

THE EU'S NEW STANCE VIS-À-VIS JAPAN AND THE US: IS *OU-BEI* A VALID EXPRESSION TODAY?

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Based on numerous excerpts from mostly European newspaper articles, press releases, and official documents, this paper is a preliminary effort in delineating the different approaches Europe and the United States are using to cope with the post-Cold War international order, in general, and their relations with Japan, in particular. From the documents cited, it is clear that Europe is trying to be more autonomous vis-à-vis the United States, in politics as well as in economic activities. This trend also indicates that it is high time that Japan re-examined its long-standing habit of lumping the United States and Europe together, under the rubric of *Ou-bei*. This essay is organized around three major issues: the Japan-US semiconductor negotiations, the Helms-Burton and D'Amato Laws, and the strategies in the efforts to gain further access to the Japanese market.

Key words: *OU-BEI*, JAPAN-US SEMICONDUCTOR NEGOTIATIONS, HELMS-BURTON LAW, D'AMATO LAW, JAPANESE MARKET, EU.

I. INTRODUCTION

Ou-bei is a Japanese expression employed frequently in journalistic as well as academic writing. It lumps together Europe (*ou*) and America (*bei*), though the exact boundaries of the terrain the expression covers have never been clearly defined. It came into popular usage as Japan began its efforts at modernizing itself, i.e., to "make it wealthy and militarily strong" in the face of challenges from the great powers of the West (*oubei-rekkyo*).

The expression is still today in frequent use, whenever Japan tries to ascertain its standing in the world, or to compare its behavioral patterns, culture, social structure, etc., with those of other societies. It is natural, then, that the term was most intensely employed in the various forms of *Nihonjin-ron*, whose emphasis has consistently been on how Japan differs from the rest of the world, particularly from the West (*ou-bei*), which to the present day has remained Japan's primary reference society par excellence. *Ou-bei* has represented for Japan the model image of modernity. (*Mutatis mutandis*, this image of *ou-bei* applies to the model image of modernity itself in the so-called "modernization" theories, especially its "culture and personality" school.)

As stated earlier, the question as to which countries fall under the rubric of *ou-bei* has never been determined, nor has it been necessary to do so. It represents a general area with which the image of modernity is most closely associated.

Whatever differences may exist between Canada and the US, Germany and France, or Continental Europe and Great Britain, are, from this perspective, of negligible importance — trivialities that should be relegated to the irrelevant inhabitants of the ivory tower. Not that the Japanese people were not aware of these differences, particularly between the *ou* and the *bei*. As Endymion Wilkinson saw it, "Europe's image as a source of high culture was still strong in the post-war years. The erotic image was very much in evidence, but Europe as a source of practical

knowledge...is hardly represented at all."¹ But the great gulf that is perceived to lie between Japan and *ou-bei* as a coherent entity has seemed simply to overwhelm the "small" differences among the "Western" societies.

This "lumping together" had certain reality to it when the Soviet Union and its communist allies represented a common enemy to the "free world," on the one hand, and when the present-day NIES were still very dormant, on the other. These conditions contributed to putting into relief Western Europe and the United States as a distinctive block. With radical changes in these conditions in the 1980's and 1990's, along with the rapid rise of Japan as a major economic power, which has changed the structure of world economy (which in turn created a huge new center of wealth and of opportunity for the Asian "tigers"), the saliency of the first two as a block vis-à-vis the rest of the world had to diminish drastically. This structural change entailed a shift not only in the way Japan looks at *ou-bei*, but also the ways in which *ou* and *bei* relate to each other and to Japan.

Based on this general understanding, what follows is a *prima facie* consideration of how the European Union has shifted its approach to, as well as its perception of, the United States and Japan. A few caveats are in order.

First, in this introductory essay, I am more interested in presenting relevant materials, rather than in making premature judgements. I consider this as a first step in a larger project which aims at a tripartite comparison of mutual perceptions.

Second, the European Union is here assumed to constitute a coherent body, though I am well aware that the EU is still in the making and that there are differences (sometimes antagonistic) within and between the Commission, the Council, and the Parliament, not to mention between the EU as a whole and the individual member states. I frankly admit that my knowledge at this stage is far from sufficient to address these matters.

Third, the difficult problem remains as to whether the following accounts derive from strategic or diplomatic considerations or from somewhat deeper and "real" perceptions. Here I simply assume the latter to be the case, the assumption being dictated by my "gut feelings" which I gained through living in both the United States and Europe. The materials presented here are to be understood as "symptoms" of new trends, rather than as conclusive "proof" thereof.

Lastly, I tend to slight the still tight relationships between the US and Europe, which recently initiated a "trans-Atlantic dialogue" to redress whatever instability may have arisen in their relationships. There is no denying that the US remains the EU's most important ally in economy, politics, defense and culture. The aim of this essay is to point to some developments, as seen in documents and media coverage, in the way Europe (particularly the EU) tries to relate to the US and Japan, as well as to question the contemporary validity of the expression of *ou-bei*, not to declare the end, or even the beginning of the end, of that long-standing affinity on broad bases between the two.

The materials were taken from EU documents and newspaper/magazine articles.² They are organized under three headings: (1) the Japan-USA semiconductor negotiations, (2) the Helms-Burton and D'Amato Laws, and (3) developments in formal EU policy towards Japan.

II. THE JAPAN-US SEMICONDUCTOR NEGOTIATIONS

In 1986 and again in 1991 Japan and the US signed a bilateral trade agreement to increase the

US share of semiconductors in the Japanese market. In 1995 the foreign share of the Japanese chip market showed a record 30.6% (of which the American share was 80%), compared to about 8% in 1986.

As the term of the agreement (July 31, 1996) approached, Japan and the US found themselves at odds over whether to extend it. While the US side wanted it to be renewed to ensure further market-opening progress, Japan insisted that it has fully achieved its objectives, that government intervention would go against the tide of deregulation and the spirit of the new world trade order, and that trade disputes should be settled at the WTO rather than by bilateral agreements, as the US insisted. The negotiation was finally concluded on August 3 (two days past the deadline), with the abolishment of a Japanese market share objective for foreign manufacturers, and a creation of a new multilateral framework for further negotiations with Japan, the US, and the EU as the charter members. The US, however, was successful in stipulating that this agreement itself be concluded on a bilateral basis, excluding the Europeans, even if it is, in principle and in the future, open to the countries that agree to eliminate import taxes on semiconductors. While the last-minute effort to patch up the differences between Japan and the US was going on, the EU showed the following responses.

The European Union's chief semiconductor negotiator, Mr. Peter Carl, is monitoring the US-Japan negotiations and is expected to hold meetings with both sides. The EU is anxious to be included in any future semiconductor agreement between the US and Japan, and reached agreement in principle with Japan last month that any agreement should be multilateral rather than bilateral.³

Mr. [Yoshihiro] Sakamoto [Vice-minister of MITI] said Japan was prepared to include the European Union in such an arrangement, even if it did not meet Japanese and US demands that it abolish its semiconductor tariffs, the highest in the industrial world. However, Mr. [Ryutaro] Hashimoto said the EU must scrap its tariffs first, because they made international competition in the industry unequal.⁴

[I]n Brussels, the European Commission said Tuesday its chief semiconductor negotiator, Peter Carl, will visit Japan on Monday for "urgent consultations" on a world semiconductor accord.

"We will be able to narrow our differences, perhaps even eliminate our differences on the future of the semiconductor industry," said Peter Guilford, spokesman for EU Trade Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan.

Sir Leon has been lobbying Japan aggressively to make room for the EU at the negotiating table when the US and Japan hash out a bilateral chip accord.⁵

Sir Leon said he was "very much in favour" of relaunching negotiations on an international tariff agreement, with the aim of eliminating EU chip tariffs.... But he warned he "would not be able to recommend to the [European] Commission that ITA [International Tariff Agreement] be relaunched now or at a later stage" if Japan and the US renewed a bilateral semiconductor agreement between them.

The "only acceptable" outcome for the EU of the US-Japan talks would be a tri-or

multilateral agreement which included the EU.⁶

Japan has been pushing for the formation of a world semiconductor council to include the EU and, perhaps South Korea and other large manufacturers of computer chips. The US has consistently resisted such a multilateral deal and said that the EU could join only if it agrees to lift its tariff on semiconductors.

EU officials say this is “an impossible price” because the tariff is the subject of negotiations between the industrialised countries and some Asian countries to eliminate tariffs on high technology products.⁷

The EU supports the global and multilateral approach suggested by Japan, announced the European commission spokesman, because it has always called for replacement of the United States/Japan agreement...with a new global arrangement open to other parties. The Commission also recommends that such an arrangement exclude market access targets and that it promote better cooperation between the different enterprises and industries concerned.⁸ (Underlines original.)

The first comment by Sir Léon Brittan on this agreement was: The EU believes that the former bilateral agreement in practice operated to the disadvantage of European semiconductor producers. The EU has continually expressed the view that only a trilateral or plurilateral structure for cooperation between industries and between governments would be an acceptable replacement for that agreement, and that no party has the right to set any preconditions for European participation in any new agreement.⁹ (Underlines original.)

At the meeting in Tokyo, Commission officials warmed to Japan’s idea of a world forum. Mogens Peter Carl, the Commission’s chief microchip negotiator, said Europe welcomed a proposal by Japan’s microchip industry to set up a private sector *World Semiconductor Council* to discuss issues of mutual concern. “*We agreed that international cooperation in this sector has to be increased, that all significant producers should be included, and that a bilateral framework is not, repeat not, appropriate,*” he said.¹⁰ (Emphasis original.)

Tokyo has capitalised on European eagerness as a way of reinforcing its armour against Washington’s lances.

“The EU has expressed its interest in participating so it is no longer a bilateral issue,” said Hashimoto last month in a near-taunt to the US ambassador in Tokyo.
(...)

At the G7 summit in Lyon last month, Santer, Brittan, Hashimoto and Tsukahara agreed to intergovernmental cooperation which negates the basis for the current US-Japan deal, declaring: “Markets, not governments, shall determine market share and governments shall not intervene.”¹¹

But the EU now looks as if it could be playing a key role in the next semiconductor

agreement, in whatever form it takes. On the other hand, Japan and the US seem to have drifted further and further apart in their negotiations.¹²

When the accord was first negotiated, the US suggested that the pact would be advantageous to all manufacturers in gaining access to the Japanese market, yet the EU market share of about 1.5 per cent has barely grown over the duration of the pact. European companies have often complained that US companies were given preferential treatment.

Sir Leon Brittan, EU commissioner for trade, said the EU will block further negotiations on an international technology pact if it is left out of a semiconductor agreement.¹³

III. THE HELMS-BURTON AND D'AMATO LAWS

In March 1996, the American Congress passed the so-called Helms-Burton Law (the Cuba Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act), under which foreigners who do business with Cuba can be sued for damages *in US courts* if they are thought to have benefited from properties seized by the government of President Fidel Castro after the 1959 Cuban revolution.

The EU and the member states reacted strongly and quickly. Speaking at the opening of a Council meeting, European Commission President Jacques Santer promised swift, decisive response to the act: "We must react and must react today." While the Council reaffirmed its commitment, along with the US, to promote democratic reform in Cuba, it expressed a deep concern over the extra-territorial effects of the law. European Trade Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan said he had known for awhile how strongly Ministers felt about the Helms-Burton Law. "But I was frankly surprised at the unanimity of their conclusions, the rapidity of their deliberations and the determination of their action," he said. He also added that although no-one saw the issue as a crisis in EU-US relations, "It is nonetheless a strong disagreement." "The fact that we are such close allies does not mean we lose the right to fight in defense of our interests."¹⁴

The following is a list of statements made by some of the major figures in the European political scene.

Go-it-alone tactics are not the way to solve your [US] problems" added Jacques Santer, president of the European Commission.¹⁵

In a rare show of unity, the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, France and the European Commission have all rounded on the Helms-Burton Act, and called on US President Bill Clinton to waive the worst elements of this extra-territorial legislation by July 15.¹⁶

"Not only is the [Helms-Burton] bill wrong in principle, it constitutes bullying of a small country. It is nonsense to say Cuba is a threat to the US," said British Socialist MEP Stan Newens, president of the European Parliament's delegation to Mexico and Central America. He added: "The only possible means of bringing pressure to bear on the US is

countermeasures.”

Dutch Christian Democrat MEP Karla Peijs said: “We need a proper reaction from the EU, and a tough reaction from the Irish presidency. We cannot leave it to empty declarations. The EU must shoulder its responsibility and make certain that the interests of its citizens are protected.”¹⁷

Sir Leon Brittan, the EU trade commissioner... said, the Cuba Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act... “offends and attacks America’s trusted allies, damages business confidence in the United States and beyond, and establishes a dangerous precedent that the United States itself will come to regret if other countries follow it in the future.”¹⁸

In August 1996, President Bill Clinton signed another law that will punish European and Japanese companies that invest in the petroleum sector in Iran and/or Libya. The law requires the US President to sanction offending companies with two out of a list of six possible punishments. The president could, for example, block the export of goods or technology to sanctioned companies; he could prohibit US banks from lending \$10 million to any one of those companies; or he could prevent a blacklisted company from exporting goods to the US. The enactment of the law could not but arouse another wave of criticism, even harsher this time, against the United States.

EU Council President Dick Spring commented on the signing of the D’Amato legislation by President Clinton with the following declaration: “I note with considerable concern that the United States yesterday adopted legislation with extra-territorial effect which penalises non-US companies investing in the oil and gas sectors in Libya and Iran.”¹⁹

In Brussels, MEP Peter Kittelmann, EEP member, affirmed that the European Union must act, and immediately call for procedure to settle disputes with the WTO. The United States, he says, has no hesitation in envisaging trade war with Europe which should not be content with vague threats. In Paris, government spokesman Alain Lamassoure declared...that France would immediately take retaliatory measures if French firms were directly affected by the application of the D’Amato legislation.²⁰ (Underlines original.)

In the evening of 8 August, the Irish Presidency and the European Commission made an official demarche...in protest at the signing of the D’Amato Act. The Presidency and the Commission reiterated the EU’s support for the struggle the United States is leading against terrorism and expressed the EU’s readiness to cooperate at multilateral level to combat terrorist activity in all its forms and whatever its source, while considering that the law against Iran and Libya was neither appropriate nor an effective means of combating international terrorism. The Presidency and the Commission also stressed that the EU intended defending its rights and interests were these to be jeopardized by the Act, and that they reserved the right to challenge it or any measures taken under the Act in the appropriate international fora.²¹ (Underlines original.)

French Interior Minister Jean-Louis Debré ruled out the idea of setting up a United Nations style of organisation against terrorism, dominated by the US. Each country needed its own "margin of manoeuvre" in choosing the way it combated terrorism, he said....

...European governments are determined to maintain their "critical dialogue" with Teheran and with the governments of other so-called rogue states.

French Foreign Minister Hervé de Charette said: "To leave Iran isolated is not the wisest thing to do. It is much more sensible to put pressure on Iran to re-enter the international community and join us in the struggle against terrorism."

As the Paris meeting took place, the EU in Brussels was formally tabling laws which would make it illegal for EU companies to comply with US legislation punishing those who trade with Cuba, Iran and Iraq.²²

Hier, de Berne à Tokyo et d'Oslo à Moscou, en passant par Rome et Madrid, le tollé s'est fait général. Le plupart des capitales se sont fait l'écho de Bruxelles en contestant que Washington puisse prétendre à des effets extraterritoriaux d'une loi interne américaine. Les commentaires des uns et des autres vi-à-vis des mesures américaines ont parfois été durs.

(...)

D'une manière plus globale, «*les Etats-Unis mettent en danger leur leadership et leur crédibilité*» dans les relations multilatérales, a affirmé le président de la Chambre de commerce Europe-Etas-Unis, Willard Berry. «*En forçant ainsi la main (à leurs partenaires commerciaux) les Etas-Unis ne sont pas près d'obtenir le soutien dont ils ont besoin pour prendre des mesures de façon multilatérale*», a-t-il ajouté.²³ (Emphasis original.)

Jacques Chirac, qui a menacé les Etas-Unis de «mesures de rétorsion immédiates»... a par ailleurs estimé hier qu'il fallait «que l'Europe et la France, chacune pour sa part, se dotent d'une législation adaptée ce que l'on appelle les textes miroirs de manière à pouvoir évoquer ces sujets sur un pied d'égalité avec nos partenaires américains». Il a aussi invité le gouvernement français «à être particulièrement ferme, en liaison avec nos partenaires européens, à l'égard de cette initiative unilatérale des Etas-Unis».²⁴

Mr Kittelmann [the European Parliament Rapporteur on the WTO] in a recent communiqué said, "The European Commission and the Member States now have very little time to demonstrate to the Americans in a credible manner that the European Union would respond with sanctions and other appropriate measures."²⁵

[T]he US bill - and European reaction to it - again illuminated the distinctions between the United States and Europe on the issue. While Washington insists that Iran and Libya must be confronted over their support for terrorism, the Europeans, seeking to protect strong economic interests, argue that dialogue will achieve greater behavioral changes in both countries than isolation.

(...)

Mr. Kinkel said, "We think it is more correct to keep talking to Iran and not drive it into a corner, so that we can use talks to work against the things Iran stands accused of."²⁶

Les autorités françaises ont toujours affirmé qu'elles ne partageaient pas - du moins jusqu'à preuve du contraire - l'analyse américaine selon laquelle l'Iran, la Libye, l'Irak et le Soudan seraient des «États terroristes».²⁷

Qu'ils soient d'accord ou pas avec la nécessité de faire pression sur ces trois pays, le Européens et bien d'autres ne peuvent pas accepter que ce soit le Congrès américain ou la Maison Blanche qui décide qui peut commercer avec qui. Il existe une instance pour décider avec un minimum de légitimité de telles sanctions économiques: le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies, une instance dans laquelle Washington ne manque pourtant pas d'influence.

(...)

...[A]u-delà de la «question de principe» sur extraterritorialité des lois américaines, les Européens ont bien du mal à tenir tête au rouleau compresseur américain. Dans le même bain que Washington dans la lutte antiterroriste..., les Européens ont du mal à «vendre» leur attitude plus mesurée.²⁸

In Germany, the Federation of Industry warned that "jobs created by German companies in the United States could be endangered" by the impact of the legislation on trade between the two countries.

A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of Italy...noted, "We have the same concerns that we have expressed many times before" over the United States' imposing domestic laws on third parties.²⁹

The law "establishes the unwelcome principle that one country can dictate the foreign policy of others," EU Trade Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan said. He said the law doesn't go in the right direction in the fight against terrorism in Iran and Libya.³⁰

On July 15, Ministers at the European Union's Foreign Affairs Council met in Brussels to discuss retaliatory measures against the United States should it hurt EU interests. Based on the results of this meeting, the European Commission adopted on July 30 a draft Community Regulation intended to prevent European businesses complying to the Helms-Burton Law and allowing for their compensation for any injury they could suffer from it. It comprised four countermeasures: recourse to the WTO; possible imposition of visas on certain American nationals by member states; the anti-boycott legislation; and establishment of a "watch list" of American companies and citizens penalizing European economic activities. This regulation was worded in such a way that its effects may be extended to D'Amato Law for Iran and Libya.³¹ One of the main draftsmen of the Regulation at the Commission said "We might expect that the D'Amato legislation will be added as soon as it is enacted in the US"³² The commission also said it was working on creating a legal statute which would enable Europeans to counter-sue in courts in Europe to recover damages.³³

These concerted pressures yielded swift results. President Clinton decided to *defer* for six months the right of US companies to file lawsuits against foreigners. Even then, many European governments were disappointed that he did not *waive* the right altogether.

"These is a feeling among the Europeans that some accepted rules of the game have been violated," said Dominique Moisi of the French Institute for International Problems: "The US seems to use war talk and apply it to trade issues."³⁴ The Helms-Burton Law is seen as a precursor for new "provocation" linked to American trade policy. In an informal meeting in Dublin on September 18-19, EU trade ministers are likely to continue the debate "on an acrimonious note"³⁵ whether to retaliate against Washington's plan to level sanctions against Europeans doing business in Cuba, Iran and Libya, and whether to take the US to arbitration at WTO over the two laws. The American argument that the WTO is not the appropriate forum for resolving the transatlantic dispute seems to find little sympathy in Europe.

IV. THE NEW JAPAN-EU -US TRIANGLE

The US remains today Europe's biggest external market, accounting for approximately 17.5% of its export, and 17.3% of import in 1993. In the same year, Japan imported 4.7% of the EU's total export, while its share in the total EU import was 9.7%. But if one compares these figures with those of 1983, one notes that the US shares of the EU's export and import have remained remarkably stable, (17.4% and 17.2%, respectively), while Japanese trade with the EU has shown considerable growth in both directions (2.6% and 6.4%, respectively).³⁶

As is evident from these figures, the EU has constantly recorded deficit in its trade with Japan. Though the imbalance has been narrowing in the last five years, (while the US deficit with Japan has risen), the EU is urging Japan to open its market still further, as does the US. The EU's approach, however, seems considerably different from that taken by the US. At the same time, the EU is worried about some signs the US shows in terms of trade protectionism, as well as extra-territoriality (the Helms-Burton and D'Amato laws), and unilateralism (semiconductor talks with Japan).

Perhaps the most important official document illustrating the EU's position is its Commission's "Europe and Japan: The Next Steps".³⁷ Based on "a close study of the US approach and its results," it expresses a deep concern about the recent "publicly aggressive policy of seeking specific targets which [the US] views as commitments and which it threatens to enforce under its unilateral 301/Super301 provisions unless they are met."³⁸ While it recognizes that for both the EU and Japan, the links with the US will remain strong in their efforts to develop new approaches to foreign and security policy, it underlines that these links are not "omni-present" any more.³⁹ Against the view that the EU would gain much from modelling its approach on that of the US, the document says:

The validity of this view needs to be challenged, quite apart from the fact that the EU does not have the same all-embracing relationship with Japan and that it is opposed to unilateral trade sanctions which it regards as a destabilising factor in world trade.⁴⁰

Within this overall framework, here are some directly relevant excerpts from this document.

Japan has now clearly and publicly announced its desire to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. This, together with resentment of the tactics employed by the United States in pursuit of its bilateral economic objectives is leading to a certain reappraisal of relations with the United States. (p. 4)

The EU supports the disciplines of the multilateral trade regime and does not therefore attempt to apply pressure on Japan through threatening illegal trade sanctions. It seeks to explain convincingly why market access measures are also in Japan's own direct economic interests... It also emphasises that allowing bilateral problems to fester will inevitably have an effect on other elements of the relationship. (p. 9)

Developments in the EU and Japan call for a review of the relationship. This Communication argues in favour of increasing the weight of the EU-Japan political relationship both for its intrinsic merits and as a counterweight to US influence. Japan will seek an increasing role in international affairs - the EU can either welcome and support this process and thereby seek to exert some influence over it or it can be passive, watching it happen without any attempt to shape it. The Commission recommends the former option, believing that the Union has much to gain from supporting the emergence of a new Japan which will be a partner working towards its own goals of global peace and security and an open, multilateral trade environment. A stronger political relationship will also have its effect on the bilateral economic relationship. It will help to reduce current trade tensions and to identify ways in which cooperation can replace conflict. (p. 19)

It is clear from these statements that the EU is intent on distancing its approach to Japan from that of the US; it does not hide its apprehension of the methods of threatening sanctions and other intimidations adopted by the US. The document also illustrates how the EU tries to replace the "single-issue" approach, often deployed by the US, with that on a wider basis, e.g., offering support for Japan's eagerness to obtain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council in exchange for greater economic gains,⁴¹ or its commitment to maintain "critical dialogue" with Iran and Libya, rather than the tactic of isolation. This apprehension of, along with distancing itself from, the US tactics, is echoed in a number of other documents.

But despite these developments, the Commission says in its report it is increasingly concerned about the use of unilateral initiatives by the US. "It is fair to say that many new problems arrived than were solved," the spokesman said.... "The EU continues to believe that unilateralism in some US trade laws undermines WTO rules," the report says. "This is truer now than ever following the extension of WTO disciplines further into new fields such as services and intellectual property."⁴²

Le «cavalier seul» des Etats-Unies est finalement moins grave qu'on ne pouvait le craindre. Du moins pour l'Europe.⁴³

Dans un entretien accordé au Figaro, M.Debré [le ministre de l'intérieur français] soulignait qu'il «n'était pas besoin de créer de nouveaux organes», contrairement à ce que

proposait Washington, et observait que «l'approche» des États-Unis n'était effectivement «pas exactement la nôtre».⁴⁴

Pour Jacques Chirac, le remède est dans la solidarité, l'investissement dans l'homme et l'augmentation de l'aide au développement. Il a d'ailleurs défendu avec vigueur le «modèle social européen fondé sur la protection sociale, un dialogue tripartite comme moteur du progrès et une responsabilité de l'État par rapport à la cohésion sociale». On ne peut pas remettre ce modèle en cause, il n'est pas obsolète, a-t-il plaidé.⁴⁵

Les discussions, à Lyon, n'ont pas échappé à la règle. Les Américains sont accusés par les autres de divers maux: dollar trop bas, méthode de voyou sur le commerce mondial, pingrerie vis-à-vis des pays pauvres....⁴⁶

“Americans have transferred the policy of overwhelming force on the battlefield that they used in the Gulf war to trade rivalries with Europe and Japan,” says Francois Heisbourg, a French strategist.⁴⁷

One important instance in which the EU demonstrated its determination to take world leadership *despite the US refusal* was the interim global financial services pact (valid for 17 months) which was concluded at the WTO on July 26, 1996, to liberalize billions of dollars worth of trade in banking, insurance and securities. The pact, perhaps the most important international trade accord since the end of the Uruguay Round world trade pact, was first sealed in April, 1994. As the expiration of the first round of the pact neared, the US stunned the rest of the world by pulling out of the deal, largely because it was dissatisfied with market opening measures from some countries, including Brazil, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, India and South Korea, among others.

Japan, which had hesitated for a long time to commit itself to joining the pact without the full US participation, finally decided to join forces with the EU and more than 70 other countries. The accord allows Japanese investors to buy more financial services abroad, and guarantees access to Japan's private and public pension funds. This access had already been granted by Japan to the US in a recent bilateral deal. Likewise, the EU will extend to the rest of the world the access it had already given to the US, while the latter promised, in a letter President Clinton sent to EU Commission President Jacques Santer, to grant a most-favored-nation status to the EU.

The major difference between the US, on the one hand, and Japan and the EU, on the other, was that the former refused to extend blanket most-favored status to all the countries in the pact, while the latter agreed to do so. In other words, the US here again held on to the bilateral deal, which Japan and EU regarded as going against the spirit of multilateralism of the WTO. Though most observers cast doubt as to how effective the accord will be without the full participation of the US, it nonetheless represents a significant turn in the Japan-EU-US triangle, in that the EU was successful in backing Japan to leave behind its hesitancy to go against the will of the US, of which Japan has been a faithful follower.⁴⁸

V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

In the post-Cold War world, where economic power has nearly replaced political power as the driving force in foreign relations, the EU seems to be forging a relationship with Japan aimed at turning a bipolar world into a tripolar one. Since the 1991 joint declaration on the EU-Japan relations, the former's policy towards the latter has been geared towards strengthening the third side of the EU-US-Japan "triangle."

This policy's most severe proponent, Sir Leon Brittan, approaches Japanese market as though he is in a race with Washington. The transatlantic relationship, which has traditionally been strong, seems to become competitive where Japan is concerned. Overall, however, the EU's approach has been much more balanced, compared to recent extravagancies of the US government. As one Commission expert on Japan said, the EU avoids "the megaphone diplomacy." Tokyo officials are, according to a Japanese trade lobbyist, finding these "soft-sell" tactics refreshing after loud and threatening American ones.

While everybody recognizes that the US is an indispensable player for any international arrangement to be truly effective, it is increasingly regarded to have become an isolated and arrogant nation, particularly with its endemic conviction of the universal validity of American principles, and the need for other nations to accept them. But the preceding statements point to a new direction in which both Japan and the EU seem to be concluding that they can no longer accept unquestioned American leadership, that they need to start defining their own interests by standing up to the United States.

As I said in the caveat at the beginning of this paper, it is difficult at this stage to determine whether the accounts quoted here derive from strategic considerations or are manifestations of deeper shifts taking place in Europe's basic orientations. For that, we need much closer and broader analyses of social trends in Japan, Europe and the United States, particularly the fate of "modernity" in the three areas which are generally seen to have achieved the highest level of modernization. They are, however, sure symptoms that demand us to reconsider to what extent it is legitimate to keep on lumping *ou* and *bei* together.

NOTES

1. Endymion Wilkinson, *Japan Versus the West: Image and Reality*. Penguin Books, 1991, p. 84.
2. I would like to express my deepest appreciation to Dr. Wolfgang Pape, Ms. Daniela Dicorrado, and Ms. Veronique Arnaud, of the EU Commission, and to the Japanese Embassy in Brussels, for sparing their precious time to instruct this neophyte on the various aspects of the EU, as well as for providing official documents and other materials. Let me also emphasize that any misunderstandings or shortcomings in this paper are mine.
3. *The Financial Times*, July 20, 1996.
4. *The Financial Times*, July 1.
5. *The Wall Street Journal*, July 3, 1996.
6. *The Financial Times*, July 31, 1996.
7. *The Financial Times*, August 4, 1996.
8. "Europe," No. 6762, July 3, 1996.
9. "Europe," No. 6785, August 5/6, 1996.
10. "European Report," No. 2148, July 13, 1996.
11. *European Voice*, July 25-31, 1996.
12. "European Report", No. 2146, July 6, 1996.

13. *The Financial Times*, August 2, 1996.
14. "European Report," No. 2149, July 17, 1996.
15. *The European*, July 4-10, 1996.
16. "European Report", No. 2148, July 13, 1996.
17. *The European*, No. 323, July 18-24, 1996.
18. *The International Herald Tribune*, July 31, 1996.
19. "Europe," No. 6787, August 8, 1996.
20. "Europe," No. 6787, August 8, 1996.
21. "Europe," No. 6789, August 12/13, 1996.
22. *The European*, August 1-7, 1996.
23. *Les Echos*, August 7, 1996.
24. *Les Echos*, August 8, 1996.
25. "Europe," No. 6771, July 15/16, 1996.
26. *The International Herald Tribune*, August 7, 1996.
27. *Les Echos*, August 6, 1996.
28. *Les Echos*, August 6, 1996.
29. *The International Herald Tribune*, July 25, 1996.
30. *The Wall Street Journal*, August 6, 1960.
31. "Europe", No. 6781, July 31, 1996.
32. "European Report", No. 2153, August 1, 1996.
33. *European Voice*, August 1-7, 1996.
34. *The Wall Street Journal*, August 8, 1966.
35. *European Voice*, September 12-18, 1996.
36. It is also worthy of note that among the non-European multinational companies, based on the size of their turnover in Europe in 1994, the three largest were Japanese (Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Matsushita Electric Industrial). The top ten were equally divided by Japanese and American firms, though among the top 100, American firms (73) far surpassed the Japanese (17). See *The European*, July 18-24, 1996.
37. The European Commission, "Europe and Japan: The Next Steps," COM(95)73, August 3, 1995.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
41. The Commission has been a vocal advocate of Japan's bid for a security council seat, but EU governments are less enthusiastic. Last year, Union foreign ministers told the Commission they could not endorse its proposal to allow Japan to join, due to a lack of consensus on the issue among member states. They did, however, "welcome the desire shown by Japan to play a political role more in keeping with its economic weight in the world."
42. "European Report," No. 2153, August 1, 1996.
43. *Les Echos*, July 27, 1996, p. 1.
44. *Le Monde*, July 31, 1996, p. 2.
45. *Les Echos*, July 1, 1996, p. 4.
46. *Libération*, June 29-30, 1996, p. 6.
47. *The International Herald Tribune*, July 3, 1996.
48. The preceding accounts depended on: *The Wall Street Journal*, July 19, 1996; *The International Herald Tribune*, July 20 and July 27, 1996; *Les Echos*, July 27 and July 28, 1996.

ヨーロッパの対日・米アプローチ
——「欧半」ひとくくりへの疑問

柏岡富英

要旨：冷戦後の新しい国際秩序を模索する中で、アメリカとヨーロッパの政治経済的なアプローチには、いくつかの基本的な違いが明らかになってきている。この傾向は、対日本対策についてとくに顕著である。この研究ノートでは、主にヨーロッパの新聞記事、公式文書、プレス・リリースなどを素材にして、二地域間の乖離を叙述するとともに、「欧米」という明治以来のくくり方を、今日も無反省に使い続けてよいものかどうかに疑問を呈する。本稿でとりあげるイシューは、(1) 日米半導体協議、(2) ヘルムズ・バートン法およびダマアト法、そして (3) 日本市場のさらなる開放に関するアプローチ、である。