

# THE “ORIENTALIZATION” OF JAPANESE PHILOSOPHY

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The debate on orientalism has touched the field of philosophy. That is, it has stirred, to some extent, the common trend of the europeanization of philosophy. This paper will discuss the problem of the “orientalization” of Japanese philosophy in a much wider perspective. Specifically this will discuss how Europe, often identified with the “Western tradition, mistreated other traditions, in particular Japanese philosophy. It shall therefore touch upon the problem of the reinvention of the philosophical tradition. The position is therefore directed towards the familiar doubts as to whether the non-European streams of thought contain any “philosophy” at all. This question inevitably brings us to the relevant problem of the various ways in the search for Truth. I would like to touch upon two methods in the search for truth: the meditative-mystical and logical-discursive-rational ones. These seem to me decisive ways in approaching the relations and transreadings between the European and Japanese philosophical traditions.

## **1) Is philosophy a European phenomenon, and what does it mean for “Japanese philosophy” and its beginnings?**

The above question could as well be asked in the following way: Is there anything like Europe or Asia (not to mention the misused “East” and “West” in this context) in the field of philosophy, and where does Japan stand in this distinction?

In today’s philosophical world, although it often claims to be “global”, we can still hear the voices arguing that philosophy is exclusively a European (“Western”) phenomenon. When Nishi Amane introduced the streams of European philosophy (positivism and utilitarianism) to Japan, he himself must have believed that by doing this he was bringing to his country something that it lacked or needed for its salvation from the bondage to Neo-Confucianism. Nishi’s great awakening<sup>(1)</sup> might have meant too entering a dream even more decisive and tremendous than the former one, the belief that there was something superior in Western, European, ideas and its civilization, and that “the master key to Western culture could be precisely identified as a single discipline, namely philosophy. This discipline he first defined as ‘the clarification of wisdom and virtue’”<sup>(2)</sup>, a science presumably so superior to anything Japan or even China with their Song philosophical tradition and its development in Japan might have produced in the field.

By the time Nishi was confronted and charmed by European philosophy, it had already been understood in Europe as a "European or Western enterprise"<sup>(3)</sup>, which has not been the case throughout the history of European philosophy. Therefore Nishi saw in Europe also Japan's Other, at the time of Japan's growing awareness and perception of the West. If we look at the European philosophical moment, and especially at Nishi's insight into it, we understand that what he perceived was exactly the attitude at that time, to which I shall later refer as the logical-discursive-rational way. This segment, which together with the meditative-mystical way, forms a unity in human understanding and being in the world, everywhere, be it "East" or "West", although somewhere one or the other of the two poles might be more suppressed or recognizable.

This oneness brought Europe to the situation where it hit the borders of what might be called "European" philosophical discourse. It is also reflected today, in a radical critique of European philosophy's dream of attaining a foundation for knowledge and an absolute basis for truth. Might it be the oneness of European philosophy which brought Nishitani Keiji to mourn for what he called the forgotten selves or the loss of the "spiritual basis of Japan"?<sup>(4)</sup> According to Nishitani, in his essays on nihilism, there was a solution from the decay of a spiritual core.<sup>(5)</sup> Karl Löwith had stated, "the Europeans themselves had already ceased to believe in their own culture", which could be understood also as the insufficiency of the exclusively logical-discursive-rational way, which is being called into question today.

European philosophy evolved to Hegelian holism, a philosophy of change and becoming; the changes always taking place within a rational holistic system. When approaching the history of Japanese philosophy, we do not get much help from the notion of Truth in a rigorously Hegelian sense<sup>(6)</sup>. Even if we take into account his teleological hierarchy of writings, where the peak is reserved for phonetic writing of the alphabetic type, we see in it a stand which in its obsession with the letter diminishes any system that does not correspond to this demand. We can read from it the possible consequences for Japanese philosophy.

So if we try to answer the opening question, we might argue that "European" philosophy has been going through various phases of its definitions and redefinitions, of searching for and losing its own identity. The last fifty years of encounters of Japanese and European philosophy, which would still include Nishida Kitarō as a living figure of world philosophy, brings into the debate the contemporary movement in philosophy that are opening new possibilities of verifications of thought and rationality and their basis and assumptions. This is also the moment which calls for a rethinking of the unity of the two inseparable ways to truth, that have been too often put into opposition to one another.

Although Nishida's early work "A Study of Good", has often been criticized as "naive"<sup>(7)</sup>, we should still read it as an important challenge to philosophy. Besides the recognized and legitimate way of searching for Truth, (logical-discursive-rational) he is arguing in the direction of "pure experience", which at the beginning of his work he defined as: "To experience means to know events precisely as they are. It means to cast away completely one's own inner workings, and to know in accordance with the events. Since people usually

include some thought when speaking of experience, the word “pure” is here used to signify a condition of true experience itself without the addition of the least thought or reflection. For example, it refers to that moment of seeing a color or hearing a sound which occurs not only before one has added the judgment that this seeing or hearing relates to something external or that one is feeling this sensation, but before one has judged what color or what sound it is. Thus, pure experience is synonymous with direct experience. When one experiences directly one’s conscious state there is as yet neither subject nor object, and knowledge and its object are completely united. This is the purest form of experience.”<sup>(8)</sup>

## **2) Orientalism and the division into logical-discursive-rational and meditative-mystical ways of approaching the truth**

Since becoming acquainted with Said’s work<sup>(9)</sup>, I have tried to follow the dynamics of the notion of “Orientalism”. To the author of this controversial and inspiring work it primarily meant the way in which Europe communicated with the East (Orient) due to the special place which the Orient occupies in the Western (European) experience. This is to say, for Europe the Orient was not only a neighbor but has been (which for me in the wider sense of orientalist undertakings, is not only the past state of affairs) the world of its richest and oldest colonies. The Orient has also been the source of Europe’s civilizations, languages and its rival in culture. The Orient has been one of the deepest and most repeated images of the Other. It helped Europe to define itself, as its counterpole and opposite. Apart from this dimension of the notion, I have been primarily interested in the distorted relationship, if it was put into practice, in the fields of religions or on the part of philosophy which deals with people’s relationships to their existence and impermanence. In this sphere, the two forms of one’s spiritual search more or less overlap each other. The origins of these distortions and the ways in which these ideas were nurtured are particularly interesting.

In the present essay I cannot give a full historical overview of these standpoints but shall, as a starting point, give Zaehner’s notorious idea<sup>(10)</sup>, which has had a strong influence on the Euro-American intellectual, of a distinction between “Indian” (Eastern) and “Judaic” (Western) conception of people and the world. It drew from the fact that the Judaic accepts God as an objective reality whereas the Indian does not. On this basis he came to the conclusion that it is not possible to bridge the gaps between those two standpoints, since “the European mind is possessed by the concept of Truth, the concept that the ultimate realities can be known at least in part, and that the possession of this truth is so vital to man’s well-being. Such is not, and rarely has been, the Indian or Chinese way of seeing things.”<sup>(11)</sup> Although in his statement Japan is not mentioned, it is instructive for the confrontation within the debate on Orientalism, which should not degenerate into an infinite discourse about “East” and “West.” It would keep losing its philosophical essence until it became a pure political polemic trying to disqualify the mentioned authors. Therefore, in this paper, I deal with it as a phenomenon, recognizable in the majority of the perceptions of Japanese philosophical works

in Europe.

The notion in question is the phenomenon of mystical experience, which in Nishida's philosophical works is called *pure experience*, or as mentioned in various religious works, the experience of the Absolute, Infinity, Nothingness. One could have a certain standpoint about the "naïveté" of Nishida's work, but not in relation to the notion of *pure experience*, which might have been inspired by William James and his work on *mystical experience*.

What follows from this are such questions as:

- Does mystical experience exist?
- If it does exist, what is its phenomenological definition?
- Is it a philosophical concept?

The classical objections to it undermine the existence of mystical experience as a notion that would have any relevant position besides the knowledge acquired in a logical-discursive-rational way. Faure<sup>(12)</sup> quotes less well-known classical orientalist statements, which are colored with explicitly western paternalistic standpoints toward Asians, especially Buddhist religious and philosophical orientations. In the light of further arguments the following four are particularly instructive:

— "Europe. . . is destined by Providence to regenerate the Asians, whose intellectual and moral vigor seems exhausted."<sup>(13)</sup>

— "Buddhism has nothing in common with Christianity, which stands as high above it as European societies stand above Asian societies."<sup>(14)</sup>

— "To claim that these (Asian) peoples are atheistic is the same imputation as if we said that they are anti-Cartesian; they are neither for nor against Descartes: they are true children. A child is neither an atheist nor a deist; he is nothing."<sup>(15)</sup>

— "Buddhism can teach us nothing, and to follow its teaching would be disastrous to us. Notwithstanding its specious appearance, it is but a tissue of contradictions, and it is no calumny to say that, looked at closely, it is spiritualism without soul, virtue without duty, morality without liberty, charity without love, a world without nature and without God. What lesson can we draw from such teachings? And how much we should have to forget to become its disciples! How much lower we should have to descend in the scale of civilization!"<sup>(16)</sup>

The above statements, which are, as arguments, naive and offensive, were all written in the second half of the 19th century, at about the time when Nishi Amane had been so enthusiastically introducing Western learning and philosophy into Japan. They reflect the general atmosphere in Europe towards Japanese thought at that time.<sup>(17)</sup> What we are confronted with here is not only ignorance and the degradation of important and much more venerable traditions, but also the anxiety of a researcher well trained in rational-logical discourse who appears to be quite frail when encountered with a theme which would demand a different strategy. As a result, various defensive mechanisms are mobilized. One of the possible defenses is also a kind of "smokescreen", formed from an effectively loaded debate on orientalism. The second possibility is a widely practised encapsulation, such as the one by

which the official Church in Europe managed to turn the work of medieval mystics into a harmless phenomenon. At that time they were accused of heresy. Today their works are truly accepted into academic discussion but not into everyday religious pragmatics.

As an illustration, let us follow the thoughts of a philosopher<sup>18</sup> who intercedes on behalf of the revitalization of the mystical search: "We start from the supposition that the human being is opened and capable of comprehending the infinite and therefore susceptible to mystical experience. Our presupposition is, that this openness enables the way into the world of mysticism / . . . / . The mystical dimension of human nature is an anthropological fact, which determines humans as rational and free beings / . . . / . We do not start primarily from a Christian understanding of mysticism / . . . / . In its broader sense we understand the mystical dimension as a capacity of a human being to express himself in infinity, although it remains an unspoken word, which is precisely the peculiarity of the mystical: one is not able to express it or put it into concepts / . . . / . The higher one rises, the less important the words are, said Dionysius Areopagite / . . . / . It is a special experience, a pre experience, which takes place at the encounter with the unknown. Therefore it is very difficult to articulate it. 'The word, which does not address the heart, does not have any weight', said Solzhenycyn. That is why contemporary positivist-materialist logic is so empty."<sup>19</sup> This is the tradition on which the arguments for the introduction of positivism into Japan were grounded, and in regard to which the same author wrote the following statement: "Compte has thrown into the world his utopian thought about the immense role of positivism in the future: technics have been limited only to the inorganic field, in positivism this will be different, since by that time, technics will cease to be only geometrical, mechanical or chemical, but in the first place political and moral."<sup>20</sup>

We can doubt however, that Comte would fight so much for positivism in science, if today he could see the frightening effects of science and technics, which in their endeavors cannot give up their illusions about the elixir of immortality.

The authors that make claims for the legitimacy of mystical experience make different mistakes: they are limiting the genuineness of the mystical with the notion of a Christian God. Zaehner defended this standpoint very firmly. Even the more tolerant authors limit their standpoints with<sup>21</sup>. Tertulian: "Anima naturaliter christiana" and define: "Mysticism as a spiritual life, which expresses itself in a deeper and more direct connection with God."<sup>22</sup>

We might ask ourselves whether the God here is not just a symbol, a stenographic record for the unexpressible and unexplainable, which the mystical experience reveals to us. Faure<sup>23</sup> claims that "there is probably no way for Westerners to understand Asian religions from a purely traditional Indian, Chinese, or Japanese perspective, but perhaps there is no need to do so either." At this point he brings Bakhtin into the discussion and argues that "'exotopy', or more simply outsidership, is a powerful factor in understanding another culture, as long as it does not claim any transcendental privilege." The term "outsidership" is used here so that the Other can be left in its enclave and not be bothered about. The question remains as to which authority is entitled to draw the borders to such exotopies.

The familiar mistake is to understand ecstatic behavior as an element or reflection of mystical experience, since it impresses the surroundings with its bizarreness, but is in its essence only a disturbing admixture, or a picture of an inner fight between neurotic narcissism and a genuine aspiration for enlightenment. Many examples of individuals who had to pass through such a phase on their way to enlightenment are known from history (Theresa of Avila, Ramakrishana). There might be many more persons that deserve a thorough psychiatric analysis on suspicion of hysteric psychosis, but after real mystical insight one keeps the experience for oneself it subtly echoes in one's life for ever.

The problem becomes crucial for the Kyoto School and its relationship to European medieval mysticism. The encapsulation of European medieval mysticism is "endangered", paradoxically, from Japanese philosophers, who found the parts of those works with which they were able to draw parallels with Japanese Buddhism. This could be one of the reasons why the efforts to devalue the phenomenon of mystical experience can be directly derived from the orientalising of certain philosophical streams in Japan, or even from the "reversed orientalism" practiced by some Japanese thinkers. Instead of making such attempts, we must be as precise as possible in the phenomenological definition of this subject, otherwise we are encountered with trends which could be described as "mystification of the mystical". In them the basic term "mysticism" is becoming more and more a pejorative one.<sup>[24]</sup>

Critical remarks directed to Suzuki, Nishida and Zen are, it seems, intended for mysticism or mystical experience of the world in general. If I try to summarize remarks critical of mystical experience, they can still not make it something nonexistent. Accepting it as a fact and trying to transfer it to the others, one should be aware that in its essence it can never be translated into logical-discursive-rational language. Such undertakings cannot even neglect as something outdated or naive the more than ninety-year-old description of the mystical given by William James.<sup>[25]</sup>

The phenomenon of mystical experience is therefore founded as a subjective reality, which in Nishida's philosophy is described as "pure experience", with its own energetic potential. We can only follow it according to the descriptions in everyday reality. The "enlightenments", against which much of "orientalization" is directed, are not reserved only for certain extraordinary persons, famous "mystics" of the "East" and "West" or even, as some authors try to generalize, the understanding of mystical experience as a psychopathological phenomenon. It is also not true that the inclination to the mystical was central just to certain religious orders, but is still essential as an orientation of "deep and solitary souls — theologians, poets and other artists"<sup>[26]</sup>. Although an artist or a poet in search of enlightenment reaches only 'the trace of the shadow of the light of another world's magnificence', the sum of these aspirations gives the taste and the right measure to the often deceptive, rational and technological development, which makes the West so proud of itself. Was this the "development" that Nishi was striving for, and that Nishida with his "pure experience" allegedly slowed down?

A wide range of "schools"<sup>[27]</sup> are brought into consideration when reflecting upon

meditative ways and practice, which have been central parts of the philosophical (sic) undertakings of the Kyoto School. The fact that the meditative-mystical dimension was included does not make it less philosophical. All the various schools, which are not all necessarily well-formed religions, mobilize various techniques by which a mystical experience is enhanced. Sometimes, however, these might be just rudimentary or abortive, but still different from all that it is possible to experience by exclusively logical-discursive-rational ways. Nishida's philosophy and his "pure experience" teach us that both ways do not deny each other but, rather, stay as inseparable as yin and yang.

## Conclusion

If we try to evaluate the extent to which Japanese philosophy has been orientalized, we have to approach it from at least two angles. First, we should ask ourselves to what extent were the streams of thought that Nishi Amane searched for and found in the West decisive for Japanese philosophy. Nishi introduced the dimensions of European philosophy that he encountered at the time which were in line with the Hegelian praise of Reason and its role in the formation of culture,<sup>(28)</sup> with all the necessary consequences of such an exclusive decision. Besides the predicament of the European obsession with Reason, which has been decisive in this process, we should not overlook the Japanese philosophers themselves and their own relationship to the Japanese philosophical heritage. We could argue that the workable mixture of East and West which was supposed to serve the objectives of national strengthening can, in perspective, also lead towards weakening if the important resources are not taken into consideration.

Nishida's turning point is instructive, since he did depart from the pure speculative standpoint in the Hegelian sense. With his pure experience he opened up new sources for the energies that might have been blocked off by the accepted standards of rationality that Europe at the time had imposed on the field of philosophy. Nishida's interpreters have often reached the edge of reversed orientalism. Nishitani's statement that "Western thought is primarily rational, or, we may say, logical."<sup>(29)</sup> leads to his: "This represents an important element of the Western spirit that strikes me as very different from the spirit of the East."<sup>(30)</sup> With its adoration for "Western Reason", such an argument unjustifiably draws the line between the two methods described above. On one side it deprives the so-called West of its non-logical traditions, and on the other one traps the East into the exclusively intuitive dimension ("Rather than logical, rational, and methodical, it (the Eastern spirit) has been extremely intuitive".)<sup>(31)</sup> By this statement he neglected all rich logical and dialectical traditions<sup>(32)</sup> that could not have been placed anywhere but in the East. The traditions that have, besides the mystical-meditative path, followed and developed important methods of logic, dialectics and conceptual thinking. With statements like "The standpoint of learning — of reason and logic, of method, of rationalism — that has emerged in the philosophy and science of the West had been lacking in the East"<sup>(33)</sup>, not only has injustice been done to the non-European, in this

case Asian philosophical traditions themselves, but they have also helped to develop the tradition of orientalization of Japanese philosophy, which culminated in reversed orientalism being practised by the Japanese thinkers themselves.

Finally we can return to Nishida's early work "A Study of Good" and to its "naïveté". I am convinced that it was far from naive to introduce into the arena of philosophical debate "pure experience" as a potential legitimate tool in the search for truth about the human being and its place in the world. It would be naive to think that by doing this a synthesis had been accomplished, a synthesis between the two ways described above as logical-discursive-rational and meditative-mystical. Philosophical debate up to the present has not been able to determine the advantage of either of them and Nishida's work can be understood not as a synthesis but as the unity of both that, like yin and yang, represent the unity in duality which is also a spiritual talisman and which should accompany us on the way to Truth.

Orientalism, understood as unjustified paternalism of the European towards the Asian tradition, has been the starting point of the paper. It is reflected also in the primacy of the logical-discursive-rational over the patterns connected with the meditative-mystical search. The process which started with the ways of asserting European philosophical heritage over the Asian ones outlined above has also developed an echo in the opposite direction and has in its own way deepened the European: Asian diastase, also partly due to the work of D.T. Suzuki. In the development of "reversed orientalism" each of the sides (European and Japanese in this case) has been defending its own standpoints (logical-discursive-rational vis à vis meditative-mystical) as the only relevant and liberating one. If one of each was trying to construct a synthesis of both, it has been clear from the beginning which is the dominant and stronger and which is the weaker and "less philosophical" one.

The described dilemma, however, is just an example of a controversial problem ("We" vis à vis the "Others"), which will be solved only when the position of dominance is transcended and they will be finally understood as mirrors of each other. The paradigm of yin and yang can serve us on the way to solving this problem.

### References

- (1) The quotes for the English version of the article are taken from: Havens, T.R.H.: Nishi Amane. Princeton University Press. Princeton, 1970, p. 24.
- (2) Ibid., p. 34.
- (3) More on this issue in the very instructive article by Robert Bernasconi: Heidegger and the Invention of the Western Philosophical Tradition, p. 1 (to be published in Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology in 1995). I would like to thank Professor Bernasconi for allowing me to read and quote this article before its publication.
- (4) The quotes for the English version of the article are taken from: Nishitani, K.: The Self-Overcoming of NIHILISM. State University of New York Press. Albany, 1990, p. 175. "Up until the middle of the Meiji period a spiritual basis and highly developed tradition was alive in the hearts and minds of the people. Indeed, the reason Japan was able to take in western culture with such unprecedented alacrity was that people then were possessed of true *ability* born of spiritual substance. However, as



Europeanization (and Americanization) proceeded, this spiritual core began to decay in subsequent generations, until it is now a vast, gaping void in our ground. The various manifestations of culture at present, if looked at closely, are mere shadows floating over the void. The worst thing is that this emptiness is in no way an emptiness that has been won through struggle, nor a nihilism that has been "lived through". It is the natural result of our having been cut off from our tradition. Before we knew what was happening, the spiritual core had wasted away completely."

- (5) *Ibid.*, p.178. "The essential thing is to overcome our inner void, and here European nihilism is of critical relevance in that it can impart a radical twist to our present situation and thereby point a way toward overcoming the spiritual hollowness. This is the second significance that nihilism holds for us. The reason the void was generated in the spiritual foundation of the Japanese in the first place was that we rushed earnestly into westernization and in the process forgot ourselves. When Löwith says that the Japanese adopted western culture indiscriminately, he means both that we adopted it without realizing that "the Europeans themselves had already ceased to believe in their own culture," and also that we Japanese had lost touch with ourselves. These are two sides of the same coin."
- (6) Few philosophers are aware of the fact that Hegel, known for his infamous derogatory statements about Asian philosophies, changed his view on Indian philosophy four years before his death. In his article published in *Jahrbuch für wissenschaftliche Kritik*, XVI, 1827 he claims that the streams of thought previously described by himself as unphilosophical (in this case *sāṃkhya* and *yoga*) do deserve to be named philosophy. This statement does not change the fact of the absence of Japan from this field, but is still very important with regard to the orientalisation of non-European philosophies.
- (7) Nishida, K.: *A Study of Good*. Printing bureau, Japanese government. Tokyo, 1959, p.207 (Nishida Kitarō and Some Aspects of His Philosophical Thought — Shimomura Toratarō)
- (8) *Ibid.*, p.1.
- (9) Said, E.W.: *Orientalism*. Routledge and Kegan Paul. London, 1978.
- (10) Zaehner, R.C.: *The Concise Encyclopedia of Living Faiths*. Hutchinson. London, 1971.
- (11) *Ibid.*, XIII.
- (12) Faure, B.: *Chan Insights and Oversights*. Princeton University Press. Princeton, 1993.
- (13) *Ibid.* p.36.
- (14) *Ibid.* p.36.
- (15) *Ibid.* p.37.
- (16) *Ibid.* p.38.
- (17) This topic has been discussed in detail in: Maja Milčinski: *Lunyu s stališča kitajske sedanjosti* (1985), published in 1988 under the title: *Pogovori*.
- (18) Juhant, J.: *Mistika in filozofija*. *Bogoslovni vestnik* 54 (1994).
- (19) *Ibid.* pp.97-98.
- (20) *Ibid.* p.98.
- (21) *Ibid.* 18.
- (22) *Ibid.* p.100.
- (23) *Ibid.* 12, p.8.
- (24) Faure (12): The selection of the descriptions of the practitioners of meditation is among the ones done either in "mala fides" or from the point of view of extreme ignorance of the phenomenon. P.44: "One has but to look at the faces of these misguided seekers of the Way, to believe that the process in many cases is too sadly true and that they become half comatose creatures devoid of the glow and splendor of the Divine image within. Others, doubtless, find, as has been demonstrated in many another monkish system, that this way of meditation, far from bringing the destruction of the desires, brings through inactivity but greater incitement, and makes baser thoughts more dominant." P.44, r.38: "They have, nearly all of them (Buddhist monks), an expression approaching idiocy (sic), which is probably acquired by that dreamy state in which one of their most famous professors is said to have passed nine years with his eyes fixed upon a wall". (Davis)

- (25) William James's definition of "mystical" contains four characteristics:
- ineffability — no adequate report of its contents can be given in words
  - noetic quality — although the phenomenon is so similar to states of feeling, the mystical state seems to the one who experiences it to be a kind of new state of knowledge of experience
  - transiency — it fades very quickly and it is difficult to recall it into memory. Some memory of its content always remains, and a profound sense of its importance. It modifies the inner life of the subject
  - passivity — by preliminary voluntary operations, as by fixing the attention, or going through certain bodily performances the attainment of mystical states may be facilitated; yet when the characteristic sort of consciousness once sets in, the mystic feels as if his own will were in abeyance, and indeed sometimes as if one were grasped and held by a superior power. (James, W: *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. The Modern Library. New York, 1929, pp. 370-372.)
- (26) *Ibid.* 18, p. 101.
- (27) *Ibid.* 25 (Hindu Bhakti, Jewish Kabbalah, Christian Hesychasm, Sufism, Transcendental Meditation, Patanjali's Ashtanga Yoga, Indian Tantra and Kundalini Yoga, Tibetan Buddhism, Zen, Gurdjieff's Fourth Way, Krishnamurti's Choiceless Awareness).
- (28) In his article: *Imagining History. Inscribing Belief in the Nation* (*The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 53, Nr.1, 1994, pp. 24-44) Stefan Tanaka described Okakura's strategy based on the Hegelian model and used in the schema of revitalization of Japanese art history. It is instructive to read in it the sophistication with which Okakura managed to balance the tension between "Western" method and "Eastern" subject.
- (29) Nishitani, K.: *Nishida Kitarō*. University of California Press. Los Angeles, 1991, p. 41.
- (30) *Ibid.*, p.44.
- (31) *Ibid.*, p.49.
- (32) Anne Klein's splendid work "*Knowledge and Liberation*" (Snow Lion Publications. Ithaca, 1986) is a very helpful remedy for overcoming the distorted ideas about the exclusively "Western Reason".
- (33) *Ibid.* 29, p.55.