auxiliary gendarmes, Akashi stated, “In order to augment our ability to suppress [riots] and provide protection in Korea, the Korean government will furnish the funds with which to recruit some 4,000 Korean nationals and will have them assist the riot suppression agencies.” Attempts to incorporate Koreans into the domestic security structure began as early as the latter half of 1907 in several quarters. For example, in November the garrison army “divided 250 members, officers included, of the Korean imperial guard battalion into small units and sent them to posts in various parts of the country to serve as fuglemen, secret agents, interpreters, and so forth.” The civilian police, too, were brought in. From September 1907 to February the following year, units of about 50 to 100 Korean patrolmen were organized to help put down rebellions under Japanese army command. Then on 2 May 1908 at a meeting at the Residency General it was decided to bring Korean auxiliaries into the police organization. There being “no objection at all in any quarter regarding this matter,” the army, the Residency General, and the civil police all acknowledged the need for assistance.

It is worth noting that the number of Korean auxiliaries Akashi envisioned went way beyond the 100 or 200 level of the previous cases; as noted above, he had his sights on “about 4,000.” One theory explains this enthusiasm for hiring local people as a result of an inspection tour he made in 1896 to Taiwan and French Indochina. There he saw for himself how effective the use of local soldiers had proven to be in ruling people different from the rulers. They were familiar with the area’s geography and customs, and their maintenance costs were low. Indeed, in his letters from those days written to War Minister Terauchi he often cited examples from French Indochina in explaining his thoughts about using Korean auxiliary gendarmes. (On this point, see note 49 in Chapter Two.)

Then there arose the question of where these new assistants would be placed. Opinion was divided. The civilian police side, including Police Bureau Chief Matsui, wanted
them attached to the Korean patrolmen units. Akashi was negative in this respect. “To be indifferent to the proportion of Japanese and Koreans would be dangerous,” he said. “If, as proposed earlier by the resident general, the assistants are placed with the Japanese military police either as auxiliary gendarmes or policemen, it will help to watch and supervise them well.” Akashi believed that in hiring large numbers of Koreans it was important to consider their numerical balance between numbers of Korean assistants and Japanese. He wanted the military police itself to keep watch over any Korean assistants. One of his pet theories was the need for careful attention to the “proportion vis-à-vis Japanese troops” when local soldiers were employed.

As it turned out, the new Korean assistants were attached to the kempeitai, probably because Resident General Itō’s stance was close to Akashi’s. “Employing many new police inspectors from Japan to supervise local assistants … would be a huge expense,” said Itō, showing reluctance to put assistants under the civilian police. Attaching them to the kempeitai would make it “convenient to keep control over them.” Akashi, for his part, said in a proposal submitted to Itō that the number of military police assistants could be expanded at low cost and that hiring local people would provide work for former soldiers of the now-dissolved Korean army. Itō is said to have approved this proposal “as a policy that best fits the circumstances.”

Thus, working from his own blueprint, Akashi accomplished a rapid expansion of the kempeitai by establishing the system for auxiliary gendarmes. In June 1908 the kempeitai recruited more than 3,000 auxiliaries, so that by August the total number was some 4,300. In the short term, this substantial number of new assistants made up for a reduction in troops that occurred when one division of the Japanese army was replaced by another (Chōsen shinpō, 23 August 1908). But more significantly, with the addition of the new recruits, the number of locations where military police were stationed rose from slightly over 200 in June to 453 in August (ultimately reaching about 500); we can safely assume that Akashi’s principal objective was to achieve a wider distribution of military police personnel. That result would faithfully reflect his expectation that kempei officers and their assistants “would be stationed at four or five hundred locations to make up a dense surveillance network.” Given that the number of civil police stations changed little during the same period, the kempeitai was obviously becoming the preponderant force in the police organization as a whole.

In June 1908, as the kempeitai auxiliaries were being assigned, many long-established provincial governors were dismissed, to be replaced by Koreans sympathetic to Japan. Under the reorganization of the provincial governments that July, a police department was set up in each province. As noted early in section 3, the head of the Central Police Bureau had assumed authority over the local police in January, and now that authority was passed to the governor in each province. These and other measures were all part of the ongoing project to build a system of local rule that would enable flexible
response to guerilla activities. From a certain angle, a more robust peace preservation system in the provinces anchored in a strategic allocation of kempei and their auxiliaries gave teeth to this approach to provincial control, and in that respect we can say that it represented a positive move on the part of Itō himself to subdue the Righteous Armies by using the kempeitai. Two years before when he was still new to the post of resident general and extremely sensitive about censure coming from the European powers, Itō wanted to soften the harshness of military rule as much as possible, but now, though he still kept an ear to world opinion, he had no choice but to use hard, decisive means to put down the resistance in Korea.

An editorial of 20 May 1908 in the Chōsen shinpō ventures a guess about Itō’s state of mind at the time. What he feared the most, it said, was “criticism from abroad,” and now he faced a bad situation. The pro-Japanese former foreign affairs adviser Durham W. Stevens, an American appointed by Japan, had been assassinated several months before by two expatriate Koreans in the United States, where Stevens had gone to promote Japan’s cause in Korea. In addition, the Korean resistance was being aided by “formidable sources” (probably meaning Emperor Kojong). Itō also was worried that Korea was not reaping “the fruit of protection” by Japan. Under these circumstances, he “saw that even if he carried out massive suppression of the insurgents, Japan would not lose the sympathy of the Western powers, and that such decisive suppression was absolutely necessary to keep order and govern in Korea,” the editorial concluded.

At first Itō perhaps considered those measures to be a temporary policy deviation, but conditions were moving his plans further and further away from what he had originally intended. Itō and Akashi were in basic agreement about the anti-insurgency effect of spreading small kempeitai units throughout the provinces. That being said, it is instructive to consider the thinking of Akashi, the real power behind the expansion of the kempeitai, as revealed in documents from that period. The first point concerns his position on how much power the kempeitai should have. Recall that in May 1908, when spreading unrest and riots demanded timely action, the head of the Korea Garrison Army was put in temporary command of the kempeitai and the Korean police. But the old problem of where to draw the line between kempeitai and Korean (civil) police jurisdiction and authority remained unresolved. In June, when recruiting for kempeitai auxiliaries began, Itō met with the Korean cabinet at the 41st session of the Council on for the Improvement of Government. Addressing the cabinet members at that meeting, who were disturbed about the power struggle going on between the kempeitai auxiliaries and the Korean patrolmen, Itō said,

[We should issue “ordinances”] which, for example, would give sole responsibility to the kempeitai to subdue rioting and would stipulate that if looting or sabotage occurs after an insurgency is put down, the kempeitai can, if requested by the civil police,
assist in dealing with it. That would make clear the division of responsibilities, and major clashes [between Korean kempeitai auxiliaries and patrolmen] should not occur. 86

Itō’s policy was to make a clear distinction between functions: the kempeitai alone were to take charge of quelling anti-Japanese resistance, while the civil police were to carry out the supporting clean-up and maintenance after an uprising was put down. The following month, July, Itō instructed Oka Kishichirō, vice-minister of the Korean interior ministry, to discuss with the kempeitai chief Akashi “the division of duties of the kempeitai and the police.”87 Around the same time and probably prompted by a similar instruction from Itō, Matsui, chief of the Korean Central Police Bureau, pressured Akashi to divide kempeitai and police functions either by territorial jurisdiction or by type of duties.88 The talks floundered, but in July Itō stepped in and the interior vice-minister and the kempeitai chief worked out an agreement.

To begin with, the main duties of the kempeitai (Article 1 of the agreement) were to handle criminal investigations, arrests, prevention of “offenses against the state, recruitment of rebels, and assembly of robber bands,” while other duties were left to the police (Article 2). In emergencies or in places where neither kempeitai nor police were stationed, both were called upon to respond with flexibility (Articles 4 and 5). Finally, Article 6 gave the kempeitai command over the police “at those times when the performance of the duties described in Article 1” made such command necessary.

Early on as the armed insurrections escalated, a system had been formulated by which “the police will engage mainly in reconnaissance and the army units will take charge of subduing riots,” and even after the kempeitai replaced the Korea Garrison Army as the main pacification force, the civil police were expected to “deal mainly with reconnaissance; subduing riots is not their central work.”89 Considering that just such a division of labor was already up and working to some extent, the clarification of duties in Articles 1 and 2 only reflected the reality of how the kempeitai and police stood at the time. Even so, both forces viewed the agreement with anxiety, each fearing that it would in some way restrict them.

Matsui, who adamantly opposed expanding the powers of the kempeitai, was not included when the agreement was drawn up in July 1908, and when later he learned of its content, he wrote to Itō: “If the kempeitai have command over the police, how, I wonder, will this affect peace preservation in Korea?” Akashi also was “exceedingly dissatisfied” with the agreement, for different reasons. He objected to the Article 6 provision limiting kempeitai command over the civil police to instances when their duties in Article 1 so required. He proposed using the expression “whenever necessary to maintain unity with the police,” which would allow a wider interpretation and make explicit the idea of integrating the two organizations. Quite a few others in the kempeitai
are said to have seen the agreement as actually restricting the kempeitai.

Akashi’s unhappiness with the agreement reflected his view of the wider framework of provincial rule in Korea as a whole and how the kempeitai should be employed within it. The second area in Akashi’s thinking that we should note, therefore, concerns his views on establishing and maintaining local rule. To begin with, we find a significant gap between the opinions of Itō and Akashi.

As previous research has established, Resident General Itō intended to reshape provincial administration in Korea by removing tax collecting, juridical, police, and other powers from the provincial governors, county magistrates and other Korean local administrators, and at the same time he wanted to put Japanese or pro-Japanese Korean bureaucrats in charge of those functions. We have seen how, during the period of the police advisers, the Japanese side was particularly energetic in curtailing the activities of the county magistrates, and when the anti-Japanese resistance began to escalate, they devised ways to bring in provincial governors who were sympathetic to Japan. In short, the ruling structure formed by the Korean monarchy continued to exist in form, but stage by stage the Japanese found ways to transform the substance and turn it into a colonial type of ruling system. This was in line with Itō’s policy of “step-by-step” annexation. Yet when reform of provincial administration was brought to a standstill by the rising guerilla insurgency, Itō was compelled to admit, “In my view, until we can quiet the rioting, any significant changes in the way the local regions are governed, merging counties, for example, will be impossible. We cannot begin until we can see that people are calm.”

In October 1906, the Residency General set up what was called a myŏn (township or village) system, by which it sought to establish myon, the lowest administrative units, in the outlying regions of the provinces structured around pro-Japanese large landowners. The idea was to create townships that supported Japanese control in the outer rural areas. The effort floundered because village leaders were generally reluctant to become heads of such units; indeed, anti-Japanese militias frequently demanded myon heads to help finance their movements. Perfecting a system of rule in the rural areas proved to be particularly difficult. While he indicated his wish to improve the myŏn-head system Itō himself recognized that “it will be of little immediate use in helping to subdue the banditry.”

Again, starting in November 1907, the Korean interior ministry tried to help organize “self-defense bands” in the townships. Under the supervision of the Japanese military and civilian police, these groups were supposed to survey numbers of households, confiscate private weapons, and so forth. The project was stymied, however, partly by the antipathy of the local populace toward the Iljinhoe society, which formed the organizational and operational core of the self-defense bands, and partly because of obstruction by Christians and guerillas. By the end of the following year, it had ceased to function at all.

What did others think? Let us examine the responses to Itō’s ideas on establishing provincial rule—including the efforts noted to control the rural regions—in particular
among the Korea Garrison Army and the kempeitai. In October 1907 the commander of
the garrison army, Hasegawa Yoshimichi, wrote to War Minister Terauchi arguing that
recent rampages committed by rank-and-file soldiers in P’yŏngyang, Úiju and elsewhere
had occurred because “out of the need to subdue the bandits, one regiment had been
spread out too thinly to 50 or 60 places.”96 At that time the 13th division of the Korea
Garrison Army was dispersed all over the peninsula. Hasegawa also stated in his letter
to Terauchi his opinion that in order to maintain discipline, the army units should be
gathered in one location and stationed there long term.97 Itō’s plans for restructuring
provincial government were too gradual for Hasegawa, who voiced his disgruntlement in
the same letter to Terauchi (see note 96):

In order to stamp out the insurgency as quickly as possible, I believe we should
concentrate our troop strength to a certain degree. Regarding provincial
administration, I have repeatedly recommended to the resident general that the
police force be enhanced, but judging from past experience, that is not something
that can be done quickly.

With his militant disposition, Hasegawa reportedly did not get along well with Itō,
and it is apparent from this that he had misgivings about the progress of reform of the
provincial system. News of complaints from army and kempeitai units also was reported
to Itō. Due to the increased activity of the anti-Japanese armed resistance, more and more
Koreans were refusing to serve as county magistrates, and that was hindering efforts
to secure cooperation in Japanese military operations on the ground.98 The army and
kempeitai were therefore not enthusiastic about the way Itō was going about constructing
a system of provincial rule.

Later, in the middle of 1908, when at last it seemed that the insurgency was getting
under control, the Japan’s army in Korea and the kempeitai were able to start thinking
about how to maintain peace and security after the pacification. In a report he sent to
Japan in June 1908, Muta Keikurō, chief of staff of the Korea Garrison Army, predicted
that the resistance would be brought under control “some time during June and July” and
expressed the view that “in order to maintain peace permanently after the resistance is
quelled, it is absolutely necessary to reform the administrative organs and police forces.”99
Kempeitai chief Akashi, in the meantime, was becoming more interested specifically in
how to control the lower-level rural areas. He had some concrete ideas about establishing
direct control of provincial administration, with the kempeitai as the leading agent:

By applying considerable armed force it will not take us long to subdue the
insurgents for the time being…. To quash them permanently, in my view we must
lay the foundations for long-term control by expanding our security capabilities and
reforming and tightening regional governance. Accordingly, as the basis of rule in Korea, it is absolutely necessary from now on to govern by increasing the number of military police and distributing them in small groups to every village. In my opinion, as things stand now in Korea, if we want to subdue the insurgents, dampen the rebelliousness among the people, collect taxes, promote colonial settlement and other new enterprises, and properly enforce new laws … the expansion [of the military police force] is a task of the utmost urgency.

Foreseeing an end to the anti-Japanese resistance, Akashi envisaged deploying the military police at the village level throughout the countryside so that they could not only keep peace and order but perform a wide range of duties, including tax collection and facilitating colonial settlement and development. Nor did he see the gendarmerie as simply a physical force with only an indirect role in the execution of provincial administrative affairs. Consider, for example, a letter that Akashi wrote in May 1908 to Tachibana Shōichirō, adjutant of the war ministry, in which he made the following comments regarding the Tōyō Takushoku Company, a colonial development company to be set up in December that year:

I see the [Tōyō] Takushoku Company as truly fundamental to the administration of Korea…. The objective must be to quietly penetrate the villages, and immigrant settlers from Japan must cultivate the land with utter seriousness. The ones who will make acquisitions, provide leadership, and be central [to the endeavor] must be gendarmes. In key regions, I believe the gendarmerie need to have a close relationship with the Takushoku Company as immigration policy advisers, policy makers, and council members, and to be put in charge of the company’s police affairs and its protection.

Given that Akashi and Tachibana had been at the army academy together as cadets, it is possible to suppose that here Akashi was, to some extent, simply “talking big” to an old friend. Nonetheless, it is clear from the letter that he saw the Tōyō Takushoku Company as a kind of advance guard for Japanese rule in the provinces and wanted to use kempei forces to steer it as they saw fit. He wanted kempei officers to “provide leadership” and insinuate themselves as the center of a system of local control that could be brought about by “quietly penetrating the rural villages.” Meanwhile, Akashi’s plan to stack key positions in the Takushoku Company with military police contrasted starkly with the view Itō expressed in his (January 1908) opinion statement regarding the company’s establishment, in which he argued for including influential Koreans in the company and thus avoid antagonizing the people. On the one hand, Akashi was aiming for a military government that would strictly execute provincial rule by military strength,
with the kempei at the forefront of the system, and on the other, Itō hoped to create a colonial system through policies that could be described as “ruling in fact though not in name.” It was probably at this juncture that the gap in thinking between the two men became most plainly evident.

4. The Kempei-led Police System and Annexation

(1) Developments in Annexation Policy during Sone Arasuke’s Tenure as Resident General

We have already noted the discord arising between the kempeitai and civil police over their respective areas of jurisdiction, and differences in views between the resident general and the kempeitai chief regarding use of the kempeitai and plans for securing control of the provinces. However, there is no evidence that any discussion of these issues took place after mid-1908. For both Itō and Akashi, the most pressing task was to stamp out the anti-Japanese militias, and since their opinions on how to achieve that were generally similar—both men advocated using the kempeitai—then presumably there was no immediate need to coordinate their views. But the main reason for the lack of discussion was probably Itō’s growing disillusionment about the prospects for effective rule in Korea by the Residency General.

It is well known that Itō began to lose interest in the administration of Korea from around the middle of 1908. At that point he saw little hope for an end to the resistance and its violent activities. In addition, he faced internal conflict within the Korean government as well as efforts by the Iljinhoe, a society advocating Japan-Korea unification, to have him replaced as resident general. As early as 24 April 1908 an article appeared in the newspaper Nagasaki shinpō reporting that Itō was “making ready to flee” because of “the [Korean] people’s complete lack of confidence” in the Korean cabinet and because of “the antagonistic attitude of the military faction led by General Hasegawa,” meaning General Hasegawa Yoshimichi, commander of the Korea Garrison Army. In a meeting with Hasegawa in July that year, Itō reportedly “disclosed his decision to resign from his present post and said he would hand over the post to Viscount Sone” (then Vice Resident General Sone Arasuke). Itō’s resignation in June the following year was not, therefore, a sudden development but something he had been considering for some time. In any case, in July 1908 Itō returned to Japan, where he remained until his resignation in June 1909 (except for several weeks beginning in January 1909, when he accompanied the Korean emperor on a national tour of Korea). Itō was absent from the Residency General for more than eight of the twelve months immediately preceding his resignation; which in itself attests to a serious loss of enthusiasm for the job of running the country.
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Itō had advocated annexing Korea in gradual stages, and his resolve to resign confirmed a change in policy away from gradualism to a rapid annexation. Itō himself endorsed the “First Policy Paper and Outline of Administrative Measures presented to him in April 1909 by Prime Minister Katsura Tarō and Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō, which stated that Japan intended to “carry out the annexation of Korea at the appropriate time.” Another record tells us that “at the time of his resignation as resident general, [Itō], recognizing the need to write a memorandum on policy direction for the future, confirmed the policy of annexing Korea at the proper time.” This adds to evidence that when he left office, Itō endorsed early annexation. His replacement was Sone Arasuke, until then vice resident general, whom Itō had identified many months before as his successor.

In July 1909 a Japanese cabinet meeting decided on the “Annexation of Korea.” Despite the proviso that “until the proper time for annexation arrives, [Japan] should, in line with its annexation policy, secure actual power of protection [of Korea] and strive to establish effective control,” this document nonetheless made explicit Japan’s intention to stick with the plan to annex Korea. The first section of the “Outline of Administrative Measures in Korea,” which was adopted at the same time, also announced that Japan, “assuming responsibility for the defense of and maintenance of order in Korea, [will] station in that country the troops necessary for that purpose and increase as far as possible the number of military police (kempei) and police officers dispatched” to Korea. Around the same time, furthermore, Itō’s policy in legal affairs, which allowed Korean authorities to carry out their own legal codification and judiciary reforms, was abandoned; and, as part of a strategy aimed at stripping the Western powers of their consular jurisdiction in Korea, Korean judicial authority was transferred to Japan. In accordance with the Memorandum on the Commissioning of the Judicial and Prison Affairs of Korea, signed in July 1909 immediately after Itō’s resignation, the administration of judicial police affairs was placed under the control of Japanese courts in Korea (see Figure 2, p. 14). In line with these measures, the Central Police Bureau of the Korean interior ministry also began “to conduct inquiries about judicial and police functions that should be reassigned, and, in negotiation with the Residency General and [the Korean government’s] Ministry of Legal Affairs, to formulate relevant supplementary laws and ordinances.”

However, even though the Japanese government regarded its annexation policy as already firmly established, and there had been a clear shift in measures being taken within Korea, it was more than another year before Korea was actually annexed. In explaining why Korea was not annexed right away, most sources cite the Kando (Ch. Jiandao) border dispute. This issue was indeed part of the “Korea problem,” the fear that the Western powers might intervene if the Kando border remained under contention. That explanation is instructive, but what I propose here is that there were hurdles to clear within the Japanese government and within the Korean Residency General before Japan could deal with factors in the international environment, and hence, complete the
annexation. That is, if we shift perspective and focus on internal conditions in Japan and Korea, we could argue that Japan could not act decisively on annexation mainly because the Korean resistance movement was too strong; but we must also remember that the person who hesitated on annexation because he sensed danger in Korea’s domestic situation was the resident general himself—Itō’s successor Sone Arasuke. Keeping that perspective, let us now consider the political discord between the Japanese government and the Residency General over annexation policy after Itō’s resignation, with particular reference to Sone’s views.

Before being assigned to the Residency General, Sone had served as justice minister in the third Itō Hirobumi cabinet (1898), agriculture and commerce minister in the second Yamagata Aritomo cabinet (1898), and finance minister in the first Katsura Tarō cabinet (1901–1903), among other posts. This was a man who had accumulated his political experience under the patronage of two political giants, Yamagata and Itō, both key actors in the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and dominant figures in Meiji era politics. On the subject of Sone’s political pedigree, one critic of that era wrote that his “daring and decisive character is akin to that of Marquis Yamagata, while it is Marquis Itō whose patronage he has greatly enjoyed, so it is fair to regard [Sone] as a Yamagata-Itō hybrid.” This description of Sone as a “hybrid” of the Yamagata and Itō political lineages is intriguing when one considers the assessment of him by leaders in the Yamagata group when Sone became resident general.

Sone became vice resident general in Korea in September 1907. Itō’s and Sone’s roles were divided, Itō mainly providing “guidance” to the ministers in the Korean government and Sone presiding over the Conference of Parliamentary Councilors, which was composed of the Japanese vice ministers of the Korean ministries. Together with Itō, Sone was thus effectively co-chief executive in charge of running Korea. Yet he appears never to have tried to assert his own authority over Itō’s head, choosing always to defer and remain the “faithful attendant”: “When Marquis Itō is present [in Korea] [Sone] is willing to have him do as he pleases, and when [Itō] is absent [Sone] silently hopes that nothing will go wrong, and if something does happen he waits for each and every telegrammed instruction from Itō before deciding what to do.” Itō had marked Sone as his successor at an early stage, but in the eyes of Prime Minister Katsura Tarō, Yamagata Aritomo, and other political leaders of the Yamagata lineage, Sone was not necessarily the top candidate to succeed Itō as resident general. Katsura regarded War Minister Terauchi Masatake as the best person for the job but ultimately appointed Sone because it would have been difficult to remove so important a figure as Terauchi from his cabinet. The press also expressed doubts about Sone’s capabilities. This is not to say that Yamagata and Katsura expected little of Sone. Katsura carefully instructed Sone to “act in accordance with the directives of the home [Japanese] government,” and reported to Yamagata that Sone’s appointment was “expedient” because “we will be able to direct
But what was Sone’s own vision regarding the annexation of Korea? He was not a “full-blooded” member of the Yamagata political lineage, and his feelings about the annexation issue were different from Japanese government views. Itō first recommended Sone as the next resident general, and Sone saw himself as Itō’s successor as well. At the time of Itō’s resignation, “Marquis Itō suggested that, depending on three factors—current circumstances in Korea, relations with the Western powers, and the situation in Japan—[Japan] should wait and see over the next seven or eight years how the [annexation] situation develops in reality, as opposed to theory. Marquis Katsura agreed with that view, and the three of them [Sone, Itō, and Katsura] made a firm secret pact” to that effect. Furthermore, in his inaugural directive as resident general, Sone indicated that he would maintain the status quo, stating that Japan was “resolved not to alter existing political policy regarding Korea.”

However, the gradualist approach that Sone pursued, in keeping with Itō’s vision (even though Itō himself may already have abandoned that position), was challenged on all sides. His views were at odds with those of the top echelons of the Japanese army and the kempeitai in Korea, who were all affiliated with the Yamagata faction, and thinly-suppressed dissension over whether annexation should proceed gradually or swiftly was simmering among the Japanese officials of the Residency General itself. (I will take up the former problem in part (2) of this section and the latter in Section 3 of Chapter Two.) Another serious problem was the gap between Sone’s outlook on the annexation issue and that of the political leaders in the Yamagata group in Japan. This gap began to grow more noticeable toward the end of 1909, partly because Japan’s rejection of American attempts to neutralize ownership of the South Manchurian Railway had encouraged closer relations with Russia, and, consequently, increasing international acceptance of Japan’s plan to annex Korea. Around November that year, Prime Minister Katsura began pressuring Sone to return to Japan. Writing to War Minister Terauchi Masatake in December, Yamagata noted that Resident General Sone seemed to understand the situation, but Yamagata could not hide a degree of anxiety, commenting that “the matter of Korea appears to have become an extremely pressing state of affairs.”

The barely-contained discord between Sone and Yamagata-faction elements in the Japanese government was brought into the open by an incident involving the Iljinhoe and the government’s handling of it. On 4 December 1909 the Iljinhoe submitted a petition for Japan-Korea unification, just after Yamagata’s letter to Terauchi. After the petition was issued, Sone, “looking haggard,” tried to block the Iljinhoe move, stating that the group “must be more circumspect and not allow itself to be drawn into provocative activities by either Japanese or Koreans.” In Sone’s view, the Iljinhoe’s unification statement was an attempt “to stir up unnecessary strife and confuse the public.” Acting on instructions from Sone with the approval of Prime Minister Katsura, Korean Prime Minister Yi Wan-
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young rejected the petition on 8 December (the copy addressed to the resident general was held but no action was taken). Sone, it is thought, feared that the Iljinhoe’s actions would trigger a wave of angry insurgency led by the nationalist Taehan Hyŏphoe (Great Korea Association, a large political association founded in 1907) and other groups opposed to the Iljinhoe, but he was probably also concerned that the petition issue might fuel the drive to annex Korea without delay. Furthermore, as indicated by the secret agreement between Katsura, Itō, and Sone made when Itō resigned, Katsura also believed that more time was needed before conditions would be right for annexation. While traveling officially in the Kansai region (from the 2nd to the 8th of December), Katsura sent a telegram to Sone approving rejection of the petition.

War Minister Terauchi, a leading figure in the Yamagata faction, took a sharply different slant on these developments. Having prior knowledge of the Iljinhoe petition, Terauchi had stated the day before it was issued, “I think it only right to accept [the petition] as a reasonable political opinion, given the present state of affairs in Korea.” He was therefore intensely displeased by the Katsura-Sone move to reject the petition. In a letter to Prime Minister Katsura dated 8 December, he expressed concern that Japan might lose its chance to carry out the annexation at all, adding that he was “deeply worried that [Sone’s] cautiousness could, on the contrary, lead to bloodshed … and make it difficult for us to take action in the future.”

Pressed by Terauchi, Katsura changed his mind. The day he returned to Tokyo from his Kansai trip (8 December), Katsura sent Sone a telegram:

I have just returned to the capital from an official trip to Kansai. I have been apprised of the details of the opinion expressed by the war minister in his telegram of the third of this month…. No matter when or how they do it, if there are any Koreans who back the policy of the [Japanese] imperial government, naturally the government must be prepared to support them. Therefore, and since this is precisely what the war minister expressed in his recent telegram, I expect you to concur with the position conveyed by the war minister and make appropriate arrangements in accordance with his policy…. Rejecting the “Iljinhoe petition” would encourage elements opposed [to Japan-Korea unification], and since that would work against the administration’s policy, I want you to see to it that the petition is not rejected.

So Katsura asked Sone to go along with Terauchi and accept the petition. Katsura also sent Commander of the Japanese Army in Korea Ōkubo Haruno—who had been in Tokyo and was related to Terauchi by marriage—to Korea to further explain the prime minister’s position. On 9 December, Katsura sent Sone another telegram urging him to be prudent: “In these circumstances your situation demands great caution. It is imperative that you maintain a strictly impartial position.”
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Sone’s reply telegram of 10 December read,

… on the one hand one surmises that the cabinet, having had prior notification from the war minister about the petition, has indirectly known about it for some time, but on the other hand, to handle it in this way does not take full account of the situation and is extremely rash. I have deep misgivings, but you may rest assured that, out of my sincere desire not to let any harm come to this country, I will deal with the matter in a completely impartial manner.\textsuperscript{129}

With the Iljinhoe in collusion with key figures in the Japanese army, Sone could express his displeasure at the submission of the Iljinhoe’s petition, but he had no choice but to promise to remain “impartial.” On 13 December, Terauchi sent a message to Yamagata. After commenting that “in short, Sone’s imprudence and the prime minister’s thoughtless telegram in response to it were a big mistake,” he informed Yamagata that he had sent Sone a telegram advising him to hold the petition and not to reject it.\textsuperscript{130}

Under relentless pressure from Katsura and Terauchi, Sone made a move that went well beyond the bounds of “impartiality.” On 14 December, a number of newspapers in Japan published the following informal comments by Sone:

I see no need for any change for the time being in Japan’s policy toward Korea. My hope is that we will guide Korea in its development and extend to it benevolent influence, securing the country as soon as possible so that we can work together for peace in Asia. The advocates of the [Japan-Korea] unification doctrine do not understand what they are doing, nor do they care about the consequences…. Even if unification were possible, we must consider carefully the timing and the state of the country…. Whether to sustain or destroy, or to eliminate or merge with, a country with a history, land, and customs completely different [from our own] are by no means simple matters.\textsuperscript{131}

Adhering firmly to his determination to maintain the status quo and keep Korea as a protectorate while “guiding it in its development,” Sone rejected the “unification doctrine” as a thoughtless argument that was ill-timed and reflected little real understanding of the situation. So far I have found no historical records that shed light either on the political calculations leading Sone to go public with his endorsement of a cautious approach to annexation, or on the Japanese government’s reaction. In any case, it is clear that his gamble did not pay off: two days later, on 16 December, the Iljinhoe petition was officially accepted. After the messy dispute over the petition, the Iljinhoe used its contacts with the Yamagata faction and launched a campaign to have Sone replaced as resident general.\textsuperscript{132}
On 23 December, Sone made the following remarks to (his son) Yoshikawa Kanji:

> If it has been decided all along that [Japan and Korea] would unite now, not even half a year since [Itō’s] resignation, then what was the point of making me his successor in the first place? Prince Yamagata is a military man; he doesn’t understand politics. Katsura would understand if I could explain things properly to him. What need is there to rush into unification?
>
> Anyone, anytime, can carry off a military unification just by changing the name on the doorplate…. What harm is there in going slowly and waiting until the time is ripe? Korea is not the same as Taiwan. We should wait until the Korean people consciously embrace assimilation and then carry out [unification].

With over two years’ experience in Korea since his appointment as vice resident general, and keenly aware of the tenacity of Korean nationalism, Sone thought it best to take ample time and annex the country only after the Korean people were assimilated into the ways of Japanese society. He believed in gradual annexation, but the tone in his comments to Yoshikawa Kanji betrays resignation that the argument for gradual annexation had been orphaned and had little hope of survival. Sone was recalled to Japan in January 1910. After his return, he became bedridden with illness and died in September the same year without ever setting foot in Korea again. In his absence, initially the commander of the Korea Garrison Army effectively became acting resident general, which gave the army a much greater say in the country’s affairs. Sometime around March Katsura also began leaning toward dismissing Sone and going ahead with annexation, and in May Sone was replaced as resident general by Terauchi.

One effect of that tangled series of developments surrounding the December 1909 Iljinhoe petition for Japan-Korea unification was to expose the differences in positions on annexation between the resident general in Korea and the Japanese government (particularly political leaders in the Yamagata group), and it showed how the resident general’s argument for gradual annexation was eventually written off. These developments also highlight the significance of the Iljinhoe petition in the political processes of the time, giving us a new understanding different from the generally accepted view that the petition had no impact on an already firmly entrenched annexation policy. Clearly it would be wrong to suppose that the Japanese government began considering annexation because of the petition, but as the foregoing discussion reveals, the problem of how to deal with the petition brought to the surface the disagreements on annexation policy among the political leaders of the day and provided the occasion at last to be decisive about them. In that respect, the petition and its ramifications are ultimately of great significance.
(2) Establishment of the Kempei-Dominated Police

All the while, as the discord between the Residency General and the Japanese government over the annexation surfaced and came to a head, the problem of the powers and organization of the civil police and kempeitai in Korea, which had been smoldering in the background for some time, also took some twists and turns. In the spotlight was Resident General Sone who not only confronted opposition from the Yamagata clique in the Japanese home government but also had to deal with dissension within Korea from the garrison army and the kempeitai, both of which were led by members of the Yamagata group.

Sone conceded the need for more kempei personnel to deal with the Righteous Armies, which had become a seasoned guerilla resistance, but he never considered making such increases permanent. We have noted that on 14 December, as the ramifications of the Iljinhoe petition unfolded, Sone turned to the press to argue the case for cautious, gradual annexation. Newspaper reports included the following comments: “The application of iron-handed military rule should be strictly temporary and not a long-range policy. Excessively tough policies can too easily provoke immediate resurgence of trouble and leave us facing a permanent enemy. That is hardly the kind of long-term national policy we should adopt” (Osaka Asahi shimbun, 14 December 1909); and, “I find it deplorable that some people still advocate the imposition of military rule” (Jiji shinpō, 14 December 1909). Convinced that the annexation of Korea should take place only after the Korean people were more thoroughly assimilated, Sone did not want a reinforced kempeitai brought in as an “iron hand” to stamp out guerilla resistance, causing events to snowball into outright annexation.

On the other hand, it is clear that Sone’s policy for maintaining public peace and order was at odds with the ideas of kempeitai chief Akashi Motojirō, who thought the gendarmerie should be used not only to stamp out Korean insurgents but also to govern the provinces (see Section 3 of this chapter). By the time Sone’s comments came out in the press, Akashi had resigned as kempeitai chief (July 1909) and was serving exclusively as chief of staff of the Korea Garrison Army, a post he had held until then concurrently with his kempeitai position. A biography of Akashi conjectures that part of the reason he resigned as kempeitai chief lay in the long-standing problem of the kempeitai vs. the Korean civil police: “Despite his eagerness to integrate [the separate police forces], the opportunity to do so did not arise.” We can assume, then, that Sone and Akashi had quite different thoughts on the scope of kempeitai authority and the appropriateness of establishing a kempei-led police organization.

In January 1910, when Sone was summoned to Japan, leading figures in the kempeitai and the garrison army began complaining to War Minister Terauchi about Sone’s peace and security policy. Chief of Staff Akashi—who kept in close contact with Terauchi and the kempeitai in Korea after resigning as kempeitai chief—sent a message to Terauchi, in
which he vented some of his frustrations:

In my view, the task of maintaining public peace and order in Korea will require even greater care and vigilance from now on. However, the kempei and [civil] police forces are separate; kempei, precisely because they are military, have little contact with the civil administration. The Residency General has closer contact with the chief of Police Headquarters and the head of the Central Police Bureau. This I find highly objectionable…. The law prescribes kempei duties in a thorough and precise way, and this makes for particularly intolerable conditions when using them in Korea, because deployment of the kempei duplicates that of the civil police and both end up performing the same duties. This way of using [the police forces] is inexpedient and uneconomical, and is conducive to the growth of secret rivalries among low-ranking officers.139

Akashi found the separation of the military and civil police to be unacceptable, especially with regard to liaison with the Residency General and economic efficiency. Having expressed his own dissatisfaction to Terauchi, Akashi went on to relate that Sakakibara Shōzō, his successor as kempeitai chief, “is earnestly racking his brains [over the matter] but is, I think, seriously troubled by the separate use of the military and civil police.” He then explained his conviction, which he had held for some time, that the military and civil police forces should be integrated: “I believe that if the military police and civil police were united under a single office, to be headed concurrently with his army post by the top commander of our military forces in Korea, then the three different organizations [army, military police, and civil police] would be able to act in closer communication with one another.”

Around the same time, kempeitai chief Sakakibara also sent Terauchi a note regarding Sone’s “plan to switch the military police in the south to the north and move the [civil] police officers in the north to the south” as a way to improve security in Korea’s northern border region. Sakakibara criticized Sone, commenting that “these days the distribution and deployment of troops must be in line with Japan’s policy,” meaning that they should be geared to support Japan’s national policy of annexing Korea.140 In the same letter, Sakakibara reported that in the current situation “liaison between the Residency General and the army command is extremely inadequate” and expressed his concern that “when the issue of unification [of Japan and Korea] also arises (especially when such unification is to be implemented in a planned way), if there is no effective coordination between the Residency General and the army command, it will be difficult to maintain public peace and security not only in the provinces but throughout the entire country.” Ōkubo Haruno, a relative of Terauchi then serving as commander of the Korea Garrison Army, flatly stated his opposition to Sone: since Sone seemed to think that
there was “nothing in particular to say” about such matters as beefing up security in Seoul and clamping down on private schools in the provinces, Ōkubo declared that “the resident general is utterly committed to maintaining the status quo…. I cannot agree [with his view] at all.”

Not surprisingly, after Resident General Sone returned to Japan, the kempeitai and the Korea Garrison Army began calling for basic revision of his policies on the institutional matter of the split police organization, and the operational matter of deploying and administering the kempeitai and civil police in preparation for early annexation. Helped by the efforts of Terauchi and other Yamagata-clique figures in the military establishment, those matters were resolved by creating a police organization that combined the kempeitai and civil police forces, followed by major reinforcement and redeployment of kempeitai personnel.

Let us look first at the reorganization of the police. War Minister Terauchi took over the post of resident general on the condition that the government moved quickly on annexation. Until he officially assumed that position on 30 May 1910, he discussed the annexation with a number of ranking people in both the government and private sector in Japan, and spoke with Sakakibara, Usagawa Kazumasa (president of the Tōyō Takushoku Company), and other high-echelon figures stationed in Korea. In several letters from such people to Terauchi beginning in January 1910, reference was made to the issue of unifying the military and civil police forces in Korea. Sakakibara, for example, wrote in his January letter that he would “this month prepare a draft of my views concerning the military police system” (see the letter cited in note 140). (Sakakibara’s vision of the military police system remains unknown, however, since he did not write any such specific proposal.) The aforementioned letter from Akashi, in which he proposed integrating the kempeitai and civil police forces, was written around the same time. Akashi had envisioned placing “the top commander of our military forces in Korea” as head of a unified military-civil police organization, but the military police system that was actually established not long thereafter was not structured that way. The decision to place the new police organization under the control of the chief of the kempeitai in Korea and to absorb the civil police into the kempeitai followed a proposal that seems to have come from elsewhere. As far as can be ascertained at present, the most likely source of that idea was Councilor Akiyama Masanosuke, Terauchi’s aide in the war ministry.

Akiyama gained Terauchi’s confidence by his long experience in law and his detailed knowledge of international law. He had served at Terauchi’s side since the Russo-Japanese War, and at Terauchi’s request accompanied him to Korea when Terauchi was appointed resident general. In May 1910, by which time Terauchi had been unofficially tapped to be the next resident general, Terauchi asked Akiyama to draft an opinion statement on the annexation of Korea. The document Akiyama submitted asserted that, after considering whether the Western powers would intervene or not, annexation “could
be executed immediately,” and it included the following recommendation regarding the police system:

Considering the special circumstances in administering the Korean peninsula, at least until public order is restored, it would be appropriate to appoint the kempeitai chief concurrently to the post of Central Police Bureau chief so that he commands both kempei and civil police officers, which would put both administrative and judicial police business under his chain of command, thereby … improving upon the achievements of the civil administration.144

Akiyama’s idea of managing both civil and military police in an integrated manner under the command of the kempeitai chief is closer than Akashi’s proposal was to the military police system that actually came into being a month or so later. The Akashi biography cited earlier also concedes that Akiyama’s plan “was instrumental in” the establishment of the subsequent military police system.145 Furthermore, a memo by Prime Minister Katsura probably drafted around the same time confirms that the provincial police were to be made military police and that “local policing should be under a single chain of command.” Thus Katsura had determined that coordinating separate military and civil police agencies, deploying them side by side, and having them enter into agreements with one another would do more harm than good; therefore, he decided, “the duplicate system will be abolished.”146

Meanwhile, a group in the civil police led by Matsui Shigeru, chief of the Central Police Bureau of the Korean Ministry of the Interior, had been studying the history of police system reform in British-occupied Egypt. On the basis of these studies, the civil police prepared a statement of opinion opposing placement of the police apparatus under military command and separating it from the provincial administrative structure. This document was submitted in February 1910 to Resident General Sone, who was by then in Japan, and later to the new resident general, Terauchi. Ultimately, however, such arguments were shelved and forgotten. (This point will be examined in more detail in the next chapter.)

In any case, having laid the groundwork, Terauchi formally became the third resident general in Korea on 30 May. Half a month later, on 15 June, Akashi relinquished the post of chief of staff of the Korea Garrison Army to Sakakibara and once more became commander of the kempeitai in Korea. (Under the reorganization effected on the same day, the kempeitai set up a command headquarters, and the title of the organization’s head was changed from “chief of the kempeitai” to “commander of the kempeitai.”) This reshuffle was “just what War Minister Terauchi had explicitly instructed” (Chōsen shinpō, 18 June 1910). Having prepared the necessary documents before leaving Tokyo, Akashi carried out the reorganization of the police immediately upon arriving at his
new post on 20 June. He gave Ishizuka Eizō (acting director general in charge of the Residency General) the job of negotiating with the Korean government and equipped him for the task with a number of documents, including “Matters for Consultation with the Prime Minister of Korea” and “Letter of Inquiry to Acting Prime Minister Pak Chae-sun.” These documents requested, among other things, that the Korean government transfer authority over the Korean police force to the Japanese government, approve the creation of a police organization headed by the commander of the kempeitai, and for the time being bear the expense of police affairs. On 24 June, with the unanimous approval of the Korean cabinet, Terauchi and Pak exchanged a “Memorandum Concerning the Relegation of Korean Police Affairs,” which prescribed that “until Korea’s police system is deemed complete, the government of Korea shall entrust police affairs to the government of Japan” (Article 1). Korean authority over the Korean police had already been reduced to a facade by the processes giving effective control to Japanese police advisers and Japanese vice ministers. With this memorandum, any remaining vestiges of that authority were wiped out.147

Five days later, on 29 June, the core of the new military police system was completed with the establishment by Imperial Ordinance No. 296 of the “Organization of Residency General Police Agency System.” The head of the kempeitai in Korea was now given the concurrent post of head of the Central Police Headquarters. A kempeitai unit chief was installed in each province as its commissioner of police affairs, and under its jurisdiction were placed civil police superintendents, inspectors, and constables as well as low-ranking commissioned kempei officers (appointed as police superintendents), noncommissioned kempei officers (appointed as police inspectors), and kempei superior privates (appointed as police constables). The single-command system for the Korean police organization that Akashi had envisioned for many years was now a reality, a mere half-month after his return to the position of commander of the kempeitai.

After ousting Sone as resident general, why was the clique of former Chōshū domain figures centered around Terauchi in such a hurry to establish the military police system? Perhaps a clue lies in the following passage from the official records compiled by the kempeitai in Korea:

Decisive action to annex Korea became an increasingly urgent matter with each passing day, and it had to be resolved as soon as possible. In June this year [1910] the Empire [of Japan] assumed authority for police affairs in Korea, and in July the unification of the police agencies was carried out … These measures were prerequisites [for annexation].148

The usurpation of Korean police authority and the unification of the police apparatus were thus clearly “prerequisite” measures for the “increasingly urgent matter” of the
annexation of Korea. As related in this chapter, since the Russo-Japanese War the divided structure of Japanese police in Korea had been in an unstable state of flux in terms of the balance of its constituent parts, which changed depending on the policies adopted by each resident general. Taking that into account, the most compelling explanation at present for the rapid establishment of the kempei-dominated police system is, I would argue, that in preparing to annex Korea—Meiji Japan’s grandest political undertaking—the Chōshū clique, powerful champion of immediate annexation, wanted to secure a system that would further its project by removing all elements of instability in the system for maintaining security and public order.\textsuperscript{149} Thus, the integration of the police in Korea was achieved some two months prior to the country’s annexation (which took place on 22 August). The police leadership was overhauled along with the reorganization of the police system. Changes also took place in deployment and use of kempeitai and police forces. Let us examine how these changes developed.

On 15 June, Imperial Ordinance No. 266 “On Reinforcement of Field-rank Officers of the Military Police” was issued, allowing reinforcements to be supplied from among active-duty field-rank officers not only in the military police branch but in other branches of the military. From June to August, the number of military police was increased by 1,000 men. On 29 June, furthermore, the auxiliaries were officially incorporated into the kempeitai in Korea with the same rank as first- and second-class privates of the Japanese army. Naturally these measures further increased the proportion of kempei in the overall police organization, but here, I want to draw attention to something else: by examining the changes that the top echelons brought about in the composition of personnel in the police, we find other effects that went beyond simply numerical expansion.

Figure 5 summarizes the personnel changes among high-ranking Japanese police officials (including military police) who made up the upper echelons of the police organization before and after the new kempei-dominated police system was fully in place. Two things are noticeable about the flow of personnel at that time. First, of the civil police who had been employed until then by the Korean government and the judicial police attached to the Residency General, around half were relocated to Japan. Second, on the military police side, new personnel were injected not only from the ranks of existing kempeitai in Korea but also from kempeitai units in Japan and other branches of the military, and they took control of key posts in the chain of command. In this way, some of the newly added kempei filled posts that had been made vacant by the elimination of civil police officers, and thus they became new commanders in the police organization.
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Consider the revision of police authority in the thirteen provinces. Since the reorganization of provincial government in June 1908 discussed earlier, the post of police department chief had been filled in each case by a Japanese civil bureaucrat, but with the creation of the kempei-led police system (kempei keisatsu seido) that position was changed to commissioner of police affairs (Keimu buchō) and was held concurrently by the kempeitai unit chief in each province. Consequently, all of the Japanese civil police bureaucrats who had been police department chiefs in the previous system were discharged, and many of them followed Central Police Bureau Chief Matsui in returning to Japan. Meanwhile, the commissioners who succeeded them consisted of six persons transferred from other branches of the military, four former kempeitai unit chiefs in Japan, and three pulled from the ranks of the kempei stationed in Korea.

Most of the high-ranking Japanese officials appointed to posts in the Korean empire prior to Korea’s annexation were retained in the post-annexation Government General of Korea. Compared with that continuity, the drastic reshuffling that took place in the police arm of the government around the time of annexation was exceptional. To put it another way, during the recasting of Korea from protectorate to colony, in the makeup of its personnel the police department exhibited the most conspicuous change and discontinuity from the previous administration.

Under this new, kempei-dominated system for public law and order, how were kempei and police forces deployed and used in relation to the imminent annexation of

Figure 5. Changes in Number of Police and Kempeitai Personnel around the Time of the Establishment of the Kempei Police System (High-ranking Personnel)

Sources: Compiled from the 1910 and 1911 editions of Shokuin-roku [Personnel Directory], Cabinet Printing Bureau.

Note: The letters for May 1911 represent the following categories: Government General civil police
ⓐ = former Residency General police officers transferred to the Government General police
ⓑ = those transferred from Japan to the Government General civil police
ⓒ = those transferred from various departments of the Residency General to the Government General civil police
ⓓ = former police officers hired by the Korean government transferred to the Government General civil police
ⓔ = those whose affiliation before transferred to the Government General civil police are unknown. Kempeitai stationed in Korea
ⓕ = those transferred from the former kempeitai in Korea
ⓖ = those transferred from Japan to the kempeitai in Korea
ⓗ = those transferred to the kempeitai in Korea from other divisions of the military
ⓘ = those whose affiliation before transfer to the kempeitai in Korea are unknown
ⓙ = those transferred to Japan, etc.

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Under this new, kempei-dominated system for public law and order, how were kempei and police forces deployed and used in relation to the imminent annexation of
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the country? To explore this question, we will examine the document “Military Matters Relating to the Annexation of Korea,” an overview of the security system arrangements thought to have been written by Terauchi immediately after the annexation. Having established the new kempei-led police system, Akashi immediately drafted a proposal for the deployment of the kempei and other police, and by the end of July they were all in place; the document attributed to Terauchi is a historical record of the specifics of that deployment.

The document explains the purpose of the abovementioned addition of 1,000 men to the military police as being “to place them, along with constables, in key locations to man sentry posts distributed at a density of one for every 14 square kilometers, and to increase the number of border sentry posts along the Yalu river and the Tumen river.” Regarding the “key locations,” the document mentions that 300 of the police reinforcements were “deployed for the time being in Seoul as it was necessary to strengthen security in the city during the period of change of government.” On the eve of annexation, the additional security forces were thus strategically placed in border areas and the capital.

The beefed-up security measures were particularly evident in the redeployment of the Korea Garrison Army. From June to July 1910, army troops were concentrated in Kyŏnggi, Hwanghae, and Kangwŏn, reflecting the perceived need to prepare for “greater efforts for control in provincial areas where insurgents like Ch’oe Ŭng-ŏn, Yi Bŏm-yun, and Hong Bŏm-do are known to be increasingly active, and for security along railway lines and on roads to Seoul.” This disposition of forces was presumably aimed at the activities of the guerilla resistance, which, since Japan’s “Major Punitive Campaign against Insurgents in Southern Korea” that began in the autumn of 1909, had been in the process of relocating its bases to northern Korea and in the country’s border areas. The moves by the garrison army also were geared to “working in constant cooperation with the kempeitai and police forces to prevent disturbances in the capital prior to the anticipated change of government.” These developments all lead to the conclusion that the changes in kempeitai and police deployment, made to strengthen readiness for expected activity by the resistance forces (although they had been growing weaker), were in a direct sense preparations for the annexation of Korea.

In step with the reinforcement of security in anticipation of annexation, people within the military police organization began to look ahead and consider what their role would be after the resistance had been brought under control. In their view, the military police should assume a broader range of duties. For example, in June 1910, the month the kempei-led police system was established, the Japanese kempeitai headquarters in Korea produced an intriguing pamphlet titled Kankoku shakai ryakusetsu (Brief Discourses on Korean Society; published in revised form under the title Kankoku shakai kō [Thoughts on Korean Society] by Bunseisha in 1912). The pamphlet was “compiled with the aim of assisting military police work by covering topics relating to ages-old
social structures and customs that survive today” in Korea. A cursory glance at the table of contents indicates that it deals with a wide variety of topics: “1. Social organization; 2. Institutions; 3. Kinship; 4. Work; 5. Religion; 6. Parties and socializing; 7. Crime; 8. Farmland system; 9. Lodgings; 10. Miscellaneous topics.” This pamphlet, together with the fact that soon after annexation the kempeitai and other police departments in each province were conducting topographical surveys, surveys on traditional customs, and so on, suggests that the kempeitai and police had a keen interest in administering the provinces.

Also around that time, by their tone, official directives given to military police officers newly dispatched to Korea clearly sought to instill a sense of the broad authority the officers should assume. One stated that “the idea that the duty of the kempeitai police is solely to subdue insurgents” was “grossly mistaken,” and that it was their “expected duty” also to promote industry, facilitate the activities of Japanese businessmen in Korea, and so on.

Such views had arguably already been seeded in the plans of Akashi Motojirō, who sought to utilize the military police in a framework of provincial rule through local deployment. We should also remember that the civil police force, which was about to be taken in by the kempeitai organization, had already begun evolving into a body with wide-ranging administrative duties, as discussed at the end of Section 2 above. It is not surprising that a new image of the kempeitai as more than simply a peacekeeping force began to take shape. Around the time of annexation, a system of “kempei rule” was already being purposefully set up to give the kempeitai responsibility for almost thirty functions, ranging from “improvement of roads” and “reform of forestry and agriculture” to “encouragement of sideline businesses,” “propagation of laws,” “explanation of tax obligations,” and even “promotion of the Japanese language.”

The “Treaty concerning the Annexation of Korea to Japan” was concluded on 22 August 1910. On 29 August it was promulgated in Seoul, where “military police constables were posted every 30 meters or so, and even two people meeting to talk could be questioned by the police.” A month later, the various provincial police departments operating under each local kempeitai chief began to emerge as the agents of a system of provincial administration, reporting constantly to the Central Police Headquarters on conditions in every part of the country (Chōsen shinpō, 27 September 1910). Thus began the era of “kempei rule” that lasted for almost a decade until the Samil Movement for Independence on March 1st of 1919.
Chapter Review

This chapter traces the evolution of the police organization in Korea from a political perspective, from the Russo-Japanese War to the annexation of Korea.

During the Russo-Japanese War, a plan was forged for a military-dominated system of rule in Korea headed by Japan’s Korea Garrison Army. In keeping with that plan, the Japanese kempeitai in Korea, disregarding the wishes of the Korean government, exercised authority over police affairs through martial law and other means. Itō Hirobumi, however, who arrived in Korea in March 1906 and became the first resident general, was concerned that an obviously military government in Korea would attract censure from the Western powers. He formed a plan to transfer responsibility for public security from the garrison army to the Korean police while at the same time enhancing the Korean police force by using Japanese police affairs advisers, who had been in Korea since February 1905. The advisory police were subsequently made the core of the setup for maintaining peace and order, and they also played a role in dismantling and usurping authority over police affairs, judicial affairs, and tax collection, all functions that had been the preserve of local officials representing the Korean monarchy.

Some previous studies in this field have focused solely on Japan’s military police in Korea, attaching little importance to the advisory police. They present a one-dimensional argument that links Japan’s military dominance of Korea during the Russo-Japanese War directly to the creation of the kempei-dominated police system just prior to Korea’s annexation, overlooking the intervening reality of the advisory police. The reorganization of the police organization around the time of annexation was not aimed simply at putting the kempeitai in sole charge of police affairs; rather, the fact that the resulting kempeitai-dominated police system was, at least formally, a structure that combined kempeitai and the civil police must be understood in terms of the cultivation and use of the civil police during Itō’s term as resident general.

With the escalation of armed resistance by Koreans following the conclusion of the Third Japan-Korea Convention of 1907, both Itō’s vision for maintaining public security and the premise of gradual annexation underlying it had to be drastically revised. The adoption of a policy to bring in a large contingent of kempei officers as a countermeasure to the resistance led to significant strengthening of kempeitai influence and authority. The expansion in both the size and powers of the kempeitai around that time is well understood, but I hope the present work adds to that prior body of knowledge by presenting a clearer picture of the visions formulated and acted upon by each of the main protagonists.

Specifically, in the period in question we find first of all the emergence of discord between Akashi Motojirō, chief of the military police in Korea, and Matsui Shigeru, head of the Korean Central Police Bureau, over a number of issues, notably how to coordinate the powers and responsibilities of the military police and Korean civil police and how to
deploy the Korean auxiliary gendarmes. Then, as negotiations between the two camps continued, the Akashi side purposely proceeded to expand the powers of the gendarmes with a view to eventually integrating the separate police bodies into one organization under kempeitai command. This was possible because Akashi and Itō were in rough agreement about how to go about using the kempeitai to counter the Korean resistance, but the situation soon developed beyond what Itō had intended. When it became apparent that the resistance forces would soon be brought under control, Akashi formulated a plan to place kempei in local posts throughout the countryside and to give them a wide range of duties beyond keeping the peace. This idea of gaining control of the provinces through external military force represented a major departure from Itō’s initial strategy of remaking provincial government while leaving the local functionaries of the Korean monarchy in place. We can surmise that these circumstances contributed to Itō’s loss of enthusiasm for the administration of Korea beginning in mid-1908.

Regarding the political processes during the year or so from Itō’s resignation in June 1909 to the annexation of Korea in August 1910, in the present work I have focused on the emergence and eventual resolution of a certain degree of discord between the new resident general, Sone Arasuke, and the Japanese home government. The policy line taken by Sone, who saw himself as heir to the doctrine of gradual annexation, clashed with the views of such key figures as War Minister Terauchi Masatake and elder statesman Yamagata Aritomo, and it created a rift that surfaced with the dispute over how to deal with the Iljinhoe’s December 1909 petition for “unification.” This conflict of annexation policy was ultimately resolved by Sone’s recall to Japan, whereafter Terauchi and others around him forged ahead with fast-paced reforms of the police apparatus in preparation for annexation. In June a new police system was created with the civil police being absorbed into the kempeitai, after which the police force was increased in numbers, its leadership underwent a personnel shakeup, and adjustments were made in the deployment of kempeitai and the Korea Garrison Army. With these changes, the preparations for annexation were complete.

Thus, from the end of 1909 on, the move to take Sone out of play and the effort to integrate and revamp the military and civil police unfolded in tandem. In that sense, the reform of the police organization was inextricably tied to the processes leading up to Korea’s annexation under the direction of the ex-Chōshū domain clique in the army leadership.


3 The following were informative references: Kim Sŭn-mu, “Podoch’ŏng e taehayŏ- Chosŏn kyŏngch’al chedo ŭi kwŏn e taehan koch’al” [A Study of the Origins of the Korean Police System: With Special Reference to the Chosŏn Police Bureaus (Podoch’ŏng)], Hyangt’o Seoul, no. 26, May 1966; Hong Sun-ok, “Chosŏn wangoju ŭi chŏnmunjok kyŏngch’al kigu e kwanhayŏ” [Concerning the Professional Police Agency under the Chosŏn Monarchy], Ton’guk tae hakkyo nonmunjip (Inmun saho kwahak p’yŏn) [Collected Essays: Tonguk University (Humanities and Social Sciences)], vol. 10, July 1972; So Ki-yŏng, “Kŭndae Han’guk kyŏngch’al haengjŏng kujo e kwanhan yŏn’gu (1894–1945)” [Studies on the Structure of Police Administration in Modern Korea, 1894–1945], Chapter 3 of the preceding volume.


6 Arimatsu Hideyoshi (Director of the Police Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Home Affairs), “Kankoku
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...ni okeru teikoku keisatsu kikan kakuchō no gi” [Concerning the Expansion of the Japanese Police Agency in Korea]. Thought to date February 1904 or later. Arimatsu Hideyoshi kankei monjo [Documents Related to Arimatsu Hideyoshi], R 3–103. Held by University of Tokyo Faculty of Law.


10 Yun Pyŏng-Sŏk, “Ku hanmal chuhan Ilbon-gun e taehayo” [Concerning the Japanese Army in Korea at the End of the Chosŏn Period], Hyangt'o Seoul, no. 27, August 1966. According to this source (p. 96), Saitō’s statement of opinion was sent, through Hayashi Gonsuke, as a proposal to the Japanese government, and its main points became the model for Article 1 of the May 1904 cabinet decision on the “Plan for Facilities in Korea.” In the essay Saitō is wrongly identified as military attaché to the legation.


14 Haraguchi Kensai, commander of the Japanese Army in Korea, to War Minister Terauchi Masatake, 6 June 1904. Terauchi Masatake kankei monjo [Documents Related to Terauchi Masatake], National Diet Library Kensei Shiryōshitsu (Modern Japanese Political History Collection), Tokyo, 364.

15 Inquiry from Yi Ha-yŏng, then Korean foreign minister, to Korean legation minister Hayashi, 2 June 1905, in Ku Han’guk woeygo munsŏ [Diplomatic Notes of Chosŏn Dynasty Korea], vol. 7 (ilan 7), ed. and pub. by Koryŏ Taehakkyo Asea Munje Yŏn’guso [Korea University Asiatic Research Center], vol. 7, 1970, pp. 585–586; Reply from Hayashi to Yi Ha-yŏng, 5 June 1905. Ibid., pp. 591–592.


17 Report from Minister Hayashi to Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō, 13 September 1904. “Kankoku shisei ikken” [A Matter Concerning the Governing of Korea], Gaimushō kiroku [Record of the Foreign Ministry], 5-2-6-7; Japanese Foreign Ministry Diplomatic Record Office, Tokyo.

18 Notification from Minister Hayashi to Foreign Minister Yi Ha-yŏng, 8 January 1905. Ku Han’guk woeygo munsŏ, vol. 7, p. 397; Protest from Yi Ha-yŏng to Hayashi, 3 April 1905. Ibid., vol. 7, p. 492; Dispatch from Hagiwara Morikazu, charge d’affaires ad interim, to Foreign Minister Pak Cheson, 19 October 1905. Ibid., vol. 7, p. 793.

19 Request from Foreign Minister Yi Ha-yŏng to Minister Hayashi, 19 January 1905. Ku Han’guk woeygo munsŏ, vol. 7, p. 410; Chŏsen chūsatsugun rekishi [History of the Japanese Garrison Army in Korea], ca. 1914; reprint, Gannandō Shoten, p. 238.
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20 Request from Foreign Minister Yi Ha-yŏng to Minister Hayashi, 19 January 1905. *Ku Han’guk woegyo munsŏ*, vol. 7, p. 410; *Chōsen chūsatsugun rekishi*, p. 238.


22 Ōtani Kikuzō to Vice-chief of Army General Staff Nagaoka Gaishi, 29 September 1905. *Nagaoka Gaishi kankei monjo*, p. 73.

23 Minister Hayashi to Katsura Tarō, acting foreign minister, telegram, 29 September 1905, in “Kankoku shisei ikken.”

24 “Kankoku keiei ni kansuru shokan tekiyō” [An Outline of Our Thoughts on the Administration of Korea], November 1905, in *Nagaoka Gaishi kankei monjo*, pp. 74–77. This memorandum was composed by Japanese Garrison Army in Korea Chief of Staff Ōtani and was submitted to Resident General Itō via Hasegawa.


26 Iwai Keitarō, ed., *Komon keisatsu shōshi* [A Short Account of the Advisory Police], Korea Central Police Bureau, 1910, p. 5.

27 In the five articles of the agreement, Adviser Maruyama was obliged to “cooperate in the restructure of [Korean] police affairs” (Article 1), and the Korean government was required to “obtain the consent of Maruyama Shigetoshi before carrying out any business related to police affairs.” This meant granting the police adviser the right to attend meetings of the Korean Parliament (*Ŭijŏngbu*). Iwai, *Komon keisatsu shōshi*, p. 13.


32 The Japanese army in Korea regarded Sin T’ae-hyu as a long-time member of the pro-Russia faction led by Yi Yong-ik and as hostile to Japan. Attributed to kempeitai in Korea, “Kankanjin no keireki” [General Careers of Korean Officials], March 1909; Kukusa Pyŏnch’an Wiwŏnhoe [National Institute of Korean History] (ROK), ed., *Chu han Ilbon konsakwan kirok* [Record of the Japanese Legation in Korea], vol. 36, 1994, p. 268.


34 Confidential communication from Terauchi to Komura, 27 May 1905. Kim Chŏng-myŏng, ed., *Nik-Kan gaikō shiryō shisei* [Collection of Japan-Korea Diplomatic Materials], vol. 5, Gannandō Shoten, 1964, pp. 480–481; Confidential communication from Katsura to Terauchi, 7 July 1905. Ibid., p. 504.


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42 Residency General of Korea, ed., Kankoku shisei ippan [Some Aspects of the Administration of Korea], 1906, p. 36. In this connection, Kang Ch’ang-sŏk writes (Kang, Chosŏn Tongkambu yŏn’gu) that a clash was prevented over the amount of authority to be given to Rijichō police and the Advisory police, and “more power was given to the Residency (Rijichō) police” (p. 73), but the figures showing the actual numbers for police postings make that difficult to accept. See Figure 3.


44 Chōsen chūsatsugun rekishi, pp. 50–51. There is a large discrepancy between the figures in this account showing reductions in kempeitai numbers and those appearing in Figure 3. That is thought to be because many of the military policemen who were cut were posted as non-regular members.


48 Nik-kan gaikō shiryo shusei, vol. 6, part 1, pp. 130–132.

49 Chōsen kempeitai rekishi [History of the Korea Kempeitai], vol. 1 (first printing unknown); reprint, Fuji Shuppan, 2000, p. 116.


52 Residency General of Korea, ed., Kankoku shisei ippan [The Protection and Annexation of Korea], 1918, p. 129.

53 Memorandum of Furuya Hisatsuna, “Kankoku yōhei hōkan ni taisuru Itō tōkan kunji enzetsu yōryō” [Summary of Resident General Itō’s Instruction to Judicial Officers Hired by the Korean Government], January 1907, in Itō Hirobumi kankei monjo, 213.


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61 Zaimu shūhō [Financial Weekly], no. 1, April 1907, pp. 3–10.


63 Admonition from Police Adviser Maruyama to police inspectors and police superintendents in all provinces, 5 June 1905. Iwai, Komon keisatsu shōshi, p. 45. The duties and authority of the police advisers originally were confined to the following five categories: “Matters involving higher police,” “Association of Koreans and non-Koreans,” “Punishment for national offenses,” “Reporting all incidents of murder, arson, felony, and rape,” and “Promotion, demotion, reward, and punishment of police officers.” Iwai, Komon keisatsu shōshi, p. 14.

64 Korean Interior Ministry Central Police Bureau, ed., Kankoku keisatsu ippan [Some Aspects of the Korean Police], 1910, p. 40. This work was produced on the basis of inquiries and reports, and the responses to them, brought up by police department chiefs from the provinces at the 2nd Meeting of the Conference of Provincial Police Department Chiefs in September 1909.


66 Korean Interior Ministry Central Police Bureau, ed., Ryūki 2-nen Keisatsu jimu gaiyō [A Summary of Police Affairs for 1908], 1908, p. 28.


68 Chōsen kempeitai rekishi, reprint, vol. 1, p. 163.

69 Government General of Korea, ed., Chōsen no hogo oyobi heigō, p.194.

70 “Reference: Beginning the next fiscal year police-related expenses in the budget of the Residency General will be transferred to the Korean military police, which is under the direction of the Japanese Ministry of War,” September 1907, in “Kōbun ruijū” [Official Documents by Category], 2A11-rui [category] 1035, National Archives of Japan; see also a letter contained therein from Mizumachi Kesaroku, vice-minister of finance, to Nakagawa Kojūrō, secretary to the prime minister.

71 Matsui Shigeru jiden, p. 242.

72 Matsui Shigeru jiden, p. 244; Residency General, Daiichiji Kankoku shisei nenpō, pp. 126–127.

73 Tsushima Ikonoshin, “Chōsen keisatsu no enkaku” [History of Korea] (6), Kyōto hōgakkai zasshi, vol. 12, no. 9, September 1917, p. 135. I was unable to find the original of the agreement, which was known as “Directive No. 41 of May 1908,” but since a letter from Akashi to Terauchi of 8 May 1908 (Terauchi Masatake kankei monjo, 6: 12), and Chōsen kempeitai rekishi, vol. 1, p. 224, refer to the agreement, we can be certain that this directive did exist.

74 Korean Interior Ministry, Ryūki 2-nen Keisatsu jimu gaiyō, pp. 99–100. Further, beginning October 1908, the rules were revised so that the staffs were to meet “temporarily, only when necessary.”

75 Akashi to Terauchi, 3 May 1908. Terauchi Masatake kankei monjo, 6:11.

78 Akashi to Terauchi, 8 May 1908. Ibid., 6:12.
80 Statement at the 41st meeting of the Council for the Improvement of Government, 9 June 1908. *Nik-Kan gaikō shiryō shūsei*, vol. 6 (part 2), pp. 889–893. With the addition of the auxiliaries to the kempeitai, moreover, between September and December 1908 the Korean patrolmen corps, who were part of the civil police, was completely disbanded. (Korean Interior Ministry, *Ryūki 2-nen Keisatsu jimu gaiyō*, pp. 79–80.)
84 Chong-ik Kim, “Japan in Korea (1905–1910): The Techniques of Political Power,” Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1958, pp. 136–137; Moriyama Shigenori, *Kindai Nik-Kan kankei shi kenkyū* [Studies on the History of Relations between Modern Japan and Korea], University of Tokyo Press, 1987, p. 222; Yi Sang-ch’an, “1906–1910-nyŏn ui chibang haengjŏng chedo pyŏnhwa wa chibang chach’i nonŭ” [The Debate Over Local Government as Affected by Changes in the System of Local Administration, 1906–1910], *Han’guk hakpo*, no. 42, March 1986, p. 71. Another relevant work is Kang Jae-ho, *Shokuminch'i Chōsen no chihō seido* [The Provincial System in Colonial Korea], University of Tokyo Press, 2001. Here, Kang Jae-ho takes issue with the paper that is the basis for this chapter (Matsuda Toshihiko, “Chōsen shokuminch'iku no katei ni okeru keisatsu kikō: 1904–1910” [The Police Organization in the Colonialization of Korea: 1904–1910], *Chōsenshi Kenkyūkai ronbunshū*, no. 31, October 1993). Kang argues (p. 90) that “in regard to government organization, even before the ‘July 1907 reform of the provincial administration system,’ the provincial governors had the power to supervise and direct the police. That being so, to say [as Matsuda does] that the reform enabled the provincial governors to assume power in both name and substance over the police is not entirely justified.” Due to the paucity of sources on the concrete details of how the police were supervised and directed, this area remains unclear. But as Kang’s book also points out (p. 87), “with the installation of the adviser system and the beginning of so-called adviser politics, there developed within a new and changing bureaucratic organization a dual structure of official authority on one side and actual power on the other, and the whole organization developed some very strange ways of operating.” Going along with that view, it seems to me that Kang’s argument regarding the power of the provincial governors in relation to “official authority” lacks coherence. If, instead, as I attempt to do in this book, we focus on the policy of the chief of the Interior Ministry Central Police Bureau and regard that agency as wielding “actual power,” we have an approach that is also compatible with Kang’s frame of reference. From that perspective, we can better understand the actions of the Central Police Bureau chief in repealing the secret order of January 1908 because he “feared destroying good relations with the provincial governors” and in
allowing the head of the Central Police Bureau to assume command over the provincial civil police chiefs “only in times of emergency” (Korean Interior Ministry, Ryūki 2-nen Keisatsu jimu gaiyō, p. 29). All things considered, I think we can say with confidence that the provincial governors were empowered at the time under discussion.

86 Nik-Kan gaikō shiryō shūsei, vol. 6 (part 2), p. 893.
88 According to Matsui Shigeru (Matsui Shigeru jiden, p. 256), Matsui’s idea was, “First, to separate the spheres of jurisdiction of the kempeitai and the police marking out areas by province. . . . Second, to keep the kempeitai focused mainly on subduing the insurgents, and where administrative police work and judicial police matters are concerned, get backup as needed from Korean police officers.” In the passage that follows in the text, the source is Matsui Shigeru jiden, pp. 257–268 unless otherwise noted.


95 See Hong Yŏng-gi, “1907–8-nyŏn Ilche ǔi chawidan chojik kwa Han’gugin ūi taen” [Japan’s Organization of and the Korean’s People’s Reaction to the Self-defense Bands, 1907–1908], Han’guk kŏndaesa yŏn’gu [Studies in Modern Korean History], no. 3, September 1995.

96 Hasegawa to Terauchi, 2 July 1907. Terauchi Masatake kankei monjo, 38:24.

97 Hasegawa to Terauchi, statement of opinion, “Kankoku haihei ni kansuru shōrai no iken” [My Opinion on Future Deployment of Troops in Korea], September 1907, in Mitsu dai nikki, Meiji 40 (1907)–5. It was not until August the following year, 1908, that the Japanese Garrison Army in Korea began actually concentrating its forces (see Chōsen kempeitai rekishi, vol. 1, p. 248).

98 Source cited in note 92.


100 Akashi to Terauchi, 19 May 1908. Terauchi Masatake kankei monjo, 6:13.

101 Akashi to Tachibana, 26 March 1908. Tachibana Shōichirō kankei monjo [Documents Related to Tachibana Shōichirō], National Diet Library Kensei Shiryōshitsu (Modern Japanese Political History Collection), Tokyo, 5: 5.

102 Itō to Prime Minister Saionji Kinmochi, statement of opinion, January 1908, “Kōbun zassan” [Miscellaneous Official Document Collections], National Archives of Japan, 2A13-san [miscellaneous], 1083.

103 Regarding Korean resistance to Residency General rule, and the interpretation that this was the source of Itō’s loss of enthusiasm as the country’s administrator, I have drawn particularly from Moriyama, Kindai Nik-Kan kankei shi kenkyū, p. 145; Lone, “The Japanese Annexation of Korea 1910,” pp. 156–158; Duus, The Abacus and the Sword; and Kang Ch’ang-sŏk, Chosŏn T’ongkambu yŏn’gu, p. 85. However, although these studies present a common understanding of the factors that led to Itō’s resignation, the problem remains that they do not adequately probe the developments in Residency General rule between Itō’s resignation and Korea’s annexation. I present my own view on this matter later in Section 4 of this chapter.

104 Hasegawa to Terauchi, 7 July 1908. Terauchi Masatake kankei monjo, 360:67.

105 Note that it is also unlikely that Itō’s return to Japan at that time was for government business. The diary of Hara Takashi tells us that Itō, during his previous trip home to Japan from December 1907 to April 1908, made contact with then Prime Minister Saionji Kinmochi and with Hara himself, but he did not do so during this time in Japan just prior to his resignation as resident general. In the diary entry for 7 March 1909, Hara wrote: “Met Itō for the first time in a long while.” Hara Keiichirō, ed., Hara Takashi nikki [Diary of Hara Takashi], Fukumura Shuppan, 1965.

106 Hara Takashi nikki, entry for 4 January 1910.

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111 *Chōsen kempentai rekishi*, vol. 1, p. 186.

112 Himaraya Sanjin, “Fuku-tōkan toshite no Sone Arasuke-shi” [Sone Arasuke as Vice Resident General], *Chōsen*, vol. 2, no. 2, October 1908.

113 *Hara Takashi nikki*, entries for 19 April and 3 June 1909.

114 According to one contemporary article, prevailing informed opinion about Sone maintained that Itō and Sone “differ markedly in reputation, and more, that Sone is unfit” for the post of resident general. See Miyake Setsurei, “Sone shin tōkan” [Sone, the New Resident General], *Chūō kōron*, vol. 24, no. 7, July 1909, p. 59.


122 Regarding the Japanese government’s response to the Iljinhoe’s petition for unification, see also Yi Yang, “Tai-Kan seisaku no ichi sokumen: Ishinkai no ichi” [One Facet of Japan’s Korean Policy: The Place of the Iljinhoe], *Kyūshū shigaku*, no. 84, 1985, pp. 72–73; Sakurai Ryōju, “Nik-Kan gōhō kengi to Nihon seifu no taio” [The Proposal for Japan-Korea Unification and the Japanese Government’s Response], *Reitaku Daigaku kiyō*, vol. 55, December 1992, pp. 37–42; and Hatanos Masaru, “Nik-Kan heigō undō: Uchida Ryōhei to taigai kōha yoron no ugoki o chūshin ni” [The Movement for Japan-Korea Unification: A Study Focusing on Developments Involving Uchida Ryōhei and Foreign Policy Hardliners], *Ningen kagaku* (Tokai University), vol. 10. no. 2, March 1993, pp. 76–77. However, because these studies do not use the telegrams in *T’ongkambu munsŏ* as historical
sources, their explanations concerning the attitude of the Residency General fall short, a deficiency that the present work expressly seeks to rectify.

123 In October 1909, upon receiving a report from Sugiyama Shigemaru on the moves by the Ilchinhoe to form a coalition with two other large political associations to support the annexation petition campaign, Katsura commented that “the unification [of Japan and Korea] will occur in its own proper time; it will not do to cause trouble by rushing headlong into [unification].” Kokuryūkai, Nik-Kan goppō hishi, vol. 2, p. 212.


125 War Minister Terauchi to the chief of the kempeitai in Korea, telegram, “Regarding: Secret Order on Measures against Political Agitation Following the Iljinhoe Members’ Petition for Korea-Japan Unification], 3 December 1909, in T’ongkambu munsŏ, vol. 8, p. 41.


127 Prime Minister Katsura Tarō to Resident General Sone Arasuke; source cited in note 117.


131 Ōsaka Asahi shimbun, 14 December 1909. Though worded differently, Sone’s comments in favor of maintaining the status quo in Korea policy also appeared in the Ōsaka Mainichi shimbun and Kokumin shimbun, in both cases on 10 December 1909, and in the Tōkyō nichinichi shimbun on 14 December 1909. Also, an editorial in the Hwangsŏng sinmun referred to those remarks by Sone while appealing to the Korean people to refrain from unrest over the issue of the Iljinhoe petition for unification.

132 Han Sang-il, Nik-Kan kindaishi no kūkan, p. 192.


134 Regarding the commander of the Japanese Army in Korea serving concurrently as acting resident general, Ishizuka Eizō, acting head of general affairs in the Residency General, had already requested that expedient in a letter to Terauchi dated 20 December 1909 (Terauchi Masatake kankei monjo, 86:1). In January the following year, furthermore, Ōkubo Haruno, commander of the Japanese Garrison Army in Korea, proposed to Terauchi two possible approaches to the matter: that the army commander, while not formally appointed as acting resident general, take charge of Residency General affairs as circumstances require; or, that he be formally appointed as acting resident general (Ōkubo to Terauchi, 3 January 1910, Terauchi Masatake kankei monjo, 222:16). In late March, Japan’s ruling party Chūō Club censured Prime Minister Katsura for not appointing an official acting resident general (see Komori Tokui, Akashi Motojirō, vol. 1, Taiwan Nichinichi Shipōsha, 1927; reprint, Hara Shobō, 1968, pp. 350–351), which suggests that the former of Ōkubo’s suggestions was adopted.

135 Two studies—Kokuryūkai, Nik-Kan gōhō hishi, vol. 2, p. 623, and Baba Tsunego, Kiuchi Jūshirō den [Biography of Kiuchi Jūshirō], Herarudoshia, 1937, p. 231—maintain that Yamagata, Katsura, and Terauchi met on 20 March and resolved to dismiss Sone and proceed with the annexation of Korea, but neither work cites any source for that claim. However, the press reported that, at a meeting held the following day between Katsura and a group including Diet member Adachi Kenzō of the Daidō Club, “In response to the proposal that there was an urgent need to dismiss Resident
General Sone and thoroughly shake up the Residency General staff, Prime Minister Katsura explained that their proposal was more or less consistent with his own opinion and that he was already certain of what to do about the matter . . . and wished to leave it to him for the time being.” (Osaka Asahi shimbun, 25 March 1910). This suggests that Katsura was in fact maneuvering to distance himself from Sone around that time.

136 Such a view is expressed, for example, in Unno, Kankoku heigō shi no kenkyū, pp. 355–357.
137 Sone to Terauchi, 6 December 1909. Terauchi Masatake kankei monjo, 289:4.
138 Komori, Akashi Motojirō, vol. 1, p. 439. Given that Akashi had been awarded the Order of the Sacred Treasure, Second Class the previous year for his services in suppressing the insurgents, it is hard to imagine that the resignation was due to some fault on his part, and so the view expressed in this biography is presumably correct.
140 Sakakibara to Terauchi, 1 January 1910. Terauchi Masatake kankei monjo, 262:4.
142 According to the Terauchi dairy entries for February to May 1910 (Terauchi Masatake nikki), the people he met with during this time included Yamagata, Katsura, Usagawa, Sakakibara, Ogawa Heikichi (member of the Lower House and member of the Nik-Kan Dōshikai), and Sugiyama Shigemaru (member of the Kokuryūkai).
143 After graduating from the law department of the Imperial University (now University of Tokyo) in July 1890, Akiyama served in the foreign ministry. From 1904 to 1910 he served as a councilor in the war ministry, and from 1910 on held that post concurrently with that of councilor in the Government General of Korea. It is known that, during the period from the Russo-Japanese War until around the time of Korea’s annexation, Akiyama drafted policy proposals on a number of issues relating to the Korean administration other than those mentioned in the present work; and in the spring of 1904, at the request of the foreign ministry, he produced a report on making Korea a Japanese protectorate. (See Tanaka Shin’ichi, “Chōsen ni okeru tochi chōsa jigyō no sekaiheki-teki ichi: Teikoku shugi shokuminchi-teki tochi seisaku no tokushu Nihon Chōsen-teki seikaku (1)” [The Significance in World History of Land Survey Project in Korea: The Distinctive Japanese-Korean Nature of the Imperialist-Colonialist Land Policy (1)], Shakai kagaku kenkyū, vol. 29, no. 3, October 1977, pp. 69–70.) After Korea was annexed, Akayama also formulated, at Governor General Terauchi’s bidding, a proposal for switching from a three-tiered to a two-tiered judicial system, though such a revision was never realized. (See Kokubu Sangai, “Chōsen shihōkai no ōnen o kataru: Zadankai yoroku” [Talking about the History of the Korean Judicial System: Supplement to the Roundtable Discussion], Chōsen Shihō Kyōkai zasshi, vol. 20, no. 3, March 1941, p. 337.)
144 Akiyama Masanosuke den [Biography of Akiyama Masanosuke], ed. and pub. by Akiyama Masanosuke Den Hensankai, 1941, pp. 129–131. According to Komori 1968, vol. 1, pp. 460–461, in addition to Akiyama, Tanaka Gi’ichi, head of the military affairs department of the war ministry, also had a hand in formulating the plan for the new military police system, but I have not been able to corroborate or further elucidate this claim.
147 This process has been dealt with in many studies in this field and therefore will not be examined in detail in the present work. For a recent study on the topic, see Unno, Kankoku heigō shi no kenkyū, pp. 368 ff.
149 Unno offers a different interpretation regarding the haste to establish the military police system.
The objective was to firmly secure authority over police affairs in Korea, but, he says, the military police system “would have been established anyway as a corollary of the planned annexation of Korea. That it was nonetheless forced through two months prior to the annexation was perhaps because Terauchi, Akashi, and their cohorts feared that, once conditions had returned to normal after the annexation, the Japanese government would not have allowed kempeitai-civil police integration (which could be construed as making martial law permanent) as part of the apparatus of colonial rule” (Unno, *Kankoku heigō shi no kenkyū*, pp. 374–375). However, given the unlikelihood that significant opposition would arise to hinder the creation of the new military police system, I think it wrong to regard this fear of roadblocks as the reason for the rush to set up the system before annexation. First of all, it is not clear exactly who Unno means when he refers to a “Japanese government” that would not have allowed the amalgamation of the kempeitai and the civil police. War Minister Terauchi himself was highly influential in the government as a dominant member of the cabinet, and Prime Minister Katsura had also sanctioned the creation of a kempei-led unified police system. In that context, it is difficult to imagine that there were any significant government figures opposed to kempeitai-civil police integration, nor is there any documentary evidence suggesting that there were. Second, even supposing, as Unno does just before the passage quoted above, that there were “police bureaucrats and legal scholars” who could have formed a faction opposing kempeitai-police integration, it is unlikely that such a group would have had sufficient political influence to thwart the police integration policy. It is true that (Korean Interior Ministry) Police Bureau Chief Matsui Shigeru, cited by Unno as one such “police bureaucrat,” opposed kempeitai-police integration, but his position had already grown too weak to matter politically as I discuss in the next chapter. Regarding Akiyama Masanosuke, cited by Unno as one of the “police bureaucrats” opposed to the police integration policy, I have pointed out in the present work that Akiyama, as Terauchi’s close aide and confidante, was on the contrary one of the architects of the move to integrate the different police organs. (In the comments quoted by Unno, Akiyama expressed his opposition not to the new military police system itself but to the idea of making it a permanent institution.)

150 See Asai Yoshizumi, “Kankoku heigō zengo ni o keru Nihonjin kanryō ni tsuite: Bunkan kōtō shiken gōkakusha o chūshin ni” [Japanese Bureaucrats around the Time of the Annexation of Korea: With a Focus on Bureaucrats Who Had Passed the Higher Civil Service Examination], *Chōsen gakuhō*, no. 193, October 2004, p. 89. According to this study, of the Japanese bureaucrats who had passed the higher civil service examination and had been appointed to the government of the Empire of Korea (1897–1910), around 78 percent are believed to have remained in Korea to serve in the Government General.


153 Among such works are *Kongōsan annai ki* [Guide to Geumgangsan], edited and published by the Ch’unch’ón Kempeitai Headquarters, 1911; *Kōgendō jōkyō kōgai* [Overview of Conditions in Kangwŏndo], edited and published by the Ch’unch’ón Kempeitai, 1913; *Heianhokudō kyūkan chūsa* [Survey of Old Customs in P’yŏngan-bukto], edited and published by the Úiju Kempeitai Headquarters and the P’yŏngan-bukto Police Department, 1913; and *Kannan shi shiryō* [Materials on (Hamgyŏng-namdo), edited and published by the Hamgyŏng-namdo Kempeitai Headquarters, 1915.


156 Yun Pyŏng-sŏk, “Ku hanmal chuhan Ilbon-gun e taehayŏ,” p. 115.