

## Chapter Three

# The Kempei Police System and Regional Control


In the first decade of colonial rule following Japan's annexation of Korea, the governing style had such a pronounced military character that it has come to be called "military rule" (*budan seiji*). The "military" bent of the government was shaped, first, by the fact that the governor general was, by Japanese law, a top-ranking military officer with wide discretionary powers, and, second, by the adoption of the kempei-dominated police system (kempei police system) to support the execution of colonial rule.

As described in Chapter One, Korea's kempei police system was formally established in June 1910 as the outcome of an historical rivalry and power struggle between the Korean police (civil police force) and the kempeitai (gendarmarie) in Korea. The resolution of their struggle resulted in the "merger" of the two into one structure, but because the top positions in the police organization were staffed by kempei officers, the relationship of kempei (or military police) and police in the unified structure was never simply one of coexistence. The Central Police Headquarters chief (*Keimu sōchō*) was concurrently an army general and commander-in-chief of the Korea kempeitai, and the Provincial Police Department (*Keimubu*) chiefs also, were kempeitai field officers heading the provincial kempeitai. Because these officers served simultaneously in kempeitai and high-level police positions, the kempeitai had a firm grip on the backbone of power over the civil police. (See Figure 6)

Further, kempei personnel were authorized to carry out ordinary police work, and kempeitai detachment stations and outstations, in addition to police stations and substations where civil police were detailed, functioned as police agencies. As a general rule, civil police were posted around the newly-opened ports and around railway centers, while kempei were deployed in other areas that the military police designated as high security or important in the campaign to wipe out the Righteous Armies, but the domain where kempei were empowered to function as ordinary police was actually far bigger than the total area under the jurisdiction of the civil police. (See Figure 7)

With kempei officers in command of its central axis, the kempei police system had an extremely strong military coloration, both in the structure of its internal organization and in the way it was used to govern the Korean people. That is probably why the administration of Korea in the 1910s is sometimes described not as "military rule," but more bluntly as "kempeitai rule." The kempei police system also stood as evidence of how

Figure 6. Kempei Police Organization (Outline)




Source: Based on charts in *Shisei nijūgo-nen shi* [A Twenty-five Year History of the Administration of Korea], edited and published by the Government General of Korea, 1935, p. 33.

Notes

1. This chart shows the organization immediately after Imperial Ordinance No. 343 of the “Regulations on the Kempeitai in Korea” was issued on 10 September 1910.
2. The thick lines indicate the chain of command of civil police and the thin lines the chain of command of the military police. The double lines (=) indicates concurrently held posts.

greatly the Korea kempeitai at that time differed from the Japanese parent organization. The kempeitai in Korea was a special kind of gendarmerie with more and stronger powers than Japan’s own. A core distinction was its organizational hierarchy; while the kempeitai in Japan proper and in other Japanese-occupied territories was under the commander-in-chief of the kempeitai organization in Japan, the work of the military police in Korea came under the direction of Japan’s minister of war and minister of the navy, and ordinary police work was directed by the governor general in Korea. (See Figure 6)<sup>1</sup> In fact, according to personnel rules for army officers established as policy in October 1910, in the areas of rank and pay, the “commander-in-chief of the ‘Korea kempeitai’ . . . is to be

Figure 7. Respective Areas of Jurisdiction of the Kempei and Civil Police (as of March 1914)



Source: Kasuya Ken'ichi, "Aja no minzoku undō to Nihon teikoku shugi" [The Asian Nationalist Movement and Japanese Imperialism], *Kōza Nihon rekishi* [Lectures on Japanese History], vol. 9, University of Tokyo Press, 1985, p. 126. Presumably the original source is the illustrated report, "Kempei keisatsu haichi henkō ni kansuru ken hōkoku" [Report on the Redeployment of the Kempei and Police], sent from Kempei Commander Akashi Motojirō to War Minister Kusunose Yukihiko, included in Ministry of War, ed., *Mitsu dai nikki*, Taishō 3-1.

treated as equivalent to .... the commander-in-chief of the kempeitai [in Japan]," which placed the two on an equal level.<sup>2</sup>

Partly because it was unique among all the other kempeitai organizations in Japan and its occupied territories, the kempei police system operating in Korea during this phase of Japan's colonial rule has stimulated a number of studies focusing on the system

itself, and there is a comparatively large number of works in the broader field of policing in colonial Korea that deal with this unique organization.<sup>3</sup> They tend, however, to leave many topics unexamined, mainly because the ban on certain kinds of publications and public expression during the period of “military rule” ensured that very few relevant materials would be available to study today. In this chapter I want to take up three of the topics that have received little or no attention.

First, how should we understand the kempei police system as an institution? It derived its distinctive character from the role in it of the kempei: whereas originally they were meant to perform as gendarmes or military police, in the kempei police system they were assigned to civil police positions and they were also authorized to do ordinary police work. Yet most of the published research on the kempeitai police system does not examine the laws and statutes pertaining to the appointments to police posts and to police work carried out by gendarmes. Studies in this area, consequently, contain multiple factual misunderstandings. I will try to rectify some of those misunderstandings by presenting evidence that the laws and rules governing the appointment of kempei officers to police posts on the one hand, and those authorizing kempei to do ordinary police work on the other, were completely separate from the start, and that the policy objectives in each set of laws and regulations were also different.

Second, I examine what the Government General thought about the state of Korea’s security—how it perceived the conditions for peace, order, and stability. Once it was established, just before annexation, the kempei police system went virtually unchanged right up until the March 1st Movement of 1919. Except for a short time at the very beginning, it underwent no significant organizational expansion. That is why previous studies give only summary accounts of the Government General’s outlook and consider that it, too, did not change much. I argue that we cannot assume that there was no change at all in the way the Government General regarded the peace and security situation during the decade of the kempei police system. In this chapter we will trace certain shifts in the views of the Government General and the people who were in charge of security and public order. The two major junctures when those shifts occurred were the incident known as the “Case of the 105,” which is discussed later, and the outbreak of the first world war.

The third topic of this chapter is an examination of how, in practical terms, the smallest units of colonial government were administered under the kempei police system. Some studies on this period make a point of detailing the brutality in the methods used by the kempei police to assert their control, and they constitute a valuable body of work. But they rely mainly on such sources as ordinances, regulations, and instructions, and also on the biography of Akashi Motojirō, who was the commander-in-chief of the Korea kempeitai. There have been almost no attempts to explore what the actual work of administration in the local regions consisted of or how the officers saw it, using primary sources coming out of the Korea kempeitai itself. During my search for source materials, I was fortunate

to come across a large volume entitled *Chōsen chūsatsu kempeitai shiryō* [Documents of the Korea Kempeitai] (held by Tama Branch of Hōsei University Library), which contains material on conferences relating to kempei police activities in the area around Kangwōndo during the first half of the 1910s. This was a major find, and it allowed me to get a fairly broad picture of the nature and diversity of activities by the low-level kempei police. I wanted to investigate not only activities that would have been required of the higher (political) police but I also looked closely at the wide-ranging involvement of kempei police personnel in routine administrative police duties, a development that is considered to be peculiar to the 1910s.

## 1. Institutional Aspects of the Kempei Police System

In the kempei police system, kempei, who were all military men, assumed civil police positions and also took on ordinary police duties, creating an exceptional organization. In the view of one admiring historian, “Such a strong policing system exists nowhere else in the world.”<sup>4</sup> Be that as it may, the institutional and legal aspects of the kempei police remain underexamined. In this section we will look at its institutional core by considering, first, the practice of appointing kempei to police positions and, second, having kempei officers take on ordinary police work. Section 3 of the first chapter noted how certain ideas had been germinating for some time in the mind of Akashi Motojirō, the leading actor in the kempei police system. He wanted gendarmes to be ranked above civil police, and he envisioned using the gendarmerie as the nucleus of the manpower needed for regional control. This section shows how those ideas were incorporated into the kempei police system and the ways in which they were reflected in its operations.

The insufficient understanding of the institutional aspects of the kempei police system shows up clearly, among other places, in two conflicting views that continue to appear today concerning a basic question: What proportion of the manpower in the Korea kempeitai dealt with ordinary police work? One view assumes simply that everyone did—that all kempeitai personnel in Korea were involved in some way with ordinary police work. Most of the earlier studies make that interpretation an unspoken premise. A more thorough discussion on this appears later, but to summarize: Even general accounts sometimes point out that there was a large-scale increase in kempeitai numbers during 1910–1911. This view could not have been developed without assuming that statistics given for “gendarmes... *who carry out the duties of police stations*” (emphasis added) that appear in the *Chōsen Sōtokufu tōkei nenpō* [Annual Statistical Report of the Government General of Korea] of 1910 and 1911 are simply figures that represented all kempei personnel.

The other view holds that, “In areas where there were no police stations, kempei detachment stations and outstations performed police duties in their stead. Responding to necessity, therefore, commissioned officers and lower ranking officers in the kempeitai were given concurrent appointments as police superintendents and police inspectors.”<sup>5</sup> If we stand by that approach, it means that “in the 1910s, *not everyone in the Korea kempeitai* was automatically assigned to concurrent ordinary police duties .... *just a portion of them* were given such assignments” (emphasis added).<sup>6</sup>

The two views are too different to be easily reconciled, and, in any case, it turns out that both ways of reading the issue are mistaken. Against the claim of the first, we must look at the figures for all “Korea kempeitai personnel” and compare them with the figures for “Korean kempeitai personnel engaged in ordinary police work.” Doing that, we can clearly see that not all the Korea kempeitai personnel acted as ordinary police. As for the second view, the writers have conflated the two procedures—“assigning kempei officers to civil police positions” (superintendent, police inspector, etc.) and “engaging kempei in ordinary police duties”—and taken them to be the same thing. In fact, the laws and regulations governing each one were issued separately, and we must also consider the possibility that the policy goals embedded in each were different.

With those points in mind, we can set out the main tasks of this section, the first of which is to separate the two activities, under the kempei police system, of “assigning kempei officers to civil police positions” and “engaging kempei in ordinary police duties.” Once we do that, we can look again at the respective laws and regulations with a view to better understanding the circumstances of the police position assignments as well as what, exactly, ordinary police work entailed. Finally, we will investigate the policy intentions behind those laws and regulations and the ultimate aims of the police work done by kempeitai personnel.

Regarding civil police postings, a topic that has not been well understood, an important point is that as a whole, the majority of kempei were not assigned to police positions, particularly at the beginning of the 1910s. Data in *Shokuin-roku* [Personnel Directory] issued by the Cabinet Printing Bureau makes this clear. Each annual edition of the Directory, in the subsection “General Headquarters of the Kempeitai Garrison in Korea” under the “Ministry of War” section, lists the names of all kempeitai personnel in Korea with rank of noncommissioned officer or above, while the subsection “Police Stations” coming under the section “Government General of Korea” lists all civil police personnel from the rank of police inspector and higher. The names of kempei officers assigned to positions in the civil police are included in this section. By studying both lists, it is possible to identify those in the Korea kempeitai headquarters who were assigned to positions in the civil police, which came under the Government General of Korea. The above Directory does not list superior privates with ranks below noncommissioned officer, but considering that there was no law providing for the assignment of superior

privates to civil police positions,<sup>7</sup> we can identify kempeitai officers who were assigned to police positions by referring to the data in the Directory. Figure 8 shows the results of surveys done on kempeitai assignments to police posts throughout the era of “military rule.”

By studying the table, we can see a correlation between the kempei officers’ ranks and their assignment rate. That is to say, in each year for which data are given, almost 100 percent of the upper-ranking commissioned officers and warrant officers had police positions, but that was not the case with the lower ranks; on the whole, for kempei sergeant-majors, sergeants, and corporals, the lower the rank, the smaller the number assigned to police duties.

Two edicts determined the method of assigning kempei to civil police positions and brought about such differences in the frequency of those assignments. They were the Imperial Ordinances of June 1910 by which the kempei police system was established: (1) Imperial Ordinance No. 296, “Organization of Residency General Police Agency System” and (2) Imperial Ordinance No. 302, “Pertaining to Assignment to and Authority of the Positions of Residency General Chief of Police, Chiefs of Provincial Police, Police Superintendents, and Police Inspectors.” (Both, revised on 9 October 1910, after Korea’s formal annexation, were superseded by, respectively, Imperial Ordinances Nos. 402 and 358. Those revisions were mainly changes in words and names, replacing, for example, “Kankoku” with “Chōsen” and “Residency General” with “Government General in Korea.” Citations from them that appear below are taken from the revised versions.) The relevant text can be found in (1), Article 6, which states, “The central police chief must be an army general who is head of the Korea (Chōsen) Kempeitai,” and Article 8, “Provincial police chiefs must be kempeitai field officers who head the kempei units in each province.” Then in (2) it is stipulated that, “In particular, the general who heads the Korea Kempeitai and commissioned officers can be appointed, respectively, as central police chief of the Government General in Korea, and provincial police chiefs or Government General in Korea police superintendents. Kempei warrant officers and noncommissioned officers can be assigned as Government General police inspectors.”

This system of assignments distinguished appointments by kempei rank. According to Articles 6 and 8 in (1), the positions of central police chief (*Keimu sōchō*), who was the top commander of the police organization, and provincial police chiefs, who held the top police post in each province, had to be filled, respectively, by the army general serving as Korea kempeitai commander-in-chief, and kempei field officers serving as heads of the provincial kempeitai units. In the case of lower ranking kempei, however, including commissioned officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers, (2) stipulates that they “*can be appointed* as police superintendents (*keishi*) [or] police inspectors (*keibu*)” [emphasis added]; in other words, in some cases they were assigned to those posts, but not always. An officer named Tsushima Ikunoshin, who worked (ca. 1911–

Figure 8. Rate of Kempeitai Officer Assignments to the Civil Police (1911–1918)

	Kempeitai personnel in Korea			Assigned as police officers		Assignment rate $((b) \times 100 / (a))$
	Posts	No. of persons (a)	Posts	No. of persons (b)		
May 1911	Commissioned officer	Army general (Kempeitai commander)	1	Central police chief	1	100.0
		Kempei colonel (Provincial kempei chief)	14	Provincial police chief/ police superintendent	14	100.0
		Kempei lieutenant (Kempei squad chief)	101	Police superintendent	101	100.0
	Warrant officer	Kempei special-duty sergeant major	20	Police inspector	20	100.0
	Noncommissioned officer	Kempei sergeant major	14	Police inspector	11	78.6
		Kempei sergeant	125	Police inspector	62	49.6
		Kempei corporal	337	Police inspector	28	8.3
Total		612	Total	237	38.7	
May 1912	Commissioned officer	Army general (Kempeitai commander)	1	Central police chief	1	100.0
		Kempei colonel (Provincial kempei chief)	15	Provincial police chief/ police superintendent	15	100.0
		Kempei lieutenant (Kempei squad chief)	97	Police superintendent	95	97.9
	Warrant officer	Kempei special-duty sergeant major	20	Police inspector	20	100.0
	Noncommissioned officer	Kempei sergeant major	38	Police inspector	36	94.7
		Kempei sergeant	111	Police inspector	61	55.0
		Kempei corporal	284	Police inspector	42	14.8
Total		566	Total	270	47.7	
May 1914	Commissioned officer	Army general (Kempeitai commander)	1	Central police chief	1	100.0
		Kempei colonel (Provincial kempei chief)	15	Provincial police chief/ police superintendent	15	100.0
		Kempei lieutenant (Kempei squad chief)	96	Police superintendent	92	95.8
	Warrant officer	Kempei special-duty sergeant major	20	Police inspector	20	100.0
	Noncommissioned officer	Kempei sergeant major	53	Police inspector	53	100.0
		Kempei sergeant	251	Police inspector	229	91.2
		Kempei corporal	448	Police inspector	217	48.4
Total		884	Total	627	70.9	

	Kempeitai personnel in Korea			Assigned as police officers		Assign-ment rate
	Posts	No. of persons (a)	Posts	No. of persons (b)	((b)×100/(a))	
May 1916	Commissioned officer	Army general (Kempeitai commander)	1	Central police chief	1	100.0
		Kempei colonel (Provincial kempei chief)	15	Provincial police chief/ police superintendent	15	100.0
		Kempei lieutenant (Kempei squad chief)	96	Police superintendent	95	99.0
	Warrant officer	Kempei special-duty sergeant major	20	Police inspector	20	100.0
	Noncommissioned officer	Kempei sergeant major	52	Police inspector	52	100.0
		Kempei sergeant	250	Police inspector	234	93.6
		Kempei corporal	446	Police inspector	337	75.6
	Total		880	Total	754	85.7

	Kempeitai personnel in Korea			Assigned as police officers		Assign-ment rate
	Posts	No. of persons (a)	Posts	No. of persons (b)	((b)×100/(a))	
May 1918	Commissioned officer	Army general (Kempeitai commander)	1	Central police chief	1	100.0
		Kempei colonel (Provincial kempei chief)	15	Provincial police chief/ police superintendent	15	100.0
		Kempei lieutenant (Kempei squad chief)	97	Police superintendent	96	99.0
	Warrant officer	Kempei special-duty sergeant major	20	Police inspector	20	100.0
	Noncommissioned officer	Kempei sergeant major	52	Police inspector	45	86.5
		Kempei sergeant	249	Police inspector	228	91.6
		Kempei corporal	445	Police inspector	296	66.5
	Total		879	Total	701	79.7

Source: Calculated from Cabinet Printing Bureau, ed., *Shokuin-roku* [Personnel Directory].

**Notes**

1. Personnel listed in “Army—Kempeitai stationed in Korea” in *Shokuin-roku*, as checked against the same personnel and their names under “Government General of Korea—The Central Police Headquarters and Provincial Police Departments” in the same directory, to compute the rate of those assigned as civil police officers in the kempeitai.
2. It is not known why the numbers of kempeitai personnel listed above are not necessarily the same as in *Chōsen Sōtokufu tōkei nenpō* [Annual Statistical Report of the Government General of Korea] and *Rikugunshō tōkei nenpō* [Annual Statistical Report of the Ministry of War].

1914) as police superintendent in charge of police affairs in the Government General Central Police Headquarters and was extremely well-informed about the department's internal affairs, wrote that,

In the application of the special ordinance on assignments [referring to (2), Imperial Ordinance No. 302], the general who was kempeitai chief and kempeitai commissioned officers were all assigned as chief of central police, chiefs of provincial police, or police superintendents; and as for noncommissioned kempei officers, those who were needed to deal with police affairs were assigned to police inspector posts. To give some particulars, among noncommissioned kempei officers, some heads of kempei detachment stations and outstations were always assigned as police inspectors, while others were not.<sup>8</sup>

What were the criteria for deciding which kempei would get civil police positions and which ones would not? Regarding what he said about those “needed to deal with police affairs,” Tsushima elaborates: “Because of the kempeitai-dominant police organization, the kempeitai commander-in-chief, and commissioned officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers attached to each provincial kempeitai department were assigned to the leadership and executive posts in the Central Police Headquarters and to middle-ranking positions in the provincial police departments. Assigned and deployed as police superintendents or inspectors, these people were ranked higher than civil police officers.” He goes on to explain that, as for kempei working at the lowest levels (in kempeitai detachment stations and outstations, for example), “When the kempei and civil police collaborated in police work on a contingency basis as needed, functioning, for example, as police guards, escorts, patrolmen, scouts, and riot police,” kempei commissioned officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers were made police inspectors so that they could directly supervise and command both kempei and the civil police.

A fundamental reason for putting kempei in civil police posts, in other words, was to institutionalize kempeitai control. While formerly the kempei chain of command had been separate, under the new arrangements kempei could now command the civil police, and at lower levels, kempei leaders could direct both kempei and civil police. One of the institutional features of the kempei police system, then, was that it placed control over the civil police firmly in the grip of the kempeitai, and the measure that ensured the exercise of such control was the system of assigning kempei to civil police posts.<sup>9</sup>

Certainly that measure was not applied uniformly and did not have equal effect throughout all parts of the police organization. The kempeitai retained and enforced its control the most thoroughly in the section known as the higher (political) police. Among five sections in the Central Police Headquarters, the Higher Police was the only section that had a kempei officer as its chief, and the person in charge of the Higher Police in

the provincial police departments was always a kempei. That meant that the channel of communication from Central Police Headquarters chief to Higher Police section head to Higher Police directors in the provincial police departments was monopolized by kempei appointees, which made for good communication and swift, efficient action. The head of the Higher Police section, in fact, was the next most powerful person after the chief of police, which is why, when Central Police Chief Akashi was absent for a period, the person who took over for him temporarily was Yamagata Kan, the first chief of the Higher Police section in the Central Police Headquarters (*Chōsen shimbun*, 8 March 1911). The heads of the Public Peace and Order section and the Public Sanitation section, on the other hand, were civil police officers, with a few kempei appointees on their staffs. The General Affairs section and the Police Affairs section (the name of the former was changed to the Accounting section in 1917), which dealt mainly with internal Central Police Headquarters business, generally had no kempei on their staffs (except for those who took care of documents in the General Affairs section and provided liaison with the Korea kempeitai supreme command).<sup>10</sup>

Assuming that the assignment of kempei officers to police positions can be understood in the way we have described above, the next question concerns to what extent Korea kempeitai were involved in ordinary police work. This problem must be reexamined and treated separately, because the primary purpose of putting kempei into police positions was not just to use them to get ordinary police work done, as one group of studies has argued it was. Kempei officers assigned to the civil police positions of superintendent or inspector naturally were able (legally) to do ordinary police work, but others also could be assigned to that work. Another edict of 10 September 1910 (3), Imperial Ordinance No. 343, “Provisions Pertaining to the Korea Kempeitai,” enabled those without specific civil police appointments to take charge of ordinary police functions. Article 3 states that, “The governor general of Korea stipulates that kempeitai officers with the rank of commissioned officer, warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, and superior private, can perform the work of the civil police while maintaining the positions they currently hold.”

Here, too, however, because of the particular wording, “can perform,” we have to assume the possibility that some of those officers did ordinary civil police work and some did not. What proportion of kempei personnel did those jobs? We can make a fairly close estimate by comparing Ministry of War records with Government General records. Figure 9 shows a comparison of (a) numbers of Korea kempeitai personnel as they appear in the *Rikugunshō tōkei nenpō* [Annual Statistical Report of the Ministry of War] with (b) numbers of “kempei detachments and kempei officers who handle the work of police stations” contained in the *Chōsen Sōtokufu tōkei nenpō* [Annual Statistical Report of the Government General of Korea].<sup>11</sup>

**Figure 9. Rate of Kempei Engaged in Civil Police Duties (1910–1918)**

		1910	1911	1912	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918
Commissioned officer	(a)	141	135	141	151	152	151	151	150	147
	(b)	77	78	78	112	112	112	112	111	112
	Rate	54.6%	57.8%	55.3%	74.2%	73.7%	74.2%	74.2%	74.0%	76.2%
Warrant officer	(a)	24	24	24	23	24	25	25	25	25
	(b)	2	18	18	20	20	20	20	20	23
	Rate	8.3%	75.0%	75.0%	87.0%	83.3%	80.0%	80.0%	80.0%	92.0%
Noncommissioned officer	(a)	805	812	812	811	812	811	811	810	811
	(b)	186	675	675	753	753	753	751	750	758
	Rate	23.1%	83.1%	83.1%	92.8%	92.7%	92.8%	92.6%	92.6%	93.5%
Private soldier	(a)	2,390			2,527		2,417	2,513	2,511	2,482
	(b)	742	2,525	2,525	2,470	2,460	2,417	2,501	2,514	2,484
	Rate	31.0%			97.7%		100.0%	99.5%	100.1%	100.1%
Kempei auxiliary	(a)	4,222			4,490		4,627	4,667	4,668	4,601
	(b)	1,012	4,453	4,473	4,603	4,626	4,627	4,657	4,737	4,601
	Rate	24.0%			102.5%		100.0%	99.8%	101.5%	100.0%
(a)Total		7,582	7,482	7,754	8,002	7,086	8,031	8,167	8,164	8,066
(b)Total		2,019	7,749	7,769	7,958	7,971	7,929	8,041	8,132	7,978
Rate		26.6%	103.6%	100.2%	99.5%	112.5%	98.7%	98.5%	99.6%	98.9%

**Sources:** (a) indicates personnel listed in the *Rikugunshō tōkei nenpō* [Annual Statistical Report of the Ministry of War], including those equivalent to commissioned and noncommissioned officer in the accounting, sanitation, and veterinary departments. Regarding the number of private soldiers and kempei auxiliaries in the (a) category, for 1913, data was augmented from Zenkoku Kenyūkai Rengōkai (National Federation of Kempeitai Veterans' Associations), ed., *Nihon kempei seishi* [The Official History of the Japan Kempeitai], Kenbun Shoin, 1976.

#### Notes

1. "Rate" indicates the proportion of those engaged in civil police duties for all the kempeitai personnel:  $(b) \times 100 / (a)$ .
2. Because private soldiers and kempei auxiliaries were not distinguished in the statistics shown in the 1911–1914 editions of the *Rikugunshō tōkei nenpō*, the spaces for these are left blank. As for the number of private soldiers and kempei auxiliaries in the (a) category for the year 1913, a different source was used as mentioned in "Sources" above.

The main generalization we can make from the data is that only about one-fourth of all kempei personnel were doing ordinary civil police work as of the end of 1910, but soon after that there seems to have been a change in the system that increased the proportion, so that virtually all of them were involved in such work in subsequent years.<sup>12</sup> What do these numbers mean? What is the significance of statistics that show such a huge leap beginning in 1911? Previous interpretations of the (b) total of 2,019 kempei doing police work for 1910 fall roughly into two schools: one takes that figure as the actual number of kempei and assumes that there was a radical expansion of kempei personnel from late 1910 into 1911,<sup>13</sup> and the other assumes that the large difference between the 1910 total and later is the result of statistical error.<sup>14</sup>

In my view, neither of those interpretations can be substantiated. The first one fails when other materials are considered and it easily becomes apparent that the total number of kempei personnel was not 2,019. Apart from the War Ministry's statistical report, from which the (a) numbers in Figure 9 were taken, another source supports the higher number.

In June 1910 just before annexation, Resident General Terauchi requested the Japanese government to boost the Korea kempeitai by 1,000 men. According to the latter source, at that time Terauchi observed that the current status of personnel was, in addition to over 5,200 policemen, “more than 2,300 kempei and 4,500 kempei auxiliaries.”<sup>15</sup> That means that by the end of the year, with the additional forces sent from Japan, there must have been 3,300 kempei and 4,500 auxiliaries, which would bring the kempeitai total to 7,800.

Or, like the other view, we could presume that the number 2,019 for “kempei ... who handle the work of police stations” appearing in the 1910 Government General statistical report is simply some kind of statistical error. But there is evidence enough to refute that hypothesis, too. The recently reissued official history produced by the Korea Kempeitai, *Chōsen kempeitai rekishi* [History of the Korea Kempeitai], gives two parallel figures: a chart showing late December 1910 numbers for “Korea Kempeitai Regular Personnel and Horses Deployment” puts the total at 7,832 men, and then 2,019 appears for “numbers of kempei detachments and kempei personnel carrying out the duties of police stations” in the same month and year.<sup>16</sup> That is an extremely large difference between two numbers appearing parallel to each other in the same source, both related to the end of 1910. The most logical way to interpret it is to conclude that at that point in time only 2,019 out of a total of around 7,800 kempei were engaged in ordinary civil police work. In other words, nowhere were nearly all of the Korea kempei doing such work.

Now, how do we explain the abrupt increase that made the 26.6 percent of kempei in police jobs in late 1910 jump up the following year to hover around 100 percent for the next eight years? Materials that might illuminate the concerns, aims, and intentions that motivated changes in the way the kempei police system operated are extremely hard to find. But we can learn something by looking at a certain shift of focus occurring around 1910 in the work and deployment of the kempei police. Whereas the kempeitai at first concentrated on suppressing the Righteous Armies of the resistance movement, at this point their work increasingly involved regulating certain areas in the everyday lives of Koreans. I believe that shift occasioned a new commitment throughout the kempeitai to perform ordinary civil police jobs on a much wider scale and can therefore account for the statistics we have been examining.

To elaborate, let us look first at the “open formation” or decentralized deployment policy of the kempei police that was implemented beginning in October 1911. Its major effect was to expand the kempeitai presence to 254 additional locations and add 197 more civil police agencies to the current number. That raised the total number of kempei police facilities by 140 percent.<sup>17</sup> After the first big wave of additional facilities under the decentralized deployment policy, the annual rate of increase for both kempei and police facilities was approximately 5 percent or less than the previous year. Even the total number of facilities added between 1912 and 1918 was lower than the level of expansion carried out in the one year spanning 1910–1911. What this tells us is that once

the decentralized deployment of October 1911 had been carried out, the foundation of the kempei police was essentially in place.

Decentralized deployment affected staff as well as location. Formerly 3–5 men who were either noncommissioned officers or superior privates and 4–6 auxiliaries staffed the lowest-level kempeitai outstations (*bunkensho*) and dispatch camps (*hakensho*), but measures taken under decentralized deployment cut personnel in each location to 5–6 in all. And the 5–10 or more policemen and assistant patrolmen who had manned the civil police substations were reduced to 1–2 policemen and 3–4 assistant patrolmen.<sup>18</sup> Reducing staff at each location while increasing the number of locations invited complaints from the working staff, and it also generated problems of communication among low-level posts, hindered supervision of lower-ranking police officers, and so forth.<sup>19</sup> At the same time, these measures were also seen as a way to “shorten the distance between police or kempei stations (staffed by kempei, police, or both) . . . [and] broaden police powers” (comment by Ozawa Hisashi, head of South P’yŏngan Provincial Police Department and Pyŏngyang Kempeitai chief. [*Chōsen shimbun*, 1 April 1913]). In any case, the decentralized deployment policy of 1911 split up both kempeitai and civil police into more numerous, smaller units and spread them out more widely, and without doubt it enabled them to penetrate deeper into local society. It is very likely that these changes in patterns of deployment worked to increase the proportion of kempei doing ordinary civil police work.

The second significant point is that the various laws that would define and shape the kempei police sphere of duties were just becoming operative in that period. A barrage of regulations had already been fired off around the time of the annexation, legalizing restrictions on meetings, public gatherings, business transactions, and so forth, and they were followed by more curbs based on the Ordinance on the Swift Adjudication of Crimes (December 1910); the Ordinance on Civil Suits and Arbitration (also December 1910); the Ordinance on Punishment by the Flogging (March 1912); and the Rules on the Punishment of Police Offenses (March 1912) that stipulated detailed items to be closely monitored in everyday life. Together, these decrees, regulations, and laws extended the judicial power of the kempei police substantially and provided institutionalized backing to “kempei rule.” In effect, that concentrated string of decrees instituted an organized set of legal measures enabling the kempei police to clamp down even on everyday offenses. For example, the Rules on the Punishment of Police Offenses covered a wide spectrum of misdemeanors, big and small, so that they “served not only as a ‘public order act’ to control anti-Japanese activities,” but they also aimed at “searching out ‘suspicious persons,’ controlling ‘group activities,’ and adjusting ‘economic and cultural troubles’” between Japanese and Koreans, and so forth.<sup>20</sup> Going back to the main point of this section, the establishment of this legal network is further indication that an important shift was taking place, wherein policing activities moved out of the stage when they had

focused on suppressing the anti-Japanese armed resistance and into a new phase. Now, each in their own district, the kempei police began exerting constant, probing control over even the smallest aspects of the daily lives of the local Korean populations.

Other scholars have investigated the practices of assigning kempei to police positions and empowering kempei to do police work, arrangements that, as we have seen, formed the backbone of the kempei police system. But in the previous research no distinction was made between assignments of kempei to police positions and kempei's performance of police work. They were different, in fact, and the difference is significant in analyzing the history of this period. To begin with, the two types of assignments were governed by two separate sets of laws, and those two sets of laws were designed for different purposes. Kempei were assigned to civil police positions in accord with two Imperial Ordinances (together with later revisions), one pertaining to the organization of Residency General (later revised to Government General) police force officers and police stations (No. 296), and the other pertaining to the Residency General (later revised) chief of police; assignment to and authority of the positions of the chiefs of provincial police; police superintendents, and police inspectors (No. 302). The purpose of these two ordinances (and their revisions) was to place kempei officers in a legal position of authority to command the civil police within the police agencies, focusing on the Higher Police section. Appointments to those posts were limited to one group of upper-echelon kempei officers. It is perfectly clear that not all kempei personnel were given such assignments.

Performance of ordinary police work was determined according to Imperial Ordinance No. 343, "Provisions Pertaining to the Korea Kempeitai" (promulgated 10 September 1910). The way this ordinance was applied changed greatly from 1910 into 1911, as demonstrated in the enormous leap in numbers; the proportion of kempei engaged in ordinary police business jumped from about one-quarter of the total in late 1910, to 100 percent a few months later. As to the reasons for that rapid involvement of virtually the entire corps, we can presume that it came about partly as a result of decentralized deployment, which was implemented at that time, and having kempei perform civil police duties made it possible to exert much wider, more thorough, consolidated control. The other important factor was a series of laws and decrees that went into effect in the same period and provided stronger and more efficient means to regulate a multitude of everyday activities. These developments underlay a shift in the operation of the entire policing system, moving kempei into police jobs and putting them in charge of broad areas of ordinary police work.

## 2. The Government General's Perception of Security Conditions

This section looks at the perception of Korea's security, stability, and order by top officials in the Government General during the 1910s—it examines their views on what was happening, what was needed, what was in store in the future. As we will see, they saw things differently as certain events unfolded. An analysis of how their views changed will help us better understand the institutional structure of the kempei police system discussed in the previous section, and it will also give us a clearer idea of what the lower-level kempei police actually did—and why—which we will discuss more fully in the following section.

There was a shift in Governor General Terauchi's thinking about public order and security shortly after annexation. Let us first take up an event closely related to that shift, namely, his resignation in August 1911 from the concurrent post he held as minister of war, leaving him in office only as governor general.

For a short time after Korea was annexed, Terauchi seems to have felt some reassurance about the prospects for stability and peace in the colony. The annexation had been accomplished without widespread insurrections or violence by the Righteous Armies, and Terauchi wrote to elder statesman Yamagata Aritomo, "Conditions have been largely peaceful since [the annexation] .... I had all the heads of the provincial police departments report to me, and according to their information, the Korean populace are tranquil. In some places apparently Japanese and Koreans even hold parties together."<sup>21</sup> News from the commander-in-chief of the Japanese Korea Garrison Army was also good: "Seoul as well as the countryside are both genuinely serene .... Mob rioting no longer occurs.... [All that remains] is to capture the ringleaders."<sup>22</sup> As we saw in Section 3 of the first chapter, violent uprisings by the Righteous Armies in the late phase of the resistance movement during 1907 and after, ground down by suppression mainly by Korea kempeitai, had started to fade out even before the annexation was finally accomplished.

Just before the annexation, Akashi Motojirō, chief of Government General Central Police Headquarters (and concurrently commander-in-chief of the Korea Kempeitai) also observed that, "As far as I can see, in general, the rebel revolts by now have run their course."<sup>23</sup> He made that comment in a talk to the provincial police chiefs (concurrently chiefs of the provincial kempeitai units), but then he went on to urge the utmost caution, instructing the officers to be always vigilant in watching for anarchist and socialist ideas and for any signs of "nascent secret societies." The tightening of command authority by the kempeitai over the Higher (political) Police that was discussed in the previous section undoubtedly reflected this critical, extremely wary view.

Then, in the middle of 1911, about a year after annexation, clearly some kind of change was taking place in the way Governor General Terauchi and others responsible for

Korea's stability and order saw the security conditions in Korea. In May 1911 Terauchi sent a letter to Yamagata in which he expressed his desire to resign as war minister and as governor general:

If it should so happen that Prince Katsura [Prime Minister Katsura Tarō] resigns, I, too, if it is possible, would like to be allowed to retire from both the positions I currently hold. As you are aware, for ten years now I have humbly tried to serve as minister of war .... The future in Korea promises to be extremely difficult, and I feel wretchedly, unendurably miserable. I wish to be allowed to resign from both my positions.<sup>24</sup>

Terauchi requested permission to quit both positions, citing his decade-long tenure as minister of war (he took that post in March 1902), and the "extreme difficulty" he foresaw in Korea that would make it intolerable to stay on as governor general. Prime Minister Katsura felt threatened by this: if Terauchi were free to become prime minister, a new generation in the Yamagata faction would come forth in greater strength. After talking it over with Hara Takashi, an extremely influential figure of the Seiyūkai political party, Katsura agreed to let Terauchi step down as war minister, but he dissuaded him from leaving the governor generalship, and in the end Terauchi went along.<sup>25</sup> He remained in office only as governor general, but his perception of the Korean situation was gloomy as ever. Then, about halfway through 1912, he vented deep frustration in a letter to Katsura, saying, "The longer I have been in Korea, the greater my hardship has become."<sup>26</sup>

Events related to kempei police efforts to squash underground movements and secret societies, for one thing, seem to have had something to do with Terauchi's shift from optimism after annexation, and then into gloom over Korea's security and stability. In particular, he was probably shaken by linked incidents that later came to be called the "Anak Conspiracy" and the "Case of the 105." Those incidents led to mass arrests in 1910 of alleged partisans and anti-Japanese nationalists, and they were followed by serious ramifications. Central Police Chief Akashi's program of stamping out secret societies and other underground organizations was first put fully into action with the Anak Conspiracy (in December 1910), which centered on the arrest of An Myōng-gūn (brother of Itō Hirobumi's assassin), who was accused of crimes in connection with his money-raising for the independence movement. A plot to assassinate Governor General Terauchi was fabricated by the police and was used as the pretext to begin rounding up more than 600 Koreans in September 1911, 105 of whom, including An, were indicted. These events were at the center of a determined effort by the Government General to choke off clandestine activities of the Sinminhoe (New People's Association), a nationalist group founded in 1907 that was pivotal in the independence movement. The arrests and conspiracy trials in the Case of the 105 (many among the 105 were Sinminhoe leaders) decimated the

organization, for many of its members had been arrested and it was effectively crushed. The details of both incidents are well documented elsewhere,<sup>27</sup> but let me point out elements they had in common. In both cases, those targeted by the police were activists and underground organizations considered part of the Patriotic Enlightenment Movement, a campaign that had taken root in the northern, heavily Christian part of Korea to promote education, native industry, Korean-run commerce, and so forth. Also in each case, the kempei police had already written the fabricated “plot” of a conspiracy beforehand and used torture to make it turn out as they planned. In mid-1912 Terauchi wrote to Yamagata regarding the trials of the 105,

The preliminary investigations of the assassins that have been going on since last year have been concluded, and a hundred plus several dozen of the arrested will go to trial this time. Public trials of those people will begin at the end of this month, and when the trials start it will be hard to predict what kind of action their partisan sympathizers, who are spread out all over the country, will take. The best we can do is to be thoroughly prepared. Since before annexation their objective . . . [has been] to take back national sovereignty. For that reason, more than the sympathizers and their ilk inside the country, we have to be extremely vigilant about the ones living outside the country in exile, while carefully watching those within.<sup>28</sup>

A sense of urgent anxiety resounds in this letter, in its stress on the stringent precautions that Terauchi believed were needed to deal with the numerous “partisan sympathizers,” within and outside Korea, who supported the “assassins” being tried in court, and whose aim was no less than to “take back national sovereignty.” Around that time, Terauchi had visited P’yöngyang where most of those arrested in the Case of the 105 had been sent, and he related what he had felt on his visit there: “Korea’s long-term prospects look only discouraging.”<sup>29</sup> Presumably Terauchi and others in the Government General all knew from the trials of the 105 that the Sinminhoe had been building a large-scale base for the independence movement in China and elsewhere. Terauchi must have felt deep despair to contemplate the sheer persistence and undaunted resilience of the independence movement activists at home and abroad, and to have no end in sight of the trouble bound to come from Christians and others, who took courage from the movement and simply refused to give up. Police Superintendent Kunitomo Naokane, who was in charge of secret operations in the Higher Police section in the Central Police Headquarters, led the investigation and arrests of the 105. In his opinion, “All our present efforts, great as they are, to Japanize the Korean populace . . . will have no effect,” and he added that, “Dangerous situations such as rioting will not occur, but I fear that like this incident, crimes are going to break out frequently in the future.”<sup>30</sup>

There was another, equally ominous event that unsettled the already tense

Government General executives as they considered what had to be done to ensure security and order. That was the outbreak of the Xinhai Revolution (1911) in China, erupting in the Wuhang uprising on October 10th that year. What impact would it have? China's neighbors in Korea were intensely interested in and concerned about the Xinhai Revolution. Their reactions varied. Some concentrated on the ideals of the revolution, and others focused on Japanese policy toward China: Was it good or bad, constructive or destructive? To many Koreans, whether or not the revolution would have a detrimental effect on their economic life was the paramount concern (this issue will be discussed in Section 3 of the next chapter). The Xinhai Revolution created deep psychological unease among Koreans, who felt it directly, but only for a short time. Knowing how this event could galvanize Koreans, however, the Government General must have experienced acute apprehension about its ability to maintain stability and control. At that time Ishizuka Eizō, general affairs director of the Government General, related in a letter to Terauchi the feelings of Koreans in connection with the Xinhai Revolution, such as: "It was lucky that Japan went right ahead and annexed Korea last year; if they had tried to do it this year, it would have been really difficult," and "It was very unfortunate for the Korean people that Korea was unavoidably annexed by Japan." In Ishizuka's analysis, the Chinese revolution was a catalyst to bring Korean anti-Japanese feeling out into the open.<sup>31</sup>

After a brief interlude when Governor General Terauchi might have felt some relief knowing that the guerilla resistance had been virtually crushed, some time in 1911 he had the painful realization that now a different kind of security problem loomed on the horizon. Likewise, the kempei police (whose specific functions are discussed in the next section) steadily shifted their focus from consciously organized groups of activists to the wider popular consciousness, which was a breeding ground of such dangerous activities.

There can be little doubt that the outbreak of World War I in 1914 and the wave of socially radical currents of thought that it unleashed exerted a decisive influence on the thinking of the governor general and everyone responsible for order in Korea in the late 1910s. Upon the start of the war rumors abounded about how the war would affect everyday life, about the possible conscription of Koreans, and so forth. Indeed, the second half of the 1910s saw signs of change and agitation everywhere. On the economic front, in 1916 the price of rice and other commodities shot up, leaving many poor farmers in dire straits and sending rising numbers away from the farm to wage labor jobs. Determined to improve their society, Koreans with new ideas tried to take action. One group of people, building on their success in business and finance, set out to create an economic base for a bourgeois nationalism. Another were the Korean students who had gone to Japan to study after the annexation and now, in the latter part of the 1910s, were coming back to Korea. In parallel efforts, these people launched themselves into the project of getting rid of the old society and building a modern, stronger Korea. Thus emerged a class of new intelligentsia well grounded in Western culture who began to influence ways of thinking

in Korea.<sup>32</sup>

How did the Government General view these socio-economic developments and new ideas? Japan quickly declared war on Germany in August 1914, and at that time Governor General Terauchi gave instructions to his staff, stating forcefully that the war “cannot influence Korea,” and urging the officials and police under him to “prevent people from becoming panicked.”<sup>33</sup> At the 1916 conference of provincial police chiefs, Terauchi voiced his concerns more concretely: “With the advancement of the times, noticeable improvements are finally being made in private enterprise and other areas, but at the same time, as often happens, a mood of frivolity is setting in and people are picking up wasteful, extravagant habits. This cannot be helped to some extent, but it has already gone too far and I am exceedingly concerned.”<sup>34</sup> Speaking at the conference of provincial police chiefs at the beginning of 1917, Hasegawa Yoshimichi, who had succeeded Terauchi as governor general the previous October, was also explicit when he cautioned the officers to be on the watch for agitation instigated by “those people with their new education who dare to act in outrageous ways.”<sup>35</sup>

References appearing in Terauchi’s address to the spread of “private enterprise,” for example, and his worry about a new, unrestrained “mood of frivolity” express views that the kempei police shared. Early in 1916 Nakano Arimitsu, director of the central police security section, made the point that, “There has been great progress in society in these past few years, but we cannot afford to ignore the changes also taking place in the thinking of the people at large and in the economy, as well.” Elaborating, he said, “The influences reaching into the Korean people’s worldview have become an exceptionally significant phenomenon” (*Keijō nippō*, 5 January 1916). Coming from the provinces, an opinion voiced around the same time by the head of the Yongsan Kempei detachment, Yano Sukezō, begins to sound truly anxious. In response to an enquiry from Seoul, he wrote, “As for Koreans, first of all, in the realm of ideas all is deteriorating into chaos, and I think that no time has been worse than now .... Christianity is being preached by foreign missionaries .... and wrong ideas passed on by bad elements among the believers are winning over the intellectuals, which is creating serious obstacles to governing.” He continued, “The industrial policy has made possible solid improvement in the quality of material life since annexation .... and because of that the common people have developed more cultivated tastes,” but in comparison, he concluded tersely, “their way of thinking remains as it was before.”<sup>36</sup>

We will now examine a source that is more practical and closer to the ground, and that is an internal report called “Kannai jōkyō hōkoku” [Report on Conditions in the Sakju District], produced at the Sakju Kempei Outstation<sup>37</sup> (hereafter “Report”). In the view of the Report, the roughly 35,000 people who lived in Sakju were doing well: their “financial and economic situation” was good; they enjoyed “great abundance after several years in a row of extremely productive harvests, and the conditions this year also portend an increase of about 10 percent over last year.” Their production of silk thread, among

other things, was prospering, and “the rural economy is very strong and continues to grow. In particular, ordinary farmers are growing more wealthy” (Report, sheets 31–32).

The Report documents the pulsing social and intellectual currents. “The way people feel has changed so vastly,” it says, referring to “great changes in popular attitudes about education . . . . In both town and country people have become intensely enthusiastic for education; they are loudly declaring the need for schooling” (Report, sheets 8, 30). It describes many kinds of new developments, including voluntary enrollment of children of school age into general schools, a spurt in demand for girls’ education, a proliferation of small-scale private schools (*sōdang*) in response to the new education, and others, and it notes the rising interest in ideas, such as “thoughts on rights,” “sense of duty,” and “the spread of rule by law.” Then the Report concludes that all these were “benefits of [Japanese] imperial rule.” This narrative conveys the strong sense at that time of “great changes in popular attitudes about education” and confidence that they could be handled within the framework of colonial rule. This view presumably was shared by local educational authorities.<sup>38</sup>

At the same time, the Report did not neglect to describe a tendency among younger intellectuals that was troubling: “Some of the graduates of elementary schools or other schools who have had contact with Japanese, and some of those with some education who want to become civil servants, have extravagant and lavish tastes . . . they have lost the moderation, practicality, and realism that is needed by the new government” (Report, sheet 22). As for the growing popularity of Christianity, the Report says that, “We are always keeping an eye on the words and actions of the pastors and missionaries who are proselytizing . . . [but] we see no signs these days of subversion or unlawful behavior” (Report, sheet 14). In their view of the peace and security situation in Korea, it is clear that Japanese officials at all levels were keenly aware of rising Korean standards of living on the economic side, and on the other side, the intellectual ferment that was being stirred by new currents of thought.

Two events at the end of World War I that were to have an incalculable impact on colonial Korea were the 1917 October Revolution in Russia and the establishment in November of a socialist/communist government under Lenin, and the enunciation of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points in January 1918, in which the American president declared the principle of national self-determination. Those events, which generated movements all over the world to free people from colonial bondage, were ample reason for anyone involved in maintaining peace and order in Korea to experience a new level of anxiety and feel a greater need for vigilance.

In January 1919, Central Police Headquarters banned the publication in newspapers of any article concerning national self-determination or the Paris Peace Conference, where the Fourteen Points were being negotiated.<sup>39</sup> On 15 February, Kempeitai Commander-in-Chief (=Central Police Chief) Kojima Sōjirō addressed the provincial kempeitai heads (=provincial police chiefs) in the following way.

Since the collapse of the Russian and German empires, he said, “new revolutionary ideas” and “voices calling for self-determination” have been spreading among colonial peoples all over the world. Turning to conditions in Korea, “Our so-called benevolent government has not yet received praise by all people. We cannot but assume that dissatisfaction and discontent are always lying hidden.” Among “people wandering abroad” especially “students going to Japan . . . quite a number of them are planning and working to develop and build greater force in conspiratorial collaboration with people in Korea.” He added, “All kinds of gossip and rumors are flying around about the death of Emperor Kojong [died January 1918] and they are shocking and infuriating Koreans.” Foreseeing what would happen in Korea, Kojima cautioned the police heads:

What we have to be most acutely attentive to is the infiltration of revolutionary new ideas and the spread of thoughts of national self-determination . . . people’s thinking can change unpredictably; and that kind of change and the movement led by activists outside Korea could rouse sympathy from the world powers. Not only that, spreading ideas that capitalize on the new situation can very quickly sway public opinion and make it extremely difficult to keep control. It is not difficult to see this in the future.<sup>40</sup>

Kojima stresses the need for the utmost vigilance, knowing what troubles powerful revolutionary ideas and idealism about national self-determination could bring to Korea. He was proved right when, two weeks later, surrounded by the upheaval of the Samil Uprising, Korea’s rulers found it “extremely difficult to keep control.” Some contemporary studies make the point that the Government General did not really see the uprising coming until just before it broke out, and it is probably true that they did not know about the concrete plans for the printing and distribution of the Proclamation of Independence. But the kempei police were well aware of the intellectual currents that fed and drove the momentum of the movement, and they had been sensing a crisis coming for some time.

However, that sense of crisis did not translate into an urgent project to strengthen the system of maintaining order. The general opinion was, in fact, that if anything, the system should be downsized. In a March 1917 letter to Prime Minister Terauchi (he became prime minister in November 1916), Central Police Chief Furumi Izushio expressed the idea that, “We should not let the police organization in Korea just stay as it was at the time of annexation, as you well know, and therefore we should further reduce it and reorganize it,” and he indicated that they had already started to restructure it in January that year.<sup>41</sup> At every available opportunity, the Ministry of War, also, since the annexation, had been making known its opinion that the Korea kempeitai should be reduced. Then in February 1919 Minister of War Tanaka Giichi stated during Diet interpellations that at

present, given the potential for instability arising from the Russian Revolution, he was opposed to pulling out the entire kempeitai force from Korea, but he was considering reducing the amount of funding for it (see Section 1, Chapter Five). The actual budget for the police around that time shows that, because of ramifications from the war boom, the Government General's financial policy was showing signs of becoming expansionary, beginning in fiscal 1918, and there was an increase in police funding, but none of that was targeted for added staff or expansion of facilities.<sup>42</sup>

The people who ruled Korea believed that they could do both—respond to the rising intellectual ferment among the Korean people and at the same time downsize the kempeitai. But the imminent Samil Uprising would completely overturn that kind of thinking, and the final outcome would be the dismantling of the kempei police system. We will discuss this in Chapter Five.

### 3. The Work of the Kempei Police in the Local Areas: The Case of Kangwŏndo Province


To recapitulate, soon after the annexation, the kempei-dominated police organization was used to establish a system that would put kempei into the ordinary jobs of the civil police. Around the same time the Government General leadership, now that the anti-Japanese insurgency had been effectively extinguished, began concentrating more on how to deal with secret societies, religions, and so forth—the kind of activity that was handled by the higher police. As a result, the administrative load of the police expanded to include a raft of jobs ranging from higher police types of functions to the chores of explaining and enforcing the rules that Koreans were supposed to follow in their daily lives. This section examines a document in *Chōsen chūsatsu kempeitai shiryō* with the title “Keimukikan kaigi kannai jōkyō shimon tekiyō” [Summaries from the Conference of Provincial Police Agencies: Reports and Responses to Enquires on Provincial Conditions] edited by the Ch'unch'ŏn Kempei Unit, under the Kangwŏn Provincial Police Department (June 1913). (Hereafter “Summary.”) In this section, using Kangwŏndo as a case study, we will explore what the kempei police actually did and how they performed their assorted duties in the first half of the 1910s.

First, concerning the nature of the document itself and its value as a source, let me begin by explaining its provenance as a report generated by a police conference. The main kempei police policy guidelines for maintaining stability and order were decided at important conferences that were held on both the national and provincial levels. Meeting usually for five days, the heads of all the provincial police departments gathered in Seoul for the most part, once a year. During a typical conference, on the first and second days

the governor general and the vice governor general would each address the group, and after that the Central Police Headquarters chief, acting as chairman, presided over the delivery of reports on conditions in each province; next, the central police chief gave advice and directives (day 3); that was followed by discussions of the wishes and opinions of the police in each province and meetings with related agencies (days 4 and 5).<sup>43</sup> Since all of the provincial police chiefs doubled as provincial kempeitai heads, usually they held a meeting after the police conference to discuss matters related to military policing. That year, in June 1913 when the Summary was produced, both the conference and the meeting afterward took place.

After the national-level police conference, the provincial police chiefs each brought the results of the conference back to his own province. The heads of the kempei detachments and outstations and police station heads within the province met—in most cases the following month—to discuss the results. This meeting, also, was a five-day affair with a schedule that typically began with reports from the assembled participants on conditions within their jurisdictions (day 1), and that was followed by enquiries and responses, and directives and advice (day 2); consider possible action on opinion and request items (day 3); business matters with related officials, and consider possible action on directives and advice and on opinion and request items for each kempeitai jurisdiction (day 4), and finally enquiries and responses on military police affairs in the kempeitai jurisdiction (day 5).<sup>44</sup>

The Summary contains the proceedings of the provincial-level conference of kempei detachment and outstation heads and police station heads in Kangwŏndo in June 1913. It has 121 sheets<sup>45</sup> and is printed by the hectograph method. It contains reports made by the heads of the agencies in the Kangwŏndo police department—six kempei detachments, three outstations, and its five police stations—on conditions in their jurisdictions, as well as the record of the questions from the Kwangwŏn provincial police chief (=Ch'unch'ŏn kempeitai chief; at that time it was Major Nasu Tasaburō) and their answers, including much animated argument about the content of the



**Note:** The counties indicate where kempei detachments, out stations, and police stations were located.

kempei police work and the policies and guidelines the officers followed in performing their jobs.

The Summary brings up a welter of issues. Kangwŏndo was one of the centers of the conflict with the Righteous Armies during the few years leading up to the annexation, and even after annexation the kempei police kept up the pressure on hold-out guerilla resistance with considerably more persistence than in other provinces.<sup>46</sup> Policemen used disguises and other covert means to seek out the rebels, and kempei on special duty exploited the widely-dispersed smaller policing facilities to patrol the region on a daily basis, including night patrols, going even into the most remote places.<sup>47</sup> Actual armed clashes with the guerilla fighters were few, however,<sup>48</sup> and in July 1915 when Ch'oe Ŭnŏn, their leader, was captured, the campaign to wipe out the Righteous Armies was finally over.

Police work in these times consisted of much more than pursuing and trying to suppress Righteous Army bands, however. In the words of one provincial police chief, “If you see things the way a policemen does, in this job we seem to have to deal with just about everything in life” (response from the provincial police head to a comment from the Wŏnju kempei detachment head, 87. Here and below the reference numbers indicate the sheet or “envelope page” number in the Summary). The kempei police put their hands to all kinds of things, many times acting as auxiliaries for government agencies. The kinds of work they did that are mentioned in the Summary appear in Figure 10. Taking only examples that the multiple police agencies referred to in their reports, we will now look concretely at what the kempei police did in Kangwŏndo.

Let us begin with the monitoring of religion and education, two areas related to higher police work in which many participants showed great interest. Regarding religion, activities by Confucianists, Buddhists, members of a pro-Japanese group called Sich'ŏn'gyo—all of them were watched. A small number were considered to require particularly close surveillance, and the one that received their most concentrated attention was Christianity. Kangwŏndo was slow to absorb new cultural influences; a Confucian-based anti-Japanese feeling and a type of nationalism stemming from Chundoism, tended to be much stronger there than in other provinces,<sup>49</sup> but kempei surveillance focused on Christianity. In the course of their routine activities, kempei would often encounter something in the words or behavior of Christians that was disturbing. The Summary details many such instances, describing, for example, how Christians did not really listen when lectured by the police but just sneered, and how the Christians “welcome Koreans anytime” to the church, but “they don't accept a kempei or an auxiliary” (Head of P'yŏnghae kempei outstation, 47; Provincial police chief responding to Wŏnju kempei detachment head, 82). The provincial police chief gave the following advice about how to respond to Christians:

Figure 10. List of Duties Mentioned in the “Summary”

Type of duties		Kempei agency									Civil police agency					Total
		Detachment					Outstation				Police station					
		Inje	Hoeyang	Kosōng	Wōnju	Yōngwōl	Uljin	Kangsōng	Chōngsōn	P’yōnghae	Yangyang	Kangnūng	P’yōngchang	Kimsōng	T’ongch’ōn	
Religion	Surveillance of Christians			○	○					○	○				○	5
	Monitoring of activities of Confucianists										○					1
	Monitoring of pseudo-religions										○					1
Education	Supervision of village schools ( <i>sōdang</i> )		○			○				○				○		4
	Supervision of private schools		○	○				○								3
	Encouragement of Japanese-language learning					○								○	○	3
	Surveillance of graduates of technical schools										○					1
Road construction		○			○											2
Sanitation	Establishment of sanitation unions	○									○					2
	Medical activities by police doctors		○							○						2
	Well-digging			○												1
	Quarantine									○						1
Land and forestry	Measures against <i>hwajōn</i> cultivation	○					○				○				○	4
	Forest conservation						○	○								2
	Recognition of common lands						○									1
Crime measures	Crackdown on gambling			○	○									○		3
	Surveillance of scribes										○					1
Encouragement of activities	Tax payment, savings, and employment				○					○	○				○	4
	Raising of national flags	○														1
	Participation in the Red Cross and the Women’s Patriotic Association													○		1
Other	Grasp of export and import statistics									○	○					2
	Measurement of rainfall	○														1
	Arbitration of civil suits	○														1
	Survey of hot springs			○												1
	Enhancement of legal knowledge			○												1
	Survey of registration			○												1
	Preservation of cultural assets				○											1
	Fire fighting							○								1
	Control of settlers in border regions								○							1

Source: Compiled from “Keimukikan kaigi kannai jōkyō shimon tekiyō” [Summaries of the Conference of Provincial Police Agencies: Reports and Responses to Enquires on Provincial Conditions], edited by the Ch’unch’ōn Kempei Unit, under the Kangwōn Provincial Police Department (June 1913).

Note: The circles indicate that duties in question are mentioned for specific kempei/police stations.

Freedom of religion is recognized in Korea and in Japan alike .... Naturally a policeman is duty-bound to discipline someone if he undermines public morals or breaks the law, but you have to think about timing or you risk angering the Korean unnecessarily and that could make it difficult to keep order ... you cannot be too strict, and you cannot be too lenient. You [policemen] need to use your own judgment about this (Provincial police chief to P'yŏnghae kempei outstation head, 48).

This police chief was encouraging the police to watch out for acts by Christians that might cause a social disturbance, but not to go too far and aggravate them, for that could make it more difficult to keep the Koreans under control. This caution against too quickly resorting to one-sided repression was related to the experience of the Case of the 105. In that incident torture was used to extract false confessions, and since early the year before (1912) a group of American missionaries and the American press had protested. Both Governor General Terauchi and Police Chief Akashi heard such criticisms directly and indirectly. The issue of using overly repressive measures with Christians had been brought up at the national-level conference of provincial police heads that preceded the Kangwŏndo conference of kempei unit and police station heads.<sup>50</sup>

Underlying their policy toward Christians was the idea that a few leaders—often, in this case, Christians they judged to be “upper class”—could influence many people. Apparently kempei police surveillance often used methods of “secret spying” in their investigations (Provincial police chief to T'ongch'ŏn police station head, 70). They sought information on numbers of missionaries and believers, their words and acts, and the social class of the believers, among others. In order to determine the “social class” of believers, they acquired information on “their financial assets and how much education they had,” and then the kempei police would compare that data with the results of surveys they had made of individual households and their members. On the basis of that combined information they sought to categorize believers as “upper class” or “lower class” (Yangyang police station chief and T'ongch'ŏn police station chief, 26, 27, 69, 70). Why they took this approach was explained in terms of the metaphorical *yangban*: “If there are ten or twelve clever yangban they can use every possible opportunity to gather innocent believers and fill them with seditious thoughts” (Provincial police chief to T'ongch'ŏn police station head, 70). The kempei feared that a handful of “upper class” Christians could spread their “seditious thoughts” among the many more numerous “lower class” Christians.

The activities of the kempei police related to education branched out considerably. The watchful mistrust they demonstrated toward Christians was, in education, directed toward private schools, which were strongly influenced by Christianity. The number of private schools in Kangwŏndo was comparatively small (as of March 1914 the total number of all kinds of private schools in Korea was 1,207, and of that, 38 were in

Kangwŏndo). The lowest-level kempei police made minute surveys of the private schools in their respective districts to cull information on the numbers of teachers and students, subjects taught, and facilities and property of each school (Hoeyang and Yŏngwŏl kempei detachment heads and head of the Kansŏng kempei outstation, 15–17, 57, 77). One detachment head talked about some of the ways kempei police maintained coordination with administrative agencies, saying that in this job, kempei “sometimes stop in at private schools and more traditional village schools (*sŏdang*) where they monitor and encourage the children. Sometimes they censor textbooks.... They always keep in contact with the principal and the administrators, so at any time they can talk with them about school affairs” (Hoeyang kempei detachment head, 57).

Kempei police likewise surveyed the village schools, which were small-scale private schools, but they approved these schools to a certain extent, considering them useful as supplementary educational facilities at a time when there were not yet enough regular public schools. The comment that, “Those small schools should be helped by treating them delicately and guiding them in a good direction” (Provincial police chief, 52–53), and other similar remarks suggest that the kempei police tried to lead the *sŏdang* toward accommodation with colonial rule. That viewpoint reflected fairly faithfully the Government General’s policy, held until the “*sŏdang* regulations” were established, of “letting the *sŏdang* remain.”<sup>51</sup> In another area, under orders from the director of the interior affairs bureau, the kempei police helped out with Japanese language teaching in places where no instructors had been sent from Japan.<sup>52</sup> As far as we can see from the Summary, this kind of activity consisted mostly of stopping by regular public schools already equipped with Japanese language education facilities, guidance, and teachers. Kempei police who themselves personally taught Japanese language were found only in a few stations (Yŏngwŏl kempei detachment head, 95).

The Summary shows a side to the kempei police stance toward Christianity and the various educational institutions that should not necessarily be described as repressive. To accept a one-dimensional image of the kempei police as nothing but an “instrument of naked violence,” as is frequently done, might not fully account for everything the kempei police did in their work. Should we not take the view that the way they carried out their jobs was based on reasoned and careful policy considerations and calculations that went beyond what so many see as nothing but brutality? The kempei police were not simply a device for violence used to enforce policy; it seems fairer to say that they functioned as a policy implementation agency at the lowest levels, with violence accompanying some of their implementation methods.

Not all kempei police work involved the surveillance and so forth described above, which was higher police type of work. Kempei also assisted local government agencies in a role described as “administrative facilitation,” and they actively participated in managing the daily lives of Koreans. Of the numerous jobs of this kind that appear in

Figure 10, let us look first at how they assisted in road work, as an example.

A statute relating to roads (Government General Order No. 51) was enacted in April 1911, and the first phase of a road construction project was launched in August that year. Roads needed for army transport always took precedence in building and repair projects, and the kempei police had a large hand in planning routes and road layouts. According to “Regulations for Road Maintenance and Repair” (December 1912, Government General Order No. 25), road work was to be done by conscript labor, naturally without compensation, and it was mainly the job of the kempei police to make the conscripts keep working.<sup>53</sup> This was the era of “Taishō democracy” in Japan, and two opinion leaders in particular, Nakano Seigō and Yoshino Sakuzō, had published articles highly critical of the way Japan was governing Korea. Because of those articles the strong power that the kempei police wielded in road projects and the grueling labor performed by conscripts were by then well known.<sup>54</sup> One account in the Summary talks about the conditions of road building, and how difficult it was to carry out large-scale construction projects, like those that used dynamite, with forced labor (Inje kempei detachment head, 11–12). Others describe how deeply the Korean people resented the system: “They bitterly hate going out as forced labor” (Wōnju kempei detachment head, 80).

Cholwoo Lee considers the measures and rules used routinely to run the colony, drawing on Michel Foucault’s notion of “discipline” and locates the problem in “modernity as a problem of power and domination,” arguing that, “Japanese rule (re)discovered and (re)created as targets of control various fields of social practice uncontrolled before.”<sup>55</sup> It seems, then, that even in the administrative work of the police in the early phase of the colony, where new institutions and a new order were introduced, new kinds of problems also emerged.

How new problems arose in connection with the introduction of new institutions is illustrated by the program to improve public sanitation and public health in the early years of the colony. At that time there were not enough hospitals and doctors trained and equipped to administer Western medical treatment, and so the Government General approved employing on a temporary basis—as “interns”—practitioners of the traditional Chinese medicine used in Korea. The government depended heavily on the police for household surveys and epidemic prevention programs and on local administrative agencies for the program to teach the local population about sanitation. In Japan, the Police Bureau and the Public Health Bureau were separate agencies under the Home Ministry, and organizationally sanitation and public health were separate from the police. In Korea, however, public health and sanitation were put into the police orbit. Korea’s Bureau of Interior Affairs abolished the Sanitation section in April 1911, and its work was moved into the sanitation division within the Central Police Headquarters’ Police Affairs section. In April 1912, inspection and quarantine at seaports, which had been the responsibility of customs officials, and inspection of cows being sent out of Korea,

formerly done by officers in the Korean Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce, and Public Works, were shifted into the Central Police Headquarters. These arrangements put the police in charge of all functions related to public health and sanitation.<sup>56</sup>

The Summary includes a great many entries relating to an effort to set up what were called sanitation unions. Supervised by the kempei police, sanitation unions were groups that collected a fixed regular fee from local residents, including Japanese, and took on the tasks of improving cleanliness inside and outside the home, of toilets and streets; they worked on contagious disease prevention, helped to enforce sanitation and public health regulations more widely, and other activities.<sup>57</sup> Efforts were made in Kangwŏndo to set up sanitation unions in the local areas, and 22 unions had been formed by 1912. Forty-three unions were newly organized in 1913.<sup>58</sup> In fact, however, progress was difficult and the program fell short of expectations. On the grounds that “the unions aren’t really in place yet,” kempei police proposed forming sanitation unions only in areas of high population density, and they also suggested making it a policy to give the district sanitation function to the “school unions” (*gakkō kumiai*; Incorporated associations established to handle the financing of elementary school education for Japanese living in Korea were expected, depending on the condition of the school’s neighborhood, to take care of sanitation as one item in the operation of the school). The provincial police chief, however, was unwilling to approve either proposal (interchange between the Inje kempei detachment head and the provincial police chief, 7–9; interchange between the Kangnŭng police station head and the police chief, 37–38). In those places that did not yet have the necessary social and economic foundation for something like the sanitation unions, physicians hired by the police on a temporary basis and attached to the Korea kempeitai<sup>59</sup> made rounds and treated people in their homes, or moved around the district and examined Koreans at places along the route. They also gave short training courses in sanitation to the policemen in those places (Yangyang police station chief, 24; Hoeyang kempei detachment chief, 65).

Problems were also caused when modern management methods were brought into the realms of land, woodland, and forests. About 80 percent of Kangwŏndo was mountainous or hilly, and therefore forestry-related administrative work was very important. With the enforcement of the Forest Law in 1908 and a cadastral survey that was begun in 1911 requiring, among other things, certification of ownership rights to land, communal lands, whether forest or pasture, became national land (for the purpose of modern management). The rural population was barred from using it. This created ongoing friction with local people.<sup>60</sup>

“Rumors arose that everything, even privately owned fields and hills would be confiscated,” and, “People were asking how they could make charcoal now. A lot of them had gotten together and a mood of insurgency was taking hold” (Uljin kempei detachment head, 97, 106). Thus troubles emerged that were seen as possible threats to peace and order. The provincial police chief recognized that, “If we are too rigid and too thorough

in enforcing the law, the people ... are going to suffer financially” (103), and he advised flexibility in responding to such situations. Korean discontent in the province remained strong, however. The following year, in September 1914, several hundred people living in Samchök county staged a protest against the government confiscation of privately owned woodlands and a temporary Japanese employee in the Agriculture, Commerce and Industry Bureau was murdered.<sup>61</sup>

Another issue concerned *hwajön* slash-and-burn agriculture. In Kangwöndo this method of cultivation was fairly common. Farmers burned off the vegetation in a hillside or woodland plot before cultivating it and then moved on to another place in a few years when the fertility had declined. The government tried to ban this traditional method, but here, too, the provincial police chief thought it best to be flexible: “The sudden prohibition of this practice is making life very hard for the farmers in this province.” What the police should do, he said, is “consider local conditions, and depending on those” decide whether to allow people to continue the practice or to discipline them as violators of the law (Provincial police chief, 119. In that connection, Article 18 of the Forest Law of 1911 put police officers in charge of issuing permits to carry on slash-and-burn cultivation).

The situations described here give some idea of the involvement of the kempei police as administrators. One important role was their function as agents bringing modern management practices into areas that until then had remained largely outside the reach of national government regulation. As a consequence of that role, they could not avoid coming up against the contradiction created by the gap between the laws and the realities of life in the provinces. Given such circumstances, there were many cases when the resolution or handling of a problem was left to the discretion of the kempei police stationed in the local area. Their job was complicated by another factor, which, as the Summary reports, was the fact that “69 percent of the people have no education,” and so of course they had difficulty grasping what the laws and regulations meant (Provincial police chief, 75–76). One exchange expresses frustration that no matter how many times they arrested a fellow for gambling, it had no effect (Kimsöng police station head response to a question from the provincial police chief, 55–56). These voices from the Summary communicate something of the difficulty that the kempei police experienced as they tried to modernize management in Kangwöndo.

However, during the last half of the period of “military rule,” with the reorganization of rural administration<sup>62</sup> and the jolting impact of the new, radical ideas around the time of World War I, the government tended, rather, to favor cutting back the role of the kempei police in general administration. In September 1915, Governor General Terauchi brought this matter up in a talk with the kempeitai commanders and police leaders:

Recently we have achieved a certain level in the gradual reorganization of the rural administrative structure, and as rural development proceeds, the main business of

the police has expanded tremendously. From now on I would prefer to see some reduction of the involvement of the police organization and have it function less as the support of government administration and devote more energy to its own work.<sup>63</sup>

This move to separate the police from administrative duties became increasingly more as the police turned increasingly more attention to dealing with anti-Japanese movements after the Samil Uprising.

One final point is a phenomenon directly related to the very diversity of kempei police work and to their tendency to rely more and more frequently on their own judgment in dealing with the affairs of their districts. I am talking here about the routinization of dishonesty and improper behavior on the part of the lowest ranks of kempei police, who were mainly Koreans. In the kempei-dominated police organization, the lower the rank, the more Koreans were likely to be deployed in those posts. The posts of assistant patrolman and kempei auxiliaries came to be staffed only by Koreans, putting those low-level officers in frequent contact with the local population.<sup>64</sup> In one respect, as was described in Section 1 of this chapter, the 1911 implementation of decentralized deployment had the effect of loosening supervision over the lower-level officers, eventually giving them the leeway to be derelict in their work, to extort bribes from the local populace, and so on. *Chōsen chūsatsu kempeitai shiryō* contains records of enquiries put to lower-level kempei police and the responses, and these show how serious the problem had become. According to those records, measures to deal with these derelict or corrupt low-ranking Korean kempei auxiliaries and assistant patrolmen included admonishing them, having their families and contacts watched, or in the most flagrant cases, arranging to have those on special duty even tailed by another secret agent.<sup>65</sup> The Summary also relates such goings-on. A comment concerning the use of lower ranking officers in civil suit mediation argues, “It is damaging to let lower-ranking officers do this because they are not fair” (Provincial police chief to Inje kempei detachment head, 11). In another case, kempei auxiliaries and assistant patrolmen “imitate” the standards of living of Japanese patrolmen, and because that left them short of cash, “there’s nothing they can do but swindle and do other bad things” (Provincial police chief to Jeongseon kempei outstation head, 36). Such execrable behavior by low-ranking Koreans in the kempei police was one factor stoking the intense anger that provoked the March 1st Movement. (More on this subject will be discussed in Section 2 of Chapter Five.)

## Chapter Review

This chapter reexamined the kempei police in its institutional aspects, focusing on the core of the institution, which was the limited number of kempei assigned to civil police posts, on the one hand, and the much larger number doing routine civil police work, on the other. Previous studies discuss kempei being assigned to police posts and kempei performing actual civil police work without distinguishing between them, but it is clear that the two were determined by separate sets of laws and regulations, and that the laws embodied different aims. Provisions in the 1910 Imperial Ordinances Nos. 296 and 302 (and their revisions) stipulated the placement of kempei in civil police posts. In the kempei police organization, which was centered on higher police work, those assignments were limited to high-ranking kempei officers who were supposed to command civil police officers. Having kempei do the ordinary jobs of civil policemen, however, was authorized by the 1910 Imperial Ordinance No. 343. We saw that the numbers of kempei doing civil police work soared in late 1910–1911, from about one-quarter of the total to almost 100 percent. We can deduce that such a rapid increase was a consequence of an operation to use kempei in civil police work in a more comprehensive way, at a time when decentralized deployment enabled a denser network of facilities. Another reason to have larger numbers of kempei take on civil police jobs was to carry out in an organized way the plethora of laws, rules, and regulations governing many aspects of everyday life.

Second, we explored the way the Government General's perception of the security and order situation shifted over the decade of the 1910s. Before annexation, priority in maintaining security and stability went to the task of putting down the armed resistance by Koreans in the Righteous Armies, but soon after the annexation the insurrections had faded and ceased to be the major concern. Around the time of the Case of the 105, however, Governor General Terauchi had become anxiously aware of the movement outside Korea to build a base for the independence movement, and he knew of the simmering ambitions by Christians and other nationalist Koreans to "take back the country." Further, he remained concerned about disturbing ideas even after one of the strongest secret societies in Korea had been effectively dismantled with the arrests of the 105. Terauchi had become exceedingly pessimistic about Korea's future, which was one reason he resigned as minister of war. With the outbreak of World War I, his outlook on peace and order in Korea changed yet once more, growing darker.

The Government General appreciated how quickly economic conditions in Korea were improving, partly because of the war boom, but magnetic new ideas pounding on Korean society simply reconfirmed its belief in the need for extreme vigilance. Toward the end of the war, a sense of danger gripped the kempei police as they considered the kinds of threats posed by influences from the Russian Revolution and the powerful notion of national self-determination that was sweeping the world. But until the Samil Uprising

erupted, they could not get past the sense that to maintain strength at the current level, or lower, was enough to maintain peace and security.

Third, in the first two sections we considered how characteristic features of the kempei police—their priority on higher police work and the way they intervened in the daily life of the Korean population—played out in their routine jobs in their districts. We saw, in the case of Kangwŏndo, how the kempei police carried out the higher police functions of surveillance and surveys of religions, particularly Christianity, and of private schools, village schools, and other Korean educational facilities. Emphasis was put on careful monitoring and “guiding” schools in the right direction. I argue that the kempei police did not always resort to violent means and in fact wove carefully thought-out policy considerations into the means they used. We also looked at some of the variety of managerial jobs they did, such as their roles in road work, public sanitation programs, and modern management of forest lands. The final points focused on how the kempei police functioned as the agent of change, introducing and teaching modern methods of management in an area that was largely untouched by national power in premodern times, and on the structure of a situation where low-ranking kempei police, faced with the gap between the law and the reality, increasingly made their own judgments in an expanding sphere of activities.

It would have been valuable to discuss the topics of Section 3 in relation to the changes in the perception of security that was the focus of Section 2, but since my materials dealt with only certain times and places, it was impossible to compare them adequately. I did not develop the topic of Korean reactions to the way the kempei police did their work, but I will go a little further into these question in the next chapter, using the findings of surveys of popular sentiment.

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- 1 A fair number of books and articles state that the Korea kempeitai was under the command of the Korea Garrison Army (in 1918 the name was changed to the Korea Army [Chōsengun]), for example, or they talk about the “Korea [Garrison] Army Kempei.” Such references are inaccurate.
  - 2 *Chōsen kempei rekishi*, vol. 2, p. 195.
  - 3 Yi Sŏn-gun, “Ilche Ch’ongdokpu ūi hŏnbyŏng chŏngchi wa sasang t’anap” [Suppression of Thought and Kempei Politics under the Japanese Government General], *Han’guk sasan* [Korean Thought], vol. 8, June 1966; Kang Dŏk-sang, “Kempei-seiji ka no Chōsen” [Korea under Kempei Rule], *Rekishigaku kenkyū*, no. 321, February 1967; Yi Hyŏn-hŭi, “Sam-il undong ijŏn hŏnbyŏng kyŏnch’alche ūi sŏnggyŏk” [The Character of the Kempei-dominated Police System before the March 1st Movement] in *Sam-il undong 50 ju’nyŏn kinyŏm nonjip* [Essays Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the March 1st Movement], Tonga Ilbosa, 1969; Kim Yong-dŏk, “Sam-il undong ijŏn ūi t’aehyŏng” [Punishment by Flogging before the March 1st Movement] in *ibid.*; Yi Yŏn-bok, “Ilche ūi hŏnbyŏng kyŏngch’al sogo” [Thoughts on Imperial Japan’s Kempei-dominated

Police], in Kasōng Yi Sōn-gun Paksa Kohūi Kinyōm Nonmunjip Kanhaeng Wiwōnhoe, ed., *Yi Sōn-gun paksa kohūi kinyōm nonmunjip* [Essays on Korean Studies in Commemoration of the 70th Birthday of Doctor Yi Sōn-gun], Ŭlyu Munhwasa, 1974; Son Jōng-mok, “Ilche ch’imnyak ch’ogi Ch’ongdok t’onch’i ch’oje wa hōnbyōng kyōnch’al chedo” [The Kempei-dominated Police System in the Government General System of Rule during the Early Phase of the Japanese Aggression], *Seoul Sirip Taehak Sudokwōn Kaebal Yōn’guso yōn’gu nonjip* [Seoul Metropolitan University Institute of Metropolitan Area Development Papers], vol. 11, December 1983; Sin Chu-baek, “1910 nyōndae Ilche ūi Chosōn t’ongch’i wa Chosōn chudun Ilbon’gun—Chosōn’gun kwa hōnbyōng kyōnch’al chedo rūl chunsim ūro” [Research on the Japanese Army Stationed in Korea—the ‘Korea Army’—and the Kempei-dominated Police System in Korea under Japanese Rule during the 1910s], *Han’guksa yōn’gu*, no. 109, June 2000.

- 4 Tabohashi Kiyoshi, *Chosen tōchishi ronkō*, p. 92.
- 5 Pak Ŭn-gyōng, *Ilche-ha Chosōnin kwallyo yōn’gu* [Studies on Korean Bureaucrats under Imperial Japan], Hangminsā, 1999, p. 58.
- 6 Chang Sin, “Kyōnch’al chedo ūi hwangnip kwa singminji kukka kwōllyōk ūi ilsan ch’imt’u” [Establishment of the Police System and the Penetration of Colonial State Power into Daily Life], in Yōnse Taehakkyo Kukhak Yōn’guwōn, ed., *Ilche ūi singmin chibae wa ilsang saenghwal* [Everyday Life under Japanese Colonial Rule], Hean, 2004, pp. 561–562.
- 7 Some scholars propose that kempei superior privates were assigned as (civil police) patrolmen (for example, Namiki Masahito, “Minzoku undō, keisatsu” (1), p. 74), but there were no laws providing for such assignments and that understanding is inaccurate.
- 8 Refers here and below to Tsushima Ikuoshin, “Chōsen ni okeru kempei keisatsu tōitsu seido no kōsatsu” [A Study on the Joint Kempei Police System in Korea] (1), *Hōgaku ronsō*, vol. 49, no. 4, October 1943, p. 510; *Ibid.*, (2), *Hōgaku ronsō*, vol. 49, no. 6, December 1943, p. 722.
- 9 In this connection, when the kempei police system was still fairly new, Tsushima noted rumors circulating among civil policemen that “henceforth, if there are openings in posts of police superintendent or police inspector, no one will be hired to fill them,” and that, “Instead, kempei will be appointed to fill those vacant positions.” Thus, the civil police seem to have expected kempei power to expand throughout the whole police system as civil police posts continued to be filled by kempei appointees. The rumors turned out to be groundless (actually, after March 1911 and June 1912, respectively, civil police were recruited for the posts of superintendent and inspector), but they make it clear that the civil police understood perfectly well in that early phase that the kempeitai intended to take over the power to command the civil police by putting kempei into certain civil police posts.
- 10 See Tsushima (2), pp. 724–725.
- 11 Strictly speaking, only the 1910 and 1911 volumes of *Chōsen Sōtokufu tōkei nenpō* [Annual Statistical Report of the Government General of Korea] contain “kempei detachments and kempei officers who handle the work of police stations” or similar expressions. From 1912 onward the Annual Statistical Report refers to the “kempeitai and its staff.” Despite the change in the wording of the reference, however, the numbers that appear in the report in 1912 onward continue to be presented using the same statistical categories as appear in the 1910 and 1911 volumes. Moreover, in the 1915–1917 volumes of *Keisatsu tōkei* [Police Statistics] (edited and published by Korea Kempeitai Headquarters and the Korea Government General Central Police Headquarters, reprinted by Kyōngin Munhwasa, 1989) the figures presented as numbers of “kempei staff currently serving in civil police positions” are almost identical to those for “kempeitai and its staff.” For those reasons it seemed safe to conclude that the figures in the Government General’s Annual Statistical Report indicated numbers of kempei staff who were doing ordinary police jobs.
- 12 Before drawing this conclusion from the table, however, we must take into consideration the difference in numerical values that emerges between the rate (frequency) of kempei appointment to police posts in Figure 8 and the rate in Figure 9. In Figure 9 the numbers for each category of

commissioned officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers are greater than in Figure 8. This is partly because the two tables were constructed from different sources. For example, the Personnel Directory used for Figure 5 does not include commissioned- or noncommissioned-level officers who worked in the accounting, sanitation/public health, or veterinarian sections of the Korea kempeitai, while the *Ministry of War Annual Statistical Report* used for Figure 9 does. If we focus only on the idiosyncrasies of the particular sources used to derive the figures, however, we cannot explain huge differences in numbers—for example between 476 noncommissioned officers in Figure 8 and 812 in Figure 9. I still have not found a logical way to resolve this problem. Also, among the police posts assigned to kempei commissioned and warrant officers, some of them, such as police affairs officers (*keimukan*), were probably not included in the statistical category of “police officers who perform ordinary police business,” because police affairs officers were purely administrative with no executive police powers. Admittedly, therefore, it is problematic to use these statistical data in a way that compares and contrasts them. Nonetheless, given the current lack of any other such statistical data, I have gone ahead and used these with the expectation of finding some consistent patterns in them.

- 13 For example, Kang Man-gil, *Han'guk hyōndaesa* [A Modern History of Korea], Japanese translation published by Koma Shorin, 1985, p. 25; Han'guk Minjungsa Yōn'guhoe, ed., *Han'guk minjungsa kūndaep yōn* [A History of the Korean People: Modern Times], Japanese translation published by Mokuseisha, 1989, p. 151; Kasuya, op. cit., p. 125.
- 14 Nakatsuka Akira, “Chōsen minzoku undō to Nihon no Chōsen shihai” [The Korean Nationalist Movement and Japanese Rule in Korea], first printing 1969, *Shisō*, no. 537, March 1969; reprinted in *Kindai Nihon no Chōsen ninshiki* [Modern Japanese Perceptions of Korea], Kenbun Shuppan, 1993, p. 100; Yi Yōn-bok, “Ilche ūi hōnbyōng,” p. 182.
- 15 “Rikugun daijin seigi: Kankoku chūsatsu kempeitai o zōka su” [Request from War Minister: That the Korea Kempeitai Be Increased], June 1910, in *Kōbun ruijū*, 2A, Category 11, 1106.
- 16 *Chōsen kempeitai rekishi*, vol. 2, pp. 230–231.
- 17 Government General of Korea, *Chōsen Sōtokufu shisei nenpō* [Government General of Korea Annual Report on Administration], 1911 edition, 1913, pp. 69–70.
- 18 Korea Government General Central Police Headquarters, ed., *Chōsen keisatsu ippan* [Outline of the Korean Police], 1912, p. 23.
- 19 See Matsuda, “Nihon tōchika no Chōsen,” pp. 46–47.
- 20 Yi Chong-min, “Keihan-zai no torishimari hōrei ni miru minshū tōsei—Chosen no baai o chūshin ni” [Approaches to Social Control Seen in Laws on Punishments for Minor Offenses: The Case of Korea], in Asano and Matsuda, eds., *Teikoku Nihon no hōteki kōzō*, pp. 346–348.
- 21 Terauchi to Yamagata, 10 September 1910, in *Yamagata Aritomo kankei monjo*, vol. 20, held in the National Diet Library Kensei Shiryōshitsu (Modern Japanese Political History Collection).
- 22 Ōkubo Haruno to Terauchi, 14 November 1910, in *Terauchi Masatake kankei monjo*, 222:19.
- 23 Komori, *Akashi Motojirō*, p. 452.
- 24 Terauchi to Yamagata, 6 May, 1911, in *Yamagata Aritomo kankei monjo*, vol. 21.
- 25 Hara Keiichirō, ed., *Hara Takashi nikki* [Diary of Hara Takashi] vol. 3, Fukumura Shuppan, 1965, pp. 134, 158, 264, 6 June 1911; 28 August 1911; 23 November 1912. Terauchi to Katsura, 29 August 1911 in *Katsura Tarō kankei monjo*, 62:26. Concerning Katsura's intentions, also see Kobayashi Michihiko, *Nihon no tairiku seisaku 1895–1914* [Japan's Continental Asia Policy 1895–1914], Nansōsha, 1996, p. 290.
- 26 Terauchi to Katsura, 23 May 1912. *Katsura Tarō kankei monjo*, 62:36.
- 27 For the history of research on both incidents, see Yun Kyōng-no, *105-in sakkōn kwa Sinminhoe yōn'gu* [The Case of the 105 and the Shinminhoe (New People's Association)], Iljisa, 1990, p. 9 ff.
- 28 Terauchi to Yamagata, ca. June 1912, in *Yamagata Aritomo kankei monjo*, vol. 23.

- 29 Terauchi to Tokutomi Sohō, 12 June 1912. Sakata Masatoshi et al., eds., *Tokutomi Sohō kankei monjo*, vol. 2, Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1985, p. 269.
- 30 Kunitomo Naokane, “Hi: Futei jiken ni yotte mitaru Chōsenjin” [Confidential: Koreans as Observed in Connection with the Disturbances], unpublished material, 1911; reprinted Fuji Shuppan, 1986, pp. 414, 429.
- 31 Ishizuka to Terauchi, 18 November 1911. *Terauchi Masatake kankei monjo*, 86:6. See also Matsuda, “Ilbon yukgun,” p. 241.
- 32 Yim Kyōng-sōk, “1910 nyōndae kegūp kusōng kwa nodongja/nonmin undong” [Class Structure in the 1910s and the Labor-Peasant Movement], in Han’guk Yōksa Yōn’guso, Yōksa Munje Yōn’guso, eds., *Han’guk kūndae sasansa yōn’gu* [Studies on the History of Modern Political Thought in Korea], Ch’ōngnyōnsa, 1989; Pak Ch’an-sūng, *Han’guk kūndae chōnch’i sasansa yōn’gu* [Studies on the History of Modern Political Ideas in Korea], Yōksa Pip’yōngsa, 1992, Chapter. 2; Chōng T’ae-hun, “1920 nyōndae chōnban-gi Ilche ūi ‘Munhwa chōngch’i’ wa burūjoa chōngch’i seryōk ūi taeūng” [Imperial Japan’s ‘Cultural Rule’ in the First Half of the 1920s and Responses from the Bourgeois Political Forces], *Yōksa wa hyōnsil*, no. 47, March 2003, pp. 25–27.
- 33 *Chōsen Sōtokufu kanpō*, 24 August 1914.
- 34 Mizuno Naoki, ed., *Chōsen Sōtoku yukoku kunji shūsei* [A Collection of Speeches and Addresses by the Governor General], vol. 1, Ryokuin Shobō, 2001, p. 374.
- 35 Mizuno, *Chōsen Sōtoku yukoku kunji shūsei*, p. 419.
- 36 Yano Sukezō, “Chōsen ni okeru kempei to sono kaizen ni tsuite” [The Kempei in Korea and Their Improvement], *Gunji keisatsu zasshi*, vol. 11, no. 7, July 1917, pp. 19–20.
- 37 Attached to the Ūiju kempeitai station of the P’yōngan-bukto provincial police department. This report, written around September 1917, is included in *Chōsen kempeitai shiryō*.
- 38 According to Yuge Kōtarō, director of educational affairs, whose informal observations were printed in *Maeil sinbo* (16 January 1919), each region varied but in general, “There has been a remarkable increase in the number of student who voluntarily are going” to the regular public schools. He also talked about the plan to step up the pace of increasing the number of regular schools. Also see Furukawa Noriko, “Chōsen ni okeru futsū gakkō no teichaku katei: 1910 nendai o chūshin ni” [The Process of Establishing Regular Public Schools in Korea: Focusing on the 1910s], *Nihon no kyōiku shigaku*, vol. 38, October 1995.
- 39 Yun Pyōng-sōk, “Sam-il undong e taehan Ilbon chōngbu ūi chōngch’aek” [Japanese Government Policy to Deal with the March 1st Movement] in *Sam-il undong 50 ju’nyōn kinyōm nonjip*, p. 416.
- 40 “Chōsen Sōtokufu Keimu Sōkanbu naikun no ken” [Internal Addresses Given at the Government General Central Police Headquarters], *Mitsu dai nikki*, 1919, 1.
- 41 Furumi Izushio to Terauchi Masatake, 24 March 1917. *Terauchi Masatake kankei monjo*, 57:1.
- 42 As for changes in police-related expenses (kempei expenses in Japan’s general account and kempei auxiliaries plus police affairs expenses in the Korea Government General special account), see Matsuda, “Nihon tōchika no Chōsen,” Table 1, p. 36. The increase in police-related expenses from 1918 onward was applied primarily to salary increases for lower-level staff, including patrolmen and kempei auxiliaries (*Maeil sinbo*, 29 December 1918).
- 43 Lacking documentation to verify the complete schedule of the provincial police heads conference of 1913, the year the Summary was produced, I used instead the schedules of the provincial police heads conference and the kempei heads conference held in May 1914, which were published in the *Maeil sinbo* 28 April–3 May 1914.
- 44 Those are 1914 cases from and the Ch’unch’ōn kempeitai, Kangwōndo Police Department. *Kempei buntaichō kaigi shorui* [Documents from the Conference of Kempei Detachment Heads], June 1914, in *Chōsen chusatsu kempeitai shiryō*.
- 45 “Envelope pages” formed by printing on one side, folding in half with printed side out, and binding

- at the open edge side; each folded sheet was numbered once.
- 46 For instance, in 1915 a total of 23 searches were made in all of Korea and 108 officers were deployed for that purpose; of those, Kangwŏndo accounted for 16 searches and 74 officers to carry them out. For a comprehensive treatment of the anti-Japanese Righteous Army movement, in Kangwŏndo see Yi Ku-yong, “Kangwŏndo chibang ũi ũibyŏng hangjŏn” [Righteous Armies’ Resistance in Kangwŏndo] in *Kangwŏn ũibyŏng undongsa* [History of Righteous Army Campaign in Kangwŏn], Kangwŏn Taehakkyo Ch’ulpanbu, 1987.
  - 47 Kangwŏn Provincial Police Department, *Keimukikan kaigi shimon jikō tōshin (Keimukakari)* [Enquiries and Responses at the Police Organization Conference (run by the Police Affairs Section)], June 1914. In *Chōsen chūsatsu kempeitai shiryō*, 25–33; Ch’unch’ŏn Kempeitai Headquarters, *Kangwŏndo jokyo kogai* [Summary of Conditions in Kangwŏndo], 1913, included in Sakurai Yoshiyuki Bunko [Sakurai Yoshiyuki Library] held by Tokyo Keizai University, pp. 243–244.
  - 48 In 1915, there was only one actual clash between the kempei police and Righteous Army militia in Kangwŏndo (involving four Righteous Army fighters).
  - 49 Cho Tong-gŏl, “Sam-il undong ũi chibangsa jok sŏnggyŏk: Kangwŏndo chibang ũr chungsim ũro” [The Local Character of the March 1st Movement: Kangwŏndo] in *Ilche-ha singminji sidae ũi min-jok undong* [Nationalist Movements in the Colonial Period under Japanese Rule], Tosŏ Ch’ulpan Pulpit, 1981, pp. 37–41.
  - 50 On the protest to Terauchi and Akashi from the foreign missionaries living in Korea, see Yun Kyŏng-no, *105 in sakkŏn*, pp. 150–152. Also, a protest from the Presbyterian Church from the city of Taegu was discussed at the conference of provincial police chiefs in 1913; they said, in part, “We hope the police will not enter the houses of missionaries and Christians without permission” (Memo written in 1913 by Terauchi, in Yamamoto, ed., *Terauchi Masatake nikki*, p. 601).
  - 51 No Yŏng-t’aek, *Ilche-ha minjung kyoyuk undongsa* [History of the People’s Movement for Education under Japanese Rule], T’amgudang, 1979, pp. 81–83; Furukawa Noriko, “1910 nendai Chōsen ni okeru shodō” [Traditional Village Sōdang Schools in Korea during the 1910s], *Ajia kyōikushi kenkyū*, no. 6, March 1997, pp. 43–46.
  - 52 Police Notice No. 8400: Notification from kempeitai commander-in-chief and police affairs section chief to provincial kempeitai unit heads and provincial police department heads, “Concerning Request that Kempei Patrolmen Provide Japanese Language Education,” *Keimu geppō*, no. 7, January 1911, pp. 122–124.
  - 53 On the Government General’s road building plan and the general situation of the burden placed on the Korean people, Hirose Teizō, “1910 nendai no dōro kensetsu to Chōsen shakai” [Road Construction in the 1910s and Korean Society] (*Chōsen gakuho*, no. 164, July 1997) gives a detailed account.
  - 54 Nakano Seigō, *Waga mitaru Man-Sen* [Manchuria and Korea as I See Them], Seikyōsha, 1915, pp. 52–53; Yoshino Sakuzō, “ManKan o shisatsu shite” [Observing Manchuria and Korea] (1916), in Matsuo Takayoshi, ed., *Yoshino Sakuzō, Chūgoku Chōsen ron* [China and Korea], Heibonsha, 1970, pp. 56–57.
  - 55 Chowloo Lee, “Modernity, Legality, and Power in Korea under Japanese Rule,” in Gi-wook Shin and Michael Robinson, eds., *Colonial Modernity in Korea*, Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999, p. 50. With the colonization of Korea, government authorities began interfering with the smallest details of everyday lives, something that had not previously been targets of their management and control. It has been argued that this development in the use of power signaled the emergence of “modernity” in Japanese rule. Two such works are Yi Chong-min, “1910 nyōndae Kyōngsŏng jumin dŭl ũi ‘choe’ wa ‘pŏl’” [The ‘Crimes’ and ‘Punishments’ of Residents in Seoul in the 1910s], *Seoul hak yŏn’gu*, no. 17, September 2001; and Chang Sin, “Kyŏnch’al chedo ũi hwangnip”.
  - 56 Matsumoto Takenori, “Shokuminchi ki Chōsen nōson ni okeru eisei, iryō jigyo no tenkai: ‘Sho-

- kuminchi-teki kindaisei' ni kansuru shiron" [Projects for Sanitation and Medicine in Agricultural Villages in Colonial Korea: An Essay on 'Colonial Modernity'], *Shōkei ronsō*, vol. 34, no. 4, March 1999; Pak Yun-chaе, *Han 'guk kūndae ūihak ūi kiwōn* [The Origins of Modern Medicine in Korea], Hean, 2005, pp. 302–322, 330–336.
- 57 I could not find sanitation union agreements for Kangwōndo, and so I used for reference the "Second sanitation union agreement for Namsan-myōn (Namsan township) in Hamgyōng-bukto," (ca. 1915, found in *Sankō shorui-tsuzuri* [Reference Materials] (This source, *Sankō shorui-tsuzuri*, is a collection of materials relating to work duties and performance; it is presumed to have belonged to Fujita Shigekazu, a kempei superior private, who worked at that time in one of the dispatch stations that were under the command of the Hoeryong kempei detachment of the Kyōngsōng kempeitai in Hamgyōng-bukto. It is the property of Tsujita Fumio). According to this union agreement, one of the union's functions is to do "anything that will assist the police in doing their job as requested by the kempei." The agreement also stipulates that the union must receive approval from the responsible kempei detachment head in matters of budget, settlement of accounts, and items that require decision-making. The agreement provides a glimpse into how the kempei police actually controlled the management of the sanitation union.
- 58 "Survey of Sanitation Unions" (as of the end of 1913), one of the "Reference Tables" compiled by the Ch'unch'ōn Kempeitai and Kangwōndo Police Department. Included in *Chōsen chūsatsu kempeitai shiryō*.
- 59 As of the end of 1913, 5–11 police doctors were assigned to every police station in Seoul and each provincial police department. Out of a total of 105 doctors who were sent all over Korea, 7 went to the Kangwōndo provincial police department.
- 60 Yun Hae-dong, "Chosōn esō ūi Sam-il undong kwa irūnba [Munhwa chōngch'i] ro ūi chōnhwan" [The March 1st Movement in Korea and the Resulting Switch to "Cultural Rule], paper presented at a symposium in October 2002 entitled "The Life and Times of Saitō Makoto." In that paper Yun takes up the issue of prohibiting entry into the former communal forests, and argues that by disturbing the traditional order in Korea's agrarian society, that prohibition could have been a factor in the March 1st movement.
- 61 *Maeil sinbo*, 5 April 1915. Kim Chōng-gyōng, *Samch'ōk hyangt'osa* [History of My Home, Samcheok], Samch'ōk Kyoyukchōng, 1955, p. 81.
- 62 The three levels of special district (*pu/fu*), county (*kun/gun*), and township (*myōn/men*) were amalgamated in March–April 1914, and the new Korean *myōn/men* system (*mensei*) was put into effect in June 1917. The *mensei* system legally defined the duties of the lowest administrative unit of *men* and tax collection procedures, thereby strengthening the administrative power of *men*.
- 63 *Chōsen kempeitai rekishi*, vol. 5, p. 109.
- 64 On the deployment of the Korean police officers in the kempei-dominated police system, see Asai Yoshizumi, "Nittei shinryaku shoki ni okeru Chōsenjin kanryō no keisei ni tsuite: Daikan teikoku shushinsha o chūshin ni" [The Molding of Korean Bureaucrats in the Early Period of Japanese Rule: With Focus on Those Who Participated in the Korean Empire], *Chōsen gakuho*, no. 155, April 1995, pp. 55–57; Pak Ŭn-gyōng, *Ilche-ha Chosōnin kwallyo yōn'gu*, pp. 56–61.
- 65 Kangwōn Provincial Police Department, *Keimukikan kaigi*, 1–7, 19–25.