

Governance and policing of colonial Korea : 1904-1919


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Chapter Five

Shift from the Kempei Police to the Civil Police

The era of the kempei police was brought to an abrupt end by the stunning impact of the independence movement, whose pent-up fury burst forth on 1 March 1919. With the changeover that year in August to a civil police force, the Central Police Headquarters (Keimu Sōkanbu) of the Government General was abolished and a new Police Bureau (Keimubu) was set up as one of several agencies within the Government General. Locally, policing powers were, as a formality, turned over to the top provincial administrators, and a new department called Division Three (Daisanbu) was established within the jurisdiction of each provincial governor (in February 1921 the name was changed to Provincial Police Department [Keisatsubu]). The new structure that was formed from these changes is shown in Figure 16.

Figure 16. Civil Police Organization (Outline)



This chapter examines the responses of the Government General and the Japanese government when they faced the most massive anti-Japanese nationalist movement yet to erupt in the colonial era, and it analyzes the perceptions and thinking that lay behind the particular changes each side aimed to bring about in the police organization

in Korea. These questions so far have been dealt with mainly in studies on the so-called cultural rule (“*bunka seiji*”) of the 1920s. In the now considerable body of research on the years of “cultural rule” it is possible to extract a general consensus about the police in Korea: “Because of the way the police system was reconfigured, the violent expedients of Japanese imperialism that were turned on the Korean people far outstripped anything that had been perpetrated before the restructure.”¹ Beyond such a general conclusion, however, when we seek a more precise, substantiated picture, we run up against several important questions that have not been fully investigated.

The first is to pinpoint the origins of the organizational changes made in 1919. The immediate trigger for those changes was unquestionably the Samil (March 1st) Movement. Previous studies concur that, in the words of one author, cultural rule was “a policy of Japanese imperialism shaped in response to the Samil Movement.”²

Yet what about the time before the uprising? There must have been signs, some kind of indication that changes were being considered. One contemporary Japanese administrator in Korea related, for example, that, “The government...was moving ahead to put reforms into effect and they were working on a number of plans, when out of the blue, in March 1919, disturbances and demonstrations erupted all over Korea.”³ Clearly, then, preparations for reforms had been going on since well before the Samil Uprising. But for a long time the historical details of what happened during the time leading up to the reforms were not a priority to scholars.

Then came the groundbreaking research of Haruyama Meitetsu, the first to put single-minded focus on this issue. Looking closely at the political leadership of Hara Takashi, prime minister in 1919, Haruyama proposes that the idea of extending the system of rule in Japan proper to Korea, the assimilationist idea behind ‘cultural rule,’ originated with Hara. He goes on to argue that the character and intent of reforms in the system of colonial rule based on that idea had been apparent and growing more so since as far back as the Russo-Japanese War.⁴ Another scholar, Yi Hyöng-nang, draws on new material to elucidate the ideas worked out by the first Yamamoto Gonbei cabinet (February 1913–April 1914). Yi believes that among all the various moves for reforms in the system of colonial rule before the Samil Movement, these ideas probably had the best chance of coming to fruition.⁵ Yet Yi Hyöng-nang’s paper does not refer to Haruyama’s research, and it differs from Haruyama in its interpretation of the central driving force behind the revisions. As a result, as I will argue, it does not succeed in fully explaining within a coherent framework the Yamamoto cabinet’s attempts to restructure colonial administration or efforts at reforms by the Hara cabinet.

With those points of contention in mind, I attempt in this chapter to show that in the 1910s, an undercurrent leaning toward reform of the Korea kempei police system ran through Hara’s Seiyūkai party and colored the thinking of the army and the Government General bureaucracy. I also argue that the thinking of the first Yamamoto cabinet revealed

sure signs that it was already moving toward reforms and administrative changes very much like the reforms of 1919.

The second matter I want to illuminate is the process through which the reforms of 1919 were worked out in the Hara cabinet. We must not jump to conclusions about the restructure of the police system—and, therefore, the wider issue of ‘cultural rule’—simply by looking at the outcome; we must balance our perspective by examining exactly how the process of organizational restructure unfolded. There is, of course, the consensus that the catalyst for the change to cultural rule was the Samil Movement. Almost no scholar, however, has analyzed the various revisions and changes that resulted in cultural rule after studying the process of their formation from the earliest disturbances of March 1st until the new system was fully in place. In a relatively recent, somewhat generalized overview, Yi Chǒng-yong and Nagata Akifumi study the course of reforms during this period of administrative reforms in the colonial government. In a striking, vivid account, Okamoto Makiko likewise depicts in broad strokes the main currents of change in colonial administration against the background of contemporary party politics.⁶ As we can infer from numerous encounters in the literature with the prefix “Saitō Makoto’s” before “cultural rule,” the process of reforms before Saitō took over as Korea governor general—that is, before August 1919—has received little attention in previous scholarship.

As a result, it has not been fully established who, specifically, was responsible for the various reforms after the uprising erupted on March 1st. Haruyama’s and virtually all of the several studies that have appeared since then focus on the political aims of Prime Minister Hara,⁷ yet no one has adequately investigated the extent to which Hara’s “extension of the homeland” idea was realized in the reforms themselves. In the case of the restructure of the police in Korea, it is possible to view the changeover to a civil force modeled on that of Japan proper as a consequence of Hara’s determined promotion of the “extension of the homeland” concept. Hara’s wish to establish a Japan-style police force, however, still does not explain why at the same time he pushed for such a huge increase in the size of the Korea police. I chose to trace the restructure of the police organization, from before the outbreak of the Samil Movement until the changes went into effect, and to examine the bureaucracy of the Government General as one of the forces that drove the restructure, simply because I wanted to unravel that and other issues noted above.

Finally, I want to take a new look at how the shift in the police system, a result of the restructure, has been judged. Previous scholarship has tended to regard the police organization reforms as no more than superficial changes in a system that stood for the “hypocrisy” of cultural rule, and as something that made the continuing violence of the police even worse. It is true that the expansion of the police that occurred with the reforms contradicted what cultural rule was ostensibly supposed to be. Nonetheless, the expansion of the police was not logically the same thing as “continuity”⁸ of the Korea police force over the period before and after the reforms. Further, I take issue with the

contention that there was no policy change between the period before and the period after the Samil Movement. That line of argument can too easily end up diminishing the impact of the uprising on Japan's leadership class and diluting the historical significance of the movement itself. Rather than finding continuity of policy in the 1910s and in the 1920s, my position is that the shift in the police system and the expansion of the police force signified the formation of a new policy line. Accordingly, in separate sections below, I discuss the across-the-board replacement of the top people in the Korean police organization in 1919, and cite evidence showing that the Korean people were interested in and did not simply reject the reforms.

My intent here is to present a comprehensive picture of the changes made in the police system while keeping an eye on the issues sketched above. In Section 1 I lay out the basic premises for police reform. These were based on ideas emerging during the period of 'military rule' in the 1910s from a number of different, sometimes contending, forces. The next section focuses mainly on the kempei police response to the Samil Movement in order to show how the Japanese government arrived at the conclusion that the police had to be expanded. Section 3 follows developments from right after the 1919 uprising until the end of August, when organizational and administrative changes were promulgated, especially the responses of the Government General bureaucracy, Prime Minister Hara, and the army. I discuss in Section 4 the appointment of a whole new group of officers to the top positions of the police bureaucracy after the reforms went into effect, and I also examine successive appointments of additional personnel to lower-ranking positions in police agencies. Finally, in Section 5, I attempt to portray the reactions and responses to the changes in the police system by the Korean people.

1. Ideas for Police Reform before March 1st, 1919

During the 1910s, well before the kempei police system was dismantled in August 1919, disparate constellations of political power were already formulating ideas on reform of the system. The several political groups were not connected nor in close touch with each other. Each one was more interested in promoting its own interests and political objectives, and their plans for the restructure of the Korea police were all different. None of their programs materialized, but the various ideas, priorities, and inclinations they embodied all remained as political undercurrents. We can think of them as setting the stage for the police system reforms that actually were enacted in 1919. Here I will take up three groups having a particularly strong interest in the disposition of the police system: the Japanese army, the civil bureaucrats working in the Korea Government General, and the Seiyūkai political party together with Hara Takashi, its most prominent representative.

To begin with the Japanese army, let us go back to the period immediately after the annexation of Korea. At that time, the leadership core of the war ministry were studying the draft legislation titled “Provisions Pertaining to the Korea Kempeitai.” The law, which was issued on 10 September 1910, gave Korea kempeitai personnel the authority to do the work of the civil police (see Chapter Three, Section 1). While the draft legislation was in progress, a memo recommending that the kempei police system be treated strictly as a temporary measure was circulated among Oka Ichinosuke, then chief of Japan’s Bureau of Military Affairs, and Akiyama Masanosuke and Yoshimura Yasozō, both councilors in the war ministry. According to that memo, from 1907 onward the chief responsibility of the kempeitai was to maintain order and security, with military police duties as their secondary obligation. As the passage below states, it emphasized that the kempei police system should never be considered anything more than a “temporary arrangement.”

The Korea kempei have been made a police agency for maintaining order and security because the civil police force is not yet in good order. This will be a temporary arrangement to be called upon as the occasion requires and will not be a permanent system to remain indefinitely into the future. The primary work of the kempei is to function as military police, and so with the establishment of a police organization in Korea, kempei stationed in Korea, as far as possible, should return to their original line of work.⁹

Being a relatively concrete document, the memo also provided two alternative plans for revising the regulations governing the Korea kempeitai, in case the system was changed. This suggests that Japan’s Ministry of War might have been considering abolishing the kempei police system just as soon as the civil police force had been extended throughout Korea.

After the annexation, the war ministry did, in fact, frequently suggest reducing or restructuring the kempei police. During Diet interpellations in 1911 Ishimoto Shinroku, vice minister of war, observed that kempei dispatched to Korea using contingency funds from the war ministry (2,697 out of the current force of 3,503 kempei) could not soon be repatriated, but, “If there is some drastic change in present conditions, it should be possible to bring them back to Japan.”¹⁰ During the first Yamamoto Gonbei cabinet, which aimed at getting rid of the kempei police system (discussed below), the war ministry pressed for reduction of the kempei police as part of the second phase of government cutbacks. According to a contemporary newspaper account, Governor General Terauchi Masatake and Akashi Motojirō, chief of police (*cum* kempeitai commander in Korea) were opposed (*Yomiuri shimbun*, 6 December 1913). During Diet interpellations, Kusunose Yukihiro, war minister in the Yamamoto cabinet, declared, “The kempei who are in Korea are virtually in service to the Government General. From the perspective of the Ministry of

War leadership... a great many of those kempei seem redundant,” and he said the ministry was negotiating with the Government General to cut back on the number of men in the Korea kempeitai.¹¹ Then in 1915 it was decided to send two additional army divisions to Korea, just as the Ministry of War had wished. This led Minister of War Ōshima Ken’ichi to express in the 1917 Diet his hope that now, “by putting in more divisions, the number of kempei in Korea can, to some extent, be reduced.”¹²

What can explain the army’s attitude? This is simply an inference, but one factor might have been misgivings that showed up in the memo circulated in the war ministry—a sense that there was something irregular, not quite right about using kempei to do police work. Even Akiyama Masanosuke, who was a Government General councilor and trusted colleague of Terauchi and had helped to design the kempei police system, seemed to have reservations. As long as the Righteous Armies continued to pose a threat, Akiyama believed, there was no choice but to deploy large numbers of kempei, but “with the spread of Japan’s Imperial influence among the populace, we should steadily reduce the numbers of kempei.”¹³ The financial situation was probably another factor. Expenditures by the Ministry of War on operations in Korea had been going down until 1915, when it was decided to furnish two additional army divisions.¹⁴ Even after 1915 some within the army warned, “In the future we will have to draw some of the funds for military spending from the special accounts in Korea and Taiwan.”¹⁵ Considering how large a proportion (about 40 percent in 1914) of the ministry’s spending on Korea was kempei-related, that would have been a likely target for reductions.¹⁶

In short, during the 1910s the army kept pushing for some kind of cutback—either by abolishing the kempei police system or reducing the scale of kempeitai operations in Korea. No matter which one, abolition or reduction, received priority or whether priority swung back and forth between them, everyone concerned seems to have come to the same general conclusion about the kempei police: that there was no reason to consider the system permanent, no special need to maintain the status quo.

Another group with political impact on the reforms were the civil bureaucrats in the Korea Government General. The kempei police system was an irritant and a source of discontent among these people. Kempeitai Commander Akashi was a close colleague of Terauchi with so much power that he was sometimes called “the de facto vice governor general” or the “vice regent of the peninsula,”¹⁷ and the system itself constituted a huge, wide-ranging organization employing kempei police personnel in administrative and other jobs, even in the lowest ranks of government offices. From 1913 to 1915 *Tokyo Asahi shimbun* special correspondent in Seoul, Nakano Seigō, reported on conditions under “kempei rule”:

Listen to the heads of internal affairs in the provinces. To begin with, they all say the same thing that the governors in the local regions have no police powers of

their own, and that is at the root of the abuses around them.... Look around. Local chiefs have no police authority to maintain security, peace, and order for the people. Instead, they are obliged to take directions from the kempei for every conceivable activity.¹⁸

Nakano wrote that kempei reports on the daily activities of local officials “have a huge bearing on future promotions and demotions, appointments and dismissals,” and so naturally local administrators had to treat kempei officers with kid gloves, constantly trying to read their faces. Korean officials, he said, “appear to be nothing so much as slaves to the kempei.” Kobashi Ichita, head of the Regional Bureau in Japan’s Ministry of Home Affairs, noted in his report of an inspection tour he made in 1913 that in the provinces there was “no communication of their thoughts” between the local police chief (*cum* provincial kempeitai unit chief) and the provincial government office.¹⁹ The Government General must have known about that situation. Among the Terauchi documents are letters describing Terauchi’s alertness to whether heads of provincial governments were essentially shackled to provincial police chiefs, and letters telling Terauchi how Korean provincial governors themselves, in deference to the kempei, were relinquishing their administrative duties to the kempei side.²⁰

How did these situations appear to upper-ranking civil officers and bureaucrats in the Government General? In 1916 Hagiwara Hikozō, a trainee posted to the Department of Internal Affairs in the Government General, described the atmosphere there during the early days of his internship:

By that time the reputation of the kempei police was extremely bad. Even within the Government General people were calling for change and improvement. Central Police Headquarters had taken over the powers of the police even in administration, and only two of the section heads in the organization were civil officials—the head of the Police Affairs Section and the head of the Sanitation/Public Health Section. The heads of security, the higher police, and other sections were veteran kempei colonels and lieutenant colonels. It was not the kind of organization that encouraged its members to sense the subtleties of popular feelings and adapt to changes in circumstances.²¹

We have already noted that kempei controlled the central line of command in the Central Police Headquarters (see Chapter Three, Section 1. But Hagiwara was mistaken in saying that the chief of the Security Section was a kempei officer. That post was filled by a civil police official throughout the 1910s). Moreover, among all those within the Government General who continued to harbor simmering opposition to the kempei police system, Hagiwara claimed that, “The one with the strongest views was Department

[Bureau] of the Interior chief Usami Katsuo.” Another source relates that around February 1918 Usami consulted Yamagata Isaburō, director general of political affairs (vice governor general), and their thoughts on the kempei police system were conveyed to the Japanese government.²² As we will see in Section 3 below, Usami was to be one of the most instrumental people behind the police system reforms of 1919.

Besides Government General bureaucrats aligned with the Department of the Interior, “there were people with a lot of complaints” among civil police officers, also, who objected to the ubiquitous supervision by kempei.²³ Hirai Mitsuo, assigned in 1910 to the General Affairs Section of the Central Police Headquarters, wrote in his memoir that “the black uniforms of that time [the civil police] felt insignificant indeed. There were three interns at Police Headquarters then, and all they did was complain.”²⁴

Yamagata Isaburō, also, nurtured a hidden wish to alter the regime of military rule. He took the position of vice resident general in May 1910, shortly before Korea was annexed, and after the annexation he served as director general of political affairs under Terauchi, the first governor general. In that post Yamagata was supposed to “assist the governor general, manage the general affairs of the Government General, and supervise the departments and sections” within it, but unlike the top civil administrator—his counterpart—in Taiwan, he was not authorized to represent the governor general. He also had to contend with Terauchi’s hands-on style of micromanaging the work of his subordinates. Consequently, despite his imposing title, Yamagata was ridiculed in those days as “doing nothing but clutch at a nominal post.”²⁵

The situation changed somewhat after Hasegawa Yoshimichi took over as governor general in 1916, succeeding Terauchi. It was after the March 1st Movement, but an article in the 17 September 1920 issue of *Chōsen shimbun* reported that Yamagata “had no compunctions about considering him [Hasegawa] to be a mere figurehead, treating him like a signpost.” Visitors from Japan and lower-level officials in the Government General, the article went on, were not interested in meeting with the governor general but went instead to the director general of political affairs. Hence the director general’s house was always “bustling with innumerable people coming and going,” while the governor general’s house was “deserted.” Writing about that period in his memoir, Usami, head of the Government General’s Department of the Interior, observed that “there was no accord between the thinking of the governor general and that of the director general of political affairs.”²⁶ Yamagata was ambitious; he longed to be a major player in the planning for and governing of Korea, and he wanted to wield real authority. In all likelihood he chafed at having to work under a governor general who was an active military officer. According to a biography of Yamagata, he wrote that a major point of contention with the governor general was “whether to make fundamental changes in the kempei police system.”²⁷

These background currents in the Government General nonetheless did not yet lead to concrete moves toward reforms, even during the last period of the Terauchi cabinet.

Background material prepared for the 40th Diet in early 1918 included a separate section titled “Reasons Why There Should Be No Changeover to an Ordinary Police Force.” Pointing out how firmly rooted the Korea independence movement had become in its bases in Russia and Shanghai, the section concludes,

Kempei...are stationed in about 1,000 locations, where they do general police work while using authority and force to deal with people and prevent them from getting restless. That is the reality of keeping peace and security in Korea. To change the police agencies as they are currently operating and make them into an ordinary police force would need more funding, and also the present situation regarding public order does not yet allow such a change.²⁸

The Government General’s official position in 1918 continued to be in favor of maintaining the kempei police system. However, Yamagata, the Government General administration head, attended the 40th Diet session as a representative of the government of Korea, and there he was approached by Furuya Hisatsuna (Seiyūkai member, former secretary to Resident General Itō, former attaché in liaison with the Korean monarchy, among other posts). Going on about the evil influences and abuses of the kempei police system, Furuya prodded Yamagata, thinking to persuade him of the need to remodel the police in Korea into a system like that in Japan. Yamagata alluded to the possibility in his reply: “I believe that what you have just suggested might well eventually happen in the future.”²⁹ But practical activity toward change in the police system was not set in motion until the formation of the Hara Takashi Seiyūkai cabinet in September 1918, and then the outburst of the 1 March 1919 uprising put the change into action.

The third group we are concerned with here is the Seiyūkai (Rikken Seiyūkai, or Friends of Constitutional Government party), whose influence and political orientation were strongly affected by its leading mover at that time, Hara Takashi. Beginning during his tenure as vice foreign minister, Hara made it a personal mission to push the idea of *naichi enchō shugi* or “extension of the homeland,” an assimilationist principle of spreading Japan’s systems beyond its political and psychological borders. Within Japan after the Russo-Japanese War, the Seiyūkai, particularly Hara, attempted to drive a wedge into the iron grip the army held on Japan’s colonial rule. These attempts remained in a nascent stage in the Katsura-Saionji era. Criticism of the hold the domain cliques (*hanbatsu*) maintained on government and the army did not die down, however, and at the end of 1912 it escalated into the riots and demonstrations of the first Movement to Protect Constitutional Government. Demonstrations even targeted the military appointment system (*bukansei*)—which limited eligibility for the governor generalship to an active military officer—and the first Yamamoto Gonbei cabinet, formed in February 1913, began to act on ideas for organizational reform of the Korea Government General.³⁰

The study by Yi Hyŏng-nang is the first to examine in depth the ideas for organizational reform of government during the Yamamoto cabinet (see this chapter, endnote 5), during and after the annexation. In Yi's words, "Some of the bourgeoisie and a part of the Kokumintō [Rikken Kokumintō, or Constitutional Nationalist party] and the Seiyūkai hoped at least to curtail the regulatory power held by the Government General, a power that guaranteed its 'autocratic tyranny'." In December 1912 the second Saionji cabinet was sabotaged, and its collapse was followed by massive protests spurred by the Kokumintō-Seiyūkai-led Movement to Protect Constitutional Government. "In essence, their slogans called for abolishing the rules restricting the colonial governor generalship to an active-duty military officer, along with demands for streamlining and cost-cutting in both administration and finance; changes in the system that put active-duty military officers into the posts of army minister and navy minister; and revamping the laws pertaining to appointment of civil officials" (p. 65). The Yamamoto cabinet, "fearing public opinion, had no choice but to implement in policy the specific demands made by the Movement to Protect Constitutional Government.... One of its actions, therefore, was to get government agencies moving on reforms of the organization and administration of Japan's colonial governments" (p. 70). Despite opposition from Governor General Terauchi, a bill was drawn up early in 1914 stipulating improvements in Government General organization, but all that was interrupted by revelations of collusion and kickbacks between the Imperial Navy and the German company Siemens, the so-called Siemens Scandal. The Yamamoto cabinet fell, and by Yi's account, any hoped-for reforms at that time sputtered and died.

Yi's research is all the more valuable for having unearthed evidence of moves toward administrative reform in the Government General well before the Samil Movement, moves that would have impacted core aspects of Japan's rule in Korea. As to the level of importance of this matter, my own views differ from those of Yi on several counts.

First, who were the main forces pushing for changes in the Korea Government General? Yi argues that we should look to "the industrial bourgeoisie" to find the "core of the movement" for reform,³¹ but I am persuaded that, as Haruyama and several other studies have suggested, a more immediate and insistent factor was the determination by party activists—especially in the Seiyūkai—to secure a role for the parties in running the colonies.³² At their party congress meetings in the fall of 1913 some regional Seiyūkai chapters resolved to pursue reforms in colonial government administration. Yi also mentions those meetings, but she fails to note other important elements in steps taken by the Seiyūkai and Hara Takashi. In June 1913, when the Cabinet Colonial Bureau (Naikaku Takushoku Kyoku, set up in 1910) was abolished, Japan's Ministry of Home Affairs assumed authority over the Korea Government General.³³ At that time Hara was home minister. The same year Vice President Yoshihara Saburō was promoted to president of the Oriental Development Company, Ltd. (Tōyō Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha) operating

in Korea. Yoshihara took over from Lieutenant General Usagawa Kazumasa, a Chōshū man, and Seiyūkai boss Noda Utarō was put in as vice president (December 1913).³⁴

For its part, the *Chūō shimbun*, which was a kind of house organ for the Seiyūkai, was much more aggressive than the major newspapers in its attacks on the practice of restricting the Korea governor generalship to military officers.³⁵ In Yi's opinion, Hara and his Seiyūkai were merely "going along with public opinion and, and to a certain degree, were only agitating and exploiting the issue [of changes in colonial administration]" (Yi p. 81). Yet, in light of the developments taking place during Yamamoto's tenure as prime minister, that view seems to be off target. The semi-Seiyūkai Yamamoto cabinet reflected the Seiyūkai's own political aims—to let some fresh air into the entrenched control of Korea by the Chōshū clique of army officers and thereby expand the sphere of party power—and one move in that cause was the Yamamoto cabinet's push for administrative reform of the Korea Government General.

Next, what degree of linkage is found between administrative reforms in the Government General and reform of police system in Korea during the Yamamoto cabinet's tenure? Yi Hyōng-nang's paper notes that under the kempei police system, kempei had power of command over the police organization, and since the kempei were military officers, there was a deep connection between the kempei police system and the practice of appointing a military man as head of the Korea Government General (p. 54). The Yamamoto cabinet recognized the correlation between reforms of the two systems, but it did not necessarily make them part of the same basic issue. Press reports say that beginning around April 1913, soon after Yamamoto came in as prime minister, his cabinet appeared willing to make changes in the military appointment system for governor general. However, Japan's government did not start seriously addressing the issue of kempei police reform until November 1913, that is, not until proposals for administrative reforms in the Government General had received considerable scrutiny (*Tōkyō nichinichi shimbun*, 20 November 1913; *Yomiuri shimbun*, 24 November and 6 December 1913).

The director of the Local Affairs Bureau of Japan's home ministry Kobashi Ichita, a trusted colleague of Home Minister Hara, made an observation tour in Korea around that time. At the beginning of the report he wrote then (see endnote no. 18; the report is included with the Hara Takashi documents), Kobashi expresses a negative view of plans to abolish the kempei police system: "It is going to be exceedingly difficult to do away with the kempei police system in the very near future and replace it with a civil police agency, given Korea's present situation and the current status of Korea's special account budget."³⁶ In the same report Kobashi argues for gradual reform, stopping at "an improvement" that would, for the time being, place authority over the police in the hands of top officials in the provinces, and he concludes, "Only in gradual steps should the kempei police be made into an ordinary civil police organization."

Evidence suggests that on the Government General's side also, there was no consistent

position regarding changes in the colonial governing system and reforms in the kempei police. Consider the case of Akashi Motojirō, who had secretly mustered the hardliners on Japan's China policy and tried to orchestrate a movement to bring down the Yamamoto cabinet.³⁷ While opposing both sets of reforms, Akashi tried to persuade Governor General Terauchi to compromise. That is, he wrote to Terauchi urging him to yield somewhat on bills backed by the Yamamoto cabinet that would enable either a civilian or a military officer to serve as governor general and would dismantle the kempei police. "Would you please consider allowing him [Yamamoto] to proceed in these matters and go along with him," he asked, and continued, "Even if the kempei police system is revised, it should not be too difficult to form basically the same kind of police force getting, mainly, some of the army reservists or currently serving lower-ranking kempei to be hired as police officers." Thus, on the surface, Akashi seemed prepared to accept changes in the police organization, but his real concern was to be able to appropriate personnel who could, in effect, function like kempei officers.³⁸ Behind his request to Terauchi, Akashi reasoned that even if it meant giving in on police system reform, it was important to keep Terauchi in the post of Korea governor general and thus maintain his powerful influence in the army, which, ultimately, would be vital in pursuing the army's China policy.³⁹

Neither Terauchi nor the Government General as a whole, however, appear to have been fully persuaded to yield. Some reports certainly do suggest that Terauchi at one point had agreed to annul the military qualification for the office of governor general (*Jiji shinpō*, 31 October 1913, 25 November 1913; *Ōsaka Asahi shimbun* 19 November 1913, among others). But others focus only on Terauchi's continued opposition to the dismantling of the kempei police system (for example, *Jiji shinpō* 14 November 1913; *Yomiuri shimbun* 6 December 1913; *Maeil shinbo* 21 December 1913). And, Akashi's efforts notwithstanding, it is probably safe to say that by this time Terauchi was determined in his wish to resign.⁴⁰

The particulars of these circumstances in both the cabinet and the Government General must have affected the progress of reforms. As of late December 1913 the Cabinet Legislation Bureau had all but resolved to change the regulations to allow either a civilian or a military officer as colonial governor general, but regarding the kempei police system in Korea, "This will take some time, for there is still a need for much concentrated discussion." (*Jiji shinpō*, 26 December 1913 and *Ōsaka Mainichi shimbun*, 14 January 1914 have the same report.) At that point, the abolition of the kempei police system, which was directly involved in maintaining order and security in Korea, was probably not as close to being realized as was the change that would open the governor generalship to civilians.

Finally, it seems that in early 1914 a draft bill drawn up by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau for reorganization of the Government General was sent to the Privy Council.⁴¹ Several points in the bill are particularly relevant to the issues discussed in this chapter.

It provided that the Government General secretariat be structured on four departments and two bureaus, one of which was a Police Bureau in charge of “controlling matters related to the police and public health.” No article in the bill dealt with the kempei police organization, and there was no revision to the Korea Government General police organization system, which prescribed the regulations for the kempei police system. There is, however, a “note” in the bill:

6. Abolish the Korea Government General police organization system and handle police and public health matters within the Government General Police Bureau. At the same time revise the staffing rules pertaining to provincial officers of the Korea Government General and establish a police department in each province.

7. Reduce the army’s garrison kempei in Korea gradually along with progress in the work of the Korea Government General provincial police departments.⁴²

Thus the Yamamoto cabinet seems to have given preference to the bill for reorganization of the Government General. Regarding abolition of the kempei police system, they decided that, for the time being, it was best to steer a path of “gradual reduction.”

The Korea Government General reform bill noted that the new organization would go into effect 1 April 1914, but the Siemens Scandal broke at the end of January, and in March the Yamamoto cabinet resigned en masse. So in the end the organizational reforms never saw the light of day. As Yi Hyōng-nang’s essay makes abundantly clear (pp. 79–80), under the succeeding Ōkuma Shigenobu cabinet, formed on the basis of a compromise with the elder statesmen (*genrō*), administrative reform of the Government General died on the vine without discussion. When Terauchi became prime minister in October 1916, he came in as a former governor general who had, in a way, presided over the birth of the kempei police, making it almost impossible even to think about changing the police organization. In fact, in 1917 the Terauchi cabinet introduced a kempei police system in Guandongzhou (then South Liaodong peninsula) and created an integrated system joining the police work of the Residency General with that of the consular police under the supervision of the Guandong Residency General Central Police Bureau chief. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, background material prepared by the Korea Government General for Diet discussion during the Terauchi cabinet period stated clearly that the Korea kempei police system would be maintained.⁴³

That is how, when the Hara Takashi cabinet was formed in September 1918, three groups with distinct political objectives were beginning to seek mutual points of intersection. Those groups were, first, the core army group who, in the interest of cost-cutting, had never given up on the possibility of modifying the kempei police system;

second, civil bureaucrats and others and the director general of political affairs in the Government General, who were dissatisfied with the kempei police system; and third, Hara Takashi and the Seiyūkai who were committed to the assimilationist idea of spreading Japan's systems beyond its borders and intent upon expanding the influence of the political parties into the governing of colonial areas. The army group did not necessarily oppose reducing or abolishing the kempei police; the Government General civil bureaucracy was the nucleus of forces demanding abolition of the kempei police; and the semi-Seiyūkai cabinet would, if forced to choose, go ahead with reform of the Government General organization while holding back on changes to the police system. These phenomena in the 1910s continued, almost unchanged, into the period beginning in late 1918, which is covered by the discussion that follows.

To begin with, Yamagata Isaburō, director general of political affairs in the Korea Government General, started to move on restructuring the Government General and the kempei police shortly after the Hara cabinet was formed in 1918. With his mind on changes in the police system, Yamagata arranged for an unofficial study to be done, on the side: "Very unobtrusively he had Tokinaga Urazō, a secretary at the Government General, make a survey and assess the pros and cons of the prosecutorial systems and police systems other colonial countries used in their colonies."⁴⁴ Tokinaga became a middle-level official chiefly in charge of legal affairs in the Government General after Korea's annexation, and in October 1918, around the time he was involved in the survey, he was made head of the security section of the Central Police Headquarters.⁴⁵ Tokinaga also happened to be Yamagata Isaburō's nephew, a circumstance that made him the ideal person to carry out his uncle's private investigation. Completing the survey, evidently Tokinaga submitted a draft program for reforms in spring 1919, before the uprising of March 1st. What kind of reforms it proposed is not known today, but in some way it most certainly reflected Yamagata's concerns. We can suppose, in other words, that it would have indicated the directions in which the police system was being converted.

Yamagata was also in contact with Prime Minister Hara Takashi. During the first Yamamoto cabinet Hara had been involved in moves toward reorganizing the Korea Government General. When he became prime minister, it was expected that his cabinet would advocate reforms in the system of colonial rule (See, for example, the editorial "Hara naikaku to Chōsen" [The Hara Cabinet and Korea], *Fuzan Nippō*, 4 October 1918; Ozaki Yukio "Hara naikaku ni nozomu" [What We Want from the Hara Cabinet], *Tōkyō nichinichi shimbun*, 18 October 1918). Two weeks into the new Hara administration, Director General of Political Affairs Yamagata went to Tokyo for talks with the prime minister. He bore the tidings that Governor General Hasegawa was intent upon resigning, and he confided that he, Yamagata, wished to assume the post himself: "The time has passed in present-day Korea when a military officer should fill the position of governor general."⁴⁶

On the grounds that inevitably the army would oppose it, Hara put aside for the time being the issue of changing the qualifications for governor general, while urging Yamagata Isaburō to work on persuading his adoptive father, Yamagata Aritomo, to support reforms. Hara himself went around networking among army people. On 23 November he acknowledged to Tanaka Giichi, the war minister, his inclination to revise the Korea Government General's organization. Hara apparently presented only the larger framework of reform in colonial administration, being concerned about the governor general question (whether civilians should be eligible) and the army command (whether to remove command from the Korea Government General and place the Korea Garrison Army directly under the Japanese army). In his response in January 1919, Tanaka recommended that, in order to dampen the expected opposition from the core army leaders, reforms in colonial government administration be presented as if they had been initiated by Tanaka himself. With Tanaka's cooperation secured, there began to emerge the possibility of persuading the army to go along with the basic propositions for change in the system of colonial rule.⁴⁷ Let us say that in both the Government General and the Japanese government there were now signs of action on the reforms.

Nonetheless little, if any, concrete progress was made on the specific issue of police organization reform, and in the Government General, no discussions had yet taken place on the matter between Governor General Hasegawa and Director General of Political Affairs Yamagata. As for the Hara cabinet, Tanaka, the war minister, had done a study of the kempei police, finally putting repeal of the system into the realm of possibility. Tanaka presented the conclusions of the study in the Diet in February 1919. He explained that he had compared kempei and civil police, looking at their achievements, productivity, expenses required, and other points, in their work as judicial police and administrative police, and he had concluded that the kempei came out ahead on all counts. He then added:

The situation in Russia having come to such a pass, we are extremely concerned to see indications that Germans and others are constantly agitating and stirring up trouble among Koreans.... To consider withdrawing the kempei particularly at this juncture would be very detrimental to the governing of Korea.⁴⁸

Then Tanaka went on to say, "I believe it is still too soon to abolish the kempei, but there might yet be a way to reduce expenditures." In this, he was doing no more than reiterating the periodic demands by army leaders during the 1910s for reductions in kempei-related expenses. In any case, in the months when the Government General reform bill was being prepared in late 1918 and early 1919, just before the Samil Movement, the government's position on the kempei police was to maintain the status quo. At this time when Japan was trying to deal with serious ideological unrest churning through

the Korean population (see Chapter Three, Section 2), the only clearly articulated ideas concerned possible reduction of the number of kempei. What delivered the decisive jolt and “quite unexpectedly was the first step in abolishing the police system with the kempei at its center”⁴⁹ was the Samil Movement, when the Korean independence movement exploded into action on 1 March 1919.

2. The Samil Movement and the Kempei Police


On the first of March, 1919, initial insurrections broke out in Seoul, then Pyŏngyang, Sŏnch’ŏn, and other cities in Korea. In the blink of an eye they had spread throughout the peninsula, as if to engulf the land in a united, forceful bid for independence. It raged on, reaching a peak in the first part of April. Its primary aim was independence, freedom from Japanese rule. Natural targets were Japanese government agencies. At the beginning Korean protesters went for local institutions, attacking village offices, public schools, and post offices, the obvious places where Koreans in the provinces came into direct contact with the ruling structures of the colonial regime. In many places kempei police facilities were also set upon. Residential police substations in rural towns and villages, urban police boxes in the cities, kempeitai substations in the country, and kempei boxes in the urban areas were damaged or destroyed. At the peak of the uprising, a kempei police bulletin reported:

The first disturbances were mostly street demonstrations in the larger towns and cities, but as time went on, they gradually got worse. People acted ferociously as they attacked and destroyed police stations not just in the rural regions but within the city of Seoul as well.⁵⁰

Let us consider the conditions that generated the onslaughts against kempei police facilities. In Figure 17 the uprising is divided into two periods, March 1–20 and March 21–April 20, and the targets of attack are shown for each period.

Most activity in the first period took place in the central and northern part of Korea, in Kyŏnggido, Hwanghaedo, Hamgyŏngdo, and P’yŏngando, but after the uprising had peaked and was losing steam, it spread south from Kyŏnggido to Ch’ungch’ŏngdo, Kyŏngsangdo, and elsewhere, where the demonstrations got bigger and turned into full-scale riots. How the Samil Movement unfolded roughly corresponds with regional differences. The different levels of intensity of the demonstrations can be explained in terms of the distribution of centers of religious influence and the socioeconomic and cultural structure of agricultural communities, which varied from region to region.⁵¹ That

Figure 17. March 1st Movement Attacks on Kempei Police Facilities



Note: Sizes of circles indicate the scale of participants in the movement at places where attacks were made on kempei police facilities.

Source: Compiled from “San-ichi undō nichiji hōkoku (Chōsen-gun shireikan)” [Daily Reports on the March 1st Movement (Korea Army Commander)], in Kang Tōk-sang ed., *Gendaishi shiryō*, vol. 25 (Korea 1).

is to say, the attacks on kempei police facilities were carried out in forms of behavior that matched patterns seen in the Samil Movement as a whole.

As for why those facilities were targeted, the kempei police were the ones who went in to put down the demonstrations and arrest the leaders; the immediate cause of attacks on certain police and kempei facilities was the angry determination of local residents to release those held in detention.⁵² In a more general way, however, the festering resentment of ordinary people all over Korea at the constant, unending intrusions into their everyday lives by nosy, controlling rank-and-file kempei police were a primary cause of what happened during the uprising. According to an analysis made by the kempeitai in Kangwōndo, a factor in the spread of the uprising to that province was provocation by local leaders who stirred “discontent with the local government among the people.... [The people] wanted the proscription on communal graves lifted, no bans on slash-and-burn cultivation, freedom to gather forest products, repeal of the taxes on alcohol

and tobacco.”⁵³ Among the ordinary people throughout the province who took part in demonstrations in Kangwŏndo province, many were motivated by anger at restrictions on slash-and-burn cultivation, forced labor on road construction, expropriation by Japanese immigrants of Koreans’ fishing rights, and so on, as documented examples show.⁵⁴ In July 1919, after the eruption had subsided, one Korean gave voice to the fury people felt for the ever-watching, ever-controlling kempei police presence in everything they did. According to that source, the kempei police system figured prominently in the “causes for the riots.”⁵⁵

Under that system, the analysis observes, kempei “with no experience or administrative skills...carry out too many different functions... [and this] creates great hardship for the people...The conduct of Koreans employed as kempei auxiliaries and those working as deputy patrolmen is particularly loathsome.” Contemporary Japanese newspapers and recollections written later by officials who experienced the uprising frequently noted and criticized the behavior of the ethnic Korean kempei auxiliaries. At issue in the above document, however, is not just the Korean kempei auxiliaries or deputy patrolmen: “In a very serious judgment, people suspect that Japan itself is evading responsibility and is secretly hiring thugs to torment Koreans.” As that comment implies, ordinary Koreans associated the crude and violent behavior by the low-ranking ethnic Korean police personnel with all police, Japanese included, placing blame and focusing their outrage on the police as a whole.

With their facilities under attack, how did the kempei police respond, and what was done to keep the order-preserving machinery operating in Korea? Turning to their position at the time, let us consider events following upon March 1st and their significance for the police.

The Samil Movement was launched by a public reading that day of the proclamation of independence in cities and towns across Korea, meticulously orchestrated to take place at the same time. Since these public gatherings appeared to the police to be “no more than simple demonstrations in the towns and cities, the objective at the beginning was to pacify and contain them using only the police force.”⁵⁶ So, on the first day, the army only stood guard or made a show of force in certain regions, and the hands-on work of calming the demonstrations was left mainly to the kempei police. But the movement spread quickly. On 11 March the following telegram was sent from the Japanese Ministry of War to Kempeitai Commander-in-chief Kojima Sōjirō, who headed the kempei police organization:

We hope that you are maintaining close communication with the army chief commander with respect to putting down the disturbances. Please telegraph us if there is anything concerning which you would like to ask the minister of war to advise the army commander.⁵⁷

That telegram was a prod to the kempei police and the Korea Garrison Army to communicate closely with each other. Actually, from about this time the army was steadily establishing itself as the front line of the anti-riot action. At that time the garrison army had a strength of “1.5 divisions,” with the 19th division in the north and the 90th regiment (half of a division) in the south. Army units so far had been sent “as much as possible only to areas where disturbances had broken out,” but on 12 March some were dispatched to other, still unaffected places in the name of preventing riots before they happened.⁵⁸ Making the bold decision to use decentralized deployment, the army sent units to one location in each of nine provinces. None were dispatched to the four provinces (Kyōnggido, P’yōngan-bukto, P’yōngan-namdo, and Hwanghaedo) where troops were already deployed because the first demonstrations early in the month had been concentrated there. As the Movement advanced south in late March, the 80th battalion, which was responsible for the southern areas, decided to spread out. Between 26 and 30 March, its soldiers fanned out to cover more than 30 locations, and by 3 April the whole Korea Garrison Army had been dispersed to 120 different locations.⁵⁹

At this stage it was still assumed that the army and kempei police would continue to act in league and maintain close cooperation. On 28 March, “the governor general [instructed] the garrison commander to send the necessary additional troops to Seoul and to cooperate with the police agencies in providing defense and suppressing the uprising.”⁶⁰

Moving into April, as the uprising peaked, the mutual support between the army and the police, and also between the kempei and the police, began to fall apart, hindering effective action. One account reported, “In the past few days rampant violence has been breaking out in more and more places.”⁶¹ With violent demonstrations spreading even to the rural villages, it continued, the kempei police “are using aggressive tactics to quell the disturbances.” But when riots occurred “in the sparsely-populated rural regions, where residential police substations are staffed with only one Japanese and three Koreans each, in many cases the army reinforcements have not been as useful as expected.” The number of stations to which army troops were sent under decentralized deployment was most certainly one hundred and several dozen, but the kempei police had well over 700 facilities in outlying areas throughout Korea. So these facilities unavoidably shouldered the burden of keeping order in the rural areas. Their inadequate capability was a serious problem. Also at that time the kempei and police stations more often than not found themselves unable to provide mutual backup. Because the staff of both kempei and police facilities had to “respond quickly to a rapidly-changing situation, there was absolutely no margin to help each other. A police station had to put down riots on its own, since there was no one else but its staff.”⁶²

Such conditions made it difficult enough for kempei and police to act together in quelling the rioting, but there were further problems. According to the “Nichiji hōkoku”

(daily report) of the Police Bureau,

It is not just that disturbances have been spreading even through the thinly populated areas, but they are becoming increasingly dangerous. On 2 April [Central Police Headquarters] instructed all of the provincial police department heads and kempeitai commanders by telegram that, in order to apply force with maximum efficiency, it is all right to temporarily evacuate substations in sparsely-populated areas where no Japanese nationals are living and there is no need to protect anyone, and send the evacuated staff to join nearby stations....⁶³

Following this instruction, as shown in Figure 18, by 15 April over 10 rural police substations were emptied of staff, freeing their officers to help out elsewhere.

Figure 18. Kempei and Police Substations Temporarily Withdrawn during the March 1st Movement

Province	Facility	Police substation	Kempei substation	Total (A)	Total (B)
Kyōnggido		Sinwang, Sagang, Ch'ōkpong, and Pongnam	—	4	4
P'yōngan-bukto		—	T'ogi	1	2
P'yōngan-namdo		—	Ch'ōndae	1	30*
Hamgyōng-bukto		Ungjōm	Hahoedong	2	?
Kangwōndo		Osek	—	1	1
Ch'ungch'ōng-namdo		Ch'ōnūi	Pungmyōn, Yōngamni, and P'osanwōn	4	7
Kyōngsangdo		—	—		1
Total		7	6	13	45

Sources: Compiled from “San-ichi undō nichiji hōkoku (Keimu Sōkanbu)” [Daily Reports on the March 1st Movement (Central Police Headquarters)], 17 April 1919, in Kang Tōk-sang ed., *Gendaishi shiryō*. vol. 25, p. 377. Figures in the category “Total (B)” come from Korea Kempeitai Headquarters, ed., *Chōsen sōjō jiken gaikyō*, Chapter 6, “Genzai ni okeru minshin no jōtai oyobi shōrai no yosoku” [Current Popular Sentiments and Future Forecasts].

Notes

1. “Total (A)” indicates numbers of facilities withdrawn between 2 April and 15 April.
2. “Total (B)” represents figures reported at the conference of kempei unit heads held in June 1919 and can be understood to indicate the ultimate total of withdrawn facilities.
3. Regarding “30*” under the “Total (B)” for the province of P'yōngan-namdo, the source states that withdrawal of these facilities was made not due to a growing danger but for the sake of “concentration of police forces” in line with the active policy of suppressing disturbances at a single stroke. This number, however, is here included in this chart.

From the end of March onward, dereliction and desertions by lower-ranking Korean public officials in the colonial government, including police patrolmen, rose sharply. Sekiya Teizaburō, director of the Education Bureau in Korea's Department of the Interior, noted that “Korean police officers, especially deputy patrolmen and auxiliaries, are hardly

ever seen to be working at all. In Seoul they have stopped functioning altogether. The situation is that bad.⁶⁴

Not everything had broken down, but the retreat of colonial rule was jarringly real, and the rulers were made suddenly and acutely aware of the limits of their ability to maintain peace and keep order. After the uprising started, Central Police Headquarters hurriedly purchased 4,000 rifles and handguns from the war ministry in Japan. To augment police strength, a special measure was worked out to bring in and assign patrolmen without their having to pass the standard required examinations. Central Police Headquarters started filling out the ranks with such patrolmen in the first part of April.⁶⁵ Kempei, also, were still 20 men short after the regular hiring and replacement process had been completed. As for kempei auxiliaries, there were already 150 vacancies, but on top of that, at the end of March an exceptionally large number—660 men—left as their tours of duty ended. The numbers gap created a serious predicament: “Faced with ... such a pronounced shortage of men, there is little prospect of being able to deal successfully with riots wherever they occur.”⁶⁶ They needed a new approach to suppress the uprising.

On 2 April War Minister Tanaka urged Director General of Political Affairs Yamagata, then in Tokyo, to have the Korea governor general—who could order the military commander in Korea to mobilize the army—request Japan to send more soldiers. The cabinet members were asked to consider the petition, coming in the form of a request from Governor General Hasegawa, and two days later they voted to send additional troops to Korea, including six infantry battalions, 65 kempei, and about 350 infantrymen to serve as Japanese kempei auxiliaries.⁶⁷

The new contingents were sent to regions where Samil demonstrations were comparatively few or low-key or where the Movement appeared to have died down. This made it possible to build up a network that became preponderantly a defensive system, and by the last part of April, troops had been dispersed to cover over 500 plus several dozen locations. The press reported the idea behind this strategy: “By using all its military manpower, the army can exert maximum possible pressure [to put down riots] and leave the police agencies free to conduct search-and-arrest activities.”⁶⁸ Yet clusters of soldiers densely distributed over wide swaths of territory also created conditions that touched off massacres, large and small, of local people. One example was the notorious incident at Cheam-ni, near Suwŏn, where 29 people were herded into a church and burned alive.

Some of the police also behaved brutally toward local Koreans. Joining with army reservists, firefighters’ associations, and Japanese immigrants in “self-defense bands,” they carried out cruel acts of suppression. One police inspector gave vivid testimony to the kind of image they had of Koreans that fed such inhumanity: “Anyone in any kind of government service must be prepared to give himself to his job. Even beset by tens of thousands of violent rioters, still he must not be afraid. I, too, am ready to give my life, which is so much more valuable than theirs. I will destroy as many of them as I can

until I die a glorious death.”⁶⁹ In that way of thinking, Koreans had ceased to be people to be governed; they had become instead “insurgent mobsters,” “the enemy,” people to be crushed, even if it meant dying together on each other’s swords. It expressed a kind of psychological hysteria that projected fixed images onto Koreans in general and made them all appear to be disorderly, dangerous, and hostile.

That psychology gripped many of the Japanese living in Korea at the time of the Samil Movement.⁷⁰ The kempei police rationalized their own inhumane conduct as a reaction to “mobs” inciting “violence,” which meant, in turn, that “I was forced to shoot them.”⁷¹ Among other means besides armed force that they used to contain the rebellion, the kempei police lectured local leaders; held drills to make a show of power; gathered intelligence via secret agents and plainclothes policemen; examined and confiscated personal possessions (especially firearms); and they closed down markets.⁷² These measures seemed to bear fruit. The rebellion was by and large stamped out by the end of April.

The Government General reported that “because of the forceful actions that were taken, a state of superficial calm has returned to Korea, but we are aware that under the surface the people are still discontent.” Everywhere the atmosphere was charged with restless tension. Not even Seoul was yet considered secure. There, long into early May, “A battalion and a half plus many, many kempei and police were kept on high alert day and night.”⁷³ The kempei police continued to be enlarged. In May, contingency funds were used to add 500 Japanese patrolmen. (The police boxes that were evacuated in early April regained their staff and were restored to working order after the addition of these patrolmen.⁷⁴) At the June conference of kempeitai heads there were vociferous demands from every province for greater numbers of kempei and police.⁷⁵ As we will see in the following sections, when police system reform went from ideas to actual plan, it was only natural that a primary task would be to strengthen the forces guarding peace and security throughout Korea.

3. Reforming the Police Organization

Prime Minister Hara’s immediate reaction to the first news of the Samil independence movement was dismissive: “The long and short of it is that they’re being swept up in empty-headed talk about national self-determination.”⁷⁶ As of March he still had not made up his mind to do anything except tweak the Korea police organization a little bit within the framework of the kempei police system.⁷⁷ But as the rebellion continued on into April, and the Korea army reported that “now it is a genuine political movement by the great majority of the people,”⁷⁸ plans for reforms reflecting a range of ideas on how

to govern Korea came up for debate. At this point the press, which had initially laid the blame elsewhere, began to lean toward the idea that it was Japan's military rule that lay at the root of the Samil Movement.⁷⁹ On 2 April Hara told War Minister Tanaka, "Now that the incident has quieted down a notch, it is time to reconsider our policies in Korea." On 9 April Hara informed Yamagata Isaburō, who was in Tokyo to report on developments in Korea, that he wanted to make changes: to make the governor general a civilian and to adopt an assimilationist education policy, along with "making the kempei into a police force."⁸⁰

Among related developments, the continuing discontent in the Government General civil bureaucracy now took shape as an identifiable attitude. Ishizuka Eizō was head of the Oriental Development Company (Tōyō Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha), established by the Japanese government to expand Japan's interests—mainly land acquisition—in Korea. At the end of April in the course of reporting on an inspection tour to Korea, Ishizuka came right out and said to Hara, referring to the March 1st Uprising, "The civil bureaucrats speak privately, with smug pleasure, that it's all because of the governor general's missteps."⁸¹ Similar voices reached the ears of Governor General Hasegawa. In May Kokubu Sangai, director of the Government General Judiciary Section, submitted a statement to the governor general in which he argued vehemently for gradual dismantling of the kempei police:

We must regard the kempei police system as an exceptional temporary arrangement. That it must not be kept in operation over the long term is beyond all dispute.... In my view, kempei who have been deployed in the cities until now should be removed as quickly as possible. Or, if they must be retained, we must reduce their present numbers. Those remaining in urban garrison army bases where they are needed should perform only limited specified duties and no more. I do not think it necessary to have them do civil police work."⁸²

Among army people, Governor General Hasegawa and his predecessor Terauchi both seem to have resisted the idea of doing away with the kempei police system, as will be discussed below, but different opinions were also surfacing. On 14 May War Minister Tanaka asked the Korea Garrison Army commander, Utsunomiya Tarō, for his thoughts on the policy of rule in Korea. Utsunomiya was in situ, actively involved in putting down the Samil rebellion. He understood perfectly clearly that "the lull in the immediate situation is due completely to our military intervention. It certainly does not mean that we have eradicated the deeper causes. Under the surface people's feelings are as explosive as ever." Moreover, wanting to "go one step further in getting to the roots of the discontent,"⁸³ Utsunomiya had been shaping a plan for reforms encompassing all areas of government policy. Three days after receiving Tanaka's request, Utsunomiya immediately set about

writing a long statement of “my personal views on governing Korea.”

Regarding the police system, he wrote, “The police should gradually be placed under the command of local government officials ... [for whom] they will serve as ears, eyes, hands, and feet. (Note: I recognize that this lack [of police support at the time] was in no small way related to the uprising spreading the way it did.) This arrangement will enable [local governments] to perform better and better.” About the position of the kempei, Utsunomiya noted cautiously that “Kempei in the rural areas double as policemen, but in principle the kempei are there to provide reinforcements for policemen.... If the kempei are kept under their own command, their relationship with local governments will be about the same as it is in Japan.”⁸⁴ He saw that the division between local administrative agencies and the police organization had created problems in dealing with the Samil insurrection, and, consequently, he now believed it was time to make basic changes in the police system.

Utsunomiya’s statement was shown to Uehara Yūsaku, chief of army general staff in Tokyo.⁸⁵ Utsunomiya and Uehara, both opposed to the Chōshū clique, formed the core of the so-called Uehara faction, but their thinking on what needed to be changed in Korea’s system of keeping peace and order were basically the same as that of War Minister Tanaka, who was the de facto leader of the Chōshū clique. The Korea Garrison Army made a stand supporting the changeover to an ordinary police system in a document drawn up later in July and presented as the united opinion of the Korea Garrison Army.⁸⁶ One reason the army in Korea was so quick to unite on this issue was that it was difficult to sustain over the long term the units scattered throughout Korea under the decentralized deployment policy. According to Utsunomiya, “It is a matter of great concern that since the troops were divided and dispersed in small units under the command of noncommissioned or lower-ranking officers, security has grown lax and military discipline has become loose, but besides that, there has also been disease and such.”⁸⁷ The army needed to pull itself together fast but had not yet done so, which probably explains why a system of maintaining order and security that was not dependent on the Korea Garrison Army was deemed necessary at the time.

So it was that by the middle of 1919 the several centers of political power found themselves more or less in step on the issue of police reform. In the press and public opinion, too, with the exception of the Government General organ *Keijō nippō*, voices calling for reform of the kempei police system and demanding an end to military men as governor general in Korea grew steadily louder. The Seiyūkai-oriented *Chūō shimbun*’s calls for kempei police system reform had started as early as mid-March.⁸⁸ On 10 June War Minister Tanaka submitted to Prime Minister Hara a proposal to abolish the kempei police system. In its 13 June meeting, the cabinet considered a “definitive statement that kempei in Korea should be retained only in the border areas and places where there is unrest. All others in the kempei police system must be absorbed by the police.” The

cabinet gave its unanimous approval.⁸⁹ Now that it was officially launched, the reform started to kick in. The focus moved on to negotiations between the Japanese government and the Korea Government General delegates.

A telegram was sent on 20 June from War Minister Tanaka to Director General of Political Affairs Yamagata with instructions to “send a representative from the Government General to Tokyo in connection with the abolition of the kempei police system.”⁹⁰ The person selected to go was Usami Katsuo, director of the Department of Internal Affairs and a strong proponent of abolishing the kempei police system. One of his biographers writes, “Usami’s training and experience all took place within government organizations in Japan, and so, when he was sent to his post in Korea, we can suppose that two aspects were particularly difficult. One was that there was no police backing for measures his bureau took in Korea.”⁹¹ Kunitomo Naokane, head of the Police Section in the Government General Central Police Headquarters, accompanied Usami to Tokyo as an aide. A highly respected veteran police officer, Kunitomo was known as “the living dictionary” for the Korea police.... He had made a deep study of Korea and knew it inside and out. He also was so skilled at managing police affairs that no one could replace him.”⁹² Being adept at management himself, Kunitomo believed that, “The police should be organized systematically as a coherent entity with its own identity and structure of command. That is only natural.... As a policeman myself, I want to see a unified, self-contained police organization.” Having that outlook, Kunitomo did not like the kempei police system, which must have looked to him like a disjunctive hybrid of two organizations.⁹³

Thus the two men chosen to represent the governor general were both on the side of abolishing the kempei police system. One senses the hand of Yamagata Isaburō in the choice of Usami and Kunitomo. We must note that it was Yamagata to whom the 20 June telegram was sent, and later it was Yamagata who checked Kunitomo’s draft (discussed below). Perhaps that was because in working toward realizing the reforms, Yamagata took initiatives and showed much more dedication than Hasegawa. Receiving that telegram very probably fueled Yamagata’s ambition to become governor general: “Together with the question of the kempei police system, the qualifications for governor general were also on the agenda; a civilian might be considered for the post. As would be expected, Yamagata could envision being promoted to that office upon the retirement of the current governor general.”⁹⁴ Hasegawa, for his part, had been wanting to resign since the end of 1918. After the eruption of the Samil Movement he “regretted his mishandling of it,” and on 26 April he submitted his request to resign.⁹⁵

Also relevant here are perceptions of the nationalist uprising in Korea held by Usami and Kunitomo, both of them officials in the Government General. Being head of internal affairs administration, Usami received frequent updates on the Samil Movement from Central Police Headquarters, which must have given him a vivid sense of what was going on. In April, when the uprising was spreading, he had a chance to talk with

Western missionaries, who conveyed to him the extent of the resentment and rage among Koreans. Usami is said to have promised that changes would be made (*Japan Advertiser*, 11 April 1919, editorial). Kunitomo, on the other hand, had been on the scene for a long time. He was made an advisory police officer in the Korean government in 1905 and served as deputy inspector in the Higher Police section before taking his current post of Police Affairs director. No one knew better than he how deep was the Korean urge for independence.⁹⁶

The views and thoughts of the Government General delegates came out clearly in material prepared before the negotiations in Tokyo. This was an outline of a new police system drafted by Kunitomo, with the help of Ōtsuka Tsunesaburō, Government General first secretary. Formulated within the Government General, the draft proposal detailed a new civil police system, but its main objective was to create a stronger police better able to keep order and peace. Roughly, it contained the following main points.

First, concerning numbers, the proposal called for adding in the future 3,000 police officers to the base—the level at that time—of over 12,000 (1,700 Japanese patrolmen; 3,325 [ethnic Korean] deputy patrolmen; 2,525 kempei; and 4,719 [ethnic Korean] kempei auxiliaries). Second, concerning the budget for the police, expenditures up to that point were adopted as the assessment standard for future calculation. That is to say, the basis for assessing future costs consisted of three current expense items added together: police affairs (ordinary expenses in the Korea Government General special account), over 2.6 million yen; kempei auxiliaries (extraordinary expenses in the special account), over 1.16 million yen; kempei (from Japan's Ministry of War budget), 1.8 million yen. To that total a further 3 million yen was to be added to meet future projections, which would make a grand total of more than 8.56 million yen when it was finished, Yamagata studied the draft outline, giving particular attention to point two. He asked that the total be reconsidered, as he thought it was too high. Kunitomo wanted to avoid making any cuts in the numbers of additional personnel, but he cut one million yen from the total. In the final version of that first Government General draft, 3,000 police officers were to be added to make 15,499 men, with additional police expenditures of about two million yen, or a total of more than 7.5 million yen.

We cannot confirm with certainty that the figures itemized in the draft match the figures that were actually applied. Going by data recorded for the first phase of police expansion starting in August 1919 (see below), the numbers tally—that is, 3,000 policemen were actually added to the total. But on the budget items, the sources are spotty and their data vary. Every one of the references to pre-restructure police expenditures gives considerably larger numbers than those appearing in the Kunitomo draft.⁹⁷ The amount of increase, also—which actually is shown to have been between 5 million and 6 million yen, depending on what source one is looking at—is noted as paid out of surplus funds of the Government General.⁹⁸ As I see it, Kunitomo's figures were smaller than

the actual expenditures. That being said, we can at least confirm that, in both personnel and budget items, the plan for a huge expansion in scale as outlined in the Government General draft for the police reform was carried through from conception into application. As Kunitomo himself said, the additional funds were necessary because “a higher level of peace-keeping capability is all the more urgent in the wake of the ‘Banzai incident’ (the Samil/March 1st Movement for independence).”⁹⁹ I believe this encapsulates the Government General’s response to the fact that a much stronger peace-keeping capacity at the lower levels of the police system was needed during the Movement.

Draft proposal in hand, Usami and Kunitomo went to Tokyo toward the end of June.¹⁰⁰ Usami gave War Minister Tanaka a draft outline Kunitomo had written upon arrival in Tokyo and negotiations began. Right away there was disagreement with the Japanese government. Tokyo’s policy was to maintain the same kempei strength as before in the belt running along the Korea-China border in order to guard the area.

In early June before the discussions began, Japan’s government had called for a Korea kempeitai aide to go to Tokyo, where work was begun on restructuring the Korea kempeitai. At that time it was decided to keep kempei on border guard duty. An article that was to be put into the revised kempeitai regulations stipulated that “kempei will carry out surveillance in the border areas.”¹⁰¹ As noted above, when War Minister Tanaka made the case for abolishing the kempei police system at the 13 June cabinet meeting, he included the possibility of retaining some kempei “only in the border areas and places where there is unrest.” This was the line Japan’s government was taking when Usami and Kunitomo arrived. Usami, coming from the Government General, firmly resisted Tokyo on this point. He argued that under the new civil police system, provincial officials would have full command over the police in the local regions, and the coexistence of kempei and police in the border areas “would only invite a great deal of unwelcome trouble.” It was a matter concerning the achievement of a full-fledged civil police force, but ultimately a solution was found by exploiting the interpretation of the regulations. It was agreed that “surveillance means to stand at the border and keep watch.” Perhaps Usami went along with the rationalization that if kempei did no more than surveillance, they would not be competing with the police in their duties. In any case, Usami ended up by conceding. In fact, he had been right to worry. The division of responsibilities between kempei and civil police remained a problem for several years after the restructure, and the wrangling between the two sides dragged on for the entire time.¹⁰²

On the all-important goal of ensuring the ability to maintain security and order, however, the Government General side refused to compromise. Moving ahead to the 28 June cabinet meeting, that day a proposal was presented by the Japanese government side. Its prime architect, Yokota Sennosuke, was director general of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau. The proposal recommended creating as part of the Government General Department of Internal Affairs a police affairs section that would function as a

supervisory agency over the Korea police. The Government General representatives were indignant that the Korea police organization should be treated, in their view, so lightly, and Usami was impelled to send the following response to Yokota:

The circumstances in Korea are entirely different from those in Japan. In Korea the integrity of the police organization is of critical importance. If it is structured as a police section within the Department of Internal Affairs, it will not be able to properly maintain order and security. The police forces in all thirteen provinces must be unified, and to that end, the organization must be a police bureau with expanded power.¹⁰³

In this admonition for what he thought was the government's overly-soft view of the security needs of colonial Korea, Usami pointed out differences with Japan, and he attempted to present Korea as requiring a stronger, different kind of police organization. Kunitomo was of the same opinion. Subsequently the Government General's argument was accepted, and one of the reform measures finalized in August was to institute the Police Bureau (Keimukyoku) in the Government General and place it on the same level with other bureaus. It was passed by the cabinet, and the whole Japanese government reform bill was deliberated by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau. On 10 July it was sent to the Privy Council.

The police reform seemed at last to be making smooth progress, but there were still adverse winds blowing. One of them was opposition by Hasegawa, the sitting governor general; by Terauchi, former governor general; and by their associates. For some time Hasegawa had been expressing his intention of resigning, but he was not happy about the idea that the next government in Korea might be headed by a civilian, if the military qualification for governor general was to be repealed by the reform bill. Just before Usami left for Tokyo, Hasegawa called him in for consultation. At that time, Usami pressed the argument for allowing a civilian appointee as governor general and dismantling the kempei police system. Here, says Usami, recalling that he felt somewhat conflicted, "The director general of political affairs was in agreement but the governor general did not share the same view."¹⁰⁴

Then in early July in Seoul, while Hasegawa was in Tokyo, Yamagata made it known that if requested, he would agree to become governor general, and if he did, one of his first actions, "in response to the needs of the times," would be to make changes in the kempei police system. Hasegawa immediately conveyed his displeasure (*Tōkyō nichinichi shimbun*, 8 July 1919). As if he had planned the timing in advance, Hasegawa at that point was in the middle of carrying out a scheme he had fashioned to entice pro-Japanese collaborators among the Korean aristocrats into supporting retention of the military qualification for governor general, in a maneuver to keep the old system in place.¹⁰⁵

Another development involved Terauchi's son-in-law Kodama Hideo, who under Terauchi had been secretary to the governor general and director of the General Affairs Bureau. Kodama wrote to Terauchi that he opposed opening the governor generalship to a civilian for fear that a change in the current system, which guaranteed a military officer as Korea governor general, might affect the status of Japan's army and navy ministers.¹⁰⁶ This was followed by a communication in mid-August from Terauchi's secretary Ōkido Muneshige offering Terauchi his opinion that "the opportunistic, syncophantic plan" to turn the police into a civil police force and to allow a civilian to be governor general were simply temporary stopgap measures and no more.¹⁰⁷

In the meantime, War Minister Tanaka and Commander Utsunomiya of the Korea Garrison Army had agreed to move toward endorsing a changeover in the police system. For his part, political super-power Yamagata Aritomo made it clear that he would respect the wishes of Prime Minister Hara with respect to "the very substantial reforms" in the system of rule in Korea.¹⁰⁸ In the army, it proved impossible to rally the pivotal army leaders and work through the Japanese military in Korea to form a monolithic bloc of army opposition to the impending changes. Ultimately, Hasegawa had no choice but to keep his mouth shut. "I have very strong opinions about abolishing the kempei police, but the cabinet council has made its decision. At this point, there is no use" in pushing on.¹⁰⁹

One more obstacle lay in the Privy Council. The government draft bill concerning the Korea Government General organizational reform that was sent to the Privy Council had to go through the Privy Council examination committee, where it joined other drafts related to proposed changes in colonial administration. The examination committee first examined these documents on 14 July, but the whole process stretched out over a total of eight meetings. The examination committee report was not issued until 4 August, and it was not until 8 August that a plenary session of the Privy Council finally approved the government reform bill. Hara's earlier prediction that the new administrative system would be up and running by about 20 July was off the mark. For political reasons, the Privy Council deliberations had been drawn out way beyond expectations. That body had concurred with the plan, favored by Prime Minister Hara, to abolish the military qualification for governor general appointees, but it had made every effort to minimize any leeway for the cabinet or the political parties to influence the way Japan's colonies were ruled. That much is clear from the Privy Council's revision of the section in the government draft stipulating how much authority any prime minister would have over the Korea governor general.¹¹⁰

At the same time, when the examination committee sent its report on police system reform to the Plenary Session of the Privy Council on 4 August, it gave the following reason to abolish the current police organizational system of the Korea Government General:

In light of recent circumstances related to the so-called kempei police system, their performance does not appear to be particularly good. In the rural areas in particular, the current system has established means of communication between provincial governors and the provincial police chiefs and their subordinate officers, but cooperation among them has steadily decreased, giving rise to more and more impediments to productive work.¹¹¹

In supporting abolition of the kempei police, the Privy Council almost verbatim borrowed arguments made previously by the Government General civilian staff and some of Japan's opinion leaders after the 'military rule' era got under way. It contained no new perspectives or significant points of contention. The original police reform bill was approved with just a few revisions made in the supplementary provisions.¹¹² This suggests that the reason the police reform was stopped in its tracks from early July into August, during the Privy Council deliberations, was because it got caught in the backwash of the clash of opinions between the cabinet and the Privy Council around the issue of organizational reform of the Korea Government General.

In the meantime, Government General delegates Usami and Kunitomo waited impatiently for the reform bills to go into effect.¹¹³ Usami "called on Prime Minister Hara several times and stressed the need to hurry, to put people's minds at rest." Wanting to flesh out the still-pending police system, he consulted Hara on the question of arming police with guns. "Absolutely not," was Hara's answer; "For a policeman to carry a pistol is out of the question." He was not alone in that opinion. In Japan of that era, the accepted image of a policeman was still an officer carrying a truncheon or a saber, not a gun (they would not carry guns until 1923). In Korea, however, after the new police system was established, the number of firearms carried by police officers rose dramatically: rifles increased from 5,657 before the reform to 13,894, and revolvers rose from 1,272 before to 4,563.¹¹⁴

An analysis of the process brings out strong indications that it was the Government General representatives who laid out the course of building up the police capability for keeping order in Korea. The police reform bill was approved by the Privy Council on 8 August, and when Hara reported it to the cabinet members, he also introduced them to Saitō Makoto and Mizuno Rentarō, whom he planned to assign as the new governor general and director general of political affairs, respectively. And, then and there, Hara presented a statement he had written himself covering basically the whole of government policy in Korea, "Chōsen tōchi shiken" [My Views on the Governing of Korea]. Previous studies have taken this work as Hara's "compass" with which he was attempting to map out the governing policy from that time forward and, simultaneously, to take the political initiative himself. As for the police organization, however, all the statement said about governing policy was a reiteration of the Hara cabinet's established line. Of particular

interest is that Hara put all the weight on the idea of making the Korea police into a “system like that in Japan,” so he foregrounded the changeover to a civil police force without even mentioning expanding and strengthening the police.¹¹⁵

Thus we can find here, also, in their perceptions of the new police system, the consistent, subtle difference between the priorities of Hara and the Government General representatives. Hara was concerned first and foremost that the Korea police system realize his long-cherished hope of replicating the Japanese system, embodying an “extension of the homeland,” while the central concern of the Government General officers was to insure a powerful police organization that would keep Korea orderly, controlled, and secure.

Legal authorization for the shift to a civil police organization was issued on 19 August. Two Imperial Ordinances—No. 387 (“Abolition of the Korea Government General Police Organization System“ and No. 397 (“Revised Provisions Pertaining to Kempei”)—removed the backbone of the kempei police system by nullifying the dual positions of kempei commander-in-chief/Police Headquarters chief and kempeitai head/provincial police chief, and by barring kempei from doing ordinary police work. The central police agency in the new system was the Police Bureau, a full-fledged bureau within the Government General (Imperial Ordinance No. 386, “Changes in the Korea Government General Organization System,” Article 9). In charge of carrying out police administration in the provinces was the office called Division Three, set up in each province under the governor (Imperial Ordinance No. 391, “Changes in the Korea Government General Provincial Organization System,” Articles 12 and 13).

Other imperial orders with a bearing on these changes were the following: No. 388, “Korea Government General Police Training Institute (Keisatsukan Kōshūsho) Organization System.” This was issued in consideration of the large numbers of police being added to the force. The police training office (Keisatsukan Renshūsho), heretofore a subdivision within the Government General Central Police Headquarters was made an independent agency, reflecting the intent behind the imperial order to raise the standards of police education. No. 408, “On the Military Service of Active-duty Kempei Noncommissioned Officers and Privates First-class,” sanctioned an exception to the rules so that active-duty kempei NCOs and privates first-class, even if their tour of duty (six years) had not been completed, could be transferred into the reserves with a view to employing them as policemen. By another Imperial Ordinance (noted above, No. 397), “border surveillance” was added to the duties of kempei. And, to ease the transition, a rule was established to allow kempei to carry out ordinary police duties “for the time being” (Imperial Ordinance No. 389, “On the Duties of Kempei Officers Assigned to Kempei Detachments and Outstations in Korea”).

This section examined the process of development from the end of the Samil Uprising until the middle of August 1919, when a string of laws and regulations relating

to police organization restructure were issued. Whether it was the new Police Bureau or the matter of arming police with guns, for the most part Hara made his decisions on the basis of his “extension of the homeland” convictions. Government General bureaucrats, on the other hand, who were primarily interested in assuring order and security, supported Kunitomo’s design for building the security capability even of the village-level police, along with the changeover to a civil police force. In their view, those were the main pillars of Korea’s order and security. The restructured Korea police organization thus embodied the bureaucrats’ goals to a large extent. Tracing the process from the March 1st eruption to the middle of August, some views come across as ingenuous, like that of Kang Kil-wŏn: “If it was not enlarged, the Korea Garrison Army intended to follow the alternative plan, which was to appeal for attention to the importance of security and order and expand the police force.”¹¹⁶ Strengthening the police was not just some alternative Plan B; it was a policy directly linked with and born out of the Samil Movement.

4. High-level Personnel Changes and an Expanded Police Force

Between the first demonstrations on March 1st setting off the independence movement and the middle of August 1919, the process that brought changes to the ruling system in Korea involved debate on the institution of military appointments for governor general and the reconfiguration of the police system, but it was also a time when personnel issues came to the fore. In one view, new people were needed to stimulate, advocate for, and help implement a new kind of rule. Now, in Section 4 let us look at how Director General of Political Affairs Yamagata and other senior staff of the Government General resigned, how Mizuno Rentarō became director general of political affairs and played the leading role in a personnel reshuffle in the Government General, and how Mizuno and his new senior staff expanded the police force.

Since before the March 1st Uprising Hara had been in contact with and thinking about Yamagata Isaburō, the Government General’s director general of political affairs, seeing him as possibly the first civilian governor general. In late May, via War Minister Tanaka, it was made crystal clear to Hara that Yamagata Aritomo was firmly opposed to promoting his adopted son Isaburō to that position. After discussions with Tanaka on 10 June and again on 13 June, Hara changed direction and decided to make Admiral Saitō Makoto the next governor general, and ask Mizuno Rentarō, former Japan’s interior minister and Seiyūkai member, to serve as director general of political affairs.¹¹⁷

Still undaunted, Yamagata Isaburō continued doggedly to pursue the post of governor general, until, at the end of June, one by one the core army leaders advised him

to resign. Not only the powerful elder statesman Yamagata Aritomo, Terauchi and War Minister Tanaka, but also Usami, head of the Government General Department of Internal Affairs all urged him to reconsider.¹¹⁸ Defeated at last, on 1 July Yamagata turned in an informal resignation and on 12 August his resignation, along with that of Hasegawa, was accepted. Ōkido Muneshige, a close associate of Terauchi, saw the irony in his situation: Yamagata Isaburō had spearheaded the campaign for police restructure and abolition of the military qualification for the governor generalship, and now, pushed out as head of administration, he had come to a dead end in his career. Yamagata, observed Ōkido, did all the groundwork for the “accommodation we see today... [but] the credit for it has been usurped by someone else. Like Farmer Gonbei sowing his seeds, only to see them snatched away by the crows. I can’t help thinking how utterly stupid it all is.”¹¹⁹

Usami, one of the delegates from the Government General who went to Tokyo to discuss its organizational reform, was urged to stay on by the new director general of political affairs, Mizuno, but he, too, resigned. He was most certainly aware of the Japanese press and public opinion, which were voicing the belief that the public would be antagonized if Usami or Yamagata were promoted or stayed in office. Why? Because naturally—in the eyes of the public—they were the ones ultimately responsible for the Samil Uprising (*Kokumin shimbun*, 10 July 1919; *Yomiuri shimbun*, 7 August 1919).¹²⁰

It was indeed ironic that most of the senior staff, the same people who had sown the seeds of colonial government reform from the colonial government side, resigned, having to entrust the care and nurture of those seeds to a whole new regime. Then it became crucial to find new people who could replace the core executive leadership in the Government General and get the restructured system up and running. In Hara’s words, “Competent people are needed more urgently than changes in the organization.”¹²¹ Now, with the huge turnover of high-level managers, it became more urgent than ever to find competent people with political expertise who could get things done. The rise to power of Mizuno, the new director general of political affairs, came about precisely because he had those qualities.

Where did the idea of bringing in Mizuno come from? Just about two months before his appointment was formalized, on 13 June, to be exact, Prime Minister Hara and War Minister Tanaka had a confidential discussion on the very subject of Mizuno. Going back even further, in mid-May Home Ministry Inspector Moriya Eifu, who had been right in the thick of the Samil Movement, personally entreated Mizuno to consider taking the post of director general of political affairs. Then, on 27 June, just before the Hara cabinet submitted its final draft proposals for Government General and police organization reforms, Hara invited Mizuno to his home to sound him out about accepting the post of administrative director in the Government General. It seems that Mizuno’s reply was vague, and even though Hara thought he had had received an informal commitment from him, a few days later Mizuno sent off a letter declining the offer. He was not confident,

he claimed, that he could achieve satisfactory results in the ruling of Korea. For Hara, however, there was no one else suitable, and, moreover, Yamagata Aritomo and former finance minister and prime minister Matsukata Masayoshi (like Yamagata, an influential *genrō*) both agreed that Mizuno was the best person for the job.¹²²

Mizuno's situation was equally complex. When the first Saionji cabinet was formed, Hara, who was then Japan's home minister, promoted him to director of the Bureau of Local Affairs in the Ministry of Home Affairs, and thereafter for more than ten years Mizuno was Hara's protégé. One of a series of colonial government reforms made under the Hara cabinet was a reorganization in April 1919 of the colonial government of Guandongzhou Leased Territory (Southern Liaotung peninsula). At that time Hara had asked Mizuno to serve as head of the new Kantō-chō (Guandong government) and director of the South Manchurian Railway company (Mantetsu). Mizuno refused to accept these posts, making it difficult for him to refuse this time. Hara and Mizuno met to talk things over on 18 July and also on 6 August.

In the end Mizuno reluctantly accepted, but what could have been the reason for his reluctance? In the 6 August meeting with Hara he reiterated his anxiety about serving as head of administration under a governor general who was a military officer:

Military people and civilians usually tend to think in different ways. I know this from my experience so far; not just from having served myself in the Terauchi cabinet, but also from hearing about instances occurring in the relations between the governor general and the director general of political affairs in Korea, between the governor general and the director of administration in Taiwan, and between the governor of the Kantō-chō and the director of administration in Guandong. I fear that I am destined to repeat the same kind of experiences in the government of Korea.¹²³

But Hara did not accept Mizuno's protests. He replied that the recent set of reforms created a pressing need for "people with administrative knowledge and experience who have influence both inside and outside Japan." He continued that "in choosing the right person," he could find no one except Mizuno, who "has engaged in personnel training over long years in the Ministry of Home Affairs."

Hara persuaded him that "making these reforms in Korea work effectively is going to be like fighting a war," and a "person with the skills of a cabinet minister" would be required to make them work. In urging Mizuno to take the position, it was important to Hara not only that he was an influential, highly-placed bureaucrat among the Seiyūkai members but also that Mizuno had connections with virtually everyone who mattered in the interior ministry.

In effect, the two of them worked out a deal that had advantages for both. In return for Mizuno agreeing to serve as director general of political affairs, they then negotiated

conditions that would guarantee Mizuno power of appointments in a governing structure framed around a military governor general and a civilian director general of political affairs. Wanting confirmation regarding his role in personnel decisions, Mizuno asked, “There will probably be objections from the Colonial Bureau (Takushoku-kyoku) and the cabinet, and some cabinet ministers will probably try to interfere, but at those times, will I be given the final authority?”¹²⁴ Hara had no reason to object. Working late into the night of that 6 August meeting, the two of them arrived at conditions that were satisfactory to Mizuno, and he agreed to accept the appointment.

Certainly Hara drove a high-pressured bargain, overcoming Mizuno’s determination to decline the appointment. Hara also gave copies of his statement, “My Views on the Governing of Korea” to both Mizuno and Saitō, intending to use them both in implementing a ruling policy based on the “extension of the homeland” concept. But Mizuno was no robot. He had been unwilling, but he agreed to become chief of administration in exchange for a deal that gave him an unofficial guarantee from the prime minister of a very powerful tool—control over appointments. From Saitō as well, whose appointment as governor general was not yet official, he succeeded in getting a commitment to recognize Mizuno’s exclusive authority in personnel decisions.¹²⁵ That is how Mizuno ended up with the power to select senior executives of the Government General—the people in charge of the actual work—entirely in his own hands.

One effect was to change the dynamics of the relation between the governor general and the director general of political affairs. Compared with Yamagata Isaburō, who was mocked by the press as being no more than a figurehead administration chief, Mizuno was quickly seen to be quite different. Having lifted the office of director general of political affairs to a newly visible level, he was called the man who made the “two-pronged government in Wajōdai” (Wajōdai was the district in Seoul where the governor general official residence was located). Such judgments symbolized the emergence of the director general of political affairs into a position of considerably greater real power in the period from 1919 onward.

Although still without his formal appointment, Mizuno turned to two large, important tasks. The first was to cement a roster of executives to staff the top levels, the people who would direct the actual work of the restructured Government General. The second was to put the plan, still on his desk, for a significantly enlarged police force into action.

As for the challenge of personnel, it was more formidable than expected. The actual turnover of high-level bureaucrats in the Government General way overshot some predictions in the press that it would be small (*Tōkyō Asahi shimbun*, 12 August 1919; *Jiji shinpō*, 13 August 1919, evening edition; *Kokumin shimbun*, 14 August 1919). Far from being modest, the scale of hiring at this time was enormous, bringing in a large number—some said “well over thirty”¹²⁶—of bureaucrats from Japan’s interior ministry. Information I have been able to confirm about “Mizuno’s hiring spree,” as it was dubbed,

Figure 19. Appointment of Key Officials in the Government General by Vice Governor General Mizuno Rentarō

	Assigned post	Name	Previous post	Year	Appointment negotiator
From within the police force	Police Bureau chief	Noguchi Junkichi	Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department Police Affairs Section chief	1907	Mizuno
	Police Bureau Police Affairs Section chief	Shirakami Yūkichi	Toiyama Prefectural Police Department chief	1910	Akaike
	Police Bureau Public Peace Section chief	Urabe Shōichi	Yamagata Prefectural councilor	1910	Noguchi and Moriya
	Police Bureau Higher Police Section chief	Kobayashi Mitsumasa	Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department Police Affairs Section chief	1916	Noguchi and Moriya
	Police Bureau secretary	Mariyama Tsurukichi	Shizuoka Prefectural Internal Affairs Section chief	1909	Akaike
	Police Bureau secretary	Fujiwara Yoshizō	Aomori Prefectural councilor	1914	Akaike
	Police Bureau secretary	Tanaka Takeo	Nagano Prefectural police superintendent	1915	—
	Police Training School chief	Furuhashi Takushirō	Aichi Prefectural councilor	1912	—
	Chief of Division Three of Kyōnggido	Chiba Ryō	Akita Prefectural Police Department chief	1908	Mizuno, Noguchi, and Moriya
	Chief of Division Three of Ch'ungch'ōng-bukto	Yamaguchi Yasunori	Hvōgo Prefectural councilor	1911	Noguchi and Moriya
	Chief of Division Three of Ch'ungch'ōng-namdo	Sekimizu Takeshi	Ibaraki Prefectural councilor	1912	Noguchi and Moriya
	Chief of Division Three of Chōlla-bukto	Matsumura Matsumori	Fukuoka Prefectural councilor	1913	Noguchi and Moriya
	Chief of Division Three of Chōlla-namdo	Yamashita Ken'ichi	Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department Police councilor	1911	Noguchi and Moriya
From outside the police force	Chief of Division Three of Kyōngsang-bukto	Shinjō Yūjirō	Shizuoka Prefectural councilor	1910	Noguchi and Moriya
	Chief of Division Three of Kyōngsang-namdo	Yagi Rinsaku	Hvōgo Prefectural councilor	1909	Noguchi and Moriya
	Chief of Division Three of Hwanghaedo	Mano Seichi	Toiyama Prefectural councilor	1909	Noguchi and Moriya
	Chief of Division Three of Kangwōndo	Ishiguro Hidehiko	Gunma Prefectural inspector	1910	Noguchi and Moriya
	Governor general secretary	Moriya Eifu	Home Ministry councilor	1910	Mizuno
	Governor general secretary	Itō Takehiko	Chiba Prefecture Ishihara District chief	1914	—
	Internal Bureau chief	Akaike Atsushi	Shizuoka Prefecture governor	1902	Mizuno
	Education Bureau chief	Shibata Zenzaburō	Osaka Prefectural Internal Affairs Section chief	1905	Mizuno and Akaike
	Education Bureau Religious Affairs Section chief	Nakarai Kiyoshi	Ishikawa Prefectural councilor	1913	Mizuno and Shibata
	Industrial Bureau chief	Nishimura Yasukichi	Saitama Prefecture governor	1911	Mizuno and Moriya
	Industrial Bureau secretary	Shinohara Eitarō	Osaka Prefectural Education Section chief	1912	—

Sources: Compiled mainly from information on appointees to the Government Generalship given in *Kanpō* [Government Gazette] on 21 August 1919 and 3 September 1919, as well as from Mariyama, *Nanaïmen tokorodokoro*, pp. 54–55 and Matsunami, *Mizuno hakushi koki kinen*, p. 717. I also listed two persons (Tanaka Takeo and Nakarai Kiyoshi), who were appointed somewhat later, but their appointments were considered part of Mizuno's personnel reshuffle. Data for each person was also obtained from Hata Ikuhiko, ed., *Seizenki Nihon kanryōsei no seido, soshiki, jinji* [Prewar Japanese Bureaucratic System, Organization, and Personnel] (University of Tokyo Press, 1981) and Chōsen Gyōsei Henshū Sōkyoku, ed., *Chōsen tōchi hwa*, 1937.

Notes

1. “Year” indicates the year they passed the civil service higher examination.
2. “Appointment negotiator” indicates main persons who initiated negotiations with the individual concerning the appointment.

(For reference) Year Older Top Officials Passed Civil Service Higher Examination

	Assigned post	Name	Post prior to organizational reform	Year
Incumbent	Finance Bureau chief	Kōchiyama Rakuzō	Government General branch office chief	1906
	Legal Affairs Bureau chief	Kokubu Sangai	Law Section chief	1887*
	Communications Bureau chief	Mochiji Rokusaburō	Communications Bureau chief	1893
Resigned	—	Usami Katsuo	Internal Affairs Section chief	1896
	—	Obara Shinzō	Agriculture, Commerce and Industry Section chief	1897
	—	Suzuki Shizuka	Government General branch office chief	1899

Notes

1. “Incumbent” are people who remained as Government General officials even after the organizational reform of the Government General in August 1919, while “Resigned” are people who resigned after the reform.
2. The “year” (1887*) for Kokubu Sangai is the year he passed the examination for appointment of judges.

is collated and shown in Figure 19.

The first thing to notice in Figure 19 is that personnel activities were heavily concentrated on police-related positions. Among the many personnel changes at this time, about two-thirds of the newly-hired Government General top bureaucrats were employed in the Police Bureau or as heads of Division Three offices in each province. The priority operating here is unmistakable: to rebuild a stronger, more effective system of order and security in Korea.

Second, but not quite so easy to see, the group of new, high-level executives, well over half of whom were in police-related positions, constituted the core of an up-and-coming bureaucracy of a younger generation. This becomes clearer by comparing the years when the new group passed the higher civil service examinations (fourth column from the left) with the examination years of their counterparts prior to the Mizuno era (see the “Reference” table above for Figure 19). Singling out just the position of bureau chief (*kyokuchō*) (this was department chief, or *buchō*, under the old regulations), the old chiefs passed their examinations around the 1890–1900 decade, while the newly-employed bureaucrats passed their exams roughly a decade later, centering on the 1900–1910 period. We can infer, in other words, that the new upper-tier bureaucrats in the Government General were about ten years younger than the ones they succeeded. Police Bureau Chief Akaike Atsushi recalled in later years that the newly-appointed Division Three heads “seem amazingly young, from all outward appearances.... Many of us wonder how capable they really are....”¹²⁷ Yet Akaike himself was a good ten years younger than the former Government General chief of Central Police Headquarters, Kojima Sōjirō. Indeed, it is likely that the shift toward putting a younger generation in charge sowed seeds of antagonism between the “old breed” and the “new breed” of Government General bureaucrats.¹²⁸ In line with Moriya Eifu’s observation that Mizuno “employed very competent people to serve as officials in the provinces,”¹²⁹ this was

a new kind of personnel policy based on merit and capability that did not let rules of seniority get in the way. We can also think of it as Mizuno's personal battle formation to fight the "war" that Hara had predicted would be necessary to effect the changes being carried out in the system of rule in Korea.

A third item of interest in Figure 19 is what it tells us about how Mizuno exploited his position of power over home ministry bureaucrats and used his personal connections to make the personnel changes he wanted. In the right-hand column labeled "Appointment Negotiator" appear the names of the nucleus of his top staff, the people he selected first: Secretary Moriya, Police Bureau Chief Noguchi, and Internal Affairs Bureau Chief Akaike. Next he selected the provincial police department heads, delegating Noguchi and Moriya the job of negotiating with and persuading the candidates to accept appointment. Akaike did the negotiating with the candidate for chief of the Education Bureau, while the legwork of filling other positions was parceled out among those several people. In that way Mizuno filled out his staff working from the top down. The cabinet members, in compliance with Hara's wishes, did not interfere and went along. Achieved through a process so well oiled by Mizuno's personal influence and popularity, the appointments giving shape to the upper tier of the bureaucracy were bound to draw fire from elsewhere, and indeed, the Imperial Diet was critical of what seemed to be "a kind of Mizuno faction" growing up within the Government General.¹³⁰

What was apparent in the August 1919 personnel turnover, in any case, was the pivotal role of newly-appointed Director General of Political Affairs Mizuno. His skills, connections, and influence were at the heart of the formation of the new cadre of Government General executives. Through a process of hand-picking young bureaucrats from Japan and placing many of them in police-related positions, he made sure that his appointees, all capable and loyal, would be central in Korea's police organization.

Mizuno's other preoccupation was to take action on expanding the Korea police presence in the towns and villages, which meant adding a large number of lower-ranking positions. From early on, it was understood that transforming the police force involved more than simply turning over the authority for police work to regional and local officials; for some time there had been the tacit recognition that many more policemen would have to be added to the existing numbers. A string of new laws and regulations provided the formal parameters of a redesigned police system, but when it came to the details of the police in the provinces, including superintendents, inspectors, assistant inspectors, and patrolmen, there was little to go on except the statement that "these will be determined by the Korea governor general" (Imperial Ordinance No. 391). The new system had to be fleshed out. All that work still lay ahead, and only three months had been allotted for the transition.

That exigency was brought to Mizuno's attention by Usami, Kunitomo, and other Government General bureaucrats involved in the police system reforms. That group,

to whom an effective, fully-operative system of security and order was urgent, first approached Mizuno on the matter on 8 August, the very day when the Privy Council approved the Japanese government reform bills. At that point, Mizuno's name had barely been introduced to the cabinet, and Mizuno himself, by way of Hara's statement on the governing of Korea, had just been given a rough idea of the new policy line Hara had in mind.

Mizuno responded with alacrity. Having already secured the support of Governor General-to-be Saitō and Cabinet Legislation Bureau director Yokota Sennosuke, as well as that of Usami, Mizuno was able to accomplish two jobs that day.¹³¹ One was pick out and tap a percentage of the patrolmen from the Japanese police force. He put the matter before Oka Kishichirō, chief of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police, and obtained a guarantee of 3,000 men, which was the number recommended by Kunitomo. The other concerned the problem of whether policemen should carry firearms, which had come up earlier between Usami and Hara. On this matter Mizuno contacted the head of the war ministry's Military Affairs Bureau and arranged to borrow firearms for 1,800 men along with a range of other necessary items.

The appointments of Mizuno and Saitō both became official on 12 August. Even before that, a great deal of progress had been made in obtaining additional police personnel for Korea. In September, the new top management group at the Government General formally assumed office, and the stage shifted to Korea.

Mizuno's hand-picked police officials, also, were eager to see the arrival of additional police officers. For Akaike Atsushi who, because of the sudden death of Police Bureau Chief Noguchi, had been abruptly transferred from head of the Internal Affairs Bureau to head of the Police Bureau, "There is only one job with immediate priority, and that is to get the police force set up with ample strength, whatever it takes to do so." On 3 September when Akaike himself requested the transfer to Noguchi's post, he "asked for 500 additional policemen" and right away the number was approved.¹³² In the provinces, the heads of the Division Three offices, who were the top management of the rural police, had their first conference on 15 September. That day, united in their objective, they went to Mizuno's official residence and gave him a thirteen-article statement of their wishes. One item is reported to have been a request to "increase the number of policemen."¹³³ Mizuno received this with the comment, "It's only what one would expect."

Behind the united call by Mizuno and his close subordinates for additional policemen was Korea's precarious state of order and security. Seoul was kept in a continuing mode of high alert, the threat of closing shops always imminent. From the jails one could "hear the voices of Korean prisoners calling out 'Manse!' [For Independence!]," and Koreans "in the country are demanding that Japanese get out." In addition, "There are a lot of people who are banking on Korea's government-in-exile in Shanghai and want it to succeed." This was the Korea that Mizuno and his colleagues saw and had to contend with. The

security policy at that time was still tilted mainly toward Seoul, and so in the provinces, apart from places where government offices were located, “Even if there was unrest, no one did anything about it.” Conditions like those made the need for a stronger local police force all the more urgent.¹³⁴

Incoming Governor General Saitō, for his part, naturally understood the vital need for order, peace, and security in Korea. He had, in fact, some solid, practical ideas on how to do that by adding army divisions and bringing the police force up to a satisfactory level of strength.¹³⁵ With this solid backing from the entire Government General, from the top down, the cause of building up the police force was pushed ahead, beginning just after the reorganization of the Government General and continuing through the first half of 1920s.

The basic plan for additional policemen was pounded out in the Tokyo office of the Korea Government General by senior executives in the Police Bureau, including its director Noguchi and the Police Bureau secretary Kobayashi Mitsumasa, and others, working together with Kunitomo. The bare bones were laid out in a letter written by Saitō to former Tokyo City Mayor Sakatani Yoshio: “To the 15,000-strong force we’ve had in the past, we will add, on a temporary basis, 5,000 patrolmen. We’ll set up police substations in every village (*men*, or *myōn*) and assign three Japanese patrolmen to each one.” Saitō explained the reasons behind this plan: “When we tried out the kempei system, we put [only] one kempei in each substation, and so they felt that they had enemies on all sides and found it difficult to act quickly and effectively in situations when a fast response was needed.”¹³⁶ This kind of thinking most definitely reflected lessons learned from direct experience of the riots during the Samil Movement.

It was decided that in the “first phase of expansion” after August 1919 more men would be added to the quotas shown in column (a) in Figure 20, thus raising the numbers of regular staff. Saitō wrote that one of his primary concerns was to raise the numbers of regular lower-level patrolmen in the provinces. The left-hand column in Figure 21 shows an outline of the kind of route that might have been taken to secure the necessary numbers of patrolmen. We can infer that the plan was to recruit all the needed additional policemen within about two months, and then to have policemen take over almost all the duties that the kempei had been carrying out (except “border surveillance”), within three months.¹³⁷

It was comparatively easy to sign on new policemen in Japan, mainly because the salaries offered were fairly generous. By early October the planned 3,000 new policemen had been hired (*Keijō nippō*, 29 September 1919, evening edition). But partly because fewer kempei than originally projected were willing to switch over and join the police force, it was difficult to transfer to Korea sufficient numbers of patrolmen already employed as patrolmen in Japan. Mizuno had already begun putting out feelers to see if he could require the metropolitan areas to supply certain numbers of patrolmen, but this met with strong objections from the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department. With Japan’s economy booming from the effects of World War I, policemen had been quitting

Figure 20. Plan for Post-reform Police Expansion

Unit: person

Post/position		No. of pre-reform personnel (A)	Post-reform increase		Total no. of post-reform personnel (B = A + a + b)	No. of increased personnel (B - A)
			1st phase (a)	2nd phase (b)		
Police Bureau	Bureau chief		1		1	1
	Councilor	Jp 6 Kr 2	Jp 2		10	2
	Interpreter	4	4		8	4
	Engineer	4			4	
	Clerk	Jp 19 Kr 12	Jp 14		45	14
	Assistant engineer	3			3	
	Assistant interpreter	2			2	
	Subtotal (i)	52	21	—	73	21
Police Training Institute	School president	1			1	
	Professor		Jp 4		4	4
	Assistant professor	Jp 3 Kr 1	1		5	1
	Secretary	2			2	
	Subtotal (ii)	7	5	—	12	5
Provincial officials	Councilor		13		13	13
	Superintendent	Jp 21 Kr 8	Jp 13 Kr 6	3	51	22
	Harbor manager	1			1	
	Harbor medical officer	1			1	
	Veterinary officer	1			1	
	Police inspector	Jp 165 Kr 132	143	Jp 61 Kr 8	509	212
	Assistant police inspector		Jp 586 Kr 262	Jp 122 Kr 2	982	982
	Harbor officer	4			4	
	Assistant harbor medical officer	2			2	
	Assistant veterinary officer	3			3	
	Assistant engineer	10			10	
	Assistant interpreter	4			4	
	Patrolman	Jp 2617 Kr 3339	Jp 4828 Kr 4749	Jp 2983 Kr 72	18588	12632
	Subtotal (iii)	6308	10610	3251	20169	13861
Total (i + ii + iii)		6367	10636	3251	20254	13887

Source: Sujise Tokumatsu, “Kankoku heigō-go ni okeru Chōsen keisatsuhi yosan no enkaku” [A History of the Budget for the Korea Police after the Annexation of Korea], *Keimu ihō*, no. 181, June 1920, pp. 25–27.

Notes

1. Police officers of various posts under “No. of pre-reform personnel” do not include the kempei assigned to the police.
2. “Councilor” under “No. of pre-reform personnel” indicates former police affairs officers.
3. “Police Training Institute” (Keisatsukan Kōshūsho) under “No. of pre-reform personnel” indicates the former Police Training School (Keisatsukan Renshūsho).
4. “Jp” and “Kr” represent Japanese and Koreans, respectively.

Figure 21. Post-reform Recruitment of Patrolmen

Recruitment source	Pre-reform numbers	Recruitment target	Patrolmen recruited
① Transferred from Japan	—	1500	1454
② Newly hired in Japan	—	3000	3141
③ Former Korea Police patrolman (Japanese)	2617	All	2617
④ Former Korea Police patrolman/ assistant patrolman (Korean)	3330	All	3330
⑤ Former Korea kempei (Japanese)	3397	“A great majority” or “60–70%”	1338
⑥ Former kempei auxiliary (Korean)	4749	Majority	4181
Total	14093	More than 10,000	16061

Sources: Compiled mainly from “Chōsen mondai no sokumen-kan” [A Side View of the Korean Issue] (an article that appeared in *Japan Advisor* newspaper), *Chōsen*, no. 182, July 1920, p. 72, as well as from *Chōsen tōchi hiwa*, pp. 108–109, *Yomiuri shimbun*, 18 August 1919, and the evening edition of *Keijō nippō*, 31 August 1919.

Notes

1. Figures in the table are those included in the plan to secure the necessary numbers of patrolmen in August 1919, immediately after the police reform (so-called “first-phase expansion”).
2. Under “Recruitment source,” (2) “Transferred from Japan” indicates incumbent policemen.
3. Under “Recruitment source,” (5) “Former Korea kempei” indicates only those kempei engaged in police duties.

in droves to work in more lucrative jobs. The police department was in a tight spot: “At a time like this, when the metropolitan areas and prefectures alike are struggling with a serious dearth of patrolmen, it is like pulling teeth to get even one man to sign on” (*Jiji shinpō*, 12 August 1919, conversation with Honma Toshio, head of the secretariat, Tokyo Metropolitan Police). Superintendent-general of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department Oka was extremely displeased that his agency not only had been robbed of its senior staff by the “Mizuno’s hiring spree” but on top of that was being asked to supply large numbers of police, right down to patrolmen. Oka lodged a strong protest with Home Minister Tokonami Takejirō.¹³⁸ Trying to deal with these recalcitrant police agencies, Prime Minister Hara stepped in and personally cajoled Oka into going along with the needs of the Korea police.

Nonetheless, in fits and starts staffing progressed according to plan. How many planned posts were actually filled is shown in column (a) of Figure 20. The first phase of the expansion was more or less finished and the police force now had more than 15,000 patrolmen. On 14 November the transfer of kempei to police posts was complete, and on 12 December Imperial Ordinance No. 389 was repealed—the ordinance that had authorized kempei to perform police duties in the transitional period.

The number of regular police posts was increased again in January 1920. Those figures appear in column (b) of Figure 20, “Post-reform increase 2nd phase.” The number of Korean patrolmen added to the lists at that time is conspicuously small, probably reflecting the Government General’s mistrust of Koreans (see Section 2) after witnessing acts of sabotage, non-cooperation, desertion, and dereliction by Korean assistant police and kempei auxiliaries during the Samil Movement.¹³⁹ By the last day of March 3,000

new patrolmen had been recruited and, after training, they were expected to be sent to Korea by July or August 1920 (*Tonga ilbo*, 6 April 1920; *Keijō nippō*, 7 April, 13 April, 11 May 1920).

Thus, following upon the restructure of the police organization, the police force itself was given a hefty buildup with unprecedented speed. The scale of that expansion of personnel and facilities was enough to constitute a momentous turning point in the history of the whole colonial period. Just comparing the end of 1918 with the end of 1919, personnel numbers rose from 13,380 (including 7,978 kempei who performed police work) to 15,392, which meant an increase of about 2,000. Police facilities increased from 1,861 to 2,761. Whereas kempei police stations as of late 1918 were about one for every two villages, after the phase-two expansion, the principle of “one police station for every county (*pu*), one substation for every village (*myōn/men*)” became a reality. At this point, the goal of building up the order and security system at the basic lower levels—one of the primary tasks after the March 1st Uprising—had been accomplished.

The police buildup involved an enormous financial commitment. The police-related budget for fiscal 1918–1919 (including kempei expenses and expenses for kempei auxiliaries) more than doubled from about 8 million yen to 16.75 million yen. About 40 percent of that represented the costs of the first- and second-phase police expansion (paid out of the Korea Government General surplus fund and a supplementary budget). We cannot make a simple comparison in the case of the 1920 budget because expenditure item categories in the Government General special account were changed, but we can be certain that police-related expenditures continued their upward trend. Because of the several reforms, annual expenditures for the fiscal 1920 special account were inflated by about 150 percent, and about 40 percent (about 16.11 million yen) of the increase was due to “costs related to the police system reforms.”¹⁴⁰ A decisive factor in getting this swollen Government General budget approved was the negotiating skills of Mizuno.¹⁴¹

Later, partly because kempei were relieved of their border surveillance duty (1922), the numbers of police personnel continued to rise, but around that time a reaction set in, fueled by worry about a post-World War I recession, and financial belt-tightening became an important issue. The peak number of police in Korea (20,771) was reached in 1922, and every year from then on until the last half of the 1930s efforts were made to tamp down the numbers (see Figure 1). The result was that the augmented police numbers at the time of the Samil Movement became standard—the level routinely required for maintaining order and security in Korea and it remained that way until the war with China, beginning in 1937.

5. Korean Reactions to the Police System Reforms

When the kempei police system was turned into a civil police force, how did Koreans at the time react? I want to take up this question with special reference to a Korea Garrison Army report issued 17 September 1919, about a month after the system was restructured. Put together by some of the army staff, it describes the results of a survey the army had conducted on how Koreans in the provinces saw the changes. The report is titled “Influence of the Governor General Replacement and Changes in the Police Organization on Popular Sentiments among Koreans in Local Areas”¹⁴² (henceforth, “Local Sentiments”; page numbers are from the pagination of the collection in which the report is included). The report has certain limitations. For one thing, it is a government document. For another, the coverage extends to just four provinces (P’yŏngan-bukto, P’yŏngan-namdo, Hwanghaedo, and Kyŏnggido). Yet, given that the privately-run Korean-language newspapers *Tonga ilbo* and *Chosŏn ilbo* were not yet being published (they were founded in April 1920), it is difficult to find the kind of information contained in this report anywhere else. Also, it should be made clear at the start that, “Popular Sentiments” in the title notwithstanding, the report relates mainly responses from “officials and some of the intelligentsia.” The survey was carried out with the assumption that the sentiments of farmers were not relevant: “Their interests were not directly affected and so they were not deeply concerned” about who was governor general or what changes had occurred in the police system (“Local Sentiments,” 976).

As to the content, to begin with, the reorganized police system was given surprisingly high marks. The overwhelming majority of voices are positive, even enthusiastic: “The improvements in the police system have responded to the hopes of ordinary Koreans, and so they have created good feelings and are welcomed” (from P’yŏngan-bukto, Ŭiju-kun, “Local Sentiments,” 985); and, “Before...Koreans feared the kempei system, but now that it has become a [civil] police system, they are confident that it will guide them in a gentler way and they are very glad about it” (Hwanghaedo, Yulli-kun, “Local Sentiments,” 1024). As for the governor general, most comments related disappointment and anger that despite the administrative reform of the Government General, a military officer remained at its helm. The fact that the report includes these undisguised negative feelings about the military governor general gives some assurance that the positive and hopeful responses regarding the police system are not simply the army’s way of presenting a self-congratulatory, too-rosy picture.

In explaining those positive feelings about the police system reforms, respondents cited kempei oppression: “The kempei...habitually treated lower-class people with great cruelty, and the kempei auxiliaries in particular frequently struck people and always subjected them to harsh coercion” (Hwanghaedo, Suan-kun, “Local Sentiments,” 1023); and, “The kempei auxiliaries used to commit acts of terrible brutality when no one could

see them. They were very abusive” (Kyōnggido, P’och’ōn-kun, “Local Sentiments,” 1033). Voices like these in the report point to violence and abuse committed by kempei, especially low-level kempei auxiliaries. Many other responses expressed the hope that such assaults and tyrannical behavior by police personnel would stop.¹⁴³

For the authorities, with their professions of “cultural rule” and efforts to paint a picture of a new style of governing Korea, these responses were not altogether what they most wanted to hear. In the first place, they knew that an enthusiastic response to the restructured system could simply express relief at the prospect of something, anything, better than what they had endured under the abhorrent kempei police; it was in no way a reasoned judgment based on direct experience of strong points in the new system. Since the new police system was, indeed, still an unknown quantity, some voices were guarded, not completely convinced: “We must watch carefully to see whether or not the work of the police really will meet people’s wishes,” those ‘wishes’ being to put “the repressive, tormentingly intrusive” ways of the old kempei police forever in the past (P’yōngan-namdo, P’yōngyang-pu, “Local Sentiments,” 998). In the second place, not a few Koreans believed that they, themselves, were responsible for the police reform, that they had forced the government’s hand through their actions in the Samil insurrections. There is an element of truth to that. Upon realizing that the police system had been changed, those people thought, “Make no mistake, this is a great victory for us, the Korean people” (Kyōnggido, Changdan-kun, “Local Sentiments,” 1029–1030). Some of them became “haughty and arrogant” toward Japanese officials and immigrants living in Korea (P’yōngan-bukto, Kusōng-kun; P’yōngan-namdo, Sōngch’ōn-kun, “Local Sentiments,” 991, 1003). Some Koreans, in fact, “harbored the delusion that the reforms were just the beginning of Korean independence!” (Kyōnggido, P’och’ōn-kun, “Local Sentiments,” 1033–1034).

Considering that kind of response, it seems clear that unless the Government General could demonstrate a clear break with the former high-handed, coercive methods of the kempei police, and unless it allowed for some expansion of rights for Koreans, the hopes and expectations of Koreans would crumble very soon after the police system reforms. In fact, the restructure of the police, focused on building the security capability in local areas where low-level police worked, had been carried out quickly in a crisis situation; it was unavoidable that problems should emerge. A great deal has been written on this topic, so let me make just a few basic points about it.

First, the burden of expanding the police force bore down heavily on the Korean people: “With the police system reforms, new facilities were built in every region, and in most cases things like the cost of constructing new police substations were covered by obligatory donations from the local people. They were severely discomfited.”¹⁴⁴ The new police substations, goes a comment representative of Korean views, “were not financed by national funds, and so the local regions were made to bear the cost. Anyone who did

not contribute was made to do forced labor. The people even had to pay for the wood, charcoal, and oil that the substations used.”¹⁴⁵

Second, it was not easy to fill vacant posts and attain the designated numbers of additional police, and so as hiring went on, the quality of new police employees began to fall. An article in *Tonga ilbo*, 28 June 1921, talks about the consequences of the Samil Movement, when people were employed as policemen without being required to take any examinations:

Since the Manse Movement for Korean independence two years ago [1919], the police have changed their staffing procedures, and a large number of policemen have been hired, but this time the authorities [Government General] have had very little freedom of choice in the people they employ as policemen. There being few voluntary applications for the job, a large number of policemen have been hired under special arrangements that allow the examination requirement to be waived.... Now, however...in light of recurring public criticism that the people hired are apathetic, oblivious to the demands of their work, the authorities in P’yŏngan-bukto have decided that it is time to bring in truly qualified policemen and dismiss poorly performing police officers in each precinct.

At the same time, morale among the patrolmen recruited in Japan was not good. “They agreed to assignments in Korea just because the salary was high and they got preferential treatment,” but once they arrived at their posts they were not prepared to cope with the “dangerous situation” they found themselves in, a situation in which they “had almost no time to eat or sleep. They were armed even at all hours of the night. They slept with their gun as a pillow.” One policeman described his thoughts of resigning: “At the very least, I’d like to be transferred to work along the railway line, but if that doesn’t happen, I have my resignation letter in my pocket, ready anytime.”¹⁴⁶ As early as November 1919, among the policemen assigned to Hamgyŏng-bukto and P’yŏngan-bukto provinces, 230 men could not endure the cold and went back to Japan (*Yomiuri shimbun*, 21 November 1919). The annual police turnover continued to be huge; between 10 percent and 17 percent had to be replaced in one year (*Tonga ilbo*, 17 June 1923).

Many Koreans did indeed have expectations from the reforms, but after seeing this kind of thing happening it probably was not long before they realized the contradictory elements in the way the new system was working. With hope turning to disillusionment, they must have developed a sour antipathy toward the police system and the increased numbers of police. Mano Seiichi, the new Division Three head in Hwanghaedo, recalled that after the restructure, Koreans were “brimming over” with indignation: “As soon as a substation gets built, the police start interfering with everything we do. We have no freedom of action. For us, it would be much easier and much better without substations.”¹⁴⁷

The fact was that police deployed at those substations were themselves behind a great many instances of violence and injustice.¹⁴⁸

With good reason, the police in Korea under the new system could not simply let the situation be. The Korean independence movement had been steadily heating up inside and outside the country since the March 1st Uprising. The police fully understood the strategic importance to Japan's rule in Korea of counteracting that movement and, closely related, the need to create a new and good image of the police in the minds of the Korean people. This subject is one that I plan to take up in a separate study.

Chapter Review

During the 1910s, three groups in particular—what we have called constellations of power—had the motivation to seek changes in the kempei police system. Japan's Ministry of War, concerned especially about the financial dimension and cost-cutting, frequently talked about abolishing the system or reducing the scale of the Korea kempeitai. Within the Korea Government General, civil bureaucrats in the Bureau of Internal Affairs and in the police organization, joined by the director general of political affairs, constituted a powerful voice critical of the kempei police system. In addition, there was Hara Takashi and the Seiyūkai, who wanted to realize “extension of the homeland” in policy and to widen the political parties' sphere of influence in government, extending it to colonial government. During the first Yamamoto cabinet they made a start at administrative reform of the Korea Government General and restructure of the kempei police system, but their efforts at that time were frustrated.

The formation of the Hara cabinet in September 1918 provided the opportunity for the three groups to join forces. Through contacts with Yamagata Isaburō, director general of political affairs, Hara was supported in his moves to revise the organization of the Korea Government General, and having also secured the collaboration of War Minister Tanaka Giichi, he was able to move ahead. As for the kempei police, both the Japanese government and the Government General wanted to keep the system in place. Neither wanted to do more than to find ways to deal with the radical thinking of some Korean people. And, before the March 1st Independence Movement, the Hara cabinet's ideas on administrative reform of the Government General had not yet broadened to encompass the whole system of rule in Korea, including the police. In other words, it took the jarring shock of the Samil Movement to make kempei police reform into a real and urgent political issue that had to be dealt with quickly.

Festering throughout the period of military rule, popular resentment against the invasive “tyranny” of the kempei police intensified and boiled over during the rebellion

of March and April 1919, and it was vented in frequent assaults by local residents on kempei police facilities. The police together with the Korea Garrison Army were the core of the counterinsurgency forces, and close cooperation developed between them during the uprising. According to Korea Garrison Army documents, out of 106 separate crackdowns, the army acted alone in only nine of those, which means that 97 cases, or more than 90 percent of the total, were joint army-kempei police operations.¹⁴⁹ But in the process of stamping out the movement, disjuncts arose in the cooperation between police and army units. In some places manpower was in such short supply that substations were closed down. One consequence was that in tandem with the suppression of the movement, additional police were recruited. The increased numbers of police, deployed “for the time being,” were not expected to provide a long-term solution, and it was at this point that the need to permanently strengthen the police force at the lower administrative levels emerged as a critical priority, along with reform of the police system.

By the middle of June, the Government General, the Japanese government, and the army all recognized the necessity of reforming the system, and there began discussions in Tokyo between delegates from the Korea Government General and the Japanese government. In mid-August a series of reforms were put into effect.

What or who, in this process involving multiple alignments and groups, was the agency that made the connection between the Samil Movement and the expansion of the police? Certainly one necessary precondition for the reforms was the accession to power of the Hara cabinet, which gave Hara the chance to promote as policy his “extension of the homeland” idea. Also important, it was because of the uprising that War Minister Tanaka and the majority of army leaders recognized problems in the structure of the kempei police system. Although Yamagata Isaburō’s bid for the governor general post failed, opposed by all the top army leaders, the presence of leaders who either agreed or were willing to go along with police system reforms indicates that the police system reform was at last within reach. There is no denying that Hara and the army, given the direction in which they were trying to move, prepared the environment for reform of the system.

In the process of restructuring the police, the Korean Government General and the Japanese government under Prime Minister Hara agreed on making the system into a civil police force, but there remained an important difference in opinion. So focused was he on the pursuit of the “extension of the homeland,” inevitably Hara conceptualized the Korea police system reform in terms of that idea. On the Government General side, the ones who most clearly grasped the importance of building a stronger security system, and, moreover, worked hardest to imbue the image of the reform with the urgency of Korea’s security, were Usami and Kunitomo, both on the staff of the Government General. So it was two bureaucrats in the colonial government who, more than anyone, were responsible for policy that reflected realities of the colonial situation.

Usami, Kunitomo, and Administration Head Yamagata Isaburō, the latter with his eye on becoming the first civilian governor general, were all instrumental in the police system reform and the expansion of lower-level police power, but their roles ended before the period of “cultural rule” had really begun. What they had done was to ‘set the table’ for cultural rule.¹⁵⁰ The one who then moved on to complete the buildup of the police was Yamagata’s successor Mizuno and his cadre of new top staff, professionals he had brought in from among his close colleagues at the Home Ministry. One reason they were able to accomplish the police expansion so quickly after the Samil Uprising was that the planning had largely been done before Saitō took office as governor general. Another factor that must not be overlooked, however, is that the people to whom the implementation was entrusted were the best and the brightest of the new staff whom the new chief of administration had hand-picked from the Home Ministry bureaucracy.

That briefly summarizes how, at the time of the Samil Movement, a significant expansion of the personnel, facilities, and equipment of the police organization in Korea was pushed ahead and accomplished at a pace seen at no other time in the colonial period. The resulting transformation was huge in scale and affected every part of the system, including the composition of top management in the Government General. The considerably more robust police under the new system, however, were headed for a face-off with an increasingly frustrated and angry Korean people whose hopes for the restructured police force were already being dashed.

1 Cho Mun-yōn, “Nihon teikoku shugi no iwayuru ‘bunka seiji’ no honshitsu” [The Essential Character of Japanese Imperialist “Cultural Rule”], *Rekishi hyōron*, no. 248, March–April 1971, p. 75. Among other studies, many focus on “cultural rule” but here I note only those published during the 1980s or later: Han Mae-ho, “Sam-il undong chikhu ūi Chosŏn singminji chŏngch’aek: Saitō munhwa chŏngch’i ūi ponjil ūr chungsim ūro” [Colonial Policy in Korea Following the March 1st Movement: The Essence of Saitō Makoto’s Cultural Rule], first publication 1980, in Ch’a Kib-yŏk, ed., *Ilche ūi Han’guk singmin t’ongch’i* [Japan’s Colonial Rule in Korea], Chŏngŭmsa, 1985; Kang Kil-wŏn, “Chosŏn ch’ongdokpu ūi sin sijŏng e taehan koch’al” [A Consideration of the New Measures by the Government General in Korea], *Wŏn’gwan sahak*, vol. 1, December 1981; Kang Tong-jin, “Munhwa chuūi ūi kibon sŏnggyŏk,” [The Basic Character of Cultural Rule], *Han’guk sahoe yŏn’gu*, no. 2, 1984; An Hyŏn-sin, “1920 nyŏndae Chosŏn ch’ongdokpu ūi t’ongch’i ch’eje yŏn’gu: Minjok undong t’anap ūr chungsim ūro” [A Study on the Rule of Korea under the Government General in the 1920s: With Focus on the Suppression of Nationalist Movements], M.A. thesis, faculty of history, Sungmyŏng Women’s University, 1988; Kim Tong-myŏng, “Shihai to teikō no hazama: 1920 nendai Chōsen ni okeru Nihon teikoku shugi to Chōsenjin no seiji undō” [The Gap between Control and Resistance: Japanese Imperialism and Korean Political Movements in Korea during the 1920s], unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Tokyo Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 1997; Nagata Akifumi, “Nihon no Chōsen tōchi ni okeru ‘bunka seiji’ no dōnyū to Saitō Makoto” [Saitō Makoto and the Inception of Cultural Rule in Japan’s Administration

- of Korea], *Jōchi shigaku*, no. 43, 1998; Ch'u Kyo-ch'an, "Sam-il undong chikhu Ilche ūi Chosŏn chibae chŏngch'aek ūi pyŏnhwa" [Changes in Japan's Policy of Rule in Korea after the March 1st Movement], M.A. thesis, Inha University, 2001.
- 2 Nakatsuka Akira, "Nihon teikoku shugi to Chōsen: San-ichi undō to 'bunka seiji'" [Japanese Imperialism and Korea: The March 1st Movement and Cultural Rule], *Nihonshi kenkyū*, no. 83, March 1966, p. 54.
 - 3 Government General of Korea, "Chōsen ni okeru shin-shisei" [The New Administration in Korea], October 1921, in Kondō Ken'ichi, ed., *Saitō sōtoku no bunka tōchi* [Governor General Saitō's Cultural Rule], Yūhō Kyōkai, 1970, p. 40.
 - 4 Haruyama Meitetsu, "Kindai Nihon no shokuminchi tōchi to Hara Takashi" [Hara Takashi and Modern Japan's Colonial Administration], in Haruyama Meitetsu and Wakabayashi Masahiro, eds., *Nihon shokuminchishugi no seijiteki tenkai* [The Political Development of Japanese Colonialism], Japan Association for Asian Studies, 1980.
 - 5 Yi Hyōng-nang, "Dai-ichiji kensei yōgo undō to Chōsen no kansei kaikaku-ron" [The First Movement to Protect the Constitution and the Argument for Administrative Reform in Korea], *Nihon shokuminchi kenkyū*, no. 3, August 1990.
 - 6 Yi Chōng-yong, "Hara naikaku-ki ni okeru shokuminchi kansei kaisei mondai: Chōsen Sōtokufu o chūshin ni" [Reforms in Colonial Administration under the Hara Cabinet with Focus on the Korea Government General], *Keiō Gijuku Daigaku Daigakuin Hōgaku Kenkyū-ka ronbunshū*, no. 26, September 1987; Osada Akifumi, "Chōsen san-ichi dokuritsu undō to Nihon seikai: Undō e no taiō to Chōsen tōchi no 'kaikaku' o meguru seiji rikigaku" [The March 1st Independence Movement in Korea and Japanese Politics: Response to the Movement and the Political Dynamics of 'Reform' of the Administration of Korea], *Jōchi shigaku*, no. 44, 1999; Okamoto Makiko, "Seitō naikaku-ki ni okeru bunkan sōtokusei: Rikken seiji to shokuminchi shihai no sōkoku" [Civilian Governor General during the Party Cabinet Period: Rivalry over Constitutional Government and Colonial Rule], *Nihon shokuminchi kenkyū*, no. 10, July 1998, pp. 2–5.
 - 7 Besides the studies cited in note no. 6, see for example, Sin Chu-baek, "Ilche ūi saeroun sing-minji chibae pangsik kwa chaecho Ilbonin mit 'chach'i seryōk ūi taeūng" [A New System of Colonial Rule by Imperial Japan and Responses by Japanese Living in Korea and "Self-rule Forces"], *Yōksa wa hyōnsil*, no. 3, March 2001; Yi T'ae-hun, "1920 nyōndae chōnban-gi Ilche ūi 'Munhwa chōngch'i' wa burūjoa chōngch'i seryōk ūi taeūng."
 - 8 Kang Tong-jin, *Nihon no Chōsen shihai seisakushi kenkyū*, pp. 4-5.
 - 9 Infantry section, the Bureau of Military Affairs, War Ministry, "Chōsen chūsatsu kenpei jōrei seitei no ken" [On the Establishment of the Regulations Governing the Korea Kempeitai] (September 1910, *Mitsu dai nikki*, M43–1).
 - 10 27th Diet, Lower House, Meeting of Subcommittee No. 4, Budget Committee (fourth session), 1 February 1911.
 - 11 31st Diet, Lower House, Meeting of Subcommittee No. 4, Budget Committee (sixth session), 5 February 1914.
 - 12 39th Diet, Lower House, Meeting of Subcommittee No. 4, Budget Committee (first session), 2 July 1917.
 - 13 Komori Tokuji, *Akashi Motojirō*, vol. 1, p. 461.
 - 14 Total expenditures paid by the Ministry of War for operations in Korea, including costs of stationing the Korea Garrison Army and kempeitai greatly decreased from 9.51 million yen in 1910 to 6.52 million in 1914. (Those figures are taken from accounts settled. Korea Government General Finance Bureau, ed., *Chōsen kin'yū jikō sankōsho* [Korea Finances Reference Book], Chōsen Keizai Kyōkai, 1923, p. 284.) For changes in expenditures in the war ministry annual budget related to the kempei police, including kempei expenses, see Matsuda, "Nihon tōchika no Chōsen ni okeru

- kempei keisatsu kikō (1910–1919),” *Shirin*, vol. 78, No. 6, November 1995, p. 36.
- 15 Utsunomiya Tarō, “Hi: Ōshū senran ni kangami shōrai kokugun no shisetsu ni kansuru iken” [Confidential: Opinion Regarding Japan’s Future Army Facilities in Light of the War in Europe], Uehara Yūsaku Kankei Bunsho Kenkyūkai, ed., *Uehara Yūsaku kankei monjo* [Documents Related to Uehara Yūsaku], Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1976, p. 101. This statement was submitted to War Minister Ōshima Ken’ichi in early 1916 and was enclosed in correspondence from Utsunomiya to Uehara Yūsaku dated 13 May 1918.
 - 16 In a memo of 1912 Terauchi wrote, “Combine a considerable part of expenses of three types in the Police Affairs Bureau and make them into one category,” but this could be an indication of possible moves to stop paying kempei expenses out of the war ministry account. Yamamoto Shirō ed., *Terauchi Masatake kankei monjo: Shushō izen* [Documents Related to Terauchi Masatake: Prior to Becoming Prime Minister], Kyoto Women’s University, 1984, p. 70.
 - 17 Uzaki Rojō, *Satsu no kaigun, Chō no rikugun* [Satsuma’s Navy, Chōshū’s Army], Seikyōsha, 1911, p. 176; Editorial, *Chōsen shimbun*, 7 May 1914.
 - 18 Nakano Seigō, *Waga mitaru Man-Sen* [My View of Manchuria and Korea], Seikyōsha, 1915, pp. 56–57. Also for Nakano’s arguments at this time on Korea and their limits, Kisaka Jun’ichirō, “Nakano Seigō-ron” [The Views of Nakano Seigō], 1, *Ryūkoku hōgaku*, vol. 3, no. 2, January 1971, pp. 48–49.
 - 19 Kobashi Ichita, “Chōsen gyōsei shisatsu hōkoku” [Report on Observation of the Administration of Korea], Hara Takashi Monjo Kenkyūkai, ed., *Hara Takashi kankei monjo* [Documents Related to Hara Takashi], vol. 10, Nihon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai, 1988, p. 298. According to *Hara Takashi kankei monjo*, it is not known when this report was written, but the 20 November 1913 *Tōkyō nichinichi shimbun* refers to “a draft for deliberation on the reorganization of administration by the Government General” by Kobashi, which appears to be the same report. From this I inferred that the report was written around that time.
 - 20 Regarding the former, see correspondence from Korea Garrison Army chief of staff Shiba Katsusaburō to Terauchi, 30 August 1912, in *Terauchi Masatake kankei monjo*, 277:1; On the latter, correspondence from Obara Shinzō, governor of Ch’ungch’ōng-namdo, to Terauchi, 3 May 1915, in *ibid.*, 236:2. Part of this letter was cited in endnote 13, Chapter Four.
 - 21 Hagiwara Hikozaō, *Watashi no Chōsen kiroku* [My Record of Korea], private printing, 1960, p. 13.
 - 22 See correspondence from Usami to Yamagata Isaburō, 5 February 1918, in Tokutomi Iichirō, *Sokū Yamagata-kō den* [Biography of Prince Yamagata Isaburō], Yamagata Kōshaku Denki Hensankai, 1929, p. 708.
 - 23 Tabohashi, *Chosen tōchishi ronkō*, p. 160.
 - 24 “Chōsen tōchi nijūgoshūnen Chōsen kaikotan zadankai” [Round-table Talk on Korea Recollections in Recognition of Twenty-five Years of Governing Korea] (2), *Shisō to seikatsu*, vol. 12, no. 5, May 1935, p. 39.
 - 25 Uzaki, *Satsu no kaigun*, p. 176.
 - 26 Usami Katsuo, “Kansanki” [Idle Thoughts], manuscript in Usami’s own hand, included in the “Yūhō bunko” collection, held by Research Institute for Oriental Cultures, Gakushuin University. Also Sasaki Shōta (an official in the province of Kyōngsang-namdo), *Chōsen no jitsujō* [The Realities in Korea], Teikoku Chihō Gyōsei Gakkai, 1924 records that, “Mr. Yamagata was a rather diffident director general of political affairs since the time Mr. Terauchi became governor general, but when Mr. Terauchi was replaced by a new governor general, Mr. Yamagata became greatly motivated and began actively working together with Director Usami” (p. 168).
 - 27 Tokutomi, *Sokū Yamagata-kō den*, p. 345.
 - 28 Government-official Ōtsuka Tsunesaburō, “Dai yonjikkai teikoku gikai setsumeishiryō” [Background Materials for the 40th Session of the Imperial Diet], prepared ca. the end of 1917. *Chōsen Sōtokufu*

- teikoku gikai setsumei shiryō* [Government General of Korea Explanatory Materials for the Imperial Diet], vol. 11; reprint, Fuji Shuppan, 1998, p. 135.
- 29 40th Diet Session, Lower House, Budget Committee (13th Session), 14 March 1918.
 - 30 For the preceding, see Haruyama, “Kindai Nihon.”
 - 31 The protests and appeals from Japanese in commerce and industry certainly contained elements of criticism toward Japan’s colonial rule of Korea, but I cannot agree with Yi Hyōng-nang that such criticism was directly linked to arguments for administrative reforms in the Government General or that it was the “central force” driving the reforms. For one thing, it is reasonably clear that in the 1910s, generally, interest in Korean issues was extremely low (Matsuo Takayoshi, *Taishō demokurashī* [Taisho Democracy], first edition 1974, Iwanami Modern Library edition, 1994, pp. 284–285; Kang Tong-jin, *Nihon genronkai to Chōsen*, 1910–1945 [The Japanese Press and Korea, 1910–1945], Hōsei Daigaku Shuppankyoku, 1984, Chapter 2); Also, it is definitely going too far to say that demands for reforms in Japan’s colonial administration were the “broadest possible slogan” of the movement to protect the constitution. Almost none of the many existing studies on that movement even refer to the matter of reform of colonial administration in Korea. Furthermore, Yi’s essay proposes that the main targets in the criticism of the governing system of Korea by the industrial bourgeoisie were the Corporation Law in Korea (December 1910) and Korea’s financial management, but the administrative reforms planned by the Yamamoto cabinet were not meant simply for Korea; they were to be tried out in the Guandongzhou Leased Territory as well, as has been established by Kobayashi, *Nihon no tairiku seisaku*, pp. 302–303. And even if the Yamamoto cabinet’s approach was subject to some pressure from the bourgeoisie’s criticism of the Japanese ruling system in Korea, it was not aimed only at Korea; we must consider that plans to make changes extended to all of Japan’s colonial possessions.
 - 32 Haruyama, “Kindai Nihon,” pp. 43–46. Also, regarding the intent of the Seiyūkai and Hara to participate in running affairs in the governing of Taiwan, see Saitō Yōko, “Kei-En taisei no keisei to Taiwan tōchi mondai” [Formation of the Katsura-Saionji System and the Rule of Taiwan], *Shigaku zasshi*, vol. 103, no. 1, January 1994.
 - 33 On the changes made at this time in the administrative agencies of the Korea Government General, Yamazaki Tanshō, *Gaichi tochi kikō no kenkyū* [A Study of the Administrative Systems in Japan’s Overseas Territories], Takayama Shoin, 1943, p. 21; also, *Hara Takashi nikki*, 27 June 1913, vol. 3, p. 320, says the following about the discord arising between the cabinet and the Government General because of this measure: “At the cabinet meeting, it was decided that under the reforms at this time the Korea Government General would be placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior, but the Government General had insisted that as before the budget should remain under the Ministry of Finance. It was decided that Finance Minister Takahashi should send a telegram to the governor general stating that the government would not approve it.” On Terauchi’s great displeasure in hearing this, see *Tōkyō nichinichi shimbun*, 1 September 1913.
 - 34 According to *Hara Takashi nikki* (13 and 23 December 1913, vol. 3, pp. 371, 374, Governor General Terauchi was not happy about the personnel change in the Oriental Development Company, and he sent a personal statement to Prime Minister Yamamoto asking that the personnel be retained as before, but Yamamoto did not go along with that request. See also Arima Manabu, “Tōtaku jidai no Noda Utarō” [Noda Utarō in the Era of the Oriental Development Company], *Seinan Chiikishi Kenkyūkai*, ed., *Seinan chiiki no shūteki tenkai: Kindai hen* [The Historical Development of the Southwestern Region: Modern Period], Shibunkaku Shuppan, 1988, p. 643.
 - 35 The major newspapers at the time, excluding *Kokumin shimbun* (noted below), basically reported in favor of abolishing the system of appointing a military officer to the post of governor general, but almost none of them took up the issue in editorials. Apart from *Kokumin shimbun* and *Chūō shimbun*, only the *Tōkyō nichinichi shimbun* did so (26 November 1913) as far as I researched. In contrast, *Chūō shimbun*, launched by Seiyūkai manager Ōoka Ikuzō and known as a virtual house organ of the Seiyūkai, published two editorials in which it supported the Seiyūkai’s efforts to secure

- reforms in colonial administration. They were “Shokumin seisaku” [Colonial Policies] of 1 August 1913, and “Shokuminchi sōtoku no nin’yō shikaku” [Qualifications for Appointment as a Colonial Governor General] of 11 November 1913. Furthermore, opposing a 27 November 1913 editorial in *Kokumin shimbun*, “Sō-to-toku kansei” [Reform of Governor General Administration Overseas], which said, citing cases in British colonial rule, that a military governor general was preferable to a civilian, *Chūō shimbun* expressed ardent support for administrative reforms in the Government General, as in its 28 November 1913 editorial, “Indo no tōchi” [British Rule in India] and 11 January 1914 editorial “Budān seiji” [Military Rule].
- 36 Kobashi, “Chōsen gyōsei shisatsu hōkoku,” p. 297.
- 37 Banno Junji, *Taishō seihen* [The Taishō Political Crisis], Minerva Shobō, 1994, p. 157. This kind of political activity by Akashi was even taken up in the 31st Imperial Diet, Lower House, Meeting of Subcommittee No. 2, Budget Committee. Questions from Kinoshita Shigetarō and Hamamoto Yoshiaki, 9 February 1914.
- 38 Akashi to Terauchi, 9 November 1913. This correspondence also is taken from Yi Hyōng-nang, “Dai-ichiji kensei yōgo undō,” pp. 75–76.
- 39 Matsuda, “Ilbon yukgun,” pp. 236–238.
- 40 Some time in late November 1913, Terauchi went back to Tokyo to negotiate this matter with the Yamamoto cabinet. Upon leaving Korea, he wrote the following verse: “(Thinking of never returning to Korea) *Wataraji na / namikaze tachinu / yonare domo* [I will not go back / Although the world is buffeted / By rough winds.” Yamamoto, *Terauchi Masatake nikki*, pp. 601–602.
- 41 Yi Hyōng-nang, “Dai-ichiji kensei yōgo undō,” p. 78. (The entire text of the reform draft is presented on pages 90–94.) Kobayashi, *Nihon no tairiku seisaku*, pp. 300–301.
- 42 “Chōsen Sōtokufu kansei” [Administrative Reforms in the Korea Government General], January 1914. *Kuratomi Yūzaburō monjo* [Documents Relating to Kuratomi Yūzaburō], 30:25, National Diet Library Kensei Shiryōshitsu (Modern Japanese Political History Collection), Tokyo.
- 43 Also in March 1918, Jin Gunkichi, a member of the Lower House, submitted “Questions Concerning Police Agencies in Korea” to the 40th Imperial Diet in which he urged that the kempei police system be abolished. (Jin, a Seiyūkai member, was employed by the Korean government before Korea was annexed by Japan, serving as police chief in Hwanghaedo and Hamgyōng-bukto.) Prime Minister Terauchi and War Minister Ōshima replied bluntly, “Considering the present situation in Korea, the government regards the current police organization as quite appropriate. We have no intention of changing it for the present.”
- 44 Tokutomi, *Sokū*, p. 345.
- 45 In April 1911, Tokinaga Urazō was assigned to the post of administrative official in the Supervision Bureau of the Government General, and from 1912 on he was posted to P’yōngan-namdo province, and Kyōnggido province. In 1916 he was made a general affairs section chief in the General Affairs Bureau before becoming chief of the second department in the Internal Affairs Bureau. Tokinaga then was assigned the concurrent posts of Government General counselor and administrative official in 1918. In October that year he was made chief of the Security Section in the Police Bureau. Later when he had returned to Japan, Tokinaga served as chief of internal affairs in a number of prefectures. His last post as a public official was governor of Miyagi prefecture, where he remained until 1927 (Chōsen Shinbunsha, ed., *Chōsen jinji kōshinroku* [Directory of Personnel in Korea], Chōsen Shinbunsha, 1922 edition, p. 121 and passim).
- 46 *Hara Takashi nikki*, 13 October 1918, vol. 5, p. 25. Hara’s intentions below are indicated in *Hara Takashi nikki*, 23 November 1918, 15 January 1919, vol. 5, pp. 42, 61.
- 47 This is shown by the fact that in February 1919 Terauchi was leaning toward approving a civilian resident general for the Guandongzhou territory, and that on 12 April Guandongzhou got a civilian resident general. Haruyama, “Kindai Nihon,” pp. 52–53.

- 48 41st Imperial Diet, Lower House, Meeting of Subcommittee No. 4, Budget Committee meeting (3rd session), 4 February 1919, answer to question by Takagi Masatoshi.
- 49 Tokutomi, *Sokū*, p. 343.
- 50 Korea Kempeitai Headquarters and the Korea Government General Central Police Headquarters, eds., *Sōjō jiken no gaikyō* [Summary of the Insurrection], 15 April 1919. Reprinted as *Chōsen san-ichi dokuritsu sōjō jiken: Gaikyō, shisō oyobi undō* [The March 1st Insurrection for Korean Independence: Its Events, Ideology, and Movement], Gannandō Shoten, 1969, p. 54.
- 51 Mabuchi Sadatoshi, “Dai-ichiji taisen-ki Chōsen nōgyō no tokushitsu to San-ichi undō” [The Special Qualities of Korean Farming and the March 1st Movement], *Chōsenshi Kenkyūkai ronbunshū* [Bulletin of the Society for Korean Historical Study], no. 12, March 1986; Kim Chin-bong, “Sam-il undong kwa minjung” [The Samil Uprising and the Korean People] in *Sam-il undong 50 ju’nyōn kinyōm nonjip* [Essays Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the March 1st Movement], Tonga Ilbosa, 1969.
- 52 Tomita Akio, “San-ichi undō to Nihon teikoku shugi” [The March 1st Movement and Japanese Imperialism], in Kano Masanao and Yui Masaomi, eds., *Kindai Nihon no itōgō to teikō* [Integration and Resistance in Modern Japan], Nihon Hyōronsha, 1982, p. 122.
- 53 Korea Kempeitai Headquarters, ed., *Sōjō jiken*, p. 76.
- 54 Cho Tong-gōl, “Sam-il undong ūi chibangsajok sōngyōk,” pp. 110–112.
- 55 “Chōsenjin no mitaru Chōsen mondai” [How Koreans View the Problem of Korea], July 1919. *Saitō Makoto monjo* [Documents Related to Saitō Makoto], unpublished material; reprint, Kōrai Shorin, 1990, vol. 13, pp. 187–188.
- 56 “San-ichi undō nichiji hōkoku (Chōsen Sōtoku)” [Daily Report on Korea’s March 1st Movement (Korea Governor General)], 8 April 1919, in Kang Tōk-sang, ed., *Gendaishi shiryō* [Documents of Contemporary History], vol. 25 (Korea 1), Misuzu Shobō, 1965, p. 260. “San-ichi undō nichiji hōkoku (Keimu Sōkanbu)” [Daily Report on Korea’s March 1st Movement (Central Police Headquarters)], 1 March 1919, *ibid.*, pp. 285–286. The editor referred to the second part of the title of this volume as “Chōsen Sōtokufu Keimukyoku” [Korea Government General Police Bureau], but as the name “Keimukyoku” is not accurate I corrected it to “Keimu Sōkanbu” in this citation. Henceforth the daily report will be referred to as “Nichiji hōkoku,” with designation of either “Keimu Sōkanbu” (Central Police Headquarters in the Government General) or “Chōsengun” (Korea Garrison Army headquarters). The dates of telegrams and the editor’s page numbers will be noted.
- 57 “Nichiji hōkoku (Chōsengun),” 11 March 1919, p. 87.
- 58 “Nichiji hōkoku (Chōsengun),” 11 March 1919, p. 106.
- 59 Tomita, “San-ichi undō,” pp. 123–124.
- 60 “Nichiji hōkoku (Chōsengun),” 28 March 1919, p. 153.
- 61 “Nichiji hōkoku (Chōsengun),” 3 April 1919, p. 170.
- 62 Government General of Korea, *Dai yonjūsan-kai teikoku gikai setsumei shiryō gaiyō* [Background Materials for the 43rd Session of the Imperial Diet], *Chōsen Sōtokufu teikoku gikai setsumei shiryō*, vol. 12, p. 203.
- 63 “Nichiji hōkoku (Keimu Sōkanbu),” 17 April 1919, p. 377.
- 64 Sekiya to Government General Councilor Ōtsuka Tsunesaburō, 5 April 1919, in *Ōtsuka Tsunesaburō kankei monjo* [Documents Related to Ōtsuka Tsunesaburō], 67:7, National Diet Library Kensei Shiryōshitsu (Modern Japanese Political History Collection), Tokyo. For an overall view of Korean officials’ strikes, see Kang Tōk-sang, “Nihon no Chōsen shihai to 3-1 dokuritsu undō” [Japan’s Rule in Korea and the March 1st Independence Movement] in *Iwanami kōza: Sekai rekishi* [Iwanami Lecture Series: World History], vol. 25, Iwanami Shoten, 1970, p. 341.

- 65 Kunitomo Naokane, “Chōsen keisatsu 30-nen no kaiko” [Reflections on Thirty Years of the Korea Police], *Keimu ihō*, no. 354, October 1935, pp. 21–22. Hereafter, Kunitomo, “Kaiko.”
- 66 “Nichiji hōkoku (Chōsengun),” 3 April 1919, pp. 192–193.
- 67 *Hara Takashi nikki*, 2 and 4 April 1919 (vol. 5, pp. 82 and 83).
- 68 “Nichiji hōkoku (Chōsengun),” 11 April 1919, p. 201.
- 69 Kawabata Toyotarō to his elder brother, 31 March 1919. Tsunoda Sei, “Kawabata junsu no zep-pitsu” [Officer Kawabata’s Last Written Work], *Chōsen kōron*, vol. 7, no. 5, May 1919, p. 71.
- 70 Takasaki Sōji, *Shokuminchi Chōsen no Nihonjin* [The Japanese in Colonial Korea], Iwanami Shoten, 2002, p. 139.
- 71 Haraguchi Yoshio, “3-1 undō dan’atsu jirei no kenkyū: Keimukyoku nichiji hōkoku no hihanteki kentō o chūshin ni shite” [A Case Study of the Crackdown on the March 1st Movement with Focus on a Critical Analysis of the Keimukyoku’s “Nichiji hōkoku”], *Chōsenshi Kenkyūkai ronbunshū*, Bulletin of the Society for Korean Historical Study, no. 23, March 1986.
- 72 Korea Kempeitai Headquarters, ed., *Chōsen sōjō jiken gaikyō*, Chapter 5, “Chinbu no tame toritaru shochi, toku ni ryōshudan to mitometaru jikō oyobi mizen bōshi no tame yūkō narishi shudan” [Pacification Measures Adopted, Especially Those Recognized as Good Ones, and Preventive Measures Proven to be Effective].
- 73 “Nichiji hōkoku (Chōsengun),” 9 May 1919, p. 223.
- 74 Government General of Korea, *Dai yonjūsan-kai teikoku gikai setsumei shiryō*, p. 204.
- 75 *Chōsen sōjō jiken gaikyō*, Chapter 8, “Shōrai keimu kikan no jin’in haichi ni kansuru iken” [Opinions on Future Personnel and Assignments in Police Agencies].
- 76 *Hara Takashi nikki*, 2 March, vol. 5, p. 74.
- 77 In his written reply to a set of questions concerning the Korean Incident submitted on 8 March by House of Representatives member Kawasaki Katsu of the Kenseikai (Constitutional Association), Hara stated regarding the Korean police system, “In light of the Korean situation, I regard the current police system as alright, but I think it necessary to take all appropriate measures to maintain peace and order in rural areas, taking financial conditions into account.” Koga Renzō, chief of the Colonial Bureau of the Japanese government, in response to an interpellation (15 March) by Kitai Hajime (Mushozoku-dan [Independent Group], a parliamentary group within the House of Representatives), said, “The current kempei system must be maintained for now, although some improvements might be made depending on developments in the situation” (17th Meeting, Budget Committee, House of Representatives, 41st Diet).
- 78 “Nichiji hōkoku (Chōsengun),” 11 April 1919, p. 201.
- 79 Kang Tong-jin, *Nihon genronkai to Chōsen*, pp. 180 ff.
- 80 *Hara Takashi nikki*, 2 and 9 April, vol. 5, pp. 82 and 84.
- 81 *Hara Takashi nikki*, 26 April, vol. 5, p. 87. For such attitudes among Government General civil officials, see *Kokumin shimbun*, 23 and 24 July 1919.
- 82 Kokubu Sangai, “Sōtoku shiseihōshin ni kansuru ikensho” [A Written Opinion Concerning the Government General’s Administrative Policies] (Submitted in May 1919), *Saitō Makoto monjo* (reprint), vol. 13, pp. 149–150. Among other civil official opinions favoring abolition of the kempei police system is that of the Government General branch office chief, Suzuki Shizuka’s “Kaikaku iken” [Reform Proposals] (1919), in Kondō Ken’ichi, *Banzai sōjō jiken* [The Mansei Incident], vol. 2, Yūhō Kyōkai, 1984, pp. 199 ff.
- 83 Utsunomiya to Uehara Yūsaku, 2 May. Uehara Yūsaku Kankei Monjo Kenkyūkai, ed., *Uehara Yūsaku kankei monjo* [Documents Related to Uehara Yūsaku], Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1976, p. 107.
- 84 Utsunomiya Tarō, “Chōsen jikyoku kanken” [My Personal View of the Current Situation in Korea]

- in *Saitō Makoto monjo* (reprint), vol. 13, p. 100.
- 85 Utsunomiya to Uehara, 14 June. *Uehara Yūsaku kankei monjo*, pp. 110–114.
- 86 Korean Army General Staff Office, “Sōjō no gen’in oyobi Chōsen tōgō ni chūi subeki ken narabini gunbi ni tsuite” [Reasons behind the Uprising, Points to Note about Government Rule in Korea, and Military Preparations] (14 July 1919), Kang Tōk-sang, ed., *Gendaishi shiryō* [Modern History Documents], vol. 26 (Chōsen 2), p. 649.
- 87 Utsunomiya to Uehara, 2 May. *Uehara Yūsaku kankei monjo*, p. 109. Problems of a similar kind were also pointed out in a telegram sent by the governor general of Korea to the war minister in Japan. “Nichiji hōkoku (Chōsengun),” 11 April 1919, pp. 201–202.
- 88 An article and an editorial in the *Keijō nippō* (12 March and 2 April, respectively). Abolition of the kempei police system was supported in an article in the *Chūō shimbun* (15 March). Other articles and editorials in favor of abolition appeared in the *Yorozu chōhō* (article of 8 March) and *Tōkyō Asahi shimbun* (editorials of 5 and 16 April and articles of 23 and 29 June).
- 89 *Hara Takashi nikki*, 10 and 13 June, vol. 5, pp. 105 and 106.
- 90 Usami, “Kansanki.”
- 91 Ko-Usami Katsuo-shi Kinenkai, ed., *Usami Katsuo-shi tsuitōroku* [Writings Commemorating the Life of the Late Usami Katsuo], Ko-Usami Katsuo-shi Kinenkai, 1943, p. 143. Before he was assigned to Korea as a Government General councilor in 1910, Usami served as a prefectural government councilor in Tokushima and also in Kyoto, and a councilor in the Interior Ministry in Tokyo.
- 92 *Chōsen shimbun*, 14 April 1920. “Zai-Man Taishikan keisatsu kikan kōsei ni kansuru ken” [Concerning the Composition of the Embassy Police Agency in Manchuria] (June 1933), in “Zai-Man teikoku keisatsu kikan tōsei kankei zakken” [Matters Related to the Control of the Imperial Police Agency in Manchuria], *Gaimushō monjo* [Foreign Ministry Documents] S-677, National Diet Library Kensei Shiryōshitsu (Modern Japanese Political History Collection), Tokyo. That report on miscellaneous “Matters” was a set of proposals by a group led by Aiba Kiyoshi, the resident in charge of foreign affairs, on integrating the police system at the time of the organizational reform in Manchuria in the early 1930s. Aiba went to Korea in 1903, and after becoming an interpreter for the Advisory Police he worked under Kunitomo for a while.
- 93 Kunitomo, “Kaiko,” p. 13.
- 94 Usami, “Kansanki.” As is discussed in Section 4, the plan to make Governor General Yamagata did not come to fruition.
- 95 *Hara Takashi nikki*, 26 April and 2 May, vol. 5, pp. 87 and 89.
- 96 For example, it is said that it was Kunitomo Naokane, a Korean Central Police Bureau official in charge of the higher police (“thought police”), who tracked down An Ŭng-ch’il (childhood name of An Chung-gūn) as the culprit when Itō Hirobumi was assassinated in October 1909 (“Mikōkai shiryō, Chōsen Sōtokufu kankeisha rokuon kiroku” [Unpublished Documents: Recordings of Interviews with Persons Related to the Government General of Korea], 6, talk by Aiba Kiyoshi (April 1959, *Tōyō bunka kenkyū*, vol. 3, March 2001, pp. 236–237). See also *Hi: Futei jiken ni yotte mitaru Chōsenjin* (referred to in Chapter Three, Section 2), a voluminous report compiled by Kunitomo, who led the investigation into the 1911 “Case of the 105.”
- 97 Two relatively reliable sources give the following figures. According to the 1919 edition of *Yosan’an* [Draft Budget] (in the collection of Hōrei Gikai Shiryōshitsu at the National Diet Library), the initial budget for fiscal 1919 allocated 3,826,000 yen for police affairs and 1,290,000 yen for kempei auxiliaries (the budget for kempei is unknown). According to “Kankoku heigō-go ni okeru Chōsen keisatsuhī yosan no enkaku” [A History of the Budget for the Korea Police after the Annexation of Korea] (*Keimu ihō*, no. 181, June 1920), written by Sujise Tokumatsu (a police captain in charge of accounting in the general affairs section of the Central Police Headquarters of the government-general, and also in the accounting section of Headquarters), 13,951,000 yen was appropriated for

- police affairs (including expenditures required to deal with the uprisings of the March 1st Movement and the special budget for police affairs for expansion of the police agency), 1,290,000 yen for kempei auxiliaries, and 2,511,000 yen for the kempei.
- 98 Sujise, “Kankoku heigō-go,” p. 22; *Tōkyō Asahi shimbun*, 8 August 1919; *Yomiuri shimbun*, 26 August 1919, among other sources.
- 99 Kunitomo, “Kaiko,” p. 14.
- 100 Exactly when they went to Tokyo is not known. The date was 25 June according to Kunitomo, “Kaiko,” p. 15, and 24 June according to Usami, “Kansanki.” *Yomiuri shimbun*, 28 June, reported that Usami and Kunitomo would “soon” go to Tokyo.
- 101 What follows is from Kunitomo, “Kaiko,” p. 15.
- 102 Matsuda Toshihiko, “Shokuminchi Chōsen ni okeru ‘Kempei keisatsu seido sonzoku setsu’ saikō: 1920 nendai zenhan ni okeru kenpei to bunkan keisatsukan no kankei o chūshin ni” [Reconsideration of the “Theory in Support of Continuing the Kempei Police System” Circulated in Colonial Korea: Relations between the Kempei and the Civil Police in the First Half of the 1920s], *Nihon shokuminchi kenkyū*, no. 17, June 2005, Chapter 1.
- 103 Comment by Kunitomo, included in Tokutomi, *Sokū*, p. 346.
- 104 Usami, “Kansanki.”
- 105 Kang Tong-jin, “Nihon no Chōsen shihai seisakushi kenkyū,” p. 154.
- 106 Kodama to Terauchi, 27 June. *Terauchi Masatake kankei monjo*, 123:22.
- 107 Ōkido to Terauchi, 15 August. *Terauchi Masatake kankei monjo*, 221:10.
- 108 *Hara Takashi nikki*, 6 June, vol. 5, pp. 104–105.
- 109 Governor General Hasegawa, “Sōjō zengosaku shiken” [My Personal View on How Best to Deal with the Uprising], in Kang Tōk-sang, ed., *Gendaishi shiryō*, vol. 25 (Chōsen 1), p. 497. This document was thought to have been written in June 1919 (see Kang’s commentary in *Gendaishi shiryō*), but considering Hasegawa’s remark that “. . .the cabinet council has made its decision. There is no use [in pushing on],” it is more accurate to say that it was written after the reform bill was passed through the Privy Council and approved by the emperor in early August.
- 110 Okamoto Makiko, “Sūmitsuin to shokuminchi mondai: Chōsen-Taiwan shihai taisei to no kankei kara” [The Privy Council and the Colonial Problem: The Ruling Structure in Colonial Korea and Taiwan], in Yui Masaomi, ed., *Sūmitsuin no kenkyū* [Studies of the Privy Council], Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2003, pp. 156–162.
- 111 “Chōsen Sōtokufu kansei kaisei no ken, hoka 7-ken shinsa hōkoku” [Investigation Reports on the Organizational Reform of the Government General of Korea and Seven Other Matters], *Shinsa hōkoku* [Investigation Reports], 1919 (included in *Sūmitsuin monjo* [Documents of the Privy Council] in the collection of the National Diet Library).
- 112 The Privy Council made three major changes to the government draft as follows (“Chōsen Sōtokufu kansei-chū kaisei no ken” [Revisions in the Organization of the Government General], August 1919, *Sūmitsuin kaigi gijiroku* [Privy Council Meeting Minutes], vol. 21, unpublished material; reprint, University of Tokyo Press, 1985, pp. 259–260): (1) the names of police ranks in the government draft, *keishi* (superintendent), *keibu* (inspector), and *keibuho* (assistant inspector), were changed to *dō-keishi* (provincial superintendent), *dō-keibu* (provincial inspector), and *dō-keibuho* (provincial assistant inspector), and the terms were revised in related laws accordingly; (2) regarding the treatment of kempei after the organizational reform, the government draft stipulation that former kempei commissioned officers be assigned to posts of administrative officials was deleted, and instead former kempei, from commissioned officers on down, could be assigned to posts from provincial police superintendent on down, so as to augment the police force; and (3) the old provision that kempei could be assigned to supervise the local tax offices in the frontier regions was replaced by a new stipulation that provincial police inspectors, provincial police assistant inspectors,

- and provincial patrolmen could be assigned to do the work.
- 113 For the following, see Kunitomo, “Kaiko,” p. 16–17.
- 114 “Chōsen keisatsu ni kansuru gikai tōben shiryō” [Parliamentary Replies Concerning the Korea Police] (1921), *Saitō Makoto monjo* (reprint), vol. 4, p. 669.
- 115 In Hara Takashi, “Chōsen tōchi shiken,” the key point in his thinking concerning reform of the police system (*Saitō Makoto monjo* [reprint], vol. 13, p. 76) is this: “In all districts other than local areas where kempei were absolutely necessary, the kempei will have to be replaced by police officers. These police officers will cease to be supervised directly by the Government General and will be divided and placed under the jurisdiction of provincial administrators, just as they are in Japan proper. An agency like the Police Bureau in the Ministry of the Interior in Tokyo will be set up within the Government General and this central bureau will supervise them. . . . [The kempei] should be eliminated as soon as possible, partly to attract public attention.”
- 116 Kang Kil-wōn, “Chosōn ch’ongdokpu,” p.86.
- 117 *Hara Takashi nikki*, 23 May, and 10, 13, and 19 June, vol. 5, pp. 99, 105–106, and 109.
- 118 *Hara Takashi nikki*, 25 June, vol. 5, p. 113; Ōkido Muneshige to Terauchi, 26 June and 9 July, *Terauchi Masataka kankei monjo*, pp. 221–229; and Usami, “Kansanki.”
- 119 Ōkido to Terauchi, 15 August.
- 120 The Government General civil officials involved in the organizational reform of the police subsequently held the following positions: Yamagata Isaburō served as director of the Guangdong Office (1920–1922), and member of the House of Peers and councilor in the Privy Council (1922–1927). Usami Katsuo, after resigning from the directorship of the Department of the Interior in Korea, served as Tokyo governor (1921–1925), president of the Cabinet Bureau of Decorations (1925–1927), president of the Cabinet Bureau of Resources (1927–1933), councilor for Manchukuo (1933–1934), and member of the House of Peers (1934–1942). Kunitomo Naokane remained as police section chief in the police section in the Korean bureau of police affairs until 1927, and after retirement, became member of the Seoul assembly in 1936. Ōtsuka Tsunesaburō, councilor for the Government General, took office as chief of the interior bureau of the Government General (1919–1925), and in February 1925 he was assigned to the concurrent posts of chief secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and general affairs official on the board of the Crown Prince’s Affairs, which brought him back to Japan.
- 121 Chōsen Gyōsei Henshū Sōkyoku, ed., *Chōsen tōchi hiwa* [Unknown Episodes in Japan’s Rule of Korea], Teikoku Chihōgyōsei Gakkai Chōsen Shibu, 1937, p. 8. Hereafter *Chōsen tōchi hiwa*.
- 122 *Chōsen tōchi hiwa*, p. 5; comments by Mizuno, *ibid.*, p. 31; comments by Moriya, *Hara Takashi nikki*, 27 June, vol. 5, p. 114; and Mizuno Rentarō, “Chōsen seimu sōkan shūnin no tenmatsu” [Facts behind the Inauguration of the Director General of Political Affairs] (August 1919), Shōyū-kurabu and Nishio Rintarō, eds., *Mizuno Rentarō kaisōroku kankei monjo* [Mizuno Rentarō’s Memoirs and Related Documents], Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1999, p. 117.
- 123 Mizuno, “Chōsen seimu sōkan,” pp. 118–119. Mizuno was very apprehensive about the constraints that could be imposed by a governor general who was a top-ranking military officer. So, even after the official announcement of his assignment, as soon as he learned of the Hara cabinet plan to give the Government General control over the military and the authority to have military officers attached to the Government General, Mizuno protested and threatened to cancel his appointment as director general of political affairs. The plan was withdrawn. In these ways Mizuno brought pressures to bear that successfully prevented the military officer in the post of governor general from holding as much power as he had during the “military rule” era (Mizuno, “Chōsen Sōtoku no kengen ni kansuru kōgi jijō” [The Reasons behind My Protest Concerning the Authority of the Governor General], in Shōyū-kurabu and Nishio, eds., *Mizuno Rentarō kaisōroku*, pp. 124–131; and Miura Gorō, *Kanju shōgun kaikoroku* [Memoirs of the “Tree-viewing Shogun” (Miura Gorō)] (Seikyōsha, 1925), *Chūko shinsho* edition, Chūō Kōron Sha, 1988, pp. 407–415).

- 124 Matsunami Niichirō, ed., *Mizuno hakase koki kinen: Ronsaku to zuihitsu* [Essays on Topical Issues and Miscellaneous Writings, in Honor of Doctor Mizuno's 70th Birthday], Mizuno Rentarō Sensei Koki Shukugakai, 1937, p. 838.
- 125 *Chōsen tōchi hiwa*, p. 15, comments by Mizuno.
- 126 Maruyama Tsurukichi, *Nanajūnen tokorodokoro* [Random Memories from the Past Seventy Years], Nanajūnen Tokorodokoro Kankōkai, 1955, p. 54.
- 127 Akaike's address at the conference of Division Three heads (20 April 1920). Mizuno Naoki, ed., *Chōsen sōtoku yukoku kunji shūsei* [A Collection of Speeches and Addresses by the Governor General], vol. 3, Ryokuin Shobō, 2001, p. 350.
- 128 Inside the Government General at that time, bureaucrats who had been in Korea since before the August 1919 reform were called *zairai-shu* ("old breed") and the high-ranking bureaucrats coming from Japan after the reform were called *shinrai-shu* ("new breed") (Maruyama, *Nanajūnen tokorodokoro*, pp. 54–55). Contentious rivalry between them surfaced, for example, in different ideas about how to cope with public demonstrations protesting the closing of stores in the Chongno shopping district in Seoul in October 1919. In this case, tough measures advocated by the "new breed" staff were carried out despite opposition from "old breed" bureau chiefs (*Chōsen tōchi hiwa*, pp. 86–102).
- 129 *Chōsen tōchi hiwa*, p. 87, comments by Moriya.
- 130 "Zaigai Chōsenjin no torishimari narabini Chōsen tōchi ni kansuru shitsumon shuisho" [Written Questions Concerning Surveillance over Koreans Overseas and Japan's Rule in Korea], presented to the 44th Diet by Yamamichi Jōichi of Kenseikai (Constitutional Association), member of the House of Representatives (27 December 1920).
- 131 Kunitomo, "Kaiko," pp. 17–18.
- 132 *Chōsen tōchi hiwa*, pp. 63–64, comments by Akaike.
- 133 Matsunami, ed., *Mizuno hakase koki kinen*, pp. 724–725. This document was also referred to in *Chōsen tōchi hiwa*, pp. 70–72 and Chiba Ryō, *Chōsen dokuritsu undō hiwa* [Unknown Episodes in the Korean Independence Movement], Teikoku Chihō Gyōsei Gakkai, 1925, p. 165.
- 134 *Chōsen tōchi hiwa*, pp. 64–65, p. 68.
- 135 Pak Kyōng-sik, *Nihon teikoku shugi no Chōsen shihai* [Control of Korea by Japanese Imperialism], vol. 1, Aoki Shoten, 1973, pp. 206–210.
- 136 Saitō to Sakatani, "Saikin ni okeru Chōsen no jōsei" [The Recent Situation in Korea] (16 September), in Kondō, *Banzai sōjō jiken*, vol. 2, pp. 6–7.
- 137 Maruyama, *Nanajūnen tokorodokoro*, p. 56.
- 138 *Chōsen tōchi hiwa*, pp. 23–24, comments by Mizuno.
- 139 Both before and after the Samil Uprising the behavior of ethnic Korean police personnel was often problematic. One report says that, before the Samil Movement, among Korean kempei auxiliaries posted to guard the border areas "there were frequent cases in which discontented people [auxiliaries] secretly stole guns kept in police boxes and fled to the other side of the border," and as a result, "the police authorities subsequently pushed to get more policemen from Japan, as far as the budget would allow" (Tsushima, "Chōsen ni okeru kenpei keisatsu," part 1, p. 507). After the Samil Movement, as well, affected by the social unrest that pervaded the country, Korean policemen were uncooperative in the investigation of the incident involving Kang U-gyu, who, in a failed assassination attempt, threw a bomb at Saitō Makoto when he arrived in Korea to assume his post as governor general (September 1919); on a separate occasion, more than 30 Korean policemen working at the Chongno police station in Seoul went on strike ("Mikōkai shiryō, Chōsen Sōtokufu kankeisha rokuon kiroku," 12, comments by Chiba Ryō [July 1961, *Tōyō bunka kenkyū*, vol. 5, March 2003, pp. 256–257]). Regarding the disciplinary matter involving Korean policemen after the organizational reform, see Kim Chōng-ūn, "1920–30 nyōndae kyōnch'al chojik ūi chaep'yōn—Naeyong

- kwa nollī” [Reforms of the Police Organization in the 1920s and 1930s: Content and Logic], *Yōksa wa hyōnsil*, vol. 39, March 2001, pp. 300–301.
- 140 “Ōkurashō shokan Chōsen Sōtokufu tokubetsu kaikei sainyū shishutsu yosan keikakusho” [Estimated Revenue and Expenditures of the Special Account of the Government General under the Jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance], *Yosan’an meisaisho* [Itemization of the Proposed Budget] (Fiscal 1920), in the collection of Hōrei Gikai Shiryōshitsu at National Diet Library, p. 149. For trends in expenditures on police affairs, see Namiki, “Minzoku undō, keisatsu,” part 1, p. 94. There are slight differences between the figures I present in this book and those in the Namiki essay because the sources are different. The Namiki essay is problematic in that kempei expenditures under the jurisdiction of the War Ministry prior to 1919 are not included.
- 141 *Hara Takashi nikki*, 26 October 1919, vol. 5, p. 161; Mizuno Rentarō, “Kaikyūroku” [A Collection of Reminiscences] (written around 1948), in Shōyū-kurabu and Nishio, eds., *Mizuno Rentarō kaisōroku, kankei monjo*, p. 82; and *Chōsen tōchi hiwa*, pp. 168–169. See also Takemura Tamio, “Taishō demokurashī-ki ni okeru tennōsei naimu kanryō no yakuwari ni tsuite: Shokuminchi Chōsen shihai ni kanren shite” [The Role of Interior Ministry Bureaucrats under the Emperor System during the Taishō Democracy Era: Related to Japanese Rule in Colonial Korea], in Takemura Tamio, *Dokusen to heiki seisan* [Monopoly and Arms Production], Keisō Shobō, 1971, pp. 228–230.
- 142 Included in *Gokuhi: Kankoku dokuritsu undō shiryō sōsho (3-1 undō hen)* [Confidential: Historical Documents on the Korean Independence Movement (Samil Movement section)], vol. 5, Hanguk ch’ulpan munhwawōn, 1989.
- 143 Remarks by Koreans citing dictatorial and repressive tendencies on the part of Korean kempei auxiliaries and welcoming the police reforms are also found on other pages in “Eikyō,” e.g., pp. 999, 101, 1006–1008, 1012, 1015, 1021, and 1028.
- 144 Uchida Ryōhei, “Chōsen jikyoku shiken” [My Personal Views on the Current Korean Situation], *Saitō Makoto monjo* (reprint), vol. 13, p. 538.
- 145 Dōkōkai Headquarters, ed., “Chōsen minjō shisatsu hōkoku” [A Report on Observations of the Conditions of the Korean People], in Kondō, *Banzai sōjō jiken*, vol. 2, pp. 59–60.
- 146 Nagatome Nobutaka, ed., *Zensen naichijin jitsugyōka yūshi kondankai sokkiroku* [A Stenographic Record of the Meeting of the Voluntary Group of Businessmen from Across Korea] (1920), p. 186, remark by Fukui Takejirō. This document, which is in the Korean National Central Library, was provided by Mr. Yi Sūng-yop, to whom I am very grateful.
- 147 Mano Seiichi, “Jichi to keisatsu” [Self-rule and the Police], *Chōsen chihō gyōsei*, vol. 4, no. 5, May 1925, p. 12.
- 148 Im Chong-guk, *Ilche-ha ūi sasan t’anap* [Thought Suppression under Imperial Japan], P’yōnghwa Ch’ulp’ansa, 1985, pp. 162 ff.
- 149 “Chōsen sōjō jikenchū guntai no chin’atsu ni jūji seru higa shishōhyō” [A Table of the Dead and Injured during the Army’s Suppression of the Korean Uprising] (September 1919), in Kang Tōksang, *Gendaishi shiryō* [Documents of Contemporary History], vol. 26 (Chōsen 2), pp. 321–327.
- 150 Katō Hakurei, “Chōsen keisatsu no konjaku” [The Korea Police, Past and Present], Part 1, *Chōsen*, no. 232, September 1934, p. 95.