

Governance and policing of colonial Korea : 1904-1919

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図書名	Governance and policing of colonial Korea : 1904-1919
シリーズ	Nichibunken monograph series ; 12
URL	http://doi.org/10.15055/00000155

Chapter Four

The Korean People in the “Military Rule” Period: *Shumaku dansō* and the Survey on Popular Sentiments

In the 1910s, the Korean police made a survey of popular sentiments in Ch’ungch’ōngnamdo province and compiled the results in a document called *Shumaku dansō*, which literally means “tavern talks,” or “tavern stories.” The Korean word *chumak* (*shumaku* in Japanese) describes a traditional type of Korean country pub or tavern, which will be explained more fully later. My principal source for this chapter is *Shumaku dansō*, and I use the material in it to investigate how the Korean people responded to the new institutions and order brought into Korea after it was annexed and was put completely under the colonial rule of Japan.

Almost no scholars have focused on the everyday state of mind, the attitudes and feelings of Koreans during the 1910s, the era of “military rule,” as the central subject of their research. Apart from brief treatments presented in context of the history leading up to the March 1st (Samil) Independence Movement, there are virtually no studies on this subject. For quite some time scholars involved in March 1st Movement research have been calling for more thorough analysis of the thinking and logic of the common people in Korea during the “massification stage,” as opposed to the thinking of the religious and student leaders in the “planning stage” of the movement.¹ That being said, the fact is that materials on the period of “military rule” are scarce. Partly for that reason, even those scholars of regional and local history who recently have been reexamining the March 1st Movement as it played out in the provinces are, in almost every case, investigating the regional leaders. They do little more than offer a rough description of popular feelings and attitudes.² A few exceptional studies use results of fact-finding surveys³ to better analyze people’s everyday life and their dislike of the colonial policies, but that work, too, is shaped by the framework of research on pre-March 1st Movement history, and it tends to highlight only the anti-Japanese elements in Korean attitudes. Those studies do not probe deeply and broadly into the complex realm of how the Korean people thought and felt.

The main source for this chapter, *Shumaku dansō*, is a collection of transcribed

commentary, opinions, personal experiences, and observations gleaned in a *chumak*, a place where Koreans gathered to drink, eat, perhaps seek lodging, and to talk. It contains the results of surveys of popular attitudes and feelings carried out in 1911, 1913, and 1914 by the Konju kempeitai and the Ch'ungch'ōng-namdo provincial police department. The comments recorded in it document many of the changes occurring in Korea in the 1910s. They offer a picture of colonial administrative policies, how society was being transformed, and the wide range of popular attitudes toward those changes. *Shumaku dansō* contains a trove of information that no other source could provide. At the risk of presenting a loosely structured across-the-board discussion, I have tried to convey, verbatim, as many of the contents of the document as possible, and by so doing, to let the narratives work to reconstruct how colonial rule as a whole was seen through the eyes of the people. At the same time, by giving a picture of the network of police power extending its tendrils throughout colonial society, and of common people's perceptions of the diverse jobs of the police, I hope to fill out the analysis of the previous chapter.

Section 1 describes the purposes for which *Shumaku dansō* was conceived and compiled and it gives a brief sketch of the content. Section 2 attempts to recreate the images of Japan's colonial rule that took shape in Korean minds, using Korean voices to describe many of the concrete situations they faced. Then, to supplement the static analysis in the second section, Section 3 probes the attitudes, opinions, and perspectives of Koreans regarding the international situation and current domestic issues.

1. *Shumaku dansō* as a Source

Shumaku dansō, which is held in the Rare Book section in the Korean National Assembly Library, is a record of the results of a survey made by the kempei police to document popular sentiment at the time in Ch'ungch'ōng-namdo province. Until now, not even scholars knew that it existed, so it has not been studied before. It is written entirely by hand in Japanese and copied on a hectograph. Actually, it consists of three documents bound together. I list them below in chronological order by year of publication, but in the original binding, the order is 1914, 1915, 1912.

- (1) No title. Survey made October–December 1911, published February 1912. Total 197 “envelope pages” or double-sided sheets. Henceforth “1912 edition.”⁴
- (2) Konju Kempeitai and Ch'ungch'ōng-namdo Provincial Police Department, *Shumaku dansō*, vol. 3. Survey made December 1913, published February 1914. Total 67 double-sided sheets. Henceforth “1914 edition.”
- (3) Konju Kempeitai and Ch'ungch'ōng-namdo Provincial Police Department,

Shumaku dansō, vol. 4. Survey made October–December 1914, published February 1915. Total 55 double-sided sheets. Henceforth, “1915 edition.”

Relating the reason for the surveys, the “explanatory notes” says, “We have gathered and recorded these conversations and comments, all of them from people in this jurisdiction, with the purpose of furnishing materials from which we can learn the general sentiments of the common people and the trends in the society” (1914 edition. The other two documents contain the same note). The survey method is explained as follows:

The comments were collected by each of the jurisdiction’s four kempei detachments and nine police stations, each in its own area, on every market day during the survey period. Kempei auxiliaries, Korean patrolmen, and assistant patrolmen were sent out in disguise to the taverns (*chumak*), and there they listened to what customers were saying to one another. They were thus able to get information on what people thought and felt about politics, economics, religion, education, taxes, agriculture, commerce, and industry, and they also could learn about all kinds of rumors, false reports, and street-corner gossip. What they heard was recorded as originally spoken without embellishment.⁵

On market days when the marketplace was bustling with people, the police agencies sent their lowest-ranking staff, Korean kempei auxiliaries and the like, into the *chumak*, rural taverns or inns where, in the days before modern transportation had arrived, travelers could rest. Their mission was to faithfully record as many voices of common people as possible. The Korean *chumak* “functioned as an inn, a place to stop for food, drink, or sometimes lodging, somewhat like today’s popular taverns (*sulchip*) and roadside eating places, and it also played the role of news center, where people could exchange information.”⁶ Many *chumak* were found near the regular marketplaces, on roads leading into mountain passes, around the docks at seaports, and so on, and in the country one or two could usually be found near the entrance to a village. People of all classes came and went and mingled there, but those who frequented them the most were lower-class laborers and merchants who carried on their business at the local markets.

Shumaku dansō is thus a compendium of talk “from the horse’s mouth” garnered at local taverns that functioned as news and information-exchange agencies for ordinary folk. The recorded comments are not systematically organized by genre; rather, they are grouped according to the kempei police jurisdiction (police station, kempei detachment, or kempei outstation) that collected them, and there is no particular attempt to arrange them by topic. Naturally they have all been translated into Japanese, but in other respects there are no signs that the collectors, i.e. the kempei police, modified the utterances. We can probably assume that the kempei police faithfully recorded what they heard “without

Figure 11. Content of *Shumaku dansō*, 1912, 1914, and 1915

	No. of page sheets	Voices included	Second section (1)					Second section (2)			Second section (3)	Second section (4)		Other	Total	
			Comparison of the Chosŏn period and governor general policy in terms of civilization	Dissolution of the class system and traditional values	Korean evaluations of Japanese attitudes toward Koreans	Evaluation of kempei police	Tax, debt, rice prices, poverty	Road and railway construction and corvée	Intervention in people's lives by colonial authorities resulting from new laws and public sanitation projects	Religion		Current issues				
1912 edition	Konju	43	93	1	1	8	14	30	8	11	2	6	15	96		
	Kempei detachment	Ch'ŏnan	18	47	2	2	6	4	16	2	6	2	13	2	53	
		Yesan	9	14	1	1	1	1	2	2	5	1	1	1	15	
	Police station	Puyŏ	11	22	1	2	1	2	4	5	7	7	7	7	29	
		Konju	22	49	1	2	3	3	14	3	8	1	12	4	51	
	1914 edition	Taejŏn	7	11	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	7	1	14	
		Police station	Hongju	19	34	4	2	2	6	6	5	5	3	5	4	34
			Hongsan	16	37	1	1	1	3	16	7	7	2	2	1	38
		Police station	Asan	6	11	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	1	1	11
			Sŏsan	21	43	1	2	4	4	23	2	3	2	5	2	44
		Police station	Tangjin	8	22	1	4	3	3	3	1	5	2	2	3	22
			Poyŏng	7	20	2	1	1	1	12	1	1	2	1	2	21
Total		Kanggyŏng	10	21	1	2	2	2	11	1	1	1	4	5	24	
		Total	197	424	12	16	28	35	140	37	60	18	65	41	452	
1914 edition		Yŏnsan	9	35	1	2	5	5	11	8	3	1	6	37		
	Kempei detachment	Ch'ŏnan	14	75	5	8	4	9	13	12	6	3	4	80		
		Yesan	12	37	1	1	5	3	9	6	5	1	2	4	37	
	Police station	Puyŏ	6	34	1	3	3	3	5	3	3	1	3	9	34	
		Konju	3	15	1	3	3	3	4	3	3	1	2	3	15	
	Police station	Hongju	5	27	1	1	2	2	9	6	3	1	2	3	27	
		Taejŏn	5	26	1	1	2	1	7	2	8	2	2	2	26	
	Police station	Asan	2	13	1	1	1	2	5	3	3	1	1	2	13	
		Tangjin	5	33	3	1	2	2	12	3	6	1	3	3	34	
	Police station	Poyŏng	3	11	1	3	3	3	4	1	1	2	2	3	13	
		Sŏsan	5	31	1	3	3	1	5	4	5	3	2	4	31	
	Total	Hongsan	3	22	1	1	1	1	4	3	5	1	5	2	22	
Kanggyŏng		4	22	1	2	3	3	8	3	5	1	1	2	22		
Total	76	381	14	21	26	25	96	53	54	14	29	59	391			

1915 edition	Kempei detachment	Taejŏn	5	20				2	7	4	3	1	2	1	20	
		Ch'ŏnan	4	6	1					2	1	1		1	1	7
		Yesan	4	17				1	1	7	3	2		1	3	17
	Kempei outstation	Puyŏ	6	29	1			2	2	7	3	7		4	4	29
		Choch'iwŏn	4	19				2	2	7	3	3		1	3	19
		Onchŏnmi	4	16				2	2	11	1	2		3		19
	Police station	Ch'ŏngyang	2	5						3		2				5
		Konju	5	33	5		2	1	1	13	2	4	1	1	4	33
		Taejŏn	3	10	2					4	1	1		2		10
		Tangjin	3	12	1					9				1		13
		Sŏsan	5	27	1			1	1	14	2	3	2	4		27
		Hongsŏng	5	24	1		2	1	1	7	3	2		4	5	25
		Poyŏng	3	10					2	1		4		2		11
Sŏch'ŏn	4	16						12				1	2	16		
Total		57	244	2	13	5	14	104	23	34	6	27	23	251		

Source: Korean Police, *Shumaku dansŏ* [Tavern Talks], 1912, 1914, and 1915 editions, collection of Korean National Diet Library.

Notes

1. One comment, as a rule, falls under one category, but long comments or comments that are difficult to classify under one category may be counted under more than one.
2. The reason that the number of kempeitai and police facilities is not identical with the total number of page sheets in the 1914 and 1915 editions is because there are cases in which two facilities are mentioned on one page sheet.

embellishment.” There is nothing that can be used to cross-reference a document of this kind, which is in a class by itself and therefore difficult to critique as a source. But by studying the content, we can learn much about the people and their lives of that place and time, and we can get a realistic idea of how fine-tuned the kempei police surveillance system was and how assiduously the police monitored the communities in their jurisdictions.

At the same time, *Shumaku dansō* has certain limitations as a source. First of all, it is no more and no less than “fixed-point observations” of opinions and attitudes during three survey periods. It cannot help us much in grasping changes in the state of mind of the people. Also, it seems likely that a survey was made between the 1912 and 1914 editions, but any record of it has yet to be located. Second, it is clear that the survey method, the method of selecting the sources of information, did not depend on statistical random sampling. The content of the comments reveals that most of the sources of the information (the “respondents”) were lower-class laborers and tradesmen, but in most cases we do not learn what their precise occupation or social status was. In the third place, one has to wonder how far people living under daily police surveillance would openly speak their minds in a public place, and to what extent this information represents actual feelings and attitudes.⁷ To compensate, I did my best to use other kinds of materials to provide the backing of cross-examination, but I could not find enough to make a satisfactory comparison.

The content of *Shumaku dansō* can be roughly divided to two main themes: images of the colonial rule and the regime of the Government General as a whole, and impressions and concerns about major issues at the time, namely the Xinhai Revolution and the first world war. These can be represented as in Figure 11, which shows the proportion of the whole taken up by each topic. Categorization is made according to my discussion in Sections 2 and 3 of this chapter. It inevitably reflects to some extent the subjective view of the author. In some cases, a single commentary included responses from more than one person, and some comments touched on multiple subjects, making it impossible to adhere to a rigidly consistent method of determining the proportions for each topic. Figure 11 should be regarded as a rough depiction of the most pronounced tendencies.

2. Images of Colonial Rule

This section analyzes the wide range of comments and observations in *Shumaku dansō*, presenting an overview of their content. The discussion centers on the large categories of (1) comments relating to the colonial rule in general, (2) comments on specific policy measures bearing on daily life, and (3) comments relating to religion and religious activities.

(1) Intricately Mixed Images

After reading the entire *Shumaku dansō*, one has the impression that the concept of “cultural enlightenment” or “enlightened civilization” (*bunmeika*) was a familiar but still fuzzy idea in the minds of many Koreans at that time. The concept had already taken shape to some extent (developing out of currents of “enlightenment thinking” that began penetrating Korean society during the last years of the monarchy). Some Koreans made a clear connection between “cultural enlightenment” and Japanese rule but at the same time felt ambivalence—this was apparent in images that combined inseparably both approval/affirmation and discomfort/rejection. The following comments give us some insight into the kind of relationship some people sensed between “enlightened civilization” and Japanese rule.

“Thanks to the more culturally advanced Japanese officials, especially the kem [following this is inserted the character for “pei”], we can live peacefully, even in the rural areas. The virtuous imperial Japanese civilization has brought us great benefits, and now ordinary people can expect progress in our civilization” (1912 edition, Konju kempei detachment, 18).

“I think Korea was annexed to Japan because Korea was not yet as civilized as the Western nations, and in a few years if Korea becomes the same as Japan, perhaps it will become an independent country” (1914 edition, Sōsan police station, 57).

“Since the annexation, deadlines for paying taxes and everything else have become so strict. For people who live under a civilized rule it is just natural to correctly follow all the rules and regulations all the time. But in the thinking of people like us who are uneducated, it is stressful, too much pressure” (1912 edition, Asan police station, 4).

The above are examples of a diverse set of responses. As in the first, some directly linked “cultural enlightenment” with “annexation,” and others, like the second example, revealed an affirmation of cultural advancement coexisting with a continuing, smoldering nationalism. The third example voices the feelings of people who saw colonial rule in terms of a system of concrete measures and real-life conditions. The feelings in the third case were overwhelmingly negative. That is, the negative side of “civilized rule” more than offset any unbiased positive reactions they might have had. As for the tone of *Shumaku dansō* as a whole, on a somewhat abstract level negative and positive voices are mixed, but on a concrete level, people’s image of policy measures affecting everyday life was extremely negative. (These measures include heavy taxes, forced labor on road work, and rules and regulations that were intolerably numerous and complicated. We will look

closer at these items in Section 2.)

This dual perspective on colonial rule as a whole was inseparably connected with the Koreans' evaluation of the Chosŏn dynasty period. We will look next, therefore, at how Koreans responded to the dismantling of the premodern ruling system and of the concept of rule on which it was based, and examine the ambivalent nature of the image they formed.

Beginning with the opening of Korea's treaty ports and continuing into the colonial period, control over local society by the yangban was steadily undermined by a combination of forces. To give a brief background, during the last half of the seventeenth century, the ruling structure in rural society was dominated by three groups: magistrates (*sulyŏng*), local yangban, and a class of local functionaries (*hyangni*). It was supported by Confucian values that had moved out of the exclusive sphere of yangban scholarship to permeate rural society and become the organizing principle of rural communities. The balance began to shift in the last years of the Korean monarchy. As provincial society grew relatively stronger and local officials were able to raise their status, the yangban steadily lost their grip on control of the local areas. Then two developments—greater centralization of authority that started with the Kabo Reforms, and local administrative reforms during the Residency General period—effectively removed the yangban and *hyangni* from local government.⁸ In the colonial period, what class of people did the Government General try to utilize as the new regional leaders? Scholars are divided on the latter question, but there is agreement that the period when a defined group of local collaborators formed in the provinces was from the 1920s onward.⁹ Broadly speaking, we can consider the first years after annexation to be a time of transition when the yangban-dominated system of control disintegrated and the growing force of collaborators that would become a pillar of colonial rule was in the process of emerging.

Koreans were highly attuned to the shifts taking place in the ruling strata. Quite a few comments laden with personal feelings mentioned being freed from the tyranny of the yangban. For example, “The former yangban are not like today's yangban.... Honestly, when I think of those yangban of the old times, it makes me gnash my teeth. For us, we welcome the enlightened society we have today like we hail the coming of the New Year” (1912 edition, Konju kempei detachment, 23–25); “Officials, yangban, and the like, during the monarchy, all they did was throw their power around indiscriminately, and they governed mostly through bribery and corruption.... Nowadays there is no distinction between yangban and peasant. They are governed as equals. These times are truly so much better” (1912 edition, Yesan kempei detachment, 23);¹⁰ Specifically, the administration of justice “today” was seen to be carried out with no reference to one's class or social status: “The yangban no longer have any power to coerce us” (1912 edition, Konju police station, 18–19); and regarding civil suits between yangban and commoners, “Before, they were managed very unfairly” but that no longer happens (1915 edition,

Konju police station, 5).¹¹

Quite a few of the speakers in *Shumaku dansō* evidently could see that changes taking place in society were undermining the status and power of the yangban. One of them summed up the situation, saying, “Now we are the people of an enlightened country, and the yangban are ruined” (1912 edition, Tangjin police station, 2). Others reported such phenomena as yangban being “insulted” by commoners (1912 edition, Hongsan police station, 15), or being “made fools of” (1914 edition, Hongsan police station, 61).¹² However, when we consider that, at that time, through gifts of money and support for the Confucian institute Kyōnghagwōn, for example, the Government General sought to win over the yangban, and that leading officials in Ch’ungch’ōng-namdo also, courted local yangban to get their support, one has to question whether yangban influence actually had diminished as much as the *chumak* clientele suggested it had.¹³

At the same time, in inverse proportion to the falling status of yangban, awareness was growing of the need for new knowledge and for the Japanese language. One person put it this way: “We need to learn Japanese language and we need a new kind of education; therefore it is very important that from now on children go to the good schools to learn” (1912 edition, Asan police station, 2); and, “In years like this when the harvest is so bad, it’s best to be a civil servant.... Maybe I, too, will become a civil servant next year. To be an aide, you have to know Japanese. If I start learning it now, maybe it’s not too late....” (1914 edition, Ch’ōnan kempei detachment, 12). Here is testimony to the emergence of a positive viewpoint toward Japanese-style modern education, which those people saw as the best route to rising in the new society being shaped around them by the colonial rule.¹⁴

The dismantling of Korea’s premodern ruling system did not directly lead to acceptance of the Japanese ruling system, however. Following the fall of the old regime, there was a strong reaction decrying the decay of Confucian social values. “Thinking and beliefs recently have become shallow and confused. The good customs of the past, like service to elders, filial piety and loyalty, these are things almost no one cares about anymore. Now all we see are vulgar people who are brazen and indolent, and know nothing about courtesy. I think it is because our education methods today are failing” (1915 edition, Hongsōng police station, 47–48). These people were unhappy with the waning sense of Confucian etiquette and good manners, while others lamented the “coldness” in certain current trends: “What a world we’re in nowadays, when a man doesn’t give a second thought to suing his brother if it’s a matter of money, and you even hear of suits between parents and children.... Perhaps all these changes are happening because we are taking on the ugly customs of the Japanese” (1915 edition, Tangjin police station, 37).¹⁵ All told, people’s feelings about the changes in social mores and values that accompanied colonization were definitely ambivalent.

There were, therefore, a number of *Shumaku dansō* speakers who looked with contempt on the “parvenu upstarts” who learned new subject matter, acquired Japanese

language, and rose in society. For example, in response to hearsay that a Korean had passed the junior civil servant examination came this comment, loaded with cynicism: “Only because he knows Japanese, that uneducated bumpkin can don the Government General’s uniform with its fine gold braid—it’s ridiculous” (1912 edition, Tangjin police station, 5). Others connected the decay of traditional moral precepts with the spread of Japanese language education and the relentless penetration of Japanese people into Korean society: “Guys who understand Japanese just get more and more brash. They’ve stopped showing any respect for the aged” (1914 edition, Ch’ōnan kempei detachment, 13–1); and “The more Japanese keep coming here the more insincere and frivolous Koreans are getting” (1914 edition, Yesan kempei detachment, 26).¹⁶ If we recall that voluntary attendance at regular public schools was still far from routine everywhere, these views of education are consistent with the times.¹⁷

What greatly strengthened the tendency to reject Japanese culture and values was the routine discrimination between Japanese and Koreans in all sorts of circumstances. Japanese officials and entrepreneurs often treated Koreans with disdain;¹⁸ Korean civil servants generally had a much harder time getting ahead than Japanese;¹⁹ Koreans could not get permits for hunting rifles and Japanese could²⁰ (beginning in April 1909 permits were in principle prohibited for Koreans). Countless examples of discrimination are cited here. (One concerns the economic pressure Koreans felt from the growing numbers of Japanese living in Korea, a subject we will return to.)

The third point concerns how Koreans evaluated the kempei police. Their personnel and facilities were distributed around Korea more densely than the civil administration agencies. As we have seen, in addition to their function to maintain order and security, they were involved in a wide variety of jobs in many different sectors of life. Koreans’ views of the police were closely tied with their image of the colonial regime as a whole. Since it is a police survey document, *Shumaku dansō* includes many comments relating to the kempei police. (See Figure 11. This category of comments makes up 6–7 percent of the total.)

On police administration in Ch’ungch’ōng-namdo, Hattori Yonejirō, whose tenure as the chief of the Ch’ungch’ōng-namdo Provincial Police Department (=Konju kempei detachment chief) from 1910 until part way through 1914 roughly corresponds with the years the survey was done, says the following:

Many Japanese civil officials ... work in the provincial government offices ... but no more than one or two Japanese officials work in the rural offices.... Inevitably then, the police cannot help being omnipotent. Determined that they are its strong underpinning, the kempei police officers give faithful support to the administration.²¹

According to Obara Shinzō, who took office as the governor of Ch’ungch’ōng-

namdo province in March 1915, that kempei police sense of omnipotence was particularly strong in this province, and during the tenure of the former governor (Pak Chung-yang), “Matters related to improvements in hygiene and diet, improving the marketplace, and getting the streets clean and in order were entrusted to the police authorities and kempei, but the top provincial leaders took the attitude of being oblivious of those activities.”²² Thus the kempei police in the low-ranking local facilities wielded more power than the government administrative agencies, and that fact, as we learn from the following comment, was well known to Koreans.²³ “No one pays any attention when an order comes from a county office, but when the kempeitai wants something done, kempei go out early to supervise, and so people get to work even before an order is given” (1914 edition, Yönsan kempei detachment, 2).

How did the Korean people assess the kempei police? First, some were glad to see “rioting” and “robbery” virtually disappear. These voices were positive about the presence of the police:²⁴ “Facilities of the kempei police have been set up everywhere now. They have eradicated all traces of the intermittent mob rioting, and people are working peacefully. Now we are able to sleep peacefully at night without fear” (1912 edition, Yesan kempei detachment, 2); “When our society became more enlightened ... they set up kempei stations and now we have almost no worry [about robbers]” (1914 edition, Ch’önan kempei detachment, 10). (It seems to be a fact that the incidence of these crimes decreased significantly around the time of the annexation. See Figure 12.) Relating to police management of the jobless, idlers, rowdiness, gambling, and prostitution, one person related that,²⁵ “It seems that they investigated carousers and illicit traffic in women, and they took them into detention and/or preached at them. I think this is an extremely good thing” (1915 edition, Konju police station, 1).

Figure 12. Number of Burglaries and Thefts and of Arrests (1908, 1910–1915)

Year	Burglary			Theft		
	No. of cases	No. of arrests	Arrest rate	No. of cases	No. of arrests	Arrest rate
Oct.–Dec. 1908	412	126	31%	1,711	674	39%
1910	318	126	40%	415	186	45%
1911	206	134	65%	763	426	56%
1912	203	131	65%	1,269	687	54%
1913	233	69	30%	1,429	852	60%
1914	262	248	95%	1,371	948	69%
1915	102	77	75%	1,102	873	79%

Sources: Figures for 1908 are from *Kankoku keisatsu tōkei* [Korean Police Statistics] (1909), ed. Korean Interior Ministry Central Police Bureau, and figures for the other years from *Chōsen Sōtokufu tōkei nenpō* [Annual Statistical Report of the Government General of Korea] (1910–1915), ed. Government General of Korea.

Notes

1. The figures include not only Koreans but Japanese and foreigners.
2. The figures for 1908 cover the three months from October through December; the figures for each of the other years cover the entire year.

Yet on the other side, the presence of kempei police was irrevocably associated with violence: “In Kyōngsangdo patrolmen go around collecting the one-hundredth market tax. If there’s any suspicion of dishonest income reporting they beat you up” (1912 edition, Ch’ōnan kempei outstation, 9); or sometimes in the kempeitai they used flogging (1912, Konju kempeitai, 29), and so forth. The impressive ability of the kempei police to maintain order was fully recognized, but Koreans did not sense in them a familiar presence: “Wearing Japanese clothes, the kempei constantly on patrol are so frightening you don’t dare look at their faces” (1914 Ch’ōnan kempei detachment, 13). That comment underscores the distance between kempei police and people.²⁶ Furthermore, “Ever since they set up their new [kempei police] stations, they’ve been making people put in so much labor for sanitation and road repair and the like, that no one has time to run his business” (1912, Konju police station, 18). Forced labor under the kempei police and constant intrusions into their daily lives created intense discontent among Koreans. (This is discussed in the next section.)

In general, then, many Koreans appreciated the kempei police for keeping order in society as long as the police protected their own personal life domain, but when the police interfered in that personal domain, the Korean view was negative. Just as with their image of the Government General’s administration as a whole, Koreans demonstrated an ambivalent response to the kempei police. The complex image of the police also reveals coexisting voices; some regarded the expansion of police facilities positively and some found the new agencies and functions to be extremely disturbing.²⁷

(2) Negative Images of Intrusive Police

Some of the foregoing comments from *Shumaku dansō* showed that the more colonial policy interfered in the practical daily routines of personal lives, the more negative and emphatic the response was. Here we consider some representative cases.

To begin with comments related to financial hardship and taxes, these issues were mentioned the most frequently in every edition as Figure 11 shows. It is important to remember, in any case, that the dimension of colonial rule which mattered the most to the people was how, concretely, it impacted their personal lives. The kempei police, for their part, were closely attentive to prices and living conditions. At the beginning of 1911 they carried out a detailed survey of prices all over Korea.²⁸

Turning to movements in the price of rice in Konju, Ch’ungch’ōng-namdo (Figure 13), the price was inflated in 1911, rising about 1.5 times the level of the previous year. In the 1912 edition, one person says: “Even though the rice crop was good and the yield was probably more than twice what it was last year ... the market price of rice does nothing but rise higher and higher” (1912 edition, Konju kempei detachment, 7–8). Another, one of many similar observations, noted that the price of rice was more than double the level three years previously (1912 edition, Sōsan police station, 20).²⁹

Figure 13. Price of Rice in Konju, Ch’ungch’ōng-namdo Province (1910–1915)

Year	Unhulled rice	Unpolished rice	Polished rice
1910	3.3	8.3	10.4
1911	4.7	12.5	16.5
1912	7.1	17.0	21.6
1913	8.4	17.2	20.5
1914	5.6	11.8	15.7
1915	4.4	9.0	12.3

Source: *Chōsen Sōtokufu tōkei nenpō*, 1910 through 1915.

Note: Figures show the average annual price (yen) per *koku* (1 *koku* = 180.39 liters) for unhulled, unpolished, and polished rice (all high-grade rice).

However, once in 1914 the rice price started falling and for the first time since the annexation it dipped below the previous year’s level. Its impact on producer and consumer differed, and of course the responses were different:³⁰ “When the price of rice falls and taxes go up, this is very hard on farm families. For civil servants and people in business and people who buy rice to eat, it is really a bountiful year” (1915 edition, Soch’ōn police station, 52). However, a falling rice price was the cause of severe stress for the great majority of farmers. Among the despairing voices, “With the price of grain now only one-third of last year’s price, those who are poor are in even more dire straits” (1915 edition, Sōsan police station, 39).³¹ For some people, the falling rice price meant that they could not repay their spring and summer debts (1915 edition, Yesan kempei detachment, 22),³² and beset by financial pressures, some people turned to stealing money (1915 edition, Jeongseon kempei outstation, 35).

Malcontent among farmers stemmed partly from the Government General’s Five-year Plan for Financial Independence announced that year, which raised the land tax, and in addition raised the tobacco tax and also raised the rents due from tenant farmers on *yōktundo* land (land that was considered to have no owner and was incorporated into the national landholdings).³³ Farmers felt the increases keenly: “While the price of rice has gone way down, the land tax, compared with last year, is about 30 percent higher per *ketsu* [“100 sheaves”] (1915 edition, Poyōng police station, 50). A provision in the 1914 revision of the land tax law shifted the burden of the land tax from the tenant to the landowner, and so, when landlords found ways, as they often did, to put the tax back onto the tenants, regardless of the law, this served to deepen farmers’ discontent.³⁴ Resentment of this kind affected the way Koreans viewed Japan’s colonial administration:

The way Japan governs is really clever. Here is why. At the time of annexation, they lowered taxes, they gave the yangban, the Korean officials, and the elderly favors of money and they made everyone happy. Now, these days when we’ve all gotten used to the Japanese rule, bit by bit they’re raising taxes. . . . At this rate, tenant farmers are

going to starve, there's no doubt about it.³⁵

The view that inflated prices and financial hardship were being caused by the steady stream of Japanese coming to live in Korea was also becoming more widespread: “With more and more Japanese coming into this country, the prices of goods, especially rice, are more than triple compared with this time last year. It has become harder and harder to get by” (1912 edition, Puyō kempei detachment, 1); “Every year huge numbers of Japanese keep streaming over to Korea. I think that's the reason things are so hard for Koreans” (1915 edition, Choch'iwŏn kempei outstation, 18).³⁶ Such responses reveal how what might have been straightforward frustration with financial hardship could be transferred to strong anti-Japanese sentiment.

Second, let us consider some of the comments in *Shumaku dansō* regarding road construction and repair, and the corvée labor used to do that work. The previous chapter noted the enactment in April 1911, shortly after the annexation, of road regulations and discussed the start of the first phase, that August, of the road repair plan as in other provinces, the kempei police in Ch'ungch'ōng-namdo were deeply involved in planning and layout of roads. Previously, at a meeting around October 1910 between the Ch'ungch'ōng-namdo kempei detachment heads and police station heads, there was discussion of “road improvements.” It was decided that the principal roads leading to the provincial government office would have priority, then roads would be built connecting with the counties, and that “the land needed to lay roadbeds will be acquired without compensation.” Provincial Police Chief Hattori (also Konju kempei commander) remarked in a self-congratulatory way, “[Using] free corvée labor...improvements have been made at a surprising pace. After a year or two, we have improved one thousand *ri* [4,000 km] of roads in this province.”³⁷ Data (Figure 14) on road construction and repair in Ch'ungch'ōng-namdo province show that road building measured by numbers

Figure 14. Road Repair in Ch'ungch'ōng-namdo Province (1910–1915)

Year	Repair by the Government General	Repair through provincial projects				Total
		1st-grade road	2nd-grade road	3rd-grade road	Ungraded road	
1910	3.3	—	—	—	—	3.3
1911	11.6	0.1	14.3	40.2	75.2	141.4
1912	21.6	0.0	45.2	103.0	167.3	337.1
1913	41.8	0.0	12.0	28.3	25.2	107.3
1914	41.9	0.0	13.2	14.1	21.2	90.4
1915	41.2	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	44.3

Source: *Chōsen Sōtokufu tōkei nenpō*, 1910 through 1915.

Notes

1. Unit is *ri* (1 *ri* = 3.92 kilometers).
2. Roads managed directly by the Government General were two to three *ken* wide (1 *ken* = 1.8 meters). As for the roads run by the provincial government, the road regulations required that first-grade roads should be at least four *ken* wide, second-grade roads at least three *ken* wide, and third-grade roads at least two *ken* wide.

of *ri* reached a peak in 1912 and then tapered off, but that does not mean that the labor burden on Koreans lessened. Thereafter, construction of roads directly managed by the Government General and roadwork to widen primary and secondary roads rose as a proportion of total road construction. These data can help account for the fact that in every volume of *Shumaku dansō*, about 10 percent (see Figure 11) of the commentary conveys disaffection with road construction.

At first (in the 1912 edition), some positive opinions were expressed. A number of people praised the increased convenience of transportation and found a symbol of “cultural enlightenment” in more and better roads,³⁸ but they were a minority. The overwhelming majority of comments were unhappy. As for their content, it focused, first, on the application of “the order to confiscate land” (the April 1911 Regulation No. 3), appearing in tales of landowners whose land was taken without compensation. “In the region of Yönsan, they have been destroying a lot of rice paddies and vegetable fields. The people there are in a terrible situation” (1912 edition, Konju kempei detachment, 5); “I hear that in Japan they pay you money when they take your land for a road, but here in Korea, they just take it from you by force. I think I might even bring this to a civil suit” (1914 edition, Ch’önan kempei detachment, 17); “They took my paddies, fields, and house, and paid me nothing. I’m truly in a terrible situation” (1915 edition, Sösan police station, 42).³⁹

Other voices protested the way the kempei police carried out the job of forcing corvée laborers to work: “We don’t get paid a single *rin*. Only the roads get better while the fields and paddies are buried. . . . Can a man live like this? The only way out is to die” (1912 edition, Ch’önan kempei outstation, 14); “On the days when I have to do corvée labor, I lose 20 or 30 *sen* a day, but there’s nothing I can do. I have to go” (1915 edition, Konju police station, 1).⁴⁰ Compulsory labor was frequently called for, moreover, during busy times in the agricultural year, or when it was very cold. A particularly miserable voice is filled with pain: “They give no consideration even when it’s very cold and everything is buried in snow. Still I have to go out for compulsory labor. When do I get time to repair the roof to protect the house from cold, and cut firewood to warm us? If my wife and children do these for me they cannot spin. The little children cry all day and all night because of cold and hunger” (1914 edition, Kanggyöng police station, 67).⁴¹ Others protest that newly built roads benefit only Japanese,⁴² that only the poor are conscripted for corvée labor,⁴³ that the workers are made to repair the same place over and over again,⁴⁴ among many others.

Talking about road construction and repair, the following conversation between two Koreans was recorded:

1st Korean: It’s been four years since the annexation. . . . The farmers are better off now than they were under the Yi monarchy [.]

2nd Korean: What's better for them? Is there anything? Every day they're made to do compulsory labor, that's all they do. They have to go out and break their bones on road improvements, no? (1914 edition, Ch'önan kempei detachment, 20.)

One can understand how this kind of resentment about the cruel burden of labor on road projects could be transformed into fierce antagonism toward colonial rule.

Third, a cluster of problems came up with regard to the extent to which the power of the colonial state interfered in daily life routines. The thrust of Lee Chol-woo's argument ("Modernity, Legality, and Power in Korea") regarding the introduction of modern management into various areas of social life and custom is definitely relevant to the situation of the Korean people during this period. The following two comments reflect that situation: "Since the annexation, every time we turn around, whatever we're doing, some official pokes his nose into it. We can't do anything freely" (1912 edition, Ch'önan kempei detachment, 15–16); "Korea, too, is gradually being enlightened, and it's good that everything is getting so convenient, but having every last thing surrounded by rules is very troublesome" (1915 edition, Puyö kempei detachment, 32).⁴⁵

One commonly cited concrete example is sanitation. A few reactions to the sanitation projects were positive, but on the whole those were in the minority.⁴⁶ Before the colonial period, these people had never experienced such management, and so when kempei police took measures to prevent contagion, when they engaged in teaching about sanitation, visited homes to inspect and survey the health and sanitation conditions, people found it annoying, as in the following; "I had a toilet near the road, and a kempei came by to inspect it. He scolded me, telling me to remove it immediately. Another said to me, it's not just you, but lots of villages have the same thing.... To keep getting more civilized, it's just a lot of fuss and bother and it irks me" (1912 edition, Konju kempei detachment, 39); "The kempei keep nagging me all the time about keeping clean, but since I was born ... not once have I ever gotten sick" (1912 edition, Ch'önan kempei outstation, 15).⁴⁷ This unwillingness to cooperate and take sanitation management seriously seems to have been particularly strong among women, who spent much of their time at home and might be expected to have little direct contact with colonial authority.⁴⁸ Undoubtedly one of the reasons the kempei police in Kangwöndo province had such trouble setting up the sanitation unions, as we saw in the previous chapter, was precisely because of this almost instinctive resistance on the part of the people to modern management of sanitation and public health.

The resistance to sanitation management and the discontent with the colonial rule were combined to associate contagious diseases in Korea with the invasion of Korea by Japan. That idea generated this play on words heard in a *chumak*: "When we ate a persimmon/*Residency General* [in Korean, the two words are homonyms and can be used in puns], vomiting/*district court* [also homonyms] spread through every local region.

Cholera [correctly “plague”] spread in China’s provinces” (1912 edition, Tangjin police station, 1).⁴⁹

Apart from sanitation/public health projects, many aspects of daily life were hemmed in by increasingly stringent regulations and close surveillance. The compulsory weights and measures law, for example. (In September 1909 the revised Korean Imperial Law No. 26 on Weights and Measures was promulgated. By it, Korea’s unit measurements were aligned with Japanese standards. The next month Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce, and Public Works Law No. 43 was put into effect in important regions of Ch’ungch’ōngnamdo.) One extremely unhappy voice relates, “We kept our old instruments at home. We used them when we took rice in and out, or when we took measurements to make clothing. Using them in those ways need not be forbidden, and there’s no need to confiscate them. But recently a patrolman came to our house and he confiscated our measuring instruments. It was too much—simply dreadful” (1912 edition, Hongju police station, 19).⁵⁰

Other comments concerned the use of former communal forest and other lands. Recall from the previous chapter that Japan incorporated most communal woodland, forest, and pastureland into the national landholdings and prohibited people from using them. Here are two responses to that: “The Forest Law is a really strict regulation. If you break off even a single branch from a pine tree and somehow the information gets to the police box, they send a patrolman around and he forbids you to do it” (1912 edition, Konju police station, 20); “The price of rice is very low this year, and I want to cut some trees so I can sell wood, but it’s really hard to get a permit. I’m at my wits end” (1915 edition, Sōsan police station, 42).⁵¹ The list goes on. It contains complaints about the complicated paperwork in getting a business permit; early marriage prohibition; the gambling prohibition; the requirement of registering residence and household, and many more.⁵² All of them should be read with the understanding that in each case the comment or complaint was made in the context of experiencing a series of increasingly tight modern surveillance methods.

(3) Religion and People

A great many remarks in *Shumaku dansō* touch on religion and personal beliefs, which makes it a productive source for the study of the connections, if any, between the religious beliefs of Korean people and their feelings about a colonial regime that intruded deeply into their lives. To begin with Christianity, the number of Christians rose sharply between the Russo-Japanese War and 1910, but the increase is considered to have leveled off after the annexation because of threats and suppression directed at believers and churches.⁵³ The figures in Figure 15 describe the large trends in numbers of Christian ministers and believers in Ch’ungch’ōngnamdo.

Rough calculation from the data in Figure 15 indicates that at that time about one percent of the province’s population were Christian (as of the end of 1912, the

population of Ch’ungch’ōng-namdo was about 998,000). Being such a small number, Christians would have been considered essentially “different” from the bulk of the population. That extreme minority status probably helps to explain why, in *Shumaku dansō* as a whole, attitudes of mistrust or disdain toward Christians figure much more prominently in the comments than respect. Most of the observations about Christians point out how their speech and behavior are not like that of other people: for example, Christians “say unreasonable things” and they are “vulgar” (1912 edition, Hongju police station, 7, Poyōng police station, 1–2).⁵⁴ Seen from the outside by non-Christians, “Those believers just randomly plunge into the faith without understanding anything about it,” or they appear to be selling their books in order to make money (1914 edition, Ch’ōnan kempei detachment, 16, 19). Other comments convey the veiled criticism that the movement to regain national sovereignty, in which Christians were deeply involved, all came to nothing when Japan annexed the country: “Before, people became Christians because that way we could get help from foreigners, which we needed to ward off pressure from Japan, but now, what’s the point in kowtowing to Christian missionaries?” (1912 edition, Asan police station, 4.) One person speculates that the real intent behind the zealous proselytizing by foreign ministers and missionaries was to claim Korea: “If [Christians] made up two-thirds of the population, then [the missionaries] would be able to make this country part of their own nation” (1915 edition, Poyōng police station, 49–50). Some people suspected, in other words, that Christian missionaries were still motivated by imperialist aims.

The 1914 and 1915 editions contain other comments with a similar skeptical or critical tone, but there are also some that commend the Christian morality and spirit of mutual help among believers, and indicate interest in missionary activities.⁵⁵ It may be that the type of hardship people were experiencing in their lives under colonial rule, as we have seen in many comments, was a factor in a steadily growing attraction to Christianity. That could account for the data in Figure 15 showing a rapid increase in numbers of Christians in 1915.

Shumaku dansō provides some material relating to the way people regarded the messianic book of prophecies *Chōnggam-nok* and the cult leader Ch’a Kyōng-sōk. (1880–1936). From about the middle of the Chosōn period, in an expression of desire to be freed from an oppressive government, growing numbers of people began to put their faith in the prophecies of *Chōnggam-nok*, which predicted the downfall of the Chosōn

Figure 15. Number of Christian Missionaries and Korean Christians in Ch’ungch’ōng-namdo Province (1910–1915)

Year	Missionaries, priests, etc.		Korean Christians
	Foreign missionaries	Korean priests and assistants	
1910	11	107	7,582
1911	13	108	8,661
1912	15	97	9,226
1913	15	87	8,168
1914	16	74	9,041
1915	15	116	14,066

Source: *Chōsen Sōtokufu tōkei nenpō*, 1910 through 1915.

dynasty and the advent of an emperor from the Chǒng family. A study by Cho Kyǒng-dal proposes that with the annexation, *Chǒnggam-nok* as a book of prophecy lost credibility and its charisma faded, but that the 1910s saw a “revival of faith in *Chǒnggam-nok*” as people increasingly looked to it for help and salvation. Ch’a Kyǒng-sǒk’s movement (later the P’ochǒn’gyo) would reinterpret the logic of *Chǒnggam-nok* as doctrine and grow to become one of the dominant, expanding new religions, but at this time, writes Cho, even though Ch’a Kyǒng-sǒk’s control of the cult was solidifying, it seems that “there were still not yet serious rumors of Ch’a Kyǒng-sǒk’s enthronement.”⁵⁶

The sacred place (Sindoan at Keryongsan mountain) that, in the prophesy, was to be the new capital of the Chǒng dynasty was located in Ch’ungch’ǒng-namdo, a point of great interest to spokesmen in *Shumaku dansō*. “People say that [the Japanese emperor] gave a new name to the Chǒng clan and held an enthronement ceremony at Keryon mountain near Konju,” and, “It has been three years since Japan annexed Korea, and so the Chǒng family should establish their capital at Keryongsan mountain now.” Such talk can be taken as expressing a wish to explain logically and to reconcile the dream of the *Chǒnggam-nok* prophecy and the reality of the annexation (1912 edition, Sōsan police station, 5–6, Hongju police station, 4).

Ch’a Kyǒng-sǒk (in *Shumaku dansō* the name is recorded as “Sha tenshi” [Ch’a emperor]) by then was very influential. There was a rumor that when Ch’a predicted a great fire in the new capital, “more than 1000 followers” joined him in evacuating the place (1912 edition, Taejǒn police station, 2). These comments give the impression that, in general, indigenous beliefs centered on *Chǒnggam-nok* were much more deeply-held than Christian faith.⁵⁷

On the other hand, in response to rumors that Ch’a Kyǒng-sǒk was being investigated, “No matter how much villagers say Ch’a can see ahead, he is just talking and can’t do anything. It’s completely stupid of him to get arrested” (1912 edition, Asan police station, 6). Previous research on new religions has not seriously taken up the question of how nonbelievers viewed the followers of those religions and the doctrines they embraced. Here, too, *Shumaku dansō* is a valuable source, for it contains quite a few comments that tell us about the views of distanced observers looking at such irrational faiths more or less dispassionately.

3. Interest in the International Situation and Domestic Issues

In the previous section we examined mainly the mentality of Koreans that ran through the different editions of the *Shumaku dansō*. Their comments showed a keen interest in international events as well as current domestic issues. This section outlines popular

responses mainly to the Xinhai Revolution that erupted in China toward the end of 1911 and the outbreak of the first world war in 1914.

(1) Responses to the Xinhai Revolution

The Xinhai Revolution, which began with the Wuchang Uprising in October 1911, was the object of great interest from the neighboring Korean people. Previous studies, however, have dealt with this subject only in the context of the revolution's effect on Korean nationalist thinking and the participation in the revolution by Korean independence activists in China.⁵⁸ They have not discussed how ordinary Korean people viewed the Xinhai Revolution. Below are presented responses to the revolution as recorded in *Shumaku dansō* (the following citations are from the 1912 edition unless otherwise noted).

Strong interest among Koreans in the Xinhai Revolution is apparent in reports of rising sales of newspapers: "The number of subscribers to the *Maeil sinbo*, the *Chōsen shimbun*, and foreign newspapers has increased these days, as people want to learn about the conditions of the civil strife in Qing China" (Konju police station, 17). Those who were able to get accurate information through newspapers and other media tended to be exceptional, however. Incorrect information about the revolution was rampant.

After the Wuchang Uprising, conflict between revolutionaries and the Qing government erupted throughout China. The Japanese government tried to exert diplomatic pressure on the Qing government to install a constitutional monarchy, but without success. The Qing dynasty fell and Yuan Shikai came to power as provisional president of the Republic of China in early 1912. Concerning this series of events, many remarks showed ignorance of who launched the revolution and wrong notions about Japan's policy toward the revolution. Some people thought, for example, that Chinese had gone to Cheju Island and were engaged in war there (Konju kempei detachment, 19); that war had broken out between Japan and China (Konju police station, 2, 11); or that the Japanese army fought against the revolutionary army and won a big victory (Sōsan police station, 19). As for what happened following the revolution, too, false information circulated widely, for example, that Huang Xing had become president (Ch'ōnan kempei outstation, 11) or that the Ming dynasty had been reconstituted (Hongju police station, 7).

Under those circumstances, popular sympathy with the revolutionary army and republicanism, a point previous research has stressed, could only be very limited. Sympathetic remarks do appear, such as one that makes a parallel between the Farmer's Rebellion of 1894 in Korea with the Chinese revolution of 1911: "The revolutionary army in China won, resulting in the collapse of the existing government and the establishment of new government. Its action is truly worthy of admiration. In Korea, too, there was the Tonghak Uprising in the past, and if it had succeeded then, we would not be grieving now" (Konju police station, 14). Another remark predicts the "gradual civilizing" of

China in the wake of the revolution (Konju police station, 15–16).⁵⁹ But such views were not the majority. On the contrary, a cold attitude toward what Chinese residents in Korea said and did appears in remarks such as, “[These Chinese] are ignorant of where the world is moving” (Kanggyŏng police station, 5). That kind of outlook continued for some time. In the 1915 edition of *Shumaku dansō* there is a verbal exchange between a Chinese resident in Korea and a Korean: when told by the former, “You Koreans got your country taken away from you under [Japan’s] nice-sounding pretext of unification,” the Korean retorts, “The times demanded that development. What about your country? Every year sees civil war. There is no end to it. Worse, Western countries interfere this way and that, and your country is about to be divided up” (1915 edition, Choch’iwŏn kempei outstation, 21).

That Korean people did not necessarily sympathize with the Xinhai Revolution was largely because of their worry about its possible effects on their daily life. There was a high level of discontent among them at the time over the rising prices of rice and other commodities, as discussed in Section 2–2. Relatively many saw a correlation between the rise in prices and the revolution. This is seen in a comment that the reason for the rising price of rice is that Korean rice is “carried away in provisions supplied for the revolt of the revolutionary army in China” (Konju kempei detachment, 26).⁶⁰ Some voiced concern about the possibility that roughly woven cotton cloth, unbleached muslin (calico), and clothing might no longer be imported (Hongsan police station, 9–10 and Sŏsan police station, 17).

Secondary effects of the revolution on Korea were also feared. Some were afraid that a group of soldiers routed from the Qing government army might enter Korea (Konju kempei detachment, 40 and Konju police station, 8, 15). Another person, recalling the Farmer’s Rebellion of 1894, anxiously said, “The civil war in China . . . makes me worry that [China] might clash with the Japanese army just like they did back in 1894” (Hongsan police station, 3).⁶¹ In this connection, there was a rumor that Koreans would be conscripted by the Japanese army.⁶²

Information of various sorts, both accurate and false, about the Xinhai Revolution and also about Japan, which was now confronted by the revolution, was rife among the Korean people. Japan saw in the Xinhai Revolution an opportunity to advance into the continent. Wanting to exploit that opportunity, it expected, at least for a while, to use Korea as a base for sending troops to Manchuria.⁶³ The Korean people seemed well aware of Japan’s aggressive intentions. Rumors, often filled with inaccurate information, circulated that Japan had sent troops or was preparing to send them.⁶⁴ One canny observation pointed out the essence of Japan’s China policy at that time: “Japan assumes a posture of indifference [toward the civil war in China] and does nothing to help rescue China...because it has aggressive designs to let the turbulence unfold until China exhausts its strength. Then Japan will move in to absorb it” (Taejŏn police station, 3–4).⁶⁵

Although they perceived the aggressive nature of Japan's policy, the Korean people's thinking and feeling in response to it varied. Some saw the Xinhai Revolution as a good opportunity to get out from under Japanese rule, as expressed in a remark, "China and Korea plan to join hands and make war against Japan, expecting Haeju in Hwanghaedo to be where the fighting will take place" (Konju police station, 11). But that represents just one side of Korean feelings toward Japan. Some, on the contrary, felt a sense of relief that Korea under Japanese rule was not affected by the civil war in China: "Every time war occurred in China it had some impact on Korea, but this time, we are glad that because of the annexation with Japan we don't need to worry at all" (Yesan kempei detachment, 9), and, "We owe [being shielded from the civil war] to the Japan-Korea annexation" (Sösan police station, 21). It would be easy to criticize such comments for being naively overoptimistic, considering that in the 1930s Japan would embroil the Korean people in a fifteen-year war with China that only ended with Japan's defeat in World War II. But, at this point just after the annexation, some Koreans understandably may have wanted to see positively or justify the annexation by believing that becoming Japan's colony had saved their country from being the locus of rivalry between foreign powers.

Others identified emotionally with Japan and viewed its aggression in a positive light: "It would be nice for Japan to subdue China's revolutionary army and then make the country its protectorate. I wonder why Japan is not going ahead and intervening" (Sösan police station, 15).

Here, let us briefly consider Korean responses to current events taking place in Korea. In the 1919 edition of the *Shumaku dansö*, there appear gossip and rumors about the possibility of Governor General Terauchi's dismissal, which had been in the wind since the autumn of 1913, and about the abolition and consolidation of special districts and counties in the spring of 1914. In Japan the first Yamamoto Gonbei cabinet was planning to revise the policy of limiting the post of colonial governor general to a military officer, which set the newspapers to reporting on the possibility of Terauchi's dismissal. (This move is discussed in Section 1, Chapter Five.) Such newspaper reports triggered the gossip, which tended to be unenthusiastic, including talk about who would succeed Terauchi and predictions that nothing would change in the way Korea was ruled, even under a new governor general (Ch'önan kempei detachment, 9, 17; Yesan kempei detachment, 25; Puyö kempei detachment, 30; and Taejön police station, 45). Some voiced concern about the realignment of administrative and police organizations that would result from the consolidation of special districts and counties (Ch'önan kempei detachment, 13; Hongju police station, 36; Hongsan police station, 62; and Asan police station, 47), while others lamented the disappearance or decline of counties with long and valued histories (Konju police station, 34, Hongsan police station, 62).

(2) Responses to World War I

Last, let us look at responses to the outbreak of World War I as they appear in the 1915 edition of the *Shumaku dansō*. The first world war, which began in July 1914, created deep anxiety among Korean people, as noted in the previous chapter. Some Koreans considered themselves relatively uninvolved: “Japan might go as far as to Europe to fight, but I don’t think Korean people have anything to do with the war.”⁶⁶ But many responded in more or less the same way as they did to the Xinhai Revolution three years earlier. They were apprehensive about the war’s impact on their daily life, through tax increases, for example, as discussed in Section 2. Typical comments were: “It’s all to the bad that the war started, and now huge amounts of provisions are needed. So taxes have risen and farmers are in a terrible situation” (Taejŏn police station, 11), and “The reason that taxes have increased so excessively is probably because the Korea Government General is giving money to help Japanese soldiers go to the front” (Onchŏnni kempei outstation, 26).⁶⁷

There was also anxious gossip about conscription, like, “I’m wondering if we Koreans might have to go to the front” (Ch’ŏnan kempei detachment, 15). Some suspected that the Japanese cabinet resolution (June 1915) to furnish two new army divisions for Korea and the steady proliferation of “military support associations” (*gunjin kōenkai*) (which probably meant “associations of reservists”) were based on the premise that Koreans would be drafted (Puyŏ kempei detachment, 32, Sŏsan police station, 42).⁶⁸ It seems clear that at that point the Japanese army still did not consider drafting Koreans to be a realistic option.⁶⁹ So, it is interesting to find signs of anxiety about conscription among the Korean people as early as this, possibly even from the time of the Xinhai Revolution.

The revolution in China stirred a sense of unity with Japan among some Koreans. Comments to that effect include: “Come to think of it, it was good that Korea was annexed by Japan. I hear that the Chinese were surprised by the fall of Qingdao. Japan is a world power now” (1915 edition, Konju police station, 4), and “Japan and Britain are helping to develop Korea, so we should pray that they win. Should Japan lose, we will go to the front and die” (1915 edition, Yesan kempei detachment, 23).⁷⁰ Thus, there were Koreans who, seeing Japan succeed in battle and rising to become a world power, could justify the annexation and were pleased to consider their country as part of Japan.

Chapter Review

Chapter Four introduced *Shumaku dansō*, a collection of observations and reactions by people living in Ch’ungch’ŏng-namdo under the fine-meshed, comprehensive network of surveillance that covered the province in the early colonial period. Studies of this period

have depicted the lives of Koreans under Japan's colonial rule, but using *Shumaku dansō* as a source, this chapter shows another side of the lives of people trying to get along by conforming to or accommodating the colonial system. Whether or not that emphasis reflects bias in the source itself is a question that requires further careful examination. In that sense, this work must be considered a preliminary study. *Shumaku dansō* nonetheless provides basic material that yields a substantial picture of how ordinary Koreans were thinking. It lets us see their highly ambivalent and sometimes self-contradictory images of and reactions to Japan's colonial rule as a whole and to the collapse of the Chosŏn-period ruling system and changes in concept of rule. Rearranged, the main arguments center on three points.

First, *Shumaku dansō* is sprinkled with frequent references by Koreans to Japanese rule—some accepting and some critical—using such terms as “cultural enlightenment” or “civilization” (*bunmeika*) and “civilized government” or “enlightened government” (*bunmei no seiji*). We can infer from this that they perceived deep discontinuity between the Japanese pattern of government and the Chosŏn monarchy system of government; and that they saw “civilization” and “modernization” as an important aspect of that discontinuity. Police and government power, exercised through multiple measures to regulate daily life, was instrumental in bringing about the transformation and collapse of the old ruling system, and, consequently, in managing the emergence of a new approach, that of “colonial modernity.”⁷¹

However, and this is the second point, it is impossible to fully understand the response by Koreans to the ruling system that prevailed at this time by considering only the “modernity” dimension of that response. In another dimension, the same people were deeply dissatisfied with and bitterly opposed to policy measures that directly affected their daily lives. Their negative response to new systems of managing their lives, including corvée labor on road construction, high rice prices/tax increases, and sanitation projects, among others, can be described as a defensive stance rooted in fear for their livelihoods. That attitude was not incorporated into the anti-Japanese sensibility right away, but—and we must not overlook this point—the fervent wish simply to make a living, under the intolerable stress of an oppressive colonial rule, kept alive a part of their spirit where “colonial modernity” could not penetrate.

Third, the reactions recorded in *Shumaku dansō* to important international events occurring when the survey was made, namely the Xinhai Revolution and the outbreak of World War I, open another window on Koreans' state of mind at the time. For most Koreans it was difficult to get accurate information about these events, but the comments in the survey indicate that they were very interested. One can read in their responses a complex slant on Japan that was not simply “anti-Japanese,” and a point of view in which the main factor determining their level of interest was the influence they thought these events would have on their own lives. It is worthy of note, therefore, that while

the defensive attitude many Koreans evinced might be expected to limit their concerns to matters that affected them personally, actually they frequently demonstrated a keen interest in world affairs.

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- 1 Cho Tong-göl, “Sam-il undong ūi minjungsa-jök ūiŭi” [The March 1st Movement and Its Significance in Popular History], *Sindonga*, March 1985, p. 417.
 - 2 For the general achievements and challenges of research on the March 1st Movement, see Yöksa Munje Yön’guso Minjok Haebang Undongsa Yön’gu-pan, ed., *Chaengjöm kwa kwaje minjok haebang undongsa* [Issues and Challenges for Research on the History of National Liberalization Movement], Yöksa Pip’yöngsa, 1990, pp. 134–158. A work that represents the current level of regional historical research is Yi Ch’ang-gön, “Sam-il undong ūi chiyök pyöl chudu seryök yön’gu” [The March 1st Movement: A Study of Its Leading Forces by Region], Ph.D. dissertation, Taegu Hyosöng Kat’ollik Taehakkyo Taehagwön, 1999. Like others, this study basically emphasizes differences by region among the leadership strata.
 - 3 Cho Tong-göl, “Sam-il undong ūi chibangsajök sönggyök” and “Sam-il undong ttae chibangmin ūi ch’amyö munje: Yangyang kwa Kangnŭng ūi kyöngu” [Regional Popular Participation in the March 1st Movement: The Cases of Yangyang and Kannŭng], *Ch’unch’ön Kyoyuk Taehakkyo non-jip*, no. 9, April 1971.
 - 4 Of the three documents combined in this one volume, the sheets of the 1912 edition alone are numbered separately according to the agencies that conducted the survey (kempeitai detachments and police stations). Therefore, sheet numbers given here in referring to the same document are not sequential numbers. The other two documents have sheet numbers in sequence.
 - 5 The notes cited here are from the 1915 edition, although they are more or less the same as those in the other two documents.
 - 6 See Pae Tu-sik, “P’ungjöng örin yet chumak” [Old *Chumak* with Their Charm] in *Han’guk minsok ūi hyönjang*, Chimmundang, 1993, p. 30. See also Korean Government General Secretariat’s Archives and Documents Section, ed., (*Chösa shiryö dai-16-shū*) *Chösen no gunshū* [(Survey Materials no. 16) People in Korea], Korean Government General Secretariat’s Archives and Documents Section, 1926, pp. 209–211.
 - 7 For example, the following comments are included: “One Korean said, ‘Assistant Detective Yi of the Taejön Police hasn’t been around today; why don’t we start gambling?’ Another said, ‘A kempei is here, so I don’t think the detective will come today’” (1912 edition, Konju kempei detachment, 12), or “These days kempei and kempei auxiliaries, always changing clothes, make rounds in the market and village, and so there are almost no robberies or thefts” (1914 edition, Yesan kempei detachment, 24). In as much as people were so aware of the surveillance by the kempei police, whether or not they laid bare their true feelings is open to question.
 - 8 Yi T’ae-jin, *Chösen öchö shakai to jukyö* [Chosön Dynasty Society and Confucianism]: Japanese translation, Hōsei University Press, 2000, Chapter 14; Miyajima Hiroshi, *Yanban: Richō shakai no tokken kaikyū* [Yanban: The Privileged Classes of Yi Dynasty Society], Chūō Kōron Sha, 1995, Chapter 8; and Kang Jae-ho, *Shokuminchi Chösen no chihō seido* [Colonial Korea’s Regional System], University of Tokyo Press, 2001, Chapters 1 and 2.
 - 9 Carter J. Eckert holds that the Koreans who cooperated with the ruler during the colonial period can be traced to people who became newly rising landowners after the opening of treaty ports (Carter J.

Eckert, *Offspring of Empire: The Koch'ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876–1945*, Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1991, Chapter 1). Hong Sōng-ch'an traces those origins to the *chungin* and *hyangni* classes (Hong Sōng-ch'an, "Hanmal-Ilche ha ūi sahoe pyōndong kwa hyangni ch'ūng" [Social Changes and the *Hyangni* Class during the Late Chosōn and Japanese Rule Periods], in Yōnse Taehakkyo, ed., *Han'guk kūndae ihaengki chungin yōn'gu* [Studies of the *Chungin* Class during the Period of Korea's Transition to Modern Times], Sinsōwōn, 1999). Chi Su-gōl, on the other hand, does not limit those origins to a few specific classes but assumes a much wider spectrum of class backgrounds for those who became rich during the opening of the treaty ports (Chi Su-gōl, *Ku Hanmal-Ilche Ch'ogi yuji chiptan ūi hyōngsōng kwa hyangni*). Be that as it may, the view that the Government General did not succeed in incorporating local men of repute and property into the lower-level components of the ruling structure is shared by the Chi Su-gōl article and Ōwa Kazuaki's article "Shokuminchi Chōsen chihō gyōsei ni kansuru ichi-shiron: Mensei no kakuritsu katei o chūshin ni" [A Study on Regional Administration in Colonial Korea: With Focus on the Formative Process of the *Mensei* System] (first published in 1988), in Ōwa Kazuaki, *Shokuminchi-ki Chōsen no minshū undō* [Popular Movement in Korea during the Colonial Period], Ryokuin Shobō, 1994.

- 10 Similar remarks are also reported in the 1912 edition from Konju kempei detachment, 9, Ch'ōnan kempei outstation, 13, Sōsan police station, 2, Poyōng police station, 3; and, in the 1915 edition, the Sōsan police station, 43, and so forth. (Instead of giving all examples, which would be rather tedious, I only take up typical cases involving relevant information. The same is true of the citations below.)
- 11 Similar remarks are reported in the 1912 edition by Hongsan police station, 1; and in the 1914 edition by Sōsan police station, 56, 59. In the judicial area, there were such criticisms as, "We have never heard of any court case [between Koreans and Japanese] in which a Korean wins" (1912 edition, Kongju kempei detachment, 4–5) and, "Judges are not familiar with the state of affairs in Korea ... and so they attach importance to what an ignorant proctor says" (1912 edition, Kanggyōng police station, 1–2).
- 12 Similar remarks reported from, for example, Sōsan police station, 12–13, 15 in the 1912 edition.
- 13 For the Government General's policy toward yangban and Confucianism, see Kang Dong-jin, "Nihon no Chōsen shihai seisakushi kenkyū," p. 139, and Yi Myōng-hwa, "Chosōn ch'ongdokpu ūi yugyo chōngch'aek" [The Government General's Policy toward Confucianism], *Han'guk tongnip undongsa yōn'gu* [Studies of the History of the Korean Independence Movement], no. 7, December 1993, Chapter 2. Concerning the yangban policy in Ch'ungch'ōng-namdo province, Obara Shinzō, governor of the province, reports in a letter to Governor General Terauchi Masatake that when he invited yangban to attend during his inspection tour of counties, only pro-Japanese yangban came and that he failed to win over the die-hard faction (Obara Shinzō to Terauchi Masatake, 3 May 1915; *Terauchi Masatake kankei monjo*, 236:2). As of 1919 there were 110-odd anti-Japanese Confucians in the same province (Korea Kempeitai Headquarters, ed., *Chōsen sōjō jiken gaikyō* [A Summary Report of Incidents of Disturbance in Korea], unpublished material, 1919; reprint Gannandō Shoten, 1969, p. 6).
- 14 Similar remarks in the 1914 edition reported by Yōnsan kempei detachment, 4, and in the 1915 edition, by Puyō kempei detachment, 33, among others.
- 15 This comment apparently refers to a dispute over "chongjung" property. During the colonial period, because the Government General did not permit *chongjung* organizations to own property as legal persons, there arose in the 1910s numerous disputes over the lands that should have been jointly owned by the *chongjung* in the past. On this point, see Yi Sūng-il, "Ilche singminji sigi chongjung jaesan kwa 'Chosōn pudongsan tūnggiryōng—Soyukwōn punjaeng ūr chungsim ūro" [Chongjung Property and the "Korean Real Estate Registration Act" during the Japanese Colonial Period: With Focus on Ownership Disputes], *Sahak yōn'gu*, no. 61, February 2000.
- 16 Similar remarks in the 1914 edition from Kanggyōng police station, 65, and in the 1915 edition, Ch'ōnan kempei detachment, 14.

- 17 Han U-hŭi, “Pot’ong hakkyo e taehan chōhang kwa kyoyuk yōl” [Education Fever and Resistance against Entrance into Regular Public Schools], *Kyoyuk iron*, vol. 6, no. 1, 1991, pp. 53–76, and Furukawa Noriko, “Chōsen ni okeru futsū gakkō no teichaku katei,” pp. 177–181. In *Shumaku dansō*, too, there were comments criticizing forced school attendance and suppression of private schools, such as, “The police station recently summoned children and parents, urging the enrollment of children into school, and told them that those who would not go to school would be forced to” (1912 edition, Tangjin police station, 6) and “Japanese authorities did say they would guide and educate Koreans ... but they abolished schools, the source of teaching knowledge, and reduced study courses, eliminating many subjects” (1912 edition, Konju police station, 14).
- 18 For example, Japanese public officials “have tended to side with Japanese and dismiss Koreans” (1914 edition, Ch’ōnan kempei detachment, 17); “Especially after annexation, Japanese treat Koreans as dumb animals” (1912 edition, Taejōn police station, 7); and “Bathhouses run by Japanese refuse to allow Koreans to take a bath with Japanese and won’t let Koreans in until afterward (1914 edition, Kanggyōng police station, 65).
- 19 In the 1912 edition, Ch’ōnan kempei detachment, 8. In the 1914 edition, Ch’ōnan kempei detachment, 20, Puyō kempei detachment, 30, and Sōsan police station, 58.
- 20 In the 1912 edition, Ch’ōnan kempei outstation, 9–10. In the 1914 edition, Hongsan police station, 62.
- 21 Hattori Yonejirō, *90-nen no kaiko* [Recollections from the Past Nine Decades], privately printed by Hattori Hiroshi, 1963, p. 81.
- 22 Ohara to Terauchi, 3 May 1915.
- 23 Among other comments are: “[The county magistrate] is no more than an official in charge of affixing seals who sides with the court and the police” (1912 edition, Tangjin police station, 3), and “I think it would be okay if the county office was abolished, but I want the kempei outstations to stay as they are” (1914 edition, Ch’ōnan kempei detachment, 13).
- 24 Similar opinions were reported in the 1912 edition, Puyō kempei detachment, 6, Hongju police station, 6–7, Hongsan police station, 5, Sōsan police station, 11, and Poyōng police station, 1; and in the 1914 edition, Tangjin police station, 48, Yōnsan kempei detachment, 4, and Sōsan police station, 40.
- 25 Similar remarks in the 1912 edition from Asan police station, 3; in the 1914 edition, Hongju police station, 39; and in the 1915 edition, Taejōn kempei detachment, 10, Choch’iwōn kempei detachment, 21, Poyōng police station, 51.
- 26 In this connection, although both were public peace agencies, Koreans saw the kempeitai as more powerful than the civil police; the former was fearsome, as seen in such comments as, “The kempei are military men from the start. They wear guns and have learned all sorts of things. Policemen know nothing, and all they have is a saber” (1914 edition, Yōnsan kempei detachment, 7) and, “Policemen are civilly admonish those who committed a crime ... kempei auxiliaries easily strike people on the cheek, and the way they talk is rough. I don’t like them” (1914 edition, Taejōn police station, 42).
- 27 A case when people were perplexed at the establishment of a new police substation is seen in a comment from Konju police station, 18, in the 1912 edition. On the other hand, there is an example of someone wishing for a police substation: “In a place 40 *ri* [16 km] away from a police substation, by all means we want another one to be built to protect us” (1912 edition, Hongsan police station, 4).
- 28 *Chōsen kakuchi bukka chōsa gaiyō* [Summary of the Results of the Survey on Prices in Various Parts of Korea] (survey conducted in January 1911), edited and published by the Korea Kempeitai Headquarters and the Korea Government General Central Police Headquarters, is a voluminous 1, 554-page report recording in detail the prices of 110 items by region. This suggests how concerned the kempei police were about this problem. It is not known, however, whether this kind of survey was undertaken on a continuous basis.

- 29 Similar remarks reported in the 1912 edition by Konju kempei detachment, 32, 33, Ch'ōnan kempei outstation, 1, Puyō kempei detachment, 9, Hongju police station, 13, Hongsan police station, 2, 14, and Sōsan police station, 16–17.
- 30 Similar remarks reported from Onchōnni kempei detachment, 25, in the 1915 edition.
- 31 Many comments are similar to this. Examples in the 1915 edition are reported from the Konju police station, 1, 2, Taejōn kempei detachment, 6, Choch'iwōn kempei detachment, 21, and Hongsōng police station, 44.
- 32 Similar remarks were reported from the Taejōn kempei detachment, 11, in the 1915 edition.
- 33 Hori Kazuo, “Chōsen ni okeru shokuminchi zaisei no tenkai: 1910–30 nendai shotō ni kakete” [Colonial Finance in Korea: From 1910 to the Early 1930s], in Iinuma Jirō and Kang Jae-ōn, eds., *Shokuminchi Chōsen no shakai to teikō* [Korean Society and Resistance during the Colonial Period], Miraisha, 1982, pp. 204–205. Increases and decreases in the land tax, which were a consequence of the 1914 revision of the Land Tax Law, varied widely by province. There was an increase of about 18 percent in the case of Ch'ungch'ōng-namdo province, almost the same as the average increase (17 percent) over all of Korea (Miyajima Hiroshi, “Chōsen ‘tochi chōsa jigyo’ kenkyū josetsu” [Introduction to Research on the “Cadastral Survey” in Korea], *Ajia keizai*, vol. 19, no. 9, September 1978, pp. 47–48).
- 34 1915 edition: Sōch'ōn police station, 53, Onchōnni kempei detachment, 26.
- 35 1915 edition: Puyō kempei detachment, 29. Likewise in the 1915 edition, Konju police station, 2, Taejōn kempei detachment, 7, and Choch'iwōn kempei detachment, 18.
- 36 Similar remarks were reported from, in the 1912 edition, Konju kempei detachment, 20–21, Ch'ōnan kempei outstation, 2, Tangjin police station, 2–3, and Hongsan police station, 12.
- 37 Hattori, *90-nen no kaiko*, pp. 83–85.
- 38 “As our civilization gradually progresses, roads have become bigger and wider and railway service has also begun, thereby providing convenience, which we welcome” (Konju kempei detachment, 25). Similar remarks are reported in the 1912 edition from Konju kempei detachment, 36, 37, Yesan kempei detachment, 7, and Sōsan police station, 20.
- 39 Other examples in the 1912 edition are from Hongju police station, 6, 7 and Hongsan police station, 6; and in the 1914 edition, Tangjin police station, 52, Hongsan police station, 63, and Kanggyōng police station, 67.
- 40 Similar remarks are reported from Hongju police station, 7 in the 1912 edition; and from Yesan kempei detachment, 23 and Ch'ōnan kempei detachment, 20 in the 1914 edition. In some regions it was decided to provide some payment for compulsory labor in order to deal with such discontent, but the complaints continued, claiming that the Japanese foremen took a cut or that the payment was too low (Asan police station, 1, in the 1912 edition. In the 1915 edition, Choch'iwōn kempei outstation, 19, 20, Onchōnni kempei outstation, 27, and Hongsōng police station, 48).
- 41 Similar remarks from Hongsan police station, 8, and Hongsan police station, 14, in the 1912 edition; and from Ch'ōnan kempei detachment, 12, in the 1914 edition.
- 42 For example, Ch'ōnan kempei outstation, 17, and Puyō kempei detachment, 2, in the 1912 edition; and Konju police station, 33, and Sōsan police station, 58, in the 1914 edition.
- 43 For example, Tangjin police station, 51, in the 1914 edition; and Taejōn kempei detachment, 9, in the 1915 edition.
- 44 For example, in the 1914 edition, from Konju police station, 34, Hongju police station, 39, and Hongsan police station, 62.
- 45 Similar remarks from Hongju police station, 1–2 in the 1912 edition; Tangjin police station, 48, in the 1914 edition; and Ch'ōnan kempei detachment, 15, in the 1915 edition.
- 46 For instance, remarks recognizing the effects of cleaning and appreciating free vaccination for

- smallpox (1912 edition: Ch’ōnan kempei detachment, 2, Yesan kempei detachment, 9, Sōsan police station, 13, and Kanggyōng police station, 2).
- 47 Similar remarks are also reported by Hongsan police station, 5, and the Asan police station, 1, in the 1912 edition.
- 48 “This autumn, too, we have to get smallpox vaccinations. A female physician should give the shots to the girls and women. If a policeman comes, the girls and women in our families will be scared and run away” (1912 edition, Sōsan police station, 8). “When they do vaccinations, [the policemen] grab the wives and daughters by the arm and roll up their sleeves by force, so everyone is surprised and upset and they all start crying” (1914 edition, Taejōn police station, 42).
- 49 Concerning the outbreak of the plague in northern Manchuria and the epidemic prevention measures taken by the ruling authorities centered around the kempei police toward the end of 1910, see Pak Yun-jae, “1910 nyōndae ch’o Ilche ūi p’esūt’ū pangyōk hwal tong kwa Chosōn chibae” [Imperial Japan’s Plague Prevention Activities in the Early 1910s and the Rule of Korea], in Ha Hyōn-gang Kyosu Chōngnyōn Kinyōm Nonch’ong Kanhaeng Wiwōnhoe [Committee for Publication of Commemorative Essay Collection in Honor of the Retirement of Doctor Ha Hyōn-gang], ed., (*Ha Hyōn-gang kyosu chōngnyōn kinyōm nonch’ong*) *Han’guksa ūi kujo wa chōn’gae* [(Commemorative Essay Collection in Honor of the Retirement of Doctor Ha Hyōn-gang) The Structure and Development of Korean History], 2000.
- 50 Similar complaints were also reported by Konju kempeitai detachment, 40–41 in the 1912 edition.
- 51 Similar voices were also reported in the 1912 edition, by Puyō kempei detachment, 1; and in the 1914 edition, by Yesan kempei detachment, 24–25, and Kanggyōng police station, 63, 65.
- 52 Similar complaints also reported in the 1912 edition, by Konju police station, 20; and in the 1914 edition, Puyō kempei detachment, 31, Taejōn police station, 41, and Tangjin police station, 52.
- 53 Kuratsuka Taira, “Chōsen Kirisutokyō to nashonarizumu: 3-1 Undō ni itaru sono ketsugō katei ni tsuite” [Korean Christianity and Nationalism: The Process of Their Combination Leading to the March 1st Movement], in Taguchi Fukuji et al., eds., *Gendai minshushugi no shomondai* [Problems of Modern Democracy], Ochanomizu Shobō, 1982.
- 54 Other examples include those reported in the 1912 edition from Hongju police station, 7; in the 1914 edition, Puyō kempei detachment, 29 and Tangjin police station, 50; and, in the 1915 edition, Konju police station, 3.
- 55 In the 1914 edition: Hongju police station, 38, Asan police station, 47, and Sōsan police station, 59. In the 1915 edition: Taejōn kempei detachment, 6 and Poyōng police station, 49.
- 56 Cho Kyōng-dal, *Chōsen minshū undō no tenkai* [Development of the Korean Popular Movement], Iwanami Shoten, 2002, pp. 189–190, 298–299.
- 57 Popular interest in Keryōng-san and Ch’a Kyōng-sōk comes out in remarks reported in the 1912 edition from, for example, Taejōn police station, 3, and Poyōng police station, 6.
- 58 See, among other works, Cho Tong-gōl, “1910 nyōndae tongnip undong ūi pyōnch’ōn kwa t’ūksōng” [Changes and Characteristics of the Independence Movement in the 1910s], in Cho Tong-gōl, *Han’guk minjok chu’i ūi sōngnip kwa tongnip undonsa yōn’gu* [Formation of Korean Nationalism: A History of the Independence Movement], Chisik Sanōpsa, 1989, pp. 371–372; and Sin Sūng-ha, “Ye’gwan Sin Kyu-sik kwa Chungguk Hyōngmyōngtangin kwa ūi kwange” [An Overview of Sin Kyu-sik and His Relations with Chinese Revolutionaries], in “Chunggukhak Nonch’ong” P’yōnjip Wiwōnhoe, ed., *Kim Chun-yōp kyosu hwagap kinyōm Chunggukhak nonch’ong* [Essays on Chinese Studies in Commemoration of the 60th Birthday of Doctor Kim Chun-yōp], “Chunggukhak Nonch’ong” P’yōnjip Wiwōnhoe, 1983, Chapter 3.
- 59 Some remarks refer to the Chinese Revolution in connection with republicanism (reported by Konju police station, 12, 15, and Hongju police station, 11), but it is not clear whether or not they indicate a positive evaluation of the revolution.

Chapter Four

- 60 Similar remarks are also reported by Konju kempei detachment, 22, Puyō kempei detachment, 9, Konju police station, 22, Taejōn police station, 5, Kanggyōng police station, 3, 5, 6, and Sōsan police station, 11.
- 61 Similar remarks from Puyō kempei detachment, 3, Konju kempei detachment, 21 and Tangjin police station, 4, 5–6.
- 62 Ch’ōnan kempei outstation, 18 and Taejōn police station, 4, 6.
- 63 Matsuda, “Ilbon yukgun,” Chapter 2.
- 64 In November 1911, Japan dispatched to North China an infantry battalion and a machine-gun platoon from the Third Army Division based in Nagoya, but the idea of sending troops to Manchuria, which was pushed by the army—a strong advocate of aggressive intervention—did not materialize. However, rumors that Japan had sent one hundred warships or that Japanese troops had left for Manchuria and the like were reported by Ch’ōnan kempei outstation, 11, 17, Hongju police station, 9–10, and Taejōn police station, 1.
- 65 Another remark that points out Japan’s designs was reported by Konju police station, 3.
- 66 A similar remark was reported by Taejōn police station, 11.
- 67 Similar remarks were reported by Taejōn kempei detachment, 6–7, Choch’iwōn kempei outstation, 23, Onchōnni kempei outstation, 28, and Tangjin police station, 36, 38.
- 68 There was also a remark about conscription of Koreans, reported by Sōch’ōn police station, 54. Contemporary newspaper articles also reported on rumors rampant in the wake of the world war, such as that Korea would become a battlefield or that Koreans would be conscripted (*Maeil sinbo*, 19 August 1914, and *Chōsen shimbun*, 1 October 1914).
- 69 The idea of Korean conscription was denied at the time and considered unrealistic, even by high-ranking army men, as can be seen in a remark by Supreme War Councilor Kawamura Kageaki (*Keijō nippō*, 5 October 1916) and another by Korea Army Commander Akiyama Yoshifuru (*Chōsen jihō*, 18 August 1917).
- 70 Similar remarks are also reported by Onchōnni kempei outstation, 25, Tangjin police station, 37–38, and Hongsōng police station, 44.
- 71 For recent research trends concerning “colonial modernity,” see Matsumoto Takenori, “Chōsen ni okeru ‘shokuminchi-teki kindai’ ni kansuru kinnen no kenkyū dōkō: Ronten no seiri to saikōsei no kokoromi” [Recent Trends in Research on “Colonial Modernity” in Korea: Summary and Reconstruction of Points at Issue] (first published in 2002), in Miyajima Hiroshi et al., eds., *Shokuminchi kindai no shiza: Chōsen to Nihon* [Viewpoint of Colonial Modernity: Korea and Japan], Iwanami Shoten, 2004; Kim Tong-no, “Singminji sigi ilsang saenghwal ūi kūndaesōng kwa singminjisōng” [Daily Life, Modernity, and Colonialism during the Colonial Period], in Yōnse Taehakkyo Kukhak Yōn’guwōn, ed., *Ilche ūi singmin chibae wa ilsang saenghwal* (op. cit.); and Itagaki Ryūta, “‘Shokuminchi kindai’ o megutte: Chōsenshi kenkyū ni okeru genjō to kadai” [“Colonial Modernity”: Current Status and Tasks for Research on Korean History], *Rekishi hyōron*, no. 654, October 2004.