

Philosophy Live : A Perspective from Japan

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その他の言語のタイトル	哲学の現場
シリーズ	Nichibunken Monograph Series ; 20
URL	http://id.nii.ac.jp/1368/00006946/

CHAPTER 12

STARTING FROM THE EVERYDAY

If the salvation of the world lies in scholarship, today is a time when a new type of “national learning” is again necessary. With the advent of the new age, in other words, one of the things expected of scholarship is that it will respond to the people’s urge to “be able to know themselves.” This is the appeal that we must by all means answer.¹³⁷

—Yanagita Kunio

The book you have read thus far has not been written with clearly conceived conclusions in mind nor has it followed a rigorous method of demonstrating or verifying such conclusions. Indeed, for philosophy today, such an approach seems impossible from the outset. I have instead proceeded from ideas that may have seemed vague at the beginning, with the thought that as we proceed, we will gradually see things more clearly. Just as when we set out through a fog, we often find that the fog begins to lift, finally allowing us to see our way. I hope that, coming to this final chapter, at this point the reader will have gained a fairly clear view of the landscape of philosophical contemplation.

The Spiraling Path

After looking back over the topics covered in the preceding chapters, I would like to consider once again what it is that philosophy seeks to accomplish and what methods may be used toward that goal. We have spiraled around a mountain, as it were, in the course of which we did not necessarily get a clear view, but now have gained a somewhat higher vantage point, standing at a place that commands something of a panorama over the surrounding terrain. We are not at the final destination, but at the starting point for full-fledged philosophical inquiry. The topics discussed above are really meant as preliminary preparation for that inquiry.

In Chapter 1, we started out by examining the question “what is philosophy?” It is common knowledge that philosophy began in ancient Greece and developed in the

¹³⁷ Yanagita 1998, p. 93.

Western world. What does it mean, then, to study philosophy in a country like Japan? There may be various ways of answering this question, but the position of this book is a little different from previous ideas. Western philosophy was first introduced to Japan in

Mutual relations are implicit in the meaning of “human” (ningen), and we can think of ethics as the rules of “between people.”

the latter half of the nineteenth century, and has become part of Japan’s distinctive traditions of thought over the past 100 years and more. As a result, while I have stressed Japanese traditions of thought, I have also tried to see how ideas that are not subsumed in Western philosophy might be considered to good advantage. In that process, I tried to bring aspects of Eastern philosophy

and Japan’s traditional thought into our perspective, and reconsider the value latent in Japanese intellectual history. To what extent this has been useful, I leave to the judgment of the reader.

In Chapter 2, in considering where one might specifically begin with the issues of philosophy, I introduced Nishida Kitarō’s work *An Inquiry into the Good*, in which Nishida takes the idea of “pure experience” as his starting point. “Pure experience” is uncolored by any preconceptions and is completely direct. Yet upon close inspection, we realized that pure experience as Nishida defined it “without the least addition of deliberative discrimination,”¹³⁸ is in actuality impossible, and would only be possible under very special circumstances. Nishida’s “pure experience” is premised on our coexistence with others. Later his philosophy moved on to focus on place (*basho*), and place is none other than the locus of encounter with others. That place, as discussed, is not some sort of vacuum, but something like a magnetic field—the sometimes bumpy and uneven terrain of relations with the Other.

What sort of relations we have with others in such a place is the subject of Chapter 3. Our way of relating to others is called ethics, and regarding the basis of ethics there are numerous theories, but among them I examined Watsuji Tetsurō’s idea of ethics as the study of “human.” In Japanese, the word for human (*ningen* 人間) is written with characters meaning “between people,” so that mutual relations become implicit in the meaning of “human.” We can thus think of ethics as the “rules” of “between people,” rules for deciding what is good and bad in the context of human relations. But will ethics as rules solve all the problems we have in relations with others? Watsuji placed the state above relations between people so as to solve problems that are unsolvable between people. However, rules have no power over people who will, after all, ignore rules. When there are no set rules and you have to meet someone with whom you have not built

138 Nishida 1990, p. 3.

rational relations, that person appears as Other. What is the Other who is outside of the rules? That is the major issue to take up next.

In order for rules to actually work, a fundamental mutual understanding through language is needed. Even if the language is not the usual language, one must be able to capture the meaning through such means as the use of body language that performs the same function. The Other who is outside of the rules—simply the Other—is the one whose language does not communicate meaning in the usual sense.

That brought us to the need to examine the nature of language, which is taken up in Chapter 4. Western logic is premised on the law of non-contradiction. But there are other ways of tapping into the uses of language. Daisetz T. Suzuki's concept of the "logic of the inseparability of affirmative and negative" (*soku-hi no ronri*), presenting the formula "A is not-A. Therefore A is A"—from the *Diamond Wisdom Sutra*—breaks the law of contradiction. The seeming nonsense of Zen koans, by escaping the world confined by rules, brings us face to face with the Other, revealing the incomprehensible Other.

Chapter 5, which deals directly with the question of the Other, begins by recalling the theories of two Jewish philosophers, Buber and Lévinas. Their ideas about the Other have been widely introduced in Japan, but the ideas are premised upon an absolute deity like the God of Judaic religions, under whom people are related to each other as the prototype of the relationship with the Other. Modern Japanese philosopher Kiyozawa Manshi, who is known for his discussion of the Other, defines the Other in terms of the Absolute Infinity (that is, Buddha) vis-à-vis the relative-and-finite (human). In that respect, we can see that he was influenced by Judeo-Christian monotheism. As I observed, however, the Buddha was originally an ordinary mortal who attained enlightenment, so as Other, the Buddha is different from either an absolute God or from an ordinary human. This conception, therefore, goes beyond Western understandings of the Other. Here I introduced two terms: *ken*, to denote the realm in which clear rules can be established among humans, and *myō*, for the invisible realm of the Other for which there are no such clear rules. These concepts set forth by the medieval Japanese historian and Buddhist prelate Jien can be useful for expressing the worldview as it was seen in traditional Japan.

What is this Other that dwells in the realm of *myō*? Chapter 6 takes up the dead as representative of the Other of the unseen world. In the modern West, questions relating to the afterlife were driven out of the realm of philosophy because they could not be grasped through human powers of reason or logic. It would be modern Japanese philosopher Tanabe Hajime who would challenge that trend of Western philosophy in

Through resurrection of the dead within the living, a relationship of "existential communion" can be seen as formed between the living and the dead.

his “philosophy of death.” Tanabe’s approach was to address the question not of “what is death?” but of examining relationships with the dead. Through the resurrection of the dead within the living, a relationship of “existential communion” formed between the living and the dead. By considering the dead as a representative Other, we can get a rough idea of the world of *myō* as the locus not only of the dead but of the Shintō and Buddhist deities that make up Japan’s traditional representations of the divine. Interchange with the world of *myō* is not clearly defined and cannot be understood rationally as can the world of *ken*. Still, without some relation to the world of *myō*, there could not be the world of *ken*.

Once we have considered the Other, we are brought to what is the “I,” and this question is dealt with in Chapter 7. The Western notion of “I” (self, ego) is assumed to be separate and autonomous. This develops philosophically as the idea of consciousness, on one hand, and as the subject that is the basic unit of society, on the other hand. In modern Japan as well, great effort was expended in the effort to develop “individualism,” as typically expressed in the writing of novelist Natsume Sōseki. Sōseki’s work details the difficulty of attaining the autonomy of the ideal “self.” In Western philosophy, the individual is clearly delineated as a separate entity, but in Japan, the boundaries of the individual are not necessarily well defined. Some have tended to consider this as signifying the immaturity of Japanese thought, casting it in a negative light. Our explorations showed how, on the contrary, we may better view the “I” not as shaped by strict boundaries but rather as fluid in outline.

Thus, moving beyond the realm of ethics (*ken*) discussed in Chapter 3 and taking clues from the examination of language in Chapter 4, Chapters 5 and 6 delineate *myō*, the territory of the Other, bringing us to the depths of the fluid “I” in Chapter 7. Based on this exploration of basic principles, from Chapter 8 onward, this book seeks to deepen that basic structure from various perspectives.

Chapter 8 takes up the question of the so-called religious absolute. Here, among the leaders of recent Christian philosophy, I examined Jean-Luc Marion’s idea of “God without being,” contrasting it to Nishida Kitarō’s idea of the “place of non-being” (*mu no basho*). The two approaches are located on different dimensions, so the *ken*-vs.-*myō* scheme of Japan’s traditional religion and the Judeo-Christian notion of God ultimately “without being,” are both valid and do not contradict each other.

Chapter 9 considers concepts of nature. Where once the conviction that science would answer all questions, philosophical or otherwise (scientism) was widespread, today such an assumption is widely questioned. Within the natural sciences, as we saw in quantum physics, it has been established that unqualified objectivity is really impossible. Science was established according to the logic of *ken*, but it does not deny that which is *myō*. Even in the field of environmental studies today, it is recognized that our approach cannot be confined to the framework of the natural sciences alone, but must take into

account the realm of *myō*. In that respect, the work of Japan's Minakata Kumagusu, who was a scientist and also well-versed regarding the realm of *myō*, deserves to be noted for deeper appreciation.

Next after the matter of nature is the issue of society, the subject of Chapter 10. Here, viewing society from the perspective of discrimination and equality, we observed the difficulty of finding a simple resolution to the stress between these two. We focused especially at the issue of gender discrimination, with the writings of Hiratsuka Raichō as an example. If we apply the principles discussed in the previous chapters of this book, particularly the “fluidity of the I” is a point to consider. Inherent in the self are the two opposing directions—the impulse on one hand to set itself apart from the Other and on the other to seek unity or sameness with the Other. In order to make appropriate use of social relations, it is necessary to skillfully balance these two directions, and to actualize that balance as the rules of the real (*ken*) world.

History is created out of changes that take place in society over time. Chapter 11 considers the problem of history in terms of changes in ethos. It organizes as an intellectual history the accumulated history of thought brought in from outside and generated from inside, and based on that history we can construct philosophy. We should not see our own philosophy as the completion of history as Hegel did; philosophy and history form what might be called mutual interaction. Philosophy is formed on the basis of intellectual history and, in turn, it is philosophical ideas that shed light on intellectual history. I sought to reconstruct Japanese intellectual history through the relationship of *ken* and *myō*, starting from the debate on modernization and considering Maruyama Masao's writing as a clue to the possibilities of Japanese intellectual history.

Everyday Language and the World of Daily Life

Above I have given a brief summary of the path I have taken in writing this book, but as the reader will be aware I have not necessarily followed a particular methodology. The issues of “pure experience” discussed in Chapter 2 and of language taken up in Chapter 4, for example, are closely connected with methodology, yet I have deliberately avoided that approach. It may seem odd to have come all this distance without having discussed methodology, so here let me briefly reflect on this. As I said before, what we have considered in the preceding chapters is a sort of preliminary round, to establish firm ground, so to speak, for further contemplation, and if we think that we are finally now at the starting place, it is not such a strange standpoint to consider methodology.

Methodology is not strictly a problem in philosophy. Philosophy cannot be a “strict science” in the same way as the hard sciences. If it were, philosophy would simply follow after other sciences. Even in history, while the handling of individual historical documents or artifacts should follow rigorous rules, when it comes to the issue of the historical perspective for interpreting those materials, it would be a mistake to require

hidebound rules. Materialist history once insisted on the mistaken view that history was also a science that made it possible for there to be only one interpretation of history based on one historical perspective. In fact, like the emperor-centered view, it is just one option of many. Historical perspective is not simply a selected option, but something that can be created, depending on what kind of story, or narrative, is to be told.

Philosophy is not one of the sciences—indeed, it might not even a science at all. Rather, it could be called a meta-science. Certainly it is not “the science of all sciences.” It does not, as it might once have, aim to discover some kind of ultimate truth. Indeed, the task of philosophy might be to clarify the fact that there really is *no* ultimate truth. It was Wittgenstein who gave philosophy the paradoxical role of philosophical critique. In his *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*, he writes:

6.53: The right method of philosophy would be this. To say nothing except what can be said, i.e., the propositions of natural science, i.e., something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This method would be . . . the only strictly correct method.¹³⁹

So he is saying that metaphysical propositions that attempt to state some kind of fundamental truth are essentially meaningless; to make that clear is the role of philosophy. If that is so, then what is the *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus* all about? Isn't that philosophy? Later in his life, Wittgenstein rejected the system he had laid down in *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*, and went even further in his critique of metaphysics.

116. When philosophers use a word—“knowledge,” “being,” “object,” “I,” “proposition,” “name”—and try to grasp the *essence* of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home?—What *we* do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.¹⁴⁰

Here the standard is everyday language. Returning the language of the metaphysical back to the language of the everyday is what the later Wittgenstein sought. If that is so, what happens to his own philosophy, which sees everyday language as “language-games”? The answer to that question is not necessarily clarified in his writings.

139 *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.

140 *Philosophical Investigations*.

It is in fact daily life that must be the point of departure for philosophy, so it ought to return there. Surprisingly though, the phenomenologist Edmund Husserl, who was so bent upon philosophy as a “strict science,” wrote in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, asserting his ideas about the “life-world”:

When science poses and answers questions, these are from the start, and hence from then on, questions resting upon the ground of, and addressed to, the elements of this pre-given world in which science and every other life-praxis is engaged. (IIIA; 33)¹⁴¹

If science is not for the glory of God nor to prove the accuracy of the materialist view of history, then what is its purpose? The issue Husserl faced in his later years was the fact that despite major advances, the sciences were separately racing ahead out of control, “In our vital need—so we are told—this science has nothing to say to us” (I:2).¹⁴² In his work he calls attention to the life-world as the place where science is born and to which it must return, and he believes that the task of philosophy is above all to explain that life-world.

Because “The sciences build upon the life-world as taken for granted in that they make use of whatever in it happens to be necessary for their particular ends” (III-A:34b),¹⁴³ this life-world must first be elucidated before such sciences. The spaces of daily life may not be objectively scientific but rather “subjective-relative,” but that does not mean they should be made into objective science. It is that very “subjective-relative” life space that must be appropriately thematized and elucidated.

How do we do that? Husserl proposes that we have two ways of treating the life-world: One is “the naturally normal one . . . that of straightforwardly moving toward whatever objects are given [in order to live], thus toward the world-horizon, in normal, unbroken constancy, in a synthetic coherence running through all acts.”¹⁴⁴ In other words, it is the style of living in the life-world, which he called the “natural attitude.”

Another, quite different attitude is the “consistently reflective attitude.” “Yet there can be a completely different sort of waking life involved in the conscious having of the world. It would consist in a transformation of the thematic consciousness of the world which breaks through the normality of straightforward living” (IIIA:38).¹⁴⁵ In other words, this is a step back from the natural attitude, rethinking it in a reflective way,

141 Husserl 1970, p. 121.

142 Husserl 1970, p. 6.

143 Husserl 1970, p. 125.

144 Husserl 1970, p. 144; slightly edited.

145 Husserl 1970, p. 144.

adopting the method of “a science [that questions] the universal how of the pregiveness of the world” (IIIA:38).¹⁴⁶

In order for such a science to be valid, it is necessary to suspend judgment following the natural attitude and conduct “transcendental reduction.” This consists of “a reduction of ‘the’ world to one of transcendental phenomena, a reduction thus also to its correlate, transcendental subjectivity” (IIIA:42),¹⁴⁷ and here is where Husserl’s unique exploration of phenomenology begins, though I will not go into it further here. What I wish to call attention to is not the specific content of his argument but rather his basic methodology.

What we were examining was not specifically daily life but the specific nature of the place in which our world unfolds.

Husserl’s basic methodology is not the “natural attitude” of simply living embedded in the life-world, but an attempt to explore the structure of the life-world, taking a position in a meta-dimension of reflection upon the “natural attitude.” I think that this method has something in common with the attitude taken in this book. Chapters 3 through 8 seek to gain an overview of the structure of the

worldview that sustains our daily lives. What we were examining was not specifically what there is in daily life but the specific nature of the place in which our world unfolds. To evoke the explanation offered in Chapter 2, by using the indefinite variable, $f(x)$, rather than using a specific variable, expressed as $f(a)$, the character of the function f can be clarified.

This methodology may be called phenomenological but it is not something that has universality as described by Husserl; it makes us recognize that the transcendental framework itself is in fact constrained by its Place. Husserl himself was in fact aware of this problem. Indeed, his “transcendental reduction” approach is inevitably accompanied by paradoxes. For example, he says “universal intersubjectivity, into which all objectivity, everything that exists at all, is resolved, can obviously be nothing other than mankind; and the latter is undeniably a component part of the world” (IIIA:53).¹⁴⁸ In other words, the human who is the actor in this transcendental reduction is paradoxically part of this world; he cannot separate himself from the world, meaning that complete reduction is not possible.

Husserl therefore asks, “But are the transcendental subjects, i.e., those functioning in the constitution of the world, human beings?” (IIIA:54).¹⁴⁹ His answer to this is, “it follows eo ipso that nothing human is to be found, neither soul nor psychic life nor real

146 Husserl 1970, p. 146.

147 Husserl 1970, pp. 152–53.

148 Husserl 1970, p. 179.

149 Husserl 1970, p. 183.

psychophysical human beings; all this belongs to the ‘phenomenon,’ to the world as constituted pole” (IIIA:54).¹⁵⁰ According to Husserl, the transcendental subject that is beyond the natural attitude and that makes transcendental reduction reality has to be a God-like being completely separate from this world with neither body nor spirit.

Of course, Husserl does not stop there, going on to describe “a transcendental intersubjectivity constituting the world as ‘world for all’” (IIIA:54),¹⁵¹ but even then, as to the problem of the relationship between the transcendental subject and the human being as subject living in this actual world, I don’t think we are given a sufficient solution. Moreover, is the paradox Husserl describes really a paradox? Husserl persists in the attempt to create phenomenology as universalist theory, but is such universalism really possible?

We are living in the “life-world.” In that world, we often ask ourselves: how we should live, what should I do? Often, when we are thus at a loss, we pull back a step from our world and try to rethink what that world is all about. That is close to what Husserl calls “transcendental reduction.” By reflecting upon our understanding of the world, we have been able to construct a worldview such as depicted in the figures in Chapter 5 (p. 64). But there is nothing absolute about such schemes. What we might try to do, this book suggests, is to depict, in contrast to the Western worldview or the modern worldview, a structure of thought that lies at the root of Japan’s traditional way of thinking. The structure of a worldview is quite different from one cultural tradition to another. Any attempt to depict that structure in a universal scheme that can be applied to any and all cases is sure to fail.

So then is it impossible to mutually understand people who have been reared in another culture? If understanding between cultures is possible, then some scheme is needed that will enable mutual understanding. Toward that goal I might suggest the following. The conventionally shared schemes are only those depicted in Figures 1 and 2, so here I propose the alternative scheme shown in Figure 3 (p. 64). It is not as if this is the best or the only viable scheme, and it by no means precludes any other scheme. It is likely that if such a scheme were created on the basis of Chinese ideas or Korean ideas, quite a different diagram would emerge. Even regarding what I called Japan’s “traditional way of thinking,” it is not all that clear that this scheme is the most accurate way of presenting it, so greatly simplified and two-dimensional is it pictured. In reality, whatever

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150 Husserl 1970, p. 183.

151 Husserl 1970, p. 184.

the culture, it is bound to be more complex and multi-dimensional. Moreover, it is not as if this diagram represents the thinking of all Japanese. Indeed, even a single individual does not necessarily always see the world in terms of one scheme.

With that in mind, even when we step back a little from our daily life in the world and try to delineate the nature of that world just as it is, it will inevitably be no more than a convenient working hypothesis. Still, we can have such an expedient scheme in mind as we return to daily life and verify from there how appropriate it is. Then we can tweak the scheme accordingly. This should be seen as a sustained paradoxical duality, the mutual inter-workings of what Husserl would call our natural attitude and our transcendental attitude, in which we remain fully immersed in the world while being able to rise above it.

Know Thyself

This book proposes the kind of scheme diagrammed in Figure 3. The diagram addresses the matter of the *myō* or hidden, otherworldly realm and also accommodates the position of a monotheistic god. The figure greatly expands upon Figures 1 and 2 in terms of the scope for explaining various problems and can thus be used in place of Figures 1 and 2. If such a scheme turns out to be more than just a description and were accepted as a commonly held worldview, it might offer semi-universality according to which we can organize our ideas and could even provide a kind of guiding norm. As we saw in Chapter 11, it was in Japan's medieval times that the concept of *myō* or the concealed, otherworldly realm, came to be widely recognized in Japan, while in modern times it has been prevented from appearing on the surface of thought and discourse. Even if this structure is descriptively articulated, that still leaves it up to each individual as to how they will make use of it. By actively making use of such a worldview scheme, perhaps it may be possible to deal with issues that have been very difficult to resolve. Can such a scenario be developed? Chapter 9 about our views of nature and Chapter 10 concerning the way we see society suggest ways for applying these insights in such directions. Naturally, such a diagram is simply tentative, a seminal idea that is fully receptive to correction and change. The most effective scheme will be one that is not rigid and definitive, but rather that can be fluidly and freely changed with the input of various ideas.

Despite the fundamental role of the words “know thyself” in philosophy, Japanese philosophers have moved rather too far away from the proverb's wisdom. Flirting with concepts borrowed from the West in a desperate effort to apply them to their own circumstances turned out to be as tortuous as the arbitrary standard of Procrustes's bed. There might be nothing wrong with intellectual dabbling in times when there are no urgent problems to be resolved, but when we are faced with a crisis, such as we have experienced in the wake of the Tōhoku Earthquake, a standard borrowed from someone else is not really of much use. Only ideas that genuinely come from within and that we find truly convincing will do.

This is no time for falling into narrow nationalism. We have seen enough of the folly of using borrowed notions of the “crisis of the West” and of “overcoming modernity” for the purposes of Japanist rhetoric. A “comparative thought” based on broad perspective is indispensable. Today, it has become the norm in Western efforts to understand Asian thought to employ the methods of comparative thought, and while comparing its thought to their own traditional Western philosophy pursue their understanding of the Other. Self-understanding is recognized as understanding of the Other, and vice versa. In this book, too, while fully aware of the mistakes I might make in discussing Western philosophy, which is outside my specialty, I have endeavored to give as much consideration as possible to Western philosophy and learn whatever there is to be learned from it. In the practice of comparative thought, too, we need to try to compare not fixed ideas, but through comparison make fluid both the self and the Other.

As an example of learning for self-understanding, let me introduce the writing of Yanagita Kunio (1875–1926). Yanagita started out as a high-ranking bureaucrat who had studied agronomy in university. He is known, however, not for the worldview of the elite but for having founded folklore studies in Japan in order to understand the specific life-ways of the people. Quite in the opposite direction as philosophy, folklore is a “science of facts” that adheres as much as possible to the specific, collects facts in the greatest quantity possible, and records them. With regard to the establishment of a science for self-understanding, it offers much to be learned from.

Yanagita tried to establish a science of self-understanding, calling it the “new National Learning” (Shin Kokugaku). It was not a science for science’s sake but rather proactively practical science. He was proud of practical science: “We are not ashamed of scholarship being the servants of utility. . . . we plan to foresee the problems we think might some day trouble the people, even if they do not reflect the debates of our immediate times, and try to clarify them as much as we can.”¹⁵²

Both as a student and as a bureaucrat involved in the promotion of agriculture forced to face the huge problem of poverty and suffering in rural villages, Yanagita felt the “most profound shame having had no plan or policy that might rescue them.” Yanagita’s folklore studies, which sought to respond to the problem of poverty among the farming population, arose from his very keen awareness of the need to trace back the history of village life and understand not only the material aspects of the folk but more broadly as well. He was a believer in the saving power of scholarship, as noted in the epigram to this chapter: “If the salvation of the world lies in scholarship, today is a time when we need to learn about the country where we live. With the advent of the new age, in other words, one of the things expected of scholarship is that it will respond to the people’s urge to ‘be able to know themselves.’ This is the appeal that we must by all means answer.”

152 This and following quotes from Yanagita 1998, pp. 93–95.

Yanagita's nation (Japan)-specific folklore studies (*ikkoku minzokugaku*)¹⁵³ envisioned not a closed or self-contained scholarship, but drew on the fields of anthropology, ethnology, and folklore of the West. He entertained the lofty hope that “the folklore studies of each country's people would emerge and international comparisons would be made. And if what results from that comparison are universally applicable, then we will see the dawn of world folklore studies.”¹⁵⁴

Philosophy cannot be regarded in the same light as folklore studies. Nonetheless, in respect to their aspiration to be a “saving scholarship”—not science for science's sake but very practical science—they are quite similar. Philosophy might seem at a glance to be a pursuit distant from reality and of little utility. Indeed, if practical science is limited to its meaning for immediate gains, philosophy may seem empty and lacking in practicality. In helping us to clarify the fundamental problems in our lives and guiding us through life, however, surely philosophy must be considered an eminently practical science.

Folklore studies flourished less through the halls of academia than through the networks of local research. Philosophy likewise should not be shut up within an ivory tower. The era of simply listening intently to the lectures of learned specialists versed in foreign languages is over. Philosophy is an issue shared by all those who want to seriously contemplate their lives. It is my hope that this book will provide a small step toward the development of a truly grounded philosophy that can contribute to the wisdom of future generations.

153 Yanagita 1934, p. 255.

154 Yanagita 1934, p. 299.