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Western-Language Studies of Japanese Heritage

Peter ZARROW*

Over the past several decades, the number of sites, objects, and practices that have been deemed heritage has increased dramatically across the globe and, likewise, the number of heritage studies. Western-language studies of Japanese heritage have focused on questions of identity, power, the state, and tourism. These questions must be understood in terms of heritagization’s transnational nature. Based on Western-language, primarily English, studies, this review examines recent research on Japanese heritage. Much research has focused on museums and castles, but “intangible heritage” and “negative heritage” are also important. Heritage studies is not a coherent research field. Informed by anthropology, history, geography, art history, literary studies, and other disciplines, heritage studies probes what lies behind cultural expressions and illuminates power relations.

Keywords: heritage studies, public memory, tourism, identity, Japanese history

Over the past several decades, the number of sites, objects, and practices that have been deemed heritage has increased dramatically across the globe and, likewise, the number of heritage studies. Heritage studies is a field of research that has developed from older disciplines: anthropology, geography, sociology, and history, as well as

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built environment, landscape, and leisure and tourism studies. This is not to mention the fields of art history and conservation, museum studies, historiography and memory, literature, theatre, folklore, religion, and even international relations. Although heritage studies has its own journals, associations, and university programs, it is doubtful whether it is a coherent field with even roughly agreed-upon basic methodologies, questions, and intellectual genealogy. True, its division between theoretical work (academic) and practical work (professional) is typical of many academic fields, and heritage studies does a better job than most of bringing together theory and practice. And true, heritage studies may be well positioned to evolve as an interdisciplinary field at the intersection of traditional disciplines (just as Asian studies has). Nonetheless, its object of research—heritage—is decidedly amorphous and increasingly so.

In the nineteenth century, heritage preservation generally focused on objects and architecture deemed to have a particular aesthetic or historic value. These aesthetic and historical categories were shaped largely by elite men who associated them with national or imperial glory and identity and hoped “heritage” would help civilize and discipline non-elite peoples. As the twentieth century unfolded, however, the scope of heritage expanded to localities, subordinate groups and classes, and indigenous peoples—and also to entire built environments (such as villages and urban districts), landscapes small and large (a rock, mountain ranges, fields, vast sections of the oceans) and to traditional crafts, practices, and rituals. The rise of such “intangible heritage” in the second half of the twentieth century potentially leaves nothing out. Everything has the potential to become heritage.

The question “whose heritage?” is always up for debate, and the question “who decides?” is even more prickly. Heritage is the subject of numerous legal regimes, each with its own standards for granting official heritage status. Individual nations and the United Nations (through the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, or UNESCO) do so, as do local regimes. However, “heritage” has two broader senses. First, heritage is whatever can be conceived as heritage, with or without official status. For example, Shinto shrines in Japan, while sometimes protected in certain ways, by and large have no official heritage status; but they are, in some cases, seen as similar to Buddhist temples that do have official heritage status.¹ Second,

¹ Some Shinto shrines are incorporated into larger heritage complexes; for example, recognized Buddhist temple grounds or the UNESCO World Heritage site “Sacred Sites and Pilgrimage Routes in the Kii Mountain Range” on the Kii Peninsula.
“heritage” is often used in a metaphorical sense to describe collective memory and tradition.

Studies of heritage in Japan revolve around the major issues found in most other works on heritage. (This may indicate a greater coherency to the field of heritage studies than I suggested above.) While there is little agreement among scholars of heritage on what constitutes heritage—most seem willing to grant that heritage is anything that anybody deems as heritage—scholars do generally agree that it is a modern phenomenon. Certain kinds of heritage work certainly existed before the modern era—ranging from the collection of artifacts and curiosities to the transgenerational property of families or clans (heritage as inheritance). But the generalized sense of group identification with the past as mediated or prompted by objects, practices, and landscapes of memory can scarcely be found before the late eighteenth century. The central questions of heritage studies include the following: Whose heritage are we talking about—that is, who is constructing heritage for what purposes, and who may be challenging the “authorized heritage discourse”?

What is the state’s role in promoting (or suppressing) heritage—and to what extent is the process of heritigization best conceived as top-down, bottom-up, or some combination of the two? Should scholars focus on deconstructing heritage as a form of mythmaking categorically distinct from history writing (whatever history’s own mythical properties), or should they emphasize the social functions and perhaps deeper truths of heritage? How do people live with heritage—benefiting or suffering from it spiritually, socially, politically, and economically? A final theoretical and methodological question cannot yet be answered, if it ever will be: given that each individual case of

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2 That is, the self-conscious conflation of heritage and identity, closely related to the rise of the modern nation-state and the losses associated with industrialization and population increases, but perhaps more profoundly found in the post-Enlightenment sense that we are in some sense our past, mark heritage as a modern phenomenon. See inter alia David Lowenthal, “Identity, Heritage, and History,” in John R. Gillis, ed., *The Politics of National Identity*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, pp. 41–57. For claims that a concept of heritage is temporally deeper, and indeed universal, see David C. Harvey, “Heritage Pasts and Heritage Presents: Temporality, Meaning and the Scope of Heritage Studies,” *International Journal of Heritage Studies* vol. 7, no. 4, 2001, pp. 319–338. However, in my view, while it is true that all societies situate themselves vis-à-vis the past in some way, if we treat heritage as something more than memory-stories and traditional practices, it is a distinctively modern phenomenon.


heritigization will answer the questions above in a unique way, how can we reach useful conclusions about heritage in larger settings (such as Japan), and should we even try? “Heritage” in the sense these questions raise is, outside of Europe, a translated term. In Japan, then, heritage is not only an aspect of modernity but also, in a sense, an imported one. This essay discusses the following English-language monographs, as well as selected articles in English and French, in order to consider these questions.


While I cannot here pursue comparative questions, it may be that heritigization in Japan is distinguished, first, by the state’s dominant role from the 1870s to 1945, even while Japanese heritage was subject to contestation (as heritage always is). Second, heritage in postwar Japan may have been especially contested because of conflicting views of the Pacific War and questions of war guilt. Today, Japan is a major power in what might be called the global heritage competition for tourist dollars, and it has shaped the global heritage regime. In particular, Japanese diplomacy is largely responsible for the centrality of “intangible heritage” in UNESCO designations. Heritage, however, continues to refer both to informal or unofficial heritage practices and to officially designated heritage at the level of states and localities as much as to the coveted World Heritage status bestowed by UNESCO. Much Western-language scholarship focuses on what might be called heritage problems. First, how top-down heritigization suppresses marginal voices, but equally how those voices nonetheless
challenge official heritage and sometimes produce their own. And second, how the business of heritage tourism provides economic benefits for some but harms the quality of life for others and even risks destroying the heritage it is ostensibly designed to preserve.

Making Heritage, Museums, and Colonial Spaces

After coming to power in 1868, the new Meiji government moved with astonishing speed in passing legislation to protect antiquities. As extensive historical scholarship recounts, early missions to Western countries during the late Tokugawa had already noted the importance of national museums in Europe and the United States. Meiji authorities had also become worried about Westerners in Japan buying and exporting artworks. Such artworks symbolized Japan’s high culture, even if their value in this sense was first suggested by foreign interest in them. Japan’s first Plan for the Protection of Antiquities of 1871 (Koki Kyūbutsu Hozonkata) was designed to preserve and prevent the export of thirty-one movable objects. Such legislation was among the first of its type in the world, preceding Britain’s Ancient Monuments Protection Act of 1882. The legislation was passed on the eve of rapid Westernization and at a time when Buddhism was under attack and much of the heritage of the Tokugawa was dismissed as useless “feudal” detritus. (Daimyo castles, today central to Japanese heritage, were either abandoned or turned into military garrisons, for example.) A concern with antiquities at this time thus seems incongruous, as most people seemed to be looking firmly to the future, not the past. But the Meiji government is not unique in its efforts to preserve aspects of the past, even or especially at the price of ossifying such those aspects, and just as it awakened to their disappearance. This seeming incongruity aside, Meiji policies to protect aspects of the past, even amid tumultuous change and disdain for the past, may have contributed to the later essentialized conception of Japan as uniquely able to assimilate foreign cultures

5 Oleg Benesch, “Castles and the Militarisation of Urban Society in Imperial Japan,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society vol. 28, 2018, pp. 107–134; see also Benesch and Zwigenberg, Japan’s Castles, chap. 3.

6 Another case is that of late Qing China, where elites, alarmed by the loss of artworks abroad, began to agitate for preservation laws and the construction of museums. See Peter Zarrow, “Notes on Heritage and Memory in Modern China,” Monumenta Serica: Journal of Oriental Studies (forthcoming).
while remaining indisputably Japanese. Modern Japanese heritage thus emerged well before the mid-Meiji conservative reaction against Westernization. Yet in its headlong rush to industrialize the economy and centralize the polity, the Meiji government, while constructing an emperor-centered and Shintoized past, disdained actual Tokugawa heritage and often sought to suppress local traditions. Thus such heritage as practiced in the early Meiji did not stem primarily from a sense of loss or even the need to provide elements of stability in a turbulent time, but was rather a pragmatic response to the foreign threat.

Artworks, whether or not a matter of national pride, were certainly a tool of late nineteenth-century international diplomacy. The Meiji government sent objects abroad, participating in world fairs to show Japanese art and culture to foreigners who would not be visiting Japan. From today’s vantage, one can see the roots of a sense of heritage in the dialectic between global consumers and Japanese producers providing everything from ancient Buddhist statues to exquisite paper-making (objects, but equally fitting the category of “intangible cultural heritage” in today’s terms). Designed to meet international standards as well as appeal to local visitors, Japan’s first modern, Western-style museum was established in 1872. The neologism *hakubutsukan* (literally “building for spreading knowledge through artifacts) was used to label this new institution. A vibrant exhibitionary culture had existed throughout the Tokugawa period, but the modern museum was more clearly demarcated from everyday life, open to the public, and designed to encourage mass education and disseminate popular knowledge, especially the bases of scientific knowledge. What is today known as the Tokyo National Museum featured displays both of natural history and of fine art. It is worth noting that the museum displayed Chinese and Korean works, as well as Japanese, including antiquities such as ancient wall paintings, steles, wine vessels, and other objects outside the category of fine arts.

Japan formally established three “imperial museums” in Nara, Kyoto, and Tokyo.

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7 The adoption of Confucianism and Buddhism in ancient and medieval Japan is a standard trope. Looking at the modern era, in Marilyn Ivy’s phrasing: “Crossing boundaries of race and region, of temporalities and territories established at the foundation of the modern world system, installed everywhere with its enormous reserves of capital, ‘Japan’ appears ubiquitous, nomadic, transnational. Yet at the same time Japan seems to reinscribe the distinction ever more sharply between the ‘West’ and itself.” Ivy, *Discourses of the Vanishing: Modernity, Phantasm, Japan*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995, p. 5.


in 1889—the year that the Meiji emperor promulgated the constitution. That Meiji leaders hoped imperial museums would help create modern subject-citizens is clear from the timing. The original notion was that each museum would reflect the historical background of its locality, with Japan’s most ancient objects displayed in Nara, the eighth-century imperial capital; objects from the ninth to the eighteenth centuries placed in Kyoto, the subsequent imperial capital; and objects from the Tokugawa period (1600–1868) and from other parts of Asia exhibited in Tokyo, the shogunal capital and the capital of the new Japanese nation. Meanwhile, through the early Meiji period, Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines—with their art collections—were increasingly open to the public on a regular basis instead of only open specific occasions and even then keeping most of their property off-limits. One reason for this move was to raise money locally, but a deeper cultural transformation was also at work. New legal issues emerged as well. The ownership of statues and paintings was no longer clear. Were they owned by monks or priests, or a temple association, or in some sense the nation as a whole?

Japan’s second major antiquities measure, the Law for the Preservation of Ancient Shrines and Temples (Koshaji Hozon Hō), was passed in 1897. This law acknowledged the importance of both architecture and objects for what we now call national heritage. The term that came to be used was “National Treasure” (kokuhō), still used for official lists today. National treasures were to manifest Japanese history, to display exemplary importance or craft skills, or to have been associated with an imperial visit. These goals were further spelled out in the 1919 Law for the Preservation of Historic Sites, Places of Scenic Beauty, and Natural Monuments (Shiseki Meishō Tennen Kinenbutsu Hozon Hō). In sum, during the Meiji era’s first decades, leaders realized the importance of heritage for foreign tourism as well as the role it could play in fostering Japanese identity, a sense of the past, and especially a personal connection with the emperor. By the 1880s the government was undertaking national surveys to find National Treasures.

Two excellent monographs emphasize the state’s role in the imperial period. Alice Y. Tseng focuses on museum architecture and Noriko Aso on the creation of a national aesthetic in museums. Both point to the importance that Japan’s leaders, facing foreign threats, placed on creating a modern nation-state as quickly as possible. Tseng argues that—unlike the case in postrevolutionary France—Japan’s new

10 Tseng, The Imperial Museums of Meiji Japan.
“national art” could not be formed out of a preexisting imperial collection but rather had to be built from a variety of secular and religious sources. Her study focuses on four main buildings. Tseng describes how Japan’s first *hakubutsukan* was built in Ueno Park in Tokyo to show exhibitions of Japan’s natural and human-made products, takes us through museum-building in Kyoto and Nara, and concludes with Ueno’s Hyōkeikan Art Museum, founded at the beginning of the twentieth century. Early Meiji leaders were building a new nation by teaching the Japanese about their art historical lineage. In this larger nation-building aim, they also needed foreigners to understand Japanese artifacts as “art” (*bijutsu* was the neologism coined in 1872), on par with Western art, rather than mere crafts. Tseng situates her work in the understanding that Japanese art was a concept and category “institutionalized, canonized, and standardized under the auspices of the Meiji bureaucracy through the joint enterprises of the museum, the exposition, and the academy.”\footnote{Ibid., p. 11.} The concept also became a major ingredient of Japan’s collective history and identity. Tseng rightly emphasizes that the “state” was by no means a unified entity; nevertheless, she states, “The Imperial Museums were very much a part of the Meiji state’s self-representation as novel and progressive, although dealing directly with the matter of the nation’s cultural heritage required a more nuanced treatment that attempted to harmonize modern innovation with the ancient origins being celebrated and preserved.”\footnote{Ibid., p. 16.} The Meiji government hired the Englishman Josiah Conder as a kind of chief state architect in the late 1870s, and he directed the building of the *hakubutsukan* using masonry construction new to Japan and at least partly based, Tseng shows, on the South Kensington Museum. She also reminds us that its construction was simultaneous with that of the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York and the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston in the United States. Heritigization in Japan, we note again, was not a global laggard.

Conder was to become teacher to a later generation of Japanese architects who designed many of the buildings during the mid-Meiji and later periods—Tseng shows that to simply call their work “Western” is misleading. Museums not only repositioned the function and therefore even the essence of objects (from ritual item to art, for example) and thus turned them into heritage, but museums themselves became architectural heritage. That heritage may survive even when the original buildings do
not. (In fact, three Meiji-era museums are today designated Important Cultural Properties.) Tseng emphasizes that the new Meiji museums were designed by Western architects and by Japanese architects trained in Western design, although with the addition of Japanese symbols, such as the rising sun flag and the chrysanthemum crest now associated with the imperial throne. It might seem odd to use essentially Western architecture to house Japanese artifacts, but at least in the late Meiji, Japan’s rulers used public architecture to lay claims to global equivalence and modernity; these buildings were not imitations of either the West or Japanese tradition.

Heritage, however, involved more than museums. The need to recall or recreate historical memory and identity led to particular value being placed on the entire Nara-Kyoto region with its hundreds of temples, palaces, and mausoleums. With the emperor’s move to Tokyo in 1868, Kyoto’s status was diminished. Kyoto’s rebranding after the Restoration, so to speak, depended on making it both a repository of tradition and a site of living culture, particularly of the arts. This did not mean that Kyoto or even Nara would be sheltered from the tides of Westernization. Still, the former capitals began to function as a kind of vast open-air museum or heritage park. By the late twentieth century, the entire Nara-Kyoto region would officially become a heritage site, with numerous temples and shrines as well as several landscapes and castles listed as World Heritage sites.

The roots of the Nara-Kyoto region’s heritagization, Tseng shows, lay in early Meiji thinking about what we might call the geography of heritage. There was no doubt about Tokyo’s new preeminence, but by the time the Constitution was promulgated in 1889, “The new Japan was being defined as much by its myth-historic origins as by its modernizing objectives, and the two capitals were to be two faces of the same coin—Tokyo representing the secular, progressive countenance of Japan, and Kyoto representing its sacred, historical countenance.”

Given not only Kyoto’s imperial past but also its vast collection of palaces, shrines, temples, and mausoleums, it was a natural heritage site, but it was also, Tseng emphasizes, to host new, modern educational institutions and industrial factories. By no means was Kyoto as a whole to

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13 Ibid., p. 95.
14 Tseng’s newer work highlights how Kyoto was maintained—or rebranded—as a symbol of the imperial presence through a historical reconstruction process that featured new monumental architecture and urban renewal projects as much as preservation schemes. Alice Y. Tseng, Modern Kyoto: Building for Ceremony and Commemoration, 1868–1940, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2018.
become an ossified “museum.” As for the Imperial Kyoto Museum, after various design debates, its architecture combined Japanese elements with a basically European-classical design and a special entrance and throne room for the emperor’s visits (although the emperor never in fact visited). Proposals to build a more traditional structure, perhaps of wood, did not make it very far. One can read the final museum design as a triumph of Westernization, or one can read it as a claim to modernity and the global vocabulary of European classicism in public architecture. The Imperial Nara Museum was also designed as a classical—and hence modern—piece of architecture that stood out from its neighboring shrines and temples. That said, one can ask if Nara itself, with little economic activity outside of tourism, has been museumified.

Tseng’s study of the twinned stories of the evolution of Meiji museums and the emergence of “art” (bijutsu) as a stable cultural category helps us to also think about heritage. These developments imply a distinction between heritage that is inalienable (museum buildings, the art placed in them under the control of curators) and heritage that can be sold and is hence deemed a lesser form of heritage, or perhaps not heritage at all. It is also significant that if the Meiji government’s was the final voice in what counted as heritage, other voices—art critics, historians, local politicians—began to be heard as well.

Noriko Aso’s *Public Properties* emphasizes the effects of shifting conceptions of Japan’s imperial image at the end of the nineteenth century. Beginning in the 1890s, museums came to be classified as “imperial,” a category that was “being redefined at the time to serve as a mediating buffer in negotiating the boundaries between state and society and public and private.” At the same time, Aso states, “state cultural authority was personalized in the figure of the emperor and his immediate relations, veiling an emergent canon under majesty not to be impoliticly scrutinized.”15 But Japan’s museum-building, broadly defined, was not limited to state projects in its major cities but included numerous private ventures and even department store exhibitions and colonial museums. Although the Meiji state certainly wished to “educate” a new kind of citizen-subject or public, Aso emphasizes the diversity of the publics (plural) that also formed in a bottom-up, though not necessarily oppositional, process: “publicness was, and is, historically negotiated.”16 Heritage was only one

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15 Aso, *Public Properties*, p. 3.
16 Ibid., p. 222.
concern of Meiji leaders, and in spite of the early turn to preservation laws, they looked largely to museums and, at least through the 1870s, expositions, to highlight Japan’s natural resources and, especially, its economic products, both traditional crafts and new industrial manufactures. Aso shows that the balance shifted to various artifacts and “art” during the 1880s precisely as these objects were put under the control of the Imperial Household Ministry and reclassified as imperial property. We might thus conclude that this is how national heritage and the imperial house became inextricably linked. This move created a radically new set of property rights, neither private nor precisely public. Nonetheless, it did not mark Meiji leaders’ first interest in heritage. Aso also cites government findings from as early as 1871 stressing the need to preserve antiquities not only for the sake of educating the people and not only in terms of the international rivalry noted above but also to “serve as the basis for social scientific narratives of historical, technological, and economic development, which were in turn necessary to write Japan into the modern world . . . an elite heritage collection.”

Of course, museums required a specific kind of public. Unlike visitors to outdoor expositions, museums demanded order and quiet (no clogs, no dogs, no touching). Aso insists that such regulations should not be regarded as exclusive but inclusive, although only as long as visitors could follow the rules. Opening in the evenings allowed workers to visit. On the one hand, visitors found artifacts selected for their aesthetic value or historical significance, as in any heritage regime; on the other hand, these objects now possessed a powerful imperial imprimatur. Throughout Japan, protected sites such as burial mounds were not only saved from being paved over but also imbued with sacrality. Aso concludes, “Imperialization represented a form of appropriation, from common-use forests lands to heritage artifacts, that was often difficult to contest, because its rationalization in the name of greater good simultaneously encompassed and disavowed both state and public.”

Indeed, beneath Japan’s official narratives, individuals and organizations built regional and less elitist exhibitionary cultures through private museums and department stores. By the 1920s, these included museums of European art and of Japanese folk art and crafts. They also included, under the direction of banking heir Shibusawa Keizō, specialized museums such as those dedicated to fishing, literature, toys.

17 Ibid., pp. 67–68.
18 Ibid., p. 93.
farmhouses, and the like—the living heritage of the people. Aso argues that the private museum-builders were motivated by no less than “reimagining the public in relation to state and society.” This was perhaps more an effect than a conscious goal, but certainly the popularization of heritage was a challenge to state and imperial monopolization of heritage claims. Department stores, with their luscious displays of consumer goods and special exhibitions and concerts, did not challenge the state directly, but they broadened access to cultural knowledge. Such knowledge was meant to be consumed as a marker of social status and pleasure rather than passively observed and appreciated. As public spaces designed to display items to their best effect, department stores and museums shared a number of features. Department store exhibitions overlapped with the national museums in presenting canonical works, but also featured the works of contemporary arts and crafts (that were, mostly, within the reach of the average consumer). Aso is not concerned with whether this can be considered heritage, but insofar as artists and craftsworkers (a distinction that need not detain us here) were working within traditions and speaking to those traditions, a heritage perspective remains useful. Indeed, Aso shows, sales were often regarded as a way to keep heritage alive. In the postwar years, both department stores and museums—now “national” museums rather than imperial—continued to flourish as Japan rebuilt itself as a “culture nation” (bunka kokka). In addition to rewriting Japanese heritage as peaceful and artistic rather than martial, Japan’s leaders used the 1964 Olympics to display “national treasures” and reclaim Japan’s position in world artistic heritage.

In her discussion of Japan’s colonial museums in Taiwan and Korea, Aso emphasizes Japan’s claims to a civilizing mission and, at best, an ambivalent judgment on the worth of native heritage. To my mind, these institutions highlight the ambiguous status of peoples who were colonial subjects but also identified as foreign national subjects. Of course, these identity issues worked out very differently in Taiwan and Korea, where Japan wished to celebrate but also control the ancient historical ties between the lands that became Korea and Japan. Nonetheless, the potential of the notion of a “Great East Asia” heritage that would have developed in some tension with national heritage, even Japan’s national heritage, is worth further consideration, as is how local peoples “consumed” their distinct heritage as it was being curated by Japanese overlords.

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19 Ibid., p. 165.
20 Of course, these identity issues worked out very differently in Taiwan and Korea, where Japan wished to celebrate but also control the ancient historical ties between the lands that became Korea and Japan. Nonetheless, the potential of the notion of a “Great East Asia” heritage that would have developed in some tension with national heritage, even Japan’s national heritage, is worth further consideration, as is how local peoples “consumed” their distinct heritage as it was being curated by Japanese overlords.
story of the Japanese empire’s expansion.

Hyung Il Pai’s *Heritage Management in Korea and Japan* examines the complex story of heritagization in Korea under the Japanese. Both the Japanese and Korean states have devoted considerable resources to heritage management and heritage tourism. Pai traces the roots of the modern Korean sense of heritage to Japan’s heritage scholarship and institutions, which in many ways developed in parallel to the museums discussed above. The central story propagated by the Japanese state was simple: ancient Korea and Japan were one race (as confirmed by archaeology), then they were separated, and now they were merged again. Pai focuses on archaeology and the heritage drive to delve into the deeper and deeper past. From the nineteenth through most of the twentieth century, heritage tended to be either nationalist or imperialist. It was defined and, in a sense, claimed by the imperialist powers, as suggested in part by the general shift from early amateur reports by soldiers and missionaries to professional surveys conducted by architects and art historians. I would add that while racist and Orientalist scholars of the metropole treated colonial heritage as inferior, it could nonetheless provide a basis for native identity that would eventually work against the colonizing power. And this heritage, which could not be “our” (metropole) heritage, was often redefined as global heritage in the late twentieth century, contributing to a sense of global identity, however embryonic.

Be that as it may, Pai’s point is that unearthed artifacts did indeed contribute to national stories: “The identification and ownership of art and artifacts recovered from the ground, therefore, have been and remain to this day the most contested symbols of nationhood. Thus, for more than two centuries the empirical search for a ‘unique’ prehistoric past and an unbroken ethnic and cultural continuity is the most powerful impetus for archaeological and ethnographic field surveys around the world.”

Pai emphasizes the importance of not only the loss of antiquities as a spur to Japan’s new heritage policies but also the search for “sacred relics”—especially the physical remains of tombs—that would back up the imperial myth. As early as the 1870s, the government promulgated laws to preserve newly discovered tombs from desecration and to manage excavations under the control of the Imperial Household Ministry. Pai cites a report from 1900 that reveals leaders’ concerns:

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Since the Meiji Restoration, it has come to our attention that our ancient remains are being threatened with imminent destruction by the daily expansion of infrastructure and transportation. The construction of roads, railroads, canals, and factory buildings are cutting down mountains and forests on a daily basis. Henceforth, in order not to lose our precious memories of the past, we must figure out how best to preserve against further destruction of sacred imperial remains that have been passed down for generations. As we know, countries in Europe and America have had more than a century of preservation laws to guide the preservation of ancient remains, and it is now time for us to do the same. Therefore, we must organize our old national records, and authenticate the locations of the remains of our imperial ancestral burials, heroes, filial sons, patriots, and famous clans in order to uphold and show respect for our imperial identity [kokutai]. We want to restore our imperial remains so that we will not be ashamed when foreign tourists come to visit our country. The purpose of this committee is to create and preserve beautiful sites for eternity to promote our great ancestral achievements and their morals embodying filial piety, loyalty, and patriotism. Our preservation efforts will create a sense of national landscape [kokufū] and encourage the moral education of our citizens [fūkyō]. Our duty as citizens is to uphold the imperial lineage [ōtō] embodied in our imperial remains and burials so that the authority of the imperial household that has lasted for ten thousand generations will continue to shine on for eternity.²²

Archaeology and historical research gave rise to a dilemma, however, although one that could not be directly addressed at the time. The evidence suggested that the “Yamato race” and the imperial house originated on the Asian mainland and thus could not claim Japanese territorial indigeneity. One solution was simply to stress the Yamato triumph on the Japanese islands by a conquest-through-charisma supposedly seen in the ancient ritual artifacts unearthed by modern archaeologists.²³ This contradiction notwithstanding, Yamato origins on the mainland and migration via Korea at least marked the race’s distinction from the Ainu. Critically, the Meiji government prohibited proper excavations of imperial burial mounds and restricted archaeological research. Scholars thus looked for sites in Taiwan, China, Inner Asia, and above all

²² Cited in ibid., pp. 63–64.
²³ The notion of conquest through charisma is echoed in the Chinese classics.
Korea. And in Korea, the colonial government sponsored archaeologists and ethnologists.

Pai shows that heritagization processes in modern Japan and Korea were so intertwined as to be inseparable. This was true not only for scholars who wrote about both places but also for the tourism industry. Japanese and foreign tourists were directed to sites in both Japan and Korea, as well as in Manchuria and Taiwan. In the case of Korea, they could explore the New Korea that the Japanese were building and the old Korea, supposedly built by the same race. Japanese visited Korea (sometimes) as part of a spiritual journey that retraced the steps of conquest taken by the emperors of old. Korea may have been considered important merely as a way station for Buddhist art and Chinese architecture on their way to Japan, where they would be refined, but the result was also a distinctively “Korean” prehistory and history. Pai emphasizes that Japan’s prewar myths and ideology that shaped the development of archaeology and heritage continue to influence attitudes today, as “citizens in Japan’s former colonies in China, the two Koreas, and Taiwan also continue to identify with the old platitudes concerning the indigenous, prehistoric origins of distinct races, which they have incorporated into their new nationalistic narratives to explain the ethnic foundations of their respective modern ethnic states. . . . [and thereby] buying into ‘demeaning’ nineteenth-century colonial racial and ethnic stereotypes.”

Nonetheless, in my view, it was not that hard for Japan’s story of Korean devolution to become postwar Korea’s story of cultural glory. This narrative adoption explains why Korea frequently demands the return of the numerous artifacts “stolen” by the Japanese from the 1880s onward.

Heritage, Castles, and Japan-ness

In *Japan’s Castles*, Oleg Benesch and Ran Zwigenberg emphasize the changing functions and symbolism of the country’s well-known avatars and argue for “the centrality of castles to Japan’s modern history” as “tools for crafting identities.” While many castles were left to rot or turned into parks in the 1870s, from the late nineteenth century through the Pacific War others came to symbolize power and, as military garrisons, fostered an “identification” between civilians and the military. After the

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24 Ibid., p. 171.
war, castles came to represent national heritage in a more general sense, especially through a romantic image of the medieval warrior. Benesch and Zwigenberg also emphasize that castles have served as sites of contestation between local and national authorities—associated with local historical figures, castles potentially challenge elements of the imperial or national ideology. Moreover, they provide a legitimate space for civil society to demand or protest government actions concerning castles. This is not to say, however, that either officialdom or civil society ever spoke with one voice, and Benesch and Zwigenberg explore the claims of numerous groups, including Shinto and other religious groups. Finally, the authors also directly analyze complex heritage issues: How should castles be maintained and reconstructed? To what degree should “authenticity” be sought? For whom are castles to be preserved? How are their individual stories to be told? To what extent should we understand Japanese castle heritage as part of a global phenomenon?

*Japan's Castles* is an innovative and fascinating study that speaks to central questions of modern Japanese history. Benesch and Zwigenberg treat as largely symbolic the functions or effects of castles, which tended to dominate the cities and towns that grew around them. That symbolic effect was, however, important: castles were central to the ideologies of militarization until 1945 and of demilitarization after 1945. In addition, when we contrast hard, coercive power to the symbolic, the authors show how castles, turned into military garrisons, aided police in suppressing urban disorder at key moments. As noted above, not all castles survived the early Meiji government’s disdain for Tokugawa feudalism; they were also expensive to maintain. Still, by the 1920s, as what we might call key nodes of militarization, castles came to be “celebrated as a unification of modernity and tradition, imperial and local, military and civilian.”26 Castles have also been subject to constant reconstruction. From a purist point of view, none are purely “authentic,” and even for nonpurists, much reconstruction has been simply horrific. Yet, from another point of view, Japan’s castles are living monuments. Related to this point, the authors might have done more to frame the modern history of Japanese castles in terms of forgetting. Heritage is, simply, a set of memory prompts. But precisely as the functions of castles and their very architecture have changed (as Benesch and Zwigenberg show), their actual pasts have also been selectively mythologized and, to a large extent, discarded. That said, the authors convincingly argue for a degree of continuity in the story of Japanese

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26 Ibid., p. 12.
castles across the watersheds of both 1868 and 1945. Above all, castles represent authority and the very idea of continuity itself.

Castles also represent heritage. Though heritage is not the main focus of Benesch and Zwigenberg’s book, I highlight in the following paragraphs what they have to say about the topic. They note that Nagoya Castle and Edo Castle were among the first architectural sites to be valued for their historical importance. There was agreement and cooperation on this point among Japanese and Europeans—who were in the midst of restoring their own castles. If the early Meiji government was concerned with the export of artworks, certain elites maintained a broader appreciation of the built heritage. At the same time, early Meiji heritage was less about preserving the past in the face of a rapidly intruding future than it was more deliberately constructed to support the new imperial ideology. The limited castle renovations executed at the time were, therefore, often funded by the Imperial Household Ministry. While Benesch and Zwigenberg emphasize parallels to European uses of medieval castles to shore up the authority of modernizing monarchies, in the larger comparative framework of attitudes toward heritage, Japanese attitudes through the 1870s were distinctively less sentimental and romantic.

Benesch and Zwigenberg argue that the military’s takeover of castles, symbolizing authority and allowing troops to easily suppress urban disorder demonstrates the existence of “Taishō militarism” in parallel with “Taishō democracy.” The army had little interest in heritage, but local civil groups often did, which might result in a dual-use castle: a garrisoned castle space also opened to the public (for whom historical explanation is provided), allowing reconstruction and preservation work. Other castle sites became parks, often with shrines, under the effective control of local elites or what the authors call “civil society.” Castles were also turned into government offices. Castles gradually became symbols both of local pride and of a new national “martial identity” in a process that was, in Benesch and Zwigenberg’s view, “largely organic” and lacking in clear governmental policy. Attributing almost mystical powers to castles, the authors claim they “had unique potential for uniting conflicting layers of local, regional, national, imperial, and religious identity, while transcending temporal boundaries between the past, present, and future through the combination of heritage architecture, contemporary memorials, and futuristic displays at industrial, commercial, and later colonial exhibitions.” Heritage was but one aspect of castles in modern

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27 Ibid., p. 63.
Japan.

A major turning point in castle heritage—and Japanese culture as a whole—according to Benesch and Zwigenberg, was the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). Japan's martial past was rediscovered, and new preservation societies, perhaps ironically, saw the need to protect castles from military as well as civilian rebuilding projects. What Benesch and Zwigenberg show, if not in so many words, is another face of heritage. Japanese understanding of castles evolved from old relics to “prominent symbols of a masculine Japanese culture that united martial and aesthetic elements rooted in the distant past” and contributed to mass mobilization in the 1930s.28 This transformation reminds us that heritage is living and useful: heritage sites, to function properly, should have thousands of visitors who take something away from their visits. (The professional work of historians, by contrast, may have many fewer consumers and need not proclaim its usefulness.) The use of castle sites for various exhibitions also marked their living functions. By the 1910s, considerable professional theorization about castles began to link national purity equally to militarism and to a supposedly unique aesthetics.

Since the postwar period, for all the political conflicts surrounding castles that Benesch and Zwigenberg convincingly describe, Japanese castles have become more ordinary heritage sites: their symbolic importance is still contested but probably less central to national identity, and the discourses surrounding them more prominently feature questions of preservation and authenticity, promote tourism, shape urban development, raise funds, and reclaim local identities. Japanese leaders essentially demilitarized their old castles, and even conservatives reimagined castles as symbols of culture and peace. Of course, that military fortifications could be proclaimed symbols of peace is proof of how flexible heritage can be. Beyond this, Benesch and Zwigenberg tell us, Japanese turned to rebuilding castles in the wake of the Occupation to reconnect with heritage—albeit a heritage that recalled the Edo and early Meiji periods and skipped over the rest. At the same time, the reinvention of castles was a fraught process: “controversy was a hallmark of castle building everywhere. . . . entangled with the larger issues of memory politics.”29 Some people were concerned with castles’ authenticity even if rebuilding virtually from scratch; others were concerned with erecting something that would simply look like a castle,

28 Ibid., p. 140.
29 Ibid., p. 277.
preferably with a parking lot and flush toilets; yet others would rather build schools and community halls on available sites. The authors convincingly conclude that the modern history of castles is a story of erasure (and construction) and erasures of earlier erasures. In the late Meiji and Taishō periods, the early Meiji rejection of “samurai feudalism” was erased, while in the postwar period the links between castles and Japanese militarism were erased as a new view of the Tokugawa period (focusing on its culture) was constructed. And in the Heisei period, new castle projects sought to use more “authentic” wood to rebuild Shōwa-era concrete reconstructions. Whether Japan’s castles—and heritage generally—can ever present more complete historical views, the authors do not say.

In *Heritage Politics*, Tze May Loo presents an extensive case study of Shuri Castle, illuminating Okinawa’s long and often painful relationship to Japan proper. The king of the Ryūkyū Kingdom was evicted from the castle in 1879 by the new Meiji authorities, and the islands became Okinawa Prefecture. Loo convincingly argues that Shuri Castle became a symbol of oppression—but also a site where Okinawans could in effect negotiate or attempt to negotiate that relationship. Yet overall, Loo seems to conclude, if not in so many words, that the Okinawans had little success, at least if judged in terms of a desire to forge their identity on their own terms. Rather, they had to use Japanese standards of identity, albeit for their own purposes. Just as the Meiji government had quickly moved to recognize Japan’s national treasures, so the listing of Shuri Castle as “cultural heritage” gave Okinawa a certain status, if still a subordinate one. If I understand Loo correctly, Okinawan claims to citizenship thus represented both agency and self-repression. Meiji practice was to “preserve and appropriate” only certain aspects of Okinawan cultural heritage, claiming them as Japanese. Ironically, the US Occupation of Okinawa after 1945 refocused the target of Okinawan oppositional politics from Japan to the US, which fostered a sense of Japanese identity.

Shuri Castle, Loo suggests, originally symbolized the Ryūkyū Kingdom’s

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30 Loo, *Heritage Politics*.
“quasi-independence” from both China and Tokugawa Japan.\textsuperscript{31} (The castle displayed both Chinese and Japanese architectural features.) The Meiji military occupation of the castle erased this earlier significance, but the garrison moved out in 1896. At that point, local elites sought to restore the castle and spoke, in ways familiar at the time, of combining new functions at the site to incorporate a park, leisure activities, a museum, and economic development. They sought, Loo argues, to find a place for Okinawa as a distinctive but equal part of the empire. However, as plans proceeded to build the Okinawa Shrine at the site, the prefecture lacked the funds to restore and maintain the castle, which was thus slated for demolition. Fortunately, no less a figure than the pioneering architect and architectural historian Itō Chūta saved it. At Itō’s urging, the Home Ministry ordered that demolition be stopped and provided funding to preserve the castle. However, Itō also turned the main hall into the shrine’s Worship Hall. Loo argues, Itō’s intervention shows how Japan essentially monopolized knowledge production in Okinawa. Native Okinawans had little voice in the preservation, much less the definition, of their own heritage. In the view of Japanese like Itō, Okinawan culture displayed cosmopolitan Asian influences, but its people were of the Yamato race. Precisely because Okinawans were civilized, they could be brought into the empire. At the same time, in this view, Okinawan culture was at its “base” Japanese and indeed in some respects represented true Japanese cultural practices that had been lost in Japan itself.

In the 1920s and 1930s, the Shuri castle-shrine was the subject of larger competing discourses about assimilation, local traditions, language, and the like. Okinawan civilization was sometimes conceptualized as spiritual rather than materialistic. The new Okinawa Shrine was not very popular, but Japan’s “spiritual mobilization,” Loo shows, allowed Okinawan intellectuals to use the state to protect their own heritage.

\textsuperscript{31} Loo’s work neglects two important issues, however. First, Loo does not address the extent to which her generalizations about Okinawan opinion apply beyond the views of Okinawan elites and intellectuals; she does point to disagreements among Okinawans themselves about preservation versus development and some identity issues, but generally treats Okinawans as possessing a single voice. Second, if it is true that Shuri Castle represented the independence (if a qualified and balanced independence) of the Ryūkyū Kingdom vis-à-vis China and Japan into the nineteenth century, to what extent did Okinawan memory understand the castle as a symbol of the victors of the fifteenth-century Okinawan wars, repressive in its own way? Loo’s own notion of erasure might come into play here: Shuri Castle soon erased the interisland wars of the various Ryūkyū kingdoms; the Meiji erased the castle’s signification of Ryūkyū’s independence; and the US Occupation erased the Shinto past and to some extent the castle’s Japanese-ness.
to a degree. After the Pacific War, Shuri Castle’s history as a Shinto shrine, Loo signifi-
cantly points out, was largely erased. As Okinawan intellectuals spoke critically of
both the US and Japan, there was a certain rewriting of the former Ryūkyū kingdom’s
history through the discourse of a pre-Satsuma golden age of brave and peaceful
traders. After Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972, advocates cited the need to
strengthen Okinawan culture in calling on the national government to rebuild the
castle. There was a strong feeling that after Okinawa’s mistreatment, Japan should do
no less. The rehabilitation of heritage not totally destroyed by the war and of the other
islands’ heritage took second place. Shuri Castle, then, has come to represent victim-
ization but also resilience for Okinawan identity.32

Intangible Cultural Heritage

Castles, museum artifacts, canonical artworks—these tangible objects have all come
to represent Japan’s heritage and identity since the Meiji Restoration. But while
European heritage was being discovered in monumental constructions—great stone
churches, abbeys, and manors—Japan had little comparable architecture, since most
building was done in wood, except in the case of castles. Indeed, foreign visitors to Ise
Shrine in the early Meiji period, for example, could not decide whether it was new or
old. Either way, objects simply could not represent the full range of cultural practices
that were constitutive of heritage, as soon as anyone so viewed them. While heritage
is generally perishable outside of Europe, Sylvie Guichard-Anguis argues that it was
Japan that first moved to protect intangible forms of heritage, building a new legal
regime for it in the 1950s and, over the following decades, pushing for UNESCO
recognition of its importance.33 The issue was not entirely new to the postwar period,
of course. Jordan Sand points out that Ise Shrine’s periodic rebuilding informed
Japanese attitudes toward heritage generally.34 Early in his career, Itō Chūta doubted
that a clear line of progress could be traced in Japanese architectural history, but he

32 Shuri Castle was again destroyed by a fire in October 2019 (after Heritage Politics was pub-
lished). The Japanese government and UNESCO have both announced support for rebuilding; it
would be interesting to know how Loo understands today’s discourses on the castle.
33 Sylvie Guichard-Anguis, “Patrimoine immatériel japonais, du défilé de char à la corbeille de
34 Jordan Sand, “Japan’s Monument Problem: Ise Shrine as Metaphor,” Past and Present, February
2015, pp. 126–152.
later came to see the practice of renewing and rebuilding as a unique feature of Japanese culture. Sand notes, “Since 1897, preservationists in Japan had made it a practice to completely dismantle state-designated architectural monuments, study the condition of wooden structural members, then reassemble them, usually restoring the building to its earliest documentable form. This practice of dismantling calls to mind the periodic renewal at Ise. . . . The 1897 law, however, altered the significance of the practice by making revival of the original historical form rather than simply maintenance its motive.”

Ise’s emergence in the global as well as Japanese imagination may reflect a longing for perpetual renewal based on deep ecology or a belief that a replica may be as “authentic” as the original. Regardless, as Sand suggests, it would seem by now a rejection of common sense to deny that heritage is a useful way to frame our understanding of Ise and other shrines as sites of cultural practices as much as they are architectural or historical sites.

As Guichard-Anguis points out, Japanese argued first for two main forms of cultural practice to be recognized as “intangible cultural heritage”: the performing arts and crafts. However, the concept of intangible cultural heritage seems even harder to pin down than that of tangible cultural heritage. Granted, crafts and, for that matter, rituals do have links to tangible heritage. And granted, oral traditions and performing arts can be specified. But what social practices passed among the generations are not part of our intangible cultural heritage? A case in point is cuisine. In a series of articles, Voltaire Cang discusses the paradoxes of UNESCO’s designation of (“traditional”) Japanese cuisine—washoku—as an intangible cultural heritage in 2013. Food is certainly central to culture and identity, as anthropologists and many eaters have long known. Yet UNESCO and the countries vying for listing cannot answer the simple question “why not list all the world’s ever-changing cuisines?” The Japanese bid for washoku’s World Heritage status was largely modeled on the successful bids of the “Gastronomic Meal of the French,” the “Mediterranean Diet,” and “Traditional Mexican Cuisine.” We might also mention Turkish coffee and Croatian gingerbread, though these are more specific foods, not cuisines. In theory, UNESCO status does

35 Sand, pp. 143–144.
not apply to just any French or Japanese meal. French food qualifies when it is celebratory and festive, uses local products, and follows the sequence from the aperitif through at least three courses before ending with cheese and dessert and liqueurs.\textsuperscript{37} For \textit{washoku}, too, UNESCO emphasizes its festival nature in addition to its techniques of drawing out the flavor of fresh ingredients and its “respect for nature.” Cang highlights the distinction between UNESCO’s goal of maintaining global diversity—an argument countries can make to UNESCO is that their cuisine is under threat—and Japan’s (and France’s) narrow and “standardized” views of cuisine. Within Japan, what of regional variations? What of popular dishes like Japanese curry—should this dish be deemed merely inauthentic Indian cuisine? Outside of Japan, what of cosmopolitan experiments? Should America claim the California roll as its particular heritage? Cang points to a dystopia of gastrodiplomacy and sushi police—indeed, Japan created quasi-government organizations that could certify restaurants as \textit{washoku} or not. But when did \textit{washoku} become heritage? The term emerged in the early Meiji to distinguish Japanese food from Western cuisine (\textit{yōshoku}). Was it actually under threat a century later? Does UNESCO listing do more than satisfy the appetites of culinary nationalists? Does it create a new threat, that of ossification, or does it ultimately make no difference?

Scholars frequently note the key role Japan played in convincing the global community that intangible cultural heritage was indeed a key, valid, or authentic form of heritage worth preservation. But they have neglected Japan’s ongoing use of heritage as soft power in its international diplomacy. Natsuko Akagawa’s \textit{Heritage Conservation in Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy} elegantly remedies this neglect, discussing both the background of Japan’s prewar development of heritage and its postwar use of heritage in affecting a new global posture.\textsuperscript{38} In addition to exercising soft power, Akagawa argues, Japan is also projecting its national identity by aiding heritage projects abroad. Her book concludes with a case study of Japan’s aid to Vietnamese heritage protection that began in the 1990s. The ancient city of Hue symbolized, for the Vietnamese government, the country’s postwar unification. However, the city’s historic precolonial buildings had to be restored after wartime destruction. By the 1990s, official history was being rewritten to legitimize the Nguyen dynasty, rather than


\textsuperscript{38} Akagawa, \textit{Heritage Conservation in Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy}.
writing its rulers off as reactionary collaborators. According to Akagawa, Japanese aid and expertise played an important role in reconstructing what became the Hue Monuments Complex, which received World Heritage listing in 1993. Waseda University scholars were chosen to work with Vietnamese and French researchers to determine what early nineteenth-century Hue would have looked like. In addition to such work on tangible heritage, Japanese scholars also participated in projects to recover Vietnamese court music and theater. In her study, however, Akagawa assumes, rather than explores, the relationship between Japanese aid and Vietnamese-Japanese relations.

In my reading, the fundamental value of Akagawa’s study lies not in the case study or even her argument for the importance of heritage in Japan’s soft power diplomacy. Her work rests on a broad scaffolding consisting of two main pillars: a theoretical discussion of heritage, nationalism, and identity and a thorough examination of official documents. Akagawa suggests that prewar Japanese national identity shifted from a mix of cultural, political, and military values (I would add racial values) to the postwar cultural and economic identity. In some ways, this shift was a rejection of the past, but it was also a reconstruction of the past by rethinking its heritage. Akagawa points out that the term “cultural properties” (bunkazai) was used for the first time in the heritage laws enacted under the Occupation in 1950, specifically including intangible heritage such as performing arts and conservation techniques along with artifacts, monuments, historical sites, and the like. Occupation authorities removed putatively militaristic heritage items from official heritage lists. Meanwhile, “vernacular heritage,” such as traditional farmhouses, became important to cultural identity as postwar rebuilding and economic growth led to the demolition of such historic structures as had survived the war. Akagawa recognizes but does not fully explore how the distinction between high and popular culture plays out in heritage politics, which perhaps mostly revolves around the economics of tourism. But behind questions of how to make money from elegant netsuke or humble farmhouses, I believe, lies an anxiety of loss.

Akagawa and others clearly show that Japan’s role in the postwar international heritage regime was to help transform attitudes toward “authenticity.” In my view, current scholarship correctly treats the concept as inherently ambiguous. In the case of ruins, standard heritage practice has held that any restoration work is to be clearly

39 Ibid., p. 35.
marked. The Venice Charter of 1964 defined authenticity in four aspects: design, material, craft, and setting; it was clear even at the time that authenticity was, at best, a matter of degree. Akagawa points out that Japanese were not alone in saying that European standards of authenticity could not apply to the rest of the world. Further, the whole paradigm linking heritage to high culture rather than everyday life was breaking down. The Nara Document on Authenticity, approved in 1994, at least broadened the concept of conservation to include periodic dismantling and rebuilding. And in the long run, it “has influenced conservation philosophy by recognizing the significance of the different contexts of heritage” and doing away with set rules.40

Aurélie Élisa Gfeller points also to the international backing for change at the Nara Conference (which approved the Document on Authenticity) and to the larger rethinking in both Europe and the non-West of the concept of authenticity.41 In the politicking leading up to the Nara Conference, Japan was joined by Canada and Norway, each also interested in the conservation of wood structures among other issues. Gfeller thus emphasizes the larger global and historical context leading to the fundamental rethinking of global heritage. The notion of authenticity as a global heritage norm had taken root by the mid-twentieth century, but the preservationist movement also increasingly acknowledged the authenticity of later accretions. That, for example, it was not necessary—and indeed wrong—to “restore” a twelfth-century cathedral to its original form: its additions of the fifteen and even the nineteenth centuries were inextricably part of its authentic nature. This approach to materiality at least implicitly acknowledged ongoing cultural traditions. The further recognition of non-Western conservation methods, not to mention new vernacular and industrial heritage, greatly broadened the concept of authenticity. The Nara Document on Authenticity that emerged out of these moves, Gfeller argues, attempted to combine universal standards of heritage but in a way that recognized different cultural approaches to questions of authenticity.42 It would seem that some commitment to “authenticity” was to remain universal to heritage work, but that everyone (or every “culture”) could define for themselves what constituted authenticity.

The Nara approach both recognized and depended on a concept of intangible heritage, which was arguably most central to Japanese heritage practices. Even

42 Ibid., pp. 782–783.
tangible heritage can be judged as authentic on the basis of whether conservation techniques preserve its spirit—the very essence of intangible heritage. That is, living practice (intangible heritage) maintains tangible heritage such as shrines and temples or, for that matter, churches, but not necessarily by leaving them unchanged. Historic buildings and districts are also generally used in daily life and, unlike museumified structures (such as castles), may not be able to be preserved otherwise. For Akagawa, a key point was Japan’s readiness to promote an “Asian” approach to conservation. As Japan became an economic powerhouse by the 1980s, it became the largest donor to UNESCO. It also devoted a considerable portion of its foreign aid to heritage projects, especially in the Asia-Pacific region—and promoted a Japanese view of heritage, which we can best see as an “expression of nationalism.” Of course, cultural diplomacy was only one aspect of Japan’s foreign policy, which was primarily shaped by the alliance with the United States, but its independent soft power became increasingly important. Foreign aid for heritage projects was codified in law in 2006, which Akagawa argues has strengthened ties with other Asian countries. Projects have included conservation work on Angkor Wat, Borobudur, and Ayutthaya across Southeast Asia but also in China (Dunhuang) and North Korea. With Japanese support, UNESCO adopted the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage in 2003, which, as Akagawa seems to suggest, both reflected and promoted a trend toward marking the “representative” rather than only the “outstanding” as heritage. Broad and ambiguous definitions have led to considerable wheeling and dealing at UNESCO meetings.

Another issue Akagawa raises is language. Do the Japanese terms best translated as “genuineness” or “reliability” adequately convey the notion of “authenticity” in Western languages? There was, of course, little need to refer to “tangible cultural heritage” until the concept of “intangible cultural property” (mukei bunkazai 無形

43 Akagawa, Heritage Conservation in Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy, p. 44. Akagawa also remarks, a little too strongly, on Japan’s development assistance: “Japan’s desire to be the leader of Asia and ultimately a leader in the global arena has not changed since the pre-World War II period” (p. 113).

or heritage came to the fore in the 1994 Nara Conference, which required fundamentally rethinking what authenticity could actually mean. Masahiro Ogino has attempted to work out the theoretical underpinnings of the centrality of intangible heritage to Japanese heritage practices, discussed by many of the authors cited above.\(^4^5\) He regards as distinctive if not unique to Japan what he calls the “logic of actualization,” or how “the past is brought up to date in the present”—essentially, intangible heritage. In contrast to European heritage practice, Japanese practice relies less on monuments that firmly recall the past or museum artifacts that suggest a linear history. Rather, it relies more on, for example, “Living National Treasures,” or the ongoing production of heritage. Ogino’s point is that “practicing traditional art is not aimed at faithfully preserving the heritage of the past, but at bringing what is deemed to have existed in the past to the present.”\(^4^6\) Traditions have no “fixed embodiment” but exist only as they are “actualized”—as in a theatrical performance, for example, but also in pottery, where the heritage value lies not in the clay vessel but in the process of its making. In other words, the past is actualized not in any object but in living people. Less convincingly, Ogino argues that even some objects or sites like Kyoto palaces and temples are actualized in this sense, which is to say divorced from everyday life but still used and so brought into the present. Ogino argues that the traditional Japanese conception of time was not linear and that this nonlinear view of time encouraged the blanket rejection of traditional things (such as castles, as we have seen) in the early Meiji rush of imported modernity. Then, when Japanese realized ancient things should be preserved for their historic value, though they still did not fit any linear scheme, actualization offered a way to bring them into the present.

Ogino discusses a second approach to heritage that he finds common in Japan and also in many late-modern societies, namely the desire to preserve the present (or very recent past). I am tempted to call this “heritage of the present.” Ogino cites the new category of “industrial heritage”; one can also think of museums devoted to the 1980s and even more recent periods. Ogino, however, goes on to trace what he calls a “doubling of the world” to the loss of traditional sacred centers, which causes people to seek “transitional places” such as shopping centers and tourist destinations that are

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46 Ibid., pp. 17–18.
visited briefly and at least partly as an escape from everyday life. People are able to go back and forth between such sites and their everyday lives, resulting in a sense of actually living in two separate worlds, thus creating a doubling effect. In an example that would apply globally, residents who live in registered historic housing live in these two worlds all the time. One is tempted to push this argument, however, in directions further than Ogino seems to go. Do not all people conscious of the past live in a doubled world? Is not all heritage, like all history, inherently part of the present, which is thereby doubled?

Postwar and Local Heritage

In addition to the monographs cited above, scholars have produced seemingly hundreds of articles examining specific cases of heritage work in modern Japan. I have not attempted a systematic exploration of these studies from the frontiers of anthropology, geography, history, economics, tourism, and other fields. Rather, I discuss below selected examples of such recent work. However, I must begin by noting a lacuna in this review essay, though one that also reflects the use of the framework of heritage in modern Japanese studies. That is, the large literature on Shinto and shrines seldom directly raises heritage issues. Shinto scholars certainly touch on related issues—symbolic narrative, identity, memory, power, and contestation as well as preservation, maintenance, funding, public access, and so forth—but they seldom discuss these issues in terms of “heritage.” One reason for this may be the Shinto establishment’s resolute rejection of any official heritage status and perhaps the very idea of heritage. An idea, put baldly, may be that if Shinto represents constant renewal, then it is new, and then it cannot represent heritage (old). Further, the custodians of particular shrines fear any outside influence. According to Jordan Sand, Ise priests not only regard the shrine as the emperor’s gift to his people but proclaim that the shrine is the emperor’s property.

No doubt, visiting a shrine can be a religious experience, a touristy pleasure, a pleasant outing, or a heritage experience, or all of the above at once. But while shrines are never merely heritage, many visitors likely see them through the lens of heritage.

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48 Sand, “Japan’s Monument Problem,” p. 151. The fear that heritage status represents a kind of living death is widespread outside of Japan as well and may not be unique to the Shinto establishment.
That said, there seems to be little scholarly literature specifically using that lens to discuss shrines (as opposed to the more extensive heritage studies of castles, for example). One exception is Jordan Sand’s article on Ise cited above. Sand finds in Ise a “versatile metaphor in discourses of Japanese culture, of Asian culture, and of heritage and architectural monumentality.” In addition to raising imponderable questions of what counts as authentic, Sand points to various uses of Ise as a symbol of some essential Japanese qualities of character or worldview, such as frugality and simplicity or the ephemeral nature of reality. Overall, Japanese themselves have emphasized the shrine’s antiquity, though an ever-fresh antiquity representative of the *kokutai*. In the postwar period, according to Sand, Ise came more to represent the idea of newness within tradition. It is but a step to conclude that heritage is found in practice rather than materiality. At any rate, as Akagawa discusses, Ise was a critical case in Japan’s arguments for UNESCO to acknowledge intangible cultural heritage.

Takashi Inada argues that postwar Japan’s heritage policies have increasingly taken local populations into account.49 Inada contrasts the prewar period, with its emphasis on the “sacred traces of the Meiji emperor” (*Meiji tennō seiseki*), to the 1950 Cultural Property Protection Law (Bunkazai Hogo Hō), which included the heritage of localities and popular culture. On the one hand, the new legal regime, still in effect today, cited “living heritage” and “regional cultural property”; but on the other hand, the legal status of buried material, which as we have seen was off limits as imperial property in the prewar period, remains ambiguous. Inada also emphasizes the decentralization of heritagization processes. As the categories eligible for protection expanded—tangible cultural property, intangible cultural heritage, heritage sites, monuments, and landscapes, as well as folk cultural property, folk documents, traditional building complexes, and cultural landscapes—so did local populations’ role in decision-making. Heritage is no longer limited to rare examples of high culture but is ever more widespread. But it is also, Inada reminds us, threatened by development.

If heritagization today is often linked with local identity claims, more and more heritage sites are being built out of modern experiences, as Ogino has noted. One set of modern experiences stems from the enormous changes that followed Meiji-era rapid industrialization. Should old factory complexes and mines be preserved?

Toshiyuki Morishima has pointed out that efforts to do so since the 1970s have resulted in success when various interests are balanced: heritage protection, tourism, and urban planning.\(^{50}\) Key to such projects is cooperation between the Ministry of Economy and Industry and the Agency for Cultural Affairs. Morishima has created a database of their various projects that shows a certain imbalance or bias toward mining, textile, and military installations at the expense, for example, of transportation heritage. Nonetheless, buildings and sites as well as machines and even archives have been preserved through government efforts related to UNESCO standards for industrial heritage.

In the case of the Miike Coal Mine heritage site in Fukuoka and Kumamoto, Yusuke Matsuura has pointed to two distinct narratives: a more or less official story that accentuates the positive and a dissenting narrative that demands this heritage acknowledge the contributions of Korean forced labor and the sufferings of Japanese workers.\(^{51}\) Given the need to incorporate Miike into Japan’s application for World Heritage status for “Sites of Japan’s Meiji Industrial Revolution,” South Korea was able to insist on acknowledgment of Korean forced labor at the mines. Matsuura also highlights the “public vernacular memory” of “negative heritage” (fu no isan) held by many ex-miners. The mines suffered a slow decline before finally closing in 1997, and memories of labor disputes and pit explosions remained fresh. At least locally, World Heritage status remained controversial. While the mine sites tell largely the official story, memorial markers and memorial services keep alive a darker story.

Edward Boyle widens the lens to examine the general background of UNESCO’s 2015 addition of twenty-three locations to “Sites of Japan’s Meiji Industrial Revolution: Iron and Steel, Shipbuilding and Coal Mining.”\(^{52}\) Treating heritage as inherently contested by memory collectives, Boyle points to the tense negotiations between Japan, on the one side, and South Korea and China, on the other. At stake in the negotiations was a story of successful Westernization and “Asian cultural response” versus a story of imperialism and exploitative industrialization.

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Temporality mattered as well: if the story of industrialization ends before 1910, then Japan’s colonization of Korea is left out. Following Matsuura, Boyle notes the existence of voices outside these state-directed narratives but emphasizes that national stories tended to dominate—other stories are marginalized or even forgotten.

Equally ambiguous in its memory-work is “defense heritage,” including both the structures of modern Japan’s industrialization and state-building and the premodern castles discussed above. Old daimyo castles have become surrounded by an aura of romance and adventure, but modern military bases have been neglected, either out of antiwar sentiment or from their association with failure better forgotten. Masaaki Okada has pointed to the growing reuse of defense sites since the beginning of the twenty-first century. Some have been turned into parks; old aircraft shelters have been used as warehouses. But it is not clear if this process is actually one of heritigization or forgetting. Having said that, we should note that Jung-Sun Han has pointed to genuine popular interest in war-related sites. While the government may wish to ignore them, local communities and civil society organizations have sometimes found ways to preserve underground factories, bunkers, shelters, and the like. According to Han, while some of these heritigization projects highlight the Japan-as-victim narrative, they are recognized as “heritage of bad things” and leave room for counter-narratives and critical views of Japan. Underground factories, for example, may note the presence of enslaved Korean laborers. Highlighting local interest in “dark heritage,” Han also points to the generational shift underway by the 1990s, although he does not explicitly argue that, compared with those of the war generation, the newer generations’ memories and views may be less sensitive—or perhaps less defensive or less ideological (or ideological in a different way).

Industrialization everywhere has had its dark side, but “dark heritage” may refer to heritage that is exclusively or primarily associated with death or disaster. Dark heritage should be distinguished from the notion of “dark tourism” from which it is derived, though neither can be defined precisely. Dark tourism—visits to prison sites, Holocaust sites, Chernobyl, Fukushima, and so on—may be associated with formal memorials but is often criticized for trivializing tragedy and providing voyeuristic

thrills.\textsuperscript{55} Dark heritage, it seems to me, is more of a convenient label than a precise classification. And it is still subject to contestation, as Atsuko Hashimoto and David Telfer point out in their discussion of Okinawa Peace Park.\textsuperscript{56} The park’s meanings are mediated not only by the museum displays but also by the “storytellers” (kataribe), who are survivors of the Pacific War and offer guided tours and explanations of the exhibits. Not all visitors want to hear their “anti-Japanese” sentiments, Hashimoto and Telfer note, while the park itself confounds mainland Japanese expectations of war memorials. The bones of the enormous number of Okinawa civilians who died in 1945 are laid next to those of Japanese soldiers. The memory of the war is neither one of Japanese glory nor one of Japanese victimization (as in Hiroshima and Nagasaki), or at least not exclusively so. Yet at least one set of lessons revolves around Japanese sins: the failure to protect Okinawans from the US invasion, drafting Okinawans for the war, turning the islands into US bases, and perhaps its original nineteenth-century “colonization” of the islands. Above all, the slaughter of the Battle of Okinawa is laid at the feet of the Japanese, not the US invaders. However, Hashimoto and Telfer ask what meanings Okinawa Peace Park will convey as the older kataribe are replaced by younger generation who did not experience the war personally.

Examples of what might be considered gray heritage, if not exactly dark heritage, are commemorations that put a happy face on inherently unhappy events. One such event—taking place over years—was the repatriation of Japanese from Manchuria, Korea, and Siberia after the Pacific War. In 2015 UNESCO put a selection of documents at the Maizuru Repatriation Memorial Museum into its Memory of the World International Register.\textsuperscript{57} This gave the repatriation documents the same status as the Bayeux Tapestry, Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, and Anne Frank’s diary. Jonathan Bull and Steven Ivings argue that, in effect, UNESCO ratified an orthodox account of the state bringing people safely back to their homeland. The museum long neglected the actual memories of repatriated Japanese who faced difficulties gaining

\textsuperscript{55} Will Coldwell, “Dark Tourism: Why Murder Sites and Disaster Zones are Proving Popular,” \textit{Guardian}, October 31, 2013.


acceptance back into Japanese society, not to mention their war memories and the memories of people who repatriated themselves without the state’s help. It also neglected the Maizuru port’s role in sending Chinese and Koreans away from Japan, back to their home countries at the end of the war. By the twenty-first century, the museum was looking for ways to tell stories to audiences that had not experienced the war, and it broadened its focus. Its UNESCO application emphasized “universal themes” such as “the human determination to survive.” One point was that just as some Japanese had to be repatriated from Soviet POW camps, so, too, did German and Hungarian soldiers face repatriation at the end of the war. This argument could lessen any sense of Japanese as having uniquely suffered. Nonetheless, Bull and Ivings conclude that the museum still does little to present anything close to the full range of voices that would speak to what happened in Maizuru Port.

Ainu human remains is another painful issue subject to heritigization. Naohiro Nakamura discusses some of the controversies surrounding the government’s plan to build a memorial hall in Hokkaido to house unidentified Ainu remains that had been stored mostly in universities. Anthropologists’ seizure or theft of first nations’ human remains has of course been controversial in many countries, and the question of whether and how to return them continues to embroil scientific and first nation communities today. Nakamura shows that, in Japan’s case, the government became involved after Ainu sued Hokkaido University for the remains to be returned. Ainu themselves are hardly unanimous about the correct course to follow, but there is considerable opposition to the government’s plan for a single memorial hall. While it is impossible to trace most remains to individual descendants, many could be returned to the burial grounds from which they were originally excavated. Ainu communities could then ensure academics could no longer conduct research on the remains. As Nakamura describes this story, the issues are not finally settled, and litigation continues. Memorial services could also be held for remains that are returned to burial grounds, in which case such “heritigization” would presumably be relatively private and low-key. This would not preclude the building of a memorial hall, which would require decisions about who would tell what story about the remains.

The case studies mentioned above clearly involve questions of local identity—perhaps all heritigization does—but local identity is not their main focus. One issue

that reoccurs frequently is how official state narratives neglect local views. An example is the Miike mines, which are sites of glorious industrialization and economic development, or of enslavement and suffering. The local war-related “dark heritage” discussed by Jung-Sun Han are other examples. More prosaically, heritigization may support local pride but comes with costs. As Japan’s rural areas are hollowed out, many communities seek to bring in tourist yen. Ōgimachi’s traditional gasshō-style farmhouses received World Heritage status in 1995. Takamitsu Jimura has described how the community has attempted to deal with problems stemming from the particular type of tourism that resulted. Tourists certainly come; but especially since highway improvements in 2008, they often spend just a few hours at the site and move on, rather than patronizing local home-hostels and restaurants. Jimura’s survey of residents found that many considered their privacy invaded (tourists did not always know what was open to the public and what was not). They also felt the community suffered from traffic congestion and that their community spirit had been weakened. Young people still leave to find jobs in the city. Nonetheless, Jimura urges that a tourism management plan could help; greater provisions for in-depth understanding of the village’s history and architecture, for example, would appeal to some tourists and encourage longer stays.

The decision to seek World Heritage status must come from a national government, but the impetus might come from local leaders. Or not. Based on his fieldwork on an island in Kagoshima Prefecture, Michael Dylan Foster notes that island leaders worked to get national recognition for a village ritual as early as the 1970s, but only three decades later did the national government push for UNESCO recognition. The ritual—Toshidon—involves adult males wearing masks traveling from house to house scaring children (with family approval, to encourage good behavior) around New Year’s. Like other parts of rural Japan, Shimo-Koshikijima has long been suffering from job loss and population loss—especially of families with children, without whom Toshidon would make no sense. Toshidon was listed as “intangible cultural heritage” in 2009. Increased tourism and even TV coverage of the rituals, allowed in some neighborhoods but not others, followed. According to Foster, villagers enjoy the

recognition, though they disagree over how open the ritual should be to outside observers (after all, it takes place in people’s homes) and whether their presence changes the nature of the ritual. Do children begin performing for the camera? Does UNESCO status itself change the very nature of the ritual? Yet without UNESCO status, would the ritual survive? Foster does not answer these questions. He is interested primarily in how “UNESCO” (Yunesuko) is a floating signifier: for some, it means global standing and local pride; for others, it means tourism and income; and for yet others, it means a responsibility—even a burden—to maintain a ritual that is potentially losing its meaning.

Competing claims also rest on competing interpretations. For example, the sacred grove Sēfa Utaki on Okinawa (World Heritage as of 2000) is subject to a proliferation of Okinawan pilgrims, spirit mediums, mainland Japanese tourists, foreign tourists, tour guides, and shop owners. Aike P. Rots highlights the conflicts between these groups. The grove’s competing uses are under the control of both local authorities and the state because Sēfa Utaki is not attached to an independent religious institution; its uses and management are also subject to a great deal of negotiation and also buck passing (who pays for upkeep?). Rots emphasizes that the site was radically changed by World Heritage status, but his fundamental point is the sheer multiplicity of voices and strategies surrounding the site. The history of the “sacred place,” previously a key worship site of the Ryūkyū Kingdom and long used by local spirit mediums, suggests that all claims to it today are based on essentialized and reductive interpretations. In other words, it is true heritage—claimed and contested by diverse groups. Some native Okinawans, understanding themselves as participating in traditional rituals, regard the site as sacred but sense that mass tourism is weakening its sacred qualities. Some tourists, by contrast, understand it to be a “power spot” whose spiritual functions can be drawn on in new ways. Rots seems to regard the core issue as one of Okinawan self-determination, but that does not answer the question of authority, for it neglects the competing claims among Okinawans themselves.

The question of local authority—and authenticity—as opposed to that of the central state is certainly not limited to Okinawa. The town of Hiraizumi in Iwate Prefecture has been taken as the exemplar of Tōhoku culture. In his study of the historian Takahashi Tomio’s treatment of Hiraizumi, Nathan Hopson is concerned

61 Aike P. Rots, “‘This Is Not a Powerspot’: Heritage Tourism, Sacred Space, and Conflicts of Authority at Sēfa Utaki,” Asian Ethnology vol. 78, no. 1, 2019, pp. 155–180.
primarily with historiographical issues, but also pays attention to heritage.\textsuperscript{62} It was, he argues, the archaeological and historical evidence of Hiraizumi’s role in the world trading system that prompted the government to seek World Heritage status for it. That is, he takes Hiraizumi not as a marginal region of Japan but as a site of international significance and thus suitable for UNESCO recognition. (World Heritage status was finalized in 2011 in the wake of the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami.) Hopson suggests that Hiraizumi in the immediate postwar period also had the advantage of helping to refute the discredited prewar ideology of the homogenous nature of the Japanese “race” and polity. If Hiraizumi is understood as a “culturally hybrid” regional power that resisted full incorporation into the Japanese state, it may foster more pluralistic understandings of Japanese culture. Without going into complex historiographical issues, we can note that it was at least plausible to see Hiraizumi as both Japanese and a victim of Japanese expansion, as both culturally autonomous and as an integral part of Japan; in a word, as a hybrid. Now recognized as World Heritage of significance to all humankind, Hiraizumi remains, in Hopson’s words, “a fixture in discourses of Japanese national identity” while, indeed, its new status—cemented in history—deradicalizes its revolutionary potential.\textsuperscript{63}

In the case of Kyoto, very little heritage can be called uniquely local. Nearly everywhere are examples of ancient or allegedly ancient arts, temples, shrines, and palaces that are all associated one way or another with the imperial house. Kyoto’s long centuries as the imperial capital virtually defined the entire region’s status in the wake of the Meiji Restoration, as we have seen. Even its supposedly unique features—the Gion’s geisha culture or Kyoto kaiseki—have become metonyms for Japan. At the same time, Kyoto’s heritage also includes the modern, particularly commemoration of the Meiji Restoration itself. Visitors to sites connected with samurai martyrs of the 1860s seek an entirely different kind of experience than visitors to Kinkaku-ji.\textsuperscript{64} The experience of visiting Restoration sites may still be nostalgic, but it can, Jennifer Prough argues, also reflect an attempt to relate “traditional” values of perseverance and duty to “modern” ones of youth and openness.

Still, what we might call the local persists in the national. However much

\begin{footnotes}
\item[63] Ibid., p. 377.
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heritage work in Tokyo and Kyoto is devoted to building memories that foster identification with the nation, it also speaks to what it means to be from a particular place. If it seems obvious that Tōhoku or Okinawa would, in some ways and to some degree, define themselves vis-à-vis the Japanese state, this can be true even of Tokyo. Jordan Sand’s discussion of the Edo-Tokyo Museum, finished in 1993, highlights its emphasis on everyday life.  

The museum is part of the general movement away from the heritage of high culture, as described above, to objects—and even reconstructed scenes—that ordinary people could feel represent their own ancestors’ lives, or even their own childhood. Thus, the museum includes the interiors of imagined farmhouses and models of a postwar Tokyo apartment, complete with electrical appliances. (Not included are the factories that made those appliances or the pollution that resulted: nostalgia is part of the message). Sand notes, “Privileging the home as the site of everyday life elided other sites of community and spaces of commonality, and made possible the reinscription in objects or ideological bonds between the individual and the state.” Yet the Edo-Tokyo Museum was planned not by the state’s culture bureaucrats but by amateur historians and academics supported by the city government. Indeed, there is a certain celebration of Tokugawa Edo, implying if not a rejection of the Meiji, at least the claim that not all was made new and good in 1868. The museum’s story of “Tokyo” goes on to offer, at least in my view, a twinned experience—of increasing commodification and of certain kinds of losses. Sand points to the danger (well understood by the museum’s own leaders) that presentation of everyday life may overwhelm us with nostalgia for imagined pasts, whether recent or ancient. He highlights the tensions involved in the desire to escape the national narrative of heroic modernization, on the one hand, and romanticizing the local and everyday on the other. Many involved in the museum planning did not want to present a single authoritative narrative, but museums are by nature authoritative. Sand convincingly concludes that heritage today is fragmenting and, in a sense, gives more power to audiences in finding meaning; and yet, he notes, the role of the state in heritagization has hardly disappeared.

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66 Ibid., p. 115.
The concept of “heritage” is so capacious as to seem analytically useless. Almost everything—perhaps indeed everything—can be regarded as heritage. Into the twentieth century, the term most obviously referred to cultural artifacts, especially buildings, monuments, and art deemed worthy of preserving for future generations. Referring originally to the property bequeathed between the generations in wealthy families, “heritage” had acquired by the late nineteenth century its current sense applying to the inheritance of larger groups, especially nations. Heritage in this sense is integral to modern concepts of identity and represents the “best of the past,” what we choose to remember with pride. Heritage is thus always “our heritage”—it defines, reflects, supports, and sometimes contests a group consciousness, whether the group is the nation, a tribe, a class, an ethnic group, or perhaps humanity as a whole. Tangible and intangible objects and practices can formally be declared “heritage” by a government or UNESCO, or they may simply be understood as heritage by someone or another.67

The scope of the concept of heritage exploded in the second half of the twentieth century to include “natural heritage”—landscapes of particular beauty or historical memory—and especially “intangible heritage.” In this shift, there has been what might be reductively expressed as a move from the derivation of identity based on the intrinsic cultural or aesthetic value of heritage objects to the derivation of heritage based on identities defined as those groups that transmit “traditions, skills, and customs” (their heritage) over the generations.68 Heritage, like identity, is always plural and also processual (heritagization). Though the studies discussed here focus on Japan’s heritage, scholars discuss how it is contested, or at least subject to different interpretations, and how proper understanding of it requires a global framework. Heritage is complex because it is built on unstable mixtures of official ideology, popular nostalgia, the commercial media interests, the actions of national and local authorities, and international summits. In turn, heritage produces not only identity but also power. By no means should our use of the term be limited to sites and practices approved by UNESCO, or even those recognized by national or local governments.

67 This paragraph is broadly based on a portion of the voluminous literature reflecting on heritage; I am generally indebted to the work of G. J. Ashworth, Brian Graham, J. E. Tunbridge, Tim Winter, Rodney Harrison, Laurajane Smith, David Harvey, and above all David Lowenthal.

As UNESCO’s lists grow and grow and as every possible group seeks out its own heritage, heritage seems to be expanding and devouring all before it. And yet heritage also shrinks and even disappears. Heritage scholarship often counterposes heritage to history: the one popular and often made up, the other at least striving for objectivity and evidence. We can be skeptical of any such binary opposition, but heritage is relatively more attuned to immediate cultural flows and hegemonic social structures, as we have seen in the rise and fall of castles as symbols of masculine militarism in twentieth-century Japan. The Western-language (primarily English) heritage scholarship on Japan demonstrates the intimate links of heritage with Japanese history.

日本遺産の西洋言語研究

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過去数十年の間、世界の遺産は劇的に増加し、遺産に関する研究も増加している。日本の遺産に関する西洋の研究は、アイデンティティ、権力、国家、および観光の問題に焦点を当ててきたが、これらの問題は、「遺産化」のトランスナショナルな性格を踏まえて理解する必要がある。本稿は、主に英語を中心とした西洋言語の研究に基づいて、日本の遺産に関する近年の研究について考察する。博物館や城を対象とする研究が多い一方で、「無形遺産」や「負の遺産」も重要である。遺産研究は首尾一貫した研究分野ではないが、人類学、歴史、地理、美術史、文学研究などの学問分野の知見をもとに文化的表象の背後にあるものを検討し、権力関係を明るみに出す。

キーワード：遺産研究、公共の記憶、観光、アイデンティティ、日本史

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