

Culture—Communication—Negotiation : Japan, China, and the Soviet Union/Russia*

Peter Berton

University of Southern California

Numerous books and articles have addressed the question of the relevance of culture to the negotiating process. This chapter offers the proposition that although language and communication patterns may be seen as a part of culture, it is useful to treat communication as a distinct, intermediary concept. Indeed, at the end of the twentieth century communication, along with knowledge and information, is gradually driving our societies into a post-industrial phase, a revolutionary change not unlike the change from agrarian to industrial society. My second proposition is the importance of the comparative approach, and the selection of appropriate subjects for comparison.

COMPARATIVE APPROACH

In a television interview, the noted political scientist Seymour Martin Lipset made the statement that if you study only one country, then you cannot know any country, because to understand what is unique one must do comparative work. Having edited for almost fourteen years an international interdisciplinary journal *Studies in Comparative Communism*,¹ I am, of course, keenly aware of the advantages of the comparative method, and that is what brings me to go beyond my study of the Japanese negotiating behavior (Berton, 1982 ; 1995 ; 1996)

This chapter addresses the impact of culture and communication upon the negotiating behavior of the Japanese, the Chinese, and the Soviets (as well as the successor Russians). I attempt to construct a framework of the concepts of culture, communication, and negotiation, and introduce, in a comparative fashion, some of the basic characteristics of Japanese, Chinese, and Soviet/Russian negotiating behavior. Implicit in this endeavor are implications of these negotiating behaviors for American and other negotiating counterparts. Although this chapter is based on a large number of primary and secondary works on the subject (including my own), it is obvious that a comprehensive coverage of the three concepts of culture, communication, and negotiation and four national behavioral characteristics could easily fill twelve books. My aim,

therefore, is much more modest : to present and develop some theoretical frameworks and illustrate, in a comparative fashion, the cases of Japan, China, and the Soviet Union/Russia.

SELECTION OF SUBJECTS

The choice of Japan, China, and the Soviet Union/Russia is dictated by the fact that I have been studying and teaching international relations in the Asia-Pacific region for over forty years, starting at a time when they were known as "International Relations in the Far East." Along with the United States, the countries chosen also happen to be the most important players in the region. We are, therefore, frequently involved in negotiations with these powers, as can be often seen on the front pages of our newspapers and on television news. Last, but not least, I have some familiarity with the languages concerned.

The Soviet Union was a bitter antagonist of the United States and its allies for the entire period of the Cold War. Communist China was involved in a hot war with the United States and its allies on the Korean peninsula, and both Communist superpowers carried on negotiations with the United States for decades on end. This gave rise to a number of books, pamphlets, and articles describing the difficulties encountered in dealing with representatives of these Communist countries. Negotiations with Japan gathered steam as the balance of payments turned sharply against the United States and the Japanese market remained partially inaccessible for American products and services.

The rapid expansion of trade and steady development of economic relations between the United States and the rest of the world has resulted in a phenomenal growth in face-to-face business negotiations with foreign businessmen. This has created a cottage industry of books explaining how to deal and negotiate with the Japanese and the Chinese, and after the demise of the Soviet Union on how to negotiate obstacles in the chaotic new Russian market. In the case of Japan, an ever growing number of books also tackled the allegedly superior Japanese business management techniques.

Because of the breakup of the Soviet Union and the creation of the Russian Federation as an independent state and successor to the Soviet Union, we have to deal with four powers, but five different cultures, and five political and social organizations. In selecting appropriate negotiation case studies, we can choose from among the United States' dealings with China, Japan, the Soviet Union, and Russia ; China's negotiations with Japan, the Soviet Union, and Russia and Japan's negotiating experience with the Soviet Union and Russia—a total of nine dyads.

SPECIALISTS VERSUS GENERALISTS

There has always been a tug of war between the generalists and the specialists. In the field of negotiation studies, there are those who stress the importance of general theory applicable to all negotiations, while others point to the importance of national differences.

These national differences start with the culture of a given nation, its social structure, communication patterns, and language. And although Communism as we knew it during the Cold War is dead, the Leninist state has imposed certain characteristics on the practice of negotiations which were often stronger than *national* characteristics.² Thus, dealing with the Chinese, we need to be reminded not only of Chinese cultural characteristics, but also of negotiating attributes of a Leninist state. Similarly, in dealing with present-day Russia, we should not forget that the senior policymakers were almost all Communist Party functionaries who grew up in a Leninist state culture.

The generalists (Zartman & Berman, 1982 ; Zartman, 1993), while conceding that culture does affect the perceptions and assumptions of negotiators, bring out two counter-arguments. The first is that negotiation is a universal process, using a finite number of behavioral patterns. The second is that the plethora of international organizations have spawned an international diplomatic culture that socializes all diplomats into similar behavior.

VARIABLES OF THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS

To follow up on theoretical questions, the following six variables are, in my view, vital in the negotiation process : (1) Distribution of power, (2) Issues to be negotiated, (3) Type of relationship between the negotiating parties, (4) Past record of negotiations, (5) The venue of negotiations, and (6) Personalities of the negotiators.

Power is extremely important in negotiations, although even preponderance of power does not guarantee an overwhelmingly favorable outcome for the stronger party. Here, I would take exception to Gerald Steibel's dictum that "Negotiation is a direct function of national strength" (Steibel, 1972, p. 37). Some twenty-five years ago, a political analyst ventured the thought that North Vietnam and Israel had much more influence than their relative standing in the world's hierarchy of power. Nonetheless, it is important to take into account who is the stronger party in any negotiations and by what margin. To show the importance of power relationship, I have entitled my study of Japan's claim to the four northern islands occupied by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II, "Prospects for Soviet-Japanese Relations—Legality, Morality, and Reality" (Berton, 1986), to indicate that while the historical, legal, and moral arguments

may be in Japan's favor, the reality of Soviet power in 1985 vis-a-vis Japan precluded a negotiated settlement of this territorial dispute in Japan's favor.

Issues to be negotiated need to be classified in terms of their importance. The first distinction can be along the lines of what I would call "high politics" issues versus "low politics" issues. For example, national security, territory, and arms control clearly fall into the first category, while trade (except commodities essential for national security), administrative matters, cultural exchange, and environmental issues could be categorized as "low politics."

Type of relationship between the two parties sets the tone for the negotiating process. In my study of Sino-Soviet relations (Berton, 1985), I have developed a hierarchy of seven types of cooperative/conflictual relationships between states: (1) allies, (2) quasi-allies, (3) entente, (4) equidistance, (5) detente, (6) cold war, and (7) hot war.

It is obvious that negotiations between the United States and Japan, who are signatories to a security alliance, differ from those with states in an adversarial relationship. In turn, adversarial relationships can range from a shooting war to a cold war to a detente.

Past record of negotiations. Here it is useful to distinguish between the process of reaching an agreement and the way the agreements were (or were not) lived up to. The length of the relationship is likewise important, as it provides some measure of predictability of future behavior. And, finally, it is important to know how many negotiations resulted in a satisfactory conclusion of an agreement, how many ended in a draw, and how many deadlocked and broke up.

The venue of negotiations. There is obviously home court advantage, in terms of proximity to higher policymakers, logistics, psychological atmosphere, and the like. But on occasion, a neutral site can have certain benefits.

Personalities of the negotiators matter a great deal in terms of their status, ability, knowledge, experience (including institutional memory), and psychological makeup.

PSYCHOANALYTIC AND PSYCHODYNAMIC APPROACH

Reference to personalities of the negotiators, and especially their psychological makeup, leads me to a discussion of the psychoanalytic and psychodynamic approach. The psychoanalytic approach was one of Daniel Bell's "Ten Theories" attempting to explain Russian behavior (Bell, 1958). Bell cited the work of the late Nathan Leites who applied psychoanalytic concepts to the study of Soviet behavior at the RAND Corporation. Psychological analysis usually addresses conscious conflicts, and the psychological insights are added to political, economic, social, and other dimensions. The psychoanalytic approach,

on the other hand, taps into and stresses the unconscious motivation and intrapsychic conflicts of individuals and the collective group ideologies. Without trying to bog you down in psychoanalytic jargon, I will introduce three important psychoanalytic defense mechanisms vital to the process of negotiation, and show how they influence communication and negotiations in the international arena. They are: (1) Identification, (2) Projection, and (3) Projective Identification³. Projection and identification are known as defense mechanisms designed to protect the individual or group from danger (real or imagined). More specifically, these primitive defenses show how some individuals ascribe certain delusional fantasies to others, and how easily perceptions, reality testing, and judgement become obscured or distorted.

Identification plays an important role in group psychology, for it explains why individuals who adhere to certain cultural mythic origins need to form an identification with a leader (or an idea or ideology) who concretizes the group's beliefs. The magnification of the group's "badness" is projected onto this messianic leader. All the badness lies in the outcast, the invader, the outsider as the "enemy," the invader into the group's harmony. In regressive groups, somewhere lies a savior who will save the group from calamity, e. g., catastrophic change.

Projection is a term many of us are familiar with. It is a one way process whereby one imbues another person with certain qualities, attributes or traits. Stemming from the infant's earliest primitive desires and fantasies, unresolved aspects of the self one imparts an image and puts it into another, usually an idealized individual whose demeanor embodies these fantasies. For example, a president of a large corporation becomes in the eyes of the employees an idealized good parent, one who will meet their every need, become the caretaker, the nurturer, the provider, or will make up for the shortcomings of a missing childhood. It is a one way process because in this instance, the president does *not* identify with the projection or the group's fantasy and somehow manages to stay "on task." Similarly (as discussed below, under *amae*) one might speculate that the Japanese negotiators project onto the Americans the attributes of a stronger, elder brother/parent aspect and expect "special" treatment. The Chinese, for example, having faced British aggression and forceful British negotiators in the nineteenth century, may now unconsciously project that image when negotiating with the Americans, the new hegemony.

Projective Identification is a two-way process, whereby one projects an unconscious fantasy into the other and the other does identify with the projection (Klein, 1957). It is an unconscious form of communication designed to get rid of one's worst fears. This phenomenon is something of a role reversal, whereby one wants to get rid of some dangerous aspects of the self. The process

puts into the other such intolerable feelings as fear, undue amount of responsibility, guilt, shame. This process is covert and often creates in the recipient of the projection feelings of urgency, confusion, chaos, guilt, shame, envy, and many other unconscious feelings. For example, in negotiations members will remain unduly silent, forcing the others to unconsciously overreact and take on a care taking role. Again, to come back to Japanese-American negotiations, it would become a two-way projective identification, if the Americans should accept the role the Japanese project onto them and respond according to Japanese expectations.

CULTURE

The sequence "Culture—Communication—Negotiation" implies that there is a direct connection between a given group's (or country's) culture and its communication patterns (including language). The latter, in turn, greatly affect the group's (or country's) negotiating behavior.

When one deals with questions of culture or national character or social group characteristics an important caveat is in order. One can always find cultural norms in one country that are also prominent, though to a lesser degree, in another country. One should also remember that some members of a given society (though a distinct minority) do not behave as the dominant majority. In other words, one can always find exceptions to the rule, and thus, broad-brush discussions of any society are by definition suggestive of general trends only.

What do we mean by culture? One can find well over a hundred definitions of culture in the social sciences, but let us offer here a few :

Culture is a shared system of symbols, beliefs, attitudes, values, expectations, and norms for behavior. (Bovee & Thill, 1992) or

National culture is that component of our mental programming which we share with more of our compatriots as opposed to most other world citizens. (Hofstede, 1989)⁴ or

Culture is a set of shared and enduring meanings, values, and beliefs that characterize national, ethnic, or other groups and orient their behavior. (Faure & Rubin, 1993, p. 3) or

[culture is] an integrated system of basic assumptions, both normative and factual, about the nature of human beings and the social, physical, and metaphysical environment in which they exist. (Cohen in Faure & Rubin, 1993, p. 24). Still another definition of culture includes group prejudices.

Courtland Bovee and John Thill (1992), in discussing cultures and intercultural communications, note that cultures and subcultures vary in terms of (1)

Stability, (2) Complexity, (3) Composition, and (4) Acceptance.

Stability. Conditions in the culture may be stable or may be changing slowly or rapidly. The transition from the Soviet Union to Russia, accompanied as it is by massive changes from command economy to market relations and from totalitarianism to democracy (as yet undefined and evolving Russian brand), is bound to affect cultural mores. By way of contrast, Japan is a good example of a slowly changing culture. In the mid-1850s, after two and a half centuries of self-imposed isolation, the Japanese were forced to join the international community by Commodore Perry's black ships. But to minimize the shock to the system, the young leaders of the Meiji restoration adopted the slogan of "Western technology" and "Eastern Morals." They attempted to achieve not a symbiosis of the two worlds, but a careful grafting of useful "modern" innovation onto the fundamentals of Japanese culture. At the same time in China, this attempt failed, paradoxically because of the strength of Chinese tradition, whereas Japan as a country with a long record of cultural borrowings was always ready to adopt and adapt foreign ideas. Drastic cultural change in China had to await the revolution of 1911 ending centuries of Manchu rule, and especially the establishment of a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist "people's republic" in 1949. A slower, but nonetheless significant change is taking place in China right now when Leninist politics are asked to coexist with modified capitalist economics.

Complexity. Cultures vary in the accessibility of information. In the United States, information is contained in explicit codes, including words; whereas in Japan, a great deal of information is conveyed implicitly, through nonverbal communication, body language, physical context, and the like. Another way of looking at this phenomenon is the concept of *low-context* and *high-context* communication postulated by the anthropologist Edward Hall (1976, p. 79):

A high-context (HC) communication or message is one in which most of the information is either in the physical context or internalized in the person, while very little is in the coded, explicit, transmitted part of the message. A low-context (LC) communication is just the opposite; the mass of the message is vested in the explicit code.

Hall (Hall, 1976 and Kohls, 1978) rank ordered cultures from low-context (explicit) to high-context (implicit): the most explicit was the Swiss-German, followed by the German, Scandinavian, *the United States*, French, English, Italian, Spanish, Greek, Arab, *Chinese*, and lastly, the most implicit, *Japanese*. More on that later. Though the Russians were not a part of this project, they tend to be higher-context than the Americans, in that they would emphasize the context.

Composition. Some cultures are made up of many diverse and disparate

subcultures; others tend to be more homogeneous. Japan is, of course, the prime example of the latter, whereas Russia is a good example of the former, with China falling somewhere in between.⁵

Acceptance. Cultures vary in their attitudes toward outsiders. Some are openly hostile or maintain a detached aloofness. Others are friendly and cooperative toward strangers. Again, Japan, as an insular society, is a classic example of the former, and the United States of the latter. China historically treated foreigners as uncultured barbarians. The Russians with their history of foreign invasions have naturally tended to look askance at foreigners. And lastly, at the present time, China and Russia, as Communist and post Communist societies, display a great deal of suspicion toward foreigners.

Japanese Culture

Let us begin to discuss some socio-cultural characteristics of Japan, China, and Russia, and their effect upon their respective negotiating styles. Starting with Japan (Berton, 1995; 1996),⁶ one should first mention *Nihonkyo* (Japanism), a term used by the social critic Yamamoto Shichihei.⁷ This is a kind of tribalism that so thoroughly permeates all aspects of Japanese life and personality that its followers are not even conscious of their adherence to its doctrine. The doctrine of Nihonkyo is a simple, indefinable system of concepts characterized by the worship of tradition, which is essential in the Japanese personality. The concept of Nihonkyo fits nicely with Robert Christopher's (1983) contention that "the Japanese people as a whole have only one absolutely immutable goal—to ensure the survival and maximum well-being of the tribe."

Next, we should mention that in Japan *group* orientation, rather than individualism, is paramount (Nakane, 1970).⁸ This leads to a strong group identity and "we-they" mentality. As for group dynamism, hierarchical structure is prevalent, as it was in Confucian China. Significantly, Japanese language and speech patterns provide ample proof of hierarchical social relationships. For example, the Japanese make the distinction between giving *to* or receiving *from* a person of higher or lower rank or status in society in relationship to the speaker, and the Japanese (and in this case also the Chinese) have separate words for older and younger brothers or sisters. Within this hierarchical society, values and relationships that seem to predominate (perhaps because of the insularity, crowded environment, and homogeneity of the population) are "harmony" (*wa*), "civil formality" (*tatemae*), and dependency (*amae*).

The last concept was articulated in the mid-1950s by the eminent psychoanalyst Dr. Doi Takeo (Doi, 1973). He proposed that *amae* was a key concept for understanding Japanese personality structure. *Amae* feeling is "to depend and

presume upon another's benevolence." It is the feelings that all normal infants have toward the mother: dependence, the desire to be passively loved, the unwillingness to be separated from the warm mother-child circle and cast into a world of objective "reality." Put another way, *amae* is a dependency need which manifests itself in a longing to merge with others. This longing can be fulfilled under normal conditions in infancy, but it cannot be easily satisfied as one grows up. Yet the need for *amae* continues, and it is argued that this search for *amae* beyond infancy manifests itself in a variety of social conventions and characteristics.

Dr. Doi followed his *amae* research, with a book-length study (Doi, 1986) of *tatemae* and *honne* (appearance and reality). Dr. Doi also ties *tatemae* to group harmony (*wa*).

Tatemae is a certain formal principle which is palatable to everybody concerned so that the *harmony* of a group is guaranteed, while *honne* is the feelings or opinions which they privately hold regarding the matter. (Doi, 1986, p. 159) (emphasis added)

A less charitable American specialist on Japanese negotiating behavior (March, 1988) called it "patient dissembling," "disdain for frankness," and "a refined tendency to call things by other names."

Amae, *wa* and *tatemae* lead to other characteristics, namely politeness, indirectness, avoidance of conflict, the use of intermediaries, silent pauses in conversation, and the ambiguity of the Japanese language—all of them very important for the negotiating process.

Twenty years after his articulation of the importance of *amae*, Dr. Doi linked it to the Japanese patterns of communication (Doi, 1973a). He posited that "all interpersonal communications in Japanese society have the emotional undertone of *amae*," and that many short breaks in Japanese conversation can be explained as feeling out one another and assessing the situation. He concluded that "what is most important for Japanese is to reassure themselves on every occasion of a mutuality based upon *amae*. Dr. Doi also talks about the ambiguity of the Japanese language, and the fact how little the Japanese communicate in international conferences. The ambiguity of the Japanese language is legendary. Lack of precision is, of course, wonderful for poetry, when a thought can trail off into nothingness, but it is not desirable for legal contracts. Is that one of the reasons why the Japanese prefer oral agreements to formal contracts? Let me quote again Dr. Doi (1973a, p. 183):

Japanese communication is usually quite loose in logical connections. You can go on talking for hours, even gracefully, without coming to the point. That is why it is sometimes extremely difficult to render a Japanese

speech or article into English.

Finally, we should mention that the eminent anthropologist Ruth Benedict in her famous book on the Japanese character, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (Benedict, 1946)⁹ classified Japan as a "shame culture," in contrast to Western "guilt cultures." One of her conclusions was the dual nature of the Japanese, at once aesthetic and aggressive. Michael Blaker (1977) also sees duality in Japanese domestic ideals of conflict resolution: (1) harmonious cooperation or harmonious unity and (2) the warrior ethic. While Blaker was writing about diplomatic encounters, Japanese businesses often socialize their new employees in a boot camp atmosphere, and competition in international trade is treated as trade wars. No wonder, then, that American businessmen see their Japanese counterparts' behavior as a continuation of the samurai spirit. See, for example, the publication in English of the famous work, *The Book of Five Rings* [*Gorin no Sho*] of a seventeenth century masterless samurai Miyamoto Musashi (Miyamoto, 1982), with the subtitle *The Real Art of Japanese Management and A Guide to Winning Strategy*; or David Rogers' (Rogers, 1984) *Fighting to Win: Samurai Techniques for Your Work and Life*.

Russian Culture

Dual nature—although in this case passive and violent—is likewise ascribed by anthropologists to Russia. Although some Russian historians have noted dualities in Russian character, the British anthropologist Geoffrey Gorer (Gorer & Rickman, 1949) had related the long periods in Russian history of calm and fatalistic acceptance of oppression punctured by short violent rebellions and upheavals to the manner in which Russian infants are being brought up. The swaddling of infants is the metaphor of behavior. The Russian baby is swaddled in such a way that for long stretches of time he is completely denied freedom of motion and he learns to accept this unquestionably. But when the infant is unswaddled, he begins to express his frustration in violent movements.

In the case of Communist and post-Communist societies (China and Russia), however, there is another duality involving the tension between the society's historical traditions and the imposed Marxist dogma and Leninist practice. In shorthand fashion, one used to ask, "Are the Soviets *Russian* Communists, or *Russian Communists*?" Alexander Solzhenitsyn, as a loyal Slavophile, sees present-day Russia's problems solely in terms of its recent disastrous three-quarter century experience with Communism. Western observers, on the other hand, see much continuity between Tsarist authoritarian pathologies and aggressive foreign policy and its Soviet successor state. Many see Josef Stalin's ruthlessness and industrialization as a continuation of Ivan the Terrible and of

Peter the Great's Europeanization or modernization.¹⁰

Invasions of Russia through the ages, from the Mongols to Hitler (what Leon Sloss and Scott Davis [1987] call "the burden of a painful history") have created in the Russian psyche deep feelings of insecurity, inferiority (covered up by assertions of superiority), and extreme suspiciousness. Hence, Russian and Soviet negotiators have insisted on being treated as a superpower, and on terms of equality with the United States.

Chinese Culture

The same dichotomy between Russian Tsarist history and its recent Communist experiment is, of course, still present in China. And the continuity of Tsarist authoritarianism, degenerating into Stalinist totalitarianism, is true *mutatis mutandis* of China. It has been often observed that traditional China was a "Government of Men" instead of a "Government of Laws." Lucian Pye, an authority on Chinese politics, in discussing cultural differences between China and the United States, makes a related point that "Chinese culture traditionally shuns legal considerations and instead stresses ethical and moralist principles, where Americans are thought to be highly legalistic (Pye, 1992, p. 23). At the same time, it should be noted that in spite of elections and parliaments, Communist Leninist states, such as China and the Soviet Union, are (or were) in the Western sense lawless societies.

When one watched the first revolutionary Chinese leaders, such as Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, it was clear that in spite of being Marxists-Leninists, they were also imbued with the Middle Kingdom spirit, i. e. proud of the millennia of China's history and its central ("Center of the Universe") role in East Asia. But along with pride, their generation of Chinese were also keenly aware of the one hundred years of humiliation that befell China after the disastrous Opium War with Britain in the mid-nineteenth century. Since Hong Kong was lost at that time, one can understand the feelings of present-day Chinese leaders as they are about to regain sovereignty over that British colonial outpost in the summer of 1997.

Thus, Chinese culture and history combined with Marxist-Leninist mores is what influences the Chinese negotiator.

The Culture of Leninist States

At its height, the international Communist movement consisted of a dozen ruling states and almost a hundred nonruling Communist parties around the world. In the early 1950s, the Soviet Union was the unquestioned leader, but less than a decade later Communist China went its own way and the international

Communist movement splintered along the Moscow-Peking poles, with some independents, like Yugoslavia and a few Communist parties in the Free World, attempting to maintain distance between the two Communist superstates. The ruling Communist states (officially they called themselves socialist on the way to Communism) shared many characteristics, the chief among them being the fact that they were ruled by Leninist parties that controlled almost every political, economic, social, and cultural institution. These parties had a monopoly of power and control over all communications: personal, print, broadcasting. As mentioned above, present-day Chinese and Russian senior policymakers are (or were) Communist Party functionaries who were socialized in a Leninist state culture.

It should also be noted that in spite of the Marxist dogma about the primacy of economics, in reality, politics is all-pervasive in all Leninist societies. Thus, misunderstandings arise among Western negotiators who believe that politics, economics, and social relations occupy separate realms, and fail to realize the all-pervasive impact of politics on all aspects of life in Leninist party-states.

Claims of Cultural Uniqueness and Exceptionalism

Claims of cultural uniqueness are not unique. The Japanese persistently talk about the uniqueness of their culture, and in the heyday of their militarism and imperialism, they proclaimed the doctrine of *Hakko Ichiu*, "The Four Corners of the World Under One [Japanese] Roof." The Chinese have claimed cultural superiority for millennia. Though the Jews consider themselves "The Chosen People," they have competition from the British and also from the Japanese (where one sect actually believed that the Japanese are the Ten Lost Tribes). The French proudly promote their "Mission civilisatrice." The Russians point to the impenetrable Russian soul and the fact that certain Russian words and phrases defy translation into foreign languages. In addition to uniqueness, the Russians have also been imbued with messianism. In Tsarist times, the slogan was that "Moscow is the Third Rome [after Rome and Constantinople] and there shall never be a fourth one." The fact that Russia was the first country in the world to have established a Marxist-Leninist regime, seems only to have contributed to the Russian sense of uniqueness and mission. Last, but not least, the Americans have claimed "Manifest Destiny" and "exceptionalism" for their history and mission.¹¹

Proclaimers of uniqueness or cultural superiority, however, can be divided into two groups: some peoples have quiet confidence, accept their cultural superiority as an article of faith, while others are not quite sure. This is particularly true of Japan, an island nation, that has produced a magnificent

culture and that both prides itself on its uniqueness and is somewhat unsure of these claims. Otherwise, why would there be so many books and articles on the Japanese character (*Nihonjin ron*)? ¹² The Russians, another talented people, proclaim their superiority and at the same time exhibit doubts about it; why do they have the need to insist that almost everything in the world was invented by them? ¹³ The French seem to be firm believers in the superiority of French language and culture. So are the Chinese.

Why should there be such a difference between “unique” countries? My feeling is that “soft” believers, like the Japanese and the Russians have been cultural borrowers. In addition, both peoples exhibit a sense of insecurity and vulnerability: Russia has been periodically invaded and Japan is poor in natural resources. Does this have an effect on the way the Russians and the Japanese negotiate compared to the Chinese, the French, the Anglo-Saxons? I believe there is a difference in that the Chinese, for example, have a vision, while the Japanese get bogged down in obsessive details. The Russians are by nature suspicious, while the Japanese are terribly afraid of losing face and also tend to panic toward the end of negotiations (see the section on Negotiations, below).

Henry Kissinger (1994, p. 142) perceptively compares Russian and American exceptionalism in a way that seems partially to corroborate my theory:

The openness of each country's frontiers was among the few common features of American and Russian exceptionalism. America's sense of uniqueness was based on the concept of liberty; Russia's sprang from the experience of common suffering. Everyone was eligible to share in America's values; Russia's were available only to the Russian nation, to the exclusion of most of its non-Russian subjects. America's exceptionalism led it to isolationism alternating with occasional moral crusades; Russia's evoked a sense of mission which often led to military adventures.

DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

It is essential for negotiators to know their opposite number's decision-making process. In totalitarian countries most major decisions were made either by a strong top leader like Josef Stalin or Mao Tse-tung, or by a small self-perpetuating oligarchy, whether by the Politburo, or on important national security occasions by a smaller subcommittee of the Politburo. In present day Russia, the final decision is made by President Boris Yeltsin himself, or in consultation with a small coterie, often members of the extra-constitutional Security Council.

Japan is a special case of a society that eschews strong leadership. In fact, whenever a strong leader would appear, like the early postwar Prime Minister

Yoshida Shigeru, he was pejoratively called Wanman ("One Man") Yoshida. Normally, the country is run by consensus emanating from below, and some political scientists have opined that there is no power at the center. Interestingly, the Director General of The International Research Center for Japanese Studies, the noted Jungian analyst Dr. Kawai Hayao (Kawai, 1985) in his analysis of Japanese mythology, suggested over a decade ago that in contrast to the Western "Central Power Ruled Model," Japan can be characterized as a "Hollow Center Balanced Model."¹⁴

As a result, the locus of decisionmaking in Japan (whether in politics or in business) is not at the top, but in the middle. It is upper middle officialdom or management where different options are threshed out, leading to a consensus decision which is then sent up the chain of command where approval is generally proforma. This process of decisionmaking by consensus is called *Ringi kessai*, after the document *Ringisho* which is stamped with the seal of each person who is on the list. The advantage of this process is that everyone who affixes his seal shares in the responsibility for the decision. This process of consultation is akin to binding the roots of a tree before transplantation and is called *Nemawashi* (literally, "tying the roots"). Building a consensus is, of necessity, a slow process, and this affects any changes or concessions that might be offered during negotiations.

MAN VERSUS ENVIRONMENT

Many Japanese observers take it to be virtually axiomatic that there is a basic incompatibility between American and Japanese negotiators. The noted Japanese political scientist Mushakoji Kinhide (Mushakoji, in Japanese, 1967 ; in English, 1976) believes that this basic incompatibility derives from a fundamental philosophical difference in views about the relationship between humans and their environment. He juxtaposes the American *erabi* style and the Japanese *awase* style. The American style (choosing, can-do, or "manipulative") is grounded in the belief that "man can freely manipulate his environment for his own purposes." The Japanese style ("adaptive"), on the other hand, "rejects the idea that man can manipulate the environment. I would even go further and state that a Japanese not only adjusts to the environment ; he becomes at one with it—a form of symbiotic harmony. From this Japanese attitude follow appeals to past obligation and requests for present favor (see discussions of *amae* dependency elsewhere in this chapter) Japanese acceptance of the environment in my view stems from vulnerabilities caused by frequent natural disasters in a land of poor resources.

Inasmuch as Marxism-Leninism is an ideology of progress, overcoming

nature's obstacles and adapting nature to the requirements of a modern society is an article of faith among Communists. Many of the numerous five-year-plans in both the Soviet Union and Communist China included ambitious, "the largest in the world" schemes to harness hydroelectric power (the latest being China's current ecologically precarious plan to dam the Yangtze River), and other types of manipulating nature (canals between river systems, reversing the flow of rivers, massive irrigation projects and the like).

In traditional Chinese view, Man could be in harmony with Nature. The Chinese needed water for irrigation and from time to time had to control floods. The principle here was that if you wanted to transform Nature, you had better work *with* Nature. There was no need for Man to adjust to Nature in the manner of the Japanese. The Russians, by contrast, were in an inferior position toward Nature, as they had to live in harsh climatic conditions in their vast land.

COMMUNICATION

At the outset, a few brief comments on communication might be useful.¹⁵ First, communication is a *symbolic* activity, and therefore it includes nonverbal displays (see below), as well as objects, such as the flag. Second, communication is a *process* involving encoding (so that thoughts, feelings, emotions, or attitudes are in a form recognizable by others) and decoding (perceiving and interpreting incoming messages and stimuli from the environment). Third, communication is *transactional* (interactive), meaning that the people with whom we communicate have an impact on us and we have an impact on them. Fourth, communication takes place at varying *levels of awareness* (both consciously and unconsciously, see the section on Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Approach, above). Incidentally, we are more aware of *our* behavior with people from other cultures than with our own people, but at the same time we have to interpret the behavior of negotiators from other cultures. Fifth, *intention* is not a necessary condition for communication, for as Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson have postulated: "one cannot *not* communicate" (Watzlawick et al., 1967, p. 51). (In negotiations, one constantly communicates, even before the first verbal exchanges.) Sixth, every communication has two dimensions: a *content* (*what* is said) dimension and a *relationship* (*how* it is said) dimension. The relationship dimension is usually encoded and decoded unconsciously. The content dimension is usually encoded verbally, while the relationship dimension tends to be encoded nonverbally, and therefore vitally important to the negotiating process. I would also add that in psychoanalytic terminology one distinguishes *manifest* content (what is actually said) from *latent* content (what is thought but not communicated, or what re-

mains in the unconscious), while the *affect* shows *how* the message is communicated.

COMMUNICATION CHANNELS

One of the most striking distinctions among communication patterns is the role and quantity of non-verbal communication. One can distinguish the following five channels of communication that carry as much or more information than verbal exchange alone.¹⁶ And, of course, each culture uses these channels in its own unique way.

Occulesics is related to the use or avoidance of eye-to-eye contact during conversation. Americans, for example, are more dependent on direct eye contact as a sign of active listening, and often sincerity. They may feel that without eye contact they are "out of contact" with the other person. In other cultures, staring at the other person may be an act of impoliteness, or even challenge that can lead to unpleasant consequences.

Hepatics is related to the degree, if any, of touch (or tactile contact) in the process of communication. When Europeans and Americans meet, they usually shake hands, Latin Americans may embrace, others may kiss or touch cheeks (one, two, or three times), while still others, like the Japanese, simply bow (how deeply depends on the social standing of the parties), avoiding physical contact altogether.

Kinesics is related to the movement of hands, head, torso, etc. as amplifiers of messages, both verbal and non-verbal, or on occasion even to deliver contradictory signals. For example, the Japanese constantly nod during conversation, signifying the fact that they heard the message, but not necessarily expressing agreement. This has confused countless foreign counterparts in negotiations, as does the Japanese practice to answer a negative question with a "yes" and perhaps a nod, but which signifies a "no" in terms of substance.

Proxemics is related to personal space, or "comfort zone" in the act of communication. While in some cultures, getting close to other party's face may signify sincerity, in ours it is considered an invasion of our "private" space, and may trigger a public negative response.

Chronemics is related to the timing of verbal exchange, "turn taking," pauses, silences, and interruptions during conversation. Oriental people generally are quite comfortable with silences, and do not feel obligated to "take turns," while Occidentals (especially Americans) expect "turn taking," feel uncomfortable when the other party does not respond and proceed with their presentation, occasionally feeling the need to make unnecessary concessions. Time can also be divided into monochronic and polychronic.

NON-VERBAL COMMUNICATION

To a certain extent, all humans communicate both verbally and non-verbally. But being a homogeneous society in crowded circumstances, the Japanese more than others have learned to communicate with each other in shorthand fashion and even without words. Such non-verbal communication is known in Japan as *haragei* (the art of communicating through your body—literally “stomach” or what we in the West call gut feelings). Here is how a Japanese author (Matsumoto in McCreary, 1986, p. 58) describes *Haragei*: (1) Be euphemistic, eschewing logic or reason; (2) Keep the message vague and ambiguous; (3) Be empathetic; (4) Don’t publicly disagree; (5) Don’t be legalistic; (6) Play it artistically and wholeheartedly; (7) Don’t attract attention; (8) Don’t come on strong; (9) Don’t seek the truth; (10) Don’t tell the truth; (11) Let silence talk and language be silent.

Significantly, when the Japanese negotiate with the Chinese, they claim that the two peoples are *Dobun doshu* (same script and same kind), referring to the common use of Chinese characters and sharing the same racial characteristics. Hence, when communicating the two can understand each other without words.

LET SILENCE TALK AND LANGUAGE BE SILENT

As Matsumoto Michihiro phrases it, silence is the most important “component” of non-verbal communication. In terms of talkativeness—the other extreme of silence—the Americans are clearly at one end of the spectrum and the Japanese on the other, with the Chinese somewhere in between. In fact, some inexperienced American businessmen mistook Japanese silence as a rejection of their offers, and proceeded to lower their price. Silence can be a pause in conversation or speech can be a break between silences. According to Raymond Smith (1989) who had extensive experience in negotiating with the Soviets, Americans emphasize content and slight context. They share facts but guard emotions, and focus on words. The Soviets do the opposite: they guard facts and focus on the pauses.

POLITENESS/RUDENESS

In terms of the negotiators attitudes, there is a huge distinction between the Japanese on the one hand, and Chinese and Soviet negotiators on the other, as if they were at opposite poles. The Japanese negotiators are invariably polite, and will do everything to keep the negotiations in a civil atmosphere. (We are not talking here about wartime experiences. In early 1942, General Yamashita Tomoyuki asked for the unconditional surrender of British forces in Singapore, with a simple demand: “Yes ka, No ka?”)

At the height of the Cold War, a Chinese negotiator habitually called his American counterpart "a capitalist crook, rapist, thief, robber of widows, stealer of pennies from the eyes of the dead, mongrel of uncertain origin," charged President Dwight Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles with murder and ended his tirade by accusing the American diplomat that "he had blood on his hands and was a murderer lying in the gutter with filthy garbage" (Steibel, 1972, p. 29).¹⁷

The Soviet negotiators, in stark contrast to the Japanese, used rudeness as a tool to put the other side on the defensive. As for present-day Russian negotiators, we should remember that most of the diplomats not only were socialized under the Soviet regime but who also grew up in a society where elementary norms of civility were lacking.

NEGOTIATION

THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS

Broadly speaking, the negotiation process can be divided into the Pre-negotiation stage, the Negotiation itself, and the Post-negotiation stage. The Negotiation stage can be, in turn, divided into three phases: the first phase of assessment, the second or middle phase of bargaining and concession-making, and the third and final phase of closure.

General Characteristics and Approaches

As a broad generalization, it might be worth mentioning that several authors have commented that Chinese negotiators are closer to Western negotiators than they are to Japanese negotiators and that Professor Kimura Hiroshi (Kimura, 1980) has concluded that neither the Japanese nor Russians have as yet adopted the Western notion of negotiation.

In approaching negotiations the Chinese, Japanese, and the Russians all seem to be more serious, tight, and skeptical than the Americans. The Chinese, the Japanese, and the old Soviets also seem to be more single-minded and disciplined than the American negotiators, although it is probable that the post-Soviet Russians may be less so, especially in the business sphere. Group dependence again seems to separate the Americans from the Chinese, Japanese, or the Soviets/Russians. The Japanese negotiators are extremely fearful of losing face. The Soviet/Russian negotiator is suspicious, if not paranoid, looking over his shoulder as if somebody out there is out to cheat him. This sense of insecurity, while understandable in the light of Russian history, does not facilitate a business-like and congenial negotiating atmosphere.

PRE-NEGOTIATION STAGE

The pre-negotiation stage includes a commitment to negotiation and arranging the conference. Here each side defines the problem and develops negotiation strategies, including how to arrange the venue, agenda, and rules in one's favor. Each side may also engage in a pre-conference propaganda campaign (as was almost de rigueur in the case of Communist negotiators) or threatening behavior. Here the Chinese strategy of "Kill the chicken to scare the monkey," i.e., to take action against a weak antagonist to warn the stronger ones, comes to mind. For example, when the Dutch government sold some weapons to Taiwan, the Chinese government on the mainland took drastic action against the Dutch, to warn the major arms suppliers like the United States or France. Chinese propaganda campaign may also include proclamation of some "Non-Negotiable Principle."

All three negotiating teams (Chinese, Japanese, and Soviet/Russian) engage in a lot of preparatory work, with the Japanese being the most methodical. Collection of information for its own sake is a characteristic of the Japanese, dating back to the self-imposed seclusion in the seventeenth century, if not earlier when Japan was culturally dependent upon China. In fact, some observers have commented that the Japanese general trading companies (*sogo shosha*) could compete with the CIA and other major intelligence organizations in the quantity of information in their files. This abundance of information probably redounds to the benefit of the Japanese negotiators in trade and other economic matters.

Venue and Agenda/Rules

It is obvious that controlling the venue of negotiations and the agenda (and accompanying rules) provides great advantages. The Japanese on the whole do not actively and persistently seek these advantages. To a certain extent they are protected by a tradition of international rotation schedules. For example, the Group of Seven (G-7) annual summits follow a strict rotation schedule, though Japan was not selected for the first several conference sites. By contrast, the Communist negotiators would not only go to great lengths to assure themselves the advantages that come from controlling the venue and agenda, but would engage in lengthy negotiations to control such details of the negotiating process as the shape of the table (North Vietnamese vs. Henry Kissinger in Paris in the early 1970s). One high-ranking American negotiator went so far as to state that in the Soviet view (and by extension other Communists) form is substance. The Americans on occasion give up even negotiating about the venue, as happened during Kissinger's preliminary negotiations with Chou En-lai in 1971. One

wonders why the American President Richard Nixon had to travel to Peking in February 1972, emulating the historical role of barbarians paying tribute to the Son of Heaven, and not insisting on a neutral site?

NEGOTIATION'S FIRST PHASE: ASSESSMENT

The first phase of actual negotiations is a period of assessment, of getting to know and sizing up the opposite number, of making the opening moves, and developing possible scenarios toward reaching a satisfactory conclusion.

Getting to Know the Opposite Number

Of the three cases presented in this chapter, the Soviet negotiators seemed to have cared the least in terms of getting to know their opposite numbers. In fact, we might say that one of their favorite tactics was the use of invective, not the best way to win friends and influence people. During the Cold War period (and especially during and after the "hot war" on the Korean peninsula), the Chinese diplomats also engaged in virtuosic *ad hominem* attacks. But during more normal times, the Chinese are bent on cultivating relations with their opposite numbers for a specific purpose of later using "old friends" to extract concessions. (In the Chinese tradition "friendship" implies obligations.) This practice is so pervasive, that Lucian Pye (1992), Richard Solomon (1985; 1987), and Alfred Wilhelm (1994) who wrote extensively on negotiating with the Chinese, specifically warn American negotiators not to fall into this trap.

Another element in this practice is the Chinese concept of *guanxi*, a kind of special relationship, with undertones of dependency. This, of course, brings memories of Japanese *amae* dependency (discussed in greater detail below), but also of Japanese obligations and reciprocals of *on*, *gimu*, and *giri*, articulated by Ruth Benedict (1946). Japanese negotiators are very sensitive to Chinese overtures for special relationship and usually resist them. On the other hand, Japanese negotiators will generally invest a good deal of time to build a trustworthy relationship, before they would venture to talk business.

Opening Moves

In opening diplomatic negotiations, it is customary to make a tour d'horizon, a kind of grand survey of the world situation. During the Communist period, Soviet negotiators usually engaged in haranging the capitalist and imperialist systems. As for the Chinese and Japanese, the former are far more attuned to a broad, overall approach than the Japanese, who tend to focus on the issues at hand. No wonder, then, that Henry Kissinger praised Chou En-lai's broad vision, while Charles De Gaulle pictured a visiting Japanese prime minister as a

transistor salesman. It is only fair to add that President George Bush once appeared in Tokyo with the presidents of the American Big Three automakers, putting himself in the position of an automobile salesman.

A common characteristic of both Communist Chinese and Soviet negotiators is the insistence on developing an "agreement in principle," which can later be used as a weapon or an argument against specific proposals by the other side.

Expectations of Amae Dependency

Ambassador Kitamura Hiroshi (Kitamura, 1971) was the first Japanese diplomat to note that *amae* psychology has played a very important role in Japanese-American relations. He argues that the Japanese feel that because the United States is more powerful than Japan, it should—to a certain extent—indulge them: "The unbalanced relationship between Japan and the United States is . . . highly conducive to initiating an *amae* psychology." And when the American behavior in negotiations did not gratify or satisfy the Japanese desire for *amae*, this would in turn produce frustration and hostile attitudes on the part of the Japanese.

But did Japanese perceptions of and attitudes toward the United States change as the power relationship between the two countries changed over time? And was there, therefore, a corresponding decline in *amae* expectations? In a recent article, Ambassador Kitamura (1994) sadly notes that despite considerable rise in status, the Japanese still seem to harbor feelings of *amae* toward America, perhaps in a different guise. Yet no signs have emerged that Japan was getting to a position where she could *dispense* some *amae* to the United States. Unhappily, I think that Japan is essentially comfortable *receiving* *amae*. One should mention, however, that many younger Japanese diplomats do not have feelings of *amae* toward their American counterparts and furthermore are aware that *amae* does not work with the Americans.¹⁸

Of course, *amae* feelings are not unique to Japanese diplomacy. One can argue that in the Anglo-American English speaking so-called "special relationship," the British expect special treatment (*amae*?) from the United States. Soviet and now Russian diplomats have used the arguments that geographically Russia lacks natural defenses and the country has been constantly invaded throughout its history (the Mongols, Swedes, Poles, Napoleon, the Allied intervention after World War I, Hitler). They conveniently fail to mention that the Soviet Union invaded half a dozen Central and East European countries and colonized the three Baltic states during or in the aftermath of World War II. The Soviet/Russian diplomats also seek sympathy by invoking the twenty-eight million sacrificed in that great conflict. And now the Russians plead under-

development and difficulties in their transition from command to market economy. The Chinese use similar arguments that economically developed “rich” countries should show more understanding and be prepared to make concessions to “developing” countries like China, as well as provide help in facilitating China’s entry into international economic organizations.

NEGOTIATION’S SECOND OR MIDDLE PHASE : BARGAINING AND CONCESSION-MAKING

This is *the* main part of the negotiating process and many of the characteristics of different cultural groups are exhibited here in their fullest. But before one gets into bargaining, the two sides must present their opening positions, and there is often a dance in terms of who initiates the first step. The Chinese are particularly adept at withholding their opening bid until the other side has committed itself to their opening position. In Peking, for example, the Chinese would invite the other side, as *guests* to start, while in Washington they would expect the *hosts* to show their cards.

In the middle phase, the Soviets have used threats and other pressure tactics, such as propaganda campaigns addressed at world opinion ; the Chinese attempt to shame, play adversaries against each other ; while the Japanese will typically dig in and keep repeating their position. Parties may play the “good cop—bad cop” routine, demand recesses or intermediaries, and test the patience of their counterparts. While the Japanese have generally outlasted Western negotiators by slowing down tactics, they have been no match for the Chinese who would on occasion simply stonewall (Ogura, 1979).

NEGOTIATION’S THIRD PHASE : CLOSURE OR END GAME

The end of the negotiating process may involve a decision to break off negotiations, put them on hold, or come to some sort of a conclusion. The latter may involve last minute activities, including :

Eleventh Hour Concessions

Both Chinese and Japanese negotiators often wait until the last minute before offering meaningful concessions to the other side. Michael Blaker entitled his chapter on the Japanese negotiating style “Probe, Push, and Panic” (1973) to describe Japanese tactics. (He added “Postpone” in his chapter in this volume.) In a June 1996 television interview with U. S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky (Barshefsky, 1996), Paul Solman, economics reporter for the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) Newshour with Jim Lehrer, asked if negotiations with China are “always this kind of a cat-and-mouse game : we have to threaten

sanctions, go down to the last minute?" Barshefsky replied that "This is an unfortunate cycle, but it seems the only cycle that the Chinese have responded to with respect to implementation of trade agreements." Asked if this was also the case with the Japanese, the Trade Representative replied that this was not the case in every agreement with the Japanese. But in the case of China, she confirmed that

if you look at the history with China, all agreements came about after months and months of education, consultation, negotiations, but only at the end of the day after sanctions have been threatened. This is a pernicious cycle, but not one that the United States has created, and it is one to which the Chinese seem to respond.

POST-NEGOTIATION STAGE: IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENTS AND REOPENING OF POST-AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS

The Soviet record is mixed: they have scrupulously and faithfully adhered to payments schedules (realizing that loss of credit would dry up future sources), while at the same time cheating on agreements involving national security matters. (The controversial Krasnoyarsk radar station built in contravention of an agreement with the United States to limit ABM systems to Moscow is one such example.) The present Russian record in adhering to commercial agreements is not very good, corner cutting being the order of the day. The Japanese, very much lacking in strong principles and believing in situational ethics, are likely to attempt to re-negotiate agreements if the circumstances have drastically changed. In negotiating with the Chinese, Americans have found out that no matter what agreement is reached, it may be subject to review and objection by some higher-up not present at the conference. The Chinese also have the unsavory reputation of bringing up new demands *after* the conclusion of negotiations.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter stresses the importance of the impact of different national communication patterns upon the process and outcome of negotiations as a distinct, intermediary influence, apart from the cultural traits that condition the actions of the decisionmakers and actors in the process of negotiation. In this regard, I have emphasized the importance of non-verbal communication and different channels of such communication (oculesics, haptics, kinesics, proxemics, and chronemics). In addition, I have stressed the advantages of the comparative method, whether in the analysis of culture, communication

patterns, or the negotiating process. In comparing cultures, I have found that it is not enough to examine elements of Japanese, Chinese, and Russian cultures, and I have added a category of "The Culture of Leninist States." After all, since Russia experienced three-quarters of a century and China half a century of all pervasive control exercised by Leninist parties, in effect they were or are Leninist party-states. Likewise, it is highly desirable not to limit analysis to the conscious motives of the negotiating actors and their superiors, but to delve into the unconscious mechanisms operant in group psychology and in individual defense mechanisms. Included in this psychoanalytic domain are specific notions of identification, projection, and projective identification. The psychoanalytic and psychodynamic approach can significantly enrich our analysis of the entire negotiation process, beginning with the pre-negotiation stage and ending with the post-negotiation stage and problems associated with the implementation of the agreements.

Of the different cultures, communication patterns, and negotiation styles discussed in this paper, the Japanese seem to be the one closest to being unique. In fact, Professor John Graham, a contributor to this volume and a student of comparative negotiating behavior in two dozen cultures, once remarked that if Americans are at one end of the spectrum, the Japanese are surely at the other end.¹⁹ The empirical study (cited above) rank ordering communication patterns in accordance with their high-context/low-context also found the Japanese at the very end of the spectrum, with the United States toward the other end, though not at the extreme end. Other comparative studies have found Chinese negotiators to be closer to Western counterparts than to the Japanese, and neither Japanese nor Russian negotiators seem to have adopted the Western notions of negotiation.

Claims of cultural uniqueness are not unique. Many peoples claim uniqueness or cultural superiority, including the Chinese, Japanese, Russians, French, the Anglo-Saxons, to name a few. But these peoples can be divided into two groups: those who accept their cultural superiority as an article of faith, and those who are not quite sure. I put the Japanese and the Russians in the second category because both peoples have been cultural borrowers and both seem to exhibit a sense of insecurity and vulnerability. I argue that, as a result, there are differences in negotiating styles between the first and second groups. The negotiators from the first group seem to have more confidence and a broader vision, while those in the second group harbor more suspicion and are afraid to lose face.

In terms of culture stability, again Japan takes the top honors, with both China and Russia showing signs of transition: China trying to accommodate a

Leninist political system with an evolving modified market economic system, and Russia jettisoning both the totalitarian political system and the command economic system. Whatever the final destination of these changes in both China and Russia, the cultural milieu is bound to undergo changes.

In describing cultures, many authors have stressed the dualities and contradictory attributes, whether the aesthetic/aggressive nature of the Japanese, or the passive/violent nature of the Russians. Equally important, it seems to me, is to emphasize the effects of the Communist experiment with all its pernicious impact on Russian and Chinese societies. These societies today show that while some of the Communist policies reinforced prerevolutionary trends, others created discontinuities with the past. It would take a post-Communist period of some length for some kind of a synthesis to emerge, to borrow Marxist/Hegelian terminology. In the meantime, the Chinese or Russian negotiator is bound to exhibit a dual character.

The Japanese explicit and implicit pleadings of *amae* dependency have related parallels in Russia and China, where arguments are made during negotiations to evoke sympathies. In Russia, this usually takes the form of reminding the negotiating partners that Russia was always forced to fight off invaders and pleading human suffering and almost thirty million casualties in World War II. In China, this can take the form of cajoling and manipulating “old friends,” persons with prior experience in China or dealings with the Chinese, as well as pleading underdevelopment to obtain preferential treatment.

It is hoped that this effort of presenting conceptual frameworks for the study of culture—communication—negotiation, illustrated by selective examples from the national characteristics of Japan, China, and the Soviet Union/Russia would provide deeper insights into these complex subjects.

NOTES

- * This chapter is dedicated to the memory of my mentor Professor Philip E. Mosely, former Director of the Russian (now Harriman) Institute, Columbia University, who himself wrote the first significant account of Soviet negotiating techniques (Mosely, 1951).

I wish to thank Paul Langer for reading a preliminary draft of this chapter and offering many helpful criticisms, and Joan Lachkar for helping me formulate psychoanalytic and psychodynamic perspectives. Needless to say, all responsibility remains mine alone.

1. Now, for obvious reasons renamed *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*.
2. When I heard the most senior South Korean negotiator describe his dealings with his North Korean counterparts, I was reminded of the generic “Communist” negotiators. And the South Korean statesman was unable to identify specific “Korean” characteristics of the North Korean negotiating team.

3. Here I follow the definitions of Dr. Joan Lachkar (1992).
4. Geert Hofstede delineates five dimensions of culture: (1) power distance, (2) collectivism vs. individualism, (3) femininity vs. masculinity, (4) uncertainty avoidance, and (5) long-term orientation.
5. John Graham of the School of Management at the University of California at Irvine (and a contributor to this volume) in his study of comparative negotiation styles distinguishes between northern and southern Chinese. There are, of course, also numerous national minorities in China, such as Tibetans, Mongols, Uighurs, and Kazakhs.
6. This section on Japan's culture follows closely the section on "Japanese Cultural Characteristics" in my previous work on Japanese negotiating behavior (Berton, 1996)
7. Japanese names are given in Japanese style, surname first, followed by the given name.
It is common knowledge that Yamamoto wrote the book on the Japanese and the Jews using the pseudonym of Isaiah BenDasan, so that it would appear that the book (BenDasan, 1971) had been written by a Sephardi Jew long resident in Japan.
8. It should be noted, however, that not all scholars accept the model of Japan as a harmonious and group-oriented society. See Befu, 1980.
9. In a recent study of Ruth Benedict's archives, Pauline Kent (1994) discovered that the original Report 25, which was later expanded into the famous book, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, does not include, to any significant extent, discussions of Japan as a "shame culture." Curiously, the subsequent addition of the "shame culture" concept became the dominant theme of Benedict's book.
10. A third duality was the difference between Russia's European and Asian policies. In the West, Imperial Russia often behaved in the context of the Concert of Europe. The Asiatic Department, responsible for Russian policy toward the Ottoman Empire, the Balkans, and the Far East, often acted independently and aggressively (Kissinger, 1994).
Post-Soviet Russia has experienced a split between the "Atlanticists" and the "Eurasianists" (Kimura, 1996). This arises from the duality of Russia as a state facing both Europe and Asia, and symbolized by the Two-Headed Eagle in the Tsarist Coat of Arms.
Another useful way of tackling the Russian cultural dimension is to present a set of American and Russian mutual stereotypes, and both positive and negative images of each other collected by Robert Anderson and Petr Shikhirev (Anderson and Shikhirev, 1994, pp.99 and 108).
Russian Stereotype of Americans: people like us, but more successful and who are ahead of us, and from whom we have to learn market relations and democracy.
American Stereotype of Russians: bunglers, mafiosi, nouveau riche, and troublemakers.
Russian Positive Images of Americans:
Energy, practicality, efficiency, organization, responsibility, easy to get along, ability to seek compromises.
Russian Negative Images of Americans:
Stinginess, poor knowledge of Russia and Russian culture (especially language), limited outlook, paternalistic attitude toward Russian partners, suspiciousness and distrust.
American Positive Images of Russians:

High intellectual potential and education, inventiveness and imagination, desire to learn, dependability in friendly relations, warmth, sociability.

American Negative Images of Russians :

Disorganization (lack of discipline), low level of business culture, quickness to take offense, confusing personal and business relations, daydreaming ("on cloud nine"), promises are not thought through, inclination toward dependency, weak initiative.

11. The latest book on the subject is by Seymour Martin Lipset, *American Exceptionalism : A Double-edged Sword* (1996)
12. Some fifteen years ago the Nomura Research Institute compiled a list of 700 titles published since 1945. See Befu, 1980.
For an original position that the Japanese society cannot be explained using concepts of Western social science, see Hamaguchi Esyun's "A Contextual Model of the Japanese : Toward a Methodological Innovation in Japan Studies" (Hamaguchi, 1985)
13. One of the foremost contenders for Russia's presidency, General Aleksandr Lebed, boasted on television that Russia was a great country, citing as evidence his claim that 84 [or 86, I don't recall the exact figure] of all discoveries and inventions were made by the Russians, and then stolen and claimed by others.
14. See also van Wolferen, 1989. Some writers have referred to the Japanese political system as an onion : you peel and peel, and in the end there is nothing at the core.
15. Here I borrow from Gudykunst and Kim, 1984.
16. The following discussion is based on a handout prepared by Dr. Bruce La Brack, of the University of the Pacific, distributed at the panel on "Communicating Across Cultures" at the Twelfth Worldwide Conference of People to People International, Newport Beach, California, September 25-29, 1996.
17. Such degree of gratuitous insults may have been motivated by the Chinese negotiator's desire to establish his bona fides as genuinely anti-American and anti-imperialist for consumption back home.
18. Ambassador Edamura Sumio made this point during his comments on my paper, "The Psychological Dimensions of Japanese Negotiating Behavior," at the Kyoto Conference on Japanese Studies, October 1994 (Berton, 1996)
19. Professor John Graham's comments on my paper (Berton, 1995) at a special meeting of the Southern California Japan Seminar at the UCLA Faculty Center, February 11, 1995.

REFERENCES AND SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Robert Anderson and Petr Shikhirev, "*Akuly i 'del'finy' : Psikhologiya i etika rossiisko-amerikanskogo delovogo partnerstva* ["Sharks" and "Dolphins" : The Psychology and Ethics of Russian American Business Partnership] (Moscow : Delo LTD, 1994).
- Charlene Barshefsky, U. S. Trade Representative, interview with Paul Solman, *Newshour with Jim Lehrer*, June 21, 1996.
- Harumi Befu, "A Critique of the Group Model of Japanese Society," *Social Analysis*, No.5/6

Peter Berton

(December 1980), pp. 29–43.

Daniel Bell, "Ten Theories in Search of Reality: The Prediction of Soviet Behavior in the Social Sciences," *World Politics*, Vol. X, No. 3 (April 1958), pp. 327–365.

Diane B. Bendahmane and John W. McDonald, Jr., *International Negotiation: Art and Science—Report of a Conference on International Negotiation, June 9–10, 1983* (n. p.: U. S. Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 1987)

Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1946)

Peter Berton, "The Soviet and Japanese Communist Parties: Policies, Tactics, Negotiating Behavior," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Vol. XV, No. 3 (August 1982), pp. 266–287.

Peter Berton, "A Turn in Sino-Soviet Relations?" Chap. 2 in James C. Hsiung (ed.), *Beyond China's Independent Foreign Policy: Challenge for the U. S. and Its Asian Allies* (New York: Praeger, 1985), pp. 24–54.

Peter Berton, "Prospects for Soviet-Japanese Relations Legality, Morality, and Reality: An American Perspective," *Kokusai Shinpojiumu '85—International Symposium '85 Tenki ni tatsu Kokusai Josei to Nisso Kankei—Japan-Soviet Relations in a Changing Global Context Hokoku* (Tokyo: Kokusai Shinpojiumu '85 Soshiki Iinkai, 1986), pp. 65–69 and 331–354. In Japanese and English.

Peter Berton, "Understanding Japanese Negotiating Behavior," *ISOP Intercom* (University of California, Los Angeles, International Studies and Overseas Programs), Vol. 18, No. 2 (November 1995), pp. 1–8.

Peter Berton, "The Psychological Dimensions of Japanese Negotiating Behavior," *Kyoto Conference on Japanese Studies, 1994* ([Kyoto]: International Research Center for Japanese Studies, The Japan Foundation, 1996), Vol. I, pp. I-273–I-284.

See also discussion of the paper by Dr. Takeo Doi, St. Luke's International Hospital and Ambassador Sumio Edamura, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pp. I-285–I-292.

Michael Blaker, "Probe, Push, and Panic" in Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

Michael Blaker, *Japanese International Negotiating Style* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

Michael Blaker, *Evaluating Japan's Diplomatic Performance*, Chap. 1 in Gerald L. Curtis (ed.), *Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change* (Armonk, NY and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 1–42.

Michael Blaker, "Negotiating on Rice: 'No, No, a Thousand Times, No'," a paper prepared the Symposium on "International Comparative Studies on the Negotiating Behavior," The International Research Center for Japanese Studies, Kyoto, August 28–30, 1996.

Dianna Booher, *Communicate With Confidence!: How To Say It Right the First Time and Every Time* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994)

Courtland L. Bovee and John V. Thill, *Business Communication Today*, Third edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992).

Linda P. Brady, *The Politics of Negotiation: America's Dealings with Allies, Adversaries, and Friends* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991).

Uri Bronfenbrenner, "The Mirror Image in Soviet/American Relations," *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol.

17, No. 3 (1961).

Jaw-ling Joanne Chang, "Negotiation of the 17 August 1982 U. S.—PRC Arms Communique: Beijing's Negotiating Tactics," *China Quarterly*, No. 125 (March 1991), pp. 33–54.

Robert C. Christopher, *The Japanese Patterns of Behavior* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1976).

Robert C. Christopher, *The Japanese Mind: The Goliath Explained* (New York: Linden Press/Simon & Schuster, 1983).

Herb Cohen, *You Can Negotiate Anything* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982).

Raymond Cohen, "An Advocate's View," Chap. 3, Part I, "International Negotiation: Does Culture Make a Difference?" in Guy Olivier Faure and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.), *Culture and Negotiation: The Resolution of Water Disputes* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1993), pp. 22–37.

Raymond Cohen, *Negotiating Across Cultures: Communication Obstacles in International Diplomacy* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991).

Gordon A. Craig, "Techniques of Negotiation," in Ivo J. Lederer (ed.), *Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).

Frank John Dellerman, *Soviet Negotiating Techniques in Arms Control Negotiations with the United States*, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, International Relations, University of Southern California, August 1979, 2 vols.

John W. De Pauw, *U. S.—Chinese Trade Negotiations* (New York: Praeger, 1981).

I. M. Destler, Hideo Sato, Priscilla Clapp, Haruhiro Fukui, *Managing an Alliance: The Politics of U. S.—Japanese Relations* (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976).

I. M. Destler, Hideo Sato, Priscilla Clapp, Haruhiro Fukui, *Managing an Alliance*, Chap. 4, "Mis-perceptions Across the Pacific" (largely written by Professor Sate), pp. 89–124.

L. Takeo Doi, "Amae: A Key Concept for Understanding Japanese Personality Structure" in Robert J. Smith and Richard K. Beardsley, *Japanese Culture: Its Development and Characteristics* (Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, 1962), pp. 132–139.

Takeo Doi, *The Anatomy of Dependence* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1973).

Takeo Doi, *The Anatomy of Self: The Individual Versus Society* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1986). Translation of *Omote to Ura*.

Daniel Druckman (ed.), *Negotiations: Social-Psychological Perspectives* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1977).

Daniel Druckman, et al., *Human Factors in International Relations and Negotiation* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1973).

Leonid I. Evenko, John L. Graham, and Mahesh N. Rajan, *An Empirical Study of Marketing Negotiations in the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, MA: Marketing Science Institute, 1990). Report 90–121.

G. O. Faure, "Nonverbal Negotiation in China," *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1995).

Guy Olivier Faure and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.), *Culture and Negotiation: The Resolution of Water Disputes* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1993).

Glen Fisher, *The Cross-Cultural Dimension in International Negotiation* (n. p.: U. S. Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 1979).

Glen Fisher, *International Negotiation: A Cross-Cultural Perspective* (Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural

- Press, 1980).
- Glen Fisher, *Mindsets* (Yarmouth, ME : Intercultural Press, 1988).
- Roger Fisher and William Ury, *Getting to YES: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In* (Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 1981).
- Dean Allen Foster, *Bargaining Across Borders: How to Negotiate Business Successfully Anywhere in the World* (New York : McGraw-Hill, 1992).
- Robert L. Friedheim, "Moderation in the Pursuit of Justice: Explaining Japan's Failure in the International Whaling Negotiations," *Kyoto Conference on Japanese Studies, 1994* ([Kyoto]: International Research Center for Japanese Studies, The Japan Foundation, 1996).
- George Fuller, *The Negotiator's Handbook* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ : Prentice Hall, 1991).
- Dr. Alan Goldman, *For Japanese Only: Intercultural Communication with Americans* (Tokyo: The Japan Times, 1988).
- Geoffrey Gorer and John Rickman, *The People of Great Russia* (London : The Cressett Press, 1949).
- John W. Gould, "Intercultural Business Communication," Chap. 3 in Norman B. Sigband and Arthur H. Bell, *Communication for Management and Business* (Glenview, IL : Scott, Foresman. 1986), pp. 67-93.
- John L. Graham, "The Japanese Negotiation Style: Characteristics of a Distinct Approach," *Negotiation Journal*, April 1993, pp. 123-140.
- John L. Graham and Yoshihiro Sano, *Smart Bargaining: Doing Business with the Japanese* (Cambridge, MA : Ballinger Publishing Company, 1984), Chap. 3, "The Japanese Negotiation Style," pp. 17-32.
- William B. Gudykunst and Yong Yun Kim, *Communicating With Strangers: An Approach to Intercultural Communication* (New York : Random House, 1984).
- P. H. Gulliver, *Disputes and Negotiations: A Cross-Cultural Perspective* (New York : Academic Press, 1979).
- Edward T. Hall, *The Silent Language* (New York : Anchor Press, 1973).
- Edward T. Hall, *Beyond Culture* (New York : Anchor Press, 1976).
- Edward T. Hall and Mildred Reed Hall, *Hidden Differences—Doing Business With the Japanese* (Garden City, NY : Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1987). See *The Vocabulary of Human Relationships*, p. 61, and Glossary, pp. 157-160.
- Esyun Hamaguchi, "A Contextual Model of the Japanese: Toward a Methodological Innovation in Japan Studies," *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Summer 1985), pp. 289-321.
- W. Averell Harriman, "Observations on Negotiating," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 29 (Spring 1975), pp. 1-6.
- J. L. Hecht (ed.), *Rubles and Dollars: Strategies for Doing Business in the Soviet Union* (New York : Harper Business, 1991).
- Geert Hofstede, "Cultural Predictors of National Negotiation Styles," Chap. 16 in Frances Mautner-Markhof (ed.), *Processes of International Negotiations* (Boulder, CO : Westview Press, 1988), pp. 193-201.
- Geert Hofstede, *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind* (Berkshire, England : McGraw-Hill, 1991).

- Mamoru Iga, *The Thorn in the Chrysanthemum: Suicide and Economic Success in Modern Japan* (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1986).
- Fred Charles Ikle, *How Nations Negotiate* (New York : Harper & Row, 1964).
- Masaaki Imai, *Never Take Yes for an Answer* (Tokyo : Simul Press, 1975).
- Masaaki Imai, *16 ways to Avoid Saying No* (Tokyo : Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1981).
- C. Turner Joy, *How Communists Negotiate* (New York : Macmillan, 1955).
- Hayao Kawai, "The Japanese Mind as Reflected in Their Mythology," *Psychologia* (Kyoto), Vol. 28, No. 2 (1985), pp. 71-76.
- George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950* (New York : Little, Brown, 1967).
- Pauline Kent, "Ruth Benedict's Original Wartime Study of the Japanese," *International Journal of Japanese Sociology*, No. 3 (October 1994), pp. 81-97.
- Hiroshi Kimura, "The Russian Decision-Making Process Toward Japan," *Japan Review*, Vol. 7 (1996), pp. 61-81.
- Hiroshi Kimura, "Soviet and Japanese Negotiation Behavior: The Spring 1977 Fisheries Talks," *Orbis*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Spring 1980), pp. 43-67.
- Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York : Simon & Schuster, 1994).
- Hiroshi Kitamura, *Psychological Dimensions of U. S.-Japanese Relations* (Cambridge : Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 28 (August 1971).
- Hiroshi Kitamura, "Psychological Factors in Friction Between Japan and America," *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Summer 1994), pp. 203-220.
- Melanie Klein, *Envy and Gratitude* (New York : Basic Books, 1957).
- L. R. Kohls, "Basic Concepts and Models of Intercultural Communication," in M. Prosser (ed.), *USIA Intercultural Communication Course: 1977 Proceedings* (Washington, DC: United States Information Agency, 1978).
- Joan Lachkar, *The Narcissistic/Borderline Couple: A Psychoanalytic Perspective on Marital Treatment* (New York : Brunner/Mazel Publishers, 1992).
- Amos Lakos, *International Negotiations: Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior, A Bibliography* (Monticello, IL : Vance Bibliographies, February 1989).
- Arthur Lall, *Modern International Negotiation: Principles and Practice* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1966).
- Arthur Lall, *How Communist China Negotiates* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1968).
- Nathan Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism* (Glencoe, IL : Free Press, 1953). A shorter version under the title *The Operational Code of the Politburo* appeared in 1951.
- Seymour Martin Lipset, *American Exceptionalism: A Double-edged Sword* (New York, 1996).
- Roderick Macleod, *China, Inc. : How To Do Business with the Chinese* (Toronto : Bantam Books, 1988).
- Robert M. March, "Business Negotiation as Cross Cultural Communication : The Japanese-Western Case," *Cross Currents*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring 1982), pp. 55-65.
- Robert M. March, *The Japanese Negotiator: Subtlety and Strategy Beyond Western Logic* (Tokyo and New York : Kodansha International, 1988).
- Michihiro Matsumoto, *Haragei* (Tokyo : Kodansha, 1984).

- Don R. McCreary, *Japanese—U. S. Business Negotiations : A Cross-Cultural Study* (New York : Praeger, 1986).
- Masao Miyamoto, M. D., *Straightjacket Society: An Insider's Irreverent View of Bureaucratic Japan* (Tokyo : Kodansha International, 1994).
- Musashi Miyamoto, *The Book of Five Rings (Gorin no Sho)* (New York : Bantam Books, 1982).
- Philip E. Mosely, "Some Soviet Techniques of Negotiation" in Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson (eds.), *Negotiating with the Russians* (Boston : World Peace Foundation, 1951), pp. 271–303.
- Robert T. Moran, *Getting Your Yen's Worth* (Houston, TX : Gulf Publishing Company, 1985).
- Leo Moser, "Cross-Cultural Dimensions: U. S.–Japan," Chap. 3 in Diane B. Bendahmane and Leo Moser (eds.), *Toward a Better Understanding : U. S.–Japan Relations* (n. p. : U. S. Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 1986), pp. 21–34.
- Leo Moser, "Negotiating Style : Americans and Japanese," Chap. 5 in Bendahmane and Moser, *Toward a Better Understanding*, pp. 43–51.
- Kinhide Mushakoji, *Kokusai seiji to Nihon* [International Politics and Japan] (Tokyo : Tokyo University Press, 1967).
- Kinhide Mushakoji, "The Cultural Premises of Japanese Diplomacy," Chap. 2 in Japan Center for International Exchange (ed.), *The Silent Power : Japan's Identity and World Role* (Tokyo : Simul Press, 1976).
- National Foreign Assessment Center, *Soviet Strategy and Tactics In Economic and Commercial Negotiations With the United States : A Research Paper* (Washington, DC : Central Intelligence Agency, June 1979) (ER 79-10276).
- "Negotiating with the Soviets : Goals, Style, and Method : A Roundtable Discussion," *Foreign Service Journal*, November 1985, pp. 24–27.
- J. V. Neustupny, *Communicating with the Japanese* (Tokyo : The Japan Times, 1987).
- Gerard I. Nierenberg, *The Art of Negotiating* (New York : Simon & Schuster, 1981).
- Gregory W. Noble, *Flying Apart : Japanese–American Negotiations over the FSX Fighter Plane* (Berkeley : University of California, Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, 1992).
- Kazuo Ogura, "How the 'Inscrutables' Negotiate with the 'Inscrutables : Chinese Negotiating Tactic vis-a-vis the Japanese," *China Quarterly*, No. 79 (September 1979), pp. 529–552.
- Kazuo Ogura, *Trade Conflict : A View From Japan* (Washington, D. C., Japan Economic Institute, n. d. [1983 ?], Chap. 3, "The Socio-Psychological Framework of U. S.–Japan Relations," pp. 19–27, and Chap. 5, "Japanese Cultural Traits and U. S.–Japan Economic Friction," pp. 35–39.
- See also Kazuo Ogura, "The Sociopsychological Structure Surrounding U. S.–Japan Economic Relations," *The Wheel Extended* (April–June 1983), pp. 14–19. Different version of Chap. 3 of the preceding work.
- Kazuo Ogura, "Nichi-Bei Keizai Kosho Mitsu no Otoshi Ana" [The Three Pitfalls in Japan–U. S. Economic Negotiations], *Sekai Keizai Hyoron* [World Economy Review], November 1992, pp. 40–44.
- Kazuo Ogura, "Nikkan Kokko Nijushunen wo kangaeru 10" "Nikkan Gaiko Kosho ni okeru 'Tatemaie to Honne' : Keizai Kyoryoku Kosho ni okeru 'Purojekuto shugi' wo megutte" [Reflecting on the

- Twentieth Anniversary of the Restoration of Diplomatic Relations Between Japan and South Korea, No. 10—"Tatemaie and Honne" in Diplomatic Negotiations Between Japan and South Korea: 'Projectism' in Economic Cooperation Negotiations], pp. 25-29.
- Hisao Onda, *Koshosha to shite no Sorenjin* [The Soviets as Negotiators] (Tokyo: Kyoikusha, 1987).
- Shiro Ozawa, *Naze Nihonjin wa Kokusai Kosho ni Yowai no ka: Nihonjin no Shippai* [Why Are Japanese Weak in International Negotiations: The Failure of the Japanese] (Tokyo: Ryonsha, 1990).
- D. Peabody, *National Characteristics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
- Ype H. Poortinga and Erwin C. Hendriks, "Culture as a Factor in International Negotiations: A Proposed Research Project from a Psychological Perspective," Chap. 17 in Frances Mautner-Markhof (ed.), *Processes of International Negotiations* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 203-212.
- Lucian W. Pye, *Chinese Negotiating Style: Commercial Approaches and Cultural Principles* (New York: Quorum Books, 1992).
- Revised edition of *Chinese Commercial Negotiating Style* (Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1982). A Rand study, R-2837-AF).
- Mahesh N. Rajan and John L. Graham, "Nobody's Grandfather Was A Merchant: Understanding the Soviet Commercial Negotiation Process and Style," *California Management Review*, Spring 1991, pp. 40-57.
- David J. Rogers, *Fighting To Win: Samurai Techniques for Your Work and Life* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984).
- Edward L. Rowny, *It Takes One to Tango* (Washington, DC: Brassey, 1992).
- J. Z. Rubin and B. R. Brown, *The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation* (New York: Academic Press, 1975).
- Louis J. Samelson, *Soviet and Chinese Negotiating Behavior: The Western View* (Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1976).
- J. Sawyer and H. Guetzkow, "Bargaining and Negotiation in International Relations," in H. C. Kelman (ed.), *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1965), pp. 464-520.
- Leon Sloss and M. Scott Davis (eds.), *A Game for High Stakes: Lessons Learned in Negotiating with the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1986).
- Leon Sloss and M. Scott Davis, "The Soviet Union: The Pursuit of Power and Influence through Negotiation," Chap. in Hans Binnendijk (ed.), *National Negotiating Styles* (n.p.: U. S. Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 1987), pp. 17-43.
- Raymond F. Smith, *Negotiating with the Soviets* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989).
- Richard H. Solomon, *Chinese Political Negotiating Behavior: A Briefing Analysis* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1985). R-3295.
- Richard H. Solomon, "China: Friendship and Obligation in Chinese Negotiating Style," Chap. in Hans Binnendijk (ed.), *National Negotiating Styles* (n.p.: U. S. Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 1987), pp. 1-16.

- Bertram I. Spector, "Negotiation as a Psychological Process," chap. 3 in I. William Zartman (ed.), *The Negotiation Process: Theories and Applications* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1978), pp. 55–66.
- Gerald L. Steibel, *How Can We Negotiate With the Communists?* (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1972).
- Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Committee on Government Operation, United States Senate (comp.), *Peking's Approach to Negotiation: Selected Writings* (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969).
- Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Committee on Government Operation, United States Senate (comp.), *The Soviet Approach to Negotiation: Selected Writings* (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969).
- Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Committee on Government Operation, United States Senate (comp.), *Negotiation and Statecraft: A Selection of Readings* (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1970).
- Nathaniel B. Thayer and Stephen E. Weiss, "Japan: The Changing Logic of a Former Minor Power," Chap. in Hans Binnendijk (ed.), *National Negotiating Styles* (n. p.: U. S. Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 1987), pp. 45–74.
- M. Tourevski and E. Morgan, *Cutting the Red Tape: How Western Companies Can Profit in the New Russia* (New York: The Free Press, 1993).
- Rosalie L. Tung, *Business Negotiations with the Japanese* (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, Lexington Books, 1984).
- Keiko Ueda, "Sixteen Ways to Avoid Saying 'No' in Japan," in J. C. Condon and M. Saito (eds.), *Intercultural Encounters in Japan* (Tokyo: Simul Press, 1974), pp. 185–192, reproduced in Graham and Sano, *Smart Bargaining*, p. 24.
- Karel van Wolferen, *The Enigma of Japanese Power* (London: Macmillan, 1989).
- Howard F. Van Zandt, "How to Negotiate in Japan," *Harvard Business Review*, November–December 1970, pp. 45–56.
- Paul Watzlawick, Ph. D., Janet Helmick Beavin, A. B., and Don D. Jackson, M. D., *Pragmatics of Human Communication: A Study of Interactional Patterns, Pathologies, and Paradoxes* (New York: Norton, 1967).
- Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., *The Chinese at the Negotiating Table: Style and Characteristics* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994).
- Richard L. Wiseman and Jolene Koester (eds.), *Intercultural Communication Competence* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1993). (International and Intercultural Communication Annual, Vol. XVII, 1993).
- Shichihei Yamamoto, *Nihon shihon-shugi no seishin* [Capitalistic Spirit in Japan] (Tokyo: Kobunsha, 1979).
- Kenneth T. Young, *Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953–1967* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968).
- I. William Zartman, "A Skeptic's View," Chap. 2, Part I, "International Negotiation: Does Culture Make a Difference?" in Guy Olivier Faure and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.), *Culture and Negotiation:*

The Resolution of Water Disputes (Newbury Park, CA : Sage Publications, 1993), pp. 17–21.

I. William Zartman (ed.), *The Negotiation Process: Theories and Applications* (Beverly Hills : Sage Publications, 1978).

I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, *The Practical Negotiator* (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1982).

Mark Zimmerman, *How To Do Business with the Japanese* (New York : Random House, 1985).