

“THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF JAPANESE NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR”*

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A student of comparative negotiating behavior once stated that if Americans are at one end of the spectrum, the Japanese are surely at the other end.¹ This paper is an attempt to describe, analyze, and explain Japanese negotiating behavior, particularly its psychological underpinnings. I will first present some characteristic features of Japanese negotiating behavior, primarily in the business sphere, and the rather negative Western perceptions or stereotypes of that behavior. I will then try to find some explanations of that behavior in terms of Japanese social realities and psychological phenomena. Moving to the diplomatic arena, I shall review some concepts that are said to underlie Japan's foreign relations, particularly its difficult relationship with the United States, and offer a personal contrasting view. The writers who deal with such phenomena in the field of negotiating behavior or foreign relations generally present behavioral characteristics without trying to explain *why* the Japanese do what they do. The paper will end with some speculative, and probably controversial, ideas on why the Japanese seem to exhibit thought and action patterns that are different from those in the West, and often also different from those in China.²

Japanese Business Negotiating Style

Before we get into the Japanese *negotiating* style, a few words about Japanese *communication* style are in order. Dr. Alan Goldman, an American professor of communication, has written a handy guide, entitled *For Japanese Only: Intercultural Communication with Americans*. He presents three approaches of communication: the A (for American)-type, the J (for Japanese)-type, and the Z-type (“a combination of the American and Japanese ways of communicating, tailored and prepared for Japanese”). In his J-type Communication List he describes 111 observations from No. 1, “Formality in speaking, gestures, and facial expression,” to No. 111, “Japanese value group spirit in organizations.” I might also mention “A non-argumentative communicative style,” “Communication style that somewhat conceals emotions,” “Prefers an agenda, rather than free-form interaction,” “May be unfamiliar with turn-taking in conversations,” “Japanese communicators seem to leave much ‘unsaid,’ implied, or understated,” “Japanese often engage in selfdepreciation,” and “Japanese most often do not prefer to engage in conceptual debates, attacks, and disputes with strangers.”³

Robert March in his book, *The Japanese Negotiator: Subtlety and Strategy Beyond Western*

Logic, lists the following as salient aspects of Japanese domestic negotiation style: intuition, indirectness, disguising or suppressing real feelings, persistence, avoidance of self-praise, patient dissembling, and diligent information-gathering about the other sides' needs or intentions.⁴

To this list we can add, in no particular order:⁵ decisionmaking by consensus (*ringi kessai*); preparing the consensus (*nemawashi*, or tying the roots before transplantation); a desire that the result allows each side to win something; stressing areas of agreement; compromise; avoiding social conflict; avoiding rejection or refusal of a proposal; awareness of feelings and emotions; avoidance of complaining; avoidance of direct bargaining; indirection leads to ineffectiveness of logical presentations; *tatemaie-honne* (appearance and real intent); *omote-ura* (front and reality); saving face as the key to successful interactions; maintaining harmony (*wa*); implicit communication necessitating careful listening (versus explicit communication on the Western side); telepathy or communication without words (*Ishin-Denshin*); silences (the need to watch body language); the need to be very patient; the indirect approach leads to the need for experienced go-betweens; the use of intermediaries for introductions (*Shokai-sha*) and during negotiations (*Chukai-sha*); limited authority of negotiators (similar to the old Soviet or Communist negotiators,⁶ but in contrast to Western negotiators); long introductory sessions or courtesy calls to get to know the negotiator on the other side; discussing long-term generalized goals first; building long-term relationships; building trust; adaptability; concessions are holistic (rather than sequential).

Professor March notes that Western perception is that the Japanese way is merely perverse: "Obliqueness, avoidance, disdain for frankness, a refined tendency to call things by other names seem mere contrariness for its own sake."⁷ But a look at the characteristic features of the Japanese society, particularly those that affect the negotiating behavior and foreign relations, will help us understand that the Western perceptions or stereotypes are exaggerated or plain wrong. Dr. Michael Blaker, the first scholar to focus on the Japanese international negotiating style, likewise came to the conclusion that the materials examined in his exhaustive study of Japanese negotiation techniques did "not support the image of Japanese diplomats as devious and underhanded," and that "[t]his popular stereotype seems both unwarranted and undeserved."⁸

Japanese Cultural Characteristics

In my courses on Japanese politics and foreign policy, I have always included one or two lectures on the socio-cultural background of the Japanese society, and stressed the following aspects:⁹

(1) insularity, isolation, homogeneity, national self-consciousness; (2) the tradition of adopt and adapt; (3) group identity and "we-they" mentality, fear of social rejection; (4) hierarchical structures and vertical society, *oyabun-kobun* (parent-child, boss-underling) relationship; (5) the value of harmony and consensus, conformity and emotion; (6) the

distinction between form and content, appearance and reality (*tatemaehonne*); (7) dependency and *amae*; (8) shame and guilt cultures, ambivalence; (9) *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, two aspects of the Japanese personality? (10) feelings of vulnerability and insecurity, anxiety and tension; (11) affluence and poor-man mentality; (12) feelings of victimization (*higaisha ishiki*), “goatability” (scapegoating) and Japan-bashing, orphan Japan; (13) dependency and *amae* expectations; arrogance and “counter-*amae*” psychology.

Any discussion of Japanese social characteristics would be incomplete without reference to the morals teachings (*Shushin*) that all Japanese had studied in schools until Japan’s defeat and educational reforms initiated by the American Occupation.¹⁰ One sees the importance of the spirit of harmony (*wa*) and the “Cultivation of spirit of benevolence.” The “Shame” aspect of Japanese culture is clearly seen in the last injunction to honor one’s obligations “to parents and Emperor and avoid bringing shame to them.”

Dr. Mamoru Iga, Emeritus Professor of Sociology at California State University, Northridge, compares Japanese and American value orientations in his book, *The Thorn in the Chrysanthemum*.¹¹ Dr. Iga stresses Japanese monism (compared to American dualism), groupism (compared to American individualism), accommodationism; and authoritarian familism (versus American egalitarianism).

Professor John W. Connor¹² has developed a list of comparisons of traditional Japanese and American values that highlight Japanese socio-cultural characteristics. Of these values, the following are relevant to our discussion of Japanese negotiating behavior: reliance on the group; emphasis on hierarchy; emphasis on duty; dependency needs; achievement of goals set by others; emphasis on self-effacement; responsibility to others; deference and politeness; success through self-discipline and will power; and an emphasis on compromise, precise rules of conduct, and a “situational ethic.”

It should also be noted that the social critic Yamamoto Shichihei has characterized Japanese culture as “a culture of negotiation” (*hanashiai*), rather than “a culture of contract” (*keiyaku*). Contract “presupposes a commitment to some abstract (long-lasting) principle, while ‘negotiation’ presupposes a greater concern with the immediate interaction, to which the ego adjusts for tension reduction or for short-range problem solving.”¹³

I consider the following to be the most important Japanese characteristics. We should start with the notion that *group* orientation, rather than individualism, is paramount in Japan.¹⁴ As for group dynamism, it is important to note that hierarchical structure is prevalent, as it was in Confucian China. A well-known scholarly work on Japanese society is entitled “Vertical Society.”¹⁵ Japanese language and speech patterns provide further proof of hierarchical social relationships. For example, the Japanese distinguish between giving *to* or receiving *from* a person of higher or lower rank or social status in relationship to the speaker, and the Japanese (and in this case also the Chinese) have separate words for older and younger brothers or sisters. Within this hierarchical society, values and relationships that seem to predominate (perhaps because of the insularity, crowded environment, and homogeneity of the population) are “harmony” (*wa*),¹⁶ “civil formality” (*tatemaeh*), and

dependency (*amae*).

The last concept was articulated in the mid-1950s by the eminent psychoanalyst Dr. Doi Takeo.¹⁷ He proposed that *amae* was a key concept for understanding Japanese personality structure. *Amae* feeling is “to depend and presume upon another’s benevolence.” It is the feelings that all normal infants have toward the mother: dependence, the desire to be passively loved, the unwillingness to be separated from the warm mother-child circle and cast into a world of objective “reality.” Put another way, *amae* is a dependency need which manifests itself in a longing to merge with others. This longing can be fulfilled under normal conditions in infancy, but it cannot be easily satisfied as one grows up. Yet the need for *amae* continues, and it is argued that this search for *amae* beyond infancy manifests itself in a variety of social conventions and characteristics.

Dr. Doi followed his *amae* research, with a book-length study of *tatemae* and *honne*. Earlier I have described these two Japanese words to mean “appearance and reality.” Dr. Doi’s formulation is somewhat different and importantly he also ties *tatemae* to group harmony (*wa*).

Tatemae is a certain formal principle which is palatable to everybody concerned so that the *harmony* of a group is guaranteed, while *honne* is the feelings or opinions which they privately hold regarding the matter.¹⁸ (emphasis added)

Dr. Doi argues that when the Japanese use *tatemae*, there is no intent to deceive. He does bring in the expression “Devil-mask, Buddha-mind (*kimen busshin*). But one can also imagine the reverse, “Buddha-mask, Devil-mind.” Mitsuru Inuta has written of his countrymen’s “tendency to disguise their real intentions beneath an agreeable, smiling appearance (*tatemae*).”¹⁹ Thus, while Dr. Doi may be right about the lack of deception in the *in-group*, I would venture the thought that his observation may not necessarily be true of relationships (and negotiations) with *out-groups*. In other words, what is not permissible *in the group* and is generally not practiced (whether in the family, the company, or the nation) may be acceptable behavior when dealing with persons *outside* the group.

Amae, *wa* and *tatemae* lead to other characteristics, namely politeness, indirectness, avoidance of conflict, the use of intermediaries, silent pauses in conversation, and the ambiguity of the Japanese language — all of them very important for the negotiating process.

Above all, one should heed Professor J. V. Neustupny’s injunction not to “search for a simple explanation of Japan through a single principle.” He points to a number of explanatory concepts that “claim the power to explain the whole lot or at least large bundles of features of Japanese society: *amae*, vertical society, Zen, *tatemae* and *honne*, *oyabun-kobun* relationship, group harmony, and many others.”²⁰

Twenty years after his articulation of the importance of *amae*, Dr. Doi linked it to the Japanese patterns of communication. He posited that “all interpersonal communications in Japanese society have the emotional undertone of *amae*,” and that many short breaks in Japanese conversation can be explained as feeling out one another and assessing the situation. He concluded that “what is most important for Japanese is to reassure themselves on every occasion of a mutuality based upon *amae*.²¹ Dr. Doi also talks about the ambiguity of the

Japanese language, and the fact how little the Japanese communicate in international conferences. The ambiguity of the Japanese language is legendary. Lack of precision is, of course, wonderful for poetry, when a thought can trail off into nothingness, but it is not desirable for legal contracts. Is that one of the reasons why the Japanese prefer oral agreements to formal contracts? Let me quote again Dr. Doi:

Japanese communication is usually quite loose in logical connections. You can go on talking for hours, even gracefully, without coming to the point. That is why it is sometimes extremely difficult to render a Japanese speech or article into English.²²

Let me finish this brief survey of Japanese cultural characteristics by mentioning the Japanese reluctance to say "No" (a form of indirectness in communications as well as a desire not to offend). In Japan one simply does not say "no," for that would be too direct, abrupt, and ultimately impolite. Keiko Ueda has compiled a list of sixteen ways the Japanese avoid saying "no":²³ vague "no"; vague and ambiguous "yes" or "no"; silence; counter question; tangential responses; exiting (leaving); lying (equivocation or making an excuse — sickness, previous obligation, etc.); criticizing the question itself; refusing the question; conditional "no"; "Yes, but. . ."; delaying answers (e.g., "We will write you a letter"); internally "yes," externally "no"; internally "no," externally "yes"; apology; the equivalent of the English "no" — primarily used in filling out forms, *not* in conversation. I think she has missed the most common way one avoids saying "no" in Japan: one simply says that "it would be difficult" (*muzukashii desu ne . . .*), in essence a code word for "no."

What do all these traits have in common? Just as in the case of *amae*, the civil formality of *tatemae* also performs useful social functions. My feeling is that in a crowded society one has to maintain a certain civility. Perhaps there is fear that blurting out one's true feelings would lead to *disharmony*, and all hell would break loose. Perhaps the imprecision of the Japanese language is related to the use of *tatemae* to promote harmony in the group. Would direct, explicit speech endanger the cohesiveness of the group? And, finally, would not body language, and the use of frequent silent pauses instead of speech be safer in a group situation? In other words, one can speculate that all of this may be connected to the fear of the environment.

Japanese Diplomatic Style

Many Japanese observers take it to be virtually axiomatic that there is a basic incompatibility between American and Japanese negotiators. This naturally extends to the field of diplomacy. The noted Japanese political scientist Mushakoji Kinhide believes that this basic incompatibility derives from a fundamental philosophical difference in views about the relationship between humans and their environment. He juxtaposes the American *erabi* style and the Japanese *awase* style. The American style (choosing, can-do, or "manipulative") is grounded in the belief that "man can freely manipulate his environment for his own purposes." The Japanese style ("adaptive") "rejects the idea that man can manipulate the

environment and assumes instead that he adjusts himself to it.”²⁴ From this Japanese attitude follow appeals to past obligation and requests for present favor (shades of *amae*, see below). My own interpretation of the Japanese acceptance of the environment is that it stems from vulnerabilities caused by frequent natural disasters.

Are the Japanese poor diplomats? Some Western scholars have commented on the negative aspects of Japanese diplomatic practice. Blaker characterized the Japanese approach as “Probe, Push, and Panic.”²⁵ Professor Robert Friedheim writes that

The behavior of Japanese negotiators . . . is difficult for an outsider to understand. To some, it is inexplicable in that Japanese representatives seemed to follow strategy and tactics that were most likely to produce an outcome that would be unsatisfactory to her negotiators, and perhaps to her interests.²⁶

In discussing the “instinctive,” or village/feudal, Japanese approach, Professor Gregory Clark lists some positive aspects, but points to diplomacy as an area where it works badly.²⁷ Dr. Doi echoes Dr. Clark’s negative view of Japanese diplomacy:

I think this attitude of the Japanese [toward ambivalence] very much affects their relationships with foreigners. If they show their ambivalence to each other, they will naturally manifest it even more toward foreigners, in turn inviting foreigners’ ambivalence. The upshot of all this is that they may not really be liked by foreigners in spite of an ardent desire to be liked. *This, incidentally, explains the rather poor performance by Japanese in international diplomacy.* In particular, they do not seem to be able to exert leadership in the arena of international politics. But how can they when they have the same problem in domestic politics?²⁸ (emphasis added)

As diplomat Kitamura Hiroshi has noted in his perceptive monograph on the “Psychological Dimensions of U.S.-Japanese Relations,” the *amae* psychology plays a very important role in formulating Japanese psychological attitudes in international relations. He posits the pervasive Japanese sense of “an unbalanced relationship” with the United States, which fits with the general “sense of hierarchy,” which I have discussed above. He feels that certain Japanese psychological traits and national characteristics have become so intertwined with this “relationship of unevenness” as to pose major psychological problems. The “sense of hierarchy,” according to Mr. Kitamura, produces (a) “respect and awe,” (b) “feeling of being victimized,” and (c) “placing on a pedestal” and “disillusionment.” He then proceeds to *amae* psychology and argues that the Japanese feel that because the United States is more powerful than Japan, it should — to a certain extent — indulge them: “The unbalanced relationship between Japan and the United States . . . is highly conducive to initiating an *amae* psychology.”²⁹ Having lost the war, Japan had to depend heavily on American “benevolence” in almost all phases of national survival. This, according to Kitamura, has led to “unrealistic” and “take-it-for-granted” attitudes, which in turn have led to “frustrated” and “hostile” attitudes when the American behavior in negotiations did not gratify or satisfy the Japanese desire for *amae*.

In a study of U.S.-Japanese relations, Professor Sato Hideo points to misperceptions

rooted in cultural differences. He brings special attention to consensus, *amae* and sincerity, *haragei* (nonverbal) bargaining, and form versus substance.³⁰

Another senior Japanese diplomat Ogura Kazuo, in his monograph, *Trade Conflict: A View from Japan*, stresses the dependency theme:

As U.S. criticism of Japan's bilateral trade surpluses has grown stronger in recent years, there has been a parallel rise in Japanese charges that the United States does not understand Japan. While these charges do contain a good deal of truth, they also spring in part from the Japanese feeling that since Japan is willing to play the inferior "younger brother" role with the United States, the United States, as an "older brother," should understand Japan and be more sympathetic to and protective of Japanese interests.³¹

I think that in discussing *amae* relationships, it is important to consider the power relationship between individuals, groups, or nations. How do the Japanese feel in the mid-1990s, fifty years after the defeat in World War II, now that the power relationship between Japan and the United States has changed and in some areas shifted in Japan's favor? In the economic sphere, one measure would be total GNP, where Japan's total product in the early 1950s was 1/26 of the U.S. GNP, compared to 3/4 (or higher, depending on the value of the yen in relationship to the U.S. dollar) in the 1990s.³² Another measure could be GNP per capita, where Japanese incomes have likewise risen dramatically. From a fraction of the U.S. per capita income in the 1950s, the Japanese became richer than the Americans by the late 1980s. The question is, did Japanese perceptions of and attitudes toward the United States change as the power relationship changed over time? And was there, therefore, a corresponding decline in *amae* expectations?³³

Conveniently, Ambassador Kitamura has recently updated his thoughts about the psychological factors in U.S.-Japanese relations. He notes with satisfaction that Japan is now "a global economic power and a responsible member of the international community."

But sadly despite this rise in status, the Japanese still seem to harbor feelings of *amae* toward America. *Amae* in the sense of expecting the United States to take care of us in some way has gradually diminished since the 1970s. In recent years, however, we have seen the emergence of *amae* in a different guise.³⁴

He thinks that failure on the part of the Japanese government to adopt definite domestic demand-expansion or market-opening policies to significantly reduce the unrealistically large balance-of-payments surplus is a kind of *amae* vis-a-vis America that allows the Japanese people to underestimate the seriousness of the issue. Even the sentimental satisfaction that is felt that Japan can say "No" seems to be linked to a kind of *amae* that assumes that America will reconsider. Kitamura notes that it is very difficult to overcome *amae*, since basically it derives from a wishful, unrealistic perspective. He hopes that Japan will share global responsibilities with the United States, and doing so will go a long way toward overcoming *amae* toward America.³⁵

Yet, I was looking in vain for signs that may be Japan was getting to a position where she could *dispense* some *amae* to the United States. Unhappily, I think that Japan is essentially

comfortable *receiving amae*, and arguably Japan is still the weaker party in this relationship. But what happens when the power relationship is clearly in Japan's favor? Let us take, for example, Japanese behavior toward Korea and China from the last decade of the nineteenth century to the end of World War II. One looks in vain for a *giving amae* relationship. Quite to the contrary, Japan had displayed what I would call a *counter-amae* behavior.

The Roots of Japanese Behavior

Why do the Japanese behave as they do? Most writers describe behavior without trying to explain the underlying roots. However, Professor John Graham and Mr. Yoshihiro Sano, in their book, *Smart Bargaining: Doing Business with the Japanese*, do offer some explanations. They specifically mention three environmental factors: (1) insular and mountainous geography, (2) dense population, and (3) the importance of rice.³⁶ I would certainly accept these explanations, but perhaps would focus somewhat differently and stress additional factors.

I think the roots of Japanese behavior stem from:

(1) *insular mentality* (*shima-guni konjo*), isolation, homogeneity, national self-consciousness; (2) the pervading and related *tribal cohesiveness* termed *Nihonkyo*; (3) the prevalence of violent acts of Nature, leading to a sense of *insecurity* and *vulnerability*; (4) *poor-man mentality* which persists in spite of growing affluence; and (5) feelings of victimization (*higaisha ishiki*), orphan Japan.

Centuries of self-imposed isolation during the Tokugawa period, along with the geographical isolation of an insular nation, and a homogeneous population that had experienced centuries of feudal rule and fragmented loyalties have combined to produce a very powerful *national self-consciousness* and fierce subnational group loyalties. Proximity to the superior Chinese material and spiritual civilization and later the confrontation with advanced Western technology have necessarily affected the Japanese self-esteem. And what better way to counter such doubts than to stress the uniqueness of Japanese experience and culture.

Nihonkyo (Japanism) is a term used by the social critic Yamamoto Shichihei (mentioned above). He maintains that *Nihonkyo* so thoroughly permeates all aspects of Japanese life and personality that its followers are not even conscious of their adherence to its doctrine.³⁷ The doctrine of *Nihonkyo* is a simple, indefinable system of concepts characterized by the worship of tradition, which is essential in the Japanese personality. The concept of *Nihonkyo* fits nicely with Robert Christopher's contention that "the Japanese people as a whole have only one absolutely immutable goal — to ensure the survival and maximum well-being of the tribe."³⁸ I use the term *Nihonkyo* to denote the *tribal cohesiveness* of the Japanese.

Nature has not been generous to Japan. The country is not endowed with abundant natural resources, like Russia or the United States. Not only did Nature shortchange Japan, but it regularly unleashes destruction: typhoons, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, tidal waves — the latter incidentally known in the world by the Japanese name *tsunami*.³⁹ Being buffeted by the forces of nature for centuries is bound to produce a sense of *insecurity* and *vulnerability*.

On the positive side, these very liabilities have been amply compensated by the Japanese genius-like ability to adopt and, even more importantly, to adapt.

And in spite of growing affluence, I would venture the thought that the Japanese (at least the older and middle-age generations who have experienced the misery and destruction of war and early postwar deprivations) are afflicted with a persistent *poor-man mentality* (not unlike the Depression generation in the United States). One should note, in addition, that Japanese affluence is the affluence of the society, and not of individual middle-class Japanese, whose standard of living is well below that of their counterparts in the United States and Western Europe.⁴⁰

The preceding two factors have combined to create feelings of *victimization*. Except for short periods, Japan was a weak country relative to its colossus neighbor China, and later relative to the great Western imperialist powers. Like Germany, Japan was a latecomer to industrialization and colonization and had to play catchup. The Japanese were discriminated against in the United States (California land ownership laws, U.S. Oriental exclusion act, removal and relocation of Japanese-Americans during World War II) and it was on racial grounds. Then the atom bomb. Many Japanese are convinced that the bomb was not used on Germany, because Germany was a white nation and that dropping the bomb on Japan was racially motivated. (Never mind the reality that the bomb was tested over two months *after* Germany had surrendered.) Feelings of victimization were reinforced by the occupation of "Northern territories" by the Red Army at the end of the war and the exploitation of half a million Japanese prisoners-of-war in slave labor camps in Siberia. (Incidentally, the last two events of the war have conveniently transformed the Japanese in their eyes from aggressors to victims, but that is another matter.) The Nixon shocks, the oil shocks, Japan bashing, foreign pressure (*gaiatsu*), the list goes on.

These factors seem to explain Japanese negotiating behavior. My thoughts are offered in the hope that we better understand Japanese negotiating behavior, that Western negotiators can better adjust to negotiations with the Japanese, and that some of the insights presented in this paper might benefit Japanese negotiators in the future.

Notes

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Southern California, for their support, and Bin Li for research assistance. As is customary to add, final responsibility is mine alone.

- 1 Professor John Graham's comments on my paper at UCLA, February 11, 1995.
- 2 On Chinese negotiating traits, see Richard H. Solomon, "China: Friendship and Obligation in Chinese Negotiating Style," chapter in Hans Binnendijk (ed.), *National Negotiating Styles* (n.p.: U.S. Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 1987), pp. 1-16.
- 3 Dr. Alan Goldman, *For Japanese Only: Intercultural Communication with Americans* (Tokyo: The Japan Times, 1988), pp. 36-45.
- 4 Robert M. March, *The Japanese Negotiator: Subtlety and Strategy Beyond Western Logic* (Tokyo and New York: Kodansha International, 1988), p. 32.
- 5 Many of these concepts come from the following works: John L. Graham and Yoshihiro Sano, *Smart Bargaining: Doing Business with the Japanese* (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1984), Chap. 3, "The Japanese Negotiation Style," pp. 17-32; Edward T. Hall and Mildred Reed Hall, *Hidden Differences — Doing Business With the Japanese* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1987). See The Vocabulary of Human Relationships, p. 61, and Glossary, pp. 157-160; Nathaniel B. Thayer and Stephen E. Weiss, "Japan: The Changing Logic of a Former Minor Power," chapter in Binnendijk, *National Negotiating Styles*, pp. 45-74.
- 6 For the Soviet "art" of negotiation, see Philip Mosely's classic study, based on his personal experiences of dealing with the Soviets during World War II, Philip E. Mosely, "Some Soviet Techniques of Negotiation" in Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson (eds.), *Negotiating with the Russians* (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1951); and Leon Sloss and M. Scott Davis, "The Soviet Union: The Pursuit of Power and Influence through Negotiation," chapter in Binnendijk, *National Negotiating Styles*, pp. 17-43.
- 7 See Note 3.
- 8 Michael Blaker, *Japanese International Negotiating Style* (Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 223.
- 9 Following my interest in Japanese culture, I organized a panel on "Psychoanalysis and Japanese Cultural Characteristics" at the 73rd Annual Meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association in San Diego, May 5, 1984. (At the time, I was a Clinical Associate at the Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Institute.) See the papers by Frank A. Johnson, M.D. on "Multilevel Survey of *Amae*"; Masafumi Nakakuki, M.D. on "Two Major Characteristics of Japanese Culture, *Amae* and *Shibumi*" — Psychoanalytic Interpretation"; Yasuhiko Taketomo, M.D. on "*Amae* as a Meta-Language: A Critique of Doi's Theory and a Proposal of an Alternative Theory"; Tatsuro Takahashi, M.D. on "A Comparative Study of Japanese and American Group Dynamics"; and Mamoru Iga, Ph.D. on "Suicide and Economic Success in Modern Japan." Mark Gehrie, Ph.D., a cultural anthropologist and a psychoanalyst, and Colleen Leahy Johnson, Ph.D., a professor of medical anthropology, served as discussants.
- 10 The importance of *shushin* in the socialization process of the Japanese can be seen from the emphasis placed on *shushin* classes attended by first-generation Japanese-Americans in an extensive interview project at UCLA in the 1960s. Michele Berton, "Identity Problems of a Minority: The Case of the Japanese-Americans," draft of a Master of Arts thesis, California Graduate Institute, July 1987.
- 11 Mamoru Iga, *The Thorn in the Chrysanthemum: Suicide and Economic Success in Modern Japan* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986). See especially Chap. VII, "Japanese Value Orientation," pp. 114-138, incl. Table 32, p. 116.
- 12 John W. Connor, "Traditional Japanese Attributes or Values and Traditional American Attributes or Values," in Lois Frost, *Child Raising Techniques as Related to Acculturation Among Japanese Americans*, M.A. thesis (Anthropology), Sacramento State College, 1970, p. 77.
- 13 Yamamoto Shichihei, *Nihon shihon-shugi no seishin* [Capitalistic Spirit in Japan] (Tokyo: Kobunsha, 1979), p. 66, cited in Iga, *The Thorn in the Chrysanthemum*, p. 135-136.
In his comments on this paper, Professor Gordon Berger suggested that the reverse of Yamamoto's

- arguments may be true. Perhaps the Japanese *hanashiai* is predicated on assumptions of long-term relatedness, the *tatema* of Dr. Doi, within which people maneuver for the gratification of their needs and interests. Contractual relationships are, by definition, finite, and short-term.
- 14 Dr. Nakakuki believes that there is a narcissistic quality in this group orientation. Individuals have a strong urge to merge with each other, and develop a feeling of being united (*Ittaikan*). Group members are supportive, soothing, and receptive to each other within the group (narcissistic self-object relationship). "Two Major Characteristics of Japanese Culture," p. 2.
 - 15 Chie Nakane, *Japanese Society* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970), p. x.
 - 16 It should be noted, however, that not all scholars accept the model of Japan as a harmonious and group-oriented society. See Harumi Befu, "A Critique of the Group Model of Japanese Society." Professor Befu furthermore suggests that the model is prescriptive rather than descriptive. In other words, as a model *for* behavior rather than a model *of* behavior. According to Prof. Befu, a Japanese *must* act harmoniously in order to be a *true* Japanese. Prof. Harumi Befu, "Bunkaron: Japan's Living Myth," Stanford at Berkeley" lecture, March 17, 1983, summarized in *Bay Area East Asian Studies Newsletter*, Vol. IV, No. 7 (April 1, 1983), p. 2.
 - 17 Takeo Doi, *The Anatomy of Dependence* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1973).
See also Frank A. Johnson, *Dependency and Japanese Socialization: Psychoanalytic and Anthropological Investigations into Amae* (New York and London: New York University Press, 1993).
For an exploration of the pervasiveness of *amae* in many aspects of Japanese life, see Douglas D. Mitchell, *Amaeru: The Expression of Reciprocal Dependency Needs in Japanese Politics and Law* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1976).
That the concept of *amae* is unique to Japan was challenged by the Korean novelist, playwright, and critic Lee O-Young, who claims that "dependence is even more inextricably bound up with the Korean psyche than it is with the Japanese." Oh-Young Lee, *The Compact Culture: The Japanese Tradition of "Smaller is Better"* (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1991), p. 11. This is the English translation of I Oryon, "*Chijimi*" *shiko no Nihonjin* (Tokyo: Gakuseisha, 1982), pp. 12-13.
Ambassador Edamura makes the same point with regard to Indonesia and Spain.
 - 18 Takeo Doi, *The Anatomy of Self: The Individual Versus Society* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1986). Translation of *Omote to Ura*. Appendix Two, "Omote and Ura: Concepts Derived from the Japanese 2-Fold Structure of Consciousness," p. 159.
 - 19 Quoted in Raymond Cohen, *Negotiating Across Cultures: Communication Obstacles in International Diplomacy* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1991), p. 129.
 - 20 V. Neustupny, *Communicating with the Japanese* (Tokyo: The Japan Times, 1987), p. 196.
 - 21 L. Takeo Doi, "The Japanese Patterns of Communication and the Concept of *Amae*," *The Quarterly Journal of Speech*, Vol. 59, No. 2 (April 1973), pp. 180-185 at p. 181.
 - 22 *Ibid.*, p. 183.
 - 23 Keiko Ueda, "Sixteen Ways to Avoid Saying 'No' in Japan," in J.C. Condon and M. Saito (eds.), *Intercultural Encounters in Japan* (Tokyo: Simul Press, 1974), pp. 185-192, reproduced in Graham and Sano, *Smart Bargaining*, p. 24.
 - 24 Kinhide Mushakoji, *Kokusai seiji to Nihon* [International Politics and Japan] (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1967), pp. 155-175; quoted in Cohen, *Negotiating Across Cultures*, pp. 30-31; and in I. M. Destler, Hideo Sato, Priscilla Clapp, Haruhiro Fukui, *Managing an Alliance: The Politics of U.S.-Japanese Relations* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976), p. 108.
Incidentally, the goal of psychotherapy in Japan is to help the patient accept and adjust to the environment, rather than develop individual potential.
 - 25 Michael Blaker, "Probe, Push, and Panic," in Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973). See also his latest work, "Evaluating Japan's Diplomatic Performance," Chap. 1 in Gerald L. Curtis (ed.), *Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change* (Armonk, NY and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1993).
 - 26 Robert L. Friedheim, "Moderation in the Pursuit of Justice: Explaining Japan's Failure in the

- International Whaling Negotiations,” paper prepared for this Conference.
- 27 Gregory Clark, “Instinctively Different” — The ‘Contradictions’ of the Japanese,” *Speaking of Japan*, Vol. 8, No. 80 (August 1987), pp. 18-21.
- 28 Dr. Takeo Doi, “The Japanese Psyche: Myth and Reality” (New York: Japan Society, 1989) (Distinguished Lecturer Series, May 2, 1989), pp. 11-20, at p. 18.
- 29 Hiroshi Kitamura, *Psychological Dimensions of U.S.-Japanese Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 28 (August 1971), 42 pp. Available from University Press of America.
- Of course, *amae* feelings are not unique to Japanese diplomacy. One can argue that in the Anglo-American so-called special relationship the British expect special treatment (*amae*?) from the United States.
- 30 I. M. Destler, *Managing an Alliance*, Chapter 4, “Misperceptions Across the Pacific” (largely written by Professor Sato), pp. 89-124.
- 31 Kazuo Ogura, *Trade Conflict: A View From Japan* (Washington, D.C., Japan Economic Institute, n.d. [1984?]), Chap. 3, “The Socio-Psychological Framework of U.S.-Japan Relations,” pp. 19-27, and Chap. 5, “Japanese Cultural Traits and U.S.-Japan Economic Friction,” pp. 35-39.
- Mr. Ogura has also written about the Chinese negotiating style: Kazuo Ogura, “How the ‘Inscrutables’ Negotiate with the ‘Inscrutables’: Chinese Negotiating Tactic vis-a-vis the Japanese,” *China Quarterly*, No. 79 (September 1979), pp. 529-552.
- 32 On April 19, 1995, when the yen soared to a record 79.75 to the dollar, Japan’s gross domestic product (GDP) came to within two-tenths of one percentage point of equaling the value of all goods and services produced in the United States. Sam Jameson, “As Yen Rises, Japanese and U.S. GDPs Go Head-to-Head,” *The Los Angeles Times*, May 8, 1995, p. D1.
- 33 One of my ongoing research projects is to look at the post-World War II Japanese-American relations and try to correlate Japanese attitudes toward the United States with the shifting power relationship.
- 34 Hiroshi Kitamura, “Psychological Factors in Friction Between Japan and America,” *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Summer 1994), p. 217.
- 35 *Ibid.*, pp. 217-218.
- One should also mention that many younger Japanese diplomats do not have feelings of *amae* toward their American counterparts and furthermore are aware that *amae* does not work with Americans.
- 36 Graham and Sano, *Smart Bargaining*, p. 17
- 37 Isaiah BenDasan (pseud.), *Nihonjin to Yudayajin* [The Japanese and the Jews] (Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten, 1971), p. 115, cited in Iga, *The Thorn in the Chrysanthemum*, p. 126.
- It is common knowledge that Yamamoto wrote this book. He used the BenDasan pseudonym so that it would appear that the book was written by a Sephardi Jew long resident in Japan.
- 38 Robert C. Christopher, *The Japanese Mind: The Goliath Explained* (New York: Linden Press/Simon & Schuster, 1983), p. 55, cited in Iga, *The Thorn in the Chrysanthemum*, p. 126.
- 39 Perhaps it takes an outsider to point out the importance of natural disasters. My friend, the late Russian scholar Alexander Vanovsky in one of his books argued about the importance of volcanoes in the interpretation of one of the earliest Japanese chronicles, the *Kojiki* [Records of Ancient Matters], an obvious phenomenon that somehow escaped Japanese scholars.
- 40 I remember a Washington correspondent of *Asahi Shimbun* telling me that the house he was renting in the suburbs of the District of Columbia was superior to the mansion of the Murayama family, the owners of his newspaper, not to mention the company-provided small apartments of his superiors in the newspaper’s chain of command.