

Ch'oe Ch'unghōn and Minamoto Yoritomo

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Summary

In 1180 Minamoto Yoritomo responded to a royal prince's pleas, mustered troops in Japan's eastern plains, and so launched the founding of the Kamakura bakufu. In 1196, Ch'oe Ch'unghōn in Korea rebelled against a corrupt dictator and established a military regime that would dominate Korea for the next sixty years. Both Korea and Japan at the same time confronted a crisis of governance and both turned to military solutions to resolve the current issues. This presentation will investigate briefly the conditions that brought these two men to power and the institutions that developed to ensure their governance. Furthermore, through an examination of Ch'oe Ch'unghōn in Korea and Minamoto Yoritomo in Japan, a clearer understanding of the histories of these two countries in the late twelfth century and early thirteenth century will emerge. Individuals can serve as agents of change and certainly the roles of both Ch'oe and Minamoto are crucial in understanding the complexities confronting Korea and Japan respectively. Issues of power and control perplexed both men, and each sought to resolve questions of distribution of wealth and authority. Their solutions to some of these dilemmas were surprisingly similar, and yet Korea and Japan chose markedly different paths of cultural development. By understanding these men and their systems of governance, keener insights into the institutions, social change and cultural evolution of both Korea and Japan will follow.

Key words

MINAMOTO YORITOMO, TAIRA, KAMAKURA, HEIAN, FUJIWARA, MANDOKORO, MONCHŪJO, RETAINER, KOREA, MILITARY RULE, CH'OE CH'UNGHŌN, INSTITUTIONS, TWELFTH CENTURY, WARRIOR

KOREA AND JAPAN IN THE TWELFTH CENTURY

Civil aristocratic societies characterize both Korea and Japan at the start of the twelfth century. Heian (794–1185), which commenced with the founding of

Kyoto in 794, had been controlled by civil elites led by the Fujiwara family who through a web of interlocking networks was in virtual command of the country. In Koryō (918–1392) civil aristocrats similarly governed the country and by the start of the twelfth century several key aristocratic families led by the Kyōngwōn Yi lineage dominated the dynasty. In both states, private institutions controlled by these houses started to co-opt and compete with the central governing structure for control over land and personnel. A public-private dyarchy was especially visible in Heian.¹ Although periods of unrest rocked each of these societies, the adulation of civil, literary values and the disparagement of martial traditions continued.

The most serious challenges to this order commenced in the middle of the twelfth century. In Japan, the Office of the Retired Emperor (*In*) worked closely with the Taira lineage which defended *In* property rights around Japan. When an imperial succession dispute erupted in 1156, the Taira quickly came to the aid of the *In*'s faction. The Taira met in battle warriors commanded by Minamoto leaders who defended the opposing side. Two successive skirmishes ensued (*Hōgen no ran* [1156] and *Heiji no ran* [1159–1160]), resulting in the victory of the Taira lineage under Taira Kiyomori and the defeat of the Minamoto. Although this marked the beginning of the ascendancy of the military and the Taira in particular into the highest civil ranks, Kiyomori still shared power with the *In* until his *coup d'état* in 1179. Nevertheless, with his victories in the 1150s, Kiyomori successfully penetrated the inner circles of Heian society and advanced to the highest civil offices, such as *sangi* (adviser) and later *dajōdaijin* (prime minister). Very much pursuing the policies that had guaranteed the earlier successes of the Fujiwara, Kiyomori married his daughter to the crown prince, and in time saw his grandson become emperor.²

Just as it was divisions or disputes within the imperial household and among Japan's civil elites that enabled military houses, even if divided themselves, to start their advance into central positions of power, similar events were occurring in Korea. Although Koryō's dynastic military leaders had been successfully co-opted into a role of subordination by the twelfth century, civil disputes starting with Yi Chagyōm's revolt in 1126 began to change this order. Both the Yi Chagyōm revolt and then the subsequent 1135 rebellion in Sōgyōng (P'yōngyang) sparked by the charismatic monk Myoch'ōng saw the successful reassertion of civil authority. However, it was the effective deployment of troops and the martial valor of the military that won these victories for the civil elite. Despite the crucial role of Koryō's soldiers and generals in suppressing these rebellions, in subsequent decades these military men experienced an onslaught of abuse from civil leaders.

Crisis, sparked by affronts to military personnel and civil mismanagement, peaked in Ūijong's reign (1146–1170). King Ūijong was an aesthete, ill-suited to

governing. He much preferred roaming from temple to temple, enjoying the beautiful sites found throughout Korea. Men of lesser standards willingly abetted him in his pursuit of pleasure. As he paid less attention to government affairs and more attention to affairs of the heart, abuse and corruption set in. Ūijong's court became seriously divided over issues of governance, sparking several major disputes and the exile of critics and potential opponents of Ūijong. It was these disruptions within the civil elite, coupled with real grievances felt by the military, that caused military officers to revolt in 1170.³

In the ensuing 26 years, prior to the rise of Ch'oe Ch'unghön, Koryō's domestic situation rapidly deteriorated. The military leaders dethroned Ūijong and enthroned his brother as King Myōngjong (1170–1197). Although they tried to maintain a semblance of order and retained a number of key civil officials to assist in their governance, the new military leaders assumed many of the most prominent civil offices. General Chōng Chungbu, a man from a lineage that had produced generals in the past, led the coup of 1170, but within eight years he was toppled from power and then a succession of men attempted to master the country. Revolts erupted across the land as peasants, slaves, and monks vented their own grievances. The dynasty was set adrift and in danger of total dissolution.

The rise of military leaders into positions of authority consummated changes that had been gradually evolving in Japan. However, in Korea they marked a much more dramatic change of events. During the Heian period control over military might gradually ebbed away from a Chinese modeled central army into the hands of local and central military elites of whom the Taira and Minamoto dominated the upper levels. Coupled with this change emerged the gradual evolution of the imperial state as the emperor transcended active political involvement and was replaced by first key civil aristocratic houses and then the Taira and Minamoto. The civil hierarchy that had been used to govern Japan in Nara and Heian became, just like the imperial army, redundant as a new system of control that was largely operated through private, personal relationships appeared. Minamoto Yoritomo was able to lodge himself within this system and effectively spread his authority.

In Korea, lines separating public and private, state and individual, were much more clearly delineated than in Japan. The Koryō monarch remained actively involved in governance and dynastic institutions retained their vitality into the 12th century. Korea's military order with clearly defined responsibilities was part of the central hierarchy and subordinated to the civilian authority. A tradition of private arms-bearing, apart from the state, had been effectively uprooted in the tenth century. And so the military coup of 1170 and subsequent rise of military officers into positions of authority marked a dramatic change in governance. Nevertheless, because of the inherent strength of the dynastic institutions, the

new military leaders had to use them in governing the kingdom. Although the Ch'oe leaders gradually developed private agencies, public institutions still retained legitimacy forcing the military leaders to work with the central dynastic hierarchy.

CH'OE CH'UNGHŌN AND MINAMOTO YORITOMO

Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn, a product of Koryŏ's military tradition, was no ordinary man. A member of the Ubong Ch'oe lineage and the son of a general himself, his family had produced a number of generals in the preceding decades and, like Chŏng Chungbu, seems to have epitomized the *kunban ssijok* or military lineage family, the families that remained the source of Koryŏ's military leadership.⁴ His mother's lineage, coming from the Chinju region in the south, carried a similar background as Ch'unghŏn's maternal grandfather had been a supreme general. Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn also married a woman from similar family circumstances. Ch'unghŏn entered the military by relying on an ūm (protective) appointment and served at the start of Myŏngjong's reign as a toryŏng (commandant) where he gained recognition for his bravery in quelling anti-military revolts. In the middle of the reign he held several other regional offices, but found himself blocked from advancing to influential ranks. Equally troubling to Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn was the rapid deterioration of any semblance of rule in Koryŏ. To Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn, a man conscious of his lineage and tradition, the years following the rise of the military were a disaster, not only to him personally but to Koryŏ as well.⁵ Yi Ūimin, the man who Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn pushed from power in 1196 was the antithesis to Ch'oe. He was of humble birth as his father had been a salt merchant and his mother a slave. By first ingratiating himself and then intimidating King Myŏngjong, he was able to find a position in the court. From there he controlled King Myŏngjong, flagrantly abused royal authority to suit his ends, and promoted men of humble origins into high-ranking positions. To Ch'oe and much of rank-conscious Koryŏ, Yi epitomized all the deficiencies of Koryŏ society at that time. Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn felt compelled to destroy him.

Minamoto Yoritomo also had an antagonist, Taira Kiyomori. Although Kiyomori's lineage was just as aristocratic as that of Yoritomo, Yoritomo, like Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn, was determined to eliminate his enemy. When Kiyomori led his coup d'état in 1179, Yoritomo was living in the Kantō plain. Like Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn, Yoritomo was aware of his lineage. The Minamoto house, for a number decades one of the leading warrior households in Heian, had relocated to the Kantō plain. Tracing his lineage back to a ninth century emperor, Yoritomo was conscious of his dual military-noble background. When his father lost to Kiyomori in the the *Heiji no ran*, Yoritomo and his brother became

hostages to a Taira kinsman in Kantō, far from the capital. The Minamoto had links to this area and here Yoritomo grew up, the scion of a great family and heir to a military tradition. With few pretensions to power, Yoritomo was all but forgotten as Kiyomori dominated Heian politics. In far off Kantō Yoritomo sat, displaying no political ambitions. He married a woman from another military household, Hōjo Masako, the daughter of his captor. Yoritomo watched as Kiyomori launched his coup and arrested the emperor. Even when an imperial prince issued a call for resistance, Yoritomo still waited, judging when it would be appropriate to take up arms.

Minamoto Yoritomo established his rule, commonly called a *bakufu*, between 1180 and 1185. He consciously worked from the Kantō plain and using Kamakura as his base, he in effect established an independent polity under his control. Yoritomo in the words of one scholar was “aware by now that autonomy within the imperial fold, not independence and isolation, would be the most effective way to gain permanence for his regime.”⁶ From this foundation he then gradually extended his authority to encompass Kyoto and by 1185 western Japan. Yoritomo cautiously vested his acts with as much imperial legitimacy as possible. But it was not until 1183 that he received a sought after imperial decree to act in defense of the realm.⁷ Then in 1184 with court approval, Yoritomo established an agency of the *bakufu* in Kyoto. By 1185, with the defeat of the Taira, the Minamoto house extended its authority into the west as a dyarchy, with two centers of rule, came to govern Japan.⁸

Ch'oe Ch'unghōn's seizure of power was much more rapid than Yoritomo's. When Ch'oe rebelled and assassinated Yi Ūimin in 1196, it was on the urging of his brother and similarly minded men. Enlisting a small cadre of followers, he planned and then proceeded swiftly to kill the dictator. With this deed successfully completed, Ch'oe Ch'unghōn met the king, explained his actions, and asked for and won royal sanction. Gaining royal legitimacy was foremost in his mind and with an endorsement from the monarch, Ch'oe Ch'unghōn was able to garner the assistance of the dynastic forces to rout out potential enemies. Without securing crucial support from the king and key generals in the capital forces, Ch'oe Ch'unghōn's efforts might have failed.

Examining these two generals at this stage already points to a number of contrasts. Although both men were offspring of military houses with distinguished traditions, the Minamoto lineage with its imperial links was more exalted. Yoritomo also enjoyed much more autonomy from the civil order and court than Ch'oe Ch'unghōn. His family had developed a separate power base in the Kantō and from this foundation of strength, he was able to slowly build his authority. He was fortunate in that he could build on the dual private/public system of governance that had already appeared in Heian. Ch'oe on the other hand was forced to deal with capital politics from the start. Private governing models had not been

institutionalized in Koryō. Although both men sought legitimacy through statements of approval from their respective crowns, Yoritomo enjoyed greater freedom of movement and only gradually linked his cause to the imperial mandate. Ch'oe Ch'unghōn from the start cloaked his power with the royal mantle.

CONSOLIDATION

In the first years after taking control both generals, Ch'oe Ch'unghōn and Minamoto Yoritomo, cautiously built up their positions. Ch'oe Ch'unghōn remained in Koryō's capital and carefully manipulated the monarch. Minamoto Yoritomo on the other hand stayed in Kamakura where he solidified his links with the countryside and involved himself in the adjudication of land disputes. Both men in this initial period also had to contain the aspirations of their younger brothers.

Over the first five years of his rule, from 1196 to 1201, Ch'oe Ch'unghōn moved swiftly to stabilize his mastery over Koryō. Besides winning the king to his cause, he also set out to assure support from the literati of the kingdom, an important power block that had been largely ignored in the previous decades. Ch'oe Ch'unghōn quickly presented himself as a reformer, a man wearied by the corruption and laxity of the previous years. He devised a ten-point program of reform to revitalize dynastic institutions and shore up the governing order. He presented this in part to win the favor of the civil elites but even more practically because he sought to extend his authority by using existing dynastic institutions. Of course he placed himself in the supreme positions of authority within this order and assured that men favorable to his cause received choice appointments. However, he was not precipitous in these ploys, as he guardedly charted his own advance into the highest office.

Ch'oe Ch'unghōn was equally prudent in establishing marriage ties with powerful lineages. When his younger brother Ch'ungsu planned to marry his daughter to the crown prince, Ch'unghōn intervened to block this union. Ch'unghōn acknowledged to his brother that their family was of comparatively humble origins and therefore should not attempt to intrude into the royal household. He also wanted to block his brother from using marriage ties as a path to a potentially superior position. Although in this stage of Ch'oe Ch'unghōn's consolidation of power, marital relations with the royal family were premature, in later decades his family would in fact marry with royalty. In the initial years of Ch'oe rule, there is little evidence to suggest that Ch'oe Ch'unghōn sought to build a new order. Rather in working to become the master of Koryō's capital Kaegyōng, he made his power base there where he dominated court politics.

As indicated above, although Yoritomo built a separate power base, he did not ignore Kyoto. Imperial legitimacy was also important to the Minamoto heir as were central titles, but his relation to the court was quite different from that of Ch'oe Ch'unghōn. Ch'oe Ch'unghōn's authority quickly expanded to such a degree that he successfully forced King Myōngjong to abdicate in 1197, and then placed Myōngjong's younger brother on the throne as Sinjong (1197–1204). Yoritomo could make no such moves. In fact Yoritomo found in Go-Shirakawa a potential antagonist, and it was not until this retired emperor died in 1192 that Yoritomo was able to exercise greater authority in the court.⁹ That year Yoritomo received the title of shogun, and although later writers have stressed the significance of this title, Yoritomo seems to have treated this as truly secondary to other court ranks such as *utaishō*.¹⁰ Both these posts were military, not civil appointments. Yoritomo, hoping to link his family directly with the imperial household, endeavored to make his daughter an imperial consort and thereby bring to fruition the potential of having a grandson as emperor. Powerful court aristocrats blocked this move, thwarting Yoritomo in his quest to expand his authority through marriage politics. The court successfully charted a course somewhat independent of Kamakura until its defeat in the Jōkyū war in 1221.

If Yoritomo was unsuccessful in penetrating Kyoto, he saw greater gains in building an independent authority. Court titles were important to him, but even more crucial was asserting control over land and its distribution. Within days of beginning his war against the Taira, Yoritomo asserted prerogatives over the land and tax system.¹¹ He took this stance in part to build up his authority over men and win followers to his cause. In his actions he was bypassing Kyoto and formulating an independent course that would be crucial in gathering and retaining vassals. Equally important in constructing this independent position was the evolution of the offices of *shugo* (provincial constable) and *jitō* (estate steward). By the time the Gempei war ended in 1185, Kamakura had fashioned the office of *jitō* to assign to its housemen confiscated lands, and it had gained legal rights to interfere in local affairs everywhere.¹² The *shugo* similarly would emerge as an important constabulary office in the 1190s. In short, even if blocked in Kyoto, Yoritomo was able to expand his influence effectively in the countryside.

There is danger in seeing the military as a monolithic bloc. Out of the many competing interests that emerged at this time, both Ch'oe Ch'unghōn and Minamoto Yoritomo had to confront numerous challenges to their command. Ironically it was their own brothers that caused both men the greatest anguish. Within a year of taking charge of the kingdom, Ch'oe Ch'unghōn fought his brother Ch'ungsu on the streets of Kaegyōng. Although the immediate issue centered on Ch'ungsu's desire to make his daughter the wife of the crown prince, certainly, political issues of dominance were at the heart of the struggle. Similarly,

when Yoritomo's brother Yoshitsune attempted to establish a special relationship with the court, Yoritomo resorted to arms to destroy him.

GOVERNANCE

Both Ch'oe Ch'unghōn and Minamoto Yoritomo developed a dual system of rule that relied on public and private agencies to govern. They designed some institutions that primarily oversaw civil functions and created others that met the military needs of their authority. They also recruited men into their households to serve them personally as followers. They used both formal court offices and their own private resources to extend their command.

Ch'oe Ch'unghōn started to build his authority by working through dynastic offices. Stymied by court protocol he eventually moved beyond this formal system and developed agencies loyal foremost to him. An instructive example is his means of recruitment. To oversee this important function Ch'oe Ch'unghōn in 1201 became minister of both Personnel Affairs and Military Affairs, and then gradually took these responsibilities out of the court and into his private residence.¹³ He turned to the state examination (*kwagō*) and by holding examinations more frequently and allowing an increased number of men to successfully complete this test, he recruited more men trained in Confucian practices into his regime. Not satisfied with these attempts, Ch'oe Ch'unghōn established the Directorate General for Policy Formulation (*Kyojōng togam*) in his residence and this body assumed responsibilities for general affairs as well as recruitment of personnel.¹⁴ In later years his son U would establish additional offices such as the Personnel Authority (*Chōngbang*) and Chamber of Scholarly Advisers (*Sōbang*) to assist in administration. Each of these agencies formulated and supported Ch'oe policies. Dynastic offices still functioned and many of the men who served in the Ch'oe private agencies also held concurrent posts in central offices and received dynastic stipends for their labors there. Furthermore, in executing policy, he continued to rely on these formal dynastic agencies to implement his decisions and through this dual system of public and private offices, he governed the entire kingdom.

Ch'oe Ch'unghōn pursued similar strategies in maintaining his military might. During his seizure of authority in 1196, he relied on a small cadre of loyalists who were family members. On winning royal sanction he was able rapidly to augment this group with the dynastic armies. As with the civil titles, he advanced into the highest military offices and dominated the armies internally. But always vulnerable to potential independent military action, he allowed the dynastic troops to atrophy and gradually built up his own private force.¹⁵ Within these forces, he developed several special units that initially began as troops to protect Ch'oe Ch'unghōn himself. When threatened with insurrection, he formed the *Tobang*

(Personal Guard Detachment) that served as a bodyguard. When the dynastic forces no longer adequately quelled disturbances near and far, Ch'oe Ch'unghōn's son U instituted the *Yabyōlch'o* (Night Patrol) that supplemented the *Tobang* and this unit on occasion left the capital to suppress local insurrections. Together, Ch'oe private troops, the *Tobang*, and the *Yabyōlch'o* enforced Ch'oe rule and brought a semblance of order to Koryō.¹⁶

Yoritomo's civil administration developed in part through the *jitō* and *shugo*, two important offices in establishing Kamakura's links with the countryside. However, even prior to the evolution of these positions, Yoritomo founded the *samurai dokoro* in 1180 to assist in the actual management of the Kamakura regime. Confronted with lawlessness and independent action by his own men, he needed an agency to help control restless followers. This office, which in effect commanded his vassals, enabled him to consolidate his power in the Kantō region and ultimately would be a major administrative center of his command.¹⁷ Two other offices, the *Mandokoro* (House Chancellery) and *Monchūjo* (Board of Inquiry) evolved during the first decade of Yoritomo's rule, and as with the Ch'oe agencies, details are frustratingly incomplete and only offer hints at the divisions of authority between these agencies and their individual evolution. Collectively Kamakura appears to have been flooded with an outpouring of legal requests and other demands for adjudication. Through the *Mandokoro*, Yoritomo was able to issue decrees which were reminiscent of practices of the Fujiwara or the retired emperor, bringing to the regime a greater degree of permanence and authority.¹⁸ The *Monchūjo* seems to have focused more on legal matters standing "at the center of the *Bakufu*'s expanding judicial network during the critical years 1184–85."¹⁹ After Yoritomo died these agencies continued to play an authoritative role in Kamakura administration.

When Yoritomo took up arms against the Taira, he was assisted by 3,000 warriors from the Kantō region. This was the core of his fighting force. Within months his command expanded to include more than ten thousand men as warriors from throughout the Kantō region responded to his appeals. These troops were private forces. The imperial armies had all but disappeared by the start of the twelfth century as fighting had become the acknowledged responsibility of private individuals. Because of these conditions, Yoritomo from the start was able to operate much more independently of the imperial household and court system.

In the twelfth century in both Koryō and Japan the retainer phenomenon expanded. Retainers played an important role in the private governance systems developed by both Ch'oe Ch'unghōn and Minamoto Yoritomo. In Koryō special bonds between scholars and their pupils had evolved early on as the success of a master would benefit the career of an aspiring disciple. Nevertheless the term retainer (*mungaek*; house guest) does not appear in the official histories until after

the 1170 military coup. In the years following the coup a number of the leading generals of the day possessed retainers. These men advanced and fell, dependent on the careers of their masters.²⁰ When Ch'oe Ch'unghōn seized control, the retainer system expanded rapidly with one source claiming Ch'unghōn had in excess of 3,000 retainers.²¹ Many of Ch'unghōn's associates, such as his brother Ch'ungsu or his nephew Pak Chinjae, also had retainers. Retainers came from diverse backgrounds. In the case of Ch'unghōn's men, some were made retainers because of their scholarly abilities and were expected to assist in administration, while others were selected because of their strength and size to perform military functions. In addition to the services they performed for the Ch'oe leader, retainers frequently held dynastic offices through which they would be paid a government stipend. As there is no evidence that Ch'oe retainers were allowed a degree of independence or given lands that they could hold separately, these men can not be labeled vassals.²²

Korean sources are frustratingly vague in presenting this retainer phenomenon. No contracts or ceremonies seem to have been held to mark entrance into a lord-retainer relationship. Nevertheless, retainers played a crucial role in the Ch'oe House structure. As trusted confidants, they would help construct policy and then execute decisions. In addition, they completed special assignments at the request of the Ch'oe leader. Furthermore Ch'oe U singled out one man to be his lead retainer (*sanggaek*).²³

The retainer system developed further in Japan. Even before Yoritomo consolidated his rule, key civil and military houses had special categories of men attached to their lineages. In Heian powerful households had their followers appointed to public offices, even if the nature of their responsibilities were primarily private. These "leader-follower" or "patron-client" relations of the Heian were further solidified in Kamakura as Minamoto Yoritomo built on this tradition and further refined the system.²⁴ In contrast to Ch'oe Ch'unghōn, Yoritomo had both vassals (*gokenin*) and another classification of men placed in a somewhat more subordinate, retainer-type relationship called *zōshiki* and *bugyōnin*. *Gokenin* were essentially independent military lords who chose to link up with Yoritomo and thereby enjoy the benefits of such an association. Their relationship to the Kamakura lord was casual and lacked the ceremonies and pledges that came to be associated with later forms of vassalage in Japan. As this institution evolved, Yoritomo used the *jitō* system for reward to his *gokenin* and in this way the "bakufu's *jitō* network provided a partial scaffolding for its *gokenin* system."²⁵ The *jitō* title became in effect a benefice.

The *zōshiki* and *bugyōnin* both were more of a "patrimonial dependence group" to Yoritomo.²⁶ Often of common origins, they worked with Yoritomo from the start of his rule in 1180. They challenged key vassals to protect the rights of their Kamakura chief and frequently became a means of surveillance of

and contact with Kamakura vassals, transporting tribute and information to Kamakura. In addition, they dealt with men branded as criminals, investigated law disputes and even drafted battle reports. In carrying out their duties, *zōshiki* were remarkably similar to the *bugyōnin*, regular *bakufu* administrators. Both the *zōshiki* and *bugyōnin* served as a “buffer” against Yoritomo’s strongest vassals and drew their pay from the shogunal treasury. “They were stipended retainers, not landed vassals. As such they could be manipulated by the lord, who directly controlled their livelihoods.”²⁷

Although both Ch'oe Ch'unghōn and Yoritomo relied on retainers and vassals to expand their authority, the functions these men performed differed. Ch'oe Ch'unghōn's retainer system never developed the complexity of that found in Kamakura Japan where both a vassal and retainer system seemed to be in operation. Although in terms of social status the Ch'oe retainer never achieved the autonomy or the standing of the Kamakura *gokenin*, most Ch'oe retainers never were placed in the subordinate status of the *zōshiki*. The Ch'oe retainer occupied a middle ground between the *gokenin* and *zōshiki*, neither autonomous nor totally subordinate. Both Ch'oe Ch'unghōn and Minamoto Yoritomo attracted men to their authorities because they were the most powerful leaders of the age. Lineage, especially in the Minamoto case, gave added integrity to the rule, but men joined Ch'oe Ch'unghōn and Minamoto Yoritomo for factional interest, not familial concerns. Just as Friday noted in the Heian period, men joined out of a “commonality of interest, not out of bloodline.”²⁸

What was crucial to both Ch'oe Ch'unghōn and Minamoto Yoritomo was to combat the centrifugal forces that challenge most regimes. Both men wished to protect their private authority. Ch'oe Ch'unghōn used his retainers to serve his needs and prevent any individual from erecting a competing authority. Yoritomo was alert to this same problem and accordingly used his *zōshiki* to check the potential independence of his *gokenin*. In this way both men were able to maintain a viable, coherent center. Subsequent Kamakura leaders under the Hōjō would not be as effective in restraining the *gokenin* who through their positions as *jitō* started to assert a greater degree of independence. Ch'oe Ch'unghōn remained more dependent on dynastic organs to govern. He linked his authority to the central apparatus and thereby ruled. Minamoto Yoritomo operated with greater freedom from central control and was less dependent upon imperial administrative offices to sustain his governance.

LOCAL GOVERNANCE

A clearer understanding of the operations of the two regimes can be found by briefly contrasting their respective policies toward local governance. Ch'oe

Ch'unghōn endeavored to reassert direct central control over local institutions and regional officials. Minamoto Yoritomo, however, although anxious to strengthen his rule, had to compromise direct control over much of Japan by acceding to a high degree of local autonomy.

When Ch'oe Ch'unghōn toppled Yi Ūimin from control of the dynasty, he confronted a rapidly deteriorating rural situation. With the collapse of central rule in the latter years of Myōngjong's reign came significant social mobility as well as social unrest. The central government was not receiving required revenue, peasant concerns were not being addressed, powerful leaders were usurping governance and privilege. Ch'oe Ch'unghōn entered this arena determined to reassert the prerogatives of the central authority and quell the disturbances that plagued Koryō. He confronted significant resistance as he had to subdue six major peasant revolts during his first twelve years in command. Peasants rebelled to thwart rapacious officials who willingly preyed upon them. With the social and political collapse that accompanied Yi Ūimin's rule, exploitation was rampant, forcing men and women to rise up, if only to defend their meager position. The forced abdication of Myōngjong, coupled with the rapid appearance of slaves in positions of power, further rocked the peasantry, increasing their demands for access to economic and political privileges. Other forces such as regional aspirations and the desire to revive ancient Silla or Koguryō allegiances sparked some rural unrest too.

Ch'oe Ch'unghōn utilized a variety of responses to reassert control over the peasant and the countryside. Problems were so serious in rural Koryō that he particularly noted the need to reestablish central prerogatives in the ten-point reform program that he issued a year after taking power. By focusing on the resuscitation of the traditional land system, he hoped to return men to farming so that both food and taxes could be provided. He coupled his appeals for calm with policy. He reinvigorated the power of the *hojang* (local township headman) to enable them to secure a degree of control. To support these local officials he also sought to expand the *kamugwan*, a central government office charged with overseeing rural jurisdictions. He dispatched central officials and men referred to as *anch'alsa* (commissioner) to meet directly with peasants in an effort to resolve local issues. An additional mechanism to control the various regions that Ch'oe Ch'unghōn utilized was to elevate or demote a district's status as a reward or punishment.²⁹

When less forceful measures failed, Ch'oe Ch'unghōn relied on military strength to quell unrest. To many of the more serious revolts that occurred during his rule, he deployed first dynastic troops and then later he enlisted his own private forces to pacify an area. In 1198, when peasants revolted in Kaegyōng, Ch'oe responded by dispatching government forces. In the next two years when peasants in distant Kyōngsang also rebelled, Ch'oe again equipped and dispatched dynastic forces to subdue the rebels. Through these actions, Ch'oe Ch'unghōn successfully reasserted central authority over rural Korea and thereby

strengthened his direct control over Koryō's diverse regions. The success of these policies can be measured in the marked drop in peasant resistance over the remaining years of his life.

Although massive social unrest did not accompany the rise of Minamoto Yoritomo, he also confronted many potential foes of his rule. The noble houses as represented by the Ōshū-Fujiwara posed a serious enough challenge that Yoritomo had to enlist his private troops to help suppress this lineage as seen in a major Minamoto expedition in 1189. There was also the potential for defiance in western Japan. This resistance was too formidable and diverse for Kamakura institutions to control all, forcing Yoritomo to make a number of compromises. He especially had to empower his *gokenin* with the authority to resolve local issues. As Yoritomo was in many respects little more than a *primus inter pares* who carried noble pedigree, he was forced by necessity to allow for much more regional autonomy.³⁰ Although his dyarchy spread throughout Japan, he never was able to exercise the direct central powers that Ch'oe Ch'unghōn so readily summoned.

Land relations in both Japan and Korea at this time were in flux. The goal of both states was to retain administrative power over land and the right to control revenue off the land. Private individual aspirations which sought to maximize profits and minimize state control often conflicted with those needs. In Heian Japan the state had been gradually losing in this struggle to control land revenues as large estates known as *shōen* proliferated throughout the country. Owners of *shōen* first acquired tax exemptions for their lands and in many cases subsequently obtained the ability to bar officials from entering and inspecting these holdings. This system accelerated as smaller land owners, anxious to acquire similar benefits, would commend their land holdings to larger, more immune proprietors who were often powerful aristocrats. The rise of the military was linked to this process as private warriors were summoned to protect the interest of the *shōen* owners. The Taira ultimately controlled over 500 *shōen* and effectively used their holdings as a means to build their authority. Minamoto Yoritomo also imposed his control over *shōen* by relying in part on his military strength and in part by broadly interpreting court orders to his favor.³¹ He too became a major land proprietor and further enhanced his authority through the *jitō* and *shugo* system.

By the twelfth century the power of the central Koryō state to compete with private interests over the control of land holdings was challenged. Two centuries earlier, by the end of the tenth century, the state had developed a land stipend system (*chōnsikwa*) from which dynastic officials were able to collect rents off specified lands to pay their salaries. In addition the state exercised tax collection rights over large tracts of land.³² In the twelfth century the state became less effective in asserting its jurisdiction over these lands as large, aristocratic families sought to gain immunities from state control. When Ch'oe

Ch'unghōn took control he initially tried to reassert state authority over the land and reinvigorate the land stipend system, but in the end he and then his descendants became the greatest landholders in the kingdom, surpassing even the royal family.

On the surface this development appears similar to events occurring in Japan. However there were significant differences. Japan's transition from state to private control over the land had advanced much further. The power of the central Japanese state had eroded sufficiently to reduce its effectiveness in collecting revenue off the land by the mid-twelfth century, and into this void had stepped the private sector, or to use John Hall's term, the "familial authority." The Ch'oe House had to contend with a much more effective central government, but also had less competition from other aristocrats. In Koryō the public/private dichotomy was still being worked out. Although the private interests of the Ch'oe House assumed ascendancy, the public needs of the state and society could not be ignored. After the demise of the Ch'oe House, large estates would proliferate throughout Koryō, but the central state never abandoned its attempts to control these large holdings.

IDEOLOGY

Both Ch'oe Ch'unghōn and Minamoto Yoritomo took a direct interest in spiritual matters. Both men actively patronized Buddhism, the most widely practiced faith of this period. They fostered local *shintō* cults or shamanism. In addition, Ch'oe Ch'unghōn actively fostered the spread of Confucian learning, making this philosophy fundamental to his rule.

Sōn (*Zen*) Buddhism developed rapidly during Koryō's military period and one participant in this proliferation was Ch'oe Ch'unghōn. He became an active patron of this school for many reasons and certainly central to his support were political interests. The other leading school in Koryō was Kyo or Doctrine Buddhism which had for centuries been the primary religion of the aristocrats. Royal offspring as well as sons of aristocrats became monks in Kyo temples and these families lavishly endowed these establishments, making them repositories of great wealth. Ch'oe Ch'unghōn turned to Zen in part to balance the omnipresence of Kyo. Zen also suited Ch'oe Ch'unghōn's needs in other ways. Zen purposely disavowed secular affairs and sought to relocate its temples to distant mountain locations and remove itself from the political turmoil that marked this age. In addition to this aloof political stance, Ch'oe Ch'unghōn also turned to Zen to enhance his own legitimacy. During the military period many of Koryō's governing elite allied themselves with Zen temples, and certainly Ch'oe Ch'unghōn knew that he might gain legitimacy in the

eyes of some through proper displays of piety.³³ Spiritual needs may well have been an additional and obvious attraction of Zen.³⁴

The Zen revival that occurred under Ch'oe Ch'unghōn took many forms. The monk Chinūl lived during Ch'oe Ch'unghōn's rise to power and Ch'unghōn was attracted to Chinūl and his discipline. Ch'oe Ch'unghōn also patronized several other Zen priests, endowed Zen temples, and encouraged his children and grandchildren to study at these monasteries. In part because of his sponsorship, Zen establishments became major centers of learning at this time, attracting scholars, warriors and peasants to this faith. Many of the eminent literati had studied with Zen monks at some of these monasteries. Moreover, the start of the popularization of Zen Buddhism throughout Koryō society begins at this time as peasants and less learned people in addition to scholars devotedly practiced Buddhism.

Ch'oe Ch'unghōn also cultivated Confucian learning as a means of philosophical support. He championed Confucianism for many reasons. One of the foundations to the authority of his regime was the support rendered it by civilian scholars. If only to win their approval, he had to foster their chosen philosophy, Confucianism. But Confucian principles served well his desire to secure stability and bring order to society. As mentioned earlier, Ch'oe Ch'unghōn oversaw the systematic holding of the state civil service examination and the recruitment of men into both state offices and his authority through these examinations. He also sponsored scholars and their scholarship and marshalled efforts to expand schools.

Minamoto Yoritomo also looked to Buddhism for spiritual and political support, but even more central to his religious needs were indigenous religious cults. Yoritomo and the *bushi* turned to a number of religious practices including Hachiman Daibosatsu, and other Shinto deities, as well as Buddhist ones.³⁵ As Minamoto Yoritomo had taken the Hachiman cult to be a personal benefactor to him and his regime, he mandated that all his *gokenin* participate in religious ceremonies at Tsurugaoka Hachiman-gū in Kamakura. Yoritomo and his Minamoto lineage appropriated Hachiman because "the deity was believed to be effective in national defense and to have special influence over military matters."³⁶ Yoritomo made this deity his *ujigami* (tutelary deity) and transferred the shrine next to his residence in Kamakura, using the shrine to legitimize himself as the successor to the Minamoto lineage. In requiring his vassals to serve this cult, he forced them "to acknowledge that they belonged to his house and were subject to his authority."³⁷ As Miyazaki notes, Hachiman, holding the highest rank in the indigenous order and equal to the deity at Ise, was an appropriate symbol for Yoritomo and an important means to gain ascendancy over his vassals. Furthermore, as Hachiman was the deification of the spirit of the emperor Ōjin, Yoritomo was able to gather an additional link to the imperial line and further enhance his

stature.³⁸ The services at the shrine also helped Yoritomo establish an hierarchical order among his vassals as each man was assigned a place in ceremonial processions and in seating based on his status within the *bakufu*.

Buddhism was also important to Minamoto Yoritomo. One of his first official acts after declaring his rebellion was to assert his role as the leading protector of shrines and temples. In 1180 Yoritomo knew virtually nothing about Zen which was just entering Japan. However, he became an early defender of the Zen monk Eisai and afforded him both the support and patronage necessary to establish Zen as a religious practice. More than Yoritomo, it is argued that Yoritomo's wife Masako was the stronger supporter of Zen beliefs. Nevertheless, the Kamakura *bakufu* looked to Zen for a number of reasons. Because of Zen's links with Sung China, the *bakufu* might have hoped to use the young monk Eisai's knowledge of Chinese culture to give credence and prestige to its authority.³⁹ Furthermore, the fact that Eisai was *persona non grata* on Mt Hiei in Kyoto might have added to his appeal for the *bakufu* very much sought to support other Buddhist schools not associated with this powerful aristocratic center.⁴⁰ Although Zen's significant growth in Japan occurred after Yoritomo's death, when the Hōjō were fully ensconced in power, the beginnings can be traced to Yoritomo's rule.

To Ch'oe Ch'unghōn in particular, and to Minamoto Yoritomo and his *bakufu*, Buddhism and especially Zen practices were of central importance. Both looked to Zen as a means to counter the prestige and influence of the heavily endowed, older schools of Buddhism. They also hoped that by linking their authority with Zen they would gain added legitimacy and recognition. Furthermore they may also have turned to Zen for spiritual nourishment as they built their power. But Buddhism alone did not answer all of their religious or intellectual needs. Yoritomo used Hachiman, a Shinto deity, to consolidate his authority. Ch'oe Ch'unghōn relied also on the scholarly pursuits of Confucian thinkers and their ideology of Confucianism to expand his command. Hachiman as the symbol of the Minamoto lineage was tapped to unify the new *bakufu*'s authority over its vassals. Confucianism with its strong sense of hierarchy and loyalty to a central rule was used by the Ch'oe House to assert its command over Koryō. All of these practices, Zen, Hachiman, and Confucianism, played important roles in legitimizing these new authorities and bringing stability to Korea and Japan at this time.

CONCLUSIONS

Ch'oe Ch'unghōn and Minamoto Yoritomo, and the institutions they developed, share many striking similarities. Both men were born into military lineages and

married women with similar backgrounds. Both rebelled when they confronted crises caused by other military leaders. They each justified their rebellions as necessary to protect the throne and each sought legitimacy through royal or imperial sanctions. Neither attempted to topple the ruling house, although they did challenge the current occupants of the throne. Encumbered by older systems of governance, they devised institutions to expedite decision making and enforcement, thereby refining and building a dual system of rule that relied on both public and private agencies. Anxious to assert strong authority, they recruited men into this new order as retainers who would be loyal principally to themselves and carefully guarded this center to prevent power from being diffused too widely or assumed by potential competitors, including siblings. They relied on various ideological foundations and shared a common interest in Zen Buddhism.

Equally striking are the contrasts. Ch'oe Ch'unghōn's authority became closely tied with the Koryō dynastic authority, and through his skillful manipulation of dynastic institutions he was able to penetrate the many sectors of society and bring a semblance of order. Minamoto Yoritomo never wrapped his authority around the imperial center and in fact competed with Kyoto on many occasions. He governed through a position of relative autonomy and accordingly had to be satisfied with a much more decentralized, indirect form of governance.

There are many ways to explain these similarities and difference. The Sinitic order which vested full authority in the emperor or king and his officials did not always suit the needs of the Koryō and Heian/Kamakura elites. Compared to Japan where this system had already started to atrophy and be replaced by new policies in the eighth and ninth centuries, Koryō maintained a much more viable, central, dynastic order. But even in Koryō there were attempts to bypass this system in the early twelfth century. Both Ch'oe Ch'unghōn and Minamoto Yoritomo were heirs to this order. Ch'oe, unable to free himself from this, chose to use it. Yoritomo gained some legitimacy through associating with it but also maintained a separate identity.

The role of familial authority has been widely discussed by historians of Japan. As mentioned earlier, behind this "familial authority," people joined together out of factional interest and often masked their associations through familial terminology. This notion is also somewhat applicable to Korea. Great families did exert an inordinate power in both Korean and Japanese societies. Lineage was important to gain legitimacy.⁴¹ In Japan legitimacy and lineage seem to have settled on a number of important families, while in Koryō legitimacy very much remained within the royal family. He who exercised control over the monarch could appropriate this legitimacy, but in Korea ultimately sovereignty rested with the king, the dynastic authority. In Japan this condition also existed, except that Japanese kingship was sacred, and accordingly elevated above politics.

The private agencies that Ch'oe Ch'unghōn and Minamoto Yoritomo created can also be compared to "kitchen cabinets" or the private means to administer that have been found in many societies. To expedite governance, leaders frequently attempt to manoeuvre around more cumbersome formal mechanisms in order to respond quickly to a crisis. Through their private institutions, both of these military leaders achieved this goal. Similarly, by relying on specially designated men and calling them vassals or retainers, they were able to recruit men and gain their loyalty into their own authority, thereby assuring the effective operation of these private agencies.

Of the two men, as noted above, Ch'oe Ch'unghōn exercised more direct command over his country. Once he had seized power, he was able to control the central authority and the civil officials who administered it. As he overcame any serious internal opposition presented by potential rivals, he ruled Koryō through the king. Yoritomo on the other hand confronted opposition from a number of powerful antagonists. After he subdued the Taira, he still faced a reservoir of resistance from the court, Kyoto aristocratic elites as well as independent military lords. With these forces he had to share his rule and accommodate their interests. In western Japan in particular, he had to govern somewhat indirectly through powerful local leaders. Where Ch'oe Ch'unghōn dominated the Koryō king and ruled from the capital Kaegyōng, Yoritomo established an alternate center, far away in Kamakura which nevertheless remained somewhat subordinate to Kyoto at least until 1221.

External, foreign threats may have strengthened Ch'oe Ch'unghōn's hand. Koryō repeatedly had to confront powerful northern invaders and to counter these challenges, Koryō depended upon a well-trained, centrally commanded military. To meet these defense needs, Koryō maintained an assertive, central governing authority which at the end of the twelfth century Ch'oe Ch'unghōn controlled. In contrast, Japan, rarely threatened by outside invaders, did not require a vigilant, central armed force and instead depended upon localized responses to military threats. Unlike Ch'oe Ch'unghōn, Minamoto Yoritomo had no strong central army and dynastic structure to appropriate to bolster his authority.

That Japan no longer maintained a strong administrative center can also be seen in the large number of legal problems Yoritomo was called upon to resolve after coming to power. With the breakdown of an effective authority in Kyoto, people across Japan needed some person or a set of institutions to sanction their land holdings. They turned to the new military leadership to legitimize existing realities. In marked contrast to Japan, twelfth and thirteenth century Koryō did not experience a rapid increase in judicial decisions, or at least the records do not indicate this to be the case. Rather Ch'oe Ch'unghōn initially resolved pressing land problems through the revived traditional dynastic land structure.⁴² The

legitimacy of the dynastic order was unchallenged and provided the easiest means to resolve critical land issues in Koryō.

That both these generals appear as contemporaries in the late twelfth century could be fortuitous. Moving beyond coincidence as an explanation, there are other reasons to explain this development. By the late twelfth century, the Sinitic order was under siege as the Jurchen had captured all of northern China, establishing the Chin Dynasty. This rule would quickly fall victim to an expansive Mongol war machine. Such dramatic challenges to Chinese institutions offered up by alien people may have easily caused Koreans and Japanese to question the efficacy of these same institutions in their own countries. More immediate is that internal, indigenous developments appear to have outpaced the ability of the accepted systems of governance to resolve expeditiously issues of rule. Serious discontinuities between institutions and authority emerged that required a realignment in the distribution of power and wealth. Building on centuries of challenges, resolutions to these issues start to be institutionalized by Minamoto Yoritomo and Ch'oe Ch'unghōn.

Military solutions offer a quick fix. When leaders or aspiring leaders wish to achieve a swift transformation, military options have often been the most expedient means. Both Ch'oe Ch'unghōn and Minamoto Yoritomo, as generals, had access to force to effect rapid change. Finally, that the twelfth century was a prosperous, wealthy age is readily evident through an examination of the significant cultural artifacts of that period. Trade expanded dramatically in the twelfth century in both Koryō and Japan as links with China became quite active. Furthermore, there seems to have been new wealth from agriculture.⁴³ This affluence benefitted many sectors of society and may well have created within those denied full access to authority an incentive to seek out power and occupy positions formerly denied to them. Military leaders best seen in the action of Minamoto Yoritomo and Ch'oe Ch'unghōn appear to have done just this.⁴⁴

Both Ch'oe Ch'unghōn and Minamoto Yoritomo represent their age. Yoritomo, rising out of the Heian order that witnessed the expansion of the warrior and regional autonomy, was a part of this legacy. Similarly Ch'oe Ch'unghōn, emerging out of the Koryō military system that was tied to the dynastic order, did not attempt to break radically from that tradition. Both of these men came from military lineages and ascended to authority at pivotal times. The manner in which they governed, the options available to them in ruling, and the limitations they each confronted, explain why Japan and Korea ultimately pursue such divergent paths from the thirteenth century. In Japan under Yoritomo, local autonomy and the military culture grew stronger. In contrast Ch'oe Ch'unghōn, in search for an appropriate form of governance, restored many dynastic agencies and worked closely with the king and his officials, reaffirming the importance of civil traditions for Korea. Even in the operation of his private

agencies, he relied on men trained in letters. Although Minamoro Yoritomo certainly also depended on the bureaucratic ability of scholars and very much appreciated the traditions of the civil aristocrat, it was the military legacy in Japan and the civil legacy in Korea that matured as the dominant themes of these two societies under Ch'oe Ch'unghōn and Minamoto Yoritomo.

Notes

1. G. Cameron Hurst III, "The Structure of the Heian Court: Some Thoughts on the Nature of 'Familial Authority' in Heian Japan" (hereafter, "Heian Court"), in *Medieval Japan: Essays in Institutional History* (hereafter *Medieval Japan*), edited by John W. Hall and Jeffrey P. Mass, Stanford University Press, 1974.
2. For a detailed discussion of these events see Jeffrey P. Mass, *Warrior Government in Early Medieval Japan* (hereafter *Warrior*), New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974, pp. 17–20. Mass notes that the *In* maintained the upper hand in his relations with Kiyomori until 1179. It should be noted that Kiyomori's warrior band always included members of Minamoto lineage groups, as the Minamoto led bands always included Tairas. Individual self-interest often superceded identification with lineage.
3. See Ha Hyōngang, "Koryō Ūijongdae ūi sōnggyōk" (hereafter "Ūijong"), *Tongbang hakchi* 26 (1981) and Edward J. Shultz, "Military Revolt in Koryō: The 1170 Coup d'état" (hereafter, "1170 Coup"), *Korean Studies* 3 (1979).
4. See Kibaik Lee (Yi Kibaek), "Korea and the Military Tradition," in *The Traditional Culture and Society of Korea: Thought and Institutions*, ed. by Hugh H. W. Kang (Honolulu: Center for Korean Studies, 1975), and "Koryō kunbanje haūi kunin," in *Koryō pyōngjesa yōngu* (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1968).
5. *Koryōsa chōlyo* (hereafter, KSC), Hosa Bunko ed. (Tokyo: Gakushūin, 1969), 13: 36a–38a; *Koryōsa* (hereafter, KS), Yōnse edition. (Seoul: Kyōngin munhwasa, 1972), 129: 1a–2b; and *Chōsen kinseki sōran* (hereafter, CK), (Seoul: Office of Governor General, 1933) vol. 1, pp. 440–445. See also Kim Tang'aek, *Koryō muin chōnggwōn yōngu* (hereafter, *Muin*), (Seoul: Saemunsa, 1987).
6. Mass, *Warrior*, p. 70
7. Mass, *Warrior*, pp. 72–73.
8. The reader is cautioned to remember that although the Minamoto house emerged victorious, as will be seen below, the military did not act in concert as a monolithic bloc.
9. Mass, *Warrior*, p. 133.
10. Jeffrey P. Mass, *Antiquity and Anachronism in Japanese History* (hereafter, *Antiquity*) (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 74–75.
11. Mass, *Warrior*, pp. 62–63.
12. Mass, *Warrior*, pp. 116–119.
13. See KS 129: 14a, KSC 14: 10b.

14. The *Kyojōng togam* was an ad hoc dynastic office. Ch'unghōn used royal legitimacy to establish this office but quickly transformed it into his private agency. See KSC 14: 25a–b; 15: 38a.
15. KSC 14: 45a, 46a–b.
16. KSC 14: 8a–b. The Yabyōlch'o formed into the Sambyōlch'o as the following passage reveals; KS 81: 15b.
17. Mass, *Warrior*, p. 69. As Mass points out this agency name had “long been used by the great central estate-holders for their military retainers.”
18. Jeffrey P. Mass, *The Development of Kamakura Rule, 1180–1250* (hereafter, *Kamakura*), Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979, p. 7. Mass rejects the traditional interpretation that saw these three agencies as distinct and “that the *monchūjo* and *mandokoro* exercised separate judicial authorities . . .” p. 75.
19. Mass, *Kamakura*, pp. 63–64.
20. See, for example, KSC 12: 2a, 11b–12a, 18b, 13: 18b, 14: 26b.
21. KSC 14: 20b.
22. KSC 14: 50b, 5b, 21b–22a.
23. Ch'oe U dispatched one retainer to attend an ailing monk, CK, vol. 1, p. 577. Ch'oe U's lead retainer was Kim Ch'ang, *Pohanjip* 3:11b.
24. See Hurst, “Heian Court,” pp. 47–49.
25. Mass, *Antiquity*, p. 82. For this and much of the following paragraph see Mass, pp. 78–85.
26. Mass, *Antiquity*, p. 83. See also Fukuda Toyohiko, “Yoritomo no zōshiki ni tsuite,” *Shigaku zasshi* 78, no. 3 (1969).
27. Mass, *Antiquity*, p. 84.
28. Friday, *Hired Swords*, p. 116.
29. For the dispatch of officials see KSC 13: 42b; 14: 37a, KS 22: 5a. And for his manipulation of regional statuses see for example *Tongguk yōji sūngnam* (hereafter, *TYS*) 25: 13b, 52: 23a.
30. Prof. Kasaya Kazuhiko described Yoritomo as a *primus inter pares*.
31. John W. Hall, *Government and Local Authority in Japan* (hereafter *Government*), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, p. 151.
32. For a solid presentation on Koryō land issues see James B. Palais, “Land Tenure in Korea: Tenth to Twelfth Century,” *Journal of Korean Studies*, vol. 4 (1082–83), 73–206.
33. Edward J. Shultz, “Koryō musin chōngkwōndae ūi pulgyo,” *Hanguksa nonch'ong*, Seoul, 1994.
34. Kim Tangt'aek, *Koryō muin*, p. 236.
35. For much of this discussion see Miyazaki Fumiko, “Religious Life of the Kamakura Bushi: Kumagai Naozane and His Descendants” (hereafter, “Religious Life”), *Monumenta Nipponica*, vol 47, no. 4 (Winter, 1992).
36. Miyazaki, “Religious Life,” p. 453.
37. Miyazaki, “Religious Life,” p. 454.

38. See Christine Guth Kanda, *Shinzo: Hachiman Imagery and Its Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 41–47. Hachiman was originally enshrined in the Iwashimizu shrine in 859 by the Minamoto ancestral emperor Seiwa.
39. Ōsumi Kazuo, “Buddhism in the Kamakura Period,” *Cambridge History of Japan*, vol. 3, edited by Yamamura Kozo, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 553.
40. Martin Collcutt, “The Zen Monastery in Kamakura Society,” in *Court and Bakufu in Japan*, edited by Jeffrey P. Mass, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982, p. 205.
41. I am referring here in particular to the writings of John Hall, best seen in his classic, *Government* and Cornelius J. Kiley, “Estate and Property in the Late Heian Period,” in *Medieval Japan*, p.110.
42. The point here is “initially,” for by the end of the Ch’oe rule in the 1250s, large estates did dot the countryside as the central dynastic land order once again faltered.
43. William W. Farris in an earlier publication *Population, Disease, and Land in Early Japan, 645–900*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985, refers to this period as a medieval agricultural revolution, (pp. 147–8), although in his later work, *Heavenly Warriors, the Evolution of Japan’s Military, 500–1300* (hereafter, *Heavenly Warriors*), Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1992, he is less enthusiastic, he nevertheless acknowledges this as a period of agricultural growth (pp. 214–5).
44. Prior to Minamoto Yoritomo, his rival Taira Kiyomori also built his power from land holdings and control over trade with Sung China. See Farris, *Heavenly Warriors*, p. 277 and John W. Hall, *Government*, pp. 141–43.

要 旨

崔忠献と源頼朝

エドワード・シュルツ

1180年、源頼朝は天皇の王子の請願に応じて関東平野の軍を召集し、鎌倉幕府の基盤を打ち建てた。1196年、韓国の崔忠献は腐敗した独裁者に反抗して軍事体制を確立し、その後60年間にわたり韓国の政権を掌握した。韓国も日本も同時期に政治体制の危機に直面し、どちらも当面の問題を解消するために軍事的解決に至った訳である。この論文では、まずこの二人に権力をもたらした諸条件で、彼らの統治を確かなものにしたといった諸制度について簡単に言及する。さらに韓国の崔忠献と日本の源頼朝を吟味することにより、12世紀後半から13世紀前半の両国の歴史に対するより明確な理解を提示する。ひとりの人間が変革の担い手となり得るのであり、崔・源の役割を明らかにすることは韓国と日本それぞれが直面していた複雑な問題を理解する上で不可欠な

ものである。権力と統治の問題は両指導者を混乱させ、両者はそれぞれに富と権力の分配という問題の解決を模索した。そのようなジレンマに対して彼らもたらした解決策は驚くほど類似しているが、韓国と日本が歩んだ文化発展の道は明らかに相違している。両指導者と彼らの統治システムを理解した上で、韓国と日本におけるその後の政治機構、社会変革、そして文化的展開を深く考察する。