

## How Unique is Japanese Negotiating Behavior?\*

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Japanese behavior is examined during the entire negotiation process: pre-negotiation stage, first phase of assessment, second (middle) phase of bargaining and concession-making, third phase of closure or end game, and post-negotiation stage of implementation of agreements and reopening of negotiations. The Japanese are extremely group dependent, fearful of losing face, and approach negotiations with suspicion, but they are not the only ones in this regard. One of the main Japanese characteristics, *amae* dependency was erroneously thought to have been unique to Japanese culture, as was the notion that *amae* dependency feelings were unique to Japanese diplomacy. In the middle phase, the Japanese appear to be different in that they dig in, "push," and keep repeating their position, but they are not the only practitioners of delaying tactics. They often wait until the last minute before "panicking" and offering concessions. If circumstances have changed after an agreement had been reached, the Japanese are likely *not* to take a strictly legalistic approach and try to renegotiate the agreement. Yet they are hardly unique in all these tactics. There are several definitions of the word "unique", among them the either/or category ("different from all others") or a continuum ("unusual"). Taking the broader meaning, the Japanese negotiating behavior is seen as somewhere along a continuum. While many of the Japanese negotiating practices were found to have parallels in other countries, on balance the best way to characterize Japanese negotiating behavior is to call it *almost* unique.

*Key words:* AMAE DEPENDENCY, BARGAINING, COMMUNICATION, COMMUNICATION CHANNELS, CULTURE, DECISIONMAKING, JAPAN, JAPANESE CULTURE, JAPANESE LANGUAGE, NEGOTIATING STYLE, NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR, NEGOTIATION, NEGOTIATION PROCESS, NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION (OCCULESICS, HEPATICS, KINESICS, PROXEMICS, CHRONEMICS)

How *unique* is Japanese negotiating behavior? How does it compare with the negotiating behavior of other nations? And if there are similarities, as well as differences, is Japanese negotiating behavior closer to that of the Chinese, or other Asians, because of geographical, racial, historical, and cultural reasons, or is it closer to the European-American model, because of Japan's firm presence as a bona fide member of the Western group of advanced industrial democracies? Or is Japanese negotiating behavior *sui generis* and unique? Furthermore, is there a difference when the Japanese negotiate with other Japanese, as compared to when they negotiate with the Chinese and other Asians, or when they negotiate with the Europeans and Americans?

Negotiating behavior is to a large extent conditioned by communication patterns and language, which in turn are shaped by culture. We can dispense with the various definitions of culture, but perhaps we might start by discussing variations in cultures.

### I. CULTURE

Courtland Bovee and John Thill (1992), posit that cultures vary in terms of (1) Stability, (2) Complexity, (3) Composition, and (4) Acceptance. Let us see how Japanese culture scores

on each point.<sup>1</sup>

*Stability.* Conditions in the culture may be stable or may be changing slowly or rapidly. Japan is a good example of a stable culture. As an example, we might point to the adoption of the slogan "Western Technology" and "Eastern Morals" by the young reformers at the time of the Meiji Restoration in an attempt to preserve aspects of traditional Japanese culture. But Japan is by no means the only country in the world with a relatively stable culture.

*Complexity.* Cultures vary in the accessibility of information. In the United States, information is contained in explicit codes, including words; whereas in Japan, a great deal of information is conveyed implicitly, through nonverbal communication, body language, physical context, and the like. Another way of looking at this phenomenon is the concept of *low-context/high-context* communication postulated by the anthropologist Edward Hall (1976, p. 79):

A high-context (HC) communication or message is one in which most of the information is either in the physical context or internalized in the person, while very little is in the coded, explicit, transmitted part of the message. A low-context (LC) communication is just the opposite; i.e., the mass of the message is vested in the explicit code.

Hall (Hall, 1976 and Kohls, 1978) rank ordered cultures from low-context (explicit) to high-context (implicit): the most explicit was the Swiss-German, followed by the German, Scandinavian, *the United States*, French, English, Italian, Spanish, Greek, Arab, *Chinese*, and lastly, the most implicit, *Japanese*. The question is whether Japanese is part of a continuum or in a class by itself. More on this later.

*Composition.* Some cultures are made up of many diverse and disparate subcultures; others tend to be more homogeneous. Japan is, of course, the prime example of the latter, whereas Russia or the United States are good examples of the former. The question is, however, whether Japan is uniquely homogeneous or are there countries with a similar or, perhaps, even greater degree of homogeneity.

*Acceptance.* Cultures vary in their attitudes toward outsiders. Some are openly hostile or maintain a detached aloofness. Others are friendly and cooperative toward strangers. Again, Japan, as an insular society, is a classic example of the former, and the United States of the latter. The question is how unique is Japan's attitude toward foreigners and strangers.

#### *Japanese Culture and National Character*

A brief discussion of this topic should start with the homogeneity of the Japanese people (mentioned above), their vertical society with a hierarchical structure, the *oyabun-kobun* (parent-child, boss-underling) relationship, strong group identity and "we-they" mentality, the obligations and reciprocals of *on*, *gimu*, and *giri*, *amae* dependency feelings, the value of harmony and consensus that often results in conformity, and the distinction between appearance and real intent (*tatemaehonne*). To this we might add feelings of insecurity, vulnerability, and victimization.

## II. COMMUNICATION

Speaking of communication patterns, it is important to note the role and quantity of non-verbal communication. One can distinguish the following five channels of communication that

carry as much or more information than verbal exchange alone.<sup>2</sup> Let us look at how the Japanese perform in each of these channels, and is Japanese performance unique?

*Occulesics* is related to the use or avoidance of eye-to-eye contact during conversation. The Japanese are not dependent on direct eye contact as a sign of active listening, and often as expression of sincerity. Quite the contrary. As a rule, they avoid direct eye-to-eye contact, preferring to hear grunts of “eh eh eh” as acknowledgment by the other party that they are being heard. But I do not believe that this is a trait unique to the Japanese.

*Hepatics* is related to the degree, if any, of touch (or tactile contact) in the process of communication. When the Japanese meet, they simply bow (how deeply depends, of course, on the social standing of the parties), avoiding physical contact altogether. In more recent times, and in some situations the Japanese rather awkwardly shake hands and bow at the same time. This is in sharp contrast to the Europeans and Americans who usually shake hands, the Latin Americans who embrace, and the French and other Latins who may kiss or touch cheeks. But there are other cultures besides the Japanese where physical contact is avoided, so that in this regard the Japanese are not unique.

*Kinesics* is related to the movement of hands, head, torso, etc. as amplifiers of messages, both verbal and non-verbal, or on occasion even to deliver contradictory signals. The Japanese constantly nod during conversation, signifying the fact that they heard the message, but not necessarily expressing agreement. This has confused countless foreign counterparts in negotiations, as does the Japanese practice to answer a negative question with a “yes” and perhaps a nod, but which signifies a “no” in terms of substance. But nodding is not a Japanese monopoly.

*Proxemics* is related to personal space, or “comfort zone” in the act of communication. While in some cultures, getting close to other party’s face may signify sincerity, in Japanese culture it might be considered an invasion of “private” space. In general, the Japanese belong to those cultures where private space is valued, in contrast, for example, the Americans who consider very close physical contact during conversation an expression of sincerity. But the Japanese are not unique in the protection of private space.

*Chronemics* is related to the timing of verbal exchange, “turn taking,” pauses, silences, and interruptions during conversation. Oriental people, in general, are quite comfortable with silences, and do not feel obligated to “take turns,” while Occidentals (especially Americans) expect “turn taking,” feel uncomfortable when the other party does not respond and proceed with their presentation, occasionally feeling the need to make unnecessary concessions. Since the Japanese are included among other Orientals, this particular trait is obviously not uniquely Japanese.

### III. NEGOTIATION

#### *Japanese Language*

Language has an obvious impact on the conduct of negotiations. Some basic features of the Japanese language include its ambiguity and indirectness of approach. As a result, Japanese negotiating proposals are often vague and ambiguous, and communication is usually quite loose in logical connections. Secondly, the Japanese are very intuitive and have learned to communicate with each other in shorthand fashion and even without words, so that in

conversation much is left “unsaid,” implied, or understated. There is an expression in Japanese, “Let silence talk and language be silent,” which means that silence is the most important “component” of nonverbal communication. Significantly, when the Japanese negotiate with the Chinese, both sides claim that they can understand each other without words. This is because of *Dobun doshu* (same script and same kind), referring to the common use of Chinese characters and sharing the same racial characteristics. If the Japanese and the Chinese have common abilities to understand each other, then the Japanese are not unique in this regard.

### A. THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS

The negotiation process can be basically divided into the Pre-negotiation stage, the Negotiation itself, and the Post-negotiation stage. The Negotiation stage can be, in turn, divided into three phases: the first phase of assessment, the second or middle phase of bargaining and concession-making, and the third and final phase of closure.

#### 1. *General Characteristics and Approaches*

How have various authors characterized the Japanese approach to negotiation? John Graham, a professor of management at the University of California at Irvine, who has studied negotiating behavior in some twenty cultures, asserts that if Americans are at one end of the spectrum, the Japanese are surely at the other end.<sup>3</sup> On another occasion, he entitled his article on the Japanese negotiation style as “Characteristics of a Distinct Approach.” Graham (1993) examined the negotiating styles of business people in seventeen cultures, including Japan, and concluded that the Japanese negotiation style was “quite distinct.” On the other hand, he also concluded that although substantial differences existed between the Japanese and the American styles, in some senses they were similar. Michael Blaker, the author of the definitive work on the Japanese international negotiating style (Blaker, 1977), summed up that style as “Probe, Push, and Panic” (the title of a chapter he wrote in the early 1970s) (Blaker, 1973), and amended in the mid-1990s to include “Postpone.”<sup>4</sup> The noted anthropologist Edward Hall (mentioned above), entitled his book on doing business with the Japanese “Hidden Differences” (Hall, 1987) stressing differences in approaches, but not uniqueness of the Japanese way of doing business. Another prolific writer on Japanese negotiation, Robert March, in his book on the Japanese negotiator (March, 1988) used the words “Subtlety and Strategy Beyond Western Logic” as the subtitle, implying an approach that is different from Western logical thinking, but not that it was necessarily unique.

On a comparative note, several authors have noted some similarities between Japanese and Chinese negotiators; others have commented that Chinese and Southeast Asian negotiators are closer to Western negotiators than they are to Japanese negotiators. Professor Kimura Hiroshi (Kimura, 1980) has concluded that neither the Japanese nor the Russians have as yet adopted the Western notion of negotiation.

Maintaining harmony (*wa*) is an important aspect of Japanese social life. Therefore Japanese negotiators try to avoid conflict, they stress areas of agreement, and look for a compromise solution that would allow each side to win something. The Japanese employ a non-argumentative communicative style. They are very reluctant to say “No,” so as not to offend, for that would be too abrupt and impolite. The Japanese negotiators are invariably polite, and will do everything to keep the negotiations in a civil atmosphere. This means that

they would disguise, suppress, or conceal real feelings and emotions. The Japanese are also extremely fearful of losing face (a trait that they share with the Chinese and Koreans as well as the Russians), and will go to great lengths to avoid rejection of their proposals. They try to avoid direct bargaining, but this indirect approach requires experienced go-betweens. The Japanese will do whatever they can to avoid confrontation.

## 2. *Decisionmaking*

The Japanese social system is not based on strong leadership. In fact, when the Japanese speak of "Leadership," they usually use this English word in a Japanese syllabary pronunciation as "Riidashippu". The country is run by consensus emanating from below (or actually at the mid-level), and some political scientists have opined that generally speaking there is no power at the center, whether it is the government, corporation, or organization. This, of course, has implications for the negotiating process, namely that Japanese negotiators will act very slowly, will have limited authority, and that a new consensus will have to be built back home, if additional or unexpected concessions are to be made. Are these features unique to Japan? Giving rather limited authority to negotiators (or keeping them on a short leash) was also the characteristic of Soviet and other Communist (including Chinese) negotiators. Building a consensus back home might have its problems in any country or organization where there is divided collective leadership. But the Japanese way of building consensus from the bottom up is unusual to say the least.

## **B. PRE-NEGOTIATION STAGE**

The pre-negotiation stage includes a commitment to negotiation and arranging the conference. Here is where each side defines the problem and develops negotiation strategies, including how to arrange the venue, agenda, and rules in one's favor.

All negotiating teams engage in a lot of preparatory work, the evidence indicating that perhaps the Japanese being one of the most methodical. Collection of information is a characteristic of the Japanese, dating back to the two-and-a-half centuries of self-imposed seclusion in modern times, and also earlier when Japan was culturally dependent upon China. Abundance of information undoubtedly redounds to the benefit of the Japanese negotiators, but we cannot conclude that the Japanese are unique in this regard.

### *Venue and Agenda/Rules*

Controlling the venue of negotiations, the agenda, and the rules provides great advantages to a negotiating team. Much as the Japanese prepare for conferences in terms of accumulating information and data, they do not actively seek venue/agenda/rules advantages. In diplomatic negotiations they are to a certain extent protected by a tradition of international rotation schedules. It should be mentioned, however, that the Japanese prefer an agenda, rather than free-form interaction. While other negotiators can be very aggressive in terms pre-conference propaganda campaigns and maneuvers to control the conference in advance, the Japanese are not alone in being relatively passive in this regard. For example, the Americans on occasion give up even negotiating about the venue, as had happened during Kissinger's preliminary negotiations with Chou En-lai in 1971. The American President Richard Nixon had to travel to Peking in February 1972, giving the Chinese the advantage of the venue, much as Imperial China's diplomatic visitors paid tribute to the Son of Heaven.

### C. NEGOTIATION'S FIRST PHASE: ASSESSMENT

During the first phase of negotiations, the participants make an assessment of the situation, get to know and size up their opposite number, make opening moves, and develop some scenarios toward reaching a satisfactory conclusion.

#### *Getting to Know the Opposite Number*

In almost every culture, the negotiators try to understand and get to know their opposite number in a different way. The Japanese first make an assessment of prior relationships and previous negotiations. If the relationship has been one of inequality not in Japan's favor, the Japanese tendency is to treat the negotiations as a family affair, with the Japanese playing the role of the younger brother. That means that the Japanese negotiators *expect* to be treated in a special fashion, to be indulged to a certain extent and favored. This is called *amae* dependency, a key concept for the understanding of Japanese society and culture articulated by the eminent psychoanalyst Dr. Doi Takeo (Doi, 1973). Japanese diplomats and scholars have written about this phenomenon, as an important psychological factor in Japanese-American relations and negotiations (Kitamura, 1971 and 1994; Ogura, 1984; Sato in Destler et al., 1976).

Although originally Dr. Doi was convinced that *amae* feelings were unique to the Japanese, a Korean novelist has claimed that *amae*-type dependency feelings in Korea are "as common as pebbles scattered by the roadside," and that "dependence is even more inextricably bound up with the Korean psyche than it is with the Japanese."<sup>5</sup> A Japanese diplomat has likewise pointed out that *amae* can also be seen in such disparate countries as Spain and Indonesia.<sup>6</sup>

And one can also argue that *amae* feelings are not unique to Japanese diplomacy. For example, in the Anglo-American English-speaking so-called "special relationship," the British expect special treatment (*amae*?) from the United States. The Soviet/Russian diplomats seek sympathy by invoking the twenty-eight million sacrificed in the defense of the Soviet Union in World War II. Now the Russians plead underdevelopment and difficulties in their transition from command to market economy. The Chinese use similar arguments that economically developed "rich" countries should show more understanding and be prepared to make concessions to "developing" countries like China. Perhaps one should also mention the Chinese concept of *guanxi*, a kind of special relationship, with undertones of dependency. So, one can argue that the Japanese *amae* dependent diplomacy is not exactly unique in the world.

Japanese negotiators are very patient and persistent. They will also generally invest a good deal of time to build a long-term trustworthy relationship. This might mean engaging in long introductory sessions or courtesy calls to get to know their counterparts before venturing to talk business. And while Japanese negotiators might first discuss long-term generalized goals, paradoxically they usually operate on an ad hoc approach, and will avoid bringing up new initiatives.

Investing in trying to build up a relationship, however, is not exclusively a Japanese trait. The Chinese also cultivate relations with their opposite numbers but for a specific purpose of later using "old friends" to extract concessions. (In the Chinese tradition "friendship" implies obligations, a concept we have mentioned in the Japanese context.)

**D. NEGOTIATION'S SECOND OR MIDDLE PHASE:  
BARGAINING AND CONCESSION-MAKING**

This is *the* main part of the negotiating process and it is here that the Japanese are perhaps different from other negotiators. They will typically dig in and keep repeating their position. It is as if they feel that the other side does not understand the Japanese position, and that another clarification will let their counterparts see the light. Other negotiators might use threats, pressure tactics, propaganda campaigns directed at world public opinion, attempt to shame the opponent or to play adversaries against each other, or try the "good cop—bad cop" routine. According to Michael Blaker, during the middle phase the Japanese simply "push," testing the patience of their counterparts. But while the Japanese have on many occasions outlasted Western negotiators by slowing down tactics, they have been no match for the Chinese who would on occasion simply stonewall (Ogura, 1979). Thus, while Japanese behavior during the middle phase is somewhat unique, they are not the only ones, and certainly not the most extreme practitioners of delaying tactics.

**E. NEGOTIATION'S THIRD PHASE: CLOSURE OR END GAME**

The end of the negotiating process may involve a decision to break off negotiations, put them on hold, or come to some sort of a conclusion. The latter may involve last minute activities, including:

*Eleventh Hour Concessions*

Japanese negotiators make concessions slowly and in small doses. They often wait until the last minute before offering meaningful concessions to the other side. Blaker has described Japanese behavior at the eleventh hour as "panic" and it is at the eleventh hour that they make final concessions. But are they unique in this regard? In the experience of one American negotiator, the Japanese share this dubious honor with the Chinese (Barshevsky, 1996), again making this Japanese approach not unique.

**F. POST-NEGOTIATION STAGE: IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENTS  
AND REOPENING OF POST-AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS**

The Japanese believe in situational ethics, and are likely to attempt to re-negotiate agreements if the circumstances have drastically changed. Are they alone in this regard? Americans have found out that no matter what agreement is reached with the Chinese, it may be subject to review and objection by some higher-ups not present at the conference. In the Middle Eastern cultures, real bargaining is likely to begin *after* the parties had supposedly reached an agreement. Thus, the Japanese lack of universal principles is distinct from the prevailing Western, and especially Anglo-Saxon, legalistic fair play in negotiations. At the same time, negotiators from other non-Western cultures also tend not to take a strictly legalistic approach.

**IV. CONCLUSIONS**

In the preceding pages I have attempted to portray the Japanese behavior during the entire negotiation process and to discern aspects of uniqueness.

As for general approaches to negotiation, we have seen that the Japanese are extremely

group dependent, especially in comparison with Westerners, but they are not the only ones who are group dependent. Neither are the Japanese the only ones fearful of losing face, nor the only ones who approach negotiations with some suspicion.

One of most pervasive Japanese characteristics, that of *amae* dependency was thought to have been unique to Japanese culture. This was, however, successfully challenged, as was the notion that *amae* dependency feelings were unique to Japanese diplomacy.

In the middle phase of bargaining and concession-making, the Japanese appear to be different from other negotiators in that they will typically dig in, “push,” and keep repeating their position. At the same time, the Japanese are not the only practitioners of delaying tactics.

Japanese negotiators often wait until the last minute before “panicking” and offering concessions, yet they are not the sole negotiators to do so. If circumstances have changed after an agreement had been reached, the Japanese are likely not to take a strictly legalistic approach and try to renegotiate the agreement. They are hardly alone in this regard and may not be extreme practitioners of renegotiation.

Is Japanese negotiating behavior unique? Certainly, the Japanese obsession with themselves, their national character, and their culture seems to indicate that they take great pride in considering themselves to be unique. But, of course, so do many other people, so that the advocacy of uniqueness per se is not unique. Japanese culture and communication patterns are patently different from those of other peoples, but the question in this essay remains, “How unique is Japanese negotiating behavior?”

Perhaps at this point we should ponder on the definition of the word “unique.” Does “unique” belong to an either/or category (you are either unique or not), or is it at one end of a spectrum or continuum? The problem is that dictionaries, especially unabridged ones, provide not one definition but several meanings of the same word.<sup>7</sup> Thus, in the case of the word “unique,” there are as many as six different meanings, some of them pretty straightforward and exclusionary (“having no like or equal,” “sole,” or “different from all others”), while other meanings leave room for a much broader interpretation (“unusual,” “rare,” “extraordinary,” “uncommon,” or “not typical”). Of course, by entitling this essay “*How Unique is Japanese Negotiating Behavior?*” and not “*Is Japanese Negotiating Technique Unique?*” (which was the title of my original presentation at the International Research Center for Japanese Studies), I have chosen the latter, broader interpretation. In that case, we must view Japanese negotiating behavior as belonging somewhere along a spectrum or continuum.

While many of the Japanese negotiating practices were found to have parallels in other countries, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Perhaps the best way to characterize Japanese negotiating behavior is to call it *almost* unique.

#### NOTES

※ The idea for this essay grew out of, and is to a certain extent based on, my public lecture in Japanese “Nihon no Koshojutsu wa Yunikku ka” [Is Japanese Negotiating Technique Unique?], in the Nichibunken Forum series, at the International Research Center for Japanese Studies in Kyoto on August 30, 1996.

1 Here I follow my presentation, “Culture, Communication, Negotiation: China, the Soviet Union/Russia, and Japan,” at the Symposium on “International Comparative Studies on the Negotiating Behavior,” Professor Kimura Hiroshi, Chairman,

- International Research Center for Japanese Studies in Kyoto on August 29, 1996.
- 2 The following discussion is based on a handout prepared by Dr. Bruce La Brack, of the University of the Pacific, distributed at the panel on "Communicating Across Cultures" at the Twelfth Worldwide Conference of People to People International, Newport Beach, California, September 25-29, 1996.
  - 3 Professor John Graham's comments on my paper (Berton, 1994) at a special meeting of the Southern California Japan Seminar at the UCLA Faculty Center, February 11, 1995.
  - 4 Michael Blaker, "Negotiating on Rice: 'No, No, a Thousand Times, No'," paper presented at the Symposium on "International Comparative Studies on the Negotiating Behavior," The International Research Center for Japanese Studies, Kyoto, August 28-30, 1996, to be published by the Center in 1998.
  - 5 The Korean novelist, playwright, and critic Lee O-Young notes that there are two equivalent Korean terms for *amae* (*origwan* and *unsok*), Oh-Young Lee, *The Compact Culture: The Japanese Tradition of "Smaller is Better"* (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1991), p. 11. This is the English translation of I Oryon, "*Chijimi*" *shiko no Nihonjin* (Tokyo: Gakuseisha, 1982), pp. 12-13.
  - 6 See Ambassador Edamura Sumio's comments on my paper, "The Psychological Dimensions of Japanese Negotiating Behavior," *Kyoto Conference on Japanese Studies, 1994* ([Kyoto]: International Research Center for Japanese Studies, The Japan Foundation, 1996), Vol. I, pp. I-289—I-292.
  - 7 See, for example, the unabridged *Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary*, the *New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language* (1976), or the *Random House Dictionary of the English Language* (2nd ed. unabridged, 1987).

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——— 日本人の交渉行動様式はどの程度ユニークか？ ———

——— ピーター・バートン ———

**要旨：**本論文は、交渉の全過程にわたる日本人の交渉行動様式を検討の対象とする。すなわち、最初の瀬踏みの時期である「交渉前」段階、駆け引きと譲歩について話し合う中期（ないしは中間）段階、交渉ゲームを終結させる第三段階、そして交渉で到達された合意を実践に移し、必要とあらば交渉を再開する「交渉後」段階の全てを検討する。

日本人は集団に依存する国民性の持ち主であり、面子を喪うことを恐れ、猜疑心でもって交渉に臨む。だからといって、日本人はそのような交渉行動様式を示す唯一の国民なのではない。日本人の主要な特性の一つとして指摘されている「甘え」（依存心）は、日本文化にユニークであり、とくに日本外交の独特の特徴であると誤解されていた。交渉の中期段階で、日本人は、自己の立場を固執し、繰り返し主張し、相手側に押しつけようとする点でも、他国民と異なっているとされてきた。しかし、日本人だけが、そのようにして合意達成を遅延させる唯一の交渉者なのではない。日本人は、しばしば交渉の最終段階となって、パニックに陥り、そのような時期にいたってはじめて譲歩する。合意到達後、もし状況が変化するならば、日本人は厳格に法律に従うアプローチをとらないで、再び交渉を開始して新しい合意に到達しようとする。しかしながら、これら全ての戦術を採る点において、日本人がユニークであるとはいえない。

「ユニーク」であるという言葉の定義は、一通りではない。他の全てのものから完全に異なっているという意味で他から峻別する場合と、普通ではないという位で、他との差異を程度の差で捉える考え方がある。ユニークという言葉の意味をゆるやかな広義で捉えるならば、日本人の交渉行動様式は、他の諸国民のそれと連続性の上で理解しうるものである。日本人の交渉のやり方は、その他の国民の中に類似のものを見つけることができる。したがって、日本人の交渉行動様式はユニークかという間にど

うしても答えなければならぬとするならば、それは殆んどユニークであると答えるしかないだろう。