

'conduit' to seek a greater political role. For one thing, such a role under the U.N., would not arouse the suspicions of other nations. Secondly, the U.N. tag would help the Japanese government steer clear of the usual domestic resentment to any expanded role overseas. But in reality, the Japanese government under Miyazawa Kiichi had to make political compromises with some of the opposition parties to get the peace-keeping legislation passed in the Japanese Diet. Thirdly, Tokyo knew that it would have to make a 'tangible human contribution' to Cambodian peace.

Japan's contribution to the successful Completion of the UNTAC was complimented by the U.N. Japan convened two international conferences (1992 and 1994) for the economic reconstruction of Cambodia and made its own substantial financial contribution. Though the situation in Cambodia is still somewhat fluid, Japan has now resumed its normal relations with Vietnam. Indochina as a whole is well-poised for greater economic interaction with Japan. Tokyo now advocates closer political and economic linkages between ASEAN and Indochina.

## Japan's Role in Regional Conflict — Resolution in Southeast Asia: The Case of the Cambodian Problem

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Japan's role in regional conflict-resolution has often been viewed as passive, gaining no appreciation from the international community. Throughout the postwar period, the US-Japan Security Treaty has so successfully ensured Japan's national security that there is almost no need for Japan to play an active political-security role. But as many changes have taken place in recent years, commonly called the post-Cold War changes, the above characterization of Japan's role is no longer accurate. We can see this in Japan's roles in the case of the Cambodian problem. The Cambodian problem had seriously affected peace and security in the region. Its solution demanded the involvement of almost all major powers, including the United Nations. In the conflict-resolution efforts of this complicated problem, Japan has contributed in various ways: diplomatic mediation, sending military personnel to join the United Nations peacekeeping operations, and the reconstruction of postwar Cambodia. Since 1990, Japan's roles have included the following:

1. Organizing the Tokyo Meeting on Cambodia during June 4-5, 1990 inviting the

conflicting Cambodian parties to a peace talk in Tokyo.

2. Proposing a dialogue on security problems to the participants of the ASEAN-Post Ministerial Conference in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991. The first ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) organized in Bangkok in July 1994 has its origin in the above proposal made by Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama.

3. Enacting a law to make it possible to dispatch military personnel overseas to participate in the UN peacekeeping operations (PKO). The first PKO team was sent to Cambodia in September and October 1992.

4. Hosting several conferences to assist Cambodia's reconstruction and the so-called Forum for Comprehensive Development of Indochina in 1993-1994. The crucial meeting of the International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC) was held in Tokyo in March 1994.

The purpose of this paper is to present another view about Japan's role in regional-conflict resolution arguing that Japan's role was active and contributing. The Cambodian problem is taken as the case study. True, there were difficulties in its attempts, but in retrospect, Japan's role in the Cambodian peace process was contributing and completing the full cycle of conflict-resolution: diplomatic mediation, cooperation with the United Nations' peacekeeping operations, and postwar economic reconstruction.

Foreign Minister Nakayama's proposal was aimed at enhancing "the sense of security" among countries. It did not have a direct bearing on the Cambodian peace settlement. We shall devote our attention to the three roles mentioned above. Before doing that, let us have a review of the Cambodian problem, especially its complexity that made it difficult for any comprehensive solution.

## **The Cambodian Problem**

The Cambodian problem has been an extremely complex issue. This is due partly to a lack of legitimacy to rule the country by the two largest fighting forces: the Khmer Rouge and the Phnom Penh government under Prime Minister Hun Sen.

The Khmer Rouge came to power along with the fall of Saigon in 1975. Unlike their Vietnamese counterpart, the Khmer Rouge government did not rule the country smoothly. It committed genocide killing as many as, according to one source, two million people during its three-year rule until December 1975. The new government that ruled the country suffered a legitimacy crisis as well when it was viewed by the international community as a puppet regime installed by Vietnam after the Vietnamese forces invaded and occupied Cambodia. It was the resistance coalition comprised of the forces of the Khmer Rouge, Prince Sihanouk and Mr. Son San that was recognized as the legitimate government by the international community. The six ASEAN governments joined forces to isolate the Phnom Penh government while they continued to recognize the coalition government under Prince Sihanouk.

After a very long period of occupation, almost 11 years of garrisoning troops, and amidst dwindling military and economic assistance from the Soviet Union, Vietnam decided to withdraw its troops from Cambodia in late 1989. This made the Vietnam-installed Phnom Penh regime claim more legitimacy to rule the country, in addition to its de facto control of power for over a decade. On the other hand, the coalition government under Prince Sihanouk began to suffer from its claim of sole representation of Cambodia. Among those countries that started reviewing their Cambodian policies in the light of changing post-Cold War security environment were Thailand under Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan and Japan. Policy-makers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo had long been looking for some roles to play in accelerating the Cambodian peace process. Their first attempt was in mediatory diplomacy.

### **Japan's Role in Mediatory Diplomacy**

Japan has limited experience in playing a role of mediator in international conflict-resolution. In 1991, the Japanese government mediated in the French-Indochina conflict between Thailand and France, inviting the conflicting parties to Tokyo. Additional mediatory diplomacy was attempted in the early 1960's trying to bring to an end to the Indonesia-Malaysia conflict, the "crush Malaysia" policy of President Sukarno. The attempt failed completely. The representatives of Indonesia and Malaysia did arrive in Tokyo, mediation was carried out, but it ended up in total failure. It was generally explained that the Japanese attempt, despite its good intentions, failed because of a lack of information and understanding of the issue and naivete in the art of mediation, especially the timing of intervention in the conflict.

The mediation in the Cambodian conflict was much more carefully prepared. The representatives of the conflicting parties were invited to Tokyo on June 4-5, 1990, but four months before that, a fact-finding mission was sent to Cambodia.

In February 1990, the Director of the First Southeast Asia Division, Mr. Masaharu Kono, was sent to Cambodia. He carried a private passport spending a week during 15-22 February observing the political situation in Cambodia and meeting a number of important members of the government of President Heng Samrin. Reportedly, Mr. Kono decided not meet Prime Minister Hun Sen. From Cambodia he went to Vietnam to join the Director-General of the Asian Affairs Bureau who was in Vietnam at that time. Upon returning to Tokyo, Mr. Kono made a number of policy recommendations to the Ministry. He recommended that more importance should be given to the Phnom Penh government under Prime Minister Hun Sen, since it was firmly in control of the overwhelming majority of the territory and population. The Phnom Penh government was independent of Vietnam and it had a policy of economic openness and reform. On the other hand, the Khmer Rouge was much hated by the Cambodian people more than generally understood in the outside world.

The above fact-finding and policy recommendations paved the groundwork for the Tokyo

Meeting on Cambodia during June 4-5, 1990. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to establish a position of downgrading the importance of the Khmer Rouge and placing more importance on the Phnom Penh government. With this approach in mind, Tokyo wanted to invite Prime Minister Hun Sen and Prince Sihanouk to discuss the future of Cambodia and the procedures to bring a decade-long conflict to an end. Because of Prince Sihanouk's insistence, the representatives of the other two members of the resistance coalition were invited to attend the meeting in Tokyo.

To avoid conflict with the ASEAN approach on the Cambodian problem, which had consistently recognized the coalition government under Prince Sihanouk, Tokyo was looking for an invitation from a certain country to go ahead with the idea of organizing the meeting. Tokyo found the answer in Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan who had earlier started rapprochement with the Phnom Penh government. In April 1990, during his visit to Tokyo, Prime Minister Chatichai suggested to Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of Japan to organize a meeting on Cambodia in Tokyo. It is possible that the idea came from the Japanese side first at the lower official level, but it could as well be characterized as "the meeting of minds" between both sides. Throughout the two-day meeting, General Chalvalit Yongchaiyudh, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense, was sent to assist the Japanese host in the mediation. Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan also sent his foreign policy advisors to assist the Japanese chief mediator. It was the Prime Minister's advisors who contacted the conflicting Cambodian parties about going to Tokyo, possibly at the request of the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. But again, the Thai side was no less enthusiastic in initiating a new approach to the Cambodian peace settlement. Earlier in January 1989, Prime Minister Hun Sen was invited to visit Bangkok as the "personal friend" of Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan.

The Tokyo Meeting on Cambodia accelerated the peace process in the way that the Khmer Rouge was downgraded from its earlier position and the Phnom Penh government was given more importance to decide the future course of Cambodia. The Joint Communiqué stipulated that a Supreme National Council (SNC) should be established and, "The SNC shall be composed of equal numbers of prominent personalities from both parties. . .". This meant that one half of the seats in the SNC would be represented by the Phnom Penh government. The remaining half were to be shared by the three party-coalition under Prince Sihanouk. This new approach and power-sharing formulae, in the views of the Japanese mediator, was a more realistic one, both in terms of reflecting reality and practicality towards the final peace settlement.

In the views of the Khmer Rouge, however, this was an attempt to downgrade its earlier position from a one-fourth power-sharing status to only one-third of the remaining half of the SNC. Being aware of this aim in the mind of the Japanese mediator, Mr. Khieu Samphan, the Khmer Rouge representative, only attended the photo-taking session at the opening ceremony. He repeatedly refused to attend the two-day meeting despite persuasion from both the host and the host's "advisors" from Thailand. Mr. Khieu Samphan adamantly refused to sign the

completed Joint Communique. Apart from the new power-sharing formulae, the Joint Communique also mentioned the cease fire as a step towards the final solution. But without the Khmer Rouge's acceptance, the Tokyo Meeting did not represent a success in bringing the two largest fighting forces to reconciliation. The Tokyo Meeting, however, did chart a new course of peace settlement by bringing Prince Sihanouk and Mr. Hun Sen to the forefront to work together in the years to follow.

Actually, the Tokyo Meeting was a small mirror, reflecting the larger picture of Cambodian conflict-resolution two years later. Following the Paris Peace Accords of October 1991, a general election was held in May 1993 under the United Nations' supervision. The Khmer Rouge refused to participate in the election. It was left outside in the cold of further isolation when the post-election government was formed by Prince Sihanouk and Mr. Hun Sen's political parties. In July 1994, the Khmer Rouge was declared outlawed and it decided to form its own government.

### **Japan's Role in UN Peacekeeping Operations**

The process of passing a PKO law had been extremely time-consuming, reflecting the Japanese public's distrust of the use of armed personnel in regional conflict-resolution. The first PKO bill, was submitted to the Diet in October 1990, but became null in November after facing resistance from the opposition parties and criticism from the general public. A revised PKO bill was submitted to the Diet in September 1992, almost a year after the first submittal. After fierce battles in the Diet, including the so-called ox-walking tactics used by the largest opposition party, the bill was finally enacted in June 1992. With the clearance of the legislative barrier, the Miyazawa government, formed in early November 1991, started sending PKO personnel to Cambodia in September 1992. In October the main body of the first dispatch of the engineering battalion left Japan and engaged in road reconstruction and other public works.

Japan's role in regional conflict-resolution in terms of sending military personnel was perhaps the greatest contribution from the Japanese government's point of view. Diplomatic mediation and development assistance were not as difficult as this one. The Japanese public's distrust of anything involving sending uniformed military personnel overseas was extremely deep. It took much time for the public to come to terms with that decision. To pass the bill, it took three Diet sessions, including as many as 90 hours of debate in the Lower House and over 100 hours in the Upper House. There were voices of opposition from neighboring countries, including a critical remark from the Senior Minister of Singapore. Mr. Lee Kuan Yew criticized the move by saying that this might be like "giving liqueur chocolates to an alcoholic". But the Japanese government was determined to make the contribution realizing that there would be more criticism if Japan did not. The lesson from the Gulf War was too costly for Japan: paying 11 million dollars to the multilateral forces, but gaining no appreciation and recognition.

In order to seek support from the general public and cooperation from the moderate opposition parties, a number of restrictions were stipulated in the law, officially called Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations. The most important restriction is that the total number of personnel sent to a specific UN request must not exceed 2,000 troops. The personnel actually dispatched to Cambodia included some 600 military officers, an engineering battalion, and a small number of civilian officers comprised mostly of policemen. The second restriction is that the PKO personnel can not be sent unless there is a ceasefire agreement and the conflicting parties accept the Japanese dispatch. Third, in carrying out their operations, the Japanese PKO personnel can only use light arms for self-defense purposes. This restriction resulted in their inability to defend themselves upon attack, which actually took place when the Khmer Rouge shot one Japanese police officer dead. Finally, no fighting forces such as infantry, artillery and armored (tank) units can be dispatched. The use of these forces, called Peace Keeping Forces (PKF), was mentioned in the Law but it was frozen for the time being.

Under these restrictions, the Japanese engineering battalion and other civilian officers helped construct and repair roads, bridges and other infra-structure. They also assisted UNTAC in supervising the general-election in May 1993. They returned to Japan after the election and the new government was formed in September the same year. Had Japan failed to dispatch military personnel to take part in the UN-PKO, according to the Paris Peace Accords, Japan's role in regional conflict resolution would have been incomplete.

## **Japan's Role in Postwar Reconstruction**

As the Cambodian peace process was drawing to a close, Japan began to play a role of reconstructing the wartorn Cambodia. The Paris Agreements of October 1991 and the general election in May 1992 signalled to the Japanese government that now it was time to play the long awaited role in rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia and the overall development of Indochina.

Japan's response came quickly. In June 1992, Japan hosted the Ministerial Conference on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia (MCRRC) in Tokyo. Participating governments and international organizations made a pledge of UR\$ 880 million to assist wartorn Cambodia. The Japanese government alone made a pledge of 150-200 million, about one-fifth of the total. In November the same year, the Japanese government decided to offer a commodity loan package of 45.5 billion yen to Vietnam to assist Vietnam's economic openness and reform program.

In the following year, Japan hosted a crucial conference on Indochina development. The so-called Forum for Comprehensive Development of Indochina, held in Tokyo on December 9-10, 1993, was organized as promised earlier by Prime Minister Miyazawa in his policy speech delivered in Bangkok in January, 1993. Representatives from 22 governments and 6 international organizations participated in the forum to express their willingness to assist and



coordinate their assistance programs to the three Indochinese states. After this meeting at the senior official level, a ministerial meeting was expected to be held in Tokyo again in the following year. According to one official in charge of this meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, the purpose of this meeting was to convince donor countries to maintain their interests in assisting postwar-Indochina's reconstruction.

During March 10-11, 1994, Japan made a great effort to host a conference in order to mobilize funds for the reconstruction of Cambodia, the International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC), an organization established by the MCRRC mentioned above. France had taken the leadership first in organizing the ICORC meeting and Japan took its turn to organize the second one. Japan did its best to make the meeting successful. Representatives from as many as 32 countries (including Japan and Cambodia) and 12 international organizations, including several non-government organizations (NGO's) were invited. The pledges made for the year 1994 reached US\$ 486 million and US\$ 271 million for the year 1995, including another US\$ 15 million for demining works, reaching a total of US\$ 773 million. As for Japan, a pledge of US\$ 87 million in grant assistance and US\$ 1.6 million for tripartite cooperation among Japan-ASEAN-Cambodia through the United Nations' Development Program (UNDP) was made for the year 1994. In addition to this, another US\$ 2.5 million was offered for demining works. The total pledge made by Japan reached US\$ 91.8 million, about one-fifth of the total pledges made at the meeting, the largest single pledge made by any government.

## **Conclusion**

Peace and stability in the region surrounding Japan was regarded by foreign policy-makers in Japan as a national goal to ensure national security. While maintaining the US-Japan security arrangement, Japan began to play a more active political-security role as the Cold War confrontation came to an end around the year 1990. This was clearly seen in Japan's roles in the Cambodian problem. In 1990 Japan attempted to mediate by inviting the conflicting parties to a peace talk in Tokyo. In 1992 a law on PKO was enacted and military personnel were sent for the first time in postwar history to join the United Nations' peacekeeping operations in Cambodia. In 1993 and 1994, Japan hosted several conferences on the reconstruction of Cambodia including the Comprehensive Development of Indochina, playing a decisive role as flag-carrier to mobilize world attention, support and funds. In a larger overall security role, the Japanese Foreign Minister made a bold proposal to ASEAN and its dialogue partners to engage in regional security dialogue with a clear agenda.

In July 1994, the Nakayama proposal was transformed to the so-called ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) took place for the first time in Bangkok with representatives from, in addition to ASEAN and its seven dialogue partners, China, Russia, Vietnam, Laos and Papua New Guinea. As in the case of the Cambodian problem, we can observe Japan's active and contributing role, this time in the promotion of transparency and mutual reassurance, leading

to what ASEAN commonly refers to as preventive diplomacy. It seems that ARF works and if it does, Japan's contributing role here again can not be denied.

# THE ASIAN HUMAN RESOURCE APPROACH IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

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Several recent studies indicate that the educational and research institutions of all modern nations are becoming increasingly similar in response to common global economic and political forces, and, moreover, that these institutions are taking on an increasingly Western form. This paper challenges the prevailing Westernization proposition by asserting that several Asian nations<sup>1</sup>, radiating from Japan through East Asia and Southeast Asia, have and are developing a distinctive approach to human resource development and utilization that contrasts in important respects with the Western model.

This paper provides a preliminary identification of the core components of the Asian approach: (1) the state coordinates education and research with a firm emphasis both on indigenous value transmission and the mastery of foreign technology; (2) high priority is placed on universal primary education while state investment at the secondary and tertiary level is limited primarily to critical areas such as engineering and the sciences; (3) individual students, their families, and the private sector are expected to provide critical backup for the education provided by the state. (4) The Asian state in seeking to coordinate not only the development but also the utilization of human resources involves itself in manpower planning and job placement and increasingly in the coordination of science and technology.

This paper outlines the sources and nature of the Asian approach; Japan, which virtually alone among Asian nations avoided the shackles of Western imperialism, is portrayed as the chief initiator and diffuser of the Asian approach. Other Asian states have rankled at the Japanese influence, or as in the recent cases of Singapore and Malaysia announced official policies of "Learning from Japan." But the regional processes leading to the emergence of the Asian approach are complex, and at this stage, only partially understood.

The paper also reflects on several global implications of the Asian approach, including social stability and Asia's human resource edge. Two other implications deserve special note:

**Pacific Rim Connection** A third set of implications could be described as the Pacific Rim Connection. Over the course of the past three decades, Asian human resources have