

THE RUSSIAN DECISION-MAKING PROCESS TOWARD JAPAN

KIMURA, Hiroshi

International Research Center for Japanese Studies, Kyoto, Japan

In October 1993, the Russian President Yeltsin visited Japan and conducted negotiations with Japanese Prime Minister Hosokawa in order to solve the Northern Territories and other issues. The parliamentary elections in December 1993 shifted further the political atmosphere in Russia to nationalistic patriotism, which has made Russia's return of the islands to Japan in the near future almost impossible. On the other hand, when one looks at the Northern Islands, it is important to note that the Russian inhabitants are increasingly favoring the return of the disputed islands to Japan. This is largely due to the difficulties of every day life, aggravated by the breakup of the U.S.S.R. and further accelerated by the 1994 earthquake. How can we reconcile these two diametrically opposed phenomena? Which groups play a more decisive role in Russia's decision-making over the Northern Territories issue: the center (Moscow) or the periphery (the Northern Islands)? At presents, this is a very difficult question to answer.

Keywords: BORIS YELTSIN, RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY, NORTHERN TERRITORIES, NORTHERN ISLANDS, RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS, FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING, ANDREI KOZYREV.

I. CENTRAL LEVEL (MOSCOW)

1. The Change from "Atlanticism" to "Eurasianism"

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia's diplomatic efforts can be broadly divided into two approaches.

The first might be called "Atlanticism",¹ which can be summarized as follows: In the context of the post-Cold War international community, Russia is an ally of the civilized nations of the West, sharing with them such values as a commitment to democracy, human rights, respect for the individual, liberalism, and belief in a market economy. It is therefore necessary for Russia and the West to work closely together. In other words, the partners with the highest priority in Russian diplomacy are "those countries that already have democracies in place and have achieved prosperity through economic development; more specifically, the United States, the countries of Western Europe, and Japan" (*Izvestiia*, 1991.10.02: 3) [Author's emphasis]. Former Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev was the leading proponent of this approach.

The second approach might be called "Eurasianism", which involves the following assertions: In view of Russia's unique geographical position and the conditions surrounding its political, economic, and cultural development, it is incapable of quickly following the road to Western Europeanization. Not only that, but such a road may not even be desirable. Rather than looking to the "West" and the "North", Russia should seek ways of pursuing political, economic, and military cooperation with countries lying to the

“East” and the “South”. Specifically, this means fulfilling Russian national interests by establishing close cooperative relationships and coalitions with the “near abroad. (*blizhnee zarubezhe*)” countries belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Islamic countries of the Middle East, China, India, and the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. Proponents of the Eurasian point of view include Sergei Stankevich, Ruslan Khasbulatov, Evgenii Ambartsumov, and Vladimir Lukin.

There are many variants in addition to the two main currents of “Atlanticism” and “Eurasianism”, each with its own particular nuance or emphasis.² Of these, two warrant special mention because they reject the Atlanticist premise that Western Europe is superior to Russia. Instead, they claim that Russia has unique and original values that do not exist in the West, and that there is absolutely no need for Russians to model their development along Western European lines.

Starting from this shared premise, the two variants proceed in opposite directions. The first variant is “isolationism”, which seeks to minimize Russian contact with the outside world, whether north, south, east, or west, and exhorts Russians to concentrate their interest and energy on domestic problems. According to this view, it was Russia’s excessive expansion abroad that started it on the road to ruin in the first place, and now it should return to the task of creating a richer society at home. This position is similar to the views held by Alexander Solzhenitsyn (Solzhenitsyn, 1991: 6-7, 9, 11-12, 14, 18-20, 22).

The second variant is “imperialism”. Taking the opposite approach from the isolationists, proponents of this view advocate Russia’s active participation and expansion abroad. They believe that Russia has a mission to propagate its unique, and superior values to the rest of the world. To them, the breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991 was a truly regrettable tragedy. Although they know it is useless to cry over spilt milk, they have now set their sights on achieving reintegration by tightening the bonds among CIS nations. People like former Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi tend toward this view.

The diverse assertions of the “Atlanticists”, “Eurasianists”, “isolationists”, and “imperialists” are reflected in the foreign policy of President Yeltsin in a variety of ways. For a while after assuming power, Yeltsin adopted the Atlanticist position and pursued a cooperative approach with the West. He looked upon Western democracy as his political model, Western capitalism as his economic model, and believed that cooperation with the West was the best diplomatic course for Russia to take. He even went so far as to say, in January 1992, that Russia was not merely a “partner” with the West, but actually a latent “ally.” From around the fall of 1992, however, it became evident that Yeltsin had changed course, pursuing a uniquely Russian diplomatic line that emphasized Russia’s “special status.” This change was clearly revealed in two ways: 1) a revision of his previously conciliatory attitude toward the West; and 2) the adoption of words and actions that reflected an aspiration to dominate other member states of the CIS.

In the first place, during the early stages of the Yeltsin Administration, Foreign Minister Kozyrev placed priority on economic strength and emphasized Russia’s need to become a “normal great power.” (Kozyrev, 1992: 10, 15). From the fall of 1992 on, however, Yeltsin himself began to assert that Russia was different from Eastern European countries, claiming it was a “great power (*derzhava*)” that not only possessed substantial

military power but also inherent strength provided by a huge land area and rich natural and human resources. For these reasons, Yeltsin began insisting that he had the right to demand a "special status" for Russia that appropriately reflected its special conditions. Taking this line a step further in his annual state-of-the nation address to the State Duma at the end of February 1994, Yeltsin even advocated the foundation of a "strong Russian state."

Next, the Yeltsin administration announced that Russia has a special interest in what it calls the "near abroad" countries of the CIS, saying that it was by no means indifferent to problems that might arise in those countries, and that, under certain conditions, it had both the right and the obligation to intervene. For example, the Russian military doctrine established on November 2, 1993, states that when circumstances in the "near abroad" countries had the potential to affect Russian security, Russia was justified in sending in troops and using military force over there. Then, in June 1995, Foreign Minister Kozyrev, who was considered pro-Western, also stunned the world by stating that Russia must not hesitate to use military force in CIS member countries in order to protect ethnic Russians living there.

2. Background Causes and Specific Policies

We can point to the following reasons behind the shift in the diplomatic approach displayed by the Yeltsin leadership: 1) Russia's attempts to establish a democracy and convert to a free market economy using a Western model have run into trouble, and the lack of smooth progress has been the source of disillusionment and exasperation; 2) Assistance from the West, which Russians believe to be indispensable for making the transition to democracy and a market mechanism, has not only been inadequate from the Russian point of view, but has come with too many restrictive strings attached, resulting in feelings of dissatisfaction and hopelessness; 3) Eurasianists have become increasingly critical of what they consider the excessively "romantic infantile pro-Americanism" (Lukin; *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 1992.10.20) which has characterized Kozyrev's diplomacy, saying that such single-minded pursuit of Western approval is too humiliating for Russia; 4) It is necessary to protect ethnic Russians (about 25 million) living in other CIS nations and the Baltic states, who are afraid they will be discriminated against and relegated to the status of second-class citizens; 5) As symbolized by the gains made in the December 1993 elections by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and his so-called Liberal Democratic Party, the Russian people are quickly becoming alienated from Yeltsin and the reformists. In his efforts to resist the ultra rightists and nationalists, Yeltsin has therefore been forced to adopt certain aspects of their agenda and incorporate them as part of his administration's policy.

Regardless of the background facts, however, specific measures adopted by the Yeltsin Administration since the second half of 1992 prove that Yeltsin has indeed changed his diplomatic orientation, by taking, for instance, the following concrete foreign policy measures:

(1) Since the July 1993 G-7 summit in Tokyo, Yeltsin has expressed satisfaction with the fact that Russia has been officially invited to subsequent G-7 summits as a *de facto*

eighth member of the political conference, and that Russia's pride as a great power is sufficiently assuaged by its attendance at these meetings.

(2) The Yeltsin leadership has expressed dissatisfaction with the idea of an expanded NATO that does not include Russia, and yet has also rejected the idea that Russia should join NATO under the same conditions as other East European countries. Yeltsin has demanded a "special status" for Russia commensurate with its position as a great power (*derzhava*).

(3) The Yeltsin government has repeatedly advocated expanding the role of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), to which the former Soviet Union and now Russia already belongs. Their aim is to transform the OSCE, which is a simple security organization, into a body that can also deal with political issues in Europe. At the same time, they want to convert NATO (to which Russia does not belong) into an organization that deals exclusively with security issues.

(4) Yeltsin and the Russian government have forced such "near abroad" countries as Moldova, Georgia, and Tajikistan to allow the construction of Russian military bases and station Russian troops within their borders. Citing their reasons (pretexts?) for this practice, the Russian government claims that they must protect the rights of ethnic Russians living in those countries, or that they are merely responding to requests issued by the governments concerned.

(5) When the conflict in the former Yugoslavia escalated into a bloody civil war, the Yeltsin leadership adopted a sharply confrontational stance against the West, insisting on the following points: a political solution should be sought rather than a military one; the UN, not NATO, should be in charge; no air bombing; and the arms embargo should be enforced.

(6) The Yeltsin administration is seeking to sign a contract to supply Iran with a light-water nuclear reactor despite U.S. objections that this would help Iran develop its own nuclear weapons.

These examples leave little doubt that, in comparison with the "Atlanticist" diplomacy of the Gorbachev and the early Yeltsin eras, Yeltsin's diplomatic line since the second half of 1992 has swung to "Eurasianism" and even, at least partially, to "isolationism" and "imperialism".

3. The Inner Circle Politics

According to the Russian constitution adopted in December 1993, diplomacy and security are under the exclusive authority of the president, while domestic economic affairs are under the jurisdiction of the prime minister. How then does the president actually go about his constitutionally appointed task of "providing leadership for the foreign policy of the Russian Federation" (Article 86, Item 1)?

First of all, the Russian President uses the Security Council, which is chaired also by Yeltsin himself. The remaining 12 members, beginning with Council Secretary Oleg Lobov and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, include many "power ministers" such as: Defense Minister Pavel Grachev; former Interior Minister Viktor fomer Yerin; former director of the Federal Security Service Sergei Stepashin; head of the former Foreign Intelligence Service Evgenii Primakov; and former Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev.

For example, the decision to postpone Yeltsin's trip to Japan in early September, 1992, and to stage a military attack on Chechnya on December 11, 1994, were both officially made by the Security Council. Some even believe that the Council is playing a role comparable to that of the Communist Party Central Committee's Politburo in the former Soviet Union.

However, just like the Politburo, the Security Council is in fact no more than a fig leaf that hides and legitimizes the personal decisions of the highest policy maker. According to some observers, the Council is just an advisory organization—indeed, a rubber stamp—that confirms decisions already made by Yeltsin. The postponed trip to Japan is a case in point: it is said that once Yeltsin indicated his intention to cancel the trip, nearly all Council members automatically confirmed and approved his decision.³

If this is the case, then we must further ask how Yeltsin himself makes policy decisions. Like the Communist Party's general secretaries Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko before him, Yeltsin has aged and is not in good health. There is deepening suspicion that Yeltsin has stopped seriously communicating with the outside world and that he has become an "emperor without clothes," relying on the advice provided by a small group of intimates, who serve as his eyes and ears. In this sense, the current situation resembles Gorbachev's final days in office, after he had lost such stalwart reformist advisors as Alexander Yakovlev and Eduard Shevardnadze. Input from the institutions and organizations which usually make and implement diplomacy is disgracefully low.

Within the immediate entourage of Yeltsin are individuals who belong to the following categories: 1) those who have shared in Yeltsin's vicissitudes since his years in Sverdlovsk (now Ekaterinburg); 2) his personal guards, who, because they watch over him 24 hours a day, are physically close to him; 3) those who have gained his trust and to whom he is indebted because of their loyalty during such crises as the August 1991 attempted coup d'état and the October 1993 attack on the parliament building; and 4) those who have sworn such unequivocal, personal loyalty to him that they would lose all current luxury and privilege if he resigned.

More specifically, these categories encompass the president's assistant, press secretary, employees of the Presidential Office's staff, and individuals, such as: Viktor Ilyushin, the top presidential aide, Alexander Korzhakov, chief of the Presidential Security Service; Mikhail Barsukov,⁴ the new head of the Federal Security Service; Oleg Soskovets, the First Deputy Prime Minister; General Pavel Grachev, Defense Minister; Victor Yerin, currently Vice-Minister of the Foreign Intelligence Service; Anatolii Klikov, who replaced Yerin as Interior Minister; and Oleg Lobov, secretary of the Security Council and Yeltsin's plenipotentiary envoy in charge of Chechnya. It is true that Yeltsin did respond to the State Duma's demands that he accept responsibility for the December 1994 military attack on Chechnya and the June 1995 Budennovsk hostage incident by firing members of his own clique. However, nearly all the ousted officials were given other important jobs and nearly all of their successors were from the same inner circle, so that the shakeup in the summer of 1995 was in fact a simple reshuffling of personnel that actually expanded Yeltsin's own group of political associates.

4. The Effects on Russian Diplomacy Toward Japan

To summarize, the following trends can be observed in the Yeltsin administration: 1) the foreign policy orientation has shifted from "Atlanticism" toward "Eurasianism", and may even be veering partially toward "isolationism" and "imperialism"; 2) foreign policy's decision-making authority is shifting out of the hands of the "Atlanticists" lobby and into the hands of the "great-power (*derzhavniki*)" and the "nationalists (*gosudarstvenniki*)" lobbies (Buszynski, 1995: 108); and 3) Yeltsin is making his policy decisions by obtaining advice from his own extremely limited, loyal entourage. Among scholars of international relations there almost seems to be a consensus that formulation as well as implementation of foreign policy is strongly influenced by domestic factors. Robert D. Putnam, professor at Harvard University, for instance, argues correctly that the politics of many international negotiations can be conceived as what he calls a "two-level game". "Governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequence of foreign developments."⁵

The important question for us is: How do these trends affect Russian foreign policy toward Japan? To begin with, Alexei Arbatov, director of the Center for Geopolitical and Military Forecasts in Moscow, argues that the aforementioned shift in Russia's foreign policy orientation was closely related to Yeltsin's policy toward Japan:

The turning point in the domestic controversies about Russian foreign policy came with the aborted presidential visit to Japan in August 1992. Moscow's mismanagement of the Russo-Japanese territorial dispute provided an ideal target for right-wing attackers. The cancellation of the summit at the very last moment, and the incomprehensible official explanations of this erratic step, were *the first time* that Boris Yeltsin yielded so obviously to the nationalists' massive campaign (Albatov, 1993: 24) (emphasis added by H.K.)

Whether one accepts Arbatov's argument or not, at least three significant impacts upon Moscow's policy toward Tokyo are observable.

First, the tendency toward "Eurasianism" means that Russia is distancing itself from Western Europe and coming into closer contact with China and other Asian countries. (Japan, while geographically located in Asia, is seen as belonging to the West in terms of its values and systems.) Emphasizing the significance of Japan for Russia's foreign policy, Kozyrev wrote: "Among our priorities is to finalize the normalization of relations with Japan on the basis of a peace treaty, including a solution to the territorial issue" (Kozyrev, 1992: 15). Now that Russia's euphoria toward the Western model has dissipated and its dreams of becoming a member of the Western community have been almost completely dashed, Yeltsin's administration is also showing less enthusiasm for rapprochement with Japan.

Instead, Russia is showing increasing interest in strengthening ties with China, India, South Korea, the NIEs, ASEAN countries, and the countries of the Middle East. It is interesting to note that in his memoirs Kozyrev mentioned Japan only after China, South Korea and ASEAN (Kozyrev, 1995: 86, 241). Shortly after Yeltsin decided to postpone his

trip to Japan in 1992, he immediately re-scheduled to his visit to South Korea, China, and India, in order to show Japan that he can still conduct summit diplomacy in Asia.

Yeltsin administration's efforts to improve relations with China are particularly striking. Moscow's emphasis on the improvement in its relations with Beijing can be traced to factors that underscore the geographical proximity, the mutually complementary economies of the two countries, or the avoidance of potential conflicts between these two former "Socialist" giants (Afanas'ev, 1994: 4): 1) Even though the Soviet Union has collapsed, Russia still shares a 4,300-kilometer border with China; 2) China also shares borders with CIS nations such as Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan which are in turn adjacent to the Russian Federation; 3) Russia and China are in a complementary relationship economically and stand to gain from increased bilateral trade activities; 4) China is a preferred customer of Russian-made military weapons; and 5) both Russia and China have been recently pursuing policies which put them in a not necessarily hostile, but somehow awkward relationship with the United States.

Consequently, as far as policy decisions at top government levels in Moscow and Beijing are concerned, the two countries are quickly coming together, and strikingly improving their relationship.

It must be noted, however, that the grass-roots attitude of ordinary people living in the Russian Far East clearly contrasts with the conciliatory line taken by the central governments in Moscow and Beijing. On the local level, the Russians and Chinese are in emotional conflict and have even shown a tendency to clash. In an article entitled, "Yellow Peril' Again? The Chinese and the Russian Far East," Viktor Larin, Director of the Far Eastern Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography, Russian Academy of Sciences, at Vladivostok, has observed that "both countries have to confront numerous factors working against bringing them together." (Larin, 1995: 291). For example, the great difference in terms of population (only about eight million in the Russian Far East) help the Russians entertain fears that, far outnumbered by the Chinese, they might eventually be absorbed in the Chinese Northeast. Moreover, most Russians in the region began to be disappointed by, and resented to, the flood of cheap, low quality consumer goods from the Chinese Northeast. According to Larin, the Chinese migrational flood includes not only ordinary merchants but also drug dealers, thieves, murderers, and other criminal elements (*Ibid.*: 298; Afanas'ev, 1994: 6). In 1993, local newspapers began to discuss "the threat of Chinese expansion" (Larin, 1995: 298), and local authorities began to take even practical measures to stop and control Chinese penetration and influence (*Ibid.*, 1995: 298-299). In 10-15 years when the Chinese standard of living will improve to the level of other advanced nations in the world, some Russians wonder which countries will provide China with energy and natural resources. Moreover, some residents and local governments in the Far East feel not very happy with the way in which Moscow reached agreement with Beijing, regarding Russo-Chinese border demarcation of the area along the Amur and the Ussuri rivers. The Central authorities did not consult in advance with them and simply informed them of their decision with Beijing.

In view of these new international developments, it is difficult for Japan to apply pressure on Russia about the Northern Territories issue with the expectation of support from the U.S., the other G-7 nations and China.

The Second impact is that the rise of the “great power” proponents and the nationalists works against Japan’s efforts to regain the disputed islands, because the preservation of Russian territorial integrity is a key political contention for these groups. Some of their assertions may be extreme, such as the following citation from Vladimir Zhirinovskii, head of an ultra-rightist, “great power”- oriented so-called Russian Liberal- Democratic party : “The Japanese will not try to acquire the Kurils. If they demand the Kurils, I’ll send our navy to Hokkaido and demand that Hokkaido be annexed to Russia. It’s been 50 years since the Japanese experienced Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and they’ve probably forgotten the meaning of that experience. I’ll be happy to remind them.” (Soloviev and Klepikova, 1995: 113). A similar stance has been adopted by Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, who, though considered a member of the “great power” lobby, does not necessarily share Zhirinovskii’s fanaticism. Grachev has repeatedly declared that he has no intention of returning the islands to Japan. For example, in a speech given on August 29, 1995, he said that “the victory of Soviet troops over Japan resulted in the return to Russia of territory that Japan had stolen.” When asked by a reporter what territory he was referring to, he clearly answered, “the Kurils” (*Asahi Shimbun*, *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 1995, 8.30). This assertion completely contradicts an important international premise of the early Yeltsin administration, which was that territorial disputes “should be decided not on the basis of military victory or defeat, but on the basis of law and justice.” As such, the Grachev statement marks a return to a Soviet-era approach, in which national boundaries are determined by the outcome of war.⁶

As for Yeltsin and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, their status and position make it impossible to officially reject the Tokyo Declaration, signed by Yeltsin and Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, in October 1993. However, if they were asked now their true feelings about the Northern Territories issue, it seems unlikely that they would fervently support the return of the islands to Japan. In August 1993 and again in October 1994, Chernomyrdin took up an uncompromising public position on the Northern Territories dispute with Japan, declaring that “Russia is not going to cede the Kuril Islands to anyone.” (*Moscow News*, 1993: 3). Similarly, immediately after the devastating May 1995 earthquake in the city of Neftegorsk in northern Sakhalin, Yeltsin stated that he did not welcome Japanese aid because he feared it would give the Japanese an excuse to ask afterwards for the islands’ return (*BBC Monitoring*, 1995.06.01). Probably based on a similar apprehension, Oleg Soskovets also indicated that Russia cannot count on Japan in rebuilding the Kurils in the wake of the earthquake in October 1994. The Russian First Deputy Minister stated: “One should not hope at the moment that urgent humanitarian assistance will now be provided by *our closest neighbors* [i.e., Japan-H.K.]” (*BBC Monitoring*, 1994.10.12). NTV (Independent Television) reported that following this, the Russian government was (instead) hoping to get assistance from India, Vietnam and Indonesia (*Ibid.*). These examples reveal an inner desire on the part of top Russian political leaders not to let the islands revert to Japanese control.

The third impact is the question of just how valid the principles of “law and justice (*zakonnost’ i spravedlivost’*)” are at the present time. When Yeltsin assumed power, he agreed to adopt “law and justice” as the cornerstone of Russian diplomacy, based on the advice and participation of such “Atlanticists” and Japanophiles as Foreign Minister

Kozyrev, Vice Foreign Minister Georgii Kunadze, and Ambassador to South Korea Alexander Panov. This represented a "conceptual revolution" (Legvold, 1989: 83-84) from the diplomatic principles of the Soviet era, which were premised on the idea that international politics are governed by "the correlation of forces (*sootnosheniie sil*)," and that the victorious has a right to do anything it wants vis-a-vis a defeated country, that is to say, what Russian jurist Sergei Punzhim calls "the victor's right (*pravo pobeditelia*)" (Punzhin, 1994: 115).

Today, however, is it really possible to assume that the Yeltsin leadership remains still committed to the principle of "law and justice"? Defense minister Grachev and other "power ministers" believe that it is only natural to resort to military force to preserve Russia's territorial integrity; this was amply proven by the military attack on Chechnya. Not a few Russians regret deeply what they perceive to be the policy mistakes committed by Gorbachev and Yeltsin, which reduced Russian territory to an almost unforgivably small size. Although they can no longer regain territory that has already been lost, they are staunchly opposed to losing any more. In all likelihood, they are utterly indifferent to Japan's argument, no matter how fervently advanced, that Stalin wrongfully occupied the Northern Territories and that the Japanese demand for reversion is qualitatively different from such developments as the breakaway movement in Chechnya.

While it is extremely unfortunate, one must thus conclude that, given the present political atmosphere in Russia, Japanese claims over the four Northern islands will not be given serious hearing.

II. REGIONAL LEVEL (NORTHERN ISLANDS)

Given the present domestic conditions in Russia we are left to ask if there is any chance the Northern Territories issue can be satisfactorily resolved. Unfortunately, the answer to this question is almost certainly no. Japan has no choice but to continue monitoring the situation carefully. However, there are several factors that might help break the current deadlock. Let us examine some recent developments that might benefit Japan in its quest to regain the islands.

1. Demarcation of Russo-Chinese Borders

One development that might be positive for Japan is the successful border demarcation between Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC), even though it took place slightly before Yeltsin's visit to Tokyo. Russia and China are neighbors, which share a long history of border disputes, starting from the Tsarist days (Alcock, 1992: 439-453, Ginsburgs & Pinkele, 1978: 1-145). The Chinese side was especially unhappy about the demarcation line made by the Treaty of Aigun and the Treaty of Beijing, which due to her weakness and its war with Britain and France, China was compelled to accept (Berton, 1969: 134). Since that time, China tried hard to rectify these and other "unequal treaties," but in vain. In 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflicts escalated to bloody clashes, which became known as "the Damansky Zhenbao" Island Incident (Ambroz, 1972: 136-142; Borisov & Koloskov, 1977: 421-431). Border negotiations between the Soviet Union and the PRC resumed but for a long time did not bring any tangible results.

It was Mikhail Gorbachev who made a breakthrough in the stalemated negotiations. Aiming at an improvement in relations with China, as one of his bold, concrete initiatives that were announced in his well-publicized speech at Vladivostok on July 28, 1986, the CPSU's General Secretary proposed that the official border on the Amur and the Ussuri Rivers "could pass along the main ship navigation channel" (*Pravda*, 1986.07.29: 2). This was the longstanding position of the PRC rooted in international law, which the U.S.S.R. had hitherto rejected. Based on this principle the U.S.S.R. and China finally reached an agreement on border demarcation in May 1991 (*BBC Monitoring*, 1991.05.17: i; 1991.05.20: c1/8). This agreement was ratified in February 1992 by a large majority in the Russian Supreme Soviet, after the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Of course, one should not overestimate the significance of this Russo-Chinese border agreement. First, there still remain seven areas, where a demarcation line between Russia and China has not yet been finalized (Akino, 1995.07.11: 15). The second reservation is that local authorities in the Russian Far East have opposed to the agreement, in which concessions were made to China, and the fact that the agreement was made unilaterally by the central authorities in Moscow without consulting them. Third, having solved their own border dispute with Russia, the Chinese leadership may no longer support the Japanese claim over the Northern Territories. Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders demonstrated solidarity with Japan and supported its claim partly to show other areas of Soviet territorial encroachment (Dittmer, 1992: 189-190).

Nevertheless, one can still say that Russia has set a very important precedent, by peacefully negotiating and solving a border conflict and showing that the territories, which formerly belonged to the Soviet Union, can be transferred to another country. It is a well known fact that in their effort to turn down the Japanese request for the return of the Northern Islands, many Soviet politicians and even scholars kept saying that they were fearful of the "Pandora's box" effect, namely setting a precedent by returning the once-occupied territories to their previous owners (Latyshev, 1992: 223-224). Once it decided to give the Northern Islands back to Japan, the Soviet Union would have had to face similar requests from Finland, China, Poland, Rumania, and other neighboring countries. Obviously this is an excuse, since almost all eleven countries,⁷ which lost territory to the Soviet Union around the end of World War II, have given up by now their demands, tacitly or explicitly in their specific arrangements with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Helsinki accord in 1975 virtually froze the European territorial status quo. While there were many in the West, who were easily persuaded by such Soviet excuses, the Russo-Chinese border agreement should serve as a positive and encouraging precedent for the Russo-Japanese effort to resolve the Northern Territories dispute.

2. Decline in the Islands' Military-Strategic Value

Another development that might prove positive for Japan is the declining value which the Northern Islands have for Russian military strategy (Zagorsky, 1995: 83-84, 93). Probably the most important reason the former Soviet Union resolutely refused to return the islands was because of the pivotal importance of their "bastion strategy," which reserved the Sea of Okhotsk as a sanctuary for SSBNs (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines) (Cunha, 1990: 18, 74, 90, Jukes, 1993: 25).

Now that the Cold War is over, however, and Yeltsin has begun referring to Russia as a partner or even a quasi-ally of the U.S. and Japan, the military strategic importance of the Sea of Okhotsk (and by extension the Northern Territories) has declined dramatically. Not only that, but the Delta-I and III class SSBNs now deployed in the Sea of Okhotsk region were built in the late-1970s and early-1980s and will reach the end of their service lives in approximately 20 years. Unless a successor generation of the current SSBNs is built and deployed, the fleet will become outdated (*Japan's Defense*; 1995: 65; Kurai, 1994: 209). Besides, according to the START-II agreements signed by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in January 1993, the Russian SSBNs will have to be greatly reduced in number by the end of 2002, and deployed in the one place, most probably in the Barents Sea area. As professor Geoffrey Jukes at the Australian National University has estimated, the Sea of Okhotsk would then lose the military-strategic importance as an SSBN "sanctuary" that it has had since 1978. Jukes thus concludes that "the most weighty military argument against returning the Northern Territories to Japan would cease to apply" (Jukes, 1993: 20-34).

Furthermore, it has become extremely difficult for Russia to supply and support soldiers and weapons on the tiny islands. Oil and other fuels are in short supply, transportation costs have skyrocketed, and troop morale is low. And, with the great strides that have been made in military science and technology, it may no longer be essential to maintain such remote outposts.

It was perhaps with these things in mind that Gorbachev stated in the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration signed with the Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu during his visit to Japan in April 1991, that Soviet troops would soon be withdrawn from the Northern Territories. Yeltsin, too, after becoming Russian President, announced plans to accelerate his own five-stage plan to resolve the issue. The third phase of that plan calls for "demilitarization," and Yeltsin expressed his intention to remove all Russian troops from the islands except for the border guards. Although the original timetable for troop withdrawal has been delayed for various reasons (including resistance by the Russian military), it seems fairly certain that the islands will indeed continue to be demilitarized. In fact, Foreign Minister Kozyrev told Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe in March 1993 that Russian troops stationed on the islands had already been reduced by 30%, to about 7,000. According to the estimates of Tadamasu Fukiura, Secretary-General of the Council on National Security Problems in Tokyo, who has been to the islands many times under the so-called non-visa exchange program, a division of Russian troops that was once stationed there has already been reduced to the size of a brigade, and will probably be further reduced to the size of a battalion by the end of 1996 (Sase, 1995: 81).

Because of these developments, the Japanese Defense Agency, in its "White Paper on Defense" published on July 30, 1995, deleted those paragraphs, in which it previously regarded the Northern Territories as important "front-line bases" for Russian nuclear strategy in the Sea of Okhotsk.⁸ Among others, the following reasons were given for this change: 1) the declining capability of Russia's Pacific Fleet; 2) the declining replacement rate of soldiers stationed on the islands; 3) the withdrawal of Russian MIG-23s combat aircraft from the islands in 1993; and 4) the advocacy by some of the upper echelons of the Russian military, in the face of difficult financial problems, to withdraw the SSBN

fleet from the Sea of Okhotsk and concentrate instead on the Barents Sea and the Black Sea areas (*Sankei Shimbun*, 1995.07.01).

3. Changes in Islanders Opinion

A second factor that may contribute toward the resolution of the Northern Territories issue is the day-to-day increase in the number of ethnic Russian islanders who favor reversion to Japan. Excluding Habomai, which has no permanent residents other than border guards, the majority of inhabitants on Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu have in recent years suddenly begun to support the return of the islands to Japan. According to a survey conducted in September 1993, after Yeltsin announced that he would visit Japan, 28.9% of the residents of the three islands favored the "two islands plus alpha" solution, and 43.4% favored the return of all four islands, representing a pro-Japan total 72.3% that far outweighed the 21.3% against reversion (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, 1995.10.11). Then, according to a survey conducted by the Moscow-based International Public Opinion Survey Center immediately after the October 4, 1994, earthquake off the eastern coast of Hokkaido, nationwide agreement for reversion increased dramatically. In Vladivostok, 89% of the respondents said they favored reversion, up from 60% in a survey conducted the previous May; in Moscow, those in favor rose from 10% to 60% (*Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 1994.10.09).

Needless to say, the primary reason for this rapid change in public opinion, especially among Russian inhabitants, is that the standard of living on the islands is deteriorating. Not only has all preferential support been cut off from the central government since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but skyrocketing transportation costs have prevented fuel, food, and other necessities from reaching the islands from the Russian mainland. As a result, fishing catches have been reduced by half, inflicting a serious blow to the mainstay seafood processing industry. The islanders are thus suffering economic distress far more severe than that confronting mainland Russians, and this already bad situation was made much worse by the earthquake. Shikotan island in particular suffered damage that may prove impossible to repair; its seafood factory, administrative facilities, school, hospital, and cultural facilities were all completely destroyed, and approximately 90% of its residents lost their homes. According to a survey conducted by the Moscow-based International Social Research Center in October, 1995, among 1,200 Russian citizens in seven major cities, including Moscow, Vladivostok, Krasnodar, 75.5% of the respondents replied "yes", while 10.0% said "no", to the question as to whether the islanders' standard of living would improve if the Northern Islands would be returned to Japan (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, 1995.10.26).

4. The "Japanization" of the Islands

The third factor in favor of reversion is the steady "Japanization" of the Northern Territories. The ethnic Russian islanders do not engage in trade with other Russians either on the mainland or on Sakhalin, or even among themselves. Legally and illegally, in person and through third parties, they are bringing crab and other fishery products to Nemuro and other regions of Hokkaido, selling it for hard currency (dollars or yen), and buying used cars, fresh produce, and daily necessities to take back with them. As a result,

Japanese goods have proliferated on the islands, while Russian goods are disappearing. If this process continues, the ruble will lose value and we may well see the islands enter the "Nemuro economic sphere" (*Shinju*, 1995.08.01), thus becoming integrated with the larger yen economy. Since Kunashiri island has almost no good barber or dentist, some fishing-boat operators have begun visiting Nemuro to get their hair cut and have work done on their teeth (Sase, 1995: 78), and fisherman also closely watch weather reports on Japanese television to help them decide whether or not to go out fishing, and their children have become fans of Japanese television cartoons. Islanders' interest in the Japanese language is also on the rise, and Japanese visitors are often asked to make arrangements to send language teachers, textbooks, and training materials.

According to a report by diplomatic commentator Hidetake Sawa, who visited the islands in 1993 and again in 1994, at least one resident of Shikotan had no qualms about saying that he considered his Governor to be Takahiro Yokomichi, who was at that time governor of Hokkaido (Sawa, 1994: 133). The reason was that Yokomichi was the only official who responded to the islanders' pleas for assistance whenever they faced a food or fuel crisis—in stark contrast to the governor of Sakhalin (who officially has jurisdiction over the islands), President Yeltsin, or American Presidents Bush or Clinton. As far as this particular islander's psychology is concerned, Shikotan island has already reverted to Hokkaido, and is thus part of Japan. Confirming this, Otto Latsis, political observer of *Izvestiia*, wrote: "The autumn earthquake [of 1994] demonstrated particularly clearly to the Kuril residents what they had known previously, —that is to say, Russia does not have either an intention nor a capability in investing money into the Kurils" (*Izvestiia*, 1995.08.04).

5. The Depopulation of the Islands

The fourth factor is the departure of Russian residents from the islands. On May 28, 1993, the residents of Shikotan sent a letter of protest to the central government in Moscow complaining that they could no longer endure the insecurity created by the reversion issue. In September of the same year, Vladimir Kashpruk, former Vice-Chairman of the Kuril Regional Council, stated, "This winter we anticipate collapse, and therefore we cannot avoid the evacuation of the residents from the islands to another location" (*Asahi Shimbun*, 1993.09.21). A month earlier, Hokkaido Governor Yokomichi, who visited the islands as the head of a Japanese delegation participating in the non-visa exchange program, had also expressed his impression that "if things continue in this condition, there might be nobody left on the islands" (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, 1993.08.11).

In fact, many residents of both Shikotan and Kunashiri plan to move to the Russian mainland and are already doing so. In the first half of 1994, more than 800 people moved away from the islands, while only about 150 moved in. The TASS News Agency reported on August 11 of that year that some 200 families had left the two islands. Authorities in Sakhalin reported, from a survey conducted up to the end of August of the same year, that 4,100 residents of the Kuril Islands (including the Northern Territories) had moved to the Russian mainland in the past year, reducing the total population of the islands by 14.1 percent (*Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 1994.08.30).

The earthquake off the coast of eastern Hokkaido in October, 1994, was a major event that has further spurred this process of depopulation. On a visit to Japan in January of 1995, Nikolai Pokidin, head of administration of the South Kuril District at that time, revealed that the population of his district (which includes all the disputed islands except Etorofu) was expected to decline to 8,500, a mere 60% of its present population (*Hokkaido Shimbun*, 1995.01.25.). He further reported that on Shikotan, where the devastation of the earthquake was greatest, some 90% of residents wished to leave (*Hokkaido Shimbun*, 1994.11.01, *Asahi Shimbun*, 1994.11.10). Reporting in August, 1995, Otto Latsis observed: "Even the money, which had been earmarked for the victims of the earthquake, has been reaching to them slowly and incompletely" (*Izvestiia*, 1995.08.04). As a result, he predicts that "more and more people wish to abandon forever 'our remotest islands'" (*Ibid.*). Some experts have gone so far as to warn that if these conditions continue, the population of the four islands will be reduced to seasonal laborers and border patrol guards, effectively rendering them uninhabited (*Asahi Shimbun, evening edition*, 1995.02.04).

These developments have led Otto Latsis to raise the following fundamental questions: Is this situation advantageous for Russia itself?" and "Will the situation improve for Russia, while Russia keeps postponing the solution of the territorial question?" (*Izvestiia*, 1995.08.04).

III. DETERMINING FACTORS FOR RESOLVING THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES ISSUE

The foregoing discussion leads to: (1) As far as the Yeltsin leadership in Moscow is concerned, present circumstances make it unlikely that the Northern Territories issue will be resolved in the foreseeable future. Yeltsin does not have enough power to take the drastic steps necessary to resolve the problem, and the domestic political conditions and mood in Russia preclude any attempt on his part to do so. (2) Focusing our attention on the Russian inhabitants on the islands, however, we see that the situation is somewhat different. It is becoming clear that these people desire a swift resolution to the problem; in fact, they may even be reaching the point where they actually want the disputed islands returned to Japan. This marked contrast concerning this issue between politicians in Moscow and the local population on the islands can be illustrated well in an observation made by Pokidin, who stated in his interview with ITAR-TASS on January 13, 1994: Whereas "there is no *politician* who would take a step" that will help "the South Kurils be handed over to Japan in the near future," "the grave economic situation makes increasingly widespread among *the local population* the view that the South Kurils should be handed over to Japan." [emphasis added by H.K.] (*BBC Monitoring*, 1994.01.15: B6).

This poses a large, important question: who exactly determines present-day Russia's policy toward Japan? If it is determined exclusively by the central authorities in Moscow, as it was under the old Soviet system, then we should be pessimistic about resolving the Northern Territories problem in the near future. If, on the other hand, local authorities are beginning to exert some influence over political decision-making, then some prospect for a resolution exists. Therefore, though it may seem a bit farfetched, we should consider

the question of who or what are the major determining factors in the resolution of the problem. In this context, I would like to make the following three points.

(1) In the old Soviet days, the answer to these question as to who makes policy toward Japan would have been quite simple. A very small group of people monopolized the right to make almost all political decisions, starting with the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and extending essentially no further than the CPSU's Central Committee or the Politburo. This made it possible to engage in coercive diplomacy based on the ideas of a single dictator, while also allowing rather bold diplomatic initiatives when necessary. Thus, Konstantin Sarkisov, head of Japan Center at the Institute for Oriental Studies, writes: "It may sound paradoxical, but a totalitarian regime could resolve relatively easily the dispute with Japan: a decision might be made at the top, and then the decision would be supported unanimously at the bottom, as it was the case of the Crimea (in which Nikita Khrushchev's decision to grant the Crimea to Ukraine as a 'gift' from Russia in 1954 was not disputed at that time)" (Sarkisov, 1992: 25). Of course, there was some consultation with and even decision-making by experts on the issue involved—, for example, military experts on a war-related issue, or the writers' union when it came to arts policy.⁹

With the advance of democratization and glasnost under perestroika, which was begun by Gorbachev, however, authorities in the Kremlin lost their ability to completely ignore public opinion when they made foreign policy decisions. To begin with, in periphery regions of the Russian Federation people began to express boldly their complaints about the Central government in Moscow, which has not provided anything to them, while instead taking away a lot of things from them. Boris Reznik, correspondent of *Izvestiia*, for instance, reported from Khabarovsk on November 29, 1995: "Everywhere the voice of protest has been growing against government officials in Moscow, who are 'pumping out' all the resources from the territories, without giving in exchange anything at all" (*Izvestiia*, 1995.11.29). Viktor Ishaev, governor of Khabarovsk region, thus concludes: "We do not necessarily intend to break away from Russia. Yet, we must add that, if the Center does not help us develop our economy, nor solve our social problems, then let it not interfere with us" (*Ibid.*). Moreover, there was a breakdown in the old pattern of the Soviet policy-making mechanism, in which central authorities decided everything; as a result, the power of localities to express their wishes has increased. In particular, the president and the parliament, who were caught up in continuous and escalating conflicts in the center, Moscow, increasingly devolved decision-making powers, specifically many economic powers, to outlying periphery regions as part of a political strategy to win the regions over to their own respective sides. Thus, for example, Stanislav Kondrashov, another political observer of *Izvestiia*, writes in August, 1995: "As the power of Moscow has weakened, there has certainly emerged the hope for more assertiveness on the part of the Far Eastern regions of Russia for cooperation with Japan" (*Izvestiia*, 1995.08.25).

Of course, this does not mean that the local people have the right to decide their own destiny. The voices of the inhabitants on the Islands as Alexei Bogaturov at the Institute for USA and Canada, Russian Academy of Sciences writes, are still "weak and do not

have the possibility to influence the decisions of the Sakhalin district (*oblast'*) and the Russian Federation" (Bogaturov, 1995: 5).

(2) A second factor that could play a role in the resolution of the Northern Territories problem is one that almost never had to be taken into account in the past—namely, natural disasters and other environmental factors that far exceed human power.

In 1992, a group of scholars from Japan, the U.S. and Russia compiled a list of possible scenarios for resolving the Northern Territories issue. The 66th and final item on the list, which was offered mostly in jest, was called the "Krakatoa Scenario." Referring to the island of Krakatoa in the Pacific Ocean, which disappeared under the sea when the Indonesian volcano erupted in the nineteenth century, this scenario suggested that one solution to the problem would be for some natural disaster to wipe the islands from the face of the earth (Allison *et al.*, 1993: 1, 42). In contrast to the other 65 scenarios, all of which were predicated on the assumption that authorities in Moscow and Tokyo would work out an agreement based on some combination of wisdom and power, the Krakatoa Scenario raised the idea that there might be a case in which human will and effort play no role at all. This idea originated on the campus of Harvard University in midsummer as a joke of an American scholar who had been working night and day on various scenarios. One variation on this theme might be the Pinotubu Scenario, in which a natural disaster would not completely destroy the islands but nevertheless render them unfit for human habitation, thus solving the problem. The earthquake off eastern Hokkaido in October of 1994 and mismanagement by the Russian authorities made the disputed islands almost uninhabitable, showing that such seemingly fantastic scenarios are in fact no laughing matter and can become a reality.

If we think about it, the sudden reunification of east and west Germany following the destruction of the Berlin Wall in the autumn of 1989 was in no way the result of talks between top leaders Mikhail Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl. Residents of East Germany had been demonstrating day and night; this developed into an unstoppable flow of people, who suddenly realized they were already on the west side of the wall. This was the true nature of the event. Although facile comparisons should be avoided, it is possible that while top leaders continue to delay their decision by focusing only on political considerations, some unforeseen event could suddenly resolve the Northern Territories issue, which has been a vexing problem for half a century. Certainly, the Krakatoa (or Pinotubu) Scenario and the fate of the Berlin Wall hint at such a possibility, which cannot be dismissed without committing the error of overestimating the importance of historical necessity and human decisions.

(3) The third element involved in determining foreign policy is the possibility of intervention by a third party.

Negotiations over the Northern Territories have been bilateral in nature, conducted directly by the two parties, Russia and Japan. The central issues are too profound for any outsiders to be able to solve (Henrikson, 1994). Furthermore, according to the author of this article, the ultimate objective lies not necessarily in the solution of the territorial dispute itself, but rather in the establishment of "full-blooded (*polnokrovnyye*)" (M. Gorbachev) relations between these neighboring nations (*Pravda*, 1989.05.17). Nevertheless, in order to facilitate such a direct dialogue between these two parties, there

is no law against a third party playing an intermediary role. Because the two negotiating parties have such a direct stake in the matter, domestic political concerns or an excess of national pride can sometimes prevent them from proposing compromises, thereby resulting in deadlock. Mediation by a third party with no direct interest in the results can sometimes be an effective aid in breaking such an impasse. For example, U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt played a major role in ending the Russo-Japanese War by providing good offices, which led to the conclusion of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty in 1905.

In theory, there is a long list of third parties who might help resolve the conflict between Japan and Russia over the Northern Territories. These include the International Court of Justice, the United Nations,¹⁰ the G-7 nations, the United States, and others. Many feel it would be particularly desirable for the United States to play a more active role in mediating the dispute. This would be fitting because the Northern Territories problem is rooted in the Yalta Conference, where President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was overly anxious to coax Russia into joining the war effort against Japan, made a facile promise to concede the Kurils to Stalin. Furthermore, in the peace negotiations in San Francisco, John Foster Dulles forced Japan to give up the Kurils but left undecided what country the islands should go to; Moreover, in the 1956 peace negotiations between Japan and the Soviet Union, Dulles opposed the compromise, which the two countries were trying to reach, and instead sowed seeds of ill feeling between them. Thus the United States now has a moral and political responsibility to step forward and take a more active role in mediating a solution to the Northern Territories problem.¹¹ It might also be noted that, if the issue is resolved, it would encourage Japan to forsake its hitherto uncompromisingly passive stance with regard to providing assistance to Russia and might spur it to begin providing more active support. In doing so, Japan could shoulder some of the burden currently borne by the U.S., providing the latter with some very practical benefits.

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NOTES

- 1 “Preobrazhennaia Rossiia v novom mire: Nauchnoprakticheskaia konferentsiia MID RF (26–27 February 1992)” *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* (March-April, 1992), p.108.
- 2 It is almost natural that, as the major foreign policy orientations of the Yeltsin administration have been changing, the scholars' ways of characterizing and classifying such Russian diplomatic orientations and their lobby groups have undergone concomitant changes. Roughly speaking, in 1992-93, both Western and Russian watchers of Yeltsin's diplomacy adopted a dichotomy: the “Atlantist” versus the “Eurasianist.” In 1993-95, however, it has become more fashionable to distinguish three or four or even five schools of thought: For example, (1) the “Westernizers”, (2) the “Russian nationalists”, and (3) the “Eurasianists” (John Roper and Peter Van Kham); or (1) the “Westernizers”, (2) the “Russian-Nationalists”, (3) “Eurasianists”, and (4) the “Geopolitical Realists” (Olga Alexandrova); or (1) “Pro-westernizers”, (2) “Moderate liberals”, (3) “Centrist and moderate conservatives”, and (4) “Neo-communists and nationalists” (Alexei Arbatov), or (1) “Westernizers” (or “Atlanticists”), (2) “Eurasianists”, (3) “Great Power” (*derzhavniki*), (4) “Isolationists” (or “Slavophiles”), (5) “Extreme Nationalists” (Jonathan Valdez). “Alexander' Rahr, “Atlanticists' versus ‘Eurasians’ in Russian Foreign Policy,” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty* (-hereafter cited as *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol.1, No.22, May 29, 1992, pp.17-27; Suzanne Crow, “Russia Debates Its National Interests,” *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol.1, No.28, July 10, 1992, pp.43-46; Jeff Checkel, “Russian Foreign Policy: Back to the Future?,” *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol.1, No.41, October 16 1992, pp.15-29; Vera Tolz, “Russia: Westernizers Continue to Challenge National Patriots,” *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol.1, No.49, December 11, 1992, pp.1-9; Igor Torbakov, “The ‘Statists’ and the Ideology of Russian Imperial Nationalism,” *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol.1, No.49, December 11, 1992, pp.10-16; Suzanne Crow, “Comparing Blueprints for Russian Foreign Policy,” *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol.1, No.50, December 18, 1992, pp.45-50; Jan S. Adams, “Who Will Make Russia's Foreign Policy in 1994?” *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol.3, No.6, February 11, 1994, pp.36-40; Suzanne Crow, “Why has Russian Foreign Policy Changed?” *RFE/RL Research Report* Vol.3, No.18, May 6, 1994, pp.1-6; John W.P. Lepingwell, “The Soviet Legacy and Russian Foreign Policy,” *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol.3, No.23, June 10, 1994, pp.1-7; Olga Alexandrova, “Divergent Russian Foreign Policy Concepts,” *Aussenpolitik*, IV 1993, pp.363-372; Alexei C. Arbatov, “Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives,” *International Security*, Vol.18, No.2 (Fall 1993), pp.5-43; Kyoji Komachi, *Concept Building in Russian Diplomacy: the Struggle for Identity* (Occasional Paper) (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, May 1994); John Roper and Peter Van Kham, “Zapadnaia politika Rossiia,” *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia* (-hereafter cited as *ME i MO*) No.11, 1994, pp.84-86; Leon Aron, “Emergent Priorities of Russian Foreign Policy,” in Leon Aron and Kenneth M. Jensen, eds., *The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994), pp.17-34; N.Popov, “Vneshniaia politika Rossii (Analiz polititkov i ekspertov) (star'ia pervaiia), (stat'ia vtoraiia),” *ME i MO*, No.3, 1994, pp.52-59 and No.4, 1994, pp.5-15; Hannes Adomeit, “Great

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- 3 In his memoir *Struggle for Russia*, Yeltsin himself wrote in this regard: "Two-day before the scheduled trip. I independently (*samostoiatel'no*) decided to cancel the visit." Voris El'tsin, *Zapiski Prezidenta*, Moscow: "Ogonek", 1994, p.186.
 - 4 In his memoir Yeltsin himself discloses how close he has been with Ilyushin and Korzhakov. Boris Yeltsin, *The Struggle for Russia*, New York: Times Books, 1994 pp.xix, 28, 142-143.
 - 5 Evans, Peter B, et al., eds., *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, 490 pp.
 - 6 Previously in the Soviet days the Kremlin's position on the territorial issue with Japan may be summarized by the axiom of a German geopolitician, Karl Haushofer, who once stated: "Boundaries are fighting places rather than norms of decision" (cited from Derwent Whittlesey, *German Strategy of World Conquest*, New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1942, p.95). Indeed, the writings and statements of Soviet spokesmen reveal the accuracy of such an assumption. For example, Khaim T. Eidus, one of the Soviet authorities on Soviet-Russian history, writes simply, yet definitely: The victory of the Soviet Army returned Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands to the hands of our people"(emphasis added by H.K.; Kh. T. Eidus, *SSSR i Iaponia: vneshne-politicheskie otnosheniia posle vtoroi mirovoi voiny*, Moscow: Nauka, 1964, p.9). Leonid Kutakov, another specialist on Soviet-Russian history, also writes: "The direct result of defeat of Japan was the breakup of its rights to the Kuril Islands and the Southern Sakhalin." (L. N. Kutakov, *Istoriia sovetsko-iaponskikh diplomaticheskikh otnoshenii*, Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Instituta mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii, 1962, p.473.)
 - 7 During and immediately after the Second World War, the U.S.S.R. took territories from the following eleven countries: the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), Finland, Poland, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Outer Mongolia, and Japan. On November 15, 1995, Reuters reported out of Tallin that Estonia has given up its demand that two strips of land (about 2,000 hectares) be returned by Russia.
 - 8 In the 1995 edition of *Boei Hakusho (Japan's Defense)*, the following paragraph, which had customarily been included in previous editions, was deleted: "Russia deploys nuclear submarines carrying SLBMs in the Sea of Okhotsk and other sea areas, where it can easily obtain support from its own naval and air forces. The Northern Territories seem to have become an important advance base for ensuring the survivability of SSBNs deployed in the Sea of Okhotsk, because the territory is located in a geographical position to control access to the sea, which is strategically important." *Boei Hakusho (Japan's Defense) (1994 Edition)*, Tokyo: Defense Agency, 1994, p.65; *Boei Hakusho (Japan's Defense) (1995 Edition)*, Tokyo: Defense Agency, 1995, p.69.
 - 9 Just which group plays the most influential role in the decision-making process depends on the particular issue in question. This is brilliantly demonstrated by the work cited below, which explicates how military matters were decided in the former Soviet Union: Timothy J. Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: the Structure of Soviet Military Politics*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1979, esp.pp.232-249.
 - 10 K. Sarkisov has concluded that, if Russia and Japan could not reach political agreement in solving the Northern Territorial disputes, there would be perhaps no other way than bringing the issue into the International Court of Justice (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, 1991.10.27). Igor' Latyshev, a staunch Russian patriot, who argues that even the two smaller islands, Habomai and Shikotan, should not be handed over to Japan, has opposed Sarkisov's idea, by saying: "In such international institutions Japan can always rely upon a support of the majority of members, since the United States and its allied West stands for the Japanese side." Igor' Latyshev, *Pokushenie na Kurily Sakhalin*, 1992, p.218.
 - 11 Primarily for this reason, Professor Alan K. Henrikson, Professor and Director of the Fletcher Roundtable, at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, has proposed that "The United States

provide the location for such a Japanese-Russian meeting regarding the territorial problem," which he called "a second Portsmouth Conference." Henrikson, *op.cit.*, pp.23-24.

- ※ (I would like to thank Dr. Peter Berton, Professor Emeritus of International Relations at the University of Southern California for reading this manuscript and offering helpful suggestions.)

ロシアの対日政策決定過程

木村 汎

要旨：1991年10月、日本を訪問したロシア大統領エリツィンは、日本の細川護熙首相との間に、長年の間日露関係改善の障害となってきた北方領土問題の解決を目指す交渉を行なった。ところが、同大統領が帰国してまもなく、ロシア国内の雰囲気は、ロシア民族主義のさらなる高揚によってきわめて愛国主義的なものとなり、北方領土を日本に返還するなどんでもないという空気に転じた。本論文は、前半部分においてそのような政治的雰囲気の変化とその理由を論じ、後半部分においては、その反面、北方領土のロシア人住民間において進行中の「日本化」と「無人化」現象が、1994年10月の北海道東方沖地震によってさらに加速化されたことを指摘している。つまり、最近、北方領土問題にかんして、モスクワ中央においては返還反対、逆に地元北方領土においては返還賛成という二つの相矛盾する傾向が発生しているのである。もちろん、ロシア外交政策を決定するのは、地方ではなく、中央である。しかし、そのような旧ソビエト時代の政策決定パターンが今後のロシアにもそのまま無修正で該当し続けると考えたら、大きな間違いを犯すかもしれない。そのような疑義を呈している点において、本論文は、エリツィン政権の対日外交という特殊なテーマをとり扱いつつも、一体誰がロシア外交を決定するのかという一般命題にかんする一ケース・スタディーとしての貢献も目指している。