Making Sense of Senseless Violence in Early Meiji Japan

David L. Howell

Princeton University

The period surrounding the Meiji Restoration was a time of unprecedented violence in Japanese history. Emblematic is the terror of the Restoration movement itself, in which "men of high purpose" (*shishi*) and other activists cut down officials, foreigners, and one another in the name of loyalty to the emperor. Peasants and townspeople rose in protest with especial frequency during this time, and urban riots (*uchikowashi*) and other large-scale incidents often resulted in the destruction of considerable property. Although surveys of the period devote due attention to this violence, they tend nonetheless to portray the Restoration as a generally peaceful revolution. Even scholars who emphasize the radical transformation of social relations and thought over the Tokugawa-Meiji divide focus less on murderous violence than on sporadic inversions of hierarchy, such as the carnivalesque revelry of the *eejanaika* disturbances, as evidence of the tumult of the times. Violence thus appears to be an incidental feature of the transfer of power, rather than an integral characteristic of Japan's initial encounter with modernity.

In this paper I shall focus on one particular type of violence in the Restoration period, bodily attacks by commoners inflicted in the course of protest. I refer here to cold-blooded murder committed to make a point about the condition of the economy, the state of social relations, the direction of government policies—in short, political violence, broadly construed: violence that is not the tragic outcome of a family dispute, or commonplace thuggery, or crime; violence that is not personal, or if it is, it is transformed into something universal by virtue of the politically charged moment in which it occurs.

Murderous violence as an instrument of protest deserves a central place in our narrative of nineteenth century Japanese history, and the way to accord it that centrality lies, ironically, in setting aside—for at time, at least—our model of peasant contention (*hyakushō ikki*). By disengaging the discussion of popular uses of violence from the analysis of peasant contention, we can expose the tensions that led to its eruption without reducing it entirely to a function of class conflict. That is, by looking at violence separately from the historiographical category of peasant contention, we are reminded that a tenuous balance between conflict and harmony—weighted ever so slightly in favor of harmony—is the usual state of affairs in any community. Conversely, focusing on moments of clearly articulated protest encourages us to overlook the sorts of tensions over participation in community activities and access to resources, and indeed over the rhythms of everyday life—often quite minor when considered in isolation—that sowed the seeds of an anger more gnawing, by virtue of its very integration

History and Folklore Studies in Japan (Kyoto: International Research Center for Japanese Studies, 2006).

into the fabric of daily life, than the major crises that led to the incidents that survive in our log of peasant contention. This is not to say we should ignore peasant contention or overlook the pressures that arose in the face of economic-structural change. Quite the contrary: my point is merely that only by recognizing that conflict was endemic to Japanese society in the middle of the nineteenth century can we proceed to a consideration of the social and political conditions that governed the translation of conflict into physical violence.

To that end, I propose to perform a methodological sleight of hand in an effort to circumvent familiar binaries of uprising versus normality, discord versus harmony, and the like. I shall organize my discussion around one specific incident from the early Meiji period, the notorious Mimasaka Blood-Tax Rebellion of 1873. However, my principal aim is not to offer a new interpretation or even a detailed account of the incident itself, but rather to focus on several telling details of the rebellion that suggest ways to think about murderous violence beyond the analytical framework of studies of peasant rebellion. By the same token, this discussion is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of violence in the Restoration period, but an illustration of an approach to the study of violence, cast in the context of one particular incident, framed in the context of abrupt institutional change.

Violence in early Meiji Japan was intimately connected to collapse of the status system. In the long run, the dismantling of the institutions of status was for most people a liberating process, for it permitted individuals to engage in economic, intellectual, and political activities previously barred to them. At the same time, however, the disruptions attendant on the collapse of the status order gave rise to new patterns of physical violence: individuals briefly became free to express violent impulses—not at will, perhaps, but certainly in accordance with principles that neither the early modern regime nor the Meiji state would have accepted as valid. For a few years, the individual impulse to violence was like a free electron, liberated from the orbit of the status system but not yet captured by the disciplinary order of the modern regime.

The murderous violence of the Mimasaka Blood-Tax Rebellion and other early Meiji incidents occurred during this unstable interval.[1] Mimasaka province, in the hilly interior of present-day Okayama prefecture (at the time of the incident it was under the administration of Hōjō prefecture), was the site of a number of major peasant protests in the late Tokugawa period, some of which featured the practice of *hinin-goshirae*, in which peasants dressed as beggars for their procession to government offices. Although the term *hinin* here refers to beggars generically and is not a status label, oral traditions in the contemporary Buraku community suggest that outcastes participated alongside commoners in a massive protest in 1866, and in other incidents as well.[2] The region was also the site of intermittent unrest in the aftermath of the abolition edict. Two groups of villages submitted petitions demanding repeal of the abolition edict in the tenth month of 1871, just two months after a Burakumin had been assaulted by a mob during the course of a protest calling for the reinstatement of the former daimyo as governor of Majima prefecture.[3] Later that year, commoners in one village entered into a compact promising join in any protests that might occur in response to abolition.[4] Thus it is not surprising that the province would be the site of anti-Buraku violence. In any case, combine this animosity toward Burakumin with persistent rumors that villages would be forced to turn over oxen and young women to the government so that their blood might be given to foreigners, and with attempts to subvert implementation of the household-registration system—seen as the mechanism by which such levies would be assessed—and it is clear that peasants in the region were overcome with anxiety in the first years of the Meiji era.[5]

The authorities in the area responded by issuing official denials of the rumors of blood collecting.[6] They also urged mutual courtesy in relations between commoners and Burakumin, though peasants interpreted this exhortation (perhaps correctly) to mean that the authorities intended for the Burakumin to respect previous standards of deferential behavior; some of their Buraku neighbors agreed with this interpretation, for one village drafted a document refusing to honor the exhortation.[7] At the same time, officials mandated the monetization of outcaste duties related to the disposal of animal carcasses in the third month of 1871, but then ordered the Burakumin to continue to perform such duties eight months later, after they had been made commoners.[8]

The Tokugawa roots of antipathy toward the Burakumin in Mimasaka are not clear. In 1864, *eta* accounted for about seven percent of the Tsuyama domain's non-samurai population of 60,000.[9] This was higher than the two or three percent estimated for the archipelago as a whole, but was probably similar to the figures for other regions in western Japan, which had far more outcastes than areas east of Edo. Outcastes in Mimasaka were scattered about the region according to the usual pattern for rural outcastes, in communities attached to commoner villages, and were subject to the control of headmen from the Kaiami house of Miho village.[10] Evidence from the late 1870s suggests that the outcaste community was riven by disparities in wealth—and concomitant tensions—similar to those that affected commoner villages throughout Japan.[11] In addition to the performance of status-based duties, outcastes in Mimasaka farmed and produced charcoal, a common enough livelihood in the heavily forested province.[12] In any case, available collections of early modern documents contain few references to outcastes, but it is possible that relevant materials either remain in private hands or have remained inaccessible because archives tend to limit public access to materials that contain discriminatory language or genealogical information.[13]

The Mimasaka Blood-Tax Rebellion was one of the bloodiest conflicts in the early Meiji period; eighteen of the twenty-four people killed and eleven of the twenty-one injured were Burakumin.[14] The rebellion began when a thirty-three-year-old resident of Teieiji village in Hōjō prefecture, Fudeyasu Utarō, disillusioned with early Meiji state-building policies, manipulated popular misunderstanding of the term "blood tax" (*ketsuzei*) to launch an uprising against the new regime. The term, which was used in government pronouncements concerning the new conscription law, resonated with longstanding beliefs in the existence of figures who roamed the countryside in search of human blood and fat, and connected as well to fears raised by the Western presence in Japan.[15] Under repeated torture Fudeyasu confessed to having spread rumors that a man in white was making his way around the area draining the blood of men aged seventeen to forty, and to having staged an incident in which such a figure showed up in Teieiji. The appearance of the man in white provided the desired impetus for an uprising, but Fudeyasu almost immediately dropped out of the picture. Instead, several bands of peasants from neighboring villages, acting without identifiable leadership, rampaged around the countryside for six days from 26 to 31 May 1873.

During the course of the disturbance a group of protesters marched on the Hōjō prefectural capital of Tsuyama, and a list of demands—perhaps composed after the fact—denouncing every major Meiji reform eventually appeared. Nevertheless, it is clear that the incident was driven by its violence, rather than by specific grievances the protesters hoped to rectify. The rioters identified their two principal targets within the first hours of the uprising: local officials charged with carrying out government reforms and the recently "liberated" outcaste community. They treated their targets quite differently: on the one hand, they destroyed government property but avoided harming officials. On the other hand, however, the protesters brutally attacked the residents of Buraku communities, killing eighteen and injuring many more; in addition, they burned down a total of 263 houses in Buraku villages. Moreover, the nature of the rebels' violence changed over the course of the disturbance. The protesters began with one technique of late Tokugawa *ikki*, the "smashing" (*uchikowashi*), in their attacks on government property and several Buraku villages. As the disturbance progressed, they turned increasingly (but not exclusively) to arson—an indiscriminate form of destruction that departed significantly from the focused anger of the selective wrecking of property—when attacking Buraku villages. It was in the context of this escalating violence against property that the murder of the Burakumin occurred.

In the aftermath of the uprising nearly every commoner household in the province was fined for participating in the disturbance. Several hundred people faced punishments ranging from flogging to imprisonment, and fifteen men were beheaded: Fudeyasu for instigating the rebellion, the others for participating in the massacre of former outcastes in the village of Tsugawahara.

The Mimasaka rebellion is one of the most thoroughly researched incidents of the early Meiji years.[16] To oversimplify a bit, interpretations have split over the question of how central the attacks on the Burakumin were to the rebellion's greater significance. On the one hand, there is an impulse to valorize the rebels' opposition to the Meiji state's heavy-handed centralizing policies; historians on this side of debate tend to downplay the significance of the Buraku attacks, treating them as spontaneous incidents or even the product of goading by disaffected samurai. On the other hand, scholars who situate the incident within a narrative of Buraku resistance against discrimination tend to cast the murdered Burakumin as heroic martyrs to the cause of Buraku liberation, but offer little further insight as to why the attacks occurred at that particular historical moment. (Raw violence of this sort directed against outcastes was virtually unknown in the Tokugawa period, and ceased after about the mid-1870s.)

Of course, the best studies of the rebellion offer subtler analyses than this summary suggests, but the fact remains that the incident is inevitably subordinated to a broader literature of peasant contention or of Buraku resistance. As a result, it has been difficult to discuss events like the Mimasaka rebellion outside the context of a predetermined narrative of class conflict and state repression. Rather than dwell on these important but familiar themes, I would like instead to consider the conditions that pushed the conflict over the edge into the realm of murderous violence.

First, let us consider the motives of the men who participated in the massacre of Burakumin at Tsugawahara village. The official history of Hōjō prefecture includes the confessions of the fourteen men who were executed for their role in the massacre, as well as that of Fudeyasu Utarō.[17] The documents must be used with care. They are composed in highly stylized language, with considerable overlap in phraseology. Moreover, judicial torture was used to extract some of the confessions (most notably Fudeyasu's). Nonetheless, they offer important insights into the motivations of the rebels.

From the confessions it is clear that the fourteen men sentenced to death for the Tsugawahara massacre were not the only participants in the killing of Burakumin. Indeed, reading through their confessions leaves one with the impression that most of them just happened to have been identified as participants. It is reasonable to suppose, then, that their fellow rioters shared their attitudes toward the Buraku community. In any case, the message that comes through the confessions is anger with the Burakumin's lack of deference toward commoners. In the eyes of the defendants, the elimination of formal status distinctions had emboldened the Burakumin to behave as commoners themselves, liberated from the burdens of their previous status. As one of the defendants, Uji Teizō, put it, "Ever since the abolition of the label *eta,* the former *eta* of Tsugawahara village have forgotten about their former status and have in many instances behaved impertinently (*furei no shimuki sukanakarazu*)."[18]

This sort of resentment appears repeatedly in accounts of the tensions that emerged in the aftermath of the promulgation of the abolition edict. In western Japan in particular, commoners took measures to contain social interaction between Burakumin and themselves, especially in matters that exposed commoners to the Burakumin's supposed pollution. Thus, hairdressers, bathhouse owners, and publicans posted notices that their services were available only to residents of the immediate neighborhood. They did so at the cost of considerable economic hardship, for to prevent the occasional Burakumin from patronizing their businesses they were forced to turn away commoner travelers and other unfamiliar customers. As we have seen, other conflict arose over rights to participate in Shinto festivals, the drawing of school-district boundaries, and the disposal of animal carcasses.[19]

In short, the reasons given by the defendants in Mimasaka for attacking Buraku villages and killing their residents were identical to those expressed in other conflicts—some violent, most not—between commoners and Burakumin in the early Meiji period. As a result, the attacks cannot be explained entirely within the context of the uprising, but rather must be considered more broadly as part of the general reaction to the elimination of the status distinction between commoners and outcastes. In other words, the uprising served as the medium in which tension and resentment escalated into murderous violence, but it did not "cause" the underlying conflict. At the same time, the uprising was nominally sparked by the fear and confusion engendered by the imposition of conscription and other early Meiji reforms; hence, opposition to the abolition of outcaste status—a policy announced nearly two years previously—did not alone "cause" the rebellion. Furthermore, the uprising served as the medium in which the resistance of Buraku communities took place, but it did not "cause" their resistance, which must be attributed to the ardor with which they welcomed the abolition edict. This is not to depreciate the importance of the uprising as medium—after all, it is unlikely the attacks on the Burakumin would have occurred independently of the more general antigovernment disturbance; at the same time, however, there is no *necessary* progression from uprising to murder—indeed, it is the very rarity of killing in peasant contention that makes the Mimasaka incident so distinctive.

Thus we are faced with the question of what pushed preexisting conflict over the edge into deadly violence. It is tempting to attribute the killings to the rage of the moment: after all, manslaughter in a fit of emotion was common enough in Japan in the 1870s. Yet to dismiss the massacre in this way begs the question of why killings in the heat of an uprising were so rare in general, and yet were concentrated in the period immediately following the Restoration.

But killing is a funny business, utterly unimaginable in normal times, utterly mundane under certain peculiar circumstances. Obviously, weaponry is an important issue here, for the presence of deadly weapons facilitates the translation of rage into murder. In the Mimasaka rebellion, as in other early Meiji uprisings, the peasants armed themselves with bamboo spears, guns, and swords. The rioters in Tsugawahara relied mostly on bamboo spears and guns to kill their victims, though they battered a number of Burakumin with stones first, and set at least one woman afire.

The presence of deadly weapons in early Meiji uprisings was a novel development in the history of peasant contention, as Yabuta Yutaka and others have demonstrated. Protesting peasants in the Tokugawa era rarely armed themselves, but rather carried agricultural implements such as sickles, hoes, and axes; during urban riots peasants and townspeople added carpenters' tools like saws and awls to facilitate the destruction of property.[20] These implements were known as *emono*, a term that normally refers to a weapon one is particularly adept at wielding; in the context of peasant contention, however, "tool" rather than "weapon" better captures the sense in which the word was used.

This particular use of the term *emono* dates to about the middle of the eighteenth century, and is one manifestation of a distinctive etiquette (*sahō*) of protest that evolved over the course of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.[21] In accordance with this etiquette, peasants deliberately avoided carrying deadly weapons, and their use of sickles, hoes, and other farm tools was intended explicitly to emphasize their status as peasants.[22] Yabuta attributes this eschewal of bodily violence to a series of adaptations during the seventeenth century to Hideyoshi's disarmament edicts (*sōbujirei*). To be sure, weapons designed primarily to inflict bodily harm—guns, swords, bamboo spears—do occasionally figure into protest narratives, but they never predominate, particularly in accounts written by people close to the events.[23]

In any case, bloodshed was rare in early modern peasant contention. Although protesters often destroyed property, and the samurai authorities frequently threatened to use force to put down protests, only rarely did people actually get killed during the course of a rebellion, and when they did it was often accidental. This remained the case up to the onset of Meiji, even as the conventions governing peasant protests evolved into a new form in which symbolic assertions of the burdens and privileges of peasant status took a back seat to graphic demonstrations of outrage. In the early nineteenth century, an increasing number of incidents occurred in which the protesters failed to present specific demands to the authorities, but rather destroyed property as an end in itself. By the last two or three decades of the Tokugawa period, references to bamboo spears and other weapons gradually became conspicuous in descriptions of protests. Nonetheless, cases of weapons actually being used against other humans remained quite isolated, though they could be quite spectacular when they did occur, as in a case in which angry peasants murdered their lord, a profligate and corrupt bannerman (*hatamoto*).[24]

To some extent we can disengage weapons from the question of the etiquette of protest. Weapons were in fact quite common in the countryside: Hideyoshi's sword hunts did not extend to short swords (*wakizashi*) or for that matter guns (*teppō*), with the result that peasants could in fact arm themselves if they so chose. Tsukamoto Manabu has demonstrated that guns were surprisingly common in the countryside; aside from Tokugawa Tsunayoshi's reign at the end of the seventeenth century and the 1850s and '60s, the authorities rarely attempted restrict their ownership.[25] Incidentally, although guns in early modern villages were used occasionally by hunters to kill game, they were more commonly employed to scare off wild boars, deer, and other animals that harmed upland fields. This helps to explain why the guns that occasionally appear in early modern protest narratives seem to have functioned mostly to sound signals.[26] In Mimasaka, however, at least one Burakumin was shot to death by a peasant who had brought along his gun.

Perhaps the most suggestive evidence about weapons comes from the Kantō region in the 1860s, where social disorder was a severe problem for the shogunate. As we have seen, efforts to reestablish order in the Kantō began systematically in 1805 with the creation of the Kantō Regulatory Patrol, a police force with the authority to arrest gamblers (*bakuto*), masterless samurai (*rōnin*), and unregistered commoners (*mushuku*) without regard to domainal or other political boundaries.[27] The patrol and related efforts to impose order—never very successful in the first place—proved particularly inadequate in the face of the political, economic, and intellectual dislocation of the Bakumatsu period.

During the last decade or so of Tokugawa rule, injunctions from the patrol magistrates to Kantō villages included instructions to set up a system by which local temple and fire bells (*kane, hanshō*) would be rung to alert residents of neighboring villages to the presence of "bad guys"—an amorphous category of disorderly elements, referred to in contemporary documents as *akutō*, *akuto*, *warumono*, and so forth—whom the peasants were to apprehend and hold for the arrival of the patrolling magistrates.[28] When so summoned, the villagers were to follow the orders of the local village officials regardless of their own place of residence; in the Kantō this could easily mean that peasants would be hurrying to enforce the law not only in another village but indeed in another domain entirely. Some injunctions included calls for the peasants to arm themselves with guns (whether registered or not) and gave leave to villagers to use deadly force to stop "unwieldy" (*te ni amarisōrō*) outlaws.[29]

These injunctions are important for a number of reasons. First, telling peasants to grab a weapon and come running at the sound of a nearby temple bell—perhaps summoned by an official with whom they had no formal relationship—marked a significant departure from the normal principles of governance in early modern Japan. Yet the routine would have been familiar to anyone who had participated in a peasant uprising, for the ringing of bells as a call to action was a standard feature of protests—including the Mimasaka Blood-Tax Rebellion, which began with the sounding of bells and blowing of shell horns.[30]

More serious was the shogunate's abdication of its monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Giving peasants free rein to use deadly force against an ill-defined population of unwieldy "bad guys" threatened to dissolve the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate violence, for "bad guys" roamed around the Kantō plain (and everywhere else) in great abundance in the 1860s. Adding to the confusion was the fact that the Regulatory Patrol—like all law enforcement agencies in early modern Japan—relied heavily on the services of marginal characters as deputies, including the very sorts of gangsters and gamblers it was charged to control. In fact, as the Regulatory Patrol itself made clear in its various exhortations to good behavior, the line separating the law-abiding peasant from the dangerous outlaw could be quite fuzzy, as attested by the popularity of fencing lessons and other inappropriate activities among the peasantry and the more general tendency of young men to imitate "bad guys."[31]

The confusion and disorder of the last years of the Tokugawa period thus forced the shogunate to compromise some of the basic principles of the status order in an attempt to maintain control over the countryside. Not only did this foster considerable uncertainty among the peasantry, but it signified that the authorities had surrendered to the reality of a heavily armed countryside.

Legitimating the presence of weapons and their use in the cause of preserving order may have had the further effect of disrupting the etiquette of peasant contention by blurring the distinction between protests and normal vigilance: the ringing of a temple bell could be a call to action in righteous anger against rapacious merchants or corrupt officials, or it could be a plea for the good denizens of the community to gather in defense against the forces of criminality. Or in an instance like the Shinchūgumi uprising of 1864, in which a motley band of masterless samurai, unregistered commoners, and local farmers banded together to take from the rich and give to the poor in Kazusa province, peasants may well have asked themselves for whom the bell tolled.[32]

The shogunate's policy of giving peasants permission to use deadly force to control disorderly elements is particularly interesting when considered in light of its official attitude toward peasant participation in fencing and other martial arts. In 1804 and 1805 the shogunate issued prohibitions against commoners' taking up martial arts; the first one was directed at urban commoners (*chōnin*) and the other at both urban and rural commoners. Both were reissued several times during the remainder of the Tokugawa period. These prohibitions notwithstanding, it is clear that peasants throughout the countryside in late Tokugawa Japan participated in fencing and other martial arts.

For example, Sugi Hitoshi has examined the spread of a regional school of fencing, the *tennen rishin-ryū*, in the Tama region of Musashi province west of Edo. He finds that before the 1840s fencing practitioners in the area were overwhelmingly members of a group of rusticated marginal samurai retainers of the shogun (the Hachiōji *sennin dōshin*), but fencing came to attract the young heirs of village headmen and other prominent peasants (typically men in their teens or early twenties); by the 1850s, nearly eighty percent of the practitioners at the local *dōjō* were commoners.

Sugi argues that participation in fencing was part of the *gōnō*'s response to "world renewal" (*yonaoshi*) movements, or the threat of such movements, in the countryside west of Edo. Indeed, the area was the site of a number of large uprisings, particularly the Bushū Rebellion of 1866.[33] Many of the peasant fencers later became involved with peasant militias, though none enjoyed much martial success. Sugi further notes that participation in fencing was, along with participation in poetry circles, one of the two main axes around which peasant cultural networks in the Kantō revolved at the time.

In the orders prohibiting martial arts practices among the peasantry at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the shogunate expressed a fear that commoners who took up swordsmanship would lose sight of their proper place in society, either by "losing their occupations" (*sono shokubun o ushinai*) or by assuming a bravado (*kigasa*) inappropriate to commoners. This feeling is echoed in one official's opposition to the formation of peasant militias in the 1860s: he was afraid that the peasant soldiers would not defer to samurai officials, but rather that bosses would emerge from their ranks, leading them to roam around the countryside without any fear of the authorities, the wealthy among them aspiring to independence, the poor turning to thievery, and all shunning agricultural labor.[34]

Thus the shogunate's calls for peasants to use deadly force against "bad guys" were issued against the background of its own repeated prohibitions of commoners' participation in martial arts organizations. No doubt the hypocrisy reflected in this contradiction is a measure of the authorities' desperation at the end of the Tokugawa period. At the same time, the shogunate may have distinguished between peasant participation in fencing groups, which it saw as an inappropriate emulation of the samurai, and proper defense of the village community in the absence of members of the Kantō Regulatory Patrol. Well-to-do peasants may not have made such a distinction—whether practicing their swordsmanship or shooting down marauding outlaws, they were protecting themselves because they could not count on the samurai authorities' protection. In any event, it is clear that the shogunate's claims to monopolize the legitimate use of violence were being undermined from within and without during the final years of the early modern era.

Of course, the Kantō and Mimasaka are hundreds of kilometers apart, but the shogunate's fear of disorder in the hinterland of Edo appears to have been an exaggerated version of an anxiety felt by political authorities throughout the country. In any case, my purpose here is not to establish a causal link between the Kantō and Mimasaka, but rather to suggest that one by-product of the turmoil of the 1860s and '70s was a simultaneous normalization and diffusion of force—or at least the threat of force—in response to conflict and disorder. Needless to say, were it not for the assassinations, urban disturbances, civil war, the threat of foreign invasion, and so on, we would not speak of the "turmoil" of the Restoration period at all. But below the surface of such obvious tumult was a more subtle problem: that the normalization of the use of force effaced the distinction between "good people" (*ryōmin*) and outlaws.

During the Tokugawa period, the samurai authorities maintained a theoretical monopoly over the legitimate use of force, and they justified that monopoly by protecting the public peace. In reality, of course, violence occurred frequently in early modern Japan, just as it does in every society. Habitually violent elements of society—gangsters, gamblers, sumo wrestlers, and other outlaws—existed on the margins of the polity, often in an ambiguous state as masterless samurai or unregistered commoners. To police this violent margin, the authorities deputized members of a variety of groups on the periphery of society, including some elements of the outlaw community itself. This approach to preserving order was cumbersome and inefficient,[35] but it meshed well with the technological and political conditions of the times, with the result that Japan was a reasonably orderly society by the standards of the early modern world.

In the last years of the Tokugawa period, however, in response to its evident inability to control the violent margin in places like the Kantō, the shogunate took the further step of deputizing the commoner populace in its entirety. In so doing, the authorities effectively admitted that they could no longer distinguish between the violent margin and the law-abiding core of society, for every member of the core—and particularly its young men—was a reserve member of the forces of the "bad guys," tottering on the precipice of criminality. In openly accepting the widespread presence of weapons in the countryside, and in attempting to harness elements of the peasantry's etiquette of protest in the service of law enforcement, the shogunate effectively enjoined the entire countryside to suspect and police itself, for the entire countryside threatened to descend into the violent margin.

This brings us back to Mimasaka and a third telling detail of the incident there. The man who by his own confession opened the door to the most brutal violence in Mimasaka was Kobayashi Kumezō, a fifty-one-year-old former sumo wrestler and local boss (*oyakata*), who lived in Myōbara, a commoner village near Tsugawahara. Let us consider his role in the massacre in some detail. In his confession,[36] Kobayashi said that people had always come to him for advice whenever disputes (*motsuregoto*) arose, and that they did so once again when news of the rioting arrived. His advice was to avoid joining the rebellion if possible, but to go along if the protesters insisted. On 28 May, the protesters arrived in an insistent mood, and so a group of villagers duly joined the crowd.

Kobayashi himself remained in the village, however, and used the opportunity to try to persuade the leaders of Tsugawahara to submit a formal apology for their supposed effrontery toward commoners in the months following the promulgation of the liberation edict. (A number of Buraku villages in Mimasaka avoided attack by presenting such apologies to the protesters; in the aftermath of the violence, the prefectural authorities ordered that all such documents be burned.[37]) In addition, he advised the Burakumin to honor the customary protocols of status difference—to go barefoot when business took them to commoner villages, bow their heads to the ground when encountering a commoner on the road, and so forth—and, as a sign of their sincerity, to agree to take up a position in the vanguard of the procession to Tsuyama. The Buraku leaders refused, saying they had no interest in participating in the rebellion and that they were determined to stand up to any attack that might be launched against them.[38]

Soon thereafter the rioters returned to Myōbara, vowing to attack Tsugawahara unless an apology were forthcoming from the villagers. Kobayashi and another man went once again to negotiate, this time with a different group of village leaders, but with the same result as the first time. Disgusted by what he saw as the Burakumin's intransigence, Kobayashi urged the rioters to proceed into the village "and attack as they pleased" (*katte shidai ni rannyū itasubeshi*).[39]

Although Kobayashi makes no mention of it in his confession, other accounts of the massacre state that one reason for the extreme brutality of the attack on Tsugawahara was the crowd's anger at the residents' overt resistance. The Burakumin constructed a series of false fortifications to give the impression that cannons and other firearms were trained on the crowd, ready to fire in case of an attack. Once the protesters saw through the ploy, they poured into Tsugawahara and destroyed it completely, burning down every single one of the hundred or more houses in the village.[40]

Kobayashi claims to have remained at home during the initial attack. The following day, 29 May, he learned that the village had been destroyed and that a number of residents who had fled to the hills overnight had been caught and brought down to the bank of the Kamo River to be killed. He went back to Tsugawahara at that point, this time with the intention of settling old scores: "It was a chance to kill some people and clear up my longstanding hatred of them, and so I went down to lead the crowd myself."[41]

Going down to the riverbank, he did not see the men he particularly hated, but he did find seven or eight women and children being held near the riverbank. He got the guards to turn the prisoners over to him after agreeing to provide them with a receipt for the women and children they had captured. As a list of names was being drawn up more prisoners were brought to the riverbank, bringing the total number to about thirty.[42]

At that point the crowd captured two prominent members of the community, Saimu Kiichirō and his son, Ryūtarō. The crowd called for their immediate deaths. Kobayashi thought this fortunate because the two had long been contemptuous of nearby commoner villages.[43] The mob dragged the two off to the riverbank. Kobayashi claimed to have left the area at that point because he thought he might be recognized if he accompanied the crowd, which could cause him problems later. By the time he returned, the two had been killed along with six or seven other villagers. He told the crowd to spare the remaining prisoners—all women and children—and went home.

In his confession, Kobayashi said that the following day, 30 May, he "felt rather bad" (*nan to naku sokokimi ashikusōrō*) about his involvement in the massacre, even though his actions were the product of the heat of the moment.[44] Worried about repercussions from the attack, and about the possibility of the protesters returning to the Buraku village, he went to Tsugawahara to survey the damage and see the survivors. He persuaded one of the surviving villagers to draft a promise that the Burakumin would return to their previous status, which he then delivered to the mayor of his own village.

As a former sumo wrestler and local fixer, Kobayashi was the sort of person whom the authorities might have labeled a "bad guy," but even more, he was the sort of well-connected man of local influence whom the same authorities would have wanted to enlist in their efforts to control disorder. Indeed, if his confession is to be believed, Kobayashi could have prevented the massacre at Tsugawahara. In any case, his role suggests that elements of the etiquette of protest survived even in the darkest moments of the uprising, elements reflected in the crowd's deference to Kobayashi in launching the initial attack against Tsugawahara, in the negotiations with the Buraku leadership over the presentation of apologies for past behavior, and indeed in the exchange of receipts for captive Tsugawahara villagers.

In Mimasaka, the rules that had governed social relations between commoners and outcastes collapsed with the formal abolition of the outcastes' base status—rules that had given structure to discrimination and channeled aversion and interaction in ways recognized and accepted (or at least tolerated) by both sides. Kobayashi's inability to influence his Buraku neighbors reflected the collapse of those rules. At the same time, the dismantling of the status system and the political order of which it had been a part rendered invalid the script by which Mimasaka peasants could present grievances to the state. (In his confession, Fudeyasu states that he was against all the early Meiji reforms and had considered presenting a petition to that effect, but abandoned the idea because he knew it would be futile—as indeed it would have been.[45]) The collapse of the early modern order took the petition out of the peasant's hand and replaced it with a bamboo spear.

In their confessions, the Mimasaka defendants gave a very personal view of their actions. One said that he had decided not to participate in the uprising, but on hearing that the mob was headed to a Buraku village, he grabbed his bamboo spear and joined the rioters; most mention a sudden welling up of murderous desire (*kotsuzen satsunen shōji*) that led them to plunge their spears into the helpless Burakumin lying before them.[46] Of course, people have been killing one another for millennia, and early modern society had its share of murders. Here, however, we have people killing strangers—or directing others to kill old acquaintances—for reasons explicitly political, yet at the same time rooted in resentments and tensions that had built up in the course of everyday interaction and everyday aversion. It is telling in this context that except for Kobayashi and one other resident of Myōbara, the other men condemned for participating in the massacre simply went home after the killings: for them, the rebellion had served its purpose.

The Mimasaka Blood-Tax Rebellion suggests that murderous violence underwent a process of "modernization" in the years following the Restoration. As we have seen, the shogunate's abdication of its monopoly over the legitimate use of force undermined the "feudal" mode of violence in Japan. Violence became detached from state power, a development that simultaneously undermined the legitimacy of the early modern state and obscured the distinction between the law-abiding core of society—that is, those secure in their status as peasants—and the violent margin.[47] At the same time, the rules that had governed the peasantry in the resolution of disputes broke down during the final decades of the Tokugawa period, as Yabuta and other students of protest etiquette have demonstrated. Or rather, the rules changed, so that protest, like violence more generally, was detached from the confines of the status system and allowed greater play within society.

In places like Mimasaka, the result of this combination of developments was a further evolution of the protocols of protest, such that the individuated murderous impulse of the participants in the Tsugawahara massacre found release. Mimasaka was not the only place to see such violence, however. Other protests in the early Meiji years saw a similar escalation from the controlled, collective violence of the crowd, to arson, and in some cases, to the killing of individuals. During the 1879 cholera epidemic, for example, a mob in the town of Numatare, Niigata prefecture, killed Yasuda Hannosuke, a former samurai (*shizoku*) who had been seen pouring a mysterious substance—stomach medicine, it turned out—into the river. The crowd turned on Yasuda and a peddler who happened to be passing by after the police refused to arrest Yasuda as the person responsible for the epidemic. The police apprehended the killers, but only after battling a crowd of about seven hundred—many armed with bamboo spears—that had been summoned to the scene by fire bells.[48] In Niigata, shreds of an etiquette of protest rooted in the early modern status system survived only to call the mob to do battle with the police.

The collapse of the early modern order rendered systematic expressions of the sanctity of peasant status meaningless. Without recourse to valid, traditional means of collective political expression, peasants turned increasingly to violence, killing to make statements about Meiji policies ranging from conscription to public sanitation, and killing to assert their liberation from the status-based strictures of membership in the law-abiding core of early modern society.

Conclusion

The appalling violence of the Mimasaka rebellion fits into a familiar pattern of popular response to uncontrollable social dislocation, in which vulnerable groups direct their anger and fear against society's weakest elements. Although this no doubt explains much of the motivation behind the attacks on Burakumin, it is worthwhile to consider the matter more closely. During the Tokugawa period, peasant contention often occurred when cultivators felt the feudal authorities had abrogated their moral covenant to provide benevolent rule. Protesters commonly referred to themselves as "august peasants" (*onbyakushō*) and rationalized their actions by asserting the centrality of their contribution to the stability and prosperity of the realm.[49] The Mimasaka protesters implicitly replicated this strategy by complaining that, in sharp contrast to the former daimyo, the Meiji leaders were behaving in all respects like "Chinamen" (*tōjin*—a generic pejorative term for foreigners). Recognizing that the new regime would no longer honor the moral covenant of the early modern period, the peasants struck out, lest they "be treated no differently from the *eta*."[50] Hence the virulence of their anger against the Burakumin, particularly their insistence on the restoration of the norms of deference that had applied during the previous regime. If the protesters could not be "august peasants" in the eyes of the authorities, they could at least force the Burakumin to reaffirm their status as such.

As we have seen, the exchange of obligations for benevolent rule was a cornerstone of the early modern status system insofar as it provided the rationale for the authorities' exactions of tax grain and corvée labor. Let us briefly examine the transition from occupation to livelihood and its relationship to early Meiji violence in light of the moral covenant of feudal rule. At the close of the Tokugawa period, the status-based occupation of the peasantry in places like the Kantō plain had come include elements that went beyond the payment of land taxes and the performance of normal corvée such as construction work and post-station duties. Because the authorities abdicated their monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, the maintenance of order became, in effect, part of a peasant's occupation.

The shogunate and domains that followed its lead may not have seen the delegation of violence as a fundamental departure from the principles of status: keeping a look-out for "bad guys" and serving in the various peasant militias organized in the waning years of the Tokugawa period were simply ways of ensuring the military preparedness of the regime and thus not intrinsically different from such indirect means as the provision of warriors' sustenance. The problem, of course, is that assigning peasants the duty of maintaining order raised questions concerning the obligations of those groups whose monopoly that duty had been—the samurai as a military class and the outcastes as agents of law enforcement. Thus, although it was hardly the intent, giving peasants leave to engage in violence undermined the moral covenant that lay at the heart of the status order, without, however, negating a basic premise of that order, which called for the peasantry to assist the authorities' attempts to provide benevolent rule.

In the early Meiji period, peasants in Mimasaka and other sites of antigovernment protest took it upon themselves to recalibrate the status order through the exercise of the very technique—murderous violence—that had undermined it in the first place. That is, the authorities, deluded by "Chinamen," had clearly abdicated their duty by enacting policies that upended the proper order of things. The abolition of outcaste status ruptured the containment field that had regulated the violence of killing (who would oversee the deaths of animals and criminals if the outcastes were liberated from such duties?), and was thus particularly disturbing. But other early Meiji reforms had the same effect, too. Conscription was all about violence, after all, though in the eyes of many peasants it was not the instruments of violence soldiers wielded that were so scary, but rather the prospect that conscripts themselves would be killed for their blood. Public health policies prompted a similar anxiety, as seen in the fears of protesters in Kōchi prefecture, who were convinced that the metal beds used in quarantine hospitals were actually grills designed to drain off the fat of the hygienists' victims.[51] Universal education imperiled peasant livelihoods and the performance of status-based duties by removing valuable labor power from the fields and moving it to the classroom. The land-tax reform both undermined agriculture as an occupation and, through its corollary practice of household registration, created a roster of potential victims of blood-draining. And so on. Thus, violence against Burakumin can be seen as a way to reinstitute the normal balance between occupation and livelihood by forcing outcastes back into their proper place and thereby alert the authorities to the errors of their ways.

On a national scale, the Burakumin and their problems were a relatively minor concern, as much larger and more powerful social groups voiced their opposition to the new politics of the quotidian. The wave of peasant movements during the years right after the Restoration—the vast majority of which had nothing to do with Buraku liberation—fit into this category. Perhaps the greatest threat came from dispossessed samurai, who rose repeatedly and sometimes extremely destructively in opposition to the loss of their status privileges. Indeed, the largest such incident, the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, took seven months to suppress and nearly bankrupted the government.[52]

The Meiji state prevailed through these and many other difficulties, however, so that by the end of the 1870s, debate—even in its insurrectionary guise—had largely shifted from the question of whether Japan *ought* to embrace Western-style modernity to specific issues of the means by which modernization would be attained. No doubt the rapid economic growth of the late 1870s and early 1880s helped peasants to accommodate themselves to the monetization of obligations—after all, their lives had improved, at least temporarily, as a result; and if they did not, the fact that the state eagerly reclaimed its monopoly over the legitimate use of violence through the creation of a modern police force and a shoot-to-kill approach to quelling unrest surely encouraged dissatisfied elements of society to make their peace with the reality of a modern nation-state.

Although the samurai participants in the Satsuma Rebellion and similar movements preceding it had a clear counterrevolutionary intent, peasant protesters had largely given up their calls for a restoration of the Tokugawa status order by the mid-1870s. Peasants did keep rebelling: they launched a number of serious challenges to the state during the economic dislocation of the Matsukata Deflation of 1881-85 in particular. In incidents like the Chichibu Rebellion of 1884, protesters loaded their plate high with condiments from the salad bar of nineteenth-century discourse—a traditional insistence on the right to benevolent rule, world renewal from late Tokugawa uprisings, and democracy and even revolution from the Meiji freedom-and-popular-rights movement—to express their sense that in placing so much emphasis on economic development the state had neglected its obligations to the people.[53] But it was clear both from their entrepreneurial behavior before the rebellion and the tenor of their demands during it that they had largely accommodated themselves to the idea of the individual as an autonomous economic and political actor.

REFERENCES

Bix 1986

Herbert Bix. *Peasant Protest in Japan, 1590-1884.* Yale University Press, 1986.

Figal 1999

Gerald Figal. *Civilization and Monsters: Spirits of Modernity in Meiji Japan.* Duke University Press, 1999.

Harada and Uesugi 1984

Harada Tomohiko and Uesugi Satoshi, eds. *"Kaihōrei" no seiritsu*, San'ichi Shobō, 1984.

Hirota 1980

Hirota Masaki. *Bunmei kaika to minshū ishiki.* Aoki Shoten, 1980.

Hirota 1990

———. *Sabetsu no shosō.* Iwanami, 1990.

Hosaka 2000

Hosaka Satoru. "Hyakushō ikki no sahō: Sono seiritsu to henshitsu," In *Ikki to shūen*, ed. Hosaka Satoru. Aoki Shoten, 2000, pp. 5-45.

Howell 2000

David L. Howell. "Visions of the Future in Meiji Japan." In *Historical Perspectives on Contemporary East Asia*, ed. Merle Goldman and Andrew Gordon. Harvard University Press, 2000.

Imanishi 1993

Imanishi Hajime. *Kindai Nihon no sabetsu to sonraku.* Yūzankaku, 1993.

Ishii and Harafuji 1994

Ishii Ryōsuke and Harafuji Hiroshi, eds., *Bakumatsu ofuregaki shūsei*, doc. 5028 [1861/2]. Iwanami Shoten, 1994, 5: 538-539.

Ishitaki 1987

Ishitaki Toyomi, "'Kaihōrei' kara Chikuzen takeyari ikki e: Buraku yakiuchi ni itaru hitsuzenteki katei no kentō." In Yoshinami Takashi ed., *Meiji shonen kaihōrei hantai ikki no kenkyū.* Akashi Shoten, 1987, pp. 37-75.

Iwama 1996

Iwama Kazuo, *Shibuzome ikki, Mimasaka ketsuzei ikki no shūhen: Aru bohimei e no chū.* Okayama: Okayama Buraku Mondai Kenkyūjo, 1996.

Kamifukuoka-shi 1997

Kamifukuoka-shi Kyōiku Iinkai and Kamifukuoka-shi Shi Hensan Iinkai, eds., *Kamifukuoka-shi shi: Shiryōhen* vol. 2: *Kodai, chūsei, kinsei*. Kamifukuoka: Kamifukuoka-shi, 1997.

Kanda 1996

Kanda Yutsuki. "Saikoku no kyokaku to chiiki shakai: Bungo Kitsuki no 'suihō' o chūshin to shite. In Yoshida Nobuyuki and Kurushima Hiroshi, eds., *Kinsei no shakaiteki kenryoku: Ken'i to hegemonii.*Yamakawa Shuppan, 1996, pp. 239–72.

"Kantō otorishimari goshutsuyakusama gokaijō utsushi"

"Kantō otorishimari goshutsuyakusama gokaijō utsushi" [1861/2], Maejima-ke monjo *shi*-85, Chiba Prefectural Archives.

"Kantō otorishimari goshutsuyakusama yori ofuregaki utsushi"

"Kantō otorishimari goshutsuyakusama yori ofuregaki utsushi" [1867/4], Maejima-ke monjo so-22, Chiba Prefectural Archives.

Kurachi 1987

Kurachi Katsunao. "Mimasaka 'hinin sōdō' no dentō no hitokoma," *Okayama chihōshi kenkyū* 54 (July 1987).

Kurachi 1988

Kurachi Katsunao. "Bakumatsu no minshū to bugei," *Okayama chihōshi kenkyū* 56 (1988), pp. 1–8.

Mori 1981

Mori Yasuhiko. *Bakuhansei kokka no kiso kōzō*. Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1981.

Nagamitsu 1978

Nagamitsu Norikazu, ed. *Bizen, Bitchū, Mimasaka hyakushō ikki shiryō*. Kokusho Kankōkai, 1978

Nakano and Zushi 1985

Nakano Michiko and Zushi Tomonori. "Mimasaka Tsuyama han hisabetsu buraku kankei shiryō (2)," *Okayama buraku kaihō kenkyūjo kiyō* 3 (1985), 163.

Niigata-ken shi: Shiryōhen

Niigata-ken, ed. *Niigata-ken shi: Shiryōhen*. Niigata: Niigata-ken, 1982, vol. 15, pp. 572-76.

"Ofuregaki no hikae"

"Ofuregaki no hikae" [1860.i3], Hishinuma-kuyū monjo *o*-38, Chiba Prefectural Archives.

"Ofuregaki utsushi"

"Ofuregaki utsushi" [1861/6], Takagi-ke monjo a-33, Chiba Prefectural Archives.

Okayama-ken Buraku Kaihō Undō Rokujūnenshi Hensan Iinkai 1987

Okayama-ken Buraku Kaihō Undō Rokujūnenshi Hensan Iinkai, ed., *Okayama-ken buraku mondai shiryōshū*. Okayama: Okayama-ken Buraku Kaihō Undō Rengōkai, 1987.

Satake 1977

Satake Akihiro, *Shuten dōji ibun*. Heibonsha, 1977.

Scheiner 1978

Irwin Scheiner. "Benevolent Lords and Honorable Peasants: Rebellion and Peasant Consciousness in Tokugawa Japan." In Tetsuo Najita and Irwin Scheiner, eds. *Japanese Thought in the Tokugawa Period, 1600-1868: Methods and Metaphors*. University of Chicago Press, 1978.

Sippel 1977

Patricia Sippel. "Popular Protest in Early Modern Japan: The Bushū Outburst," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 37:2 (1997), pp. 273–322.

Sugi 2001

Sugi Hitoshi, *Kinsei no chiiki to zaison bunka*. Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2001.

Suzuki 1984

Suzuki Ryō. "Jiyūminken undō to buraku mondai." In Buraku Mondai Kenkyūjo, ed., *Burakushi no kenkyū: Kindaihen*. Kyoto: Buraku Mondai Kenkyūjo, 1984, pp. 91-124.

"Toridoshi rōnin toriosaekata gosatagaki"

"Toridoshi rōnin toriosaekata gosatagaki" [1861/4], Asō-ke monjo *u*-36, Chiba Prefectural Archives.

"Totō rōzekisha uttaegaki"

"Totō rōzekisha uttaegaki" [1864/1], Takagi-ke monjo a-22. "Ofuregaki utsushi" [1861/6], Takagi-ke monjo a-33, Chiba Prefectural Archives.

Tsukamoto 1983

Tsukamoto Manabu. *Shōrui o meguru seiji: Genroku no fōkuroā*. Heibonsha, 1983.

Tsuyama no Ayumi Henshū Iinkai 1986

Tsuyama no Ayumi Henshū Iinkai, ed., *Buraku kaihō undō: Tsuyama no ayumi*. Tsuyama: Zenkoku Buraku Kaihō Undō Rengōkai Tsuyama-shi Kyōgikai, 1986

Tsuyama-shi shi 1980

Tsuyama-shi Shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., *Tsuyama-shi shi*. Tsuyama: Tsuyama-shi, 1980.

Uchida 2000

Uchida Mitsuru. "Emono kara takeyari e." In *Ikki to shūen*, ed. Hosaka Satoru. Aoki Shoten, 2000, pp. 117-42.

Vlastos 1989

Stephen Vlastos, "Opposition Movements in Early Meiji, 1868-1885," in *The Nineteenth Century* (*The Cambridge History of Japan*, vol. 5), ed. Marius B. Jansen. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989, 367-431.

Walthall 1991

Anne Walthall, *Peasant Uprisings in Japan: A Critical Anthology of Peasant Histories*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

White 1988

James White. "State Growth and Popular Protest in Tokugawa Japan." *Journal of Japanese Studies* 14:1 (1988), pp. 1-25.

Yabuta 1992

Yabuta Yutaka, *Kokuso to hyakushō ikki no kenkyū*. Azekura Shobō, 1992.

Yasumaru 1995

Yasumaru Yoshio, "'Kangoku' no tanjō," in *Bakumatsu-ishinki no kokumin kokka keisei to bunka hen'yō*, ed. Nishikawa Nagaoand Matsumiya Hideharu. Shin'yōsha, 1995, pp. 279-312.

Yoshinami 1987

Yoshinami Takashi. "Meiji rokunen Mimasaka ikki to sono eikyō." In *Meiji shonen kaihōrei hantai ikki no kenkyū*, ed. Yoshinami Takashi. Akashi Shoten, 1987.

NOTES

[1] All important materials relating to the incident have been published in Nagamitsu 1978, 5: 1973-2159. My account of the rebellion is based mostly on *Hōjō-ken shi*, reprinted in ibid., 1977-2012. See also a nearly contemporary account of the rebellion, "Meiji rokunen natsu Mimasaka zenkoku sōjō gaishi" [n.d.], in Hirota 1990, pp. 100-12.

[2] Regarding *hinin-goshirae*: Kurachi 1987, pp. 28-29. In the sixth month of 1871, the Tsuyama domain, which controlled most of Mimasaka, did not mention *hinin* (as a status group) in a population report submitted to the central government, but it did refer to them in an order issued concerning the promulgation of the household-registration system in the third month of the same year: see docs. 469 [1871/6/20] and 467 [1871/3/25] in Harada and Uesugi 1984, pp. 397, 396. On local oral traditions, see Tsuyama no Ayumi Henshū Iinkai 1986, 16. These traditions are corroborated in an account of a protest in the Tsuruta domain in 1868: doc. 462 [c. 1870] in Harada and Uesugi 1984, pp. 390-394. For accounts of the 1866 protest, see Walthall 1991, pp. 193-217, and Bix 1986, pp. 174-193.

[3] See docs. 479 [1871/10], 480 [1871/10], and 478 [1871/8/17-1872/2/5], in Harada and Uesugi 1984, pp. 406-407, 407, 399-406.

[4] Doc. 482 [1871/11/12], in ibid., pp. 408.

[5] *Tsuyama-shi shi* 1980, 6: 49-51.

[6] Doc. 478 [1871/10/23], in Harada and Uesugi 1984, p. 399.

[7] *Tsuyama shi shi* 1980, 6:51; doc. 486 [n.d.], in Harada and Uesugi 1984, p. 409.

[8] Docs. 468 [1871/3] and 483 [1871/11], in ibid., 396, 408.

[9] Nakano and Zushi 1985, 163.

[10] Harada and Uesugi 1984. doc. 484 [1871/11], pp. 408-409, on attachment to commoner villages but not in Mimasaka. On the Kaiami house, see Nakano and Zushi 1985, pp. 81-123.

[11] An order from Hōjō prefecture (5 March 1876) decried wealth-based discrimination within the Buraku community: Okayama-ken Buraku Kaihō Undō Rokujūnenshi Hensan Iinkai, ed., *Okayama-ken buraku mondai shiryōshū*, 64-65.

[12] On charcoal production, see Iwama 1996, 318.

[13] Archives routinely limit access to documents referring to outcastes and Burakumin, probably to avoid the problems that would arise if private detectives used the materials to identify Burakumin for the purpose of discriminating against them in matters of marriage and employment. I have encountered this problem personally at the Saitama and Chiba prefectural archives, both of which are otherwise very accommodating in granting access to materials. When using published collections of documents one therefore always faces the question of whether a lack of materials reflects a true absence or is a by-product of editorial suppression. Materials that are published are generally (but not always) issued by research institutes affiliated with various Buraku organizations, as the publication data in the references cited here show.

[14] See Imanishi 1993, pp. 186-90.

[15] Satake 1977, pp. 197-252; Figal 1999, pp. 21-37.

[16] Hirota 1980; Yoshinami 1987, 3-36; Iwama 1996; and Imanishi 1993.

[17] Nagamitsu 1978, 5: 1989-2009.

[18] Ibid., 1990.

[19] Ishitaki 1987, pp. 37-75; Imanishi 1993; Suzuki 1984, pp. 91-124.

[20] Yabuta 1992; Uchida 2000, pp. 117-42.

[21] Hosaka 2000, pp. 5-45.

[22] Yabuta 1992, p. 190.

[23] Ibid., pp. 190-202.

[24] Ibid., pp. 202-11; Uchida 2000, pp. 132-36; Hosaka 2000.

[25] Tsukamoto 1983, pp. 7-81.

[26] Yabuta 1992, p. 191.

[27] Mori 1981; Yasumaru 1995, pp. 279-312.

[28] See for example, "Ofuregaki no hikae" [1860.i3], Hishinuma-kuyū monjo *o*-38, Chiba Prefectural Archives; Kamifukuoka-shi 1997, p. 604.

[29] "Kantō otorishimari goshutsuyakusama gokaijō utsushi" [1861/2], Maejima-ke monjo *shi*-85, Chiba Prefectural Archives. Similar orders can be found among the documents of numerous Kantō villages; for example, see "Toridoshi rōnin toriosaekata gosatagaki" [1861/4], Asō-ke monjo *u*-36, Chiba Prefectural Archives. The original order is reprinted in Ishii and Harafuji 1994, as doc. 5028 [1861/2], 5: 538-539.

[30] Yabuta 1992, 174-78; Nagamitsu 1978, 5: 1981-82.

[31] "Kantō otorishimari goshutsuyakusama yori ofuregaki utsushi" [1867/4], Maejima-ke monjo so-22, Chiba Prefectural Archives; Kamifukuoka-shi Kyōiku Iinkai and Kamifukuoka-shi Shi Hensan Iinkai, *Kamifukuoka-shi shi: Shiryōhen,* 2: 606. On the popularity of fencing lessons in the countryside, see Kurachi 1988, pp. 1-8, regarding a number of groups active in the Okayama domain, and Sugi 2001, pp. 259-73, on the Tama region near Edo.

[32] See, for example, "Totō rōzekisha uttaegaki" [1864/1], Takagi-ke monjo a-22, and "Ofuregaki utsushi" [1861/6], Takagi-ke monjo a-33, Chiba Prefectural Archives.

[33] See Sippel 1977.

[34] Sugi, *Kinsei no chiiki to zaison bunka,* pp. 267-71. Sugi notes that the use of the term *kigasa* is unusual in legal documents. He compares it with *furachi,* which is extremely common in documents concerning commoners' behavior. *Furachi* suggests a failing committed by one who is not intelligent or knowledgeable enough to follow the rules necessary to maintain order, so while one who commits a *furachi* is guilty of a wrongdoing, it does not carry with it any suggestion that the perpetrator questions the legitimacy of the underlying order. *Kigasa,* conversely, is the attitude of an underdog who is putting on the airs of actually winning, and thus suggests an active flaunting of status-based rules of social interaction.

[35] See the extremely complex networks described by Kanda, "Saikoku no kyokaku to chiiki shakai."

[36] Nagamitsu 1978, 5: 2000-1.

[37] The order was issued on 5 June 1873. See Okayama-ken Buraku Kaihō Undō Rokujūnenshi Hensan Iinkai, ed., *Okayama-ken buraku mondai shiryōshū,* 104-5.

[38] Nagamitsu 1978, 5: 2000.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid., pp. 1977-78, 2002-3.

[41] Ibid., p. 2001.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid., p. 1981.

[46] Ibid., pp. 1990, 2003.

[47] White 1988.

[48] Niigata-ken, ed., *Niigata-ken shi: Shiryōhen* (Niigata: Niigata-ken, 1982), 15: pp. 572-76.

[49] See Scheiner 1978.

[50] Quoted in Imanishi 1993, p. 187.

[51] Ibid., pp. 104-5.

[52] See Vlastos 1989, pp. 367-431.