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Japan as a Model for Russia

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INTRODUCTION

In this paper I would like to present the surprisingly favorable image of Japan recently held among some Russian intellectual people. They have a high regard for Japan's achievements, particularly its rapid recovery since World War II and it current economic prosperity. I stress "*some* Russian intellectual people," because the source of my observation consists largely of the writings of Russian intellectuals, specifically scholars, researchers, and specialists of Japan —who are rightly called Japanologists—, economists, and even some politicians. Some of them have gone so far as to propose that Russia should follow Japan's experience, regarding it as a model for their own *perestroika* and other reforms.

Naturally, questions would be raised: Can we assume that these views held by some Russian intellectuals on Japan represent the views of the entire Russian general public? To what extent do these views influence the Kremlin's policy toward Japan? The relationships among the three groups of intellectual elites, the public, and policy-makers is an important subject of study. Yet this is one of the most difficult questions to answer, especially in view of the fact that the relationships vary over time, depending upon situations and issues. All that can be said at this stage is that the favorable perception and high evaluation of Japan shared by some Russian intellectuals may help Russia's general public and even decision-makers to take a favorable, positive, and conciliatory attitude toward Japan.

Having made in advance the above-mentioned caveats and reservations with regard to the limitation of my observations and findings, I would like to proceed to a discussion of the roles that, in the view of some Russian intellectuals, Japan may play for Russia. There are three possible roles that Japan can play for Russia: (1) the role as a trigger for Russia's *perestroika* (restructuring); (2) the role as a model for Russian reform; and (3) the role as the creator of a new type of civilization.

We should distinguish here between two types of countries: those that have played the role of triggering the Soviet Union's decision to embark upon *perestroika* and those that have been regarded by the Russians as a model for their reform. The former is the country that made Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders recognize the necessity to start *perestroika*, while the latter is the country that Gorbachev and other leaders viewed as an ideal for their *perestroika* and other reforms. In short, the former played a role of cause or background of perestroika, while the latter played the role of example or model of reform. This is a theoretical distinction; in practice, both are interrelated. Yet, the former does not automatically serve as a function of the latter, while the latter does not necessarily play the former role, either. Having made such a distinction, what I want to underline next is the fact that Japan has played both of these roles for Russia — that is to say, Japan was clearly one of the countries that led to the decision by Soviet leaders to commence *perestroika* and is also considered to be a model for *perestroika* and other reform attempts.

It soon became clear, however, that no matter how desirable a model Japan may be for Russia, Japan is not and cannot become a suitable model for Russia's reform efforts. Why not? To put it simply, the Japanese model is too good or too high for present-day Russia to imitate. Russia lacks the basic conditions that enabled Japan to develop so quickly and successively. Having realized this difference, most Russians have now given up on the idea of using Japan as a model for their reform. Some Russian intellectuals, however, still hold the view that Japan constitutes a completely new type of civilization, which appears to them to be an ideal synthesis between Western and Oriental civilizations. Let us elaborate in more detail on each of these three dimensions of Japan in the rest of the paper.

I. TRIGGER FOR PERESTROIKA

Name the country that led Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders to recognize the necessity of *perestroika*. The answer to this question is the USSR itself. The decline of communist ideology, political apathy, sluggish economy, and negative situations in almost all fields — which Mikhail S. Gorbachev himself called the "pre-crisis"[1] of the USSR — were the main factors leading to perestroika.[2] A number of sources could be quoted, but the following citation from Gorbachev's major writings is sufficient: "*Perestroika* is an urgent necessity arising from the profound processes of developments in our socialist society This society is ripe for change. It has long been yearning for it. Any delay in beginning *perestroika* could lead to an exacerbated internal situation in the near future, which, to put it bluntly, would be fraught with serious social, eco-

nomic, and political crises."[3]

What were the other countries that forced Soviet leaders to recognize the stalemated situations facing the USSR in the early 1980s? Undoubtedly, the United States is one country. U.S. President Ronald Reagan's offensive foreign policy, with the catchword of "building a strong America," and his SDI program had a great effect on Soviet leaders. The economic prosperity, political stability, and diplomatic and military strategic unity of West European countries must also have contributed to the Soviet's recognition of the need for reform. The rise of the Newly Industrializing Economies (NIES), ASEAN, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) must also have played a role in the decision by Soviet leaders to carry out reforms.

What I propose here is that Japan also played a significant role in Gorbachev's decision to implement *perestroika*. Two major developments took place in 1985. The first was that Japan became the world's second-largest economy in terms of GNP, surpassing the USSR. (It could be said, of course, that Japan's GNP had already surpassed that of the USSR far before 1985, if the calculation of Soviet GNP is based on the ruble's real value, not on its official, nominal exchange rate.) The second important event was that the CPSU's Central Comittee's Politburo selected its youngest member, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, 54, to be its new General Secretary. These two events may appear to be unrelated but not entirely so in the following logic. The fact that Japan economically surpassed the USSR increased the feeling of crisis among Soviet leaders. It also contributed to the realization that aging and sick leaders, such as Brezhnev, Andropov, or Chernenko, would no longer be able to cope with the difficult situations facing the USSR. The CC's Politburo members were therefore almost forced to select the young and energetic Gorbachev as their new leader to carry out economic and some concomitant reforms, albeit short of systemic reform.

The Soviets always regarded the United States as the economically most advanced country in the world, and their goal was always to surpass the United States economically. The CPSU Program, revised during the Khrushchev era in 1961, proclaimed that "in the current decade (1961-70), the Soviet Union will surpass the strongest and richest capitalist country in the world, the United States, in production per head of population."[4] Shortly, afterward, however, such optimism completely evaporated, which was not surprising. What was surprising is that it was not the USSR but Japan that in fact realized the fantastic dream outlined in the Party Program. Fedor M. Burlatskii, one of the advisers to Gorbachev, wrote in 1989: "Japan has become the second-largest industrial power in the non-socialist world. In terms of per-capita production Japan has caught up, and, many believe even surpassed the United States."[5]

In the Soviet Union, the concept of "a great power" was traditionally associated, as explained by Semen I. Verbitskii, then senior research fellow at the Institute for Oriental Studies [IVAN] of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, with a huge territory, a big population, and, above all else, a strong military capability.[6] In this regard, the great differences in the following five indexes between the USSR and Japan makes it easy to imagine how great the "Japan shock" that Soviet leaders experienced at that time was: (1) population: 290.52 million (the USSR) vs. 124.09 million (Japan); (2) land area: 22.40 million km² (the USSR) vs. 0.378 million km² (Japan); (3) energy and other natural resources: the self-sufficient richest, "Number One" country in the world (the USSR) vs. resource-poor country, the survival of which depends entirely upon resources imported from abroad (Japan); (4) World War II: a victorious nation that expanded its territory by 670 thousand km² (the USSR) vs. a defeated nation that lost 250.6 thousand km² of its former territory (Japan); and (5) race: mainly Caucasian or European (the USSR) vs. Mongoloid or Asian (Japan).

From the early 1970s, numerous books and articles were written in the West about Japan's miraculous recovery from ashes and further development of the Japanese economy. Herman Kahn's *The Emerging Japanese Superstate* (1970), Robert Guillian's *The Japanese Challenge* (1970), Ezra Vogel's *Japan as Number One* (1979), and Jean-Jacques Servan-Schereiber's, *Le defi mondial* (1980)[7] are only a few examples of such books. In the Soviet Union, however, such phrases as "Japanese miracle (*iaponskoe chudo*)," "Japan phenomenon (*iaponskii fenomen*)," and "Japan model (*iaponskaia model*)" only began to appear about ten years later, that is, around 1985 when Gorbachev came to power.[8] "Thanks to the formulation of [Gorbachev's] new political thinking," as Verbitskii wrote, "the situation will change." "Everywhere one has begun to feel a need to study the experience of Japan from the totalitarianism of its military period to its democratic and capitalist system. Within the walls of parliament, in discussion among scholars, and in the media, the question has been raised concerning the possibility of the USSR utilizing some aspects of the Japanese experience."[9]

II. WHERE IS THE "BLUE BIRD OF HAPPINESS"?

Let us move to discussion of the question as to which country was regarded by the Soviets as the best model for their *perestroika*. Here, three caveats must be made. First, the Soviets did not necessarily believe that there existed only one absolute model for their reform. Second, what they regarded as an appropriate model for their reform tended to change over time, depending upon, for exam-

ple, Soviet domestic conditions and the stage of their reform process. Third, Japan was one of the models that some Soviets at some time considered the best model for *perestroika*.

No need to be reminded anew that in the Soviet way of thinking, the Soviet Union itself had long to constitute the best, infallible model for their efforts at nation-building. The official ideology of Marxist-Leninism was considered by the Soviets to provide a blueprint for their nation-building. Perceiving the Soviet Union as a forerunner toward the ideal communist society, the Soviets did not doubt for long time that they were making tremendous progress toward that goal. Such a self-confident, self-centered Soviet way of thinking never allowed them to entertain the idea that they should consider learning some valuable lessons from the experiences of other countries.

Around the mid-1980s, however, after they finally realized their mistake in excessively relying upon Marxist-Leninist ideology, the Soviets began to search for a useful, convenient model that they could instantly apply to their efforts to reform their own economy. It was, needless to say, a fruitless attempt. The Soviets were aiming to convert their socialist-oriented country into a capitalist country. Such an attempt was a historically unprecedented experiment, for which no model of transformation was to be found anywhere in the world. West European countries, for instance, have never been socialist-oriented countries and hence cannot possibly provide an appropriate prescription for the Soviet Union to reform its economy. Nevertheless, some Russians have never ceased in their efforts to find a model for such transformation. In such efforts, one can detect a sign of continuity of their traditional way of thinking. While the Soviets previously relied entirely upon Marxist-Leninism, they began looking for a different type of ideology, a blueprint that, they hoped, could replace the Marxist-Leninism. This attitude of searching for the best model upon which they can totally and uncritically depend has consistently been their pattern of thinking, the only difference being the kind of the model. Let us examine the major models that were considered by the Soviets.

Prior to Gorbachev's ascent to power, Iurii V. Andropov surprised Kremlin watchers with words that were not expected to be uttered by a high-ranking official of the CPSU: "It is necessary to learn from the experience of *other countries*." People at the time wondered which countries Andropov specifically had in mind when he spoke of "other countries." It was assumed that Andropov was referring to Hungary, where he had been working as Soviet ambassador. Shortly after making this statement, however, Andropov passed away, without giving his own answer to this question. Konstantin U. Chernenko, who assumed power after him, went back to a strictly Soviet self-centered position of the Brezhnev type.

When Mikhail S. Gorbachev took over the top leader's position in the

Kremlin, he began a policy of *uskolenie* (acceleration), based on his conviction that the Soviet type of socialist system should be revised not totally but only partially, adapting to changing circumstances. Based on this belief, Gorbachev in the early days of his reign appeared to have been advocating a "mixed economy" as a model for such reform. The mixed economy attempts to combine "the best of the two worlds" — namely, the socialist and capitalist economies. Hungary, Yugoslavia, and China claimed to be practicing this type of economy. Soon afterward, however, it turned out to be an illusion to believe that there exists such a golden link, a middle-of-the-road, intermediary position between the two opposing systems. Socialism and capitalism are based upon two different principles, which diametrically contradict each other. In fact, the Hungarian and Yugoslavian economies nearly collapsed, thereby demonstrating that such a mixed economy is nothing but a combination of "the worst of the two worlds." Criticizing the halfway-house nature of Gorbachev's idea, Burlatskii commented: "Gorbachev's economic reform was as if it were attempting to create a monster, one half of which is a horse and the other half a bird. Such an animal can neither fly in the sky nor run fast on the ground."[10]

Some Soviet specialists viewed the Scandinavian type of welfare state to be a suitable model for Gorbachev's *perestroika*. However, application of such a model to the Soviet Union also proved to be impossible. To begin with, the Scandinavian type of economy adopted bold welfare policies within the basically well-established framework of a capitalist system. Both the objectives and achievements of Scandinavian countries were too high to be copied by the Soviet Union, which, of course, was not yet a capitalist country. Moreover, Sweden, which had been admired as the best model of the so-called welfare state, had begun to suffer from soaring inflation and other economic maladies, resulting in a power shift in 1991 from the Social Democrats back to the Conservatives.

The United States and West European countries were certainly ideal countries for the Soviets to model their reforms on. It is no secret that many Soviets, including Gorbachev and Yeltsin, were, at one time at least enthusiastic admirers of the United States and Western Europe. How highly did Yeltsin admire the United States and how enthuslastlc was Yeltsin about his first trip (in September 1989) to the United States, regarding America as the best model to be copied by the Russians? In order to answer these questions, let me cite some sentences from a biography of Boris N. Yeltsin written by Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova, enthusiastic admirers of Yeltsin in his early days in power:

> Yeltsin understood that one cannot construct a democracy guided by one's instincts alone, and quickly adopted a model to emulate — an American

> one. . . . Soon he grew enthusiastic about "democracy in America." Yeltsin accepted the American political model unconditionally for reasons of both common sense and expediency. . . . Rather than wait for Russia to develop its own democratic institutions, "We decided it was best to learn from the United States, where democracy has existed for two hundred years." . . . Thus Yeltsin had became a passionate Americaphile. . . . "Learn from the Americans" became more than a motto: it was a substantial part of his platform."[11]

However, neither the United States nor West European countries can become a model for Russia, simply because their systems are so different from the Russian system and too advanced for the Russians to copy. Furthermore, American and West European systems and achievements are a result of their time-consuming, painstaking, and strenuously accumulated efforts from below —so much so that they cannot provide an appropriate model for the Soviets, who wanted to see their objectives quickly fulfilled with the help of guidance from above.

In this way, the proposition that Japan is the most suitable model for *perestroika* emerged.

III. JAPAN: A MODEL FOR PERESTROIKA?

According to Semen I. Verbitskii, some Soviet specialists began from around the late 1960s to early 1970s, to take note of the economic achievements of Japan. At that time, however, many Soviets still entertained an "ambivalent, complicated feeling"[12] toward Japan's economic miracle. They somehow did not want to believe Japan's marvelous economic performance, partly because information about Japan's miracle reached them through Western sources. At that time, the view still prevailed among Soviet intellectuals that the Soviet Union and Western European nations were the most advanced countries in the world in such fields as science, technology, and economic innovation, whereas Asian nations, including Japan, were still underdeveloped.[13] They viewed Japan's economic growth as only a "temporary phenomenon"[14] that became possible only as a result of a "lucky"[15] coincidence of a number of favorable factors, such as the staunch protectionist policy of private enterprises by the government, excessively long working hours, a low level of wages, health care, and social benefits, a skillful and skimmed copy from the cream of the scientific and technological progress of the entire capitalist world, the apt use of low prices in the world for imported raw materials and fuel, and so forth.[16]

Those Soviet Japanologists[17] who belonged to the conservative orthodox

group, most of whom were political scientists, argued: As long as the Japanese economy could be viewed as "a temporary fortune," a revision of Lenin's well-known thesis of "capitalism as a general crisis" was not required. In contrast, however, Soviet specialists on Japanese economy,[18] who, judging Japan's development from statistical data and other objective figures, began to candidly acknowledge the remarkable leap of the Japanese economy and urge the Soviet Union to learn from Japan's *perestroika*. The oil crisis in 1973-1974 appeared to have paved the way for the prevalence, first, of the Soviet political scientists, view of Japan, and, shortly afterward, of the Soviet economists' view on Japan.

Even after accepting the undeniable fact that Japan has been rapidly and remarkably developing in economic fields, some Soviets still tried to interpret this fact in their ideologically biased fashion. Based on the Leninist doctrine, which was elaborated in Lenin's work *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916), they argued that: The development of Japan's economy sharply contradicts and confronts the economic interests of the United States and West European countries, which inevitably leads to a struggle among the capitalist countries, thereby reducing the strength of the imperialist camp vis-à-vis the socialist camp. Pointing out the incorrectness of such a Soviet view, Rafik Aliev, Soviet specialist on Japanese diplomacy, wrote in an article published in 1991: "We did not pay attention to the booming leap of the Japanese economy. In the West, the Japan phenomenon was taken to mean a formation of 'three big economic centers' in the world, that is, the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. In the USSR, however, it was understood as 'an unavoidable development of contradictions among three big imperialist powers, which was nothing but a typical Leninist way of looking at things."[19]

After Gorbachev's ascent to power, Soviet politicians and specialists ceased to focus on the vulnerable or negative aspects of the Japanese economy and also stopped deliberately emphasizing the rivalry among Western "imperialist" powers.[20] Instead, the view began to emerge that the positive aspects of the Japanese economy greatly exceeded the negative ones and that the Soviet Union should learn more actively from the lesson of Japan's postwar success story.[21] In the period from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, views even emerged in the Soviet media suggesting that Japan has provided an optimal model for Russia's *perestroika*. Let me enumerate below some such remarks.

—Leonid I. Abalkin, former vice-premier of the USSR and currently director of the Institute of Economic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, wrote: "The success of the Japanese economy constitutes one of the most remarkable phenomena in the latter half of the twentieth century. It not only changed both the structure and 'the correlations of forces' in the world economy, but also had a profound impact upon human thinking in many countries,

including Russia."[22]

— Georgii F. Kunadze, vice-foreign minister of the Russian Federation at that time, stated: "In my view, it is more useful for us to study Japan rather than the United States in the sense that Japan has a combination of small-sized military forces and excellent economic and social developments."[23]

Stanislaw S. Shatalin, economist and author of "500-Day Economic Reform Plan," said: "The economies of France and Japan are closer, more interesting, and more useful to the Soviet economy."[24]

— Viktor I. Alksnis, leader of the ultra-nationalist group "Soiuz," also showed a high evaluation of the Japan model in his statement: "Which way should we seek in order to achieve economic success? The Polish variant is often mentioned. As far as I am concerned, I myself propose the experience of our neighbor in the East, Japan. Japan has overcome [postwar] destruction, by getting a desired guarantee of stability from the U.S. occupation forces."[25]

— Fedor M. Burlatskii stated: "For the Soviet Union, Japan, with its development in such a brief period of time, is an example of remarkable success. Most of the Soviets like Japan and regard it as a future model."[26]

— Gavrill Kh. Popov, one of the leaders of *perestroika* and the former mayor of Moscow, told a Japanese professor, Hakamada Shigeki: "Your observation that the experience of Japan enforces our argument that we need *perestroika* seems to me to be *unconditionally* correct. . . . Japan's experience is now *undoubtedly* one of the factors to which our specialists and intellectuals pay their utmost attention. . . . I believe that the Japanese development has had an impetus upon the 'psychology'of *perestroika*"[27] (emphasis added).

— Sergei V. Agafonov, Tokyo correspondent for *Izvestiia* stated simply in one of his articles: "Japan can be a good model for the Soviet Union."[28]

— Anatorii I. Miliukov, deputy-director of Social and Economic Affairs, CPSU's Central Committee, and head of the delegation to Japan, the so-called Miliukov Mission, also concluded: "Japan is a model for *perestroika*."[29]

IV. COMMONALITIES AS A LATECOMER

Why, then, is Japan viewed by Russians as one of the most favorable models for *perestroika* and other Russian reform efforts? Generally speaking, a model is expected to fulfill two apparently contradictory requirements. On the one hand, it must give us a feeling that if we do our best, we may realize the model. In other words, the level of the model should not be too high to be realized. Drawing our attention to this general tendency of human beings, Abalkin correctly observes: "In our efforts to learn from the experiences of other countries, we are likely to see only what we want to see. . . . Each of us

tends to search for what is *closer* to our own ideals and convictions" (emphasis added). On the other hand, a model has, by definition, to be viewed in other's eyes as an outstanding ideal. In sum, familiarity and outstandingness — these are the two basic requirements that a model must meet. Does Japan fulfill these two requirements as a model for Russia?

In the first place, Japan started from a low stage of development, as did Russia, about 100 years ago, but was not only able to catch up with but even surpass the most advanced countries. This feature of Japanese development certainly gives an encouraging impetus to the Russians. About 100 years ago both Japan and Russia were latecomers to modernization compared with the UK, France, United States and Germany.[31] With the majority of their population being peasants, both Japan and Russia were in danger of being easily colonized by the more advanced industrialized Western countries. Japan and Russia started their industrialization drive from a common starting point at around the same time. True, they went their separate ways: one socialist and the other capitalist. However, the means for achieving industrialization were similar in both countries: "primitive accumulation of capital," exploitation of the peasant majority of the population, and the advantage of easy technological borrowings. Both Japan and the Soviet Union suffered from tremendous losses during World War II. Despite many historical similarities, however, what we witness now is a marked contrast between these two nations. Although Japan's "first wave"[32] of democratization was obstructed by militarism in the 1930s-1940s, Japan succeeded in its "second wave" of democratization, starting after World War II. Postwar Japan has also risen to become a great economic superpower, second only to the United States, with a relatively democratic system. Having experimented with the socialist way, in contrast, the Soviet Union lost credibility throughout the world as a model for democracy and economic development. It is understandable that judging from these similarities and differences between Russia and Japan, some Russians are tempted to come to the conclusion that the Russians were wrong only in their choice of the way to achieve their goals and, hence, if they instead adopt the Japanese way, they will easily be able to succeed in achieving the same level of development as Japan has.

Secondly, Japan's development is a valuable model for the Russians because Japan rapidly achieved its objectives of Westernization, industrialization, and modernization.[33] In her article entitled "Postwar Japanese Experience and Russian Economic Reforms," Elena L. Leontieva (IMEMO) writes: "The Japanese economic reforms in the 1940s are considered to be the most successful reforms of the 20th century, due to their *speed*"[34] (emphasis added). Seda V. Markarian and Elegena V. Molodiakova also write: "After World War II, the modernization of Japan proceeded with *an exceptionally quick tempo*. The

results of this modernization drive are comparable to the changes that took place in Japan in the Meiji era."[35] True, the rapid development in Japan may have been accompanied by some undesirable by-products. However, in Leontieva's view, "Fortunately this period of history for Japan turned out to be *sufficiently short* (*korotkii*)[36] (emphasis added). Therefore, development at a moderate pace and without any defects appears to be the ideal. However, Russia, in its current state, cannot afford the luxury of a moderate pace of development. For the Soviet Union under Gorbachev and the Russian Federation under Yeltsin, which were falling far behind advanced Western nations, Japan's experience was more valuable than that of other countries that have developed at a much slower pace. As Abalkin, for instance, puts it: "The *high tempo* of Japan's economic development surprised and excited the Russians. This is particularly so, because Russians traditionally tend to give high priority to high tempo as a sign of the superiority of a social-economic system"[37] (emphasis added). In a similar vein, Burlatskii also stated that "Japan, which has developed *in a very short span of time* appears to the Soviet Union to be an example of great success"[38] (emphasis added). When Deputy Primier Minister. Shatalin advocated his unique plan called "500-day plan" of economic reform, he may have thought of the success in Japan as "the shock therapy" of Joseph M. Dodge.[39]

Thirdly, Japan's experience in politics and economics provides a familiar example for Russia's *perestroika* and reform. Some Russian specialists have even gone so far as to reach the astonishing conclusion that Japan fulfilled what the Soviet Union wanted, and was unable to, achieve by becoming a *de facto* "socialist country." According to such views, Japan has in practice achieved more than the Soviet Union, as a socialist nation, originally aimed at. They cite for example, the following phenomena observable in Japan:[40] collective interests have a priority over individual interests; the state has control over the mass public in the field of ideology; and economic activities have been planned by the central government and controlled through administrative guidance.[41] Of course, some of these observations are either misunderstood or exaggerated, or based on at least partially biased images of Japan. But there is also some truth in them.

It is an undeniable fact that since the Meiji Restoration the Japanese government has played an active role and taken bold initiatives in promoting Japan's industrialization and modernization. In Japan, the government leads, nurtures, and protects private economic sectors. This is in marked contrast to West Europe's "laissez faire" type of economy, which depends almost entirely upon initiatives from the private sector. In Japan, the government's guidance, control, and even intervention are considered to be necessary evils in an attempt for such a latecomer to catch up with the advanced countries. NIEs, ASEAN,

and even some socialist-oriented countries in Asia, such as China and Vietnam, followed the example of Japan with the aim of rapidly and successfully achieving the "take off" for industrialization. It is understandable that, taking into consideration its own stagnating economic situation, the Soviet Union preferred the Japanese or East Asian way of development to the West European way.

V. GUIDANCE FROM ABOVE

The Soviet Union wished to smoothly transform its communist dictatorial system to pluralistic democracy, while avoiding any political chaos caused by struggle among political parties. From such a standpoint, the Japanese political system was considered by the Soviets to be a more suitable one than West European political systems. In the United States and UK, two main parties alternate, while in France and Italy, too many political parties compete against one another, frequently causing political instability.

In a full-page article in the February 8, 1989, issue of *Literaturnaia gazeta*, Iurii V. Tavrovskii, a Soviet Japan specialist, suggests that there are at least three lessons that the Soviet Union can learn from postwar Japanese domestic politics.[42] The first is the way in which Japan carried out its democratization process from above. This can serve as a good example for Gorbachev's *perestroika*, which was also being carried out from above. Both control and guidance from above by the U.S. occupation forces under General MacArthur after 1945 made the "transplantation" of democracy in Japan easy and smooth. The main concern of the U.S. occupation authorities was not so much in the recovery and development of democratic institutions as in the prevention of a revival of totalitarianism and militarism in Japan. Yet, the reforms introduced by the occupation authorities gave rise to a "political miracle" in Japan, which in turn, in Tavlovskii's opinion, led inevitably to Japan's "economic miracle."

Second, Japan's efficient *de facto* one-party political system also provides a valuable precedent for the Soviet Union. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has monopolized Japanese politics since its formulation in 1955, putting the opposition parties in a very weak position. Yet, Tavrovskii does not condemn the LDP's monopolitic rule over Japanese politics during the postwar period. Rather, he suggests that the LDP provides a model to be followed by the CPSU in the period of *perestroika*.

One of the secrets of the LDP's political longevity — according to some Soviet Japan watchers — lies in its basic attitude of adopting policy proposals made not only from its own factions (*habatsu*) but also from opposition parties. Paying attention to the skillful mechanism by which the LDP has been

absorbing various interests of Japanese society, Vasilii I. Saplin, a person in charge of Japanese affairs at the CPSU CC's International Department and later minister to the Russian Embassy at Tokyo, observed: "Relying upon a flexible structure of factions within its party, which allow the interests of various groups to be taken into consideration, the conservatives in the LDP can respond very sensitively and attentively to requests concerning social and economic developments of Japanese society."[43] In full agreement with Saplin, Tavrovskii wrote that the Soviet Union can learn a great deal from the LDP's coalition system comprising political cliques or factions. These factions reflect the interests of various businesses, and industrial and agricultural groups outside the LDP. These factions within the LDP debate among each other on many issues, but once they agree, they dernonstrate a very strong party unity, which has been an indispensable condition for the success of postwar Japan. The factional politics within the LDP seemed thus to Tavlovskii to provide an ideal model for the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, which had to allow to a certain degree of "pluralism in opinions"[44] within the ruling party the CPSU. In a similar fashion, Kunadze also draws attention to the LDP's unique way of governing, noting that "in Japan the ruling LDP runs the government, considering it obligatory to get some understanding from opposition parties and, in exchange for this, to make some concessions to them as well."[45]

Highly evaluating the political longevity of the LDP, Georgii Kh. Shakhnazarov, academician and advisor to President Gorbachev, also regarded the LDP as a model for the Communist Party in the USSR. Raising the question "What secret do the Japanese have?" he himself replies: "The Japanese do not have any secrets, but only a few special features; that is, despite the fact that Japanese politics is based on pluralism, the LDP has already been occupying the ruling party's position for more than 45 years. Besides, the LDP consists of factions."[46] The Japanese themselves admit: "We do not know whether the existence of factions brings benefits or costs to Japanese politics."[47] "We have achieved success thanks to, or reversely despite, the existence of factions — we do not know, which interpretation is correct."[48] "However," Shakhnazarov continues, "if the pragmatic Japanese people are not confident that their system is working well, they must find a way to correct it. It is [my personal conviction] that, in total, the positive aspects of the role that factions play overwhelm the negative aspects."[49] Making these observations concerning Japanese politics, Shakhnazarov reached a bold conclusion: "Why should we not create in the USSR as well a political party with factions?"[50]

Thirdly, "administrative guidance (*gyōsei-shidō*)" by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and other ministries in Japan can, in the opinion of some Soviets provide another model for Gorbachev's *perestroika*. In the Soviet politico-economic system the ministries and agencies in

Moscow had such a huge monopoly of power that the institutions, organs, and factories at lower levels did not feel motivated at all to take an initiative from below. The Gorbachev government wished very strongly to rectify this defect. On the other hand, however, it did not wish to let local branch offifices and plants obtain complete freedom of decision for fear that the Soviet central planning and administrative system have fallen apart. The dilemma facing the Gorbachev leadership was how to decentralize power in Moscow without losing it completely. The Japanese administrative guidance system seemed to many Soviets to provide an ideal solution.

In the Japanese system, the ministries in Tokyo have control over the development of industry and economic contracts in a broad sense, while leaving a great deal of freedom and initiative to private business sectors. It is probably impossible for other countries, such as the United States, which has a more decentralized political and economic system, to copy the Japanese system. For the same reason, the United States could not have been a model for the Soviet Union, Due to the strong centralized nature of the Soviet system, the Japanese system could, however, provide a model for Gorbachev's *perestroika*. By loosening its excessively centralized nature, the Soviet system could come closer to the Japanese system.

VI. TECHNOLOGY AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

In comparison with the United States and West European countries, both Japan and Russia shared the commonality of backwardness. The three previously mentioned features of Japanese development stem largely a sort of backwardness. It was due to this common background and the feeling of being a latecomer to the industrialized world that some Soviet reformists considered it necessary to learn from the Japanese experience. On the other hand, however, Japan has been in a more advanced position than the United States and West European countries in certain fields. The Soviets wanted to learn from Japan precisely because Japan is more advanced in some fields than the United States and West European countries.

The first field in which a "Japan model" appears to many Soviet reformists to be particularly useful for the Soviet Union due to its superior and advanced quality, is technology, Reform-oriented politicians and ideologues in the Gorbachev government pointed out that Japan has been making full use of scientific and technological innovations and very skillfully applying them to production. Despite being a latecomer to the industrialize world, the introduction of the most advanced achievements in science, technology, and management from abroad allowed Japan to catch up with and even surpass the United

States and West European countries. Japan has become a model for making full use of "the advantages of backwardness" of easy technological borrowings (Alexander Gershenkron).[51] Gorbachev regarded the use of science and technology as a crucial key to the success of his *perestroika* program. A catchword of Gorbachev's perestroika was, according to Jerry Hough, a professor of Duke University, "technology, technology, and technology."[52] Why did Gorbachev emphasize this so much?

One of the reasons why the Soviet Union was falling behind Japan and other Western countries in the field of technology is ascribable to the difference in politico-economic systems. Some may think that the Soviet type of central planning economic system is advantageous for introducing new technology into production, but in practice it was quite the opposite. The Soviet system was not able to integrate scientific-technological innovations sufficiently into fields of production. The introduction of new technology into the business sector naturally incurs the risk of unemployment and even bankruptcy. Soviet managers and workers, who long enjoyed job security and minimum payment and also lacked a strong materialistic incentive, were not easily tempted to undertake risky ventures. There is also a related disadvantage, i.e., what the Soviets called "gigantmania." In the United States and Japan, new technology is usually adopted and tested at a so-called small-size venture business level.[53] In the Soviet system, however, "small is beautiful" was not appreciated.

Of course, borrowing technology from others is a universal practice.[54] What is important, however, is how the imported technology is utilized. The biggest difference between the Soviets and the Japanese lies in the way in which imported products are utilized. The Japanese make a thorough study of imported goods, and in many cases end up producing the same, but better-quality goods, which in turn they export back to the original market countries. In contrast, the Soviets tended to sit back idly until the next generation of new technology became available from the West.[55] As a result, they were frequently unable to go much beyond what they bought in the first place.[56] In many cases, they even seemed to have difficulty merely reproducing what they had purchased.[57] In the USSR, imported machinery was often used not for the purpose of study but simply for parts to fulfill a quota, and the rest was often left outdoors for many years, due to a lack of warehouses. The capacity of Soviet managers and workers to absorb, assimilate, and diffuse imported technology thus remained quite low, probably at only about 60 percent of the efficiency it operates in the United States and West European countries.[58]

In order to overcome its technological backwardness compared with advanced Western European nations—according to Viktor Ia. Rosin, head of the Japanese Economy Section of IMEMO—Japan has been practicing with enthusiasm a "fundamental transformation" of production and other econom-

ic activities. Such an attempt is called by Rosin a search for a "new model of economic development."[59] Alexander A. Dynkin and Ivan S. Tselishchev, Japan specialists at IMEMO, praised Japan in its ability to apply scientific progress and technological innovation to production. Tselishchev observed that "Japan is still behind the United States in basic scientific research but demonstrates its strength in effectively linking its achievements with the production process."[60] In a similar vein, Dynkin stated: "Japan's scientific capability in producing automobiles and electronic products is still lower than that in the United States, and yet its competitiveness is outstandingly strong. This effective use of scientific and technological potential is a major characteristic of the Japanese model."[61] The Soviets regarded with astonishment and envied the Japanese capabilities of efficient adaptation, absorption, and diffusion of technology imported from abroad into their own production processes, resulting in much higher efficiency. Burlatskii thus concluded that "we need to learn from this unique capability of the Japanese to master creatively foreign technology."[62]

Another advanced field in Japan that the Soviets considered to be worthwhile learning from is crisis-management. No country is immune from crisis. The question is how to cope with, manage, and even overcome the crisis. Since World War II Japan has encountered a number of crises and shocks, including "the World War II-defeat shock," the "textile shock," the "dollar shock," the "oil shocks," and the "Nixon shock." However, Japan always skillfully managed to overcome these shocks. Rosin thus stated: "It is natural that the USSR should carefully study the changes occurring in Japan: Japan has proved to be a country that can recover relatively quickly from any crisis or shock, thereby demonstrating its own superior capability to adapt itself to changing circumstances."[63]

The Japanese demonstrated a capability not to only manage crises but also to change "their misfortune into fortune." What the Soviets were particularly impressed with was Japan's successful transformation of its economy from heavy-industry into less energy-consuming high-tech industries. In their jointly written article, Vladimir I. Leshke and Tselishchev observed that Japan practiced *uskolenie* and *perestroika* in the very process of overcoming the "oil crisis" Japan encountered in the mid-1970s. These two Japan specialists even suggested that this Japanese experience should serve as an example for Gorbachev's *perestroika*. They wrote: "The 1974-1975 crisis [in Japan] was caused by rapid increases in the prices of oil and other energy resources and in labor costs. To cope with these new hard conditions, however, Japanese companies put into practice a policy of *uskolenie* of technological modernization and of fundamental *perestroika* in the economy.[64]

The term *perestroika* was in fact used in one Soviet text book for university

students to describe precisely the transformation of the Japanese economy from smokestack to high-technology industries, which took place in the wake of the oil shocks in the 1970s. The text reads: "In the mid-1970s Japan had to start a rapid *perestroika* of its own economic structure. This *perestroika* was conducted by shifting raw materials, energy, and labor to less-energy-consuming high-tech-industries. The structural *perestroika* of the Japanese economy became more intensive in the early 1980s, when scientific-technological progress began to promote production. . . . This structural *perestroika* of the Japanese economy led to a reduction in the share and scale of human labor."[65] (emphasis added).

VII. SECURITY AND DIPLOMACY

Other fields in which the Soviets regarded postwar Japan to be a worthwile model for study are politics, diplomacy, and national security policies.

It may appear that when the Soviets regarded Japan as a model for their *perestroika*, they were thinking only of an economic model. Undoubtedly, economic performance occupies the most significant aspect of postwar Japanese achievements. It may be also true that *perestroika* in a narrow meaning refers only to economic performance. However, there was also considerable interest in the Soviet Union to learn from Japan in other areas such as domestic politics, foreign policy, and national security. It may be surprising to some readers of this article that some Soviets viewed Japanese politics and diplomacy as a useful experience for their *perestroika*. The traditional view both in Japan and in other countries has been to assess postwar Japan in a dual way-highly evaluating its economic performance, while regarding its political performance as second-rate. This had also been the prevailing view in the Soviet Union for a long time. The Japanese themselves believe that their economy is first class, whereas their "politics and diplomacy are the second or third class." Shortly after *perestroika* was started, however, this low evaluation of Japanese politics and diplomacy changed significantly. In early 1989, the argument appeared in the Soviet Union that postwar Japanese politics and diplomacy should also be assessed highly and could even possibly provide a valuable example for the Soviet Union. Let me introduce some of those arguments by Soviets who believed that the domestic politics, security policies, and diplomacy of Japan are also of sufficiently high quality to be copied by others, including themselves.

To begin with, some Russian specialists on Japan do not take the standard view prevailing among Japanese, and some non-Japanese, of separating political records from the economic achievements of Japan. Stressing close mutual

relationships Tavlovskii, for instance, raises the question of whether an economic miracle could have possibly taken place in Japan without a political miracle.[66] The occupation of Japan by the allied forces in 1945 provided the Japanese with the opportunity of experimenting with a historically interesting attempt to impose democracy from above. In Tavlovskii's view, the measures taken by the U.S. occupation authorities led to a political miracle in Japan, which in turn helped Japan achieve an economic miracle.[67] In short, in postwar Japan a political transformation was undertaken "in parallel with economic reform."[68] The "absence of discrepancy between political and economic reforms in the fromative and the most difficult postwar period of Japanese transformation constitutes a major feature of Japan's democratization process."[69] Tavlovskii thus concluded: "To be sure, Japan's 'political miracle' is not immune from its own vulnerabilities or deficiencies, but we have to take into consideration that it was achieved in a relatively short span of time and that by now it has become a 'magnificent architecture of people's power, which deserves respect and praise."[70]

Tavlovskii is not the only Soviet specialist on Japanese affairs who tried to closely link the politics and economics of postwar Japan. His view was shared by a number of Soviet reformist-oriented Japan watchers. The Soviet Japanologists, for example, who participated in a round-table discussion held in early 1991 almost unanimously tended to take this position. They include Konstantin O. Sarkisov (IVAN), Semen I. Verbitskii (IVAN), Vladimir N. Eremin (IVAN), Georgii F. Kunadze (IMEMO), Vadim B. Ramzes (IMEMO), Natalia V. Goriacheva (IDV), Alekseı D. Bogaturov (ISKAN), Alekseı I. Cenatorov (Institute of International Labor Movement), Vasilii I. Saplin (MID), and Iurii V. Tavlovskii (*New Times*). In the conference Ramzes stated: "One must acknowledge that in *political* fields this country [Japan] has produced a miracle, which is no less significant than its *economic* miracle"[71] (emphases added). In his article that appeared in *Izvestiia* one year later, Georgii Kh. Shakhnazarov, advisor to Gorbachev, wrote: "In our country, the postwar [economic] miracle in Japan has been debated and discussed very actively among historians. Yet, almost no one is talking about Japan's political system. . . . [But, I believe that] Japan's [economic] prosperity must be due largely to Japan's state system. . . . It is impossible to have a good *economy* under bad *politics* . . . *Politics* creates favorable conditions for *economic* development or becomes an unsurmountable obstacle for it"[72] (emphases added).

Tavlovskii and other Soviet specialists on Japan even tried to link Japan's economic miracle with its military miracle. Acknowledging the limits of military power as a means of attaining its own national security, postwar Japan has been taking a policy of restraining its defense budget within one percent of its GNP, allowing the rest of the state budget and other resources to be used in

civilian sectors. Tavlovskii noted that "Japan has been using for economic development those resources and materials that in other countries are usually devoted to military needs."[73] Highly evaluating this basic philosophy or strategy of postwar Japanese foreign and security policy which is called "the Yoshida Doctrine," Tavlovskii wrote: "[Japanese Prime Minister] Yoshida was quite a conservative politician."[74] "Recognizing, however, that it would not give a good perspective for Japan to devote manpower, energy, and other resources to military objectives," Yoshida and other Japanese realistic-minded political leaders, "while making some concessions to the pressures imposed upon them from the U.S. and elder Japanese statesmen, have adopted the policy of taking a course to develop Japan in a peaceful way."[75] There is no doubt that this policy has "accelerated Japan's economic miracle further and that the prevention of remilitalization protected its 'political miracle."[76] Fully agreeing with Tavlovskii's observations Verbitskii also wrote: "The absence of a gigantic military power and a military-industrial complex constitute one of the most important features of Japan's postwar economic and social affairs."[77]

One more aspect of Japanese farsightedness can be found in the field of national security *per se*. Starting particularly from Ohira's Masayoshi cabinet, the Japanese government has advocated a concept of "comprehensive security."[78] Ohira's advisory group, which formulated this concept, pointed out that Japan should also prepare itself for sources of threat other than war, such as shortages of food and energy, and earthquakes and other natural disasters, thereby stressing the importance of nonmilitary means to cope with these threats. This and other concepts of postwar Japanese security policies demonstrate that Japan has been quietly advocating and steadily practicing those ideas and schemes that the Soviet Union under Gorbachev claimed to start with their fantastic public-relations campaign. Such ideas and schemes include, for instance, "the limiting of military means," "the doctrine of defense for a genuinely defensive purpose," "reasonable sufficiency of defense capability," and a "comprehensive scheme of international security."[79] At any rate, the above observation seems to be reinforced further by Kunadze's writing in 1988, which reads as follows: "What becomes the important question for us is how to secure our resources for the construction of our economy, that is, how to shift our emphasis from military means to economic and political means. In this regard, there is a *similarity* between the Soviet and the Japanese military doctrines"[80] (emphasis added).

VIII. COMPARISON BETWEEN RUSSIA'S *PERESTROIKA* AND JAPAN'S POSTWAR REFORM

It is one thing country for A to provide an excellent example to country B, but it is a completely different matter whether the former can be an appropriate model to be actually copied by the latter. In order words, from the theoretical point of view, no matter how desirable Japan may be as a model for Russia, it may be possible that Japan in practice cannot be a suitable model for the Russian *perestroika*. As a matter of fact, almost immediately after the "Japanese miracle" and Japan's excellent achievements were acknowledged in the Soviet Union, the question of "feasibility," i.e., whether Japan's experience can be successfully copied by the Russians, was raised. Why did the Soviets consider it difficult, or even impossible, to copy the Japanese experience? Let us examine the reasons the Soviets reached such a pessimistic conclusion.

One reason concerns the comparison between *perestroika* and Japan's postwar reform. There are both similarities and differences discernible between these two. Which is more significant, the similarities or differences? Even if the similarities overwhelm the dissimilarities, can we safely assume that the Russians can copy the Japanese experience?

There are undoubtedly remarkable commonalities between Russia's *perestroika* and Japan's postwar reforms in terms of situations facing them and tasks that they had to tackle.[81] The situations in which the Japanese and the Soviets found themselves are quite similar: for example, the sudden disintegration of the traditional system of values and beliefs (e.g., the Japanese worship of the emperor and the Russian worship of the Marxist-Leninist communist ideology); economic instability and chaos; and the poverty and other hardships that the majority people had to endure.[82] Similarities in the environments of these two countries gave rise to similarities in the task facing the people. Both the Japanese and the Soviets tried to cope with the task of converting a centralized command economy with great emphasis upon the military sectors into a free market economy. Just as postwar Japan had to implement policies to dissolve the *zaibatsu* (financial cliques), the Soviet Union/Russia also had to dissolve huge state enterprises and to privatize them.[83] Just as postwar Japan carried out land reforms, distributing land to tenant-farmers, Russia has recently been engaged in the task of dissolving their sokhozes and kolkhozes, thereby carrying out privatization of the land. Just as postwar Japan was forced to denominate the yen, Russia is now conducting currency and financial reforms, including a denomination of the ruble. Policies of protection and encouragement of small and medium-sized private enterprises and of coping with inflation are also tasks that both postwar Japan and the Soviet

Union/Russia have had to deal with.[84]

At the same time, however, there are also remarkable differences between postwar Japan, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union under Gorbachev and the Russian Federation under Yeltsin, on the other.[85] First, the Japanese people suffered from two atomic bombings and the allied occupation, which gave them the historically unprecedented "dreadful defeat shock" (Verbitskii).[86] Ironically, however, this sense of total defeat helped the Japanese people strengthen their determination to resurrect their country from the ashes of war, and in fact gave rise to the miraculous recovery that is called "a phoenix phenomenon."[87] In contrast, while they did lose the "war" of ideology and economic competition with the United States and advanced West European countries, the Soviets did not actually fight or suffer defeat in the battlefield. The Soviets entertained a sort of halfway-house feeling that they were defeated in the Cold War, which was, according to Alexander N. Yakovlev, virtually nothing but the third World War. With such an ambivalent, half-measure feeling toward the Cold War, the Soviets were far less determined than were the Japanese to do their utmost in efforts to recover from their defeat.

Second, postwar Japan was put under the absolute political authority of the allied occupation led by its supreme commander, General Douglas MacArthur.[88] The strong personality of MacArthur, together with his forceful leadership, self-assurance, dignified bearing, sense of mission, and astute political acumen, made the occupation like a one-man show and a highly successful reign, giving the general the respect of the Japanese people.[89] The allied occupation forces had enormous political power in Japan,[90] enabling them, for instance, to prohibit the general strike scheduled for February 1, 1946. The political power and authority of Soviet President Gorbachev and Russian President Yeltsin are not comparable to those held by General MacArthur. This is not to mean, of course, that Gorbachev's authority or Yeltsin's power was always weak and fragile. In the early days of Gorbachev's reign, when he succeeded the Stalinist or Brezhnev-type of totalitarian political regime, the power and authority that Gorbachev enjoyed was quite strong, but unfortunately, at that time, he did not think of applying the Japanese model to his version of *perestroika*. Unless he is determined to become an authoritarian dictator, it would also be hard for Yeltsin to embark upon such bold reforms as those conducted in postwar Japan under the authority of the allied forces.

Third, the international environments surrounding post-World War II Japan and the USSR under Gorbachev or Russia under Yeltsin are quite different. Postwar Japan found itself in a much more fortunate situation than that of Russia. At its peak of affluence, the United States immediately after World War II was able to designate US $13.15 billion (currently equivalent to approximately US $60 billion) to the Marshall Plan, with the aim of assisting

the economic recovery of European countries from the disruption of World War II.[91] However, the United States is not in a position now to provide Russia with such a huge amount of aid. Japan also had the chance to increase production in 1950, when the Korean War broke out.[92] Fortunately or unfortunately, Russia has not encountered a similar type of international crisis.

IX. JAPANESE CIVILIZATION: MAJOR FEATURES AND REASONS FOR ADMIRATION

Realizing that Japan cannot provide a suitable model for *perestroika* and other reforms in Russia on the grounds mentioned above and others, the Russians almost gave up on the idea of trying to copy Japan. Japan's economic recession following the collapse of the "bubble economy" may have reinforced this feeling held by Russians, particularly in economic fields. This does not mean, however, that Russians have entirely stopped their proclivity to praise Japanese accomplishments. On the contrary, statements and writings by some Russians intellectuals show that the high evaluation and admiration of Japan still prevails in Russia. During his visit to Japan in November 1994, Russian Vice-Premier Oleg N. Soskobets, for example, talked about the possibility of utilizing Japan's postwar experience for the reform process that the Russian Federation was experimenting with.[93]

According to some Russian intellectuals, it is superficial and too utilitarianism-oriented for Russians to look at Japanese achievements from the point of view of whether or to what extent they can emulate the Japanese way of management. The far more important question of a philosophical nature is to ponder whether Russia can also possibly contribute something new to world civilizations, as the Japanese civilization has been doing. According to some Russian intellectuals, the Japanese have been teaching a valuable lesson to the Russians precisely in this regard. The Japanese have been trying to create a new type of civilization that is different from Western civilization, thereby trying to demonstrate to the world that Western civilization is not necessarily the only one universal civilization. Let me elaborate in more detail on Japanese civilization as viewed by these Russian intellectuals, dividing their observations and arguments into three parts: (1) major features of Japanese civilization; (2) its significance; and (3) its lesson to the Russians.

To begin with, how do some Russian intellectuals understand Japanese civilization? Japanese civilization has, in their view, the following three salient features.

The first characteristic lies in the fact that the Japanese have been quite successful in allowing Western and other foreign civilizations to coexist peacefully

with their own civilization. In their jointly written article, Seda V. Markarlan and Elegena V. Morodiakova (both senior researchers of IVAN) observe: "For the [Japanese] young generation, there are no contradictions between traditional [Japanese] culture and [foreign] European cultures: These two cultures coexist in parallel."[94] One might argue that a simultaneous existence of more than one culture or civilization is observable not only in Japan but also in many other countries. However, some Russians have pointed out the following facts: The Japanese do not uncritically import all foreign civilizations into Japan. Instead, the Japanese accept "in a selective way (*selektivno*)" only what they regard as superior to, or only those parts that would fit well with their own civilization.[95] "The Japanese," as argued by the late Dmitrii V. Petrov, head of the Japanese Section of the IDV, "has a capacity to quickly absorb all the best parts of other countries and to convert them into their own academic works, scientific discoveries, and inventions."[96] To put it differently, the Japanese have been skillful and successful in assimilating foreign civilizations within their own indigenous culture. Molodiakova, for instance, observes: "The major lesson of the Japanese model is worthwhile studying: the Japanese have been able to combine their national culture and the constantly emerging and developing elements of the world universal civilization into one."[97]

Russian specialists on Japan naturally evaluate highly *wakon-yōsai* (Western technology and Japanese spirit).[98] The Japanese, in their view, do not simply combine *wakon* (the Japanese spirit) with *yōsai* (Western civilization), but attempt to integrate these two into one.[99] The Japanese believe that they cannot successfully absorb the "achievements of Western science and technology unless they master, at least to a certain degree, Western society's "spiritual values" as well.[100]

The Russians appraise the above-mentioned Japanese way of integrating foreign civilizations into their own, particularly against the background of the Russian way of doing things. Russians tend to shift from one extreme to the other, often skipping middle-of-the-road, intermediary positions. "The Russians are, in the words of the Russian philosopher Nicolas A. Berdyaev, a people who are polarized to the highest degree: They are a conglomeration of contradictions. . . . The Russians have not been given to moderation and they have readily gone to extremes."[101] "Diametrically confronting elements in Russian mentality," Berdayev continues, "find themselves in manifestation of two extreme attitudes, such as humility and arrogance, slavery and revolt, freedom and collectivism, and nationalism and universalism."[102] The Russians thus tend to take a position of either one of the following two extremes: absolute superiority or absolute inferiority—complex feelings with regard to their own civilization and absolute refusal or absolute subjection with regards to foreign civilizations.

The second characteristic that some Russians consider unique in the Japanese attitude toward civilization concerns with the way in which Japanese change things compared with the Russian way of doing so. Russians often tend to change things very rapidly and radically in a revolutionary fashion. This probably has something to do with the aforementioned Russian national character of shifting their feelings, attitudes, and positions from one extreme to the other. The Japanese in contrast prefer a moderate way of changing things, resorting to an evolutionary reform.

For the Japanese, there are two kinds of civilizations: the the indigenous, traditional, Japanese civilization, i.e., national civilization that has existed for many centuries; and foreign civilization that has been coming into Japan from outside. The Japanese attitude toward these two civilizations are by and large as follows: While the Japanese do not easily give up their own traditional civilization, they also do not turn down foreign civilization simply on the grounds that it is alien. The combination of "sensitivity to the new and loyalty toward the old" — in Markarian and Molodiakova's opinion — constitutes one of the most important features of the Japanese character."[103] Even if a foreign civilization appears to be superior and more favorable than their own civilization, the Japanese do not immediately discard their traditional civilization but, instead, seek a way to gradually accept the foreign civilization in a step-by-step process that will not conflict with their own civilization. Molodiakova thus concludes: "What is characteristic in Japan is an evolutionary process of transformation of its own tradition. New elements are only added to the old structure and co-exist together with, and without destroying, the old structure. Through such adjustment to the old structure, these new elements gradually give rise to *perestroika* of the entire system."[104]

Why, then, do some Russians so highly evaluate the current Japanese civilization? Though some answers to this question have already been given in the preceeding parts, let me now try to answer this question in more direct fashion.

To begin with, Japan has been, as some Russians argue, demonstrating a clear example in skillfully integrating into one the two major currents of Western and Oriental civilizations. Elena Berisotskaia at the Far Eastern National University in Vladivostok, for instance, writes that Japan has been successful in playing the role of "an intermediary between the Western and the Oriental civilizations."[105]

In addition, the Japanese civilization appears to the Russians to have achieved the very difficult goal of simultaneously being both the specific and the universal civilization. Konstantin O. Sarkisov, director of the Japanese Research Center, IVAN, observes: "It is worthwhile paying attention to Japan's experience in recent years in harmonizing its [own] culture with [those

of] the rest of the world. Japan is a model of the combining of national and international cultures."[106]

Judging from the two points just made above, some Russians consider that the Japanese should be regarded as no longer as "imitators" but "creators,"[107] or that the Japanese have transformed themselves, in Molodiakova's words, from "modest students" to "teachers."[108] Sarkisov also writes: "Japan absorbed and has continued to absorb a great deal of nourishment from external sources. It is time for other countries to pay attention to the Japanese experience."[109] Vitarii K. Zaitsev, the head of the Japanese department of IMEMO, must have had a similar feeling, when he wrote that "Japan is an example of the possibility of radical transformation in the contemporary civilization process."[110] Zaitsev has even gone so far as to reach the bold conclusion that Japanese civilization indicates the possibility of creating "a new model of civilization (*novaia model' tsivilizatsii*)."[111]

X. VALIDITY OF THE MODEL, PARTICULARLY THE ROLE OF THE JAPANESE NATIONAL CHARACTER

Based upon the aforementioned discussion, let us examine the fundamental question of whether there exists a universal model of development. Since this is, of course, too large a question to be examined in this article, I shall limit myself to introducing again the debate among Soviet/Russian intellectuals on this subject. There are three schools of thought.

The first school of thought argues that the development of each country is unique and cannot easily be copied by others as a suitable example or an appropriate precedent. Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin expressed this position, when he stated in an interview conducted immediately after the "G plus 1" summit meeting held in Munich in July 1992: "Russia [now] finds itself on the unique path of reform, to which any precedent model cannot be applied."[112]

In contrast, several Russian economists argue, however, that one can find common features and patterns in the development, especially in economic development, of each country When seen from an objective point of view, the development of each nation is, in their view, not so unique. Particularly in the means to achieve economic development and in its process, there are more common features than there are differences. Peter Arben, former Russian minister of foreign economic relations, for instance, stated: "We have entertained an illusion that Russia is a special type of country. . . . But this is not correct. No special country exists. From an economic point of view, all countries are *totally identical* in terms of their plan for stabilization (emphasis in origi-

nal).[113] Sergei Vasil'ev, advisor to the Russian government, also wrote: "There is no theory that takes into consideration the specific features of a country that starts reform. Nobody has ever taken into [serious] consideration the specific features of postwar Germany, militaristic Japan, or Chile with its socialist-oriented economy. . . . From late 19th-to early 20th-century Russia, neither Sergei Iu. Witte nor Petr A. Stolypin ever thought of any specific model for Russia. They simply sought a practical solution to the problems."[114]

Taking an intermediate middle of the road position, the third school of thought argues that, while aiming to achieve an ideal model, reform or development in its actual implementation process is often subject to a shift from its original plan, adjusting to concrete conditions at any given moment. Vasil' ev appears also to be close to this position, when he stated: "The task of transforming the Russian economy from the totalitarian type of command economy into a market-oriented economy was started first by dissenters and liberal reform-minded economists and only then was it supported by the Russian general public. . . . Only as a result of efforts to formulate a general principle for solving the concrete problems of a particular country, can a national model of economic development be found. This is precisely nothing but going one's own way."[115]

In this connection, I will discuss next one of the most difficult questions, that is, the national character of Japanese people. How does the Japanese character affect Japan's "miraculous" phenomena? If it turns out that the Japanese national character has greatly contributed to Japan's miraculous developments, it would be hard for other nations, who do not have characteristics similar to the Japanese, to copy the Japanese miracle. On the contrary, however, if one can prove that Japan's miracles have nothing much to do with the Japanese national character, it would be encouraging for non-Japanese nations that aim to achieve similar types of miracles. Concerning this interesting but difficult question, there are also three schools of thought.

The first school argues that the uniqueness of Japanese culture and the Japanese people has helped them achieve the "Japan phenomenon," including postwar Japan's miraculous postwar economic performance. For instance, Tat'iana P. Grigor'eva (IVAN) writes: "The main reason behind Japan's accomplishments in economic, scientific, and technological fields is nothing less than those special merits of the Japanese national character and the uniqueness of the 'Japanese soul'."[116] Expressing a view similar to Grigor'eva's, A. I. Samsin, another Russian Japanologist, says: "The Japanese national culture constitutes a major factor that has enabled Japan to economically compete with the West. This is precisely the reason why we have to actively conduct systematic studies of Japanese culture."[117] More concretely speaking, in Samsin's view, such national features of the Japanese people as

"social homogeneity; diligent labor ethics; faithful observation of discipline; and each individual's consciousness of, and devotion to, group and public interests are the source of the Japanese type of politics and economics."[118] Vladimir N. Eremin also writes: "There is no doubt that a type of democracy developed in Japan, but it was quite a different type of democracy when compared with those 'classic' variants that are observable in the United States and in Western European countries. It is [thus] necessary for us to draw our attention to the 'national uniqueness' of the Japanese model compared with the American and Western European models."[119]

Taking an entirely contrasting position, the second group of Soviet Japanologists argue as follows: precisely because the Japanese have abandoned their traditional national characteristics, they have been able to succeed in industrialization and modernization, thereby having attained their present prosperity. Igor' A. Latyshev, former Tokyo correspondent of *Pravda*, for example, argues: "The main reason behind Japan's present achievements does not lie in the time-honored Japanese national traditions and singularities of the 'Japanese spirit' but, on the contrary, in the downfall of many of them, the renunciation by the majority of Japanese of the belief in their national exclusiveness, and the profound changes in their life, culture, and ideology."[120] This argument may sound convincing but seems to me to have one crucial defect: While this theory may account for the fact that Japan has caught up with the advanced Western nations, it cannot fully explain the fact that Japan surpassed Western countries, at least partially or in certain fields.

The third school of thought appears to have taken a middle-of-the-road, or, intermediary, position between the above two schools. It argues that, by basically preserving their own identity and national uniqueness but, at the same time, giving them up to a certain extent, the Japanese people have been able to achieve their miraculous developments. As one Soviet newspaper, for instance, put it: "The specific characteristic of the so-called Japanese miracle is that while skillfully remaining a country of specifically oriental nature the Rising Sun [= Japan] has reached, during a very brief time of period, the level of the United States in many indexes."[121] However, by pointing out that the Japanese are flexible enough to make concessions in order to achieve their objectives, this school also ends up in underlining the unique Japanese way of doing things. In this regard it may be considered to be simply a variant of the first school.

What, then, do the two schools described above imply about the possibility of Russia's following Japan's example? The first school, which abscribes the secret of Japan's success to the Japanese unique national character, suggests that the Russians, without such a character, cannot, and should not, expect to accomplish achievements similar to those the Japanese have accomplished. In

contrast, the second school, which does not link the source of Japan's achievements with the unique Japanese character, concludes that if the Russians try hard to adjust themselves to the Japanese or any other pattern of development, without sticking to their own Russianness, chances are that the Russians would also have a good chance to succeed in the future.

In lieu of presenting my own conclusion, I would like to make a few more citations again from Russian writings. First, I would like to quote from Leonid I. Abalkin, who wrote: "It is essential for us to carefully study the experiences of foreign countries that have been successful in solving social-economic tasks similar to those facing us. This does not mean, however, that we have to automatically copy what other countries have been doing. In no matter how detailed a fashion their experiences may be offered, they cannot possibly provide a ready-made prescription for us." "In the process of Russia's resurrection," Abalkin concludes, "while paying respects to all the experiences and wisdom accumulated by other countries, we still have to find and proceed along our own path."[122] Even aknowledging this general rule, there still—according to some Russian intellectuals—do appear to be some lessons that Russians can pick up from Japanese experiences: (1) the Japanese are full of curiousity about other nations' experiences and eager to learn from them; (2) recognizing the futility of automatically and uncritically copying foreign achievements with the aim of successfully repeating that country's social-economic developments, the Japanese have been taking "a selective policy of adopting only what is suitable for them";[123] and (3) "The phenomenal achievements of Japan are not the result of either a miracle or God's will but of entirely rational human behavior. It is an example of which the nucleus consists of deliberate, carefully-thought-out, goal-oriented, firmly established, and well-organized will of the [Japanese] nation."[124]

Notes

1 In his address to the CPSU's CC plenary session on June 25, 1987, Gorbachev used the term "*predkrizisnye formy* (pie-crisis situations) " Mikhail S. Gorbachev, *Izbrannye rechi i stat'i* (Moskva Politizdat, 1988), Vol 5, p 130. For the relationship between Gorbachev and crisis, see, for example, Seweryn Bialer "Gorbachev's Program of Change. Sources, Significance, Prospects," in Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum, eds , *Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), pp 233-236.

2. For a description of the Soviet economy's decline, which made Gorbachev decide to embark upon perestroika, see, for instance, Anders Åslund, *Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform* (Ithaca, New York Cornell University Press, 1989), pp 10-23, and its updated expanded edition (1991), pp 12-24

3. M S. Gorbachev, *Perestroika i novoe myshlenie dlia nashei strany i dlia vsego mira* (Moskva: Politizdat, 1987), p. 11 For an English translation, see Mikhail S Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World* (New York· Harper & Row, 1987), p 17.
4. *Programma Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Souza* (Moskva Politizdat, 1972), p. 65.
5 Fedor M Burlatskii, *Novoe myshlenie· Dialogi i suzhdenia o tekhnologicheskoi revoliutsii i nashikh reformakh* (Moskva Politizdat, 1989), p 73.
6 *Znakom'tes'—Iaponia K vizitu B. N. El'tsina* (Moskva Nauka, 1992), p. 41.
7 Herman Kahn, *The Emerging Japanese Superstate· Challenge and Response* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1970), xiii, 274 pp , Robert Guillian, translated by Patrick O'Brian, *The Japanese Challenge* (London: H Hamilton, 1970), 345 pp ; Ezra F. Vogel, *Japan as Number One: Lessons for America* (Cambridge, Mass.. Harvard University Press, 1979), 272 pp , Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, *Le defi mondial* (Paris Fayard, 1980), 477 pp These books were referred to in the book published in the Soviet Union in 1985, i.e., Boris Z. Mil'ner, Igor' S. Oleinik, Sergei A. Roginko, *Iaponskii paradoks· Real'nosti i protivorechia kapitalisticheskogo upravlenia* (Moskva: Mysl', 1985), p. 256
8 See, for example, the following: Vadim Solntsev "Dve ctorony «iaponskogo fenomena»," *Mezhdunarodnye zhizn'* — hereinafter cited as *MZ* -, No. 7, 1986, p. 74, Vladimir Ia. Tsvetov, *Piatnadtsatyi kamen' sada Roandzi* (Moskva Politizdat, 1986), pp. 19, 284; Aleksandr A Dynkin and Ivan S Tselishchev, "Iaponia nauchno-tekhnicheskii progress i organizatsiia ekonomiki," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia*—hereafter cited as *MEiMO*—, No. 10 (1987), p. 65, Burlaskii, op. cit., pp 63-76
9. *Znakom'tes'—Iaponia*, p. 41.
10. *Pravda*, July 18, 1987.
11 Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova, *Boris Yeltsin: A Political Biography* (New York: G P. Putnam's Sons, 1992), pp 168-169.
12. Semen I Verbitskii, "Evoliutsiia vzgliadov na Iaponiiu v period 'perestroiki'" (unpublished paper), p. 5.
13 *Ibid.*
14 Igor' A Latyshev, "O politicheskoi sushchnosti kontseptsii «unikal' nosti» kul'tury i dukhovnoi zhzni iapontsev," *Preblemy dal'nego vostoka*, No. 1 [61], 1987, pp 31-32
15. *Znakom'tes'—Iaponia*, p. 39.
16. *Ibid.; Iaponskii paradoks*. p. 31.
17. This is one of five groups among Soviet Japan watchers classified by Gilbert Rozman, professor of Princeton University Ivan I Kovalenko, former Deputy Director of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee and currently adviser to IVAN, and Igor' A. Latyshev, former *Pravda* correspondent in Tokyo, are champions of this conservative "orthodox" group. Gilbert Rozman, "Moscow's Japan-Watchers in the First Years of the Gorbachev Era. The Struggle for Realism and Respect in Foreign Affairs," *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1988), pp. 258-259, 268-269.
18. This group, whose approach is labeled by Rozman as "technical economics," includes, for instance, the following Japanologists· Iakov A. Pevzner, (IMEMO), the Soviet

Academy of Sciences; Vadim B. Ramzes (IMEMO); Valerii K. Zaitsev (IMEMO); Andrei I. Kravtsevich (IVAN). Rozman, op cit , pp. 258-259, 268-269.

19 Rafik Aliev, "Mesto Iaponii v politike nashel strany," *MEMO*, No 1 (1992), pp. 121-122.

20. Hiroshi Kimura, "The Gorvachev Administration's Perception of Capitalism," H Kimura, ed , *Kiro ni tatsu Gorubachofu* (*Gorbachev at Crossroads*) (Tokyo· Keisō-shobō, 1990), pp. 83-107.

21. Rozman, *op. cit* , p. 269.

22. Leonid I. Abalkin, "Pomozhet li Rossii iaponskii opyt?," *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, June 20, 1992.

23. Nihon Kokusai Fōramu, ed., *Henshitsu suru Soren Toō to Nishigawa no Taio* (Changing Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and Western Responses) (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Fōramu, 1990), p 31.

24. *Asahi Shimbun*, April 4, 1990.

25. Cited from *Demokratiia v Iaponii. opyt i uroki* (*"kruglyi stol" sovetskikh iaponovedov*) (Moskva Nauka, 1991), p 45

26 *Asahi Shimbun*, June 21, 1991.

27. Gavrill Kh. Popov and Shigeki Hakamada, "Shōnenba o mukaeta peresutoroika (The Crucial Stage of Perestroika)," in *Kokusai Kōryū*, No 48 (November 30, 1988), pp. 14-15

28. "Snachala eto kazalos' katastrofoi. Iaponskii ekonomist delitsia opytom reformy v svoei strane," *Izvestiia*, May 7, 1990.

29. *Asahi Shimbun*, April 26, 1990.

30. Abalkin, "Pomozhet li Rossii iaponskii opyt?".

31. Cyril E. Black *et al.*, *The Modernization of Japan and Russia* (New York: The Free Press, 1975), pp 15-16, 342-354

32. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman. University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 14-18.

33. Popov and Hakamada, *op. cit* , p. 15, Abalkin, "Pomozhet li Rossii iaponskii opyt?".

34 *Iaponiia: polveka obnovleniia* (Moskva: Tolk, 1995), p. 174.

35. *Iaponskii fenomen*, p. 32.

36. *Ibid.*

37 Abalkin, "Pomozhet li Rossii iaponskii opyt?".

38 *Asahi Shimbun*, June 21, 1991.

39. S. I. Verbitskii, "Evoliutiia vzgliadov na Iaponiiu v period «perestroiki»," in *Znakom'tes' — Iaponiia*, p 41, E L. Leont'eva, "Opyt poslevoennoi Iaponii i possiskie ekonomicheskie reformy," in *Znakom'tes' — Iaponiia*, p. 81; *Iaponiia polveka pbnovleniia*, p. 161.

40. V. S. Dobrovskii and V. A Moiseev, "Podsobnye masterskie Ameriki," *EKO* (*Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva*), 6 (240) (1991), p. 125.

41. *Ibid.* According to the Russian authors of this article, the Japanese Economic Planning Agency is very similar to GOSPAN (State Planning Committee), and the following slogans found in the offices and factories of Japanese companies are very similar to, and sometimes identical to Soviet slogans· "Cadres Decide Everything", "Enterprises Are Nothing but Cadres", "Everyone Who Works in a Plant Is a Staff-administrator";

"Quality Decides the Destiny of an Enterprise"; "A Wonderful Thing Today Will Become Old-Fashioned Tomorrow", "Think of Quality All the Time"; "The Improvement of Peoples' Living Standard - This is Our Honorable Task"; "Security - More Than Anything Else!" and so forth Ibid , pp 127, 138.

42. Iurii V. Tavrovskii, "Iapontsy i my," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, No. 6 [5228], February 8, 1989, p 15.
43. *Demokratiia v Iaponiia*, p. 47.
44. Tavlovskii, "Iaponskii i my".
45 *Demokratiia v Iaponiia*, p 49.
46. Georgii Kh Shakhnazarov, "U nas est' shans sozdat' dvukhpartiinuiu sistemy," *Izvestiia*, February 17, 1992.
47 *Ibid.*
48. *Ibid.*
49. *Ibid.*
50. *Ibid.*
51. Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (New York Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 51, 151, 169-170, 173, 363.
52. Jerry F. Hough, "Gorbachev's Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 64, No. 1 (fall 1985), p. 40.
53. Marshall I. Goldman, *Gorbachev's Challenge Economic Reform in the Age of High Technology* (New York: W W Norton, 1987), pp. 92-111.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 118.
55. *Ibid* , pp 131, 137.
56. Marshall I. Goldman, *USSR in Crisis: The Failure of an Economic System* (New York· W. W. Norton, 1983), p. 131.
57. *Ibid.*
58. Philip Hanson and Malcolm R. Hill, "Soviet Assimilation of Western Technology: A Study of U. K. Exporters' Experience," *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change* (A Compendium of Papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States), (Washington, D. C U S Government Printing Office, 1979), Vol 2 p 586; Dmitrii V. Petrov," Militarizatsia Iaponii - ugroza miru v Azii, *Problemy dal'nego vostoka*, No 1 (1981), p. 51.
59. Viktor Ia Rosin "Militarizatsiia Iaponii· vzgliad ekonomista," *MEMO*, No. 1 (1988), pp. 79, 81, 84.
60. A. Dynkin and I. Tselishchev "Iaponiia nauchno-tekhnlcheskii progress i organizatsiia *ekonomiki*," *MEiMO*, No. 10 (1987), p. 62
61. *Ibid.*
62. Fodor M Burlatskii, "Tekhnologicheskaia revoliutsiia i my," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, No. 25 [5039], June 19, 1985, p. 2.
63 Rosin, *op. cit.*, p. 75.
64 Vladimir G. Leshke, Ivan S. Tselishchev. "Osobennosti formirovaniia voenno-promyshlennogo-kompleksa v Iaponii," *MEiMO*, No. 7 (1987), p. 45, *see also* Rosin, op. cit., p 84.
65. Iurii D Kuznetsov, Galina B. Navlitskaia, Igor M. Syritsyn, *Istoriia Iaponiia* (Moskva: Vysshaia shkola, 1988), p. 371.

66. Tavlovskii, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
67. *Ibid.*
68. *Demokratiia v Iaponii*, p. 37.
69. *Ibid* , pp. 37-38.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 39
71. *Ibid* , p. 6.
72. *Izvestiia*, February 17, 1992.
73 *Ibid*
74 Tavlovskii, "Iaponskii i my".
75. *Ibid.*
76 *Ibid.*
77. Verbitskii, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
78. *The Final Report on Comprehensive National Security* (Tokyo. The Comprehensive National Security Study Group), July 2, 1980 (unpublished English translation), John W Chapman, Reinhardd Drifte, Ian T. M Gow, *Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security· Defense, Diplomacy, Dependence* (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), p. 71.
79. *XXVII s'ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza· Stenograficheskii otchet* (Moskva: Politzdat, 1986), Vol 1, p 87, *Pravda*, September 17, 1987; M S. Gorvachev, *Perestroika i novoe myshlenie dlia nashei i dlia vsego mira* (Moskva: Politizdat, 1987), pp. 244-245.
80 Georgii F. Kunadze, "Sostoianie i perspeckivy sovetsko-iaponskikh otnoshenii" (unpublished paper submitted and read at a joint Japan-Soviet conference sponsored by NIRA and IMEMO in Tokyo on July 20-21, 1988), p 3.
81 *Izvestiia*, May 7, 1990, Noriyuki Yonemura/Khiroshi Tsukamoto, *O sistemnoi ekonomicheskoi reforme v stranakh byvshego SSSR* (Tokio: Ministerstva vneshnei torgovli i promyshlennosti, Mart a 1992), 83 pp ; *Iaponskii paradoks*, pp 16-17.
82. Abalkin, "Pomozhet li Rossii iaponskii opyt?"
83. *Iaponiia*, pp. 160-161.
84. *Znakom'tes'-Íaponiia*, pp 70-71.
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86. *Demokratiia v Iaponii*, p 24.
87. A F K Organski and Jacek Kugler, "The Costs of Major Wars. The Phoenix Factor," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol 71 (1977), pp. 1347-1366.
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95 *Iaponskıı opyt dlıa rossıiskıkh reform* — hereınafter cıted as *Iaponskıı opyt* — (Moskva: Institut vostokovedenıia RAN, 1995), (4), p 6; *Iaponskıı opyt*, 1997 (1), p. 7.
96. *Iaponıia ı mırovoe soobshchestvo· sotsıal'no-psıkhologıcheskıe aspekty ınternatsıonal-ızatsıı* (Moskva. Izdatel'stvo MIKAP, 1994), p 211.
97. *Iaponskıı fenomen*, p. 7.
98 *Iaponskıı fenomen*, p. 26, *Iaponskıı opyt*, 1996 (3), p. 5.
99. *Razmyshlenıia o ıaponskoı ıstorıı* (Moskva Assotsıatsıia ıaponovedov, 1996), p. 61.
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114 Sergeı Vasıl'ev, "Kak skladyvaetsıa 'svoı put'," *Moskovskıe novostı*, No. 17, Aprıl 26, 1997, p. 17
115. *Ibıd*
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