Shame as a Social Sanction in Japan:

Shameful Behaviour as Perceived by the Voting Public

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Ever since Ruth Benedict used the term 'shame culture' in her book, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (1946) to describe the culture of the Japanese, discussions concerning them have periodically employed both the term 'shame culture' and the concept of shame to explain certain characteristics of the Japanese people.[1] Although the term has not been used to a great extent in English language literature, and in fact has been tabooed as a method of characterising whole cultures by most anthropologists and those psychologists involved in the study of shame, it has nevertheless tended to be used both directly and indirectly in much of the literature called *Nihonjinron*. Little empirical study, however, has been conducted on shame in Japan. Therefore when the Japanese word for shame, *haji*, was given prominence in reports by the media covering the recent spate of political scandals in Japan,[2] it was decided to include questions on just what people thought shame meant in a detailed questionnaire being conducted on the voter's perceptions of local politicians and their policies.

This paper discusses briefly the role that the shame concept has played in some of the literature on Japanese society and then goes on to present interim results that empirically disclose how the Japanese people themselves understand the concept of shame in relation to politicians and other citizens.

Keywords: JAPAN, SHAME, POLITICS, CITIZENS, SOCIAL SANCTION, RUTH BENEDICT, POLITICAL SCANDALS.

PREFACE

Haji(恥 shame in its broad sense) is a subject which has fascinated the Japanese

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1   Although the discussion of shame cultures invariably assumes the contrasting existence of a guilt culture, the data this paper discusses does not include any information on the concept of guilt and therefore guilt has been ignored here.

2   The word shame figured prominently in reports devoted to scandals involving women such as

throughout their history. However, it finally came into its own as an academically backed subject after Ruth Benedict attempted to delineate the pattern of Japanese culture as one that is based on shame. Since then, a handful of academics have tackled the topic in order to further the relationship between Japanese behaviour and the function of shame. The wide ranging popularity of Benedict's work, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* has also made the term 'shame culture' well known amongst many of the Japanese public. It could perhaps be argued that the Japanese are plagued by a 'shame-guilt complex' and it is this complex that has made many Japanese consciously aware of the basic differences between the Japanese and Westerners: that is, an awareness of Japanese behaviour being based on the ever watchful eyes of others [shame], as opposed to Western behaviour which calls on the individual to be truthful to oneself (before the eyes of God) regardless of the eyes of others [guilt].

The validity of such stereotypical conceptualisations is not the topic of this paper and therefore shall not be argued here. Rather, trying to see what the voting public actually perceive to be shameful behaviour is the central aim here. Shame has been debated by a few, in a theoretical sense, but little energy has been devoted to the grassroots perceptions of shame. In general, discussions on shame in Japan have been mainly based on the assumption that Japan is truly a shame culture and, hence, tend to treat shame as a given sanction of overall behaviour in Japanese society. In contrast to this approach, Western scholars, unharnessed by such assumptions, have tended to address the topic of shame in terms of the consequences of an overbearing sense of shame in the individual, mainly in the context of psychology and psychoanalysis. That is not to say that within Western societies shame does not function, or that it is not recognised as a social sanction. Indeed, history offers many illustrations of the use of shame as a punishment within the English village for those unable to maintain community rules, as well as other illustrations such as duels or intrigues within aristocratic society that were caused by a slight to someone's honour or a breach in the standards of expected etiquette which was guarded by a sense of shame.[3] No doubt, even today in small towns and villages, where the accepted norm is familiar to one and all, the sanction of shame still operates most effectively. Moreover, there has been a move recently to reintroduce shame sanctions, when doling out punishment for breaking the law, by legal experts in Australia and also in some parts of America.[4] Therefore, although discussions on shame differ, this does not mean that

the sex scandal which surrounded Prime Minister Uno. However, letters to the editor in newspapers and reports on well known figures who cried 'shame on politicians' were often directed at the general overall spate of political scandals which ranged from the Recruit affair and misuse of taxpayers money, to a simple lack of knowledge on matters for which politicians were supposed to be responsible. A survey of the major Japanese newspapers from around 1987 onwards offers a host of these examples which are too numerous to list here.

3   See P. Kent, 「罪の文化と恥の文化・再考」 "Tsumi no Bunka to Haji no Bunka Saiko," *Annals of Human Sciences*, No. 10, Osaka University, 1989, pp.76-80.

4   *Japan Times*, 4.11.1990, 'Use shame with punishment to control crime' Russell Mokhiber.

shame as an overall social sanction, or as a description of culture, must be limited to Japanese society alone.[5] However, considering the extensive presence and use of shame as a sanction in child rearing and many other facets of life in Japan, it is not unreasonable to suggest that shame does in fact play an important part in the regulating of social behaviour in the Japanese.

The focus of this paper is on the conception of shame as it is applied to politicians and citizens by the voting Japanese public, but before going on to discuss the data, a brief overview of studies devoted to shame in Japan will first be undertaken in order to highlight the importance this subject has in Japanese studies. I shall then go on to present the data obtained this time and attempt to explain the responses. Finally, I will discuss the findings of these initial results and the meaning they have within the context of Japanese studies.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE SHAME LITERATURE

§ Ruth Benedict's Contribution

In 1946, Benedict wrote *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, a book which was the result of much detailed and diligent research on what were a fierce and unknown enemy—the Japanese. Her results were obtained through research that was commissioned by the Office of War Information (OWI), but undoubtedly no one, including Benedict herself, realised at the time that this book would still be acclaimed as a best seller so many years later. English publications of the book have topped 350,000 with over 44 reprints in the edition published by Tuttle alone, whilst translations of the book into Japanese have gone through over 84 reprints and easily surpassed the one million mark. Moreover, a survey[6] conducted in Japan by Harumi Befu and Manabe Fumiyoshi[7] show that 33% of the respondents had read *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* and that 20% of those surveyed were familiar with Ruth Benedict. In short, this last work of Benedict's has had an enormous impact on Japanese studies and the Japanese awareness of themselves—if one is to judge by numbers alone.

However, before going on to discuss the extent of the influence of Benedict's work in relation to shame, particularly on *Nihonjinron*, it is first of all necessary to clarify her usage of this concept.

Benedict used shame to delineate the *pattern* of Japanese society. By 'pattern'

In some places in America, those who have committed sexual offenses are now required to either take out an advertisement with a photograph of themselves in the papers, or post a sign in front of their house to announce their felony.

5   See Kaufman, *Shame: The Power of Caring*, Schenkman, U. S. A., 1985, p.29, in which it is suggested that in America efforts to hide any show of shame act as a strong sanction on behaviour in general.

6   "An Empirical Study of Nihonjinron: How Real is the Myth?" *Kwansei Gakuin University Annual Studies*, Vol.XXXVI, Nishinomiya, Japan, Dec. 1987, p.98.

7   All Japanese names are given in the order of family name followed by the given name.

Benedict implied some principle or trait which characterises mass society. In her book *Patterns of Culture* she uses the patterns Apollonian and Dionysian to describe the tribal characteristics of the Pueblo and Kwakiutl Indians, respectively. In *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* the pattern of shame is used to describe the bond that gives Japanese society its characteristic of a society regulated by an idea of taking one's proper place. One takes one's proper place by guaging the "eyes of the world." She writes, "true shame cultures rely on external sanctions for good behavior, not, as true guilt cultures do, on an internalized conviction of sin. Shame is a reaction to other people's criticism. A man is shamed either by being openly ridiculed and rejected or by fantasying to himself that he has been made ridiculous."[8] And in contrast to this, "a society that inculcates absolute standards of morality and relies on men's developing a conscience is a guilt culture by definition."[9] Thus whilst contrasting Japanese and American (Western) society, Benedict characterises Japan as a 'shame culture.'

Benedict saw the sanction of shame at the core of such behaviour as: fast allegiance to the emperor, the calculated reciprocation of favours and deeds such as *on* (恩 a beneficiary gesture that results in the receivers' indebtedness) by such methods as those dictated by *giri* (義理) a debt repaid in quantitative equivalent and due on special occasions, and *gimu* (義務) which are debts limitless in both amount and duration. Shame is also the regulator of behaviour that contributes to a highly refined and universally understood hierarchical system. It acts as the compass that directs those compelled to use the well-defined map of rules that govern the course of behaviour in varying situations. Those who stray from the path are subjected to humiliation and, in certain situations, excommunication. Such are the restraints of shame, that the Japanese are schooled from an early age to understand the consequences of challenging the well-tested and wise ways of society and, thus whilst having to perform under the scrutinising eyes of society, the Japanese are careful to act according to rules which govern each different situation. As a result, unlike the American or Western ideal of a man who sticks to his principles, no matter what, and thus is not 'fickle' enough to change his mode of behaviour to compromise the situation, the Japanese adapts his behaviour diligently and deliberately according to the people and situation involved. A person who can so adjust his/her behaviour meticulously is therefore seen as a 'man' of the world and respected for such behaviour. He is praised as being 'a man who knows shame.'

Although Benedict uses this concept of shame to indicate the sum of attributes that give the aggregate of 'Japanese society,' the amount of space devoted to the actual definition of shame is only a matter of a few pages. Consequently, a great deal of the criticism on this subject, in the Japanese literature, is aimed at the definition. Benedict's biographies indicate that Benedict was attempting further clarification of

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8   Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword,* Charles E. Tuttle & Co., Tokyo, Japan, 1981, p.223.

9   Ibid., p.222.

the terms 'shame' and 'guilt' right up until the time of her unfortunate early death. However, concrete results of these attempts were not forthcoming and all that remains is her scant treatment of the actual definition of shame which has left the subject very much open to revision.

Nevertheless, despite the obvious lack of explication, the actual theory itself has on the whole been left unchallenged.[10] In fact, as a result of Benedict's work one could even go as far as saying that since its publication the Japanese have been plagued by a 'shame-guilt complex.' One can find entries devoted to the term 'shame culture' (and usually also 'guilt culture') in almost all Japanese language social science and cultural anthropological dictionaries as well as mentions of the subject in school text books and even chapters on the subject in some introductory texts on sociology. Moreover, this idea has made an impact on a large volume of *Nihonjinron* (日本人論) in a manner which ranges from the rejection of shame-oriented behaviour as a pre-modern value—which only served to hold back the modernisation of Japan, to a greater clarification of the concept of shame to illustrate that it is one of the unique characteristics that contributed to the unharnessed rise to economic power by the Japanese.

§ Benedict's Lingering Influence on *Nihonjinron*

Aoki Tamotsu states that the influence of *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* is as far-reaching as to include the greater part of the voluminous *Nihonjinron* which have been produced since the end of World War II.[11] He states that the *Nihonjinron* phenomenon has gone through four main phases. These phases are as follows:

1. Negative distinctiveness (1945–54)
2. Historical relativity (1955–63)
3. Positive distinctiveness (divided again into the periods of 1964–1976 and 1977–1983)
4. From distinctiveness to universality (1984 onwards).

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10   Yanagida Kunio argues that the Japanese do indeed have a sense of guilt in a special issue of 『民族学研究』 *Minzokugaku Kenkyu*, Vol.14 No.4, 1949 (pp.28–35), an issue that is devoted to a thorough review of Benedict's *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*. This issue is the beginning of a stream of criticisms and discussions that take up the topic of shame cultures and guilt cultures. George De Vos also discusses the feeling of guilt in the Japanese in the context of achievement and arranged marriages and concludes that methods of research and certain presupposed ideas have prevented a sufficient discussion of the role of guilt in Japanese behaviour. However, he does not dispute the fact that sensitivity to face is indeed conspicuous; rather he suggests that *a priori* reasoning and the application of Western methods of research have served to dismiss the positive and prominent role guilt plays in the area of achievement. See George De Vos, 'Some Observations of Guilt in Relation to Achievement and Arranged Marriage' in *Socialization for Achievement*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1975.
11   青木保「戦後日本と日本文化論」Aoki Tamotsu, Sengo Nihon to Nihon Bunkaron (*Nihonjinron* and Japan after the War), *Chuo Kōron*, June 1989.

Aoki is concerned with the topics of collectivism (集団主義) and shame culture (恥の文化) as discussed by Benedict and the direct and indirect influence of these topics on the majority of *Nihonjinron*. Although Benedict did not discuss the Japanese using the actual term of collectivism, according to Benedict's definition, 'shame culture' implies a necessarily collective society in order for shame to operate as an effective sanction. Aoki has selected some of the more representative *Nihonjinron* works from each of these periods to discuss the characteristics of each period. He demonstrates how time conducts this literature through a phase of rejection of so-called Japanese cultural features, rejected because of their hindrance to the modernisation of post-war Japan, to an attempt, in the second period, to locate a newly-found society within the world by describing these same features in a manner which gives weight to the historically based elements of Japanese culture. Moving into the third phase Japan has begun to find her economic wings and, therefore, the literature reflects the expectations for a prospering Japanese society by positively reassessing Japanese cultural features and explaining Japanese economic growth as a result of features such as shame and collectivism. (It is during this third phase that *Nihonjinron* enjoy great popularity with the general Japanese public.) The fourth and last phase sees the bashing of Japan in response to not only her economic invasion but also as a result of explanations which endeavour to label the Japanese and her culture as unique. Consequently, the *Nihonjinron* of this period have moved away from stressing uniqueness and attempt to place Japan in the international world through various methods such as much greater detailed comparative studies.

Aoki cites a number of works as examples of each of these periods, however, it is unnecessary to review all the works cited by Aoki to prove his point. Rather the above brief outline of Aoki's paper is to demonstrate the extent of the influence of Benedict's work on Japan and, more pointedly, to show that within Japan the topic of 'shame culture' is a subject that is regarded as having the power to explain a great many of the features that make up Japanese society.

§ **The Japanese Response**[12] **to Benedict's Shame Culture**
Covering the full range of responses to Benedict's concept is far beyond the scope of this paper. Fortunately, however, even though the volume of responses is great they tend to gather around a few representative works. One person's name invariably quoted when discussion of the subject of shame culture is undertaken in Japan, is Sakuta Kei'ichi (作田啓一). He is considered to be an authority on the subject and consequently most works following his tend to be merely an extension of the groundwork which he was the first to lay. He has addressed two works to the subject

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12   In the West, anthropologists such as C. Kluckhohn and M. Mead did go on to use shame and guilt to delineate differing types of society. However, this method of categorisation soon lost favour as cultures began to be described as much more complex entities above and beyond the scope of such an analysis. Thereafter, the study of shame in the English speaking world has mainly been confined to the areas of psychoanalysis, in a clinical sense, and to some areas of philosophy.

of the Japanese shame culture.[13]

Sakuta does not disagree with Benedict's concept of 'public shame' in principle (in fact he very much agrees with it), but rather his point of contention is that Japanese behaviour depends more on the sanctions of private shame or embarrassment (恥じらい *hajirai,* 羞恥 *shūchi*) than public shame. He explains shame as being rooted in the standards set for measuring inferiority-superiority, associated with the ego ideal, as opposed to guilt, which is based in the norms governing good and bad, associated with the super-ego.[14] Embarrassment, another important aspect of shame, is encountered when one is exposed to a gap or lag in values associated with one's membership and reference groups, thus making the actor face a possible loss of clear self-identity. (By reference group he means a non-membership group with which one would either like to or does identify with.) In this sense, one can feel embarrassment due not only to ridicule but also pride. This is because of the discrepancy in value ideals due to changing situations and the ensuing adjustment of the ego ideal and the objective real self. These adjustments are made according to one's membership and reference groups at that time.

Needless to say Sakuta, like most others who criticise Benedict's definition of shame, disputes the argument that shame is an external sanction, as opposed to guilt, which was described as an internal sanction. He stresses the sensitivity of the Japanese to the exposure of the self as a result of an acute awareness of self which is due to the ever-present attention or gaze of others. As private shame is most concerned with self-image and identity it becomes the medium through which public shame is translated into guilt and, as such, it is considered a more intense internal sanction of behaviour than the sanction of public shame.

Sakuta goes on to explain the sort of social structure which accommodates the development of the ever-felt gaze that causes private shame to occur. During the first half of the Meiji period, Japanese society had a strong middle class that was able to effectively bind the state, which was a powerful reference group for the people, with the masses' membership groups in provincial or village society. As a result, the values of the membership and reference groups were often the same. Expected behaviour or rules of behaviour therefore had a common basis which accommodated shame and honour as sanctions.

As industrialisation and urbanisation marched forward and social mobility increased rapidly, the stabilising medium between the two groups rapidly faded and gaps between the village membership group and the city reference group began to promote an awareness of 'society's eyes.' Consequently, the standard rule of thumb for behaviour began to blur as the two groups' sets of values began to drift apart. During the Taisho period, along with the urban reference group, the West also became a

13　『「恥の文化」再考』 *Haji no Bunka Saikō* (Shame Culture Reconsidered), Chikuma Shobo, 1967, and 『価値の社会学』 *Kachi no Shakaigaku* (The Sociology of Values), Iwanami Shoten, 1972.

14　This is a direct reference to Piers and Singers' definition of shame and guilt. See Piers, G. & Singer, M. B., *Shame and Guilt,* Garden City, Charles C. Thomas, Illinois, 1953.

point of reference, further complicating rules by which the Japanese set their social behaviour. This, coupled with the lack of an autonomous intermediating and stabilising group in Japanese society (which could dictate a common set of rules), led to a society which cultivated an awareness of society's eyes as a measure for the behaviour because its members were divided by differing groups and standards.

As we can see from the above, Sakuta not only considers shame (private and public) as a controlling factor in Japanese behaviour but also maintains that a variety of particular groups play an important, but not a united, influential role in deciding the behaviour of Japanese.

Sakuta's work was expanded on by Inoue Tadashi (井上忠司), who refines Sakuta's definition and explanation but in essence differs little from Sakuta's argument. Inoue, a social psychologist, redefines Sakuta's public shame (which Sakuta considers to be equal to the shame defined by Benedict) by further dividing it into public (公恥 kōchi) and personal shame (私恥 shichi). Personal shame he defines as being caused when the subject compares his ego-ideal with his real self and feels inferior as a result of the comparison. In contrast to this, public shame is encountered when the subject compares himself with members of his member-ship group and feels himself to be inferior. However, for the sake of pursuing further argument, he groups these two together under the name of shame (恥 haji) and distinguishes it from the private shame of embarrassment or shūchi (羞恥)—the effect being a refined repetition of Sakuta's definition. Needless to say he concludes that the eyes of the groups, or even the imagined eyes of the groups, to which the individual Japanese is affiliated play a major role in guiding social behaviour.[15]

Others in the field of psychology and psychoanalysis have taken up the topic of shame when describing the Japanese character. Often the fact that a comparatively large number of Japanese patients suffer from erythrophobia (赤面恐怖症, excessive blushing due to embarrassment or shame) and anthropophobia (a fear of others) is cited as being representative of the fact that Japanese society is a shame culture.[16] (This has spurred a common misconception that, unlike the Japanese, 'Westerners' going through puberty are not subject to fits of blushing.) Also explanations of the Japanese as being 'inter-relation' oriented or group-oriented (as opposed to self-dependent or individualistic) often use the concept of shame culture to support their theories.[17]

There are many studies that touch on the subject of shame as a particular trait of Japanese society. However, the above-mentioned authors and genres are representative

15   『「世間体」の構造』 *Sekentei no Kōzō* (The Structure of *Sekentei*), NHK Books, No.280, 1977.
16   See 森田正馬、高良武久 『赤面恐怖の治し方』 Morita Masataka & Kora Takehisa, *Sekimenkyōfu no Naoshikata* (Treatment for Erythrophobia), Hakuyosha, 1953; 内沼幸雄 『羞恥の構造』 Uchinuma Yukio, *Shūchi no Kozo* (The Structure of *Shūchi*), Kinokuniya Shoten, 1983.
17   See 浜口恵俊 『間人主義の社会　日本』 Hamaguchi Eshun, *Kanjinshugi no Shakai Nihon* (Japan: A Contextual Society), Tōkyō Keizai Shinposha, 1982. 木村敏 『人と人との間』 Kimura Bin, *Hito to Hito to no Aida* (The *Mediance* between People), Kōbundo, 1972.

of these studies and suffice to make the point clear that these studies have a firm standing in studies on Japan. Although Japanese scholars have seen fit to dispute Benedict's definition of shame society, they have, nevertheless, chosen to maintain the concept in order to either explain Japan as a shame society or use the concept to support theories which discuss particular Japanese human relations.

Yet despite the widespread use of shame and shame culture, few studies have attempted to clarify what shame means to the Japanese people through the use of empirical studies. Therefore, it was decided to try and obtain a raw image of shame as perceived by the Japanese before going back to the theories already formed. However, before introducing the data on shame, it will be useful to refer to one of the few empirical studies on shame, conducted by Takie Sugiyama Lebra.

§ From the Marginal Boundaries

Takie Sugiyama Lebra, Japanese born but located for most of her working life in Hawaii, has also taken up the topic of shame and the Japanese.[18] Sugiyama Lebra also supports the idea of using shame (and guilt) to delineate cultures. However, she takes a social approach to the definition of both shame and guilt and goes on to define the two, not in the way Benedict did as opposing concepts, but as being of different dimensions and thus more complementary than conflicting. She defines shame as being dependent on an awareness of status or status occupancy. In so doing, Sugiyama Lebra rejects the above-mentioned definitions that rely on whether shame is generated by incompetence, inferiority or impropriety, instead defining it as the situation which brings about status incongruence, that in turn makes one's status occupancy awkward. Shame is thus intensified when status identification is simple, exposure is experienced and shame can be shared. According to research conducted by Sugiyama Lebra, which includes TAT materials she obtained from Japanese respondents, the Japanese, whilst also expressing guilt as a guide for their behaviour, tend to place more weight on shame as a sanction due to the clear presence of the above-mentioned three elements which accommodate a sensitivity towards shame.

Sugiyama Lebra's approach to shame obviously involves an idea of differing levels, according to the status of the person(s) involved, and an idea that shame is not necessarily restricted to one person alone. In the Japanese sense this is a point that should not be ignored as shame in its most serious sense in Japan often involves all members of the family, household or group. The argument concerning different levels and status is also important as the Japanese language employs various usages of polite speech which are reliant on a knowledge of a person's status so that they may be addressed in a correct fashion. As such, there are a variety of manifest clues on which a person may rely in order to position himself on the status map. Thus it is obvious that there is also a clear idea of what status should entail and consequently

18   Sugiyama Lebra, T. "The Social Mechanism of Guilt and Shame," *Anthropological Quarterly,* Vol.44 (October, 1971), pp.241-255. Also see "Shame and Guilt," *Ethos,* 11:3 (Fall 1983), pp. 192-209.

an expectation that fitting behaviour accompany the status held.

It is apparent from the data obtained from the survey conducted that the Japanese do have certain ideas about what they expect from those in public office and from others holding the status of citizen. It is to this topic that I should like to turn next by employing the data obtained and discussing some of the reasons for the results.

THE JAPANESE VOTING PUBLIC AND THEIR CONCEPT OF SHAME

§ Survey Details

The following data was obtained from a questionnaire that was conducted in the Kinki district, parts of Niigata and Tottori Prefectures during a period dating from the beginning of December 1989 to early January 1990. The questionnaire was mailed to a total of 5,223 people selected randomly from local city hall registries. A total of 1,849 people returned the questionnaire (35%). The survey was carried out in conjunction with two surveys conducted in the previous year, by the same team of investigators, which were addressed to those who held elected public representative office. The first was sent to local representatives (地方議員 *chihō giin*) ranging from members of the prefectural government to representatives in the village assembly, and the second was sent to heads of local governments (首長 *shuchō*, e.g. governors, mayors, village leaders).[19] The aim of the three surveys was to attain a clearer picture of the changing scene of present-day local Japanese political society. In the first two surveys conducted, it was attempted to ascertain how and why local representatives seek office and once there, how they maintain office. The third survey, with which this paper is wholly concerned, determined to measure the level of participation and interest in politics by the public as well as their political preferences and their expectations concerning politicians. All three surveys are concerned with politics at the local—*not* national—level, but as the results below show, politics at the national level have served to influence a large number of the responses.

The topic discussed here specifically refers to two questions relating to how shame is conceptualised. The first question asks, "What do you think is the most shameful type of behaviour for a politician as a politician?" The second question is "What do you think is shameful behaviour for a citizen like yourself ?"[20] Both questions were

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20   The original questions are as follows. 1. 政治家としてどのような行動がもっとも恥ずべきだとあ

followed by requests for concrete details. In a pretest carried out, a question on individual or personal shame—in other words embarrassment—was also included but answers were not forthcoming in large numbers and when the question was answered the responses differed minimally from the second question concerning citizens. Hence, it was decided to omit this type of question from the actual survey.

Although there has been much discussion on the topic of shame little empirical study (or little of much value) has ensued. To the best of my knowledge there is certainly no data similar, in nature or scale, to that obtained here. As the discussion on shame has attempted mostly to refine definitions of shame, it was decided here to leave the questions open in order to obtain a concept of shame, as the Japanese voters themselves perceive it, in order to give body to the concept.

The nature of the survey has restricted the concept to two specific areas and also omitted those in the population under the voting age (20). As a result, the full range of ideas concerning shame may not have been captured here (as the full range of any idea is not captured in any survey). However, the population surveyed can be considered to be a good representation of a cross-section of the Japanese in age, gender and occupational groups when compared with the statistics obtained in such national surveys as the 1985 SSM Survey.[21]

§ Data Analysis

For the purpose of analysis, the responses to the two questions concerning shame were grouped into five categories each [Table 1]. A hint was taken from Takie Sugiyama Lebra and each category was as far as possible correlated to a certain level of *expected* behaviour. Here the categories do not necessarily equal a certain social status although some correlation between the expected behaviour of those in the upper echelons ranging down to the level of human frailties and personalities can be seen. Category 5 does cross the boundaries of other categories but because of the significant numbers involved, a separate category was set aside for responses specifically mentioning money and corruption, in the case of the politicians, and money-related deeds for the citizens. Obviously the expectations held for each of the two groups are not the same as the two subjects do differ considerably. Although some correlations can be seen at similar levels, the five categories for the politicians and the citizens should not be thought of as parallel.

· The five categories concerning shameful behaviour for politicians are as follows.
  1. Use or abuse of authority (12.4%).
  2. Obligations and behaviour expected of a politician; including leadership and morals (17%).

なたは思われますか。具体的に一つをお教えください。 2. 同じ市民の中ではどのような行動が恥ずべきだとあなたは思われますか。具体的に一つをお教えください。

21　原純輔『1985社会階層と社会移動全国調査』Hara Junsuke (Editor), *1985 Shakai Kaisō to Shakai Idō Zenkoku Chōsa*, (1985 National Research on Social Stratification and Social Mobility), Shakai Kaisō to Shakai Idō Zenkoku Chōsa Iinkai, Osaka, 1988.

3. Relations with, and obligations to, the public (recognition of the public's needs) (17.1%).
4. Fulfillment of self-interest and personal desires to the exclusion of others (20.9%).
5. Plutocracy, corruption and money (32.6%).

· The five categories concerning shameful behaviour for citizens are as follows.
1. Use and abuse of power, authority and status, (11.3%).
2. Social obligations which include the keeping of laws, rules and norms for the benefit of society in its wider sense (18.5%).
3. Morals and behaviour, in general, necessary for the smooth operation of society (22.9%).
4. Specifically stated problems, rules and norms that affect everyday life, life in the community and human relations (17.7%).
5. Pursuit of self-interest and personal desires to the exclusion of others, including selfish interests directly related to money and corruption (29.6%).

Table 1.

Politicians	Overall %		Citizens	Overall %	
Abuse of Authority, Power	12.4	Category 1	Abuse & Use of Authority	11.3	Category 1
Misuse of power, status	22.8		Abuse & use of authority	36.4	
Benefiting particular others	64.9		Specific gains	49.6	
Misuse of taxes	9.4		Misuse of taxes	4.0	
Leadership	17.0	Category 2	Rules of Society	18.5	Category 2
Malfeasance	42.7		Laws	23.6	
Immoral acts/impropriety	24.4		Discrimination	18.4	
Lack of conviction	18.8		Social order & promises	9.4	
Politician as a Public Servant	17.1	Category 3	Voting conduct	23.1	
Election Promises	32.1		Morals & Mores	22.9	Category 3
Lying	13.5		Morals, common sense, manners	36.9	
Change of attitude	11.8		Lying	6.8	
Lack of public awareness	28.3		Non-participation	15.2	
Selfish Egoism	20.9	Category 4	Inconsistent behaviour	37.3	
Self-centeredness	10.0		Communal Life	17.7	Category 4
Personal interests & desires	89.3		Non-participation	18.7	
Money & Corruption	32.6	Category 5	Garbage	7.4	
Servant to money	29.6		Causing trouble	32.5	
Corruption	23.6		Slander & gossip	33.0	
Bribery	46.0		Money & Selfishness	29.6	Category 5
			Selfishness, egoism	52.7	
			Precedence of own interests	17.7	
			Money & bribery	22.4	

Tabulations of these categories were made and cross tabulations with the results of

the rest of the questions in the questionnaire were also taken. However, as these answers were freely recorded it is impossible simply to analyse the results statistically. Instead, content analysis was employed with wording of replies, phrasing of words, etc., taken into account in the course of analysis. Categorisation was mainly based on the similarity of the meaning of replies. A conscious effort to probe previously discussed theories was avoided here in order to leave respondents the freedom to state their ideas without being unnecessarily influenced or manipulated by the investigator. However, it must be stressed that this is an interim report and that therefore there is still room left for much further detailed analysis and comparisons. The following is a discussion of significant results.

§ The Results
—The Politicians—

The following is a detailed explanation of the content of the above categories for the politicians, accompanied by some of the possible reasons for such responses.

Category 1

All responses that referred to the use of authority were classified in this category. This first category, involving the use and abuse of power and authority by politicians, (12.4%) includes: the misuse of power and status in abstract terms only [22.8%]; the use of power and status for one's own benefits or for the benefit of a specific person or parties to the exclusion of others [64.9%]; the misuse of tax money [9.4%].*

Only one or two respondents gave any specific reasons such as morals or the necessity for politicians to give of themselves rather than simply abuse their authority. Influence and authority, however, are necessary tools of the trade for a politician in Japan. Without them politicians can do little for their constituents. A number of responses actually stated that they realised the use of authority and money were necessary in the political world before going on to criticise these. The system of *sanban* (三バン three *ban*: financial resources, カバン *kaban*; influence and reputation, 看板 *kanban*, and organised support, 地盤 *jiban*[22]), without which it is said a politician in Japan cannot operate,[23] is evidence of this necessity. However, the *jiban* that was once based on communities or *Gemeinschaft* groups is now having to shift its mode of organisation to a greater dependence on associations such as *kōenkai* (後援会 support groups for individual politicians) and support from companies, trade unions and the like. Nevertheless, the need for *kaban*—resources—and *kanban*—influence—has not decreased at all; if anything it has multiplied many times. In a

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* Percentages within [ ] indicate percentages of sub-categories with the responses to a single category equaling 100% while numbers in ( ) indicate the percentage of a particular category to all responses to the question.

22 This translation belongs to Gerald E. Curtis. See *election campaigning Japanese style,* Kodansha International, 1983, p.250.

23 間場寿一、居安正、高島呂二 「日本の政治を読む」 Aiba Juichi, Iyasu Tadashi & Takashima Shoji, *Nihon no Seiji o Yomu* (Reading Japanese Politics), Yūhikaku, 1987, p.27.

world where *nemawashi* (根回し before-hand consultations in order to achieve consensus) is necessary simply for the consideration of a plan, implementation of a plan becomes very much dependent upon the ability of a politician to see that the right people are contacted and consulted from the outset of a project. In most social settings in Japan, creating new contacts requires the offering of some token, be it in the form of a bar of soap or, in certain cases, large amounts of cash. Thus to initialise contacts, influence is first employed while resources are necessary to initiate an actual meeting.

Similar responses were given in relation to the conduct of citizens but the responses directed at the politicians were worded less critically, probably because the use of authority by them is recognised as a necessary evil. Nonetheless, resentment is expressed at the manipulation of authority for the benefit of the strong, such as large enterprises and people of high social standing, to the detriment of the man on the street. The Recruit affair was no doubt seen as an abuse of authority in cases where individual politicians were able to handsomely line their pockets simply by virtue of their elected status. Even at the prefectural level the use of authority by politicians can be decisive in gaining access to opportunities for financial profits and expansion. Thus complaints by respondents extend from abuse of authority by politicians at the national level down through to the local levels.

However, from the point of view of the politicians, surveys conducted by major newspapers indicate that the voting public often abuse politicians' status by constantly requesting their presence at weddings, funerals, festivals and other events to enhance the status of those conducting the event. Results show that politicians at the national level who belong to the Liberal Democratic Party (自由民主党 LDP) are often asked to attend weddings 6~7 times a month and funerals 26~27 times a month. Invitations to year-end parties and New Year parties together often total as many as 100 times.[24] Each time a politician attends, it is expected that he/she give a certain amount of money—a custom which is common throughout Japan. LDP politicians feel compelled to attend as they base their election results on such support but many feel that they are being abused for the sake of supporters' pride and would like to see laws prohibiting their attendance.[25]

Cross tabulations show that voters who both actively participate at the most basic levels of local government (自治会 *jichikai,* 町内会 *chōnaikai*) and support politicians in the prefectural assembly specifically for their political commitments or policies, were highly likely to point out the abuse of authority as the most shameful conduct for a politician [Table 2]. There was also a strong tendency for those in the P.T.A. to criticise the abuse of power [Table 3].

24   朝日新聞 *Asahi Shimbun,* 4. 4. 89: p.1. Also see related articles in the *Asahi Shimbun,* Ibaraki editions: 1. 7. 89 and 3. 7. 89.
25   読売新聞 *Yomiuri Shimbun,* Tokyo edition, 29. 3. 89., p.2.

Cross Tabulation Tables(%)

Table 2.   Multivariates   *Category 1*
Leadership X Support of politician for his/her
political beliefs X Member of *jichikai* or *chōnaikai*

	0	Jichikai	Row Total
0	100.0		2.8
Political Belief	38.6	*61.4*	97.2
Column Total	40.3	59.7	

(N=144 x=3.8 sig<0.05 x=3.8 sig<0.05)

Table 3.   *Category 1*

P.T.A. member

Politicians	No	Yes	Row Total
Abuse	11.2	22.8	13.3
Leadership	17.2	14.9	16.8
As a citizen	17.8	13.4	17.0
As a person	20.2	22.8	20.6
Money	33.7	26.2	32.3
Column Total	82.0	18.0	

(N=1120 x=22.4 sig<0.01)

Category 2

Here all responses that referred to the behaviour of a politician as a public figure were included. The second group presents an idea of how the public would like their politicians to act (17%). Many expressed a desire to see in their representatives the opposite of what they consider to be shameful acts. For example, respondents hold the opinion that malfeasance [42.7%], immoral and irresponsible acts or impropriety [24.4%], and a lack of conviction [18.8%], are all traits unworthy of a politician. 'Sex scandals.' as they have been labeled by the Western press, involving mistresses or women in the male politician's past, figured prominently in answers concerning impropriety. The upsurge in the involvement in government by women and women's groups is said to be responsible for the outcry associated with these scandals. In the past, such associations have been common for politicians, but a form of gentleman's agreement ensured such indiscretions were not taken up by the press.

The demand for conviction and belief is also noteworthy. It is well known that Japanese politics is strongly based on factional groups, especially in the LDP. In years past, factions were grouped around an individual leader. Contributions to that faction, for example from corporations, were made in a show of support for the aims of that faction. However, as illustrated by the recent Recruit scandal, money from enterprises now tends to take the form of credit, in that money is dealt out on the basis of membership rather than on the basis of belief in a politician's convictions.[26] Seeing politicians as unthinking mechanical cogs in the greater machinery of the party is thus a probable cause for this view by voters that a man without a policy or principles is a shameful being.[27]

There is a strong correlation in data between this category and those members of the *jichikai* or *chōnaikai* who specifically chose to support higher-level politicians

26 A survey by the *Asahi Shimbun,* 16. 1. 90, produced results that indicated that just before the most recent election was held, nearly 70% of respondents would be taking into account a candidate's political ethics before voting for him, with 73% also noting that the Recruit scandal had yet to be dealt with properly. Among women voters, there was a particularly strong demand for candidates to uphold their election promise to do away with the consumption tax (over 60%). See Category 3.

27 This debate was particularly fueled by prominent persons in society that chided politicians for

because they regard such politicians as a pipeline to national govenment levels [Table 4]. There was also a correlation between this category and respondents who had both friends who aspired to politics and/or had actual relatives in the family who had gone into politics [Tables 5,6,7]. Such close contacts with politics seems to make people aware of the behaviour which is specifically fitting for a person carrying the responsibility of representation on their shoulders.

Table 4.   Multivariates   *Category 2*
Leadership X Support of politician because pipeline
with national reps and gov't X Member of *jichikai*

	0	*Jichikai*	*Row Total*
0	68.8	31.3	26.2
Pipeline	45.2	*54.8*	73.8
Column Total	51.4	48.6	

(N=183   x=7.0   sig<0.01   x=7.9   sig<0.01)

Table 5.   *Category 1, 2, 4, 5*
Members of family that are/were representatives

Politicians	No	Yes	*Row Total*
Abuse	12.3	*19.0*	12.6
Leadership	17.1	*32.8*	17.9
As a citizen	17.8	10.3	17.4
As a person	20.1	*31.0*	20.7
Money	32.8	*6.9*	31.4
Column Total	94.5	5.5	

(N=1060   x=26.1   sig<0.01)

Table 6.   *Category 2, 4*
Family in national politics

Politicians	No	Yes	*Row Total*
Abuse	12.4	17.9	12.6
Leadership	17.0	*33.9*	17.9
As a citizen	17.7	10.7	17.4
As a person	20.1	*30.4*	20.7
Money	32.8	7.1	31.4
Column Total	94.7	5.3	

(N=1060   x=25.0   sig<0.01)

Table 7.   *Category 2, 3*
Friends who aspired to politics

Politicians	No	Yes	*Row Total*
Abuse	12.5	12.8	12.5
Leadership	15.8	*21.4*	16.6
As a citizen	16.0	23.0	17.0
As a person	21.3	20.3	21.2
Money	34.4	22.5	32.7
Column Total	86.2	13.8	

(N=1356   x=14.8   sig<0.01)

Category 3

In category 3 all responses referring to the politician in his capacity as a servant of the people were included. The third category of shameful acts for politicians (17.1%) comprises: breaking of election promises [32.1%], lying [13.5%], outright changes in attitude towards supporters after a successful campaign [11.8%], neglect of citizens' needs and a lack of awareness that their position entails working for those who elected the politician [28.3%]. The breaking of promises, lying and change of

their lack of decorum as politicians. Writer Sono Ayako is one such figure who berated politicians for their lack of shame and also lack of knowledge and heart for the job they were undertaking. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 17. 3. 89.

attitude are particularly conspicuous. In the previous upper and lower house elections, the enormous swing to the opposition parties—because of opposition to the recently implemented consumption tax—was an illustration of the scenarios which instigate such distrust.[28] The consumption tax was a party policy very much opposed by the people, so much so that this one issue nearly succeeded in 'moving the mountain' in favour of the opposition.[29] The LDP promised revisions of the policy and the opposition party promised to forget their differences and band together in their efforts to abolish the tax. The opposition parties efforts have since been fruitless and the promised revision by the government is still pending. Needless to say, many people felt betrayed by such broken election promises.

However, this distrust of politicians is not just a product of the tax problem. The growth of industry brought on a number of heavy pollution problems which spotlighted the favoured interests of large enterprises to the detriment of the people. Movements of all types resulted and the power of lobbying groups increased. Reasons that have been noted for this cultivation of distrust in politicians include: the short history of the Japanese parliamentary system, which has generally led to a regard for the political system well below that of economic and cultural value systems; a worship of money; the choosing of political candidates by elite and exclusive groups.[30] The mushrooming of one-issue parties in recent years also points to another characteristic of Japanese politics. Traditionally Japanese politicians have tended to work more for specific groups than for specific national goals.[31] This trend increased as Japan rose from the ashes, in the aftermath of World War II, to the soaring heights of an economic giant in the 70's and 80's. On reaching a certain standard of affluence, the national goal of rebuilding Japan necessarily began to fade. The Japanese people began to move away from sacrificing themselves for the betterment of the country and moved towards concentrating on their own personal lives. An influx of females into the political system is a direct result of the perceived need to solve immediate problems by direct representation. The Japanese political system is thus attempting to represent a huge range of conflicting interests which are not bound by an underlying or overarching goal or philosophy.

Here, too, there is a correlation between answers in this category and those who

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28 In 1987, the 社会経済国民会議 *Shakai-Keizai Kokumin Kaigi* (Meeting of the People on Society and Economics) produced concrete proposals for changes in the election system to ensure better government. Included in these proposals was the implementation of investigations of false election promises and the subsequent punishment of offenders. However, the introduction of this proposal is yet to be seen. *Yomiuri Shimbun,* 3. 5. 87, Tokyo edition.

29 Doi Takako, leader of the Japan Socialist Party, used this phrase frequently in the last election campaign to allude to the possible change of government after about 40 years of rule by the LDP.

30 See 北西と山田 『現代日本の政治』 Kitanishi & Yamada, *Gendai Nihon no Seiji* (Contemporary Japanese Politics), 1983.

31 Tanaka Kakuei's work in advancing the progress of Niigata Prefecture's economic development by the laying of the tracks for the *shinkansen* train as far as Niigata, despite the deficit incurred by the National Railways, is an example of such political favoritism.

had both friends who aspired to politics and relations in the family who had gone into national politics [Table 7]. Also those who are members of a political support party (後援会 *kōenkai*) were found to answer in terms of this category, indicating a possible expectation of having their demands on politicians fulfilled through their support [Table 8].

Table 8.   *Category 3*

Kōenkai membership

Politicians	Non-member	Member	Row Total
Abuse	13.0	8.4	12.5
Leadership	17.2	14.0	16.9
As a citizen	15.8	*27.3*	17.0
As a person	21.2	22.4	21.3
Money	32.8	28.0	32.3
Column Total	89.2	10.8	

(N=1320   x=13.8   sig<0.01)

Category 4

All responses referring to the selfish or egotistical behaviour of a politician were grouped here. The opinion that politicians are expected to give of themselves for the good of others—but don't—is made quite clear. (20.9%) (This opinion, however, is not thought to be particular to Japan.) The consensus on the wording of responses here is extremely high. Practically all responses fall into two sub-categories: self-centeredness [10%] and *shirishiyoku* (私利私欲)—personal interest, personal desire [89.3%]. As with the following category it is pertinent to assume that the recent Recruit scandal has highly influenced this current image of the self-centered politician who gives no thought to the welfare of the public but directs all energy towards pursuing his own selfish interests.

The data shows that those who specifically state their reasons for support of representatives, at both prefectural and local levels, as opening up a pipeline to, and exerting pressure on, the higher levels of government also significantly express criticism of egoism and self-profiteering [Table 9]. Needless to say, such people who make the effort to offer their support to certain representatives and those who participate in the very basic levels of community government realise that self-centeredness is not going to profit them nor fulfill the goals in which they have an interest. However, whether these results indicate a call simply for a show of altruism or a call for a greater sharing of the profits is something that must be left to further research.

Having someone in the family who had entered politics seems to correlate with the criticism of selfishness and self-sought profiteering [Tables 5,6]. (This same group however, was not at all apt to point out corruption, etc.—category 5—as shameful behaviour.) It was found, too, that those who answered in this category were likely

to give their support because of political convictions or the policies of a particular politician. Naturally those who expect their politicians to perform public services would resent a politician who thought only of his own well-being.

Table 9.   *Category 4*
Support of pref. pol. because of influence on regional politics

Politicians	Not important	Important	*Row Total*
Abuse	10.9	12.7	12.3
Leadership	16.7	17.1	17.0
As a citizen	21.7	15.6	16.9
As a person	14.5	*22.8*	21.0
Money	36.2	31.8	32.7
Column Total	21.0	79.0	

(N=1313   x=13.8   sig<0.01)

Category 5

As the numbers were significantly large, all responses citing money and corruption (32.6%) as constituting shameful behaviour were included in this last and largest category. Nearly a third of all respondents to the question concerning the most shameful behaviour for a politician answered in terms of being a servant to money [29.6%], corruption (汚職 *oshoku*)[23.6%], or bribery (賄賂 *wairo*)[46%].

Money and politics are very closely connected in Japan. As already mentioned in category 1, *kaban* is an important political factor. Japanese aspiring to politics need enormous funds in order to run an election campaign and then need more funds in order to curry favour with those in influential positions, so that they may work effectively and thereby maintain their seats.[32] It has already been mentioned above that the recent Recruit scandal has had an obvious influence on the responses to this survey. Other influential factors of a similar nature that must also be noted are: the pachinko parlour related scandal; the Osaka Prefectural Government's undisclosed payment of bonuses to its employees and subsequent graft charges; the handling of government investments by the Kobe City government; the introduction of a consumption tax that has affected all Japanese consumers; soaring land prices.

Not since the Lockheed scandal has such a far-reaching corruption case as the Recruit scandal been seen. Under the leadership of Takeshita, decision-making took the form of overall consensus which resulted in Recruit offering contributions and sure-fire profit-making stocks to practically all members of the LDP as well as to

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32   A survey of politicians by the *Asahi Shimbun* revealed that LDP members holding national office use, on average, ¥94,710,000 a year in operating costs. For those who hold prefectural level office in Ibaraki the average yearly costs run to ¥5,520,000. There was a large difference in average costs between LDP members, who spent ¥6,770,000, and SDP members, who spent ¥3,200,000. (The monthly salary of a prefectural representative is ¥640,000.)

many other politicians in other parties and persons who influence government decisions. Although, in the legal arena, charges of corruption have been limited to only a select few it is commonly assumed that the roots of this affair run deep and wide, painting the scandal as an exercise in enormous profiteering by those located in the highest and most influential places. Moreover, at around the same time as this scandal occurred, the extremely controversial consumer tax was also imposed. Thus the public's severe criticism of politicians in general has been fired by the scale of the Recruit operation (giving to the rich) and the simultaneous imposition of the consumer tax (taking from the poor).

Overall no significant correlations between this category and other questions were found, evidencing the generally-felt resentment or aversion that Japanese society associates with politicians who turn to corruption and money. However, interestingly enough, those who had family in politics paid very little heed to money as a shameful act. This suggests a number of things which could be discussed only hypothetically at this point, and therefore I shall only point out the results here and refrain from any discussion [Tables 5,6].

—The Citizens—

The following is an explanation of the data concerning citizens.

Category 1

All responses specifically referring to authority were classified here. This category (11.3%) deals with the abuse and use of authority [36.4%], the use of authority for specific gains [49.6%] and the misuse of taxes [4%]. The abuse of authority and status naturally included asking 'favours' of politicians, government officials, leaders of groups and persons of influence (コネ kone). Wording here however, tended to express a greater sense of indignation against citizens who abused power when compared with responses referring to the abuse of power by politicians. The manipulation of politicians carried out by voters simply because of previous support they gave, or manipulation of a 'representative of the people' for the benefit of the individual or a specific local community, suggests that democratic processes are expected to be carried out to the letter more in the community than in the political world. One particular group that did stress abuse of someone's authority as shameful was the group which indicated having friends who aspired to politics. Perhaps being closely connected to those actually involved in politics produced an over-awareness of the need for a politician to be detached in order to carry out his job faithfully [Table 12].

One reason for this may be that the Japanese of the post-war period have come to place great value on the equality of opportunity. Thus, although the use of kone for gaining employment, enhancing business, advancing community projects etc., is widely practiced, it is considered a practice which usurps the hard work and endeavour put into an attempt to graduate from the right schools to achieve a promising career. Hence, although the percentage of people who consider the abuse of authority as shameful differs little for either citizen or politician, abuse of power

by a citizen seems to attract more harsh criticism than if the subject happens to be a politician.

Category 2

All responses referring to rules of society, in the abstract, were grouped in the second category. Citizens expect other citizens to maintain the rules of society (18.5%). Laws are not to be broken [23.6%]; discrimination should not be practiced, [18.4%]; social order and promises should be kept [9.4%]; and of course, in the context of this survey, proper voting conduct should be followed [23.1%]. Laws are laws, but those that received particular attention were the non-payment of taxes (as the duty of a citizen) and illegal parking, which is an ever-increasing problem in overcrowded cities and one that is particularly being campaigned against by officials in the Osaka area.

The problem of discrimination, although mainly recorded in the abstract, cites bullying of the weak and prejudice against *burakumin* (部落民 outside communities). Here again the topic of equality comes up. Although the Japanese consider their society one without social classes and (therefore?) equal in principle, the fact that criticism of discrimination appears here suggests that some are more equal than others.

As voting in Japan is not compulsory, not voting was included as shameful conduct. Voting for payment by supporters of a candidate or voting because of connections with, or obligations to (義理 *giri*), a candidate were also noted here. Payment for votes is not an uncommon practice in Japan but, as Gerald Curtis correctly points out, labeling this as corruptive would be too simplistic, as payment is often made as a form of *orei* (お礼 a show of gratitude) that is inclusive of a number of traditional nuances.[33] However, as already mentioned, geographical mobility has caused voters to move away from supporting a certain party or candidate affiliated to the community and join the increasing pool of swinging voters.[34] Therefore, compared to previous situations, where *giri* and personal relations were often involved, voting simply because of payment is probably considered more a case of bribery and thus devoid of the traditional nuances of the past.

Category 3

Grouped in this category were all responses that referred to the maintenance of morals, in the abstract, at the level of community life (as opposed to rules and regulations at the greater level of society at large). This category focuses on morals and mores in the general or abstract sense and the need for community co-operation, also in the general sense. This is the second largest category (22.9%). (Responses

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33 *Op. cit.,* p.241.
34 The percentage of swinging voters in this survey was found to be 29.4% which compares with SSM results of 32.6% on a national level. Polls conducted from 1970 indicate a change in the percent of swinging voters from 18.1% in that year to 27.5% in 1975 and 30.3% in 1980. (時事通信社 「戦後日本の政党と内閣」 Jijitsushinsha, *Sengo Nihon no Seitō to Naikaku* (Japanese Political Parties and Cabinet after the War), 1981.

stating concrete examples were grouped into the fourth category.) Citizens who lack morals or civic morals, common sense and manners [36.9%], and those who lie [6.8%], are regarded as shameful. Likewise, those unable to participate co-operatively in community life are also frowned upon [15.2%]. Here I have also grouped in the same category responses that cite an inability to voice one's views and inconsistency in behaviour or way of thinking [37.3%]. Those who are unable to express themselves clearly, or are prone to just follow the crowd, or be subservient to a particular group, are examples of this group.

For the smooth operation of any society morals, like laws and rules, are indispensable. Here most answers noting morals were coined simply as "a lack of morals" or "a lack of civic morals." Responses also criticised those who forgot their manners or rules of etiquette. The call for harmony and maintenance of morals implies that these are valued but, by the same token, this criticism of a lack of morals implies an overall breaking down of a respect for such values. The diversification of society and increased membership in a variety of association type groups can be described as being a lack of what Sakuta called an overall mainstay group[35] which can tie the various groups together and dictate the guidelines for such matters as public courtesy, common sense and morals. However, although this data does indicate a crumbling of such values it does not evidence the reasons for it.

The harmony of community life seems to depend upon co-operation within the community and its activities. Although the Japanese have often been labeled as conformists, responses here rejected conformity to anything and everything, instead calling for a greater showing of individuality and initiative from others. This meant a clear expression of one's own views, more consistent behaviour and contribution to the group in a fruitful manner. Thus the demand for co-operation in community life is not one centered on mere blind conformity but one that demands a certain amount of active participation by the individuals involved.

Category 4

In this bracket the concern is with concrete problems that affect human relations and everyday community life (17.7%). Non-participation in the *chōnaikai* and non-co-operation in specific community activities [18.7%] are examples of this category. One particular problem in the community seems to be the disposal of garbage [7.4%]. Japan recycles a great deal of its household garbage, but in order to do so it requires different types of garbage to be put out for disposal on different days. It is a community rule that garbage be put out only on the specified days, as most of it is just placed on the roadside or paths at certain intervals. Therefore, any garbage thrown out in between collections (most places have a twice-a-week collection) creates various problems for the community. Also because of the disposal treatment of differing types of garbage, putting, for example, cans in the plastics or burnable rubbish can cause damage to machinery. Many community groups are made aware

of these problems but individuals who do not participate in such groups often remain ignorant, causing problems for those actively involved in the community. These active members, no doubt, make up the respondents who noted garbage to be a bane to community life.

Causing trouble for people was also noted in relatively large numbers [32.5%]. 'Causing trouble for people' (人に迷惑をかける *hito ni meiwaku o kakeru*) can be said to be a reflection of the onus the Japanese place on harmonious human relations, as this can mean simply asking a favour of someone or causing trouble on a larger scale for the whole community. This indicates a lack of thought being paid to human relations because people no longer think far enough to realise the possible trouble they may be causing by their individual actions. Needless to say, any trouble caused is perceived as a strain on human relations.[36] Following in this same vein were responses that noted instances of talking disparagingly of people, gossiping, slander and a lack of thought for the other's well being as shameful [33%].

There have been various theories formed in order to explain the importance human relations play in Japanese society. Hamaguchi Eshun has labeled Japanese behaviour as being contextual (間人主義 *kanjinshugi*—an emphasis placed on the interaction between people rather than on the self, which is seen to reflect Western individualism); Sugiyama Lebra calls their behaviour situational (behaviour which changes according to situations and the people involved); Yoneyama has noted the *nakama ishiki* (仲間意識 mateship) of the Japanese,[37] and the list goes on. However what each points out is that the Japanese are very aware of the binding relationships in the human relations network and the important role these relations play in Japanese society. (Already noted above in Category 1 is the prevalence of the use of *kone* or connections with people in order to pursue personal interests.) This particular data suggests that the Japanese still, in theory, do value inter-relationships and the meaning the human nexus has for them but also that this value is being translated less and less into practice. Giving no thought to others, slandering, causing trouble, non-participation in community activities and the growing self-centeredness of people (to be discussed in the next category) all indicate a loosening of the knots that keep that network bound together. This might be explained as a result of greater urbanisation

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36 A survey conducted by Shōchiku Films for information to aid the production of a film, asked people who they would berate at the top of their voices if only they had the opportunity. A total of 10.8% answered they would choose politicians because of tax, lies and corruption; 8.5% answered they would choose the person next door or neighbours, with reasons such as singing late at night off key (*karaoke*) and various other local problems being cited. These results coupled with the results from this survey, indicate that even after returning to the comfort of one's home, the proximity of neighbours does present a large number of frustrating problems for many Japanese.

37 Hamaguchi Eshun, *op.cit.* See also "A Contextual Model of the Japanese," *Journal of Japanese Studies,* 11:2, 1985, pp.289–321; Takie Sugiyama Lebra, *Japanese Patterns of Behavior,* University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1976, pp.110–136; 米山俊直 『日本人の仲間意識』 Yoneyama Toshinao, *Nihonjin no Nakama Ishiki* (Japanese Mateship), Kōdansha, Tokyo, 1976.

and the growing impersonality of large cities, but the data I have at hand shows no correlation between these phenomena and the size of the place of residence or the length of residence in one spot.

Category 5

All responses citing money, self-interest and selfishness as constituting shameful behaviour were included in this last and largest category (29.6%).

A lack of thought for others or for the greater community because one is too self-centered, or the simple answer of selfishness, self-centeredness and egoism present one focal point in this category [52.7%]. Another focal point is the precedence of personal interests, or a single thought for the cultivation of one's own interests [17.7%]. Both of the above types can be thought of as selfish behaviour which ignores others in a selfish-minded way and when the two percentages are added together the result is that around three-quarters of the respondents in this category consider selfish attitudes to be a prominent problem. Answers that specifically answer with bribery and money are also present in significant numbers [22.4%] but the numbers are relatively small compared to the politicians.

Regarding the focus on selfishness, it seems reasonable to assume that this is connected with the changing economic stituation but also compounded with ever-changing social situations. Here many answers simply stated self-centeredness or selfishness without reference to a context of any sort and thus they were categorised separately here. The importance Japanese place on inter-relations with others has already been discussed above. The criticism of centering the world around oneself attests to this importance—in the theoretical sense—and to the reality of a society that is in fact moving away from the practice of such theories and values.

With the beginning of the period of high economic growth, the extended family and institutions such as *ie* began to crumble. Women have since begun to enter the work force, albeit mainly on a full-time casual basis, in ever-increasing numbers. Fathers who work as a *salaryman* or are self-employed are often unable to spend much time at home because of commitments to work and long commuting hours, or are often not in the home at all because they have been posted to other regions on their own (単身赴任 *tanshin funin*). Growing urbanisation and greater mobility in society also means neighborhood networks have little time to become established, especially in the new metropolitan areas. Thus, for the younger generation, role models (especially moral models) are faint, and participation as a member of a community is limited because of school commitments.

The fostering of a younger generation which is obsessed with scholastic performances and the results such performances will have on their future life has also served to create a generation that has difficulty observing and participating in the society around it. Parents are indulgent of the children as many families can only afford to have one or two children and tend to treat them as an extension of themselves, in the hope that the children will fulfill the dreams they were unable to attain. Often the dreams rest on obtaining better academic results, which has cultivated the thriving industry of after-school *juku* (塾 cram schools). Especially in urban areas, the child

who does not attend a *juku* is now the exception. Consequently, as the children spend a great deal of time in school, interaction with role models such as father or grand-parents or even neighbours has decreased notably and the younger generation has hence been left with little that acts as a guide or teacher in the learning of basic premises for interaction and participation in Japanese society—as it was. Thus, in certain cases, the tying of knots which keep the human network linked together may not even be taught at all. In this sense it is easy to understand the responses that target selfish-ness and, in particular, responses that make references to the younger generation.

Perhaps one of the more obvious explanations for the responses concerning money is 'unfettered capitalism.' During Nakasone's reign, many public holdings such as the national railroads etc. were privatised and rationalised. Yet at the same time publically-held prime land was sold off, triggering soaring land prices. Through a variety of government moves capitalism has been allowed to take a free hand, but the government has been slow to counteract or suppress the detrimental effects of such moves. The consequences are that a society which still holds dear the ideology of equal opportunity and no social classes, is seeing the gap between wealthy and not so wealthy gradually grow larger and larger.

To compound the problem, the price of land has risen to such heights that most Japanese can no longer afford to think of owning their own home unless they are willing to commute long hours to work or take out loans that stretch out over more than one generation. The ownership of land (for example land that was traditionally farming land) translates into ownership of a house and probably a relatively easy life economically, whereas a lifetime of hard work as a *salaryman* may mean life in a *danchi* (団地) apartment. In turn, the inability to purchase land has led to a surplus of savings for many which, to a certain extent, have been invested in stocks and bonds in the hope of reaping profits great enough to allow the purchase of a family home or allow a more desirable lifestyle, free of the woes of economic shortcomings. Playing the stock market can mean instant success but such success can be the seed of jealousy as it opposes ideals associated with equality. Hence, in many ways Japanese society is beginning to see a dramatically growing gap between social strata, specifically for those who are at the lower end of the ladder. They are the ones who are most affected by the consumer tax and high land prices and they are starting to feel the economic pressure and frustration from such changes. Thus, although Japan is now seen as an economic giant, the man on the street does not feel that this is reflected in his own private life. This is expressed in the overwhelming percentage (79.7%) of people who answered in the positive to a question which asked "Do you think there is inequity/unfairness (不公平 *fukōhei*) in the world around you?"[38] (It must be noted however that there was no significant correlation between the results of this question and the individual categories of shame.) The root of this dissatisfac-tion might be explained as being the result of relative deprivation but such observa-tions must be left to further research.

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38 「今の世の中は公平だと思いますか、それとも不公平だと思いますか。」

§

Unlike the answers concerning politicians, where significant correlations between other questions in the survey were to be found, few specific correlations were to be found in the case of the categories of shame for the citizens. Women were found to place slightly more emphasis on community issues [Table 10]. Respondents who had friends who aspired to politics did show a greater concern about the abuse of authority but less concern for money matters in relation to shame [Table 11]. The same can be said for certain correlations between questions concerning friendship networks and the categories of shame for the citizens [Table 12]. Such correlations indicate the influential role friends play in Japanese society but the interpretation of the extent of this influence must be left to further analysis.

Table 10.   *Category 4*

Citizens	Gender		
	Male	Female	*Row Total*
Abuse of Status	12.8	9.7	11.3
Rules	17.1	19.9	18.5
Social stds	24.0	21.7	22.9
Community	15.0	*20.8*	17.9
Egoism	31.2	27.8	29.6
Column Total	51.0	49.0	

(N=1137   x=10.8   sig<0.05)

Table 11.   *Category 1, 5*

Citizens	Friend who aspired to politics		
	Yes	No	*Row Total*
Abuse of Status	*18.9*	10.1	11.4
Rules	18.9	18.4	18.5
Social stds	22.5	22.7	22.7
Community	17.8	18.0	17.9
Egoism	*21.9*	30.9	29.5
Column Total	15.1	84.9	

(N=1121   x=13.8   sig<0.01)

Table 12.   *Category 4, 5*

Citizens	Gender of friend		
	Male	Female	*Row Total*
Abuse of Status	13.0	10.0	11.6
Rules	17.2	22.6	19.7
Social stds	25.3	21.4	23.5
Community	13.4	*21.4*	17.1
Egoism	*31.1*	24.7	28.1
Column Total	53.8	46.2	

(N=931   x=18.9   sig<0.01)

§ § §

The above results for both questions depict some of the concrete conceptions of shame the Japanese have in relation to politicians and citizens. These results not only indicate ideas concerning shame but also provide an image of politicians and politics and the less desirable features of Japanese society that are perceived by the Japanese themselves.

§ **Discussion**

It has already been stated that the inclusion of a question on embarrassment and subjectively-felt shame had to be omitted because respondents found it difficult to answer the question. The nature of the questionnaire is thought to be responsible for this. Needless to say, admitting to the types of situations that are embarrassing is an embarrassing situation in itself and therefore this type of question is better suited to a more 'intimate' form of survey, such as relatively in-depth interviewing. In this sense, the questions in this survey could only extract responses phrased in the objective sense and thus the answers centre on desired and expected forms of behaviour rather than subjective feelings of shame. Of course, in order to grasp other aspects of shame, subsequent differing forms of surveys are necessary.

The results then, rather than indicating when a person feels shame, indicate more when a person *should* feel shame or what the respondent wishes or wants a person not to do. This is the type of shame that both Benedict and Sakuta discussed. Sakuta described this type as *kōchi* (公恥 public shame), the ever-felt monitoring gaze of society, as opposed to *shūchi* (羞恥 embarrassment), that is felt when one experiences a gap between the norms and values of one's membership group and reference group.[39] This gaze of society gradually becomes internalised, through the process of socialisation to provide a measure for social behaviour.

The results attest to this, clearly illustrating that shame is both a firmly held concept and considered to be an effective sanction in Japan—although the responses imply that the degree of effectiveness is on the wane. Response to the questions in statistical terms alone evidence that shame is not an unfamiliar concept to the Japanese. (A total of 74.7% answered the question concerning the politicians and 61.9% answered the question concerning citizens.) The consensus on not only types of shameful behaviour but on the wording used to describe such behaviour, found in the questionnaire responses, attests to the fact that common perceptions concerning shame in Japan are widespread. Moreover, these perceptions clearly point to the function of this social sanction, shame, as being perceived as the preservation of social order, rules of behaviour and morals.

The fact that public shame acts as a strong social sanction is best illustrated in the overwhelming number of responses which imply that *haji* should be felt when expected behaviour is not properly carried out. Had the questions been phrased "What do you think a politician should not do?" or "What do you think a citizen should not do?" the results would no doubt have been much the same. Prohibition of an act in Japan can hence be re-phrased as "That's shameful (or embarrassing) so *don't* do it!"[40] This clearly indicates the strength of the sanctioning power associated with shame in Japan. Thus, when morals, laws and social order are not upheld, *haji* should be experienced. For example, as a lust for money or material things has been

39   See Sakuta, *op.cit.*
40   恥ずかしいからやるな！

traditionally frowned upon in Japan, shame should be felt when a politician becomes possessed or obsessed by money and other material interests. Likewise citizens who undermine equality and fairness threaten 'social order' and should feel shame for doing so.

The difference in responses about politicians and citizens can be explained by the relationship between shame and social status. Lebra discusses shame as an incongruence of certain actions with a particular status.[41] In other words, people are expected to play out roles that are fitting to their position in society and when one's actions are not congruent with the status or role that one holds then the result is some form of shame. The Japanese are quick to establish roles expected of a certain situation through the use of name cards, language, appearances etc., and this idea is clearly reflected in the responses which shows that respondents expect certain behaviour of their politicians and of citizens. Although expectations do overlap in some cases, for the most part respondents discriminated between the 'correct' behaviour they thought fitting for these two differing positions, clearly showing that shame is closely related to socially designated behaviour. A large number of responses concerning citizens also cited the inability to act according to the requirements of a situation (Category 3,4) which also illustrates the relationship of shame and expected behaviour.

Hence, rather than the expectation of people maintaining a code of rules that are black and white in clear prohibitive terms, the responses imply that people are required to maintain a certain code of behaviour while under the careful watch of society or the community. In this sense, shame indicated here is not a feeling that is subjectively felt but something that is objectively expected.

This data has thus provided an image of one aspect (an important aspect) of shame as it is perceived by the Japanese and also of the expected functions of shame within Japanese society. These findings also corroborate a number of the points put forward by Benedict in her study on the Japanese. However, it would be imprudent at this point to go on and suggest that Japan is truly a 'shame culture,' as Benedict claimed. An attempt to make such a claim would be premature at any stage until an assessment of the theories on Japanese shame and shame culture is carried out, and further study ensues on other aspects of shame, guilt, and the relation of guilt and shame. Yet, considering the treatment of shame in English-language publications, which tend to discuss shame in the context of the individual self and the manner in which shame affects interaction between self and others—an inside-out aspect of shame—the outside-in aspect of shame distinctly recognised here, in other words, shame as a social sanction, does suggest a different cultural perception of this concept as far as academic discussion of the subject is concerned. Naturally, in order to discuss Japan as a shame culture, cross cultural studies of an in-depth nature would be crucial. Therefore, this paper restricts itself only to findings that have resulted from the data obtained, leaving further discussion of the above mentioned topics to another

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41 Lebra, *op.cit.*

time.

In examining the cross-tabulations of the data, a correlation was observed between memberships in certain groups and their perception of shame, and also between questions geared to ascertain friendship networks and the perception of shame, suggesting that the ideas concerning shame are influenced by factors that are immediate and familiar.[42] It is noteworthy that little correlation was seen between the different categories of shame and attributes such as occupation, age, income, social strata, size of place of residence or years of residence in the present home. In other words, considering the representative composition of the respondents in this survey, this can be interpreted as meaning that categories of shame noted here can be thought of as being generally held conceptions within Japanese society, suggesting that further study on the topic of shame may make valuable contributions to discussions concerned with social behaviour in Japan.

From a different viewpoint, the data above provides vital insights into the image the Japanese voting public have of their politicians and of those who share their community. It could be that respondents may just have taken the opportunity to express their resentment about certain situations affecting their lives: their rancor about the repeated scandals involving politicians, their disgruntlement with a lack of thought on the part of others. The responses might then be classified in Japanese as *kōfun* (公憤) which can be translated as public or moral indignation and resentment. However, simply dismissing the results as an outlet for stress would be incorrect. These responses show a growing disillusionment with political representatives which was probably best summed up in the response "Being a politician in itself is shameful." Trust in politicians by the Japanese is extremely thin at the moment. Moreover, the image of daily life, conjured up by these responses, is none too bright. Good neighbours willing to participate actively for the betterment of the community seem to be few and far between, suggesting a change in society which is effecting the most fundamental levels of life. No longer do explanations of Japanese society which revolve around such key concepts as harmony (wa 和) and consensus seem to be relevant in the context of the responses obtained. According to this data, conflict is abundant but solutions are wanting.

The above data demonstrates the enormous impact the Recruit affair has had on Japanese society. Although it touched mainly national-level politicians, the image of politicians cultured since then has been applied to all the lower levels of local politics. Moreover, the data reveals a strong prevailing feeling of discontent at the growing inequality or unfairness perceived within Japanese society. The reverse side of the most shameful acts noted can be translated as the most desired form of behaviour. These comments on shame thus give an illustration of the actuality of society whilst

42   Membership in certain groups such as the PTA, the smallest unit of local government (the *chōnaikai* or *jichikai*), the *shobodan*(消防団 fire fighting team), the neighborhood watch group and the *kōenkai* (a politicians support group) was found to be influential in responses to the questions on shame.

indicating a desire for something that isn't but should be, or something that was but is no more. So although the cohesiveness of groups and the value placed on harmony have been hailed by some as factors which contributed to the economic success of Japan, these results indicate the nature of such features are changing.

The results indicate not only the conceptions of shame the Japanese hold, but also the dynamic changes occurring in politics, as perceived by the voters, as well as some unwelcome changes in society, changes that simplistic *Nihonjinron*, focusing on the success story of Japan, have hitherto failed to explain or chosen to ignore. In this sense, through the medium of shame, a vital raw image of society as the Japanese themselves see it has also been obtained from this data.

In conclusion, the results of this questionnaire clearly point to a strongly-held and functioning concept of shame within Japanese society as a whole. But at the same time, through the medium of the concept of shame, the data provided by the respondents to this survey is excellent proof of the necessity for a diverse number of approaches towards Japanese society in order to be able to capture the dynamics of its complex features. Shame as one of many indices will be valuable in assessing Japanese society, but no longer are such labels as 'shame culture,' which was used to explain all by Benedict and the *Nihonjinron* theorists who followed, to be considered feasible almighty illustrations of the changing and diversifying society of Japan.

Appendix

Questions and List of Some of the Representative Responses in the Vernacular

質問項目：最後の質問です。自由にお答えください。
　　1)　政治家としてどのような行動がもっとも恥ずべきだとあなたは思われますか。具体的に一つをお教えください。
　　2)　同じ市民の中ではどのような行動がもっとも恥ずべきだとあなたは思われますか。具体的に一つをお教えください。

Politicians

カテゴリー1　　(12.4%)
職権濫用　[＊]
税金で飲み歩いている　[159]
税金の無駄使い　[244]
政治家としての肩書を、自分の利益に利用している人　[575]
自分の地位を利用し、自分の利益しか考えない議員　[1311]
特権を悪用して私利私欲に走る。特定の人の利益を代表する(ロッキードやリクルート等のスキャンダル)　[160]

カテゴリー2　　(17%)
議会での行動：国会での質疑応答でメモを見ながら答えるようなこと又は国会議員のヤジ [1547]
政治家のあるべき姿：政治家は職業ではなく、奉仕に近いもの。私利私欲で国家を動かそうとする人　[44]
モラルや責任が欠けている：自分の責任を他人に押しつける。妻や秘書のせいにすること、売春行為　[433]
政治家は心がきたない。心のきれいな人に政治をしてもらいたい　[1213]
信念がない：政治家としての自分の信念がない人　[484]
短、中、長期的vision がないこと　[1761]
不正　[＊]
公私混同　[＊]
女性関係、女性問題　[＊]

カテゴリー3　　(17.1%)
選挙の前と後の行動が違う：選挙の時だけ頭を下げて当選後シラン顔　[684]
国民のことを考えてほしい：市民の意見を聞き入れないこと　[1845]
市民から選ばれて政治の仕事を忘れて私腹を肥やす　[1006]
次回の選挙のことのみを考える人物(バカ)　[709]
人間として恥を知らない人　[283]
発言と行動が違う　[961]
嘘をつくこと　[＊]
公約違反　[＊]
約束を守らない　[＊]

＊　Numbers in　[　]　indicate the serial number of the questionnaire while an asterisk indicates that the same response was obtained multiple times.

カテゴリー4　　（20.9%）
自己中心主義と自分の利益だけを考える：自分のことしか考えないこと　　［＊］
私腹を肥やすこと　　［＊］
個人の利益　　［＊］
私利私欲　　［＊］

カテゴリー5　　（32.6%）
金儲けのために政治家になる：金で動くこと　　［＊］
金権政治　　［＊］
汚職　　［＊］
リクルート　　［＊］
収賄　　［＊］
賄賂　　［＊］

Citizens

カテゴリー1：　　（11.3%）
地位や権力の利用（悪利用）：自分の利益のために投票する政治家を利用する　　［1552］
地域エゴ、団体エゴにもとづく議員などへの圧力　　［801］
議員へのたかり　　［120］
地位を利用する　　［1053／1414］

カテゴリー2　　（18.5%）
公共のものを大切にしないこと　　［1104］
金で投票すること　　［1309］
選挙に投票しない、棄権すること　　［1009］
社会秩序の乱し、ルール無視と棄権：約束を守らない　　［＊］
社会ルールを守らない人　　［＊］
脱税　　［＊］
犯罪　　［＊］
不正　　［＊］
差別　　［＊］

カテゴリー3　　（22.9%）　　　［抽象的な記述］
同じ日本人同志として和を保てる人間でありたい、自己中心の人は困る　　［1772］
一般常識がない、他人に迷惑をかけているのに、知らぬ顔　　［11］
道徳心が欠けて、他人の迷惑を考えない人が多くなった　　［1236］
協調性を欠く自分勝手な人　　［690］
公徳心がない　　［785］
社会生活を乱す人　　［723］
政治に無関心な人　　［1449］
公約をわきまえないこと　　［963］
自分の考えを持たない人　　［1125］
無責任　　［＊］
嘘をつくこと　　［＊］

カテゴリー4　　（17.7%）　　　［具体的な記述］
自己中心的な生活。近所が市民の一つの核として、和を持てない行動。　　［311］
地域社会生活を乱す行動　　［1142］
町内会に参加しない　　［186］

ゴミを指定日以外に出す 　［162］
人に迷惑をかけること 　［＊］
人の悪口をいいふらす 　［＊］
他人への思いやりを感じないこと 　［＊］

カテゴリー5 　（29.6％）
自己中心的で社会性がない 　［221］
自分の利益のみを考える人 　［625］
自己中心主義、自己本位、自分のことしか考えない自分勝手 　［＊］
利己主義 　［＊］ 　　　　金で動くこと ［＊］
私利私欲 　［＊］ 　　　　賄賂 　［＊］
たかり 　［＊］ 　　　　汚職 　［＊］
収賄 　［＊］

──── 市民にとっての恥の意識—調査データにもとづいて ────

──── ポーリン・ケント ────

要旨：ルース・ベネディクトが日本社会を「恥の文化」という概念で説明してから、学問の世界だけではなく、一般の人々にとってもそれはなじみが深く、日本および日本人を語る際のキー・コンセプトとなっている。私は、最近の政界におけるスキャンダルをめぐるマスコミの報道においてもしばしば「恥」という言葉でもって政治家の行動が批判されるのを見聞きし、興味深く感じた。

　そこで、「恥」が政治的文脈の中で、市民にとってどのような意味を持つのかを調べることにした。周知のとおり、恥の文化に言及する研究は多いが、その概念を厳密に検討したものは少ない。さらに経験的にアプローチしたものはほんのわずかにすぎない。実際に、市民はどのように「恥」というものを認識しているのだろうか。その結果は従来の議論にどのような知見を加えてくれるだろうか。

　1989年に行なわれた「地域社会の政治構造と政治意識の総合研究」の有権者調査の機会を利用し、最後に自由回答の形式で、1.「政治家としてどのような行動が最も恥ずべきだとあなたは思われますか。具体的に一つお教えください。」と2.「同じ市民の中ではどのような行動が恥ずべきだとあなたは思われますか。具体的に一つお教えください。」の質問を設定した。

　分析にあたっては、まず二つの質問に対する回答を、次のようにそれぞれ5つに分類してみた。これは概念にもとづく分類ではなく、回答にあらわれた言葉や表現にもとづいて分けたものである。
≪政治家として恥ずべき行動≫
　1）　権力・権威・地位の乱用
　2）　政治家として期待される行動からはずれた行動
　3）　市民に対する義務を果たさない場合

　4）　自分の利益しか考えないこと

　5）　金権・賄賂・汚職

≪市民として恥ずべき行動≫

　1）　自他の権威・地位の利用

　2）　法・規範・ルールの違反

　3）　一般的な社会性に欠けていること

　4）　地域や日常生活における不和

　5）　自己中心主義・拝金主義

　作田啓一は、恥に「公恥」と「羞恥」という二つのタイプが存在することを指摘しているが、上記の各カテゴリーは公恥に属するものと考えられるだろう。さらに、この調査が政治的な文脈において行なわれたため、政治家や行政、あるいは社会一般や生活の場としてのコミュニティに対する「公憤」も恥を媒介して現われている。このような恥の意識は、クロス集計を取ってみると、団体所属や友人ネットワークと相関が認められ、逆に職業、年齢、収入などによる違いはあまり認められなかった。すなわち、ここでの「恥」は身近な社会関係の中で「恥ずかしいからやるな」という社会的制裁として考えることができる。報告では上記の各カテゴリーの内容の検討と、他の要因との関係について論じている。