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<th>著者</th>
<th>MATSUDA Toshihiko</th>
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<td>図書名</td>
<td>Governance and policing of colonial Korea : 1904-1919</td>
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<tr>
<td>シリーズ</td>
<td>Nichibunken monograph series ; 12</td>
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<td>URL</td>
<td><a href="http://doi.org/10.15055/00000155">http://doi.org/10.15055/00000155</a></td>
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During 1909 and the first part of 1910, just before Korea’s annexation, Japanese officials employed at the Central Police Bureau in the Korean Ministry of the Interior made a study of the police system in British-occupied Egypt. That study has remained in near-total obscurity, apart from a brief reference in a memoir written in later years by Matsui Shigeru, chief of the Korean Central Police Bureau at the time and the leading figure in the investigation (henceforth referred to as the Egypt Study). There Matsui noted that he had been very interested in the Egyptian police. In this chapter I attempt to reconstruct the inception, procedure, and results of the Egypt Study, relying largely on documents I have been able to find amid the materials in the Doctor Matsui Shigeru Memorial Library (Matsui Shigeru Hakase Kinen Bunko; hereinafter, Matsui Library) formerly housed in the archives of the National Police Academy. Also, by examining certain arguments Matsui constructed using the results of the Egypt Study, and considering the political circumstances of those months leading up to the annexation, I try to illuminate the way Matsui Shigeru and other Japanese officials working in the Korean police organization conceived of and planned for Korea’s police. One further point: In Section 3 of the previous chapter we examined the rivalry between the Japanese kempeitai in Korea and the Korean civil police, paying particular attention to the thinking and intentions of kempeitai chief Akashi Motojirō. In this chapter, we will bring some balance to the picture by focusing on the Korean police side.

To begin with, what were Japanese police officials looking for in conducting a study of the Egyptian police? These were people helping to drive Korea’s colonization; what could they hope to gain by examining the police in a country so distant and apparently unrelated as Egypt? Those questions are linked with Japan’s late emergence as an imperialist nation and the extent to which it studied and absorbed the colonial experience and approaches of the Western imperialist powers. We will go into those issues below, but first let us sort out the current state of research and the major topics being studied.

Research on this subject can be divided into two large areas. One is work that compares and contrasts colonial rule by Western powers and Japanese colonial rule. The comparative historical approach has merit, but it tends to put its subjects on a level plane
and pull them out of their historical context, which in Japan’s case was the milieu of a late-blooming imperialist country that saw the patterns of colonial administration by the older European imperialist powers as models to learn from. There are today some recent and ongoing studies in comparative history by scholars of modern Korea that address the specific circumstances of different times, but so far their research topics have been extremely narrow.  

The second area is the investigation of modern Japanese ideas and assumptions about Egypt. During the early decades of the Muhammed Ali dynasty (1805–1914), whose rule is taken to mark the emergence of modern Egypt, the country’s two major goals were to free itself from control by the Ottoman Turks and to modernize in the Western mold. By the 1840 Treaty of London, however, four European capitalist nations compelled Muhammad Ali to accept a settlement that ensnared Egypt in a system of unequal treaties. By 1876, Egypt’s accumulated foreign debt was so enormous and its fiscal situation so dire that Britain and France took joint control of the country’s finances. These were critical times, ripe for the rise of nationalist movements like the Urabists who, led by Ahmad Urabi and other disaffected military officers, staged an uprising in 1879 and rallied supporters with the slogan, “Egypt for the Egyptians.” Military intervention by the British squelched the insurrection, and after 1882, the French having been maneuvered out, Egypt was left under the sole occupation of the British.

In those years, when modern Egypt was struggling to advance, Japan was moving through the first half of the Meiji period (1868–1912). In the view of scholars of Middle Eastern and African history, Japan at that time could identify with Egypt as a non-Western country under pressure from the European powers, but after Japan’s victories in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) confidence soared and stoked a rising call for expansion of Japanese influence in the world. At that point, the argument goes, Japanese began to look upon British and French rule in the Middle East as a model for their own nation’s rule in Korea. Studies dealing with the central concerns of Japanese in the early Meiji period give excellent accounts of specific topics, but, importantly for our purposes, they fail to fully convey the thinking and preoccupations of Japanese once Japan itself became an imperialist country. Those studies do not probe the precise concepts of colonial governing or administrative policies debated in Japan at the time, nor do they examine what Japanese learned from British rule in Egypt or how Japanese used what they learned.

Thus research on Japan’s rule in Korea compared with British rule in Egypt has generally proceeded along two different lines, but there is still a need to dig deeper into the historical context and tackle the question of what Japan “learned” from the seasoned imperialist nations of Europe. At this point, in other words, we need more historical case studies that analyze particular policies. With those points in mind, I give in Section 1 of this chapter as full a picture as possible of the specific procedures and methods followed
in carrying out the Egypt Study. Section 2 outlines the basic facts of reforms that took place in the Egyptian police system under the British occupation and considers how the Egypt Study assessed those reforms. In Section 3, bringing in the background of the political situation, I trace the course of the opinion paper based on the findings of the Egypt Study that was written by Korean Central Police Bureau Chief Matsui Shigeru.

1. Process and Procedure of the Egypt Study

We begin with a consideration of the professional career of Matsui Shigeru, who directed the Egypt Study, and the Matsui Library, a collection of materials containing abundant clues to many aspects of the Study. Matsui was born in Hiroshima in 1866, his father a physician. In 1890 he entered the law faculty of Tokyo Imperial University. Upon the completion of his studies he took up a post in the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department, but in his free time he continued to spend many hours at the university researching police law. He was made chief of the Yotsuya Police Station in Tokyo in 1895, which was his first clearly directed step onto the path of a career bureaucrat in the police. Matsui’s rise into officialdom coincided with the onset of a period when graduates of Tokyo Imperial University were beginning to penetrate the upper echelons of the Meiji government bureaucracies, achieving positions that had once been monopolized by men from the former domains that led the overthrow of the Tokugawa shogunate and the establishment of the Meiji government in 1868. Matsui was sent to Europe in 1901 by the Ministry of Home Affairs for about a year, and on the basis of what he observed and learned during that time, he published Ōbei keisatsu shisatsudan [Observations on the Police in the West] (1902), Berurin keisatsu enkakushi [A History of the Berlin Police] (1903), and Kakkoku keisatsu seido [Police Systems in Other Countries] (1906). These and other works make it clear that Matsui was well acquainted with police work in both its theoretical and practical aspects, and that, as a police official, he was well prepared for and brought considerable scholarly finesse to the comparative study of police systems in different countries.

Matsui served in Korea after the Russo-Japanese War, during the last phase of the colonization of Korea. He was sent in 1906 to Pusan, where, as the Resident he had jurisdiction over Japanese nationals living in Pusan and was responsible for their protection. In July of the following year the two governments concluded the Third Japan-Korea Convention, by which Japanese were able to take official posts in the Korean government. The Residency General had tagged Matsui as the perfect person to take over the Korean government’s police department, and so at its request, Matsui was made adviser to the Residency General and concurrently head of the Korean Central Police Bureau. For
about three years, from August 1907 until June 1910, Matsui headed the Korean Central Police Bureau. Being at the head of the police department placed him right at the center of the Korean government, which was under the firm control of high-level Japanese officials. The years of Matsui’s tenure as Central Police Bureau chief, however, were a tumultuous period when rival convictions about the police system in Korea vied for dominance. The idea of placing Japanese policemen in the local regions, thereby recasting the nature of the Korean police, was being steered in a direction that would give control of the outlying areas to the kempeitai, large numbers of whom originally had been brought in to stamp out the Righteous Army guerillas. As will be explained in Section 2, there was a close connection between all these changes sweeping through the police organization and the decision to make a study of the Egyptian police system. Let us go on now to outline the Egypt Study, noting materials that have been preserved in the Matsui Library.

As of 1979, of the 416 items in the Matsui Library, the great majority either are written by Matsui or are works in Japanese and other languages collected by him. Some of the more important ones, including documents handwritten by Matsui and works printed in typeset, are bound into sheaves and filed as “Kankoku keisatsu chōsa shiryō” [Documents on Surveys of the Korean Police] (4 volumes); “Matsui sensei keisatsu ikensho” [Opinion Papers of Doctor Matsui] (3 volumes); and “Kaigai keisatsu shiryō” [Documents on the Police in Foreign Countries] (1 volume). (It is assumed that the file names were determined when the Matsui Bunko was being organized.) Out of all these, 50 items are considered to have been produced during Matsui’s residence in Korea. Besides the materials that Matsui was involved in producing, including chronologies, records, documents related to security, and opinion papers on police organization reform, there are also survey reports on police systems in other countries. Following is a chronological listing of the documents related to studies of the police in foreign countries.

All of the above are found in the “Kaigai keisatsu shiryō” file except (6), which is in volume 3 of the “Matsui sensei keisatsu ikensho” file. Most of these seven works deal in some way with the police in Egypt; (2) through (5), and also (6), devote a considerable number of pages to the subject. As we will see, considering the limited time frame and the relatively few people involved, it appears that those five studies were conducted at the same time. Furthermore, while (1) and (7) on Hong Kong and India, respectively, tend to be heavy on objective, factual data recorded in a detached survey style, the reports related to the Egyptian police contain some interpretive evaluations and a certain amount of judgmental commentary related to policy.

Turning now to the inception of the Egypt Study and the individuals who were involved in it, the items listed above indicate that the first to be undertaken were (1) and (2) dated 1908. Both are abridged translations of reports originally written in English, and presumably they did not require much, if any, effort in investigation and crafting. Those listed as (3), (4), and (6), on the other hand, are more fully developed reports that contain independent analyses by the writer, and they are dated 1909 and early 1910. We can infer from the dates and type of report that the Egypt Study started not long before 1908.

As for who was responsible for writing up the survey data, the name Ōishi Yoshiki appears in (3), (4), and (7), and from the style of handwriting in (1), (2), and (5), it looks as though Ōishi authored or edited these, as well. The most comprehensive of the reports Ōishi wrote during his tenure in the security section of the Korean Central Police Bureau was (3), “Ejiputo shokumin keisatsu,” dated 23 February 1909 (henceforth, “Ōishi Report”). Insofar as that report was directed to Matsui Shigeru and Iwai Keitarō (chief of the security section in the Korea Central Police Bureau), one naturally supposes that the whole Egypt Study was carried out in response to a directive from Matsui and Iwai. There are few sources providing information on the procedure followed for the project, but we can surmise that its management chain went from the Central Police Bureau chief (Matsui) → the Bureau’s security section chief (Iwai) → the Japanese officer assigned to that section (Ōishi). Finally, the fact that all of the reports listed above except (6) were written in Japanese on Korean Interior Ministry letterhead backs the assumption that the Egypt Study was carried out by Japanese officials employed by the Police Bureau of the ministry.

The next question concerns how the several reports were compiled and finalized. It is entirely possible that the reports sent by Ōishi to his superiors, Matsui and Iwai, were used in producing Matsui’s “Gokuhi: Kankoku keisatsu ni kansuru ikensho,” dated 21 February 1910 (item (6) above, henceforth referred to as “Matsui Opinion Paper” or MOP). Chapter six of the latter, entitled “Ejiputo keisatsu no enkaku” [History of the Egyptian Police], by itself takes up 34 double-sided sheets (68 pages) out of a total of 104 sheets (208 pages), or about one-third of the entire volume. Matsui wrote a note explaining that, “The description of the Egyptian police may be somewhat redundant, but
I have decided to include that section because, in short, we do not want to be left without foundations in theory when we go about the structuring of a nation.” (Matsuda, Matsui Shigeru Hakase Kinen Bunko kyūzō, vol. 8, p. 357. The page numbers given below in parentheses, unless otherwise indicated, refer to this volume.) In fact, that chapter in the Matsui Opinion Paper on the police in Egypt strongly reflects the influence of the Ōishi Report. Section 2 “Ejiputo keisatsu no enkaku” (pp. 291–321), for example, draws heavily on the Ōishi Report (number (3) above, pp. 41–62); and Chapter Six, Section 3 (“Kurōmākyō no naisei kaikaku ni taisuru hihyō” [Critique of Lord Cromer’s Home Reforms] (pp. 323–328) is much indebted to Ejiputo naisei kaikaku (number (2) above), which, as we noted, appears to be an abridged translation by Ōishi of Modern Egypt by Lord Cromer. According to what is stated in the preface of Matsui Opinion Paper, this weighty piece of work was ultimately intended for Resident General of Korea Sone Arasuke. What happened to the ideas expressed in the Matsui Opinion Paper after it was given to the resident general will be discussed in Section 3 of this chapter.

Finally, we must consider the sources for the Egypt Study. In Ōishi’s several reports and in some parts of the Matsui Opinion Paper the references are clear and indicate that the most frequently consulted works were in English: (1) Sir Auckland Colvin, The Making of Modern Egypt (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1906); (2) the two-volume work by Alfred Milner, England in Egypt (London: Edward Arnold, 1907); and (3) Lord Cromer, Modern Egypt (London: Macmillan and Co., 1908).

All three, written by British officials who participated in the early years of Britain’s administration of Egypt, have the character of memoirs, and as such, they record noteworthy aspects of the history of British rule in that country. Colvin, the author of (1), was made a commissioner on the Caisse de la Dette Publique d’Egypt (Egyptian Public Debt Commission) in 1879 representing British creditors to Egypt, and he also acted as government controller. In 1882 he became financial adviser to the Egyptian government during the first part of the British occupation. Milner, author of (2), worked as private secretary to Lord George Goschen, who formulated the early debt servicing system in Egypt, and then between 1889 and 1892 he was director general of accounts in Egypt, ranking just below the financial adviser (undersecretary of finance). The author of (3) was Evelyn Baring, who became the first Lord Cromer after he was ennobled, first as earl and later as baron. Here we will simply use the name Cromer. In 1877 he was the British commissioner on the multinational Caisse de la Dette Publique d’Egypt, and in 1879 he succeeded to the post of controller-general in Egypt. In September 1883, after the British occupation had begun, he was made British agent and consul-general. In that capacity, Cromer worked for more than twenty years as the chief executive of the government of Egypt.

Colvin, Milner, Cromer—each was closely involved with Egypt during the period when Britain became Egypt’s sole governor. As might be expected, all three had a robust
sense of self-importance regarding their part in the British rule of Egypt, and their writing resonates with their conviction of self-worth. Auckland Colvin, who succeeded Cromer as controller-general and was a member of the public debt commission, outdid himself praising Cromer in *The Making of Modern Egypt*: “*The Making of Modern Egypt* is the work of Lord Cromer; without him it might scarcely have been accomplished, and with his name it will remain identified.”12 In the case of Milner’s *England in Egypt*, when it appeared in 1907 it provoked an angry uproar among Egyptians for its unabashed defense of a long-term British occupation of Egypt, in bald contradiction to Britain’s international pledge that the occupation would be temporary.13 As for Cromer, whom Edward Said (late author of *Orientalism*) singled out as the “personification of ‘orientalism’,”14 his book was said to have been aimed at refuting Wilfrid S. Blunt, the English traveler and writer who took the side of the Egyptian nationalists and became a spokesman for them.

It so happened that among British officials and writers the name of Cromer, consul-general in Egypt, was particularly well known in Japan around the time of the Egypt Study. Now and then the press would compare the management of Korea by its first resident general, Itō Hirobumi, with the way Cromer ran Egypt,15 and Itō himself made it clear in an April 1907 address how keenly aware he was of Cromer:

I have made it a practice to keep myself abreast of Egypt’s financial affairs, but when my appointment as resident general was confirmed, a message arrived at the British Embassy in Tokyo from Lord Cromer. He noted how extremely important Japan’s work to assist Korea is. He said that Britain always sought to benefit Egypt; if they did not have that passion, they could not achieve their objectives. Just at the time when I heard about this communication, I myself was about to assume my new post in Korea. In his letter Lord Cromer wrote that a most politically capable person should be assigned to govern Korea.16

The Japanese translation of the Cromer work was published in 1911 by the Dai Nippon Bunmei Kyōkai. In addition, an abridged Japanese translation of Milner’s *England in Egypt* was done in 1906 by Inoue Masaji, who was a financial officer working at the headquarters of the financial adviser in Korea. The translation was titled *Kankoku keiei shiryō: Eijiputo ni okeru Eikoku* [Sources on the Management of Korea: England in Egypt].17 Those works by British officials—materials that were central to the Egypt Study—contained passage after passage rationalizing and justifying British rule in Egypt, and while their objectivity as original sources is certainly in question, Japanese at the time, including the people in charge of colonizing Korea, were familiar with the British officials and with their books and reports. That feeling of familiarity, that affinity, probably worked to give a stronger sense of legitimacy to the arguments made in the Egypt Study.
There is some indication that when the Egypt Study got under way, attempts were made not to rely simply on secondary sources but to consult factual, objective primary sources as well. At the beginning of “Ejiputo Kairo shimon seido 1908-nen hōkoku” (item (5) above, probably translated by Ōishi) there is in Japanese translation a letter dated 6 June 1909 from George Harvey, commander of the Cairo City Police, addressed to the Korean Central Police Bureau. In the letter Harvey says in effect that he received an annual report sent from the Korean Central Police Bureau to the Cairo City Police in Egypt (the document in question is thought to be Ryūki 2-nen Kankoku naibu keisatsu jimu gaiyō [1909 Summary of Korean Police Affairs] published by the Central Police Bureau, Korean Interior Ministry), but, he says, a corresponding report on the administration of the Egyptian police, which the Police Bureau had requested, was not available. Therefore, he continues, he was sending instead an annual report on the fingerprinting system in Cairo that he had introduced in Egypt thirteen years before. This was certainly less than the Police Bureau in Korea had wanted, but it represented a new accomplishment—the start of direct exchange of information between people actually doing the business of police work in Korea and Egypt.

In the following section I will discuss how Japanese in Korea regarded the reforms that were made in the practical management of the police in Egypt under British rule.

2. The Egypt Study’s View of the Egyptian Police Reforms

(1) Egyptian Police Reforms under the British Occupation

This section examines changes that took place in the Egyptian police during the British occupation. The period under consideration is limited to the ten-odd years specified by the Egypt Study, namely from about 1882 when Britain became Egypt’s sole ruler, to around 1894, when the first chapter of the reforms had come to a close.

In 1820 under Muhammad Ali, whose policies pushed Egypt to emerge as a modern nation, a system of rural administration was instituted that centralized power through a hierarchy of political divisions; the biggest was the province, followed by region, district, subdistrict, and village. Egypt was split up into seven provinces (mudirīya) (under Cromer these were divided and the number of provinces increased to fourteen). Provincial governors (mudir) and regional heads (ma’mur), who were appointed by the Ministry of the Interior and were under its jurisdiction, held governing authority, but as the top local officials they also held police and judicial powers, which meant that they controlled all police officers, from the regional chief of police on down. Administering the most basic unit of government was a well-off landowning class of village headmen called umda. Originally they were appointed from above, but the position of umda became effectively hereditary.
They gave patrolmen or guards, known as *ghaffirs*, the functions of tax collecting, military conscription, and conscripting labor, as well as the authority to make arrests and impose punishments. *Umda* thus carried out police powers as well.\(^{21}\)

The British ambassador to Constantinople, Lord Frederick Dufferin, was sent to Egypt in late 1882 and he stayed until early 1883, when the British occupation was just beginning. At the top of a list of instructions to him from Britain, he was charged with overseeing the “reorganization of the military and the police,” the main point being to keep Egypt stable and prevent more violent explosions of Egyptian nationalism, like the revolt of the army officers that turned into the Urabi Uprising of 1879–1882.\(^{22}\)

In keeping with this mandate, the first one to make concrete changes in the police system was Valentine Baker, who, having served as military adviser to the Ottoman Turks, was invited to Egypt where he became inspector-general. When he took up that post early in 1883, the Egyptian army, following the advice of Dufferin, was limited to 6,000 men. At that level, in Baker’s view, it would be extremely difficult to insure Egypt’s security and the defense of its southern border with Sudan. He set about reorganizing and retooling the police so that it could function as a semi-military force to supplement the army. The core was a gendarmerie 6,000 strong stationed in all the provinces under the command of Egyptian and Turkish army officers and supervised by the inspector-general and a small number of high-ranking British military officers. Organizationally the gendarmerie was separate from the existing local police, who remained under the purview of the provincial governors and region heads, and these local administrative heads retained their police powers. The principal cities and towns, furthermore, had their own Town Police whose organization and discipline were controlled by the inspector-general, but local police chiefs under the command of local chief administrators had the power to issue orders.\(^{23}\) Baker’s reforms are generally thought to have been “intended to supplement rather than replace the existing traditional system.”\(^{24}\) For some time a revolt by followers of the Mahdist movement, which was aimed at ridding Sudan of Egyptian and European influences, had been brewing in Sudan, and at the end of 1883 Baker led a contingent of gendarmes into eastern Sudan to try to put down the Mahdists. The expedition ended in a complete rout in February 1884, sending Baker and the other survivors scurrying back to Egypt.

In the meantime, in September 1883, about when Cromer became consul-general, Clifford Lloyd arrived as the newly appointed director general of reform. (Lloyd would be made undersecretary to the interior minister in 1884.) In Lloyd’s view, too much power, including that of the police, was still massed in the hands of provincial governors. He regarded Baker’s reforms as having made no improvements, and while Baker was away, he instituted measures intended to counteract those reforms in several areas. In line with Khedive Tawfik’s decree issued in December 1883 at the initiative of Lloyd, Egypt was divided into three sectors, in each of which was stationed a delegate of the inspector-
general—an Englishman directly accountable to the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior—and in each province an Egyptian and an English inspector, both directly under the delegates. These arrangements effectively checked the exercise of police authority by the mudir and ma’mur (local governors) in their territories, and transferred that power to the British police chain of command, from the inspector-general on down. And, whereas Baker’s reforms had left the organization of police work as it was, Lloyd was intent upon completely removing police powers from the mudir and ma’mur and dismantling the traditional police apparatus. (But the village headmen and ghaffirs at the lowest unit of government held on to their police functions; not even Lloyd’s reforms affected them.)

Lloyd’s program for Egypt was anathema to the Egyptian government. The minister of the interior resigned, and the prime minister, Nubar Pasha, threatened to resign. In active opposition to Britain’s intervention in the governing of Egypt, Nubar in 1884 instituted in the rural areas quasi-tribunals called Commissions of Brigandage. These tribunals, which were placed under the jurisdiction of the provincial governors, were empowered to mete out quick and brutal punishments for banditry. It was a demonstration of resistance to the reduction of the traditional powers, including judicial power, of the local potentates. (The Commissions of Brigandage were abolished in 1889.) The government in London recalled Lloyd in May 1884. At that point the British themselves still regarded the occupation as temporary and had assured other nations that they had no intention of remaining in Egypt long; on that assumption, and given Egypt’s strategic importance, British priorities at that time were to maintain the power of the traditional ruling class—which meant supporting influential politicians like Nubar—and to ensure the political stability of the country. In those circumstances, Lloyd’s reforms rather quickly collapsed.

Lloyd resigned in the spring, and in September 1884 Baker returned from Sudan to find the police reorganized along the lines of Lloyd’s reforms. Stating his reasons to be lack of economic benefit in the reforms and local opposition from the provincial governors, Baker reinstated the old system, and arrangements reverted to what they had been before. During Baker’s tenure as inspector-general, provincial governors, regional heads, and district and village heads regained their former police powers and were directly responsible to the inspector-general. Baker reported good relations between the inspector-general and local chiefs, but, with the provincial governors under continued surveillance by British inspectors stationed in the rural areas, friction remained. As for the gendarmerie, Baker planned to make them the main force to maintain public security and he worked hard to have them trained and drilled. As it turned out, in November 1887 after Baker died, the gendarmerie was abolished and its personnel transferred to the British occupying army in Sudan.

Thereupon, “Bitter power struggles occurred behind the scenes from 1890 to 1893, as the British moved to control the Ministries of Justice and the Interior.” The Egyptian government side doggedly resisted British control. In the spring of 1890, Herbert Kitchener...
was appointed the next inspector-general, but only after a tense tug-of-war between Consul-general Cromer and Prime Minister Nubar Pasha over who would succeed Baker. Then, when Kitchener set about reducing the ghaffir presence at the lowest levels of administration and raising efficiency,³¹ Riyadh Pasha, prime minister after Nubar Pasha, tried to get Kitchener removed (he failed and his cabinet was forced to resign en masse). In another attempt to get around British oversight, in 1892 the provincial governors were instructed by the government to stop sending their crime reports through the British inspector-general but to convey them directly to the interior minister.³²

Britain’s consolidation of control over the internal administration of government, including the police, set in motion the 1894 reform of the Ministry of the Interior. Nubar Pasha, who had returned as prime minister that spring, was already planning changes for the ministry, so Cromer took the opportunity to interfere and preempt the restructuring of the police. In November the post of police inspector-general—always an Englishman centrally placed in the Interior Ministry—and the provincial police inspector positions, which were also held by Englishmen, were abolished, ostensibly in response to a request from the Egyptian government. The effect was to remove the dualism, as it was known, of a structure wherein the Egyptian constabulary were, organizationally, under the provincial governors and regional heads, but they were controlled by the British inspector-general and British police inspectors. On the other hand, a British adviser was installed in the heart of the Ministry of the Interior. That person “was to have no executive functions, but was to have the right to be kept fully informed of all the affairs of the ministry, and to obtain all information he might consider necessary for the efficient discharge of his duties.” The man chosen for the job was Egypt’s vice minister of finance, Eldon Gorst.³³

In Harold H. Tollefson’s view, “The introduction of an English Councillor into the Ministry of the Interior would more than compensate for the elimination of the police post in terms of British influence,” and such a trade-off was possible because a scheming Cromer made sure that Nubar did not get full and accurate information about the powers of the newly established British adviser.³⁴ By new laws introduced in 1895 the duties of umda were legally codified, which curtailed some of their activities and served to systematize their police functions. The British also retained the ghaffirs, who had heretofore received no pay, making them into civil servants while putting them under its control. Thus the village headmen, the traditional ruling class in the countryside, were allowed by the central government to keep their hold on the informal politics of the rural areas.³⁵

The 1894 reorganization of the Egyptian police represented the crowning achievement of the first ten years of Cromer’s administration, an era dubbed the “years of reform” in occupied Egypt.³⁶ Regarding the reforms, Milner remarks that “the theory of Anglo-Egyptian administration, to quote Lord Cromer, is that of ’English heads and Egyptian hands.’”³⁷ For one thing, Gorst, the new adviser to the Interior Ministry, created
the post of superintendent general of police, a position within the ministry to be filled by a British officer. Among other duties, the superintendent general was assigned to the job of provincial inspection, which meant, as Cromer himself recognized, that British interference in the work of the provincial governors would not necessarily come to an end. Despite such actions, significant as they were, British administrators in the Interior Ministry were careful to maintain and exploit the existing power structure in the provinces, from the village heads of the lowest administrative units to provincial power-holders. This was the framework within which they worked to supervise the new police system, and in so doing they followed the pattern of indirect rule that became the backbone of British colonial government from the late nineteenth century onward.

That process was clearly in operation between 1882, when the British occupation began, and 1894, when British leaders undertook reform of the police organization. As for Japan’s interest in Egypt, the last period of Egyptian reforms roughly coincided with a shift that was taking place in the way Japanese saw that country: what had been a sympathetic sense of identity with Egypt as a fellowvictim of imperialism was beginning to give way to a view of Egypt as a model for colonial rule by an imperialist country. Matsui Shigeru and others high up in the police bureaucracy, the people in charge of the practical procedures in Korea’s colonization, became interested in Egypt as just that—a model. They knew about the police organization reforms in Egypt ten-odd years before, and they decided to make a detailed study of them.

(2) Conclusions of the Egypt Study and Matsui Shigeru’s Vision for Korea

As we now examine the assessment by the Egypt Study of the police reforms in occupied Egypt, we will focus first on two reports: the Ōishi Report (“Ejiputo shokumin keisatsu,” February 1909), produced during the early phase of the Study, and the Matsui Opinion Paper (“Gokuhi: Kankoku keisatsu ni kansuru ikensho,” February 1910), which was based on the Ōishi Report and written as an opinion paper for the resident general). Using these two as the main sources, we will trace the Egypt Study’s assessment of the police reforms through their several stages between 1883 and 1894. On that basis, we can go on to explore the relationship between Matsui’s view of how well the reforms in Egypt proceeded and the development of his own vision for the Korean police, which, in turn, will tell us whether, or how far, the central arguments in the Matsui Opinion Paper accurately reflected the realities of the Egyptian police system reforms.

Both Chapter 2 (“Hyōron” [Critique]) of the Ōishi Report and Chapter 6, Section 5 (“Ejiputo keisatsu to Kankoku keisatsu” [The Egyptian Police and the Korean Police]) of the Matsui Opinion Paper critically examine the several phases of reform of the Egyptian police system. We will now take a careful look at each phase of the reforms, using the valuable clues contained in those two texts to help fill out the picture.
Writing in the above-mentioned “Critique” about the early 1893 reforms instituted by Valentine Baker, the trailblazer in police force reform under the British occupation, Ōishi concludes that “General Baker wanted to govern Egypt using military-type police units, but this turned out to be his biggest miscalculation…. It was, unquestionably, a truly serious mistake to take the entire police force and try to reposition it in a military-type system, where the police were placed under military command and expected to function, when the commanders did not even know what the duties of the police were” (p. 69). In “The Egyptian Police and the Korean Police,” Matsui similarly criticizes the reform of the police system that turned it into a military style organization:

The idea of organizing the police into units that operate like a gendarmerie so that they can be used to fill in where necessary for the military while continuing to do their police duties at the same time would probably appeal to the public in its present mood…. On the surface, the plan looks good, but insofar as the basic work of the police should involve domestic affairs, to turn them into a semi-military force risks undermining the democratic character of the police (pp. 340–341).

Regarding Director General of Reform Clifford Lloyd’s reorganization of the Egyptian police at the end of 1883, the Ōishi Report notes critically that “the reforms completely removed the civil police from the control of the provincial governors.” If Lloyd, it goes on, had not taken away from the provincial governors any of their police powers and “instead let the existing civil police clamp down on crime and carry out investigations under the supervision of the provincial governors, giving responsibility for real training of the civil police to the superintendent general of police, that would have been the best solution” (pp. 69–70). The Matsui Opinion Paper, also, was harshly critical of the removal of police powers from the provincial governors: “Due to lack of communication between the police and the provincial governors, the police in the provinces lost a central command post” (p. 344), and “The Egyptians vehemently objected to Lloyd’s reforms because they took all police authority out of the hands of the provincial governors” (pp. 346–347).

The Egypt Study did not make a comprehensive analysis of how the reforms played out once they were instituted. Discussing the Commissions on Brigandage, the agencies set up by Prime Minister Nubar Pasha in 1884 specifically to stamp out robber gangs and bandits, the Ōishi Report declares at one point, “Those commissions acted with egregious brutality, demonstrating that they were no more than lawless bodies using violent repression” (p. 54), while later it avers that the Commissions “greatly helped in suppressing insurgents and for a time won the trust of society” because of a reduction in violence. The administration of justice, Ōishi continues, “among a semi-civilized race” demands the flexibility to take swift judicial action (p. 74). The Matsui Opinion
Chapter Two

Paper makes no specific comment about the Commissions, and only sparse references to developments between Baker’s death in 1887 until 1894, including the mistaken observation that Baker’s successor as inspector general of police was not an Englishman but an Egyptian (p. 311). In fact, Herbert Kitchener, who succeeded Baker, visited both Korea and Japan just as the Egypt Study was getting under way at the end of 1909. He was featured prominently in the Japanese press at the time and lauded as a great general with a magnificent war record, but all this seemed to be of no concern to Matsui and his colleagues. In any case, the MOP glosses over this period by saying, “To use Cromer’s words, ‘It is needless to describe the minor changes which the police organization underwent during the next ten years (1884–1894). It will suffice to say that the system did not work smoothly’” (pp. 311–312).

Then, finally, came the 1894 reforms, which abolished the (British) post of inspector general of police, removed the British police inspectors from the provinces, and provided for a British adviser in the Ministry of the Interior. Let us look at the responses by Ōishi and Matsui to those reforms. The Ōishi Report, quoting the aforementioned work by Colvin, summarizes the substance of the reforms in seven articles (pp. 57–59), and here it gives a fairly accurate account. The sections cited from Colvin are almost all the same ones used in the MOP (pp. 315–317). Another section of the Ōishi Report, however, contains items here and there that do not tally with the facts. It states, for example, that under the 1894 reforms, “police units were organized under British police officers,” and “the provincial police occupied a position that was semi-independent from the provincial governors” (p. 80). The basic idea behind those reforms was to put a British adviser in the Ministry of the Interior and establish a single line of command from the top over the police administration and interior affairs, but that seems not to have been sufficiently understood by the author of the Ōishi Report. In any case, the report gave a positive account of the reforms themselves, saying, “The Egyptian police system recovered and moved into a new phase. Its work was very good, with the result that it preserved public peace and order and was able to make good progress” (p. 81).

The Matsui Opinion Paper is precise and accurate in its discussion of the above reforms (pp. 313–320). It uses more or less the same expressions that Ōishi employs to commend the reforms (p. 335), and compares Egypt, where an adviser was finally installed only after protracted maneuvering back and forth, with Korea, where police advisers had been in place since halfway through the Russo-Japanese War. “In this area, our policy toward Korea is very successful…. Compared with the case of Egypt, we can say that we have made great strides” (pp. 350–351).

As a whole, the Ōishi Report is a basic general survey. It is relatively comprehensive in its depiction of the process of reform in Egypt’s police system, and it touches on areas that the MOP does not deal with—the Egyptian police training system, conditions of the jails, sanitation police, and others. Also, in another report (see “Ejiputo sonraku jichi
seido” [The System of Local Self-government in Egypt], item (4) above), Ōishi takes up some of those areas that were problematic for the police during the period of British occupation, such as how to respond to the policing activities of the village headmen operating through ghaffirs at the bottom of the administrative hierarchy. The MOP, in contrast, makes almost no mention of the material Ōishi includes in the latter document. What Matsui says about Egypt bears traces of the Ōishi Report, but the focus is limited to the Baker and Lloyd reforms and the Interior Ministry reforms of 1894. The MOP has the distinctive feature of organizing its major arguments around two points: first, the pros and cons of control by military officers over the police organization, and second, the relationship of police officers and traditional provincial authorities. By taking such an approach and limiting the focus in that way, Matsui’s assessment of the Egyptian police reforms was inseparably bound up with the vision of the police in Korea that he developed in context of the peace and security concerns of that time and place.

Starting in 1907, when Matsui became Korean Central Police Bureau chief, the Righteous Army resistance, joined by soldiers unmoored from the now-disbanded Korean army, had been escalating. As we saw in Sections 3 and 4 in the previous chapter, Akashi Motojirō, who became head of the kempeitai in October 1907, placed enormous stock in the kempeitai as the core of a force that would suppress the insurgents. Resident General Itō Hirobumi also favored a stronger kempeitai as a means to keep at least a temporary lid on the insurgent militias. The result was that the Korea civil police, which had been steadily expanding under Matsui, were gradually being overwhelmed by the kempeitai. The major goal of the Matsui Opinion Paper was to protest that development and to make a case for the superiority of the civil police with himself in command. Stated bluntly, the core argument in the Opinion Paper declares,

> Insofar as its raison d’etre is to deal directly with the people, police work should belong to the government office dealing with domestic affairs. Police administration, therefore, should be closely connected to the provincial governors, who are in direct contact with the people. The military, the primary purpose of which is the defense of the state, puts second priority on the people, and so it is entirely different in basic concept from the police. (p. 185)

Following this kind of logic, the MOP reexamines at great length the problems that had emerged so far between the Korea civil police and the kempeitai in Korea. Referring to the reversal in 1907–1908 of the relative numbers of police and kempeitai, Matsui complains that “the reduction in numbers [of police] compared with the numbers of kempeitai is an exceedingly strange phenomenon” (pp. 178–179). (See Chapter One, Figure 2 for shifts in numbers for each.) He then goes into a detailed exposition of the civil police-kempeitai power struggle, which erupted on several occasions after Akashi
became the kempeitai chief, and the problem of where the Korean auxiliary gendarmes (introduced in 1908) belonged (see Chapter One, Section 3). The MOP then uses the relation between the police and the kempeitai to state its conclusion:

In my view, for public peace and order in Korea our first objective must be to maintain an organization made up solely of police, and second, in temporary emergencies, to subdivide the provinces and deploy either police officers or kempeitai personnel where needed. Third, we must distinguish between the police and the gendarmerie according to their duties.... It would definitely not be beneficial to establish a completely new position of police chief inside the Residency General in an attempt to integrate the Korean police and the kempeitai, ... And, to place kempeitai officers in command of police officers would not only further demoralize the police, but would be counterproductive in any attempt to integrate the forces and would end up making things twice as bad as they are now... (pp. 357–358)

Matsui was convinced that the civil police had to be the main force in keeping public peace and order in Korea, and he believed that the police and kempeitai had to be kept separate, at least in the provincial areas where they were deployed and according to the kinds of duties they performed.

What was the basis for Matsui’s objection to integrating the gendarmerie and the civil police? He summed up his first argument by saying,

If we concentrate only on dealing with the surface manifestations [of opposition], and rely on firepower alone to suppress rioting mobs and reduce insurgency, and if we do not pay serious attention to the people’s inner attitudes, we will never be able to eliminate the roots of popular disaffection.... The police, on the other hand, can make an appreciable contribution to ameliorating deep-seated anti-Japanese sentiment, resolving misunderstanding about Japan, effectively communicating Japanese thinking and intent, and thereby basically preventing [the rise of anti-Japanese feeling]. (pp. 280–282)

Other Central Police Bureau texts also recognize the need to attend carefully to deeply-felt popular attitudes and to “reconcile anti-Japanese sentiment.” A survey of public sentiment in the rural areas carried out by the Central Police Bureau slightly before the completion of the Matsui Opinion Paper showed that while many complaints from Koreans were directed at activities by the Japanese army, some gradually emerging “signs of reconciliation” could be detected in attitudes toward Japanese civil officials. In an article that Matsui published in the same period, he voiced his worry that “the manifestos put out by the insurrectionists would serve to agitate ordinary, good people,” and he urged
Japanese officials and citizens in Korea to make efforts to increase the Korean people’s understanding of Japan. Matsui was gravely apprehensive about the depth and intensity of anti-Japanese sentiment among Koreans. As he saw it, repressive military force would achieve nothing but a band-aid calm; only by using police working within a civilian administration with abundant opportunities for direct contact with the people could Japan even begin to reach the hearts and minds of the people.

We should note another reason Matsui gave for rejecting the idea of integrating the police and the kempeitai. “The day might come,” he wrote, “when the Imperial Government [of Japan] has full authority over Korea’s interior affairs; now, clearly, it is not yet the time for that” (MOP, p. 207). Logically, of course, Matsui’s arguments in favor of maintaining at least the formal appearance of Korean authority over its internal affairs implied the view that annexation should wait—it was still too soon. This reluctance to move too quickly on annexation, Matsui’s gradualist or “don’t rush” attitude, was presumably related to what happened to the Matsui Opinion Paper after he submitted it to the resident general. We will examine that point more thoroughly in Section 3.

With its core premise being the conviction that the time was not yet ripe for annexation, the MOP opposed the absorption and integration of the Korean civil police into the Japanese kempeitai in Korea. It argued that the civil police by themselves were much better able and better equipped to get wind of and to suppress the ideology of anti-Japanese resistance that lay at the root of the activity by guerilla militias. The Matsui Opinion Paper devoted at least as many, maybe more, pages to analyzing the reforms in the Egyptian police system as it did to the development of Matsui’s own arguments. The reason was, of course, that Matsui recognized in the way those reforms were carried out—or more accurately, in his interpretation of the way they were carried out—something that could be taken as a concrete historical precedent and would support his own position. In the perspective of the MOP, the police organization in Korea during the protectorate period “should belong to the government office dealing with domestic affairs.” Thus Matsui, who was dead set against letting the military control the Korea civil police, could point to the military police-centered system created by Baker in Egypt. He could describe its failure and then hold up the experience of the British colonial rulers, who finally returned police powers to the traditional provincial authorities by the reform of 1894, as an object lesson and a valuable precedent. Fortified with what was learned from the Egypt Study, the Matsui Opinion Paper put forth sharp questions and forceful arguments:

If the basis of police administration is not treated as a domestic civil concern that makes the people its primary focus, the [policing system] cannot operate smoothly. In the worst case, it will have adverse effects and will undermine civil order. As we can see, that was clearly demonstrated in the case of Egypt …. (p. 187)

…. The kempeitai today must not be given control over the Korean civil police. We
Chapter Two

should keep this in mind and *not repeat the same mistakes that the British made in Egypt.* (p. 207) (Emphasis added by the author.)

Thus the Matsui Opinion Paper insisted that the process of reform in the Egyptian police system held important lessons for those who would rule Korea, but how persuasive it was remains a different matter. Actually, in its excessive zeal to emphasize Matsui’s position on the two points noted—military control over the civil police and the relationship between the police and traditional local leaders—the MOP fell short on objectivity, in some places even distorting the facts. Let us look more closely at that aspect of the Matsui Opinion Paper.

First, to contest the plan to place the police organization under the control of military personnel, the MOP relied heavily on Colvin’s *The Making of Modern Egypt.* There, expressing sharp criticism of Valentine Baker’s reforms, Colvin writes, for example, “It was an initial mistake to put the police under the control of a soldier, who was profoundly ignorant of police duties.”

Clifford Lloyd, also, as he himself later acknowledged, used Colvin’s critique of Baker’s reforms as a reference when he instituted his own, later reforms. Having said that, if we consider the fact that every superintendent general of police up to that point, during the decade-long process of reform in the Egyptian police system, was a military officer stationed in Egypt with the British army, it is hard to believe that Cromer and the other administrators made as much of an issue of military personnel controlling the police as the MOP insists they did.

I believe there is room to question the Matsui Opinion Paper concerning the second point, also, that is, in its use of Egypt as an example to back the argument for giving policing powers over to the jurisdiction of traditional local authorities. To be sure, the 1894 reform gave policing powers back to the provincial governors and regional heads in Egypt, but for the Japanese administrators in Korea, including Matsui, that reform was not so much a model to consider as they sought an effective way to establish local government in Korea, as it was something *not* to follow, as it did not accord with their objectives. Concerning concepts of local government in Egypt and Korea, this is an important issue.

As in the case of Egypt, traditional local officials under the Korean monarchy had wide-ranging police and judicial powers that went beyond just political administration. Both the Ōishi Report and the Matsui Opinion Paper use the term *kansatsushi* (Korean *kwanch’alsa*, or provincial governors) as a gloss for *mudir* (provincial governors), probably because the authors of both had spotted analogous features in the Korean and Egyptian local power-holders. And it is true that for all appearances *kwanch’alsa* and other traditional local authorities retained their functions under the Korean monarchy during the protectorate period. But while those arrangements might have outwardly resembled the British style of indirect rule, under the surface the local government policy...
that Japan was trying to implement was not the same thing. As we saw in Chapter One, Itō Hirobumi, the first resident general in Korea, regarded the concentration of judicial, taxation, and policing powers in the hands of long-established local officials, from the *kwanch'alsa* on down, as problematic. One of his policy objectives was to shift real power away from Koreans and into Japanese hands. Matsui, also, in 1907 shortly after becoming chief of the Interior Ministry Central Police Bureau, sketched out his own blueprint for change in this area. Through the reform of the local police system that he instituted at the end of that year, he set up a system whereby he could command rural policemen by himself, bypassing the *kwanch'alsa*. Uchida Ryōhei, then a part-time employee at the Residency General, observed that in the actual governing at that time, “The real ruling power lies with the police, not the county magistrates. The county magistrates function as scribes and copyists who write out tax orders, decrees, and instructions and so they don’t have much to do. The provincial governors, also, have no supervisory duties, and so they all suffer from a lack of work.”

It was with good reason, then, that at a gathering of *kwanch'alsa* in June 1908, the provincial governors voiced their anger at being deprived of their powers. They had some success: in June they were given back the right to appoint county magistrates, and the powers of rural policing were restored to them in July. But there were conditions. In June that year, incumbent provincial governors who were anti-Japanese were eased out of office and reassigned, and in July, under new arrangements in the police sector, a Japanese national was installed as provincial police chief in the police department of every province. So while it might have appeared that Japanese policy was reversing the trend toward disabling the powers and functions of the provincial governors, and perhaps the provincial governors and other Koreans were [temporarily] placated, the “new arrangements,” as Moriyama Shigenori points out, actually worked only to deepen the involvement in Korean government by Japanese nationals.

Thus the Japanese began by imposing measures to wrest from Korea’s provincial governors the various traditional powers they had held under the monarchy; when the Koreans hotly resisted, the Japanese side went through the motions of formally restoring those powers, but all the while they continued to seek ways to insinuate Japanese officials directly into Korean local government. The course of the power relationship between the Korean police, over which Matsui maintained firm control, and the provincial governors followed a similar pattern. On this the Matsui Opinion Paper does not stint on self-congratulation:

We are building the police in Korea into an organization where Japanese occupy the posts of chief of the Central Police Headquarters [*Keishisōkan*] and chief of the Ministry of the Interior Central Police Bureau, as well as all leadership positions in all of the provinces, right down to the heads of local police departments and police
stations. Thus the political policy of the Residency General has been greatly successful in channeling all the actual power of policing into Japanese hands. (p. 348)

In a quirk that is no doubt apparent by now, this glowing assessment rests on an assumption that subverts the praise given in the same MOP to the 1894 reform in Egypt, a key provision of which limited involvement by British personnel to the top positions only. The British occupation of Egypt was directed along a course described as indirect rule; the way the British ruled in Egypt could not, after all, be a model for Japan, which sought to penetrate deeply into the rural structure of government in its rule in Korea.51

A close study of the two main arguments in the Opinion Paper thus reveals a substantial gap between the police system reforms actually carried out in Egypt and the kind of reforms Matsui was aiming at. Nonetheless, Matsui must be given credit for having tried to make them compatible, however tenuously, and to make room in his own thinking for the lessons learned from the police reform in Egypt.

Although the Egypt Study went on for at least a year or more, the results did not achieve a level of quality that could bear close scrutiny. Still, we cannot dismiss it on that basis or underestimate its significance. Some of the Study’s objectivity was sacrificed, in fact, in the Matsui Opinion Paper, which went to sometimes overzealous lengths to bolster its case for the non-involvement of military officers in the police and for keeping policing functions in the hands of local officials. The very fact that the MOP stood in such emphatic advocacy of those policies gives us a sharply-etched perspective on the historical situation of the Korean police at that time, as well as an incisive glimpse into Matsui’s own thinking as he considered his response to that situation.52

3. The Fate of the Matsui Opinion Paper

The Matsui Opinion Paper brought together the results of the Japanese study of the police organization in Egypt, a study in which the Central Police Bureau of Korea’s Interior Ministry had been substantially involved. The Paper was submitted to Resident General in Korea Sone Arasuke, and then to his successor Terauchi Masatake. However, in June 1910, just two months before annexation, the Korean civil police were subsumed by the Japanese kempeitai in Korea, forming a kempei-dominated policing system. Matsui was forced to resign as head of the Central Police Bureau. I have been unable to locate sources indicating how the people in the inner circles of the Residency General studied and reacted to the Matsui Opinion Paper. And so in this section I attempt only to give an account of what happened in the end—not so much the ultimate fate of the Paper itself as the ideas that Matsui imprinted in it, in connection with the annexation-centered political
discourse of the time.

In his autobiography, Matsui relates the manner in which the MOP was sent to Resident General Sone:

I had written a voluminous monograph, “Kankoku keisatsu ni kansuru ikensho” [Opinion Papers on the Korean Police], and as luck would have it, I was finally able to send it to Resident General Sone by bundling it together with a pamphlet called “Kankoku keisatsu jimu gaiyō” [Outline of the Work of the Korean Police] published by the Ministry of the Interior Central Police Bureau. [The two items] were sent on 21 February 1910 to Vice Minister Oka [Oka Kishichirō, vice minister of the Korean Ministry of the Interior], who had just returned from Japan to Korea. I asked Minister Oka to deliver [my paper] to Resident General Sone, who was then in Tokyo.53

We know that Matsui’s “Opinion Papers on the Korean Police” refers to the Matsui Opinion Paper (Matsui, “Gokuhi: Kankoku keisatsu ni kansuru ikensho”) because the date and the table of contents that Matsui gives for the work in his autobiography match those of the MOP. The other Interior Ministry pamphlet “Outline of the work of the Korean Police” that was sent to Oka at the same time refers to Ministry of the Interior Central Police Bureau, ed., “Yunghui 3 keisatsu jimu gaiyō” [Outline of the Work of the Korean Police 1909].

The Matsui Opinion Paper advocated a certain approach in the practical use of the civil police during the period when Korea was a Japanese protectorate, grounding its arguments in the experience of the police in Egypt. It also represented an attempt to check the kempeitai garrisoned in Korea, which were on course to establish dominance over the police. Matsui’s position presumably was supported to some extent by Resident General Sone, who was not at all enthusiastic about the prospect of long-term military control by kempeitai (see Chapter One, Section 4). As Matsui recalled in subsequent years, “Fortunately, both Resident General Itō and his successor Resident General Sone agreed with my position regarding the kempei police rivalry over their respective roles and functions.”54 It is true that, even after Japan gained control over Korea’s prosecution (July 1909), Sone is reported to have stated the opinion, “Other [police] powers remain in Korean hands, and so if troubles arise and the Korean police cannot fulfill their many duties, then Japan should prepare to take over all those powers” (Chōsen shimbun, 16 January 1910). If that is what he really meant, Sone had a different view from the MPO, which insisted that the Korean police be allowed to remain in name while Japanese police officials exercised the real power. Thus it is not clear how far the positions of the Matsui Opinion Paper and Sone really coincided, but there can be no doubt that Sone’s wish to keep the police and the kempeitai separate under those particular circumstances leaned
further toward a Korean civil police force with Matsui at its head than it did toward the idea of dominance by the Japanese kempeitai.

The argument against moving too soon to annex Korea that ran through the Matsui Opinion Paper also accorded with Sone’s convictions. Without repeating the particulars of the case against rushing into annexation here (see Chapter One, Section 4), I would like to review the attitudes among Residency General officials regarding that issue. Sone’s gradualist ideas had common ground with Matsui’s opinions on annexation and also with the thinking of Matsui’s superior, Vice Minister of Korean Ministry of the Interior Oka, who had served as intermediary in delivering the MOP to Sone. Oka did not get along well with Kiuchi Jūshirō, Residency General official who was Korea’s vice minister of agriculture, commerce, and public works and a leader of the advocates of decisive, quick action to annex Korea.55 As a stratagem to “exterminate the annexation hawks,” Oka is said to have started a survey of public opinion to gauge popular feelings about early annexation, with a view to getting Interior Minister Pak Chae-sun to become prime minister. In that scenario, Pak would then reshuffle the cabinet and thus maintain the status quo as well as break up the Iljinhoe society, a strong advocate of Japan-Korea unification.56 Matsui, the practical bureaucrat with a theoretical bent, did little to suggest that he ever engaged in overt political activity related to annexation. It is safe to assume, however, that he was in the gradualist group in the Residency General and hoped to maintain the status quo for the time being. In Seoul, Iljinhoe supporter Kikuchi Chūzaburō observed that “Chief of Central Police Bureau Wakabayashi … having had to deal with resentful accusations about his defense of the Iljinhoe, did not get along with Matsui, Sone, or Ishizuka” (emphasis added by author). He categorized Matsui as being in the camp that wanted to suppress the Iljinhoe and hold back on annexation.57 “Wakabayashi” is Wakabayashi Jitsuzō, chief of Korean Central Police Bureau, and “Ishizuka” is Ishizuka Eizō, acting general affairs director at the Residency General.

The MOP did have some potential supporters, people who shared its perception of the kind of police force Korea should have and its view of annexation, which was the issue that most heavily impacted the future of the police. But we must not overestimate the influence of this support base. Sone had never been able to control the officials under him at the Residency General. Rumblings about him began as soon as he assumed office: “Quite a few among the officials at the Residency General were discontent.”58 Those regarded as being his loyal supporters included Vice Minister of the Interior Oka. Sone was, in effect, targeted for criticism: “Apart from Vice Minister Oka, everyone harbors feelings of dissatisfaction with Sone.”59 Only an isolated minority in the Residency General sided with Sone and Oka in favor of a wait-and-see approach to annexation.

The political clout of the Residency General annexation gradualists was a crucial factor that would heavily impact what happened to the MOP vision and recommendations, and in Sone’s time these people were steadily losing ground. As we recall (see Chapter
One, Section 4), there was a deep-seated difference of opinion between Sone and the Yamagata faction in Japan over the handling of the December 1909 Japan-Korea merger petition from the Iljinhoe. The clash surfaced, and Sone was recalled in January 1910 to Japan, where he was laid up by illness. Adding insult to injury, the popular mood in Japan had grown sour and a strident public were clamoring for his resignation.60 The end of February 1910, when Matsui sent his Opinion Paper to Sone, was the worst timing possible. At the time the Sone policy line was being disavowed by his own government and pilloried by public opinion.

Sone resigned in May that year, and Terauchi Masatake took over his post. In a personnel changeover effected when the new resident general was installed, Interior Vice Minister Oka was sent off to serve as governor of Shimane prefecture. Matsui then “submitted to the new resident general, Terauchi, an ‘Opinion Papers on the Korean Police,’ just as he had earlier to Resident General Sone.”61 This seems to be essentially the same document as the one we are calling the Matsui Opinion Paper. In the meantime, Sone had he sent off, Terauchi was determinedly pursuing meetings with Chief of Staff of the Japanese Garrison Army in Korea Akashi Motojirō and with Akiyama Masanosuke, legal counselor to the War Ministry, on the matter of integrating the police and the kempeitai. On June 20th, Akashi, by then at his post in Seoul, asked Acting General Affairs Director Ishizuka to take charge of the planning and had him start negotiating with the Korean government. On the 23rd Terauchi went to see Matsui and informed him that the police organization was to be remodeled in such a way as to give the kempeitai dominance over it. The following day, as stipulated in a memorandum jointly signed by the Korean and Japanese governments, all rights of policing in Korea were turned over to Japan. On the 29th the reform of the Residency General police system was issued, announcing that kempeitai and police would be merged and placed under the Residency General Central Police Headquarters, which had been made independent from all provincial administrative offices. It was announced, further, that the positions of Central Police Headquarters chief and all provincial police chiefs would be filled, respectively, by the commander-in-chief of the kempeitai and the heads of kempei units. Thus the new police chiefs would hold two positions concurrently.

This new system was precisely what the Matsui Opinion Paper had foreseen and cautioned against. As we recall, in that Paper he voiced strong objections to “establishing a completely new position of police chief inside the Residency General in an attempt to integrate the Korean police and the kempeitai,” and to “placing kempeitai officers in command of police officers…” The Matsui Library contains documents probably written by Matsui himself just after the formation of the kempei-dominated policing system. At the beginning of one on the new policing system called “Questions for Study,” he lists six items. Item 1 reads, “Should not police general affairs be managed by setting up a special agency for police affairs and separating that work from the administration of other
domestic affairs?” Item 2: “The strengths and weaknesses of a kempei force that is part of a police force.” In any case, the Matsui Opinion Paper had no power to prevent the developments from 1907 onward that enabled the kempeitai organization in Korea to take effective control of the Korean police. The end product, a kempei-dominated police force, was completely different from what the MOP had envisioned. Matsui submitted his resignation as Interior Ministry chief of police effective June 30th. Two months remained before Japan would annex Korea. So it was during the short tenure of Terauchi as resident general that Matsui’s visions finally and decisively collapsed, and everyone in the Residency General who wanted to hold off on annexation, Matsui included, was forced out.

Chapter Review

This chapter has considered studies on the police system in British-occupied Egypt done by Japanese shortly before the annexation of Korea. Much remains unknown about the process of the Egypt Study, but we can probably assume that Police Chief Matsui and Security Section Chief Iwai, along with other high-ranking [Residency General] Japanese officials in the Interior Ministry Central Police Bureau, ordered the temporary employee Ōishi Yoshiki to carry out the study, and that it was done between 1908 and sometime in 1910. At the outset the study included examinations of the police in Hong Kong, India, and some others, but the main objective was to examine the police system in occupied Egypt. The Egypt Study was based mostly on English language sources, namely works written by British colonial officials in the form of memoirs, all of them imbued with the aim of justifying and rationalizing the British way of ruling Egypt. Using Ōishi’s research, which drew heavily from British books of that type, Matsui wrote his Opinion Paper in 1910, exploiting information and views in the Egypt Study to empower his own arguments concerning the police in Korea.

The Egypt Study was carried out at a time when the Korean police, headed by Interior Ministry Central Police Bureau Chief Matsui Shigeru, was being overtaken in numbers of people and institutional power by the Japan’s Korea kempeitai, headed by Akashi Motojirō. Matsui’s summary of the Egypt Study, “Gokuhi: Kankoku keisatsu ni kansuru ikensho” [Confidential: Opinion Papers on the Korean Police], what we have been calling the Matsui Opinion Paper, tracked the changes made in Egypt’s police organization under the British. Informed throughout by an acute awareness of current political realities, the Opinion Paper set out to show how the British decision to give command over the Egyptian police to military officers and to separate the police organization from local rulers had been a policy failure that was detrimental to British rule in Egypt. So the
Matsui Opinion Paper, ostensibly a condensation of the Egypt Study research, was more than simply a case study of the police in another country. Rather, it was a polemic dressed up as a case study, and in that guise it put forth a forceful political argument that embodied the personal convictions of Matsui.

Indeed, in light of what actually happened in the course of events in Egypt and Korea, one senses a somewhat self-serving aspect in the MOP’s perception of reality. In Korea, the civil police organization, with Matsui in charge, was situated as a police force within the traditional structure of local government, and it was placed under the command of Japanese. In its exterior form, the arrangement might have resembled the police system that the British finally achieved in Egypt after a hard process of trial and error, but it was not the same. The real power in the Korean police organization, extending at least to the provincial and, in many cases, the county level, was held by Japanese. The traditional ruling structures were already becoming only form with no content. Despite appearances, this was not just another version of British-style indirect rule. Japan’s administration of Korea certainly had some aspects in common with British rule in Egypt, but there were qualitative differences in conception.

In relation to the political rivalry of 1909 onward over the annexation of Korea, the thinking in the Matsui Opinion Paper was closest to the position of the minority annexation gradualists in the Residency General, including Sone. And so, very soon after the MOP was delivered to Sone in February 1910, the Sone line was rejected and the Matsui Opinion Paper dismissed. The MOP was then sent to Resident General Terauchi, but by then, under the new kempei-led police system, the Korean police force had been remodeled into a military type of organization and structurally, it had been cut off from the provincial governments. In short, Matsui’s vision came to nothing, and the Korean police were headed in a direction almost completely opposite to the course taken by the police in Egypt.

A section of the Opinion Paper was published around the time Matsui resigned as police chief. The police affairs section of the Interior Ministry Central Police Bureau editorial office, which put out a monthly report on police affairs, published on 25 June 1910 a pamphlet called *Matsui Keimukyokuchō kōenshū* [Speeches by Chief of Police Matsui]. The most startling part is the section about “Egyptian police and Korean police.” This appeared word for word in Chapter 6 of the Matsui Opinion Paper, where Matsui discusses the course of reform of the Egypt police system. There is no direct reference in that part of the pamphlet to the kempei-led police system, but an alert reader can infer the clearly implied criticism of that system. For a former police chief to publish his criticism of the current system can only be called extraordinarily audacious. The pamphlet seems to have been distributed among the Japanese officials in the former Interior Ministry Central Police Bureau.63

In mid-July 1910, after wrapping up his final business, Matsui returned to Japan.
Whenever he could, he proceeded to give speeches and lectures on the administration of Korea and the Korean police. In October 1910 in a speech at the Society of International Law he contended that the suitability or not of the kempei-dominated policing system “is an extremely serious issue for the police.” “Once the Egyptian police assumed a military-corps type of organization,” he told his audience, “that is when it stumbled badly.”64 In another talk in November at a meeting of the Society for the Study of Jurisprudence, he expressed grave worry about a kempei-centered police system that was independent of the general provincial administration.65 In an article published in January 1911, Matsui cited Cromer and Colvin to declare that “the people should be the direct foundation” of local government and local police.66 Matsui remained critical of placing the kempeitai in the position of the principal military police force. He believed that his own convictions, supported by the study of the police system in Egypt, were fully justified.
A number of studies deal with the Japanese interest in specific topics, such as Egypt’s mixed courts and the Urabi Movement. For a compendium of that research, see Sugita, *Nihon no Chūtō hakken*, pp. 112–116; and Obinata Sumio, “Jiyūminken-ki no Ejiputo ninshiki: Orūbi undō Mafudī undō o megutte” [Japan’s Perception of Egypt in the Popular Rights Era with Focus on the Urabi and Mahdist Movements], *Shakai kagaku tōkyō*, vol. 41, no. 3, March 1996, pp. 194–196.

Watanabe Tadataka, “Keisatsu Daigakkō tosho/shiryō no kaiko to tenbō” [Review of and Prospects for the Police Academy Library and Its Materials], *Keisatsugaku ronshū*, vol. 32, no. 10, October 1979, p. 42. In 1940, furthermore, a Committee for the Publication of Matsui Shigeru’s Collected Works, with Yamazaki Iwao (Interior ministry police bureau chief) at its head, was set up to oversee the collection and preparation of Matsui’s writings for publication. The materials that committee gathered presumably became the core of the Matsui Library. For details, see Matsuda Toshihiko, “Kankoku ‘heigō’-ki keisatsu shiryō kaisetsu” [Comments on Materials Relating to the Police at the Time of Korea’s Annexation], which appears in vol. 1 of Matsuda, ed., *Kankoku ‘heigō’-ki keisatsu shiryō*.

Numbers (2) through (6) of this list are reprinted in vol. 8 of Matsuda, ed., *Kankoku ‘heigō’-ki keisatsu shiryō*.

Ōishi was born in Kumamoto in April 1881. He graduated from the Kumamoto Municipal Commercial School in 1897 and later went to the United States to study. He received the bachelor’s degree at Arkansas State University in 1908. As of June 1909 he was temporarily employed in the Security Section of the Interior Ministry Central Police Bureau (Chōsen Shinbunsha, ed., *Chōsen jinji kōshinroku* [Directory of Personnel in Korea], Chōsen Shinbunsha, 1922; and also Naegak kirokkwa [Korean Cabinet Record Section], ed., *TaeHan cheguk chigwŏnnok* [Personnel Directory of the Korean Empire], as of 30 June 1909, p. 83).

The MOP’s table of contents lists seven chapters as follows: Chapter 1, History of the Korean Police; Chapter 2, Organization in Charge of Police Administration Makes Internal Affairs Administration Its Primary Work; Chapter 3, How Deployment of the Korean Police and Kempeitai Stationed in Korea Has Proceeded; Chapter 4, Reliability of the Korean Police; Chapter 5, Duties of the Korean Police; Chapter 6, History of the Egyptian Police; Chapter 7, Conclusion.


Colvin, *The Making of Modern Egypt*, p. 17


Editorials in *Tōkyō nichinichi shinbun*, 9 April 1907; *Chūō shinbun*, 27 July 1908; and *Ōsaka Asahi shinbun*, 15 June 1909.

This speech is cited in Miyajima, *Hikakushiteki shiten*, p. 98. Also an editorial in *Keijō nippō* (26 October 1924) discusses in some detail a letter written by Cromer that appears to be the same one Itō referred to in his speech. The editorial writer (presumably Soejima Michimasa), who had direct access to the letter, recalled that Cromer addressed it to “T.B. Hoher, at the time 1st Secretary at the British Embassy” and in it had requested that, “If there
Chapter Two

is an opportunity, please tell Marquis Itō that in governing Egypt, my primary objective has always been the security and happiness of the Egyptian people.”


23 Malet to Granville, no. 51, 23 June 1883 (House of Commons Sessional Papers, vol. LXXXIII, Egypt no. 22 [1883] [c. 3802]), p. 67.
25 Baring to Granville, no. 32, 7 January 1884 (House of Commons Sessional Papers, vol. LXXXVIII, Egypt no. 5 [1884] [c. 3852]), pp. 22–26.
28 Memorandum by Baker, 26 October 1885, enclosed in Egerton to Salisbury, no. 97, 26 October 1885 (House of Commons Sessional Papers, vol. LXXIV, Egypt no. 2 [1886] [c. 4611]), pp. 70–71.
31 Report on the Administration, Finances and Conditions of Egypt and the Progress of Reforms, March 1892 (House of Commons Sessional Papers, vol. XCVI, Egypt no. 3 [1892] [c. 6589]), p. 27; Report on the Administration, Finances and Conditions of Egypt and the Progress of Reforms, March 1893 (House of Commons Sessional Papers, vol. CXI, Egypt no. 3 [1893] [c. 6957]), p. 22.
33 Report on the Administration, Finances and Conditions of Egypt and the Progress of Reforms, April 1895 (House of Commons Sessional Papers, vol. CIX, Egypt no. 1 [1895] [c. 7644]), pp. 11–12.
34 Tollefson, “The 1894 British Takeover,” pp. 552–554. According to this source, right after the Interior Ministry reforms and the reorganization of the police, Cromer determined that Nubar had misinterpreted the extent of the powers of the British adviser and set about correcting that view.
39 Tignor, “The ‘Indianization’,” p. 649. For an account of the historical emergence and development of the practice of “divide and rule” in Britain’s administration of its empire, see D.K. Fieldhouse,
The Eve of Annexation: Matsui Shigeru and Japan’s Study of the Egyptian Police

40 That statement by Cromer is found in Cromer, Modern Egypt, vol. 2, p. 488.
42 On the allocation of powers between the kempeitai and police and determining the side to which kempeitai auxiliaries would be assigned, see Chapter One, Section 3. The Matsui Opinion Paper (pp. 191–199) describes how the former actually played out and what Matsui’s convictions and objections were. Regarding the latter, the use of kempeitai auxiliaries, the Matsui Opinion Paper relates how the Korean provincial governors and their secretaries wanted nothing more than to get rid of the auxiliaries from their midst (pp. 253–256); with veiled but strongly implied criticism, the MOP relates how Matsui had urged Resident General Itō to create an organization of Korean “village (myŏn) police” (p. 343) and how that idea was not accepted.
44 Matsui Shigeru, “Minshin no sotsū wa kokka no kyūmu nari” [The Urgent Necessity to Reach the Hearts of the People Soon], Chōsen, vol. 4, no. 4, December 1909, p. 16.
46 Lloyd to Baring, 31 December 1883, enclosed in Baring to Granville, No. 26, 2 January 1884 (House of Commons Sessional Papers, vol. LXXXVIII, Egypt no. 5 [1885] [c. 3852]), p. 16.
47 Baker and Kitchener were both generals; Kitchener’s successor, Settle, was a colonel. Marlowe (Cromer in Egypt, p. 144) indicates that at least in 1887 it was Cromer’s idea to place the Egyptian police under the jurisdiction of the British army stationed in Egypt.
48 Uchida Ryōhei to Katsura Tarō, 30 June 1908. Uchida Ryōhei kankei monjo, p. 64.
49 Opposing views and my own view on this matter are elaborated in endnote # 84 of Chapter One.
50 Moriyama, Kindai Nik-Kan kankeishi kenkyū, p. 221.
51 This point becomes abundantly clear if we compare the number of Japanese nationals employed as civil servants in Korea with the number of Europeans working as civil servants in Egypt: in Korea, about when the Matsui Opinion Paper was written (late 1909), of a total of 5,536 civil servants employed in the Korean cabinet and in the Imperial Household Office, 2,399 or 43 percent were Japanese nationals, while in Egypt in 1896, soon after the Interior Ministry reforms went into effect, only 690 or 8 percent of a total of 9,134 civil servants were Europeans (mostly British). The difference in those proportions speaks volumes. (According to data in Chŏng Gu-sŏn, “T’ongkambu ki Ilbonin kwalli yŏn’gu” [A Study of Japanese Officials in Korea during the Residency General Period], Kukusagwan nonch’ong, no. 77, 1997, p. 133, and Cromer, Modern Egypt, vol. 2, p. 299.)
52 Matsui regarded British rule in Egypt as a valuable model, but what model did kempeitai chief Akashi have in mind as he pressed for expansion of the kempeitai? Exploring that question further, first let us consider an essay by Kim Yong-dŏk, “Hŏnbyŏng kyŏnch’al chedo ǔi sŏngnip” [Founding of the Military Police System] (in Editorial Committee for the 60th Birthday Memorial for Doctor Kim Chae-wŏn, ed., Yodang Kim Chae-wŏn paksu hogap kinyŏm Han’guk nonjip [Essays on Korea in Honor of the 60th Birthday of Doctor Kim Chae-wŏn], Seoul: Ŭlyu Munhwasa, 1969, p. 395). There, Kim draws on Murata Yasusada, ed., Akashi taishō Etsunan nikki [Vietnam Diary of General Akashi] (Tokyo: Nikkō Shoin, 1944) to speculate that Akashi got the idea of creating an auxiliary gendarmerie during his observation tour during 1896–1897 to Taiwan and French Indochina, where he learned about effective systems of “indigenous gendarmes.” More on Akashi’s tour of Taiwan and French Indochina can be found in Kondō Masami, “Chŏheirei wa naze umi o koenakatta ka? Taiwan ni okeru shokuminchi hei yŏsei mondai” [Why Did Japan Not Require Conscription in Its Colonies? The Problem of Building a Colonial Military Force in Taiwan], Chapter 1, in Asano and Matsuda, eds., Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon. Kondō notes that Akashi and others with military connections, in
the course of their observation tour, latched onto the “idea of installing a colonial military force.” Indeed, Akashi wrote to War Minister Terauchi concerning kempeitai auxiliaries that, “There is much to be learned from the way indigenous people are trained as soldiers in the European colonies” (Correspondence of 5 February 1908, *Terauchi Masatake kankei monjo*, 6:11). Regarding his wish to use local Koreans as auxiliary kempeitai, Akashi wrote in another letter to Terauchi, “Following the example of ‘Linh-Co’ and ‘Garde civile’ in Indochina, that way is better than increasing the number of policemen” (Correspondence of 8 May 1908, *Terauchi Masatake kankei monjo*, 6:12). This makes it evident that Akashi was definitely thinking of the case of French Indochina. We cannot be completely certain, nonetheless, whether or not Akashi borrowed the structural concept of a kempeitai-dominated police apparatus from the example of another country (or a colony of another country). In his *Chōsen tōchishi ronkō* [*Ruling Korea: A History*] (unpublished material, 1944; reprinted, Seoul: Sŏngjin Munhwasa, 1972), Tabohashi Kiyoshi writes that when Akashi, while in Europe gathering intelligence during the Russo-Japanese War years, saw the way gendarmes were used there, as both administrative police and judicial police, he “probably took notice of how much more effective the gendarmerie were than the police” (p. 83). However, Tabohashi pointed out that whenever gendarmes were assigned to police work, they were placed under the interior minister. This was not at all what Akashi seemed to envision in his efforts to secure kempeitai dominance in the chain of command in Korea. All things considered, we cannot, at this point, assume that any given model exerted decisive influence on Akashi’s thinking on this matter.

53 *Matsui Shigeru jiden*, p. 262.
54 *Matsui, “Mezame yuku Chōsen minshū e,”* p. 111.
58 Miyake Setsurei, “Sone shin tōkan” [Sone, the New Resident General], *Chūō kōron*, vol. 24, no. 7, July 1909, p. 59.
52 *Matsui Shigeru jiden*, p. 265.
54 In the notes to *Matsui keimukyokuchō kōenshū* [*Speeches of Police Chief Matsui*], it is written that the speeches were published in accord with the “wishes of the majority of the subscribers [of the *Keimu geppō*],” and so we can presume that the work was distributed among the Japanese bureau-
crats in the Interior Ministry Central Police Bureau, which was the publisher of the *Keimu geppō*.

64 Matsui Shigeru, “Chōsen keisatsu no enkaku o nobe Chōsenjin no shurui oyobi seishitsu ni oyobu” [The History of the Korean Police, and Types of Korean People and Their Character], *Kokusaihō zasshi*, vol. 9, no. 3, November 1910, pp. 188–190.

65 Matsui Shigeru, “Chōsen no naimu gyōsei koto ni keisatsu gyōsei ni tsuite” [On Korea’s Internal Administration, Especially Police Administration], *Kokka Gakkai zasshi*, vol. 24, no. 12, December 1910, p. 48.

66 Matsui Shigeru, “Chōsen naimu gyōsei no hatten wa kokka no kyūmu nari” [Urgent Need to Move Quickly in Developing Effective Government in Korea], *Chōsen*, no. 35, January 1911, pp. 10–12.