

# The Japanese Critique of History's Suppression of Nature

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If the discipline of history could be persuaded to lie on the analysand's couch, what psychic structure would be revealed? Could Sigmund Freud's theories be useful in uncovering the unconscious of historiography? Thomas Mann, it would seem, thought they could. In 1937, Mann delivered a talk to the New School for Social Research which suggested, perhaps unwittingly, that nature is the unconscious of history. Mann's concern is entirely on the side of history's Ego, which is in a "pathetic, well-nigh alarming [situation]. It is an alert, prominent, and enlightened little part of the Id—much as Europe is a small and lively province of the greater Asia. The Ego is that part of the Id which became modified by contact with the outer world; equipped for the reception and preservation of stimuli."<sup>1</sup> This European Ego faces weighty responsibilities. "It is the Ego's task," Mann declares, "to represent the world to the Id—for its good! For without regard for the superior power of the outer world the Id, in its blind striving towards the satisfaction of its instincts, would not escape destruction. The Ego takes cognizance of the outer world, it is mindful, it honorably tries to distinguish the objectively real from whatever is an accretion from its inward sources of stimulation."<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, the vast primal mass of Asia and the Unconsciousness Id, Mann tells us, "knows no time, no temporal flow nor any effect of time upon its psychic process." Asia therefore is without time and thus without modernity's history. This neat dichotomy, which pits History, Ego, Consciousness, and the West against Nature, Id, the Unconscious, and the East, is in Mann's words, "a very perspicuous biological picture indeed." And it is also the structure that Japan faced as it tried to develop its own modern history. What follows is an analysis, somewhat in Mann's terms, of history's development, its suppression of nature, and the response of Japanese authors to that fundamental structure.

History, as an academic discipline, was born in the early nineteenth century as one among many of modernity's new technologies. Germany led the way in professionalization, the first chair of history being founded at the University of Berlin in 1810. France followed suit in 1812, and England belatedly joined the trend with Oxford's Regis Professorship of History in 1866, although English undergraduates were not allowed to read for a degree in historical studies until 1875.<sup>3</sup> History's purpose, as with most other technologies of modernity, was to use rational processes to produce transcendent meaning. Philological methods, carefully catalogued archives, and professional training were enhanced and developed as the foundations of the new discipline, but the pursuit of history was invigorated by an impulse that in most cases went well beyond cautious, textually-based scholarship. This impulse sought to enhance the prospects of modern society by tracing the lineaments of its ascendancy and discovering universal laws governing future progress. What gave past events meaning according to this philosophical history was not so much their substantiation through documentation, but their relationship to the larger narrative of transformation, transformation toward

freedom as never before experienced by human beings. History in the service of modernity relished Marx's idea that "everything solid melts into air," because it was hoped or, in some cases, simply assumed that the air into which solidity melted would be the breath of true liberty. New forms of culture and technology, new forms of politics, new forms of selfhood and self-determination would form a new, free, world community. It was history's job to outline the course of this freedom.

The crucial question to be asked of modern freedom was freedom from what? The usual answer, for leftists and for liberals, was freedom from oppressive forms of tradition, government, and economics—feudal aristocracies, absolute monarchs, plutocrats, or the bourgeoisie—and certainly nineteenth-century philosophers of history did desire freedom from these things. However, I would suggest that this usual answer names only the second-order fears of those who sought the freedom of high modernity. When we return to nineteenth-century texts, it is not modes of government or economic production that provoke the primary terror, but something even more elemental and fundamental: nature itself, materialism at its most material. Nature is treated, over and over again, as a problematic limit on freedom; therefore, as with other modern technologies, history tries to master it, and yet, nature proves so intractable, that history ends up, instead, merely suppressing it.

We see this pattern in Hegel and in Marx, in Walter Bagehot and John Stuart Mill, in Fukuzawa Yukichi and Katō Hiroyuki and elsewhere. These authors touch, sometimes only fleetingly, on the problem of nature, and then reflexively turn away to deal with more tractable difficulties like feudalism or the bourgeois state. While confidently disposing of the problems created by artifice, these authors conveniently forget about nature and the ways it determines our lives and, because they can forget about nature, they can predict an infinite future for human liberty. Nature looms at portals of modern history, only to be actively expelled from consciousness as soon as possible.

Yet, as we know from psychoanalysis, to repress something only gives it greater, unforeseen powers that shape conscious perceptions and actions without our necessarily acknowledging it. In Freudian terms, to try to relegate nature to the dark, unspoken side of history created an Id for the history's Ego. Nature, I would suggest, became the repressed "other" of modern liberty in nineteenth and early twentieth century historical thought. Even in the late twentieth century, when historical narratives were critiqued as naive and teleological, the desire to repress nature, to forget its power, continued. The linguistic turn, for instance, simply changed the grounds on which nature—now just another human construct—could be dismissed even from postmodern history. In short, history develops as a means to control and dominate nature (as do other modern technologies), but, because its goal is human freedom, it soon forgets this original point of departure and relegates nature to the recesses of the historiographic unconscious.

This pattern is readily apparent in the founding works of the nineteenth century. In *The Philosophy of History*, Hegel tells us that "the history of mankind does not begin with a *conscious* aim of any kind. . . . The History of the World begins with its general aim—the realization of the Idea of Spirit—only in an *implicit* form (*an sich*) that is, as Nature; a hidden, most profoundly hidden, unconscious instinct; and the whole process of History . . . is directed to rendering this unconscious impulse a conscious one."<sup>4</sup> In this passage, the

whole of History mediates between conscious Spirit and unconscious Nature. What is nature for Hegel? One might assume that nature represents forms of necessity that interfere with free will, but this is not the case. Freedom has all the force of necessity on *its* side since, in Hegel's optimistic scheme, the "destiny of the world" is freedom.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, freedom is itself a necessity. Nature is lumpen and inarticulate, all that freedom is not, a mere cipher waiting to become word, will, and consciousness. On the individual level, this means that we are not both mind and body, but, in so far as we are free, we are independent of matter; we are Consciousness and thus Freedom disembodied.

But this is not all we should recognize in the Hegelian structure of history. Although Hegel is sublimely confident in the goodness of the world, he tells us that not all human beings recognize freedom as the necessary condition of being human. Indeed, the world is deeply divided. "The Orientals," he writes, "have not attained the knowledge that Spirit—Man *as such*—is free; and because they do not know this, they are not free."<sup>6</sup> In the East, nature, unconsciousness, and unfreedom still reign. Perhaps permanently. Only in Europe do consciousness, and freedom abide. Since, as Hegel declares, "The History of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom,"<sup>7</sup> only Europe has history. The East is, in some fundamental and terrible way, nature.

Marx and Engels, turning this Hegelian idealism on its head, might be assumed to embrace nature seriously and treat it not as the antithesis of freedom but its matrix. And indeed, they appear at times to want to do just that, only to slip back into a purely human history, this time a dialectic driven not by Hegelian Spirit but by modes of production. In *The German Ideology*, Marx and Engels begin by saying that the first premise of history is "the existence of living human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organisation of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature." A beginning firmly rooted in the material, one might think, but then they shift abruptly away, saying, "Of course, we cannot here go either into the actual physical nature of man, or into the natural conditions in which man finds himself. . . ."<sup>8</sup> Man's actual physical nature and his natural conditions, I would argue, pose a dangerous conceptual challenge to Marx and Engels because of the kind of freedom they desire. Although they would like to discuss nature, they cannot do so; indeed, they are afraid to do so. Why? The reason, I think, is that like Hegelian freedom, Marxist freedom sublimates nature entirely, overcoming it totally when communism triumphs. Marx and Engels ultimately suggest that the only oppressive forces with which we have to contend are artificially created by human beings. Nature which they had initially recognized as "the first fact" of human life is brushed aside, appearing to offer no impediment or limit to human reinvention, so that once human oppression is revealed, the freedom achieved will be as absolute as Hegel's. Like Hegel, too, Marx and Engel suggest that the Orient, still in the thrall of Asiatic modes of production, is less free and more natural than European communities.

As we see here, in both the Hegelian and Marxist dialectic, modernity's aim was to overcome nature entirely in the quest for freedom. Ultimately, this overcoming is so complete that nature is seen as a mere projection of human society by many twentieth-century scholars. George Lukács, in the 1920s, insisted that "nature is a societal category."<sup>9</sup> Later, Roland Barthes picked up the theme, telling us that in the modern era "nature has changed,

has become social: everything that is given to man is *already* human, down to the forest and river which we cross when we travel.<sup>10</sup> Some scholars have treated this form of dialectical overcoming as the only form of modernity, as does Maruyama Masao when he defines modernity in terms of the triumph of *sakui* or invention over *shizen* or nature, and as does Harry Harootunian more recently when he emphasizes modernity as an “overcoming.”<sup>11</sup>

I would like to suggest, however, that the nineteenth century developed a second, non-dialectical version of modernity’s history that, although it replicates many of the dichotomies produced by dialectical model, sought a different way to negotiate between Nature and Culture and between East and West. This second model of modernity was evolutionary, relying not on dialectical antithesis, but on natural patterns of growth through which humanity would come to express itself. History was seen as a natural process, and modern liberty was a natural outgrowth of this process. Although this evolutionary form of modernity also promised liberty—sometimes even an absolute freedom—its treatment of nature was more complex in that nature was not only the opposite of freedom but also the enabler of humanity’s rise from the mire of nature. Contra Hegel, Nature contained in itself the necessity of freedom as well as being its antithesis. This paradoxical position of nature, however, was often suppressed, and, in this form of history too, nature was sometimes relegated to the dark unconsciousness of humankind’s prehistory.

Walter Bagehot, who has been described as “the Greatest Victorian,”<sup>12</sup> is among the many practitioners of this evolutionary history. Bagehot’s most famous book, *Physics and Politics*, was published in 1872 and sought to apply Darwin’s principles of evolution to society. He begins, as do so many of his European and Japanese contemporaries, with the problem of the “preliminary age” and the difficult leap from the savagery of natural society to political society. Once political rule is established, the next problem is the solidification of custom. Custom’s peculiarity, Bagehot tells us, “is to kill out varieties at birth almost; that is, in early childhood, and before they develop.”<sup>13</sup> Indeed, custom becomes a second stultifying nature at odds with liberty, and Bagehot is deeply anxious over the difficulty of “breaking the cake of custom” (his hallmark phrase) and “reaching something better,” namely freedom.<sup>14</sup> For Bagehot then, humanity progresses through natural processes such as natural selection out of the first savage, society-less form of nature and into the realm of social custom, which becomes a second nature, so choked with the rank weeds of expected usage that liberty cannot begin to grow. Oriental civilization, sadly, is still arrested in this second nature, but some European nations—those fragile edifices created to house the diversity of discussion necessary to true freedom—have evolved to the third non-natural level. Confident though Bagehot is that “Later are the ages of freedom; first are the ages of servitude,”<sup>15</sup> his means of moving from servitude to freedom involves a delicate operation which is in itself natural—the process of evolution—but which also ultimately leaves detrimental forms of nature behind.

We see much the same process in the thinking of other historians and philosophers of this evolutionary ilk. Modern liberty is seen to be both the natural outgrowth of human history, and nature’s enemy. John Stuart Mill, although he denies that “nature” is a useful analytical category,<sup>16</sup> replicates evolutionary histories as he traces the move from “those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage” to more developed societies. As with Bagehot, Mill stresses that custom, like a second nature, can be as detri-

mental to freedom as the first savage nature experienced by child-like races. As with Bagehot, Mill sees how difficult it is to overcome custom. He writes, "The progressive principle . . . is antagonistic to the sway of Custom, involving at last emancipation from that yoke: and the contest between the two constitutes the chief interest of the history of mankind. The greater part of the world has, properly speaking, no history, because the despotism of Custom is complete. This is the case over the whole East."<sup>17</sup> Here again in Mill, we find the same evolutionary sequence: nature, custom as nature, and, finally, liberty. Here again, the Orient is seen to be in only the second phase of development. In order to attain modernity's evolutionary promise of freedom, not only raw nature, but also naturalized custom must be left behind.

Compared with the dialectical mode of achieving modernity, the evolutionary mode is more conscious of human origins in nature both as the physical environment and as human nature. Evolutionary history is more reliant on natural forces to propel human kind toward freedom. Nevertheless, both the dialectical mode of modernity and the evolutionary model try to propel human beings beyond nature *per se*, because only beyond nature—and certainly beyond the stage of nature arrived at by Asian countries—can humankind be truly free.

### Japan's Responses

How was Japan to respond to modern history, structured as it was by the repression of nature—and all that nature implied: unfreedom, baleful custom, inarticulate childhood, amoral impulse, and, most particularly, The East? The most impressive fact, of course, is that Meiji Japanese leaders chose to respond directly and comprehensively to the challenge of modernity and history, insisting that Japan too could be a modern, historical nation, despite the fact that the very structure of modern history appeared to suggest that this was impossible for an Asian country. On the basic level of institutional development, it should be noted that by 1887 Tokyo Imperial University had invited German historian Ludwig Riess to hold the first chair of (non-Japanese) history, while, two years later, in 1889, a department of Japanese history was also established.<sup>18</sup> On an intellectual level, as we look back at documents from Meiji through the 1930s, I think we can uncover at least three basic strategies among Japanese responses to modern history, each premised on a recognition of the discipline's structural relationship with nature.

The most predictable strategy was to adopt one of the European theories of modern history and to replicate it, applying it to Japan. Especially during the Meiji period, most writers chose the evolutionary model, and advocated the gradual and natural growth of Japanese society away from raw nature to freedom. The question of how quickly Japan could evolve occasioned fierce disputes, but most writers agreed that progress on these terms was desirable and almost inevitable. Fukuzawa Yukichi famously traced the evolution of human society in his book, *An Outline of the Theory of Civilization*, where human beings, through the natural development of their intellectual faculties, gradually go through ascending stages of social improvement toward increased liberty and individualism. Even Meiji socialists, as historian Matsuzawa Hiroaki has argued, accepted an evolutionary view of history as leading inevitably to socialist world governance instead of the dialectical view adopted by later Taishō leftists.<sup>19</sup>

Katō Hiroyuki, tutor to the Meiji emperor and president of Tokyo Imperial University, was less certain of the speed at which Japan could hope to evolve, but he too carefully crafted

an evolutionary history that will gradually produce political rights and happiness for each individual, peace and prosperity for each nation, and a world government. His history in *Jinken shinsetsu* (1882) goes like this: at the earliest stages, the ruthless, reckless struggle for survival resulted in superiors lording it over inferiors in harmful ways. Eventually, however, social solidarity developed, usually through the work of a greatly superior dictator. This despot, having achieved stability in the proto-state, wants necessarily to prevent the arbitrary exercise of power on the part of his subordinates, and therefore must grant “certain rights and obligations to all the people.”<sup>20</sup> Katō traces a shift from a purely self-interested form of the struggle for survival to one where intellectual and ethical powers intercede, transforming the selfishly competitive situation into one which rewards kindness and public-spirited self-sacrifice. Katō insists that, “as civilization progresses, there are corresponding decreases in evil forms of survival of the fittest and increases in just forms, contributing to, in turn, even higher levels of civilization.”<sup>21</sup> Although allied with the conservative Meiji oligarchs, Katō envisions a world of peace and equality when altruistic impulses replace ruthless self-interest through natural development.

These evolutionary models of history held sway almost to the end of Meiji, when they were replaced by a dialectical view of modernity, often focusing on revolution. The debates between the left-wing Rōnōha and the Kōzaha in the 1920s amply attest to this more radical basis for achieving modernity through antithesis. In the Marxist dialectic as in the evolutionary view of history, Japan lagged behind the West, but, with the dialectical approach, the problem of the agrarian community became critical because nature was not merely something to be grown out of, but something which must be surmounted for a completely different set of family and economic relations. Industry was essential, and Marxists argued that the agrarian virtues celebrated by the government were not merely a preliminary stage, but the antithesis of modernity. In a different way, Maruyama Masao emerges out of this milieu since his work too is indebted to a dialectical view of modernity. However, as I have argued elsewhere,<sup>22</sup> a certain positivism adopted from theorist Hans Kelsen slips into Maruyama’s work, and he at times abandons a dialectical view of history for simple either-or options represented by a choice between reason *or* tradition, culture *or* nature.

In the early twentieth century, not only the left and left-leaning types like Maruyama imbibed the idea that modernity meant “overcoming.” The far right as well accepted the idea that the dialectic was central to an understanding of modernity. The famous 1942 Kyoto conference on “Overcoming Modernity” (*kindai no chōkoku*) argued that the dialectic itself had to be overcome, which was ironic, as Harry Harootyan has pointed out, since “any attempt to imagine an overcoming of an overcoming could lead to a reaffirmation of the very processes of modernity that induced people to think about eventfulness and change.”<sup>23</sup>

Let me recap: In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the two ways of achieving modernity developed in nineteenth-century Europe—the evolutionary schema and the dialectical schema—were well and truly explored by Japanese writers who often manipulated these ideas with verve and facility. However, both the evolutionary and the dialectical approach left Japanese thinkers in a quandary. Modernity, due to its very structure, was embodied by “the West” and, whether Japanese liked modernity or not, in adopting these Western understandings of modernity, they placed Japan at a disadvantage, as a second order entity left to embrace or defy a history defined elsewhere.

This dilemma led, I think, to a third strategy for thinking about the relation between modernity and nature which also appeared in the 1920s and which was developed throughout the war years in Japan. This strategy relied, not on mis-recognizing modernity as something that could be overcome or attained naturally through evolution, but on a profound understanding of the flawed structure of modern history, flawed because it had jettisoned the problem of nature to the realm of the unthought. This third strategy relied on plumbing the depths of the psyche of modernity; it would raise to consciousness the repressed idea of nature just as a psychoanalyst might help a patient to interpret the dream signals from the non-waking world.

Principal among those who wished to resuscitate nature in this way was Watsuji Tetsurō, a philosopher and professor who studied briefly in Germany before returning home in 1928 to begin his most important work concerning concepts of nature, a book called *Fūdo* (sometimes translated as “climate.”) The book was published in 1935, with a revised edition issued in 1943 to eliminate the “leftist traces” that Watsuji had, he claimed, inadvertently incorporated in the original treatise. *Fūdo* was a rebuttal to the Heideggerian emphasis on time; it shifted the focus to space, insisting that the space which a people occupy is at once social and environmental. The world consists, says Watsuji, of three basic climatic regions—monsoon, desert, and meadow—which guarantee cultural differences through their minute variations. A particular culture, instead of emerging through the dialectic of history, arises through the repetition exacted by nature’s annual cycles. Instead of the linear or dialectical time of European modernities, time should be viewed as sedimented, the layers of the passing years pressing down on one another to form the bedrock of cultural assurance.

Elements of *Fūdo* made their way into another important reexamination of nation and nature, *Kokutai no hongī*, sponsored by the wartime Ministry of Education and issued to all schools in 1937. It was written by two committees, on one of which Watsuji sat. Like *Fūdo*, I think *Kokutai no hongī* can be read as an attempt to restore nature to consciousness; indeed ultimately to claim that Japanese consciousness and nature are the same thing. The Japanese love of nature goes beyond mere love of the physical world or customs related to the passing of the seasons. Below the surface, the coalescent devotion between the Japanese people and nature unites consciousness itself with physical experience to such an extent that one cannot be separated from the other. At some mystical level, indeed, the nature of the Japanese islands and the nature of the awareness of those who live on them *are* the same thing, not metaphorically, but literally. Moving from the physical environment through customary practices to consciousness itself, nature unifies all aspects of Japanese existence.

The commentaries on *Kokutai no hongī*, written to make this ornate text more comprehensible, are rather opaque themselves, but they discuss this issue of the national relationship with nature directly. For instance, in their 1941 commentary, Sonda Hideharu and Hara Fusataka insist that the Japanese intimacy with nature is not a personal relationship akin to that of Romantic “naturalism” (*shizenshugi*) in Europe with its stress on individual consciousness (*kojin no jikaku*).<sup>24</sup> Instead, the connection in Japan lies between nature and the communal consciousness of Japanese people as a whole. Indeed, the unbroken “lineage of nature” (*shizen no goikkei*) and the unbroken “lineage of consciousness” (*jikaku no goikkei*) are united in the imperial line.<sup>25</sup> In other words, what the commentary is saying is that Japan

will not participate in modernity's trajectory from nature to history, from unconsciousness to consciousness either along the dialectical model or along the evolutionary model. Instead, what we see happening here and in other texts of the period, is the assertion that nature *is* consciousness for the Japanese people. That which was the antithesis and the suppressed of modernity in the West is fully recuperated in Japan. The very structure of the national psyche and of national history were transformed, making the Japanese equal to, if not better than, other nations.

But is this naturalized nationhood still modern? I would argue that it is. Despite the emphasis on imperial lineage and appeals to antiquity, this political image of nature as national consciousness is quite plainly not some residual tradition. It differs markedly from the universalism of most conceptions of nature in the Tokugawa and Meiji period by insisting that nature itself is somehow uniquely Japan's. While the Japanese scholars and bureaucrats who created this image sought to root it in antiquity, they were doing no more than Europeans did in rooting modern democracy in the practices of classical Greece. Invented tradition, as we know, is a major trope of modernity. But there are two, even more important ways in which this idea of nature as synonymous with Japanese consciousness is modern. First, this idea that nature is Japanese consciousness is modern in its concern for identity. If time is what Europe claims as the matrix for its development, than space, climate, the environment become the preserve of Japanese identity. By psychoanalyzing history and recuperating nature for national consciousness, Watsuji and others claim an identity for Japan which distinguishes it from modern nations in its own terms. Second and most importantly, modernity promises freedom. In European Enlightenment thought, modernity promised freedom to the individual who emerged out of the state of nature into the modern state through social contract. In Japan, modernity also promises freedom, but in this case, to the nation which emerges intact, as a natural entity, into the fiercely contested international arena. Japan is now free, absolutely free to do as it wants. I think, in short, that wartime Japan created a form of modern political ideology that engaged the problematic of modern history articulated in Europe, and went beyond it in realizing that nature did not have to serve as the opposite of consciousness and freedom as long as "consciousness" was defined as communal and "freedom" was defined as ultranational. This is an impressive intellectual achievement even though the political results were abhorrent.

### **Therapeutic Failure**

This holism, this desire to integrate humanity and nature, extended beyond history and the humanities to the sciences. As the essay in this volume by Pamela Asquith and unpublished research by Gordon McOuat indicate, twentieth-century Japanese scientists such as Hayata Bunzō and Imanishi Kinji also worked out new biological theories uniting all life—human and non-human—in ways suspicious of linear development. Working in the Japanese colony of Formosa, Hayata posited a new theory of evolutionary biology based on complex webs of connection among organisms, webs far more dynamic than the European phylogenetic trees that developed only unilinearly. Imanishi went further, insisting on the unity of all elements on the planet earth—living and non-living. Writing in 1940, Imanishi tells us that "the environment exists in a living thing and the living thing exists in the environ-



ment, they are not separate.”<sup>26</sup> This stance, which seemed so different from Western views, was heralded by postwar environmentalists such as Lynn T. White who assumed that Japan's holistic vision must have consequences for their use of the environment.<sup>27</sup> Through writers such as White, the Japanese were transformed from the laggards of modernity to the prophets of environmental purity. The bottom line for many was that if, intellectually, conceptually, we could bring nature back into history as had the Japanese, we could save ourselves from environmental disaster.

But the therapy was not really successful. If the goal was true integration, the holism achieved remained partial. Nature had been recovered for history only on national grounds, and humanity had been reincorporated within the natural sciences only intellectually. As the work of William Tsutsui demonstrates,<sup>28</sup> even the wartime embrace of nature as national consciousness, had precious little impact on the use of natural resources. Indeed, looking at ideas of nature and the uses of nature simultaneously in modernizing Japan suggests that the greatest gulf lies not between the “two cultures” of science and the humanities that C. P. Snow and more recently Stephen Jay Gould pointed to, but between ideological values and actual practices. We can bring nature back into intellectual history all we want and still create one heck of a mess on the land, in the sea, and in the air. Even in Japan, the full recovery of nature within history and the complete understanding of humanity's place within the natural world has not yet occurred.

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NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Mann 1937, p. 17.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., pp. 17-18.

<sup>3</sup> White 1973, p. 136.

<sup>4</sup> Hegel 1830-31, p. 25.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>8</sup> Marx and Engels, p. 42.

<sup>9</sup> Lukács 1971, p. 234.

<sup>10</sup> Barthes 1972, p. 153.

<sup>11</sup> Harootunian 2000, p. 42.

<sup>12</sup> Young 1948.

<sup>13</sup> Bagehot 1872 (1999), p. 50.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 49.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 29.

<sup>16</sup> See the discussion of the idea of nature in Mill "Nature."

<sup>17</sup> Mill *On Liberty*, p. 71.

<sup>18</sup> Numata 1961, p. 278.

<sup>19</sup> According to historian Matsuzawa Hiroaki, Meiji socialists such as members of the short-lived Shakai Minshūtō (Socialist Peoples Party) 1901 believed that a socialist society could control the negative effects of competition while embracing the evolutionary teleology of progress as "the universal foundation for our understanding of history." Matsuzawa 1973, p. 50. Socialist Ōsugi Sakai who translated Darwin's *Origin of the Species* in 1914 understood the "struggle for survival" to refer to class struggle.

<sup>20</sup> Katō Hiroyuki, *Jinken shinsetsu*, p. 444.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 426.

<sup>22</sup> Thomas 2001.

<sup>23</sup> Harootunian 2000, p. 42.

<sup>24</sup> Sonda and Hara 1941, p. 24. Sonda and Hara use Nietzsche here as representative of the "Western" emphasis on individualism.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 551.

<sup>26</sup> Imanishi 2002, p. 33.

<sup>27</sup> White 1967, pp. 1203-7.

<sup>28</sup> Tsutsui 2003, pp. 294-311.