

Utopian Structures of Government in 17th century Japan and Europe

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'When he travelled he took along his own cherished convictions and theories. Perhaps his travels were even motivated by the desire to return home with confirmation of these theories. And who can trust his eyes when under these circumstances he saw everywhere exactly what he wanted to see!' wrote Christian Wilhelm Dohm in 1774 about Engelbert Kaempfer.

Curiously enough, these critical phrases were contained in a pamphlet advertising Dohm's new German edition of Kaempfer's *History of Japan*.¹ Naturally, the greater part of this pamphlet was praising the work it wanted to sell, extolling, among other things, the author's keen judgment, his precision and intellect. The fact that Dohm went against his own self-interest by calling attention to a fault in the work, speaks of the seriousness with which he regarded this alleged weakness in Kaempfer's writings.

In his epilogue to Kaempfer's *Geschichte und Beschreibung von Japan*, Dohm made no secret of the fact that he was troubled by Kaempfer's high praise for the Eastern Nation. However, what worried Dohm most and what he, as aspiring historian, civil servant and diplomat, felt the need to distance himself from, was Kaempfer's description of the fifth Tokugawa Shogun Tsunayoshi as perfect ruler and the shogun's administration as the perfect government.²

Dohm, like many of his contemporaries, could not accept that at times Kaempfer considered the heathen Japanese superior to his most Christian European contemporaries. In this respect his criticism of Kaempfer's work must be dismissed as biased and uninformed. However, in one respect Dohm was right. Already very early in his life, Kaempfer had mapped out a political utopia which curiously resembled the aspirations of the fifth Tokugawa shogun Tsunayoshi, and when Kaempfer came to Japan he saw 'exactly what he wanted to see.'

In 1673 the young Kaempfer had ambitiously chosen the difficult subject of sovereignty as topic for his school matriculation theses. Entitled *Exercitatio Politica de Majestatis Divisione* ... (Political discourse on the Division of Sovereignty) the essay, contrary to what the title might suggest, argued that by definition *majestatis*, sovereignty, is indivisible and omnipotent.³ In this conclusion Kaempfer followed his famous predecessors Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes.⁴ Like them he was convinced that a mistaken judgement in this matter would have the gravest political consequences, leading to civil war and rebellion.⁵ Yet Kaempfer mentions neither Bodin nor Hobbes. He did not have to go so far afield. The question was hotly debated amongst scholars, and Kaempfer cites a host of German jurists and university professors who all wrote with authority on the subject.

Kaempfer names the work of twelve legal experts of the sixteenth and seventeenth century who maintained that sovereignty can indeed be divided into the personal authority of the monarch and the greater authority of the state. Just as the moon is dependent on the sun for its lustre, it was argued, so the sovereignty of the ruler is dependent on and limited by the constitution of the state.⁶ Kaempfer, however, saw his ideal encapsulated in words attributed to Alexander the Great: 'Just as the world cannot be ruled by two suns, the state cannot be governed by two authorities concurrently.'⁷ He mentions the writings of nine authorities to support his view and indicates that there are many more. Why was this question of such importance to Kaempfer and his contemporaries?

Cardinal Mazarin died when Kaempfer was ten. Since then, Louis XIV, the self-styled *roi de soleil*, had consolidated his personal, absolute leadership. Kaempfer's plea for indivisible and omnipotent sovereignty, as well as his symbolism, appear very much inspired by the French ruler who maintained: *L'état, c'est moi*.

Yet Kaempfer was no admirer of Louis XIV. In the first sentence of his *History of Japan*, he cynically remarked that on his departure from Sweden, Germany was threatened by its most Christian and most un-Christian enemies. The most Christian enemy was, of course, Louis XIV, whose alliance with the Osman Turks permitted them to reach the gates of Vienna.

Kaempfer's omnipotent ruler was an utopian figure. He was neither Louis XIV, nor Kaempfer's later employer, the Duke of Detmold, as whose 'slave' he described himself towards the end of his life.⁸ He was a sage king. Kaempfer states: 'A king ... who is solely intent on his own advantage is degenerate,' and concludes his discourse with the statement that the tyranny of the Roman rulers did not deserve to be called sovereignty.⁹

Commentators on Kaempfer's work have been perplexed at the contradictions they believe are inherent in his progressive acceptance of other religions, customs and races, and his conservative views on government. I have argued elsewhere that Kaempfer's abhorrence of any form of popular government was based to a large extent on the experience of his youth. Lemgo, his hometown, acquired the dubious fame of burning the largest number of women as witches. The height of this persecution was reached in Kaempfer's teens. His father, the principal vicar, apparently ignored this unholy behaviour, but his uncle, the junior vicar, admonished the city councillors and mayor from the pulpit. For this he was accused as being in league with the devil and finally pronounced guilty and sentenced to death in the name of the University of Gießen, the institution responsible for such judgements. Later, in his *Amoenitates Exoticae*, Kaempfer forcefully expressed his anger at those who locally conducted the inquisition, brandishing them as 'frequently uneducated, biased, if not to say greedy, cruel, and wicked people'.¹⁰ While the death sentence of the uncle was pronounced by the University of Gießen, the responsibility rested with the local government of the mayor and his city elders. Kaempfer had learnt early in life that the government of the people was corrupt and could not be trusted. There was a need for an all-powerful sage king to curb the excesses of the common, uneducated people.

Kaempfer's personal experience might readily explain why this enlightened scholar, pleading for religious toleration, was, at the same time, advocating political absolutism. Yet Kaempfer was not alone in endorsing positions which appear incompatible today. One modern scholar, noting these same, 'paradoxical' tendencies in Bodin wrote: 'Thus political absolutism and religious toleration, the improbable twins of the modern state system, make their first appearance in the writing of this enigmatic sixteenth-century French lawyer.'¹¹

Absolutism was not only endorsed by those who were enlightened enough to plead for religious toleration. Even the advocates of the natural law theory, scholars who believed that every man, however humble, had some inalienable rights, were proponents of political absolutism. Today man like Hobbes are accused of insincerity when they argue both for the rights of the individual and the authority of an omnipotent ruler. The work of Samuel Pufendorf, one of the best known defenders of the natural law theory, has been described as 'honeycombed with juxtaposed and unresolved combinations.'¹² Such 'contradictions' are similarly apparent in the writings of Leibniz, the famous liberal thinker and student of China.¹³

The reason for these apparent inconsistencies in political thought must ultimately be sought in the political situation of the period.

The Thirty Years War had exposed the Holy Roman Empire as no more than an empty shell. The emperor did not hold sovereign power. He presided over a loose federation of some 355 political units, each of which could enter a virtually limitless combination of alliances within and outside the empire: an extraordinary political 'monster' as Samuel Pufendorf called it.¹⁴ Lacking unified direction, this 'monster' was unable to defend itself, but divided and dismembered, its splinters generated enormous destructive powers. With the right alliances, in themselves insignificant political units wreaked havoc far beyond their actual capacity, permitting, in turn, outside competitors, such as France and Sweden, to feed on the spoils. It is estimated that on average the Thirty Years' War wiped out some forty per cent of the population, in some some states, such as Mecklenburg, Hessen, Pfalz and Württemberg, the loss was up to seventy per cent.¹⁵ Those who survived regarded their local rulers with the utmost of contempt, and expressed nothing but disdain for their fellow countrymen, who, once law and order broke down, were often as guilty of violence and destruction as invading soldiers.¹⁶ Small wonder then that contemporaries were unable to imagine that feudal lords, let alone commoners, were capable of governing.

The Treaty of Westphalia brought an end to continuous carnage and devastation, but it did not solve the contradictions inherent in the political system, nor eliminate the threat of war.

Europe was engaged in an important paradigm change, and the 17th century witnessed the most painful stages of this process. Under the cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin, France had developed into a centralized state, corresponding already largely to the modern national unit. The German states were eager to imitate the *roi de soleil*, but still bound to the empire by a code of feudal laws. The friction between late feudal administration and the rise of

absolutism dominated politics after the Peace of Westphalia. The war against the Osman Turks, conducted mainly by the emperor, the house of Hapsburg, invested the empire temporarily with renewed importance as feudal alliance of Christian states. Yet the clock could not be put back: the medieval framework no longer corresponded to the realities. Opportunism reigned; countless alliances made and broken led to sporadic fighting, and the constant threat of full-scale war dominated the second half of the 17th century. The question of how the continual squabbling of lesser and greater feudal barons could be stopped was of greatest importance.

The lives of men like Kaempfer, Leibniz and Pufendorf — but also Bodin and Hobbes in France and England before them —, were dominated by the memory and threat of war and insurrection. If they had one common utopia, then it was government promising eternal peace. In the political climate of the day, men's right to live in peace was the most important right. Experience had shown that neither feudal lords nor commoners could be trusted to act ethically and respect the property of their neighbours.¹⁷ At the time the only political solution to secure for men the right to live unmolested appeared to be the absolute state, where the authority of the ruler was undivided and not contended.¹⁸

Political absolutism and peace Kaempfer found in Japan. Although peace had already prevailed for many generations when Kaempfer arrived there in 1690, the political situation had, nevertheless, certain similarities with that of his native country. While the Holy Roman Empire was split into some 355 political units, Japan had some 250 *han*, governed more or less autonomously by their daimyo. Just as the *Reichstag*, the diet of the empire, was staffed by the members of the empire and met at Regensburg, the daimyo occupied the highest posts in the central administration at Edo.

The similarities went deeper than mere appearances. Japan was, like Europe, engaged in an important paradigm change. The Warring States Period had demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the medieval order. The vestiges of a feudal-type system had been on a collision course with new ambitions of absolutism. But the Tokugawa had somehow succeeded to avoid this collision. Or rather, had succeeded into turning it into a prolonged, but — until the final stages — peaceful tug-of-war.

Kaempfer visited Japan at a time when shogunal powers were at their height. When he travelled to Edo in 1691/92, the country had recovered from the natural disasters of the Tenna Period (1681-84) and not yet been subjected to those at the turn of the century. The economy was booming, as the novels of Ihara Saikaku readily attest. Initial protest to Tsunayoshi's policy of relying on his chamberlains rather than the daimyo in the government of the country, had proved ineffective. Many of their rights and duties were now concentrated in the hands of the grand chamberlain Makino Narisada, and his successor-designate, Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu, was waiting in the wings. The scale of Japan was much smaller than that of the Holy Roman Empire, but what Kaempfer saw, provided him with confirmation of his theory that absolutism was necessary to maintain the all-essential peace. Kaempfer noted that also here in Japan the common populace was interested in their local welfare only, and

the stubborn petty rulers were 'thirsting for political authority.'¹⁹ Yet the Tokugawa had managed to build up a system of such stringent laws and police their subjects with such ingenuity that their destructive political ambitions were held in check, and peace was being maintained. When Kaempfer learnt, moreover, that the ruler was a studied man, extending unprecedented patronage to scholars, there could be no doubt for him that the Japanese had never been more fortunate than under their present government.²⁰ Kaempfer was not uncritical of Japan, but its political structure closely approximated his utopia.

While Kaempfer admired the absolutism of Alexander the Great, Tsunayoshi saw that of the Confucian sage kings Yao and Shun as his model.²¹ These fabled rulers of Chinese antiquity did not share their authority with hereditary feudal lords, as he and his predecessors, but ruled through ministers selected and appointed by themselves.

There is no detailed treatise revealing the political structure of the shogun's vision — generally he is accused of lacking any political foresight whatsoever —, but an examination of the record reveals that from the first days of his government his utopia of absolute authority provided the motivation for his political reforms. What Kaempfer saw and found praise-worthy when he arrived in 1690 in Japan, reveals itself as the outcome of a decade of intense political manoeuvring to diminish the might of the powerful daimyo who, especially in their capacity of Senior Councillors, shared the shogun's authority and were able to impede any policies he might wish to enact.

Only days after becoming shogun, Tsunayoshi installed his long-time retainer, tutor and confidant, Makino Narisada, as his official chamberlain at Edo castle.²² Just over one month later he directed that daimyo were no longer to use the Senior Councillors as intermediaries, requiring them to direct any communication with the shogun via the chamberlains.²³ On that same day he dealt another blow to the established authority of the Senior Councillors by appointing his favourite among them, Hotta Masatoshi, as solely responsible for the administration of farmers.²⁴ Previously these duties had been shared in monthly rotation by all Senior Councillors. As the overwhelming part of the government's revenue was derived from the taxation of farmers, this effectively put Hotta Masatoshi in charge of government finance. This situation was confirmed some days later when Tsunayoshi stated that Hotta was to be in charge of *koku yō no koto* (national finance), and strengthened his position by placing a number of high ranking officials under him, including an inspector.²⁵ The elevation of a man who had demonstrated his personal loyalty shortly previously when Tsunayoshi's succession to the shogunate was threatened, was completed when he was made Great Councillor (*tairō*) later in the year. On the same day the faithful Makino Narisada was elevated to Grand Chamberlain (*gosoba yōnin*).²⁶ Narisada, we are told, became the "eyes and ears" of Masatoshi.²⁷

The question of whether Hotta Masatoshi was a forerunner of government by the shogun's favourites, the Chamberlains, acting under his personal direction, or whether he served as an independent administrator similar to the former *tairō* Sakai Tadakiyo, is a debated one, and indicates how little historians know about his political activities.²⁸ Nor has it been established

what motivated the Junior Councillor Inaba Masayasu to assassinate Masatoshi, his senior relative, in Edo castle in 1684, at the cost of his own life. A contemporary, the scholar Toda Mosui, noted in his diary how Masatoshi had misused the authority entrusted to him, and even recorded the rumour that he planned to dispose of the shogun to rule the country as the Hôjô had done in Kamakura times. In Mosui's eyes, Masayasu was a man of unparalleled loyalty to the shogun who sacrificed his own life to restore authority to the ruler.²⁹

Historians can only speculate whether the particular form in which Masayasu chose to display his loyalty was in response to the shogun's prompting, or had grown out of his own observations and convictions. Certain is that Tsunayoshi used the incident to further entrench his Chamberlain government. As Masatoshi's assassination took place close to the shogunal chambers in Edo castle, the shogun decreed, ostensibly as a security measure, that the offices of the Senior Councillors be moved to a more distant part of the castle, and that all communication with him be channelled via the Chamberlains. This meant that the Senior Councillors had lost their role as power brokers and been replaced by the Chamberlains as the shogun's closest advisers.³⁰ A year later Toda Mosui wrote about the shogun's chamberlains:

'The three men Makino Bingo no Kami, Matsudaira Iga no Kami and Kitami Wakasa no Kami serve the shogun in a manner unheard of in previous reigns. They are below the Senior Councillors, but above the Junior Councillors. The authority of Makino Bingo no Kami, however, is greater than that of a Senior Councillor.'³¹

When Kaempfer arrived in Edo for his first audience with the shogun in 1691, he was told that there were five Senior Councillors, and the first was Makino Bingo no Kami.³² Moreover, Kaempfer noted: 'This Bingo, or Bengo, used to be the shogun's guardian and foster father before he became shogun. Now he is his most intimate councillor and the only one whom the shogun trusts.'³³ True to the tradition of Yao and Shun, Tsunayoshi had succeeded in installing his personal follower as the country's single most powerful minister, but he was to be far less successful in handling the large administrative machinery that controlled the day-to-day government of the country.

While Kaempfer asserted with Alexander the Great that a state could not be governed by two suns, Tsunayoshi maintained that just as the sun illuminates the smallest pebble of the realm, the shogun is responsible even for the lowliest of his subjects. He made this assertion early in his government when Hotta Masatoshi reported to him how he had been touched by the abject poverty of two street urchins. According to his own record, Masatoshi had felt the impulse to help, but had then decided that caring for the lowest of society was beyond the duty of the shogun's minister. Masatoshi described how Tsunayoshi corrected him, stating that the shogun was responsible for all the people of the realm, however lowly their status.³⁴ This simple story illustrates an important paradigm change, and the fact that the senior minister chose to record for posterity how his views required correction by the ruler, confirms that it was an abrupt and unexpected — in Masatoshi's eyes perhaps even inappropriate — shift from the accepted norm. Masatoshi had reacted to the situation according to the rules of the hierarchical delegation of authority characteristic of the feudal state. Tsunayoshi,

however, took this occasion to express his utopian vision of the centralized, or autocratic state. Not the lower officials were responsible for the care of the street urchins, but the shogun and the minister to whom he had delegated his authority.

I have argued in greater detail elsewhere that this political utopia was the binding thread of Tsunayoshi's diverse and much criticized political stratagems.³⁵ Thus his debasement of the coinage and other financial policies, such as the abolition of individual domain currencies (*hansatsu*), and fixing the exchange rate of gold and silver, eroded the financial autonomy of the domains. The profits from the debasement not only strengthened the financial position of the ruler, but also established the principle that the ruler had a right to draw on the wealth of the whole country, regardless of domain boundaries.³⁶

The judgement of the famous Forty-seven *rōnin* (masterless samurai) case, again, asserted the principle that the laws of the central government must precede over those of the domain: though personal loyalty was still of utmost importance, punishing the *rōnin* for defending the honour of their dead master indicated that personal and particular relationships now took second place to the demands of the state.

The policy which has perplexed historians most, and has been harshly criticized by contemporaries and later generations alike, is Tsunayoshi's infamous *shorui awaremi no rei* (Laws of Compassion). This policy, however, is no more than the logical extension of Tsunayoshi's view that "just as the sun illuminates the smallest pebble of the realm, the shogun is responsible even for the lowliest of his subjects." As the name indicates, these laws not only protected street urchins — and even the unborn child — but also all other 'living beings.' For the samurai the most burdensome and therefore most criticized aspect of these laws was the protection of dogs, which many of them kept in great numbers. True to his vision of the centralized, autocratic state, Tsunayoshi stated that 'both people of high status and of low status' had to observe the laws when he condemned one of his own veterinarians to death for having killed his neighbour's dog in anger.³⁷

For most of the samurai, Tsunayoshi's utopian vision of the state had little to recommend itself. Except for the fortunate few who on account of the shogun's personal favours or their special expertise, or talents, rose far above their inherited station in life, it entailed loss of authority — as in the case of the daimyo — or additional onerous duties, as, for instance, when the lower officials were charged with taking care of orphans, sick travellers and, to the great amusement of the crowds of commoners, were even sent out to chase stray dogs.³⁸ The lack of support from the samurai class, in charge of the overwhelming part of the country's administration, meant that Tsunayoshi's political vision remained a utopian one.

In his account of the shogun's government, Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu, who succeeded Makino Narisada as Grand Chamberlain and most powerful minister, lamented that the shogun's policies were obstructed "on all levels, and it was impossible to succeed." He concluded:

'During his thirty years of governing the people, the shogun wanted to make the world like that of Yao and Shun. But the intentions of his early government were not fulfilled. Now

who is to blame for this? The Ancients [of China] lamented, "There was a lord worthy to be called a lord, but he had no ministers worthy of the name." Indeed, although the country is different, the saying remains true.³⁹

Conclusion

Scholars have debated at length the differences and similarities of European and Japanese feudalism. Regardless of the disparities, it can be said for both parts of the world that continuous fighting between 'petty kings' discredited government of the feudal type and nourished the utopia of a grand, all-powerful and just ruler.

Japan's three great unifiers, Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa Ieyasu, ostensibly established their hegemony by military means. However, their victories would not have been as swift if especially the powerful 'outside' lords, the *tozama daimyō*, had not recognized that partial submission to a greater political unit was more advantageous than continuous warfare for complete autonomy. Much the same can be said of the 'electors' that met at Regensburg to chose the so-called Holy Roman Emperor. In both cases, however, the supreme ruler was no more than a compromise: he was lacking the authority as well as the wisdom and respect that would make his position strategically and morally unassailable. The political greatness attributed to Yao and Shun, or Alexander the Great, remained a utopian vision.

Nevertheless, the centralized, autocratic state was eventually to become the form of government in both Japan and Europe. While these autocratic states might have been lacking in sage rulers, their political authority was such that, regardless of the realities, the image of the great ruler could be constructed and imposed upon the people.

Both in Europe and Japan these autocratic states have been replaced by democratic government, and from the standpoint of the late twentieth century, the utopian visions of seventeenth century Europe and Japan have a strong reactionary flavour. Max Weber, however, argues convincingly that absolutism, which replaces feudal lords with bureaucrats in the administration of the country, is an essential stage in the development of the modern democratic state.⁴⁰ If Weber's proposition is accepted, then the utopian structures of government of men like Engelbert Kaempfer and the fifth Tokugawa shogun Tsunayoshi must be regarded as visionary and advanced for their age.

Notes

- 1 *Nachricht die Urschrift der Kämpferischen Beschreibung von Japan betreffend*, Lemgo, 1774, cited in Hüls, H., 'Zur Geschichte des Drucks von Kaempfers 'Geschichte und Beschreibung von Japan' und zur sozialökonomischen Struktur von Kaempfers Lesepublikum im 18. Jahrhundert', *Engelbert Kaempfer zum 330. Geburtstag*, Hüls and Hoppe, eds, 1982 F.L. Wagener, Lemgo, p. 196. (All translations are my own unless otherwise stated.) Even though my research has shown that the printed editions of Kaempfer's manuscript *Heutiges Japan* differ from both Scheuchzer's translation *The History of Japan*

- and Dohm's *Geschichte und Beschreibung von Japan*, for convenience sake the work is referred to as *History of Japan*. (See Bodart-Bailey, 'Kaempfer Restor'd', *Monumenta Nipponica*, 43:1, Spring 1988.)
- 2 Lemgo, 1777-9. Facsimile edition in 2 vols., F.A. Brockhaus, Stuttgart 1964, p. 414-22.
 - 3 This essay is translated and annotated by R. Müller-König as 'Über die zwiefache Majestät: real und personalebundene Majestät' in H. Hüls and H. Hoppe, eds., *Engelbert Kaempfer zum 330. Geburtstag*, Lemgo, 1982, pp. 15-29.
 - 4 Jean Bodin, *Les Six Livres de la République*, Paris, 1583, facsimile edition Scientia Aalen, 1961, p. 122. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, R. Tuck, ed., Cambridge, 1991, p. 127.
 - 5 König, p. 20.
 - 6 König p. 23.
 - 7 Curtius Rufius, *Historiae Alexandri Magni Macedonis, book 4, ch. 11*, cited in König, p. 24.
 - 8 Karl Meier-Lemgo, ed., *Die Briefe Engelbert Kaempfers*, Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Wiesbaden, 1965, p.45.
 - 9 König, pp. 26-27.
 - 10 'saepe homines indocti & praejudiciis effascinati, ne dicam avari, crudeles & impij,' 'Investigatio Innoentiae per Crocodilos & Ignem, apud Gentiles Orientes hodie usitata', *Amoenitatum exoticarum politica-physico-medicarum ...*, (usually referred to as *Amoenitates Exoticae*), Lemgo 1712, p. 458. For a more detailed treatment see Bodart-Bailey, *Kenperu to Tokugawa Tsunayoshi*, Tokyo, 1994, pp. 29-42.
 - 11 Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation*, London, 1967, pp. 298-9.
 - 12 Leonard Krieger, *The Politics of Discretion, Pufendorf and the Acceptance of Natural Law*, Chicago & London, 1965, p. 2.
 - 13 See, for instance, G.W. Leibniz, *Politische Schriften*, H.H. Holz ed., Frankfurt and Wien, 1966, pp. 15, 18-21, 26, 27, 29.
 - 14 *De statu imperii Germanici*, 1667, cited in Wilhelm Treue, *Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft und Technik in Deutschland vom 16. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert*, dtv, 1974, p. 102. The states of the empire only obtained the right to enter alliances with outside powers at the peace of Westphalia, but such alliances were already concluded during the war.
 - 15 Treue, p. 117.
 - 16 *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg in Augenzeugenberichten*, Hans Jessen, ed., dtv, 1971, p. 408-9.
 - 17 Hobbes wrote: 'The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death;' (*Leviathan*, Ch. 13, p. 90).
 - 18 *Leviathan*, Ch. 18, p. 127.
 - 19 '... dura & Imperii sitientia Principum capita ...', Engelbert Kaempfer, *Amoenitates Exoticae*, p. 495.
 - 20 *Amoenitates Exoticae*, p. 502.
 - 21 Kuroita Katsumi, ed., *Tokugawa Jikki*, in *Shintei zôhō kokushi taikēi*, Tokyo 1929-35, VI:735. (Hence: *TJ*)
 - 22 *TJ*, V:363, Empō 8.7.9.
 - 23 *TJ*, V:379, Empō 8.urū 8.30.
 - 24 *Ibid.*
 - 25 *TJ*, V:369, Empō 8.8.16.
 - 26 *TJ*, V:432, Tenna 1.12.11.
 - 27 Hotta Masatoshi, *Fukyō kōki*, quoted by Kitajima Masamoto, *Edo bakufu, sono jitsuryoku shatachi*, Tokyo, 1964, pp. 262-63.
 - 28 See Tsuji Tatsuya, *Kyōhō kaikaku no kenkyū*, Tokyo 1963, pp. 57-8, who is opposed by Ito Tasaburō, *Nihon kinsei shi*, Tokyo, 1952, 2:109, and Fujino Tamotsu, *Bakuhan taisei shi no kenkyū*, Tokyo, 1961, pp. 416.
 - 29 Toda Mosui, *Gotōdaiki*, Hayakawa Junsaburō, ed., *Toda Mosui zenshū* Tokyo 1915, pp. 29-32.
 - 30 Kurita Mototsugu, *Edo jidai shi*, Tokyo 1976, p.489.
 - 31 *Gotōdaiki*, p. 42, Jōkyō 2.7.21.
 - 32 Engelbert Kaempfer, *Heutiges Japan*, British Library MS Sloane 3060, f. 352.

- 33 *Ibid*, f. 362v.
- 34 Hotta Masatoshi, *Yôgenroku*, in *Zoku zoku gunsho ruiju*, Tokyo, 1906-9, vol. 13, p. 31.
- 35 B.M. Bodart-Bailey, 'Tokugawa Tsunayoshi (1646-1709) a Weberian Analysis', *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques*, XLIII.1.1989.
- 36 See Beatrice M. Bodart-Bailey, "A Case of Political and Economic Expropriation: The Monetary Reform of the Fifth Tokugawa Shogun," *Papers on Far Eastern History*, 39, March 1989, pp. 177-89.
- 37 Kinsei shiryô kenkyûkai, ed., *Shôhô jiroku*, 3 vols., Tokyo, 1964, I:357B. For a detailed discussion see Beatrice M. Bodart-Bailey, 'The Laws of Compassion', *Monumenta Nipponica*, 40:2, Summer 1985.
- 38 "Laws of Compassion," pp. 168-9, 188.
- 39 *Kembyô jitsuroku* (manuscript, Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan) vol. 34; also cited in Kurita, *Edo jidaishi*, I:450.
- 40 See "Tokugawa Tsunayoshi (1646-1709) a Weberian Analysis."