

The Role of Emotions in International Negotiations

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The topic of this paper may seem rather ambitious and ambiguous. After all, emotions affect every conscious action of an individual—and many of the unconscious ones as well. But this ambiguity and lack of boundaries serves a good purpose here.

The broad concept “emotions” is useful for two reasons. First, it forces us to focus on real people. A nation, a government, or an international organization does not have emotions; only people do. Yet, so much of academic writing—at least in the United States—uses such expressions as “Germany *feels* that . . .,” “the US Government *is angry* at Japanese trade practices,” or “Beijing *feels strongly* that Taiwan belongs to China.” Strictly speaking none of these expressions make much sense. More importantly, by using such language we tend to overlook significant psychological processes that affect the behavior of diplomats and other government officials involved in negotiations.

My second reason for exploring the role of emotions in international negotiation is that this broad approach stimulates us to inquire into a wider range of issues. The very vagueness of the question allows us to come up with some new and perhaps interesting answers. In particular, I hope that by seeing negotiators as real people—people with emotions—we can shed some light on the changing role of nation-states and national governments in world affairs. By contrast, if we see sovereign countries as the ultimate international “actor,” we will never notice how much the capacity of sovereign (or national) governments to act on anything depends on people and their sentiments and emotions. What enables a nation-state to be a so-called “actor” is the people who serve in its government as well as all the men and women who support the government as workers and warriors, as scientists and artists, as merchants and farmers. And it is all these people who together shape the actions of a nation-state and who are influenced by their hopes and fears, their feelings of loyalty or alienation, their sense of enthusiasm or despair.

Those of you who have had the patience to read some of the specialized academic literature from the United States dealing with international relations

may have come across the debate between the so-called “realist” theory and the “liberal” or “institutional” theory. The “realist” theory emphasizes the tendency towards anarchy in international affairs and the reliance on balance of power arrangements. The “institutional” and “liberal” theories stress the possibility that international institutions can overcome the tendency to anarchy and that truly cooperative relations among liberal democracies are likely to overcome the risk of war. During the Cold War, the East–West confrontation and the US–Soviet military balance of power imposed an order on the world that showed a close fit with the realist theory. The most famous statesman who sought to act in accordance with the “liberal” theory was US President Woodrow Wilson. But as a manifestation of a liberal–institutional concept of international order the European Union (which is regional, of course, but not global) has been far more successful than President Wilson’s League of Nations.¹

For our purposes here it is useful to distinguish two types of emotions: on the one hand, emotions that refer to, or are animated by, something in the future; on the other hand, emotions that refer to, or are animated by, something in the past. We will, however, pay little attention here to emotions that are linked to something that happens in the immediate present. For example, it will not interest us here that a diplomat may get angry because his opponent has just used offensive language. Similarly, it will not interest us that a negotiator may be more willing to make some concessions because he feels relaxed and in good spirits having just enjoyed a fine lunch and imbibed lots of *sake*.

Emotions Animated by Ideas about the Future

Let us first look at emotions referring to an event that is expected to occur in the future. These are the emotions of hope or fear, the emotions of yearning for some future success or of worrying about some future failure. In complex international negotiations these images about future outcomes and their follow-on consequences consist of many variables. For example, in trade negotiations these variables may include tariff levels for different goods, rules restricting government subsidies, adjustments of patent rights, agreed volumes

1 These few sentences cannot do justice to the richness of recent international relations writings on the realist vs. liberal-internationalist views. For a recent sampling of contributions see David A. Baldwin (editor), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). A stimulating discussion is offered by Stanley Hoffmann, “The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism,” *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1995, pp. 159–177. Hoffmann makes several observations that are in agreement with a thesis of this paper; namely, his points on the importance of “emotional bonds of allegiance that tie the society to the state” and on the loosening or severing of these ties in current ethnic and separatist crises.

of trade, and so forth. Most of these variables are not commensurable, that is to say, the outcomes agreed for each of the variables cannot be added up to get a measurement for the overall outcome. Hence, the negotiators have to attach more or less arbitrary weights to these variables. They must decide, for example, whether their nation would benefit more if its principal trading partner improved the enforcement of patent rights or if it lowered certain tariffs. The way in which government officials prioritize such different issues depends on their emotional attachment to alternative outcomes—their concerns, hopes, and fears for the future.

In the so-called “armistice” negotiations that ended the Korean war in 1953, the issues included such disparate things as the return of prisoners of war, restrictions on armaments for North and South, and the structure and composition of an international arms inspection team (the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission). The American negotiators placed great hopes on this Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. In their eyes it was an essential element of the armistice agreement that they had to win in order to prevent North Korea from violating the prohibitions against an arms build-up. As Americans soon learned, this Commission was worse than useless; it could do nothing about North Korea’s arms build-up in violation of the truce agreement, but it inhibited the US response. By contrast, the American negotiators invested much less effort in the dividing line between North and South, which—far from being a temporary armistice line—became a permanent border. Today this line is the most heavily armed border in the world.

This example illustrates an important tendency in American diplomacy. The negotiating tactics of US government officials in the Korean armistice talks reflect an emotional attachment to the liberal-institutional view of world order. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was meant to make sure that the hard-won peace in Korea would last; it was like a miniature version of the Wilsonian dream of the League of Nations, the organization that was meant to prevent another world war. Actually, it became obvious very quickly that this Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was neither neutral (because Communist Poland and Czechoslovakia together had half the votes), nor supervisory (because the North Koreans could easily block all relevant access).

While setting up this commission seemed to be a goal that the American negotiators valued, drawing the line for the territorial division between North and South Korea was emotionally an unappealing issue for American diplomats and hence something on which the US negotiators spent less effort and time. In the American view at end of World War II, the Korean peninsula was meant to become a unified country. The division between North and South that was

hastily arranged in 1945 was meant to be a temporary compromise reached with Moscow in order to create separate Soviet and US occupation zones.

During the first phase of the negotiations on a nuclear test ban in the late 1950s, US and British diplomats exhibited a similar attachment to institution-building. As if motivated by a strange utopianism, the US–British side sought to superimpose a liberal–institutional structure on the Cold War reality of balance of power. They sought to create an elaborate “impartial” Control Organization intended to detect and confirm nuclear tests carried out in violation of the treaty. To act as a neutral arbiter, this organization would have had to float above the Cold War cleavage like some heavenly creature. Of course, nothing came of this idea. The Soviet negotiator at that time, Ambassador Tsarapkin, had no such illusions. “If any State were to take the step of violating the treaty and to start a series of nuclear explosions,” Tsarapkin said, “such a State would of course never allow any inspection team to enter its territory.” We should ask ourselves whether more recent arms control agreements with all their elaborate international inspection organizations—such as the Chemical Weapons Convention—might not be similarly unrealistic.

In negotiations that might lead to the partitioning of a previously unified country, strong emotional preferences become involved on both sides of the issue. Minorities seeking independence will favor partition, those who wish to preserve an empire, or “national” unity, will fiercely oppose it. Interestingly, in many recent struggles about partition the American political elite had a strong dislike for the idea that a previously unified country should be broken up. Some intellectuals have suggested that the American memory of the terribly costly Civil War might explain this tendency; others have argued that the emotional distaste for partition of American diplomats might stem from the realization that the United States itself is a country with many ethnic and racial groups.

Whatever the reason, this American tendency shows itself in many instances. For example, when the Soviet Union broke up in 1991 into its constituent administrative “republics,” senior officials in the Bush administration at first hesitated to recognize these newly independent states. In the same year these senior US officials opposed the break-up of former Yugoslavia. And with the unfolding crisis Bosnia, this aversion to partitioning has manifested itself particularly strongly, even though Bosnia had never been a sovereign state with a unified territory but was merely an administrative division of Yugoslavia and before that, of the Ottoman empire.

The 1995 Dayton accords on Bosnia produced the detailed map of separation between territories with Serb military forces and under Serb political control, on one side, and territories with Muslim–Croat forces and under the political control

of authorities in Sarajevo, on the other side. The negotiations in Dayton, Ohio, in the fall of 1995 that produce this map were inspired, led, and managed by American diplomats. Yet, in these negotiations—as well as during the several years of Bosnian warfare before them—the senior US officials unequivocally maintained that the separated territories of Bosnia had to be glued together again. The Dayton agreement provides that a single unified government is to be set up and that the dividing line between Serbs and Muslims (as well as the Croats in Bosnia) must be erased. That is to say, a constitutional structure is supposed to bridge and heal the chasm that has been opened up by four years of brutal religious warfare. At this time it seems unlikely that the unification of Bosnia will succeed just because it has been mandated by the Dayton accord. History, however, might yet show the Dayton agreement to be a significant accomplishment of American diplomacy, either because it did lead to a peaceful integration of Bosnia, or—more likely—because it led to a more or less peaceful partition.

History teaches us that in reality international diplomacy is usually motivated by a mixture of philosophies that could be viewed as a combination of the theory of “realism” and the theory of “institutionalism” (or of a “liberal” order based on consensus). As Henry Kissinger wrote, “balance-of-power systems have existed only rarely in human history” and that for American diplomacy the combination of the “moral” and the “strategic” (balance-of-power) elements “cannot be prescribed in the abstract.”² Sometimes statesmen have sought to create an international organization (or a union of states) to buttress a balance-of-power system, sometimes to advance a Wilsonian world order, sometimes having a combination of these two broad ideas in mind.

Once negotiations are underway to create such a new entity, the diplomats involved often become emotionally attached the institutional edifice they are creating. In the evolution of NATO—surely, one of the most successful alliances in history—the satisfaction with the progress made nourished such an attachment among many NATO diplomats. American and British officials were the principal promoters of the integrated military core of NATO, which greatly enhanced the alliance’s military strength and helped build emotional links among the staff.

A parallel example is the creation of the European Union. American diplomacy, using the leverage of the Marshall Plan, helped Western Europe after the Second World War to overcome its pre-war economic protectionism. This

2 Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York : Simon & Schuster, 1994) p. 21 and 812.

provided a favorable environment for French, German, and other West European officials to create the European Common Market. But without the emotional attachment to a larger goal among many of these officials, the enterprise would at best have become a free trade area. It remained for Jean Monnet and his German, Belgian, and Dutch colleagues to articulate the idea of building a united Europe and to keep alive a sentimental attachment to this vision. Although a great many interesting books and articles have been written about the dramatic success of the movement to unite Europe, only a minority of the authors have fully recognized the importance of this emotional dimension.³

Is it possible that in the next century today's European Union will evolve into a single sovereign state? The continuing negotiating process in Brussels has not been without setbacks from the point of view of those who favor greater integration. But a certain momentum and sense of direction has been created by the past four decades, with the gradual construction of more powerful central institutions that the member states agreed to. The growth and eventual fragmentation of centrally governed, sovereign states is mysterious process for which human history offers many puzzling and conflicting examples. The sense of national belonging, or what is sometimes called nationalism, is only part of the story. As Elie Kedourie reminded us, "the Ottoman Empire was not a 'nation', the Roman Empire was not a 'nation', and yet they were able, as few contemporary states have shown themselves able, to continue for centuries, to maintain the cohesion of the social fabric and to attract the loyalties of men."⁴ Sometimes, a national sentiment emerges suddenly and motivates soldiers and diplomats to fight and to bargain for a nation that they had never dreamt of before. E. J. Hobsbawm points out that "while the Jews, scattered throughout the world for some millennia, never ceased to identify themselves, wherever they were, as members of a special people. . . . at no stage. . . . does this seem to have implied a serious desire for a Jewish political state, let alone a territorial state, until a Jewish nationalism was invented at the very end of the nineteenth century. . . ."⁵

Equally puzzling can be the breaking apart of nations or sovereign states. Very few of the academic and government experts on the Soviet Union thought before 1990—let alone before the mid-1980s—that Russia might be separated

3 Jean Monnet's own story does, of course, reflect the power of emotions in shaping the approach to European integration (Jean Monnet, *Les Etats-Unis D'Europe Ont Commencé*, Paris: Laffont, 1955).

4 Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993) p. 73.

5 E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p. 47.

from such entities as Ukraine (including the Crimea!), Belarus, and Kazakhstan. A previously unified state may break apart even without any ethnic, linguistic, or religious differences that would seem to justify the separation. The secession of Norway from Sweden in 1907 was not proposed by anyone until the 1890s.⁶ How can such things be anticipated? And if the state is inherently an unstable entity, what does that say about the sense of loyalty and emotional attachment of the officials who serve the government of “their” state? This leads us to the question of the influence of emotions that are rooted in past events.

Emotions Animated by Remembrance

The main purpose of international negotiations is to shape relations between governments or public organizations (e. g. UN, EU, WTO) for the near or more distant future. As noted above, negotiators are therefore influenced by “forward-looking” emotions, such as hope and fear. But people’s emotions are also influenced by the memory of events that occurred in the past, or that people imagine to have occurred in the past. These emotive recollections influence human behavior in many situations; in particular, in diplomatic negotiations—a context where precedents and history play a large role.

Several “backward-looking” emotions are relevant for international negotiations:

- (1) *Anger resentment, or hatred because of misdeeds, treachery, or wanton attack committed by the opponent’s government or its predecessors.* —This sentiment has considerable impact on many diplomatic relationships. It seems to affect, for example, South Korea’s diplomacy toward Japan. It has also influenced Japan’s diplomacy toward the Soviet Union because of the latter’s violation of the Japanese–Soviet neutrality pact and its retention of the Northern Territories. This unpleasant memory appears to influence Japanese negotiators even when dealing with today’s Russia. It is more easily understandable that the diplomacy of the Baltic states and Poland towards Russia should be influenced by the remembrance of the Soviet depredations suffered during the Stalin period.
- (2) *Emotional attachment to pieces of national territory.* —Territorial disputes tend to be the most difficult issues in international negotiations. When two countries desire to exert sovereignty over one and the same piece of territory, negotiations between them will be prolonged, and if influential people on each side have some emotional attachment to the territory—no

6 E. J. Hobsbawm, *ibid.* p. 105.

matter how small and worthless it might be—the risk of war is often imminent. Clearly, the tenacity with which government officials seek to hold on to or reclaim a piece of territory is not proportional to its value. It is not just economic assessments or strategic calculations about the future value of a piece of land, but an emotional attachment rooted in history that determines the stubbornness and sacrifice with which the conflict is pursued.

British officials easily gave up the port of Aden which could have become a valuable strategic base in the Gulf region (much better located than the British–US base on Diego Garcia). But they continued to hold on to the Falkland islands which are strategically and economically worthless. In 1982, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was so strongly motivated to undo the Argentine aggression and occupation of the islands that she accepted the risks of an extraordinarily difficult military operation 8000 miles from the United Kingdom when a negotiated Argentine withdrawal could not be obtained. Many senior British officials, but by no means all, shared this emotive emphasis on reestablishing British sovereignty over these barren islands inhabited by only 2000 British citizens.⁷ But the Argentine leader, General Galtieri, was even more motivated by emotions rooted in the past and deaf to calculations about the future. He rejected possibilities for a compromise that had merged from frantic US, Latin American, and United Nations efforts to mediate the conflict, even though some of the final compromise formulas might well have led to eventual Argentine possession of the Falklands.

One can think of many more examples of negotiations over some slice of territory in which negotiators feel they cannot “surrender an inch” even though the overall relations with the other side to the dispute are far more important than the contested piece of land. The strong insistence of Japanese officials that Russia must return the Northern Territories is a case in point. This insistence is matched by Russia’s stubborn position to refuse negotiating about a return of these impoverished islands.

Recent history, however, provides a few noteworthy exceptions to this tendency to become emotionally attached to pieces of territory. Most of the

7 Sir Nicholas Henderson, British Ambassador in Washington at the time of the Falkland crisis, wrote in an essay (published in the *Economist*, November 12, 1983): “There could scarcely have been an issue since 1939 upon which the British felt so strongly, and this feeling ran across party lines. No government in Britain could possibly contemplate a negotiation involving the Argentines while they remained in occupation of the islands.”

senior officials of the Russian Federation, it seems, are resigned to the loss of the Crimea despite Russia's strong historic claims and the emotional attachment of many Russians to the Crimean peninsula, where Russian ethnics dominate. All the more puzzling is the inability of Russian diplomats to exploit the strong emotional interest of Japanese officials in recovering the Northern Territories. Russia might negotiate a substantial (albeit perhaps disguised) compensation by agreeing to return the islands to Japan. Another example of overcoming the emotional attachment to a piece of territory is provided by the US-Panamanian negotiations over the Panama Canal. Starting with the Johnson Administration, US officials have been quite willing to negotiate the surrender of the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone to Panama, despite the fact the United States had good legal title to keep the Canal "in perpetuity," and even though the government of Panama never exercised sovereignty over the canal and its US Zone. (The state of Panama came into existence only as a result of US intervention and as part of a bargain by which it agreed to give the United States control over the Canal Zone.)

- (3) *Trust and Bonding*. —Diplomats who participate in prolonged conferences often develop emotional bonds with each other as well as a certain attachment to the ongoing conference. The conference becomes "their" institution; and the diplomats representing governments that might have opposing positions begin to feel like colleagues engaged in a noble common enterprise. A reasonably satisfactory experience in dealing and working with these "colleagues" can engender mutual trust.⁸ Agreements that were hammered out together will nourish a sense of jointly achieved accomplishment. Such personal bonding and collegiality are important in prolonged multilateral arms control negotiations and in complex trade negotiations.

An interesting associated development of this personal bonding and sense of collegiality is the creation of a common intellectual culture. A set of agreed concepts and a common vocabulary usually emerge in arms control and trade negotiations long before the work of the diplomats has culminated in an agreement acceptable to their governments. Indeed, the negotiating process in prolonged multilateral conferences is greatly

⁸ An important analysis of the interactions that build up trust in such situations is to be found in I. William Zartman and M. R. Berman, *The Practical Negotiator* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 27-40.

influenced by the common culture of ideas that serve to structure the issues, a culture toward which the participants develop an increasing emotive affinity.

In a way, these conferences become non-violent arenas for a contest among competing ideologies that seek to establish values and goals for ordering international relations. Thus, the goal of a comprehensive test ban has now emerged, after decades of argumentation and dispute, as a cultural norm that is almost taken for granted by most nations. It is the associated conditions, not the goal itself, that remain under dispute. Similarly, on human rights a common culture has emerged for the norms on racial persecution and discrimination. Today, these are strongly emotional issues in international negotiations and no diplomat would dare to disagree that racism is bad. On other aspects of human rights, however, one can now observe a continuing, lively debate, especially between European and American negotiators, on one hand, and Chinese and South-East Asian ones, on the other. That is to say, a common culture of terms and concepts has not yet emerged.⁹

Whether one wishes to expand or to limit the influence of common norms and concepts for international diplomacy depends on one's preference for giving priority either to full national sovereignty or to a more uniform international order. Clearly, members of the so-called "international" staffs of multilateral organizations (such as the United Nations or the European Union) are supposed to work together as colleagues on the achievement of the organization's goals, not as negotiators on behalf of the nations from which they were recruited. The people who serve on international staffs, however, have differed greatly in their willingness and ability to serve the common goals of the international organization, rather than the preferences or instructions of the country from which they came. In past decades, it is fair to say, those who came from Western Europe, North America, and Japan have acted more as truly "international" officials than those who came from other countries. The selection process in these countries tends to recruit individuals who are already emotionally predisposed in favor of international cooperation. By contrast, "international" officials who had been recruited from the former Soviet bloc were

9 A recent American view of the differences is provided by David I. Hitchcock, *Asian Values and the United States: How Much Conflict?* (Washington, D. C., Center for Strategic & International Studies: 1994). A Japanese view is offered by Akimasa Mitsuta, *Chuka no hasso to Nihonjin* [The Chinese way of thinking and the Japanese] (Tokyo, Kodansha: 1993).

kept under tight supervision and formidable pressure by their home governments to support the policy of the Soviet Union.

- (4) *Feelings of loyalty and related sentiments.* —No government can function unless the people who serve it—or at least the key people—are motivated by feelings of loyalty. A feeling of loyalty is part of a larger cluster of feelings, or sentiments, that enable people to work together in competition with or in opposition to other groups. This cluster includes feelings of belonging to a group (being part of “we” in opposition to “them”), a sense of trust towards colleagues, an emotional attachment to unifying common values and symbols, such as the national flag and anthem, a code of honor, historic traditions, religious beliefs. Evidently the emotions involved here are largely rooted in the past. They may have been nourished by a common education, memories of past common achievements, or positive feelings toward parents or ancestors that blend into a sense of attachment toward the national patrimony.

In Moscow in the autumn of 1991, representatives of the administrative divisions of the Soviet Union—the so-called Soviet “republics”—negotiated with senior Soviet government officials about the relationship of their “republics” with the center. Most of the senior Communist (or former Communist) officials in Moscow wanted to keep the country together. Despite the failed coup in August 1991, they felt a sense of loyalty toward the larger Union in which they all had grown up and lived, and for which many of them had fought in World War II. To be sure, Boris Yeltsin chose to enhance his own political role by promoting a sovereign, independent status for the Russian republic. That assertion of independence, in itself, was not particularly startling. However, what surprised most experts who had studied Soviet affairs and Soviet history for decades, was the sudden evaporation of a sense of loyalty toward the single unified country among all the delegates who negotiated about the future relationship among these administrative entities (the Soviet “republics”) that they represented. Even though most of these administrative units had not existed as independent sovereign nations in the lifetime of these delegates, or the lifetime of their parents, and even though the borders of most had been arbitrarily drawn by Stalin, these delegates managed to defend a new independence for their “republics” and to abandon their loyalty toward that larger country which had been held together and ruled for many generations from St. Petersburg (in Czarist times) and from Moscow (in Soviet times).

Emotions That Will Shape the World Order

Is it conceivable that negotiators representing the Prefectures of Japan or the Départements of France would some day meet in Tokyo, or Paris respectively, to make their administrative units into newly independent states? We are approaching here some important questions about the emotions of people who are in a position to structure the relationships among states, among the sub-units of existing states, and within international organizations. The sense of loyalty toward an existing nation and the desire to preserve the integrity and independence of that nation can be destroyed by a radical upheaval in political ideology. It is political ideology—in many cases intertwined with religious beliefs—that provides the glue which makes national loyalty a powerful force. For seventy years the Soviet Union Soviet was dominated and politically inspired by the Communist party. When the party lost its cohesion, power, and legitimacy there was nothing left to hold the country together since the Communists had gone to great lengths to erase all legitimacy of the Czarist tradition.¹⁰

The Communist party in China is losing its power, ideological relevance, and cohesion far more slowly and less dramatically than did the Soviet Communist party. Nonetheless, the process of weakening the center has gone so far that the authorities in Beijing now continuously have to negotiate with provincial authorities on tax revenues, economic policy, and other issues. After a future succession crisis in Beijing, some officials representing provincial power centers might feel greater loyalty to their local constituency than to a fractured and ideologically bereft national government. Beijing's adamant position on Taiwan may reflect a sense of insecurity about national cohesion.

The break-up of several sovereign states into smaller sovereign states in this decade has been the result of negotiation, not of wars fought for secession. In addition to the Soviet Union, the break-up of Czechoslovakia was a negotiated outcome, as was the separation of Macedonia from Yugoslavia. And if Quebec should separate from Canada, that outcome would also be reached through

10 An excellent assessment of the end of Soviet Communism can be found in the special issue of *The National Interest*, "The Strange Death of Soviet Communism," Number 31, Spring 1993. Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr. wrote in that issue: "Having undermined its own legitimacy at the February [1990] Plenum, the Party voted at its Twenty-Eighth (and last) Congress in July 1990 to destroy itself organizationally by giving up the Party's supervision of the government, by removing all government officials (except Gorbachev) from the Politburo, and by filling that body with non-entities" (p. 54). Then, after the failed coup in August 1991, Gorbachev was totally discredited and Yeltsin promoted (as note above, for his own reasons) the independence of the largest unit with the USSR. That left nothing in the center toward which the representatives of the other Soviet Republics could feel a sense of loyalty.

negotiation. At the same time, other independent nations have engaged in prolonged and complex negotiations to form a larger union. The most notable case, of course, is the European Union. The more recent North American Free Trade Area represents a far more limited form of integration than the European Union. Slowly, however, the world of today is becoming enmeshed in a global web of trade and financial networks, communications links, environmental interdependence, and cultural interactions that restrict national sovereignty to some degree and lead to mixed emotions among the diplomats and officials of all the governments involved. Many British government leaders and officials, for example, seek to limit the process of European integration. In the United States, opinion is divided on whether to strengthen international organizations or to protect and reaffirm America's sovereign independence.

In recent decades, many political scientists and international relations experts have written about the growing global interdependence caused by the environmental impact of industrialization, security problems, demographic pressures, and an increasingly integrated world economy. German, Scandinavian, and American writers, especially, have suggested that the role of nation states will diminish and that the emerging worldwide problems will require global political structures that can develop common policies and seek to implement new solutions.¹¹

What most of these writings neglect, however, is the emotional dimension of the political process that seeks to build government structures for the world as a whole which would increasingly have to perform functions now the responsibility of nation states. By and large, the advocates of stronger global organizations are motivated by emotions that concern the future—fear of nuclear proliferation, concerns about population pressures, hopes for controlling global warming, and so on. By contrast, the statesmen and diplomats who seek to preserve the untrammelled national sovereignty of their countries are motivated by emotions that relate to things in the past—a sentiment of national belonging, a desire of people to preserve their cultural environment, a sense of loyalty toward the existing national government.

11 A small selection of these writings is: The World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighborhood* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Stanley Hoffmann, "The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism," *Foreign Policy*, vol. 98, Spring 1995, pp. 159–177; Rolf Knieper, *Nationale Souveränität* (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer, 1991); Karl Kaiser & Hans-Peter Schwarz (eds.), *Die Neue Weltpolitik* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale fuer Politische Bildung, 1995); Yehezkel Dror, *Ist die Erde Noch Regierbar?* (a report to the Club of Rome, Munich: Bertelsmann, 1995); this book has an extensive international bibliography.

In the normal flow of international negotiations, these conflicting emotions nudge decisions almost imperceptibly. At one point they might induce a diplomat to support a small step toward greater international cooperation, at another point they might motivate a diplomat to oppose a decision that would detract from his nation's freedom of action. The clash of these emotions becomes more apparent only in a crisis. And in most crises, the emotions animated by things in the past tend to win out over the emotions animated by ideas about the future. It takes a leader of extraordinary forcefulness—and often ruthlessness—to prevail with his vision about the future against colleagues or opponents who are motivated by emotions that are rooted in the past. Lenin was such a person when in 1917 he seized power, engineered the destruction of the Czarist traditions, and imposed upon Russia a totally new social and economic order.

By contrast, the Socialist parties in Europe in 1914 were too weak to promote the principles of the Second International (the program approved by European Socialist leaders) that called for halting the outbreak of World War I. The Socialist parties of the European states could not negotiate a united position in August 1914 against the war. Each party rationalized in its internal deliberations that its own nation was embarking on a *defensive* war, and according to previous Socialist peace resolutions defensive wars were permissible.¹² This crisis illustrates that the emotions of nationalism and of things of the past can prevail over the hopes for a new, peaceful future.

In June 1940, days before the final defeat of France by Nazi Germany, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill tried to negotiate with the French Premier, Paul Reynaud, a deal inspired clearly by emotions and visions about the future. Churchill proposed to the French government an “indissoluble union” of France and Great Britain; but the French government (at that time huddled in Bordeaux, its last refuge from the advancing German army) could not embrace the future-oriented sentiments of Churchill. The emotions rooted in past things prevailed and the French Council of Ministers rejected Churchill's proposal.¹³ Remarkably, after World War II it was the British who refused for more than ten years to join with France in the integration of Europe, the endeavor that has since led—with British participation—to the creation of the European Union.

12 Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), pp. 128–137.

13 Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: Their Finest Hour* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949) pp. 186, 205–212. Churchill wrote after the war: “Rarely has so generous a proposal encountered so hostile a reception Most [French ministers] were wholly unprepared to receive such far-reaching themes.” Some of the French complained that it was a scheme to put France in tutelage, or to carry off her colonial empire. (*Ibid.* pp. 212–213.)