

The Anguish of Civilized Behavior: The Use of Western Cultural Forms in the Everyday Lives of the Meiji Japanese and the Ottoman Turks During the Nineteenth Century

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This paper analyses the eclectic cultural patterns which combined western and indigenous culture in the everyday lives of the Meiji Japanese and the Ottoman Turkish elites during the nineteenth century. The use of dress, home interiors, and etiquette by elites are discussed in the comparative framework of Norbert Elias's "civilizing process" that engendered the modern individual in the West. The above framework is applied to the experience of Japan and Turkey within the time frame and social environment of nineteenth century reformist elites.

The paper argues that the individual in both countries underwent a new "civilizing process" due to the introduction of western culture to an already existent milieu of indigenous forms and norms of civilization. The introduction of western culture engendered the politically charged symbolism of bi-cultural forms. They were seen as part of an eclectic cultural environment of reform and tradition. Both societies faced the "double" tension stemming from the self-perception of the rational in western and traditional culture representing "civilized behavior" in public spheres. Unlike standard arguments that see tradition as an emotive haven of security from the tension of modernization, the individual in Japan and Turkey found emotive refuge in alternative eclectic cultural environments with less defined cultural boundaries in private interior spheres.

Keywords: WESTERN CULTURE, DRESS, HOME, ETIQUETTE, NORBERT ELIAS, OTTOMAN TURKEY, MEIJI JAPAN, RATIONAL, EMOTIVE, INDIVIDUAL

The psychological history of western culture beyond its "borders" is yet to be written. During the nineteenth century the Meiji Japanese and the Ottoman Turks used western culture as part of their reform efforts that linked their historical experiences to the history of the West. Thus, these "non-westerners" as they are sometimes called created patterns of eclecticism which formed the milieu in which the twentieth century was to take place. The nineteenth century eclectic reality of the Meiji Japanese and the Ottoman Turks did not remain as it was throughout the historical process of change, but aspects of it have remained to be irrevocable for the self-image of individuals in both societies. Since then, each generation in Japan and Turkey has continued to recreate and debate its individual and societal self-identity within an indigenous eclectic pattern of what is perceived as native or western as part of its "modernity".

The terms westernization, and or modernization all too frequently have been used

in the past to brush up a complex process with very cursory strokes. Both terms emphasize the role of western culture in the general transformational dynamic of societal change inherent in such processes as the development of an industrial economy, the emergence of capitalism, or the establishment of a centralized polity such as the nation-state, a national educational system, and the assimilation of western forms of secular law and legal reforms and so on.

However, neither term has been able to describe the mental and emotional context of the meaning of western culture vis-à-vis the local/indigenous/previous cultural components for the individual at a point of given time during this process of general transformation-be it termed reform, revolution, westernization, or modernization. Nor can these terms deal at length with the meaning of the eclectic mixture of the "nascent" and the "western" for the individual during this period of swift change to our contemporary age, other than the fact that "non-westerners" were trying to keep some things traditional such as the kimono or the veil, or even the Japanese emperor. This is so even in the case of the use of western culture together with the nascent one in the "outer" or "public" environment of individuals and their connection to society. More important, westernization and or modernization as analytical concepts say little about "inner" or "personal and private" meaning of the resultant multi-cultural environments.

The concepts of westernization and modernization invariably restrict their analysis to what remains similar and different of the result in an "outside" environment beyond the borders of the Western world from the earlier experience of the parent world-namely the West as an abstract notion-usually an ideal in the mind of the writer. And invariably, eclectic mixtures always appear as either inconsistent or uniquely exotic in comparison, therefore eluding perceptive explanations of their meaning.

The resultant eclectic patterns of the Japanese or the Turkish historical venture with western culture are hardly identical, but each in its own uniqueness also reveals similarities to each other as well as the encounters of those in other societies "outside" of the West who have also had to attribute meaning to the incorporation of western culture into their personal lives. One can even argue that this process was perhaps akin to the experience of the general population of the European continent since the Renaissance. Lest one forget, the majority of today's westerners also had to learn to incorporate what was deemed to be more up-to-date western culture emanating from the urban capitals of Europe such as Rome, Paris, and London into their personal environment to consider themselves to be a part of contemporary times.^{1/}

This paper, therefore, ventures to focus on the eclectic patterns in the respective experience of nineteenth century Meiji Japanese and Ottoman Turks in order to search for a context of meaning in the use of western culture for the individual during the reform era. An underlying purpose is to provide an alternative and hopefully uncovered framework of analysis for this "non-western" history of western culture that differs from the standard stance of scholars of Japan and Turkey which is invariably based on the presumption of similarities and differences from a perception

of the West as a static ideal.

Members of Japanese and Turkish society have shared a common agenda of having to attribute a meaning to the incorporation of western culture into their personal lives. This has been especially so for the elite as shown by recent research that deals with westernization in the study of nineteenth century urban elites. In her recent book on the modern Japanese aristocracy, Lebra discusses the internalization of westernization since the Meiji period by the Japanese aristocracy and some of the problems resultant from the process.^{2/} Compared to the practice of the scholars of Japanese studies who use the term modernization (*kindaika*) more often than the concurrent term of westernization or Europeanization (*seiyōka*, or *ōshūka*) to explain Japanese history since 1868, westernization as a concept is a central subject in the Turkish literature on modernity as it ultimately became the official policy of the Kemalist Republican Revolution after 1923. For Turkey, recent works on the nineteenth century urban families, who were more often than not members of the elite, have also started to deal with cultural aspect of westernization that brings a new emphasis on the concept of modernity primarily seen in political or economic terms until today.^{3/}

The purpose of the paper is, therefore, to focus on the use of western culture particularly in the everyday lives of the nineteenth century Meiji Japanese and Ottoman Turkish elite rather than evaluating the use of western culture by the general public. One reason for trying understand the mentality of the elite is that they were in a "head-start" position of incorporating western culture in their personal lives and were trying to use western culture in reforms. Their decisions throughout the nineteenth century, therefore, had a lot to do with creating the eclectic world which shaped the general public in the elitist character of decision-making for the top down reform experiences of Japan and Turkey that have been already noted extensively, whereas, at least for the duration of the nineteenth century, one can argue that the general public of Japan and Ottoman Turkey were not that directly involved in the process of decision-making.

Finally, out of the many possibilities that could be selected for a study of western culture in Japan and Turkey, this paper is based on a selection of attire, household environment, and manners, that remain somewhat arbitrary choices. However, those components are worthy of analysis for a topic concerned with the meaning of western culture particularly because the nineteenth century was a time when dress and ceremony carried much more importance in the everyday life of an individual compared to today. These three components reflected one's individual perceptions of suitable culture, social status, and in the case of countries like Meiji Japan and Ottoman Turkey political purposes. Hence, they serve quite conveniently as evidence that reveals how the members of the Japanese and Turkish elite saw themselves as part of this reforming—"modernizing" world of eclecticism.

Westernization, Europeanization, and or Modernization

In general, westernization or Europeanization as it has sometimes been called during the nineteenth century, has meant the use of western cultural forms as direct

imports from the West such as the legal system, arts, philosophy, architecture, technology that were related to general and "public" concerns of reform. It has also referred to the adoption of western culture at a more personal or "private" domain such as dress, grooming, cuisine, lifestyles and so on. The term westernization, frequently used together with the term Europeanization, was particularly in vogue during the nineteenth century. Basil Chamberlain, the astute British observer of Meiji Japan, is fond of using the term Europeanization.^{4/}

In comparison to westernization, the term modernization, a newer concept that has been used since the Second World War, has dealt with the same phenomena from a more structural perspective that can be argued to have deemphasized the normative quality of westernization which suggested that at some point in the future all conditions including the normative elements of "westernizing" societies will end up, or should end up, being identical to the West. In comparison to westernization, a simple summary of the concept of modernization would be that it has been used to explain the same historical process of using western culture, as part of a structural process that begins with the emergence of the modern West since the seventeenth century. Here the emphasis has been on trying to unravel the more internal or covert structural processes of the emergence of modernity in any given society regardless of the differences of political ideology or culture. The assumption is that modernizing societies and the West will share a universal historical agenda but will not necessarily share the same cultural outlook. Furthermore, the process of modernization is a phenomenon which is not based on a one to one relation of cause and effect of western culture as in the concept of westernization. Rather, it is brought about by the greater transformations toward industrialization, urbanization, political participation, and social change: the key words in the concept.

In this context the term modernization was thought to have hopefully deemphasized the cultural and normative quality of the concept of westernization. For example, one can argue that the term modernization has emphasized the economic and social change toward industrialization as opposed to the adoption of a western lifestyle. One can also argue that modernization has paid central focus on the importance of the structural aspects of political processes such as centralization, integration, and participation that lead to the formation of the nation-state for the countries of the western world as well as the non-western world. The above processes have received special emphasis in the concept of modernization instead of the ideological differences in political systems of democracy, totalitarianism, and traditionalisms toward the rights and liberties of the individual.

The critics of the modernizationist approach have already pointed out all too well, the inherent weak points in the modernizationist approach. The use of the term modernization frequently ended up again seeing as modern only that which was explainable in terms of structural similarities to the idea of industrial society and the nation-state. The structuralist approach of the term usually ended up placing secondary importance to issues of ideology such as individual rights and democracy as part of modernity. In the Saidian critic of Orientalism, the assumptions of modernity are shown to have also become a tool for conceptualizing non-western

cultures and peoples in as less "modern", therefore, subordinate in some form to the West. 5/

Suffice it to say that any term such as westernization or theory including the modernizationist one has its merits and demerits as forms of explanation. Therefore, this paper will not deal with a lengthy critic of either term as it has already been done quite extensively. The pendulum has already swung the other way as the proliferation of "anti-modernizationism", can become simply a way to present alternate forms of nationalism. Therefore, this paper will prefer to focus on realms that have been left largely uncovered in our understanding of the historical use of western culture by either concept. After all, the individuals who first started adopting western culture into their personal lives did not do so simply because it was fashionable, although fashion was certainly part of the process. More often than not these decisions by "non-westerners" already carried varying reform agendas of "modernity" which they had decided were compelling in order to ward off the threatening aggression of the West. Whether they liked it or not, the agenda of incorporating western culture into their personal lives also meant that they had to undergo complex mental adjustments which had to be creative and healthy enough in the long run. Whether they "succeeded" in doing so is not a primary concern of this paper. Rather, a primary concern is to understand how they went about doing it.

Historical Background and Elites

Needless to say the historical circumstances for Meiji Japan (1868-1912) and Ottoman Turkey (1280-1923) in terms of western culture were quite different. The political modernization of Japan and Turkey has been already studied as a part of the modernizationist studies of the Sixties, however, a brief summary of the historical circumstances in both societies in terms of western culture is useful.6/

In Japan, western culture makes a dramatic entrance with the political drama that ensued after the "forced" opening of the country that had been under the isolationist peace of the Tokugawa Shoguns (1600-1868) by Commodore Perry in 1853 which led to the signature of the "unequal treaties of trade" reflecting extraterritoriality and mandatory tariffs in 1858. While western culture has a long history in Japan since the 15th century, the 1868 Meiji Restoration after the brief civil war between the opposition samurai who had militantly reacted to the signature of the humiliating treaties signed by the Shogunate, began the intensive encounter of Japanese society with western culture.7/

Studies of Japan's modernization have stressed the swift speed with which the Japanese leaders, who were the major power holders from the domains that had formed the anti-Tokugawa league, accomplished the reforms necessary for the transformation of Japanese society from a feudal polity of various domains and the national government of the Shoguns to a nation-state and empire by the early years of the twentieth century. Throughout this "gestation" period, the early Meiji reforms incorporated western science technology into a modern educational system and founded the legal and institutional forms of government based on the western

model, where the Constitution of 1890 and the Meiji Civil Code of 1895 stand out. Furthermore government and private enterprise leadership succeeded in accomplishing swift economic growth and industrialization. These changes supported the emergence of Japan as a military power and the successful revision of the "unequal treaties" by the end of the nineteenth century after a series of important military victories such as the Sino-Japanese War of 1885, and the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 as well as the signature of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance .

Studies of Japan's modernization have also pointed out the important role that the heritage of the Tokugawa era played in this quest. The relatively high literacy rates of the population, coupled with the gradual development of a commercial market economy during the long centuries of Tokugawa peace plus the homogenous quality of the population have been seen as factors that contributed to the transformation process after 1868.8/ While the story of Japan's encounter with western culture in this modernizationist outlook appears quite positive until the end of the nineteenth century, the political and social problems of the twentieth century and the Second World War serve as the Japanese apocalypse in terms of its Meiji experience. After a destructive war and defeat which led to surrender in 1945, the encounter of Japanese society with western culture could be said to have had to begin anew with the Post-war reforms during and after the Occupation period.

In contrast to Japan, the history of the Ottoman Empire's encounter with western culture has a much longer history of political, religious, and most significant, military confrontation and interaction with Europe since the end of the middle ages. The Ottoman interest in western culture as a medium of reform was quite late, however, and began with the first serious steps taken toward reforming the major military institutions of the Empire in the eighteenth century. By the early years of the nineteenth century, the reformist Sultan Mahmut II had begun the process of expanding the content of reform beyond military objectives to involve reforms in the larger context of administrative, educational, economic, legal, and cultural spheres. The Anglo-Ottoman Treaty of 1838 brought "home" the capitulationist character of the nineteenth century "unequal treaties" for the Ottoman Empire. The commercial treaties of the early nineteenth century went hand in hand with the transformation of the economy, uneven as it was, to a more open commercial and integrated one with Europe and the gradual beginnings of some efforts at industrialization. Important land marks in the nineteenth century series of reforms was the beginnings of the reform period with the imperial edicts of 1826 and 1839. Similar to the use of "Meiji reforms" as popular term for the history of nineteenth century reforms in Japanese society, the 1839 edict known as the Tanzimat, or, the "New Order" edict has given its name to the nineteenth century history of Ottoman reforms. The edicts began a process of reform that had a wide span, covering the military, bureaucratic, social, and economic spheres of Ottoman society. Of the numerous reforms, however, the establishment of modern educational institutions, the gradual and partial revision of the customary religious based legal system with western inspired ones, and finally the promulgation of the first Ottoman Constitution in 1876 stand out as the areas where the infusion of western culture was most controversial. 9/

Compared to the Meiji success story, the Ottoman reforms of the nineteenth century have a tragic quality to them. Ironically, the Ottoman Turks had to loose and empire in order to start building a nation-state based on the western model. In the words of Ortayli, it was their longest century. 10/ First, the Ottoman efforts at reforms had to face the handicap of having to pursue reforms while fighting numerous wars and battles that were tearing the Empire apart. Second, the Ottoman elite saw the incorporation of western culture in their series of reforms as an important means to strengthen the empire within its own framework and not to replace it with a nation-state. However, the impact of nationalism made it no longer possible to mold the multi-ethnic and multi-religious communities of the Empire into a unified Ottoman citizenry in the long run. Finally, the politics of reform had a jagged history. The last Sultan of the nineteenth century, Abdulhamit II, known rather infamously as the "Red Sultan" for his despotic rule, accomplished his long reign of 33 years as a conservative modernist without activating the parliament despite the existence of the Constitution.

The accumulation of opposition to this state of affairs was a "Young Turk" revolt. Organized by a younger generation who were themselves the products of nineteenth century reforms, the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, dethroned Abdulhamit and brought back the Constitution. The Young Turks introduced a fresh new agenda of Turkish nationalism and a vigorous economic and social program in an effort to save the empire as a constitutional monarchy. But it remained to be a last ditch effort that ended up in disaster as the empire plunged into the First World War with Bismarck's Germany. Unlike Meiji Japan, by the early decades of the twentieth century, the Ottoman empire finally crumbled under the conflagration of the Great War of 1917, which was the Turkish apocalypse. The Turkish Republic born out of its ashes in 1923 with the nationalist revolution led by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), engendered the second phase in the Turkish encounter with western culture in a more intensive manner. 11/

The Turks who survived as the dominant ethno-cultural entity of the former multi-ethnic and multi religious Ottoman population, in a republic of much smaller size, had to rehash the agenda of reform versus tradition and the perennial question of incorporating western culture. The scions of the former Ottoman elite, the new nationalist leadership, rejected the Ottoman experiment with western culture, which was accused of being too eclectic, together with the Islamic tradition of the *ancien régime*. Familiar to students of Turkish "modernization", the new encounter with western culture was delineated by a new ideology of nationalism, more similar in intensity and framework to the earlier Meiji experience. While Islamic law was completely abolished in 1926, westernization in law and in other aspects of society become one of the important pillars of the new Republican revolution. 12/

In addition to history, even the concept of elites for both societies entail significant differences. For the Meiji period the Japanese "high" elite can be argued to consist of the members of the Imperial household or royalty and the newly formed hereditary aristocracy recruited from the members of the Pre-Meiji domain lords and the ancient court aristocracy of Kyoto and most important, the power holders from the political

elite of the Restoration leaders. The relatively small numbers of the above which included roughly anywhere around five to six hundred families, one could extend it somewhat if one included the members of the elite who were not necessarily titled but has close interaction with the new aristocracy.

However, nineteenth century elite culture in Japanese society was also based upon a larger demographic base of a "middle class" elite of political and intellectual figures. This wider middle class elite comprised a rather large population of journalists, politicians and opposition leaders, academics, literary figures, artists and so on. If the nineteenth century suffrage regulations that had property qualifications can be seen as a form of delineating the boundaries of the percentage of the elite population, it meant that anywhere from 15-20 percent of the population which represented about 5 million people belonged to this upper middle and middle class of urban educated people that had contact with western culture in some form. They were usually members of the former samurai, Meiji gentry, *shizoku*, class but more and more commoners or, *heimin* joined the group due to the swift social, and economic change as well as the relatively high educational level of the country.

One also needs to take into account the general social environment in which the elites operated for the duration of the nineteenth century. By the end of the century, Japanese society was a highly literate one and could increase its total literacy from about 20 percent in 1868 to close to 80 percent for all of the population. The possibility of relatively easy communication also helped the dissemination of information around the country. Japanese society was relatively densely populated with about 45 million people living within the compact geographical environment of the Japanese isles. By abolishing the hereditary character of feudal law and institutions, the Meiji reforms did create a firm legal and institutional basis that encouraged the development of meritocracy as the basis for advancement in society. All in all, the new reforms gave rise to social dynamics with horizontal and egalitarian qualities. However, in the long run, modern Japanese society did also retain a strong hierarchal quality in terms of its social and familial organizations where status and heredity continued to play important roles.

The pre-nineteenth century background to the social character of the elites in the Ottoman empire need some explanation as it was quite different from conditions in Japan, particularly the feudal hereditary class heritage of Tokugawa Japan. In the Ottoman case, the role of political decision-making was firmly based upon the institution of a long standing elitist bureaucracy and a scholar class of religious law that supported the rule of the Ottoman dynasty. While the Ottoman family was the only one with hereditary rights to the office of the Sultan, as well as the title of Caliph, the Commander of the Faithful, ever since the conquest of Egypt in the 16th century, the Ottoman elite was not formally hereditary in principle and Sultanic authority was absolute and personal. Somewhat reminiscent of the Chinese bureaucratic tradition, The elite tradition of pre-nineteenth century Ottoman society was a form of meritocracy based on the recruitment of military and bureaucratic personnel as servants, or *kul*, from the Christian as well as the Muslim population of the empire, who were educated in the Ottoman Turkish urban culture of Istanbul and

through various palace schools served the Sultan. The elite military corp of the empire who were called the Janissary corp, or the "new soldiers" were the best representation of this "anti-feudal" entity in imperial polity. The Janissaries who were the vanguard of the conquest campaigns to Europe were loyal to the Sultan alone, and were supposed to act as a balance to the local Anatolian Turkish noble families whom the Sultan considered as potential rivals.

In addition to the bureaucratic and military elite, the religious scholars, the *ulema*, constituted a class of literati who specialized in the study of Islamic scholarship as well as other subjects. While the military-bureaucrat servant class as well as the scholars constituted a "military", or, *askeri*, class with special privileges, the rest of the Muslim, Christian, and Jewish population of the empire including the Turkish one belonged to the *reaya* class of subjects. Recent studies suggest the literacy rate of the general muslim population was probably only 2-3 percent in the early 1800's, which however increased to a sizable 15 percent by the end of the nineteenth century due to new schools and educational reforms. 14/ This meant that fewer numbers of people were involved in the general middle class formation of Ottoman Turkish society from the masses and much lower literacy rates prevailed among the general population compared to the Meiji experience.

On the other hand, nineteenth century Ottoman educational reforms did place special emphasis on widening the base of elite education while introducing a new network of basic education to the masses. Thus, the numbers of people with high education who also had a relative access to western knowledge and culture increased greatly and constituted the newly rising class of bureaucratic and military elite. Known as the Young Ottomans and Young Turks of the latter half of the nineteenth century, this larger social entity is comparable to the Meiji-educated second generation "upper middle class" or "middle class" elite, below the titled Meiji aristocracy. The Young Ottomans played a similar role of expanding and confronting the ranks of the older Ottoman elite. Despite the basic differences obvious in the above summary, the Meiji and Ottoman elites, therefore, share some common grounds that make them comparable in terms of the infusion of western culture.

In contrast to the position of the elites in nineteenth century Japan and Ottoman Turkey, the general public of Meiji Japan and the Ottoman Empire were so vastly different as to make comparison difficult in this context. Suffice it to say, the homogeneous linguistic reality of the Japanese isles and the widely shared perception of common ethnicity by the Japanese public contrasted greatly with the multi-cultural/multi-linguistic/multi-religious heterogeneous character of Ottoman society with an imperial ideology which customarily emphasized religious affiliation and explicitly deemphasized ethnicity until the impact of nationalism in the nineteenth century. 15/

Other differences should also be kept in mind as well. The use of western culture in the Ottoman case, for example, should entail concurrent studies of numerous communities other than the Turkish speaking elite. The Ottoman Christian and Jewish communities which consisted of a rich variety of ethno-communal cultures such as Greek, Armenian, Balkan, Spanish, Levantine cultures as well as the Arab

Muslim and Christian elites of Lebanon, Palestine, and Egypt were all part of the greater process of incorporating western culture in the empire. One has to remember that their elites were also part of the upper class Ottoman elite formation in the nineteenth century as well. In many ways it could be even argued that these non-muslim subjects helped bring western culture "home" for the Turkish population. But this is a topic beyond the scope of this paper. Furthermore, twentieth century political history has dictated the demographic reality that the muslim Turkish population of the empire together with its elite remained to be the dominant cultural carriers in contemporary Turkey, who debated the Ottoman empire's vestiges, including its peculiar eclectic combinations of western culture and indigenous components.

In the case of Japan, the "elitist" argument has to keep in mind the premise that the geographical isolation of Japan as an island nation largely kept the general public out of direct contact with Europe and the United States even after the Meiji period. Except for immigration which did not bring large infusions of culture back into the old country, or the exceptional career of young men as students abroad, the Japanese masses remained pretty much isolated from direct contact with the Western World as during the Tokugawa period. They were able to interact with western culture only as components of it arrived into the country through the filter of urban intellectuals, or, the political decisions of government leaders, and the economic and educational systems, and so on, all of which were products of relatively elitist choices.

The nascent and western versus "modernity" and "tradition"

One complexity in this history of western culture beyond its "borders" between Meiji Japan even post-war Japan or Ottoman and Republican Turkey is that both the Japanese and the Turkish encounters with western culture since the nineteenth century have also entailed the "covert" use of western principles and models in the innovation, reconstruction, and the remaking of nascent cultural forms. These revised native components of culture were supposed to be part of the native tradition within a generation. What constituted to be modern and western in an "overt" sense for the nineteenth century has also sometimes come to be envisioned as tradition, frequently of a negative character, by the next or has been accepted as an old historical vestige.

A good case in point for the "covert" application of the western model would be the formulation of state Shinto ideology of the Meiji era that served the modern nation state as the tradition for a modern nationalist ideology then and was created out of the ancient nativist faith of Japan. By now for us, it is clear that State Shinto was an "invented tradition" formulated to be the instrument of a modern monarchy that reflected western principles and forms of ideology couched in a more Japanese context. 16/

A more "covert" example similar to the same process of invention would be the example of the 1876 *Mecelle* Islamic civil code of the Ottoman reforms that entailed the systematization of the orthodox *Sunni Hanefi* sect legal practices in commercial

law and inheritance, inspired by the organizational form and principles of the Napoleonic Code. The *Mecelle* left the issue of marriage and divorce to the domain of religious law, which was the *Shariat* (the judicial code of Islam) for Muslim subjects, the Church and Rabbinical Codes for the Christian and the Jewish subjects. Still it was a remarkable up to date interpretation of traditional Islamic jurisprudence that provided solutions to commercial transactions, contracts, and property rights between Muslims that was suitable for the market orientation of the Ottoman economy during the nineteenth century.

While in Islamic garb, the new *Mecelle* was furthermore part of a series of legal reforms that were more overtly western, such as in the case of the criminal code and the commercial code to deal with international trade. The *Mecelle* was also part of a "package" of imperial edicts which throughout the nineteenth century were, if not directly brought in from the West, were certainly inspired of contemporary conditions in the West. Since, imperial authority could frequently circumvent religious dictates and custom, the imperial ordinances and rescripts, usually the brain-child of reformist bureaucrats in disguise, provided the new legal basis for reforms. While couched again in Islamic terminology, imperial ordinances provided inheritance rights to women and children in agricultural land, abolished the customary status and laws pertaining to religious and social differences between muslims and non-muslims, and outlawed bondage and slavery, and even ventured to interfere into Islamic family law by putting some restrictions on the Islamic practise polygamy. 17/ Ironically, the *Mecelle* and the Imperial edicts were to be abolished by the Kemalists reforms in 1926 as the bastion of Islamic tradition eventhough when seen as part of a package of legal acts, they had in some measure brought the western principles of individual rights and liberty closer to home for the individuals of the empire.

An even better example in the fluid nature of our concepts of what constitutes western and or modern is from the historical experience of the Meiji legal reforms which were considered as successful completions of legal westernization ergo modernization at the time. For example, during the Meiji period, Basil Chamberlain, considered the Japanese legal system as completely Europeanized with the adoption of the new Civil Code of 1898 and the Meiji Constitution of 1890. And for the modernizationist studies of the post-war period, Japan's "modernity" in terms of a westernized legal transformation was considered as complete in contrast to the uneven experience of the Ottomans. 18/

Yet, since the disasterous encounter with Japanese militarism during the Second World War and the subsequent Japanese defeat, both Japanese codes have been critically evaluated as bastions of incomplete westernization and or modernization that have carried over elements of feudal political culture and the *ie* family tradition into modern Japanese society. 19/

These are but a few of the many examples that reveal the generational shifts in the meaning of what constitutes to be the West or Modern by historical circumstances. It also reflects the complex meanings associated with what was considered as western and therefore modern during the nineteenth century for the members of the elites in Meiji Japan and Ottoman Turkey who had a hand in envisioning and drafting these

reforms among others. Here, the discussion will turn, therefore, from the relatively impersonal realm of public reforms to the more personal realm of how western culture used by the members of the elite reflected their conceptualization of the role of western culture in the new civilizing venture at hand.

The Civilizing Process: Attire, Home, and Manners

While both Tokugawa Japan and Ottoman Turkey had contacts with western culture before the nineteenth century it is really the period starting with the 1800's that represents the overture that begins the quest for a cultural identity of reform. The Japanese and the Ottoman Turkish elites of the nineteenth century ascribed the meaning a "civilizing process" reminiscent of Norbert Elias to western culture particularly its material components that directly affected one's life such as attire, household environment, manners which were increasingly considered to be necessary to adapt to the new age. For the Meiji elite things western and their adoption at the personal level, whether for public or private concerns, was particularly important between 1870's and the turn of the century. For the Ottoman elite, the adoption of the accruements of western culture in everyday life started earlier obviously due to the geographical proximity and intimacy of the country to Europe. But western culture began to be officially adopted after the 1820's with the political decision making related to nineteenth century reforms of Mahmut II. 20/

For the Meiji Japanese and the Ottoman Turks, some of their adoption of western culture in everyday life had to do with fashion, or needs of practicality, but western cultural forms also carried symbolic meanings for the reform program of the age. The adoption of western dress as an attire for official use is a case in point. While there was a practical side to the adoption of western trousers and shoes since one needed western clothes for western style military training, frequently the use of western clothes was also quite laden with the symbolic meaning of the effort at integrating with western society as part of the reform efforts. Western cultural forms in attire, in home life, and the shift in manners or etiquette particularly stand out as worthy of analysis. They were considered as a necessary part of the new civilizing process associated with the reform age for the members of the elite in Meiji Japan and Ottoman Turkey during the nineteenth century—to dress, and live within a western context. Hence western culture gained new meanings—social and political in character—in the "outer" or "public" and "inner" or "private" spheres of their lives beyond the ordinary needs of practicality and personal taste.

But one suspects there was more depth to what happened than mere practicality and fashion, or even political reform symbolism. If the words of Norbert Elias may be applied to their historical experience, by the adoption of the cultural forms of other civilization, the Meiji Japanese and the Ottoman Turkish elite were reorganizing the cultural content of the rational and the emotive aspects of the individual's connection to society in immediate terms. 21/ Furthermore, the process was implanted upon an existing practice of what already constituted the civilized process in the nascent culture of each society with its own rational and emotive qualities. The result was eclectic combinations which were necessary for the survival of the individ-

ual.

Elias analyses in depth the emergence of civilized processes in Western Europe since the Middle Ages in the gradual emergence of the image of the human individual as rational which interacts with his/her inseparable emotive side. He traces the development of courtly culture, the control of a direct discharge of impulses, the gradual emphasis on sport and dance, and the development of a sense of civilized behavior in the form of rules of etiquette—as part of the history of the emergence of Western Europe. For Elias, these social and psychological changes molded the individual in the context of society that contests the ideal image of the modern individual in Western thought as a free being liberated from family and society. The emergence of the individual in social context with his or her inner consciousness was all part of the history of what for him was part of a civilizing process through social, economic, and political change which brought with it the “psychological” modifications necessary for the modern individual. This new image of “modern man” is an individual whose ties with society are permanently impaired and yet is also part of it as well. In the Elias typology, the Western European individual also has to live within the tension between the interconnected rational and the emotive sides to his/her mental nature and hopefully finds a modicum of balance within this perennial and rather ambivalent state of affairs. Elias is quite monolithic in his Euro-centered focus, for example he disregards the survival of definite differences in the more “emotive” Mediterranean personality of southern Europe and the more tension-ridden personality of the north which he assumes represents the West per se, and he is very superficial in his attempts to understand the individual in non-western cultures. 22/

However, it is clear that in such environments as those of Meiji Japan and Ottoman Turkey, individuals who were frequently the members of the elite felt for various reasons of politics and social life the need to familiarize themselves with components of western culture which in the end had to somehow shift the rational and emotive in their lives to fit the new complicated layers of differing lifestyles.

Meiji Japan

Dress and Hairstyle:

The Meiji history of western attire officially started with the 1872 Dajokan order for the adoption of western dress by government officials and soldiers and the members of the court. While the decree caused some consternation, western dress for the Meiji elite was symbolic for most of the Meiji era as representative of the policy of westernization. The first public portraits of the Emperor and the Empress in western dress appeared in 1872 as part of the official events to encourage the adoption of personal grooming and attire. The same year, the Empress appeared in public with natural eyebrows and gleaming white teeth “à la Européenne” in order to discourage the custom of shaving eyebrows and staining teeth that were the mark of a married beauty in upper class Tokugawa society. Meirokuzasshi, the main forum for the reformist intellectuals and statesmen of the era, are filled with essays by leading figures such as Mori Arinori, Kido Kōin in favor of the adoption of western

forms in personal grooming. 23/

The western image of the military and the bureaucracy represented no compromises to indigenous symbols. As far as the Japanese were concerned usage of the male dress in this context of reform was to be “exactly” like the West—in line with the official reform program based on the slogans of strengthening the military, enriching the economy, and civilization and enlightenment. All of these motives were tied to the persistent goal of revising the unequal treaties of 1858 and gain the status of equality as a nation. Interesting and practical adjustment was made to social reality, however. Japanese peasant boys hated to wear stiff military boots in service, hence were allowed to wear the comfortable straw sandals of Japanese peasants when on active duty. Boots were only required for ceremonies and actual fighting. 24/

While some of the measures taken by the new leaders did not create an immediate outcry, for example white teeth had almost automatic acceptance, for the Japanese of the early Meiji era a sensitive point of social and political symbolism was the hair styles of men and women. Early Meiji popular essays and pamphlets abound in comical depictions of the *chommage*—the proud chignon of the samurai versus the *jangiri*—a version of the Prussian crew cut or random cropping in popular parlance of the modern up to date Meiji young man. With the abolishing of samurai status together with the former feudal class distinctions in 1869, men’s hair-cuts had soon become mandatory. Seidensticker relates a popular ditty of the time “If you thump a *jangiri* head it sounds back Civilization and Enlightenment”. 25/

Women’s hairstyles were just as controvertial and focused on the debate whether women should give up the oily lacquered look of the Tokugawa court. Again the Meirokuzasshi journal writers abounds in articles by intellectual-reformer figures, mainly men, who hotly debated the issue of women’s hair. Women were complaining that the old style was unbearable. But the Japanese public strongly reacted to the mode when women poured out into the street with their tresses loose and freely flying about—the tresses interpreted to literally reveal the “looseness” of women. Government leaders were forced to ban the new styles. In the Meirokuzasshi debate one author who felt sorry for the plight of women sympathetically suggested perhaps the “poor creatures” should be allowed to wear a wig in public and leave their hair free and healthy at home. But short hair cuts—a risque fashion even by the standards of Europe in the nineteenth century—were definitely not to be allowed. Ultimately, the history of women’s hairstyles involved the foundation of an official guideline and a school for European styles adopted for Japanese women. 26/

By the late Meiji years Japanese women wore western hairstyles considered suitable for the kimono as many popular journals of the time recommended. By the Japanese victory of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, Edwardian fluffy chignons were fashionable in Japan, known as the 203 atama, the symbol of Hill 203 that was finally taken by Japanese troops after a long and arduous fight. Ironically, the chignon hairstyles of Japanese women today when they choose to wear a kimono as a traditional hairstyle appears to be a direct descendant of the western style reformist fashions of the Meiji era. 27/

For the Meiji Japanese elite, western dress and grooming were crucial as part of the

social and political changes to impress upon the westerners that Japan was civilized enough to warrant treaty revision in order to gain the status of equality. The process of civilization in personal context was therefore laden with a heightened political motive. The 1858 series of treaties with Western Powers had included the standard nineteenth century "unequal treaty" clauses of extraterritoriality and mandatory tariffs that gave special privileges to westerners, and were seen to have compromised Japanese sovereignty. Itō Hirobumi in particular together with Kido Kōin and Inoue Kowashi were at the forefront of the westernization policy for the upper class elite who were now to have direct interaction with westerners. 28/

The 1884 the *Rokumeikan*, The Deer Cry Pavillion which was established as a ball room entertainment club for Tokyo society can be seen as the stage where the experiment for the policy of westernization was to be acted out. Reading Tsuda Ume's letters to her American mother, one is struck with the whirl wind social flutter of the age. The "actors" were to be mainly the members of the newly formed aristocracy, especially women such as the Tsuda sisters who were brought up in America and were well versed in western lifestyles. They were to be particularly important in forming an amicable social environment with westerners resident in Tokyo. They were active in an unprecedented glittery social life of ball room dancing, teas, charity balls together with the western residents of Tokyo. The aristocratic women were even obliged not to refuse a dance offer from a foreign guest. The experiment in the 1880's was brief as sharp public criticism and the failure of the first attempt to revise the treaties, ended the ball dancing. Inoue Kowashi's ultimate goal in this policy of cultural westernization, however artificial as it may have seemed, was to create a common public sphere with the foreign residents of Tokyo as the social factors necessary for the political purpose of treaty revision. 29/

Sensitivity to western opinion and or approval was quite strong in this political motivation of the civilizing process. This can be seen especially in the controversy that arose concerning popular and or public images of women's attire. As far as the modern Japanese educational system was concerned, the *Mombushō* deemed that Japanese girls were to wear a version of the male *hakama* for school that created the image of the typically Meiji girl in chignon hairstyles with a part of the hair let loose, who went to school in a practical *hakama* with shoes. It might at first appear as if the Japanese women were in general not required to fit a singular mode of dress as much as men as they were not to be that directly involved in representing the modern image of Meiji Japan. Quite content with the reformed but still traditional role dictated for women as good housewives and wise mothers, women were to wear a version of the traditional kimono garb. But even the kimono sometimes reflected the interaction between Japanese sensibilities and western opinion on the matter. The Meiji kimono was a reformed version, because the colorful and brocaded Tokugawa women's kimono which meant for sailing about in palaces or homes, was not suitable for the public activity of the more middle class image of Meiji society. While remaining to be a symbol of Japanese femininity and beauty, even the kimono could not escape political and social concerns. So it was shortened somewhat with government injunctions of austerity and decorum that advised modest styles and

somber colors. 30/

The Tokugawa kimono which was the attire of the samurai/merchant classes and its risque variety worn by the famous beauties of the courtesan quarters had an elegant erotic air about it provided by the décolleté of a shapely long neck and a slight frontal opening of the long skirt which revealed the charming footsteps of a lady in motion. According to Chamberlain, western critics resident in Tokyo at the time disapproved of especially the slight frontal opening that revealed shapely feet or ankles. Meiji opinion that was against the Tokugawa kimono also had the agreement of local western opinion on the subject. Therefore, it became customary to wear the kimono wrapped firmly on the left hand side that allowed for comfort in walking and did not risk the erotic gait of the Tokugawa styles. 31/

However, there was a western style public image almost mandatory for elite women only. For Count Ito, the first prime minister of the country and the founder of the constitution of 1890, and his circle of reformist bureaucrats, women's western dress was associated with western education and advancement of women's position in society. Tsuda Ume's letters are filled with careful considerations about what type of dress to wear on each occasion. For her, western dress in particular was at least during her Meiji years commensurable with her official role as a teacher in the newly established School for Peeresses and as a young woman educated in the United States working for the improvement of the educational level of her countrywomen. The government shifted policies back and forth about the dress of the court women. Ume complains that with the demise of the "westernizers" such as Mori Arinori briefly in the 1890's, a new court dress inspired of the Heian costumes was made mandatory. But in a few years western dress again became the norm for the women of the newly formed aristocracy. 32/

Here again, western opinion is very interesting in terms of the intimate involvement westerners had with the way the Japanese conducted their reforms particularly in the cultural sphere, which will contrast with the psychological distance between westerners and the Ottoman reformist agenda, at least in issues such as dress. In the words of Chamberlain again, westerners urged their Japanese friends to give up this experiment of western style fashions for women as the kimono was so much more becoming. As is well known, Pierre Loti, the French romantic naval officer cum man of letters-adventurer, who was an observer of both the Japanese, and Ottomans to whom he became deeply attached, was more cruel in his comments. In contrast to Tsuda Ume's comments, he was overwhelmed with the image of the Empress and her ladies in waiting who appeared in an official gathering with the crisp spartan image of Heian court attires and laequered hair left flowing in their backs like the "wings of a bird". Even Mrs. Clearidge the first lady of the President of the United States wrote a letter imploring that the Japanese women not ruin their health by the horrible custom of European corsets. The outcry of the western residents of Japan now socializing with the Japanese elite seems to have has something to do with the demise of the policy as well as the better known conservative reaction on part of the Japanese public to women wearing revealing gowns in such affairs as the Rokumeikan balls. 33/

In sum, the Meiji elite's experimentation with western attire as a cultural form resulted in the eclectic combination of using Japanese and Western forms side by side for the same function, or, separately to serve different functions in state and society. The dress adventure of the Meiji Japanese reflects numerous aspects of this eclectic pattern that formed what was seen as the civilizing process of the nineteenth century.

The dual character of *Wa* and *Yō* or Japanese and Western in the eclecticism within the civilizing process stands out as the familiar pattern to student's of Japanese history.

While this dual pattern of eclecticism is frequently interpreted as having brought a degree of flexibility, and stability to the Japanese encounter with western culture, in reality the public sphere of attire was dictated by a significant degree of inflexibility. Writers have usually noted how as time progressed a pattern prevalent until the early decades even after the Second World War emerged: western dress at work-Japanese dress at home that may have helped the cultural sensibilities of the Japanese public's confrontation with an alien culture that helped "placate" the psychological stresses suffered during "modernization" by being able to be "Japanese" at home. The 1930's publications on Japan imbued with the schematization of Japanese ideology of that time liked to present an image of Japanese men as European at the work place-Asiatic at home with the kimono. Late Meiji photographs of statesmen such as Ito posing with his family as a genial patriarch in Japanese costume signify this separation of the Japanese to the "inner" sanctum of private-family-personal life, and the delegation of complete western attire to the "outer" public sphere. 34/

In reality it would appear from the continuation of intensive controversy about the matter in the politically engage elite world, each category in itself was quite inflexibly ordained as they were loaded with political symbolism. Lebra notes the families of the aristocratic women of Meiji Japan had to provide for a *juni-hitoe*, a Japanese court dress designed from 10th century Heian originals, and a robe *décoltée*, formal western gown with a tiara as part of their dowry. The general public was certainly freer in its eclectic combinations of this duality with a motley of attires ranging from the combination of a bowler hat with a kimono, but as one moved up the social scale the *Wa* and *Yō* categories of dress as with many other elements became quite rigid and public. 35/

For the politically engage, public image strictly dictated the choice of dress. The very conservative for example doggedly insisted on pure Japanese attire and confronted with the complete western outfit, the *haikara*, or "high collar" morning coat of the reformers who were bent on westernization. Sometimes, however, it was not the sharp difference in political vision but rather preferences of political style that dictated choice of the male *hakama* over the Meiji *haikara*, or the morning coat, which was the typical attire of the government official. Fukuzawa Yukichi who was the most famous liberal and pro western culture educator, intellectual of Japan usually wore a *hakama* which was hardly a symbol of conservatism for him. In his case as with many other intellectuals who were more in the opposition and chose to remain as private and independent critics of government policies, the *hakama* would

seem to be Fukuzawa's implicit rejection of the formal government officials image in morning coat grooming.

Just how loaded with political meaning was the usage of Japanese or Western dress for the elite is clear from the preference for Japanese male dress by the politically ambitious nationalists of the new rising middle class, or the "second Meiji generation", around the turn of the century. Ironically, many of them were brought up in the western style schools of the new age. Major intellectual figures of the-day such as Tokutomi Sohō severely criticized the Meiji bureaucracy as insipid and wavering over the Treaty Revision issue and the Japanese irredentist claims in Asia. Some of them also distained the official Western garb of the Meiji elite. The declaration of the parliamentarian Sasaki Tomijū, to Abdurresid Ibrahim, a Tatar-Turk from Russia who was visiting Japan in 1908, is very clear about the meaning of dress in the Asianist politic of the day. Commenting on the Japanese victory against Russia, Sasaki points out frankly that now Japan had achieved equality among the world nations i.e the West, thus, "we the Japanese can dispense with wearing the Western morning coat and its trappings and proudly wear our manly *hakama* again". 36/

Home

The same pattern of dual eclecticism applied to the Japanese home. Observers of Meiji social history frequently note that partially due to the scarcity of space, partially to governmental policy that preferred national priorities over a direct improvement of living standards which arose very gradually, most Japanese experienced the transition from the Tokugawa to Meiji Japan in small Japanese style households which used a few instrumental western components such as a desk for school age children, perhaps a radio. The inside of the house, which was somewhat flimsily built especially in the new urban areas, meant a lifestyle of taking off shoes and living in multifunctional rooms covered with tatami, or, rice mat flooring, and the toilet facilities may have been constructed outside. Many houses did not have private bathroom facilities and public bathhouses provided these services for the general population.

The Japanese house also reflected the Japanese family lifestyle of separate branch households that lived as small families who did not require large homes. Legally and socially the branch households were united under the administration of the main branch continued by the eldest son of the larger family unit or the extended family system known with the term *ie*. With the new Civil code 1898, the Meiji family system accomodated individual rights to private property and firmly established monogamy as the form of legal marriage, but it also subjected members to the legal supervision of the main branch head of the *ie* who was responsible for the conduct of religious rites to the ancestors as well as most tasks that pertained to the marriage, legal issues, social behavior, inheritance questions of subordinate branch households with female members and younger sons. 37/

While branch household members were dependent on the legal rights of the main branch, however, they usually did not live together and frequently there was a separation of economic assets and property between the different branches before the

death of the patriarch of the main branch. This meant that houses which tended to be relatively small were expected to serve the needs of separate households though members of the older generation would tend to live with the eldest and his bride.

The elite who built beautiful Western style mansions in Tokyo such as the Iwasaki mansion or the residence of Count Itō and others had the space and means to build large residences with many rooms that reflected best the concerns of the elite in terms of cultural lifestyles. Hence in their case therefore the practicality and poverty argument does not apply to their choices which were clearly cultural although elite families, which may have tended to have a larger number of people too tended to live as independent households.

In elite homes, there was the inner rooms of the house decorated and arranged in informal Japanese style where the family lived and relaxed that frequently added a sprinkling of western components such as an armchair for the father of the family, a desk, or a radio later on, and the beautiful drawers for the lady of the house. In the case of an intellectual as many pictures of the age show, this "inner" sanctum had frequently meant the chaotic stacks of books, mementos, a brazier for warmth, pillows, a working table, western style lamps in a tatami floor. Tsuda Ume, the pioneer in women's education who had been brought up in America as one of the select female students sent with the Iwakura mission in 1872 describes the inner sanctum area in her home in Tokyo sprinkled with a mixture of Japanese and western furnishings. She also describes a similar informal Japanese quarters in the upstairs of Count Itō's family residence where she lived for a while as an instructress to his wife and daughter. She complains that it was hard to keep order in the back rooms of her father's home and hoped that guests would not see the mess. In many households of the elite there was a tendency toward sexual segregation as well that carried over from Tokugawa practice. Lebra discusses the division of the houses of the aristocracy in Tokyo between *omote*, "public-exterior" rooms primarily the domain of men and the *oku*, "private-interior" that was the domain of women. An exception to this rule of segregation was however the privileged position of the male head of the household. Here, among the male family members, only the head of the household had the liberty to use the most outer spheres of the "public" rooms, the *soto*, or the "outside" sections of the public area which frequently served as office space as well, and also the most interior, or, *ura*, rooms of the female domain due to his role as the father and husband of the family. 38/

If the inner rooms can be termed as the private informal spaces of the home used for daily contact and sleeping, the public space of the elite residences were usually split into two; one in pure western form, the *yōkan*, the other in pure Japanese form, *Nihonkan*. In the Iwasaki mansion built by the most famous entrepreneur family of Meiji Japan who built the Mitsubishi group of companies, there were grandly decorated Western style rooms used for entertainment and official visits frequently with the implication that there would be foreign guests. Tsuda Ume's father had added a parlor to their residence in Tokyo after she came home from America where she held afternoon tea gathering and entertained her Japanese and foreign guests. In the Itō residence, the family preferred to have dinner in the western style dining room

downstairs which were very jolly occasions for the young Ume. Count Itō also entertained foreign and Japanese friends here as well in parties attended by Saigō Takamori and other important figures of the period.

On the other hand, many of these elite homes also made sure that there was a pure Japanese room arranged in studied simplicity with an heirloom vase or painting in the alcove. This Japanese room was again part of the public space of the home meant to represent an official image. It was commonly used for serious family gatherings, performance of the classical Japanese arts, or to entertain a distinguished Japanese or foreign guest, who was known to be familiar with Japanese ways. 39/

The western and the Japanese public formal rooms carried appropriate cultural symbolism for the users. When Count Itō entertained friends in the context of Tsuda Ume, the western room is used often on these occasions which transpired around the 1890's. On the other hand a few years later Ibrahim, the Tatar visitor who now visits Itō in his residence in 1908, was ushered into the formal Japanese room with a *tokonoma*, the ceremonial alcove. 40/ Perhaps it was considered more appropriate to receive this Central Asian visitor who had just arrived from Siberia via Vladivostok with an Asianist agenda in mind in an Asian-style Japanese room.

The three types of rooms in an elite Meiji home represent a perfect symbolism of what the Meiji elite tried to realize in their reform programs. The pure West image in the parlor and the dining room as with the western dress of the elite women and men on formal occasions represented the Meiji effort to be exactly like the West on a public and formal plane in order to gain equality. One dressed appropriate to the image of the room to be used for a formal occasion. Again Tsuda Ume complains how she was forced to change quickly into her western gown from her kimono which she wore when upstairs because Count Itō in an impromptu manner had asked for her to join a party being held in the western style dining room downstairs. In contrast, the pure Japanese formal room adhered to the image of an unadulterated Japaneseness, perhaps reminiscent of Shintō ceremonies and shrines which did not amalgamate western culture in any overt form. 41/

Finally, the "personally real" mixture of the two elements in a confused but comforting fashion in the private inner rooms reflected the daily amalgam of the western and the Japanese in the daily lives of the Japanese. In contrast to the "pure" Japanese/Western rooms, this, "third sphere" was an informal eclecticism which combined in an amalgam both cultural elements in a non-structural and seemingly haphazard and comparatively confused manner. Yet, this confused or informal mixture which was neither pure Japanese nor pure Western clearly offered more sanctuary to the more "private" side of a person. The accounts of Ume and Lebra's aristocratic families, indicate that it was in these inner rooms of mixed element that individuals allowed for themselves the expression of emotive feelings and sensibilities in a freer and relaxed manner. Apropos Elias, the emotive aspect of the Japanese individual self image was at liberty in the culturally "impure" and "undefined" cultural combinations of the inner rooms, whereas the rational self image was allowed to operate in the formal dualistic eclecticism of the Meiji "public" image which was split into western and Japanese compartments.

The Meiji elite's use of western culture close to their person in dress and home represents a solution to the problem of multi-cultural existence with western culture—the *Wa* (Japanese) and *Yō* (Western) pattern. Outwardly, the “Japanese” method of cultural dualism appears to have solved the problem of having to live with western culture as a formal public image but one suspects that large areas of tension remained for the individual. Perhaps it was not so much the ability to live “Japanese style” per se that offered a sense of security and emotional comfort to a Meiji individual as has been frequently claimed, for to be pure Japanese also entailed a formal act in the domain of rationality even in the privacy of one's home. Rather, it was the nondescript hodgepodge “inner room” combinations without any clear definition that allowed for relaxation and the ability to be “natural” and live out one's “emotive” side.

Etiquette:

Nothing brings out this problem of the rational and the emotive in a cultural context more than the Meiji dictates on public propriety, manners, and etiquette. As with many other issues, Meiji governmental orders dictated a new set of public morals and propriety for the general public directly through various public rules of behavior or more indirectly through national education. Some of the concern for a new set of Meiji norms of manners and public behavior was influenced by western cultural norms that was taken as “civilized behavior”. The Meiji leaders were very sensitive about foreigners making fun of them and sometimes the authorities encouraged new forms of public propriety to make Japan acceptable to the nineteenth century self-centered westerner as “civilized”. “So foreigners will not laugh at you” was written on many tablets in public spaces to inculcate the new image of Japanese society. Phallic statues used in the fertility faith of Japanese peasants were razed down because it was immoral or uncivilized in the new westernized Japan. Workers in Tokyo could not go about in loincloths and had to wear Happi coats. 42/

Manners and etiquette books of the nineteenth century reflected some of the *Wa Yō* solution and some of its problems. Etiquette or *Reigi* in Japanese society carried a very important weight in the socialization of the individual to society as part of the civilizing process. Based on the Chinese Confucian teaching on the matter, etiquette was seen as the reflection of the moral fortitude and virtue of an individual as well as the means with which he or she could relate to society via specific rules of conduct according to the hierarchy of a social relation.

Etiquette rules which were quite detailed and complicated, were developed by the Kyoto court aristocracy, the *kuge*, from Chinese teaching. With the ascent of the warrior samurai class to power, the *kuge* passed the tradition of courtly etiquette to the warrior class during the Muromachi age of the 15th century. By the end of the Tokugawa age, *kuge* and samurai manners had spread to the wealthy members of commoners from the merchant and peasant class with cultural sensibilities. While many schools of etiquette existed, the Ogasawara *ryū* or *école* was the most dominant during the Tokugawa period known for its subdued elegance and style. 43/

During the Meiji period, one of the early concerns of the elite was to devise a new

school of etiquette that would be suitable for a wider public to help national integration in a population that had lived quite separate cultural lives and had developed divergent forms of behavior ranging from the rough rustic manners of the average peasant to the stylish dandified etiquette of the late Tokugawa urban samurai of Edo. The major problem was to adapt some of Tokugawa feudal etiquette to the needs of a socially more mobile and international Meiji society. The Meiji *Reigi* was devised to be a fairly uniform standard for the nation as opposed to the class distinctions of the feudal era. But, the authors of the new *Reigi* books also reflected a strong intention to reinforce the familiar norms of propriety according to social and sexual hierarchy.

There was a prolific outpouring of manners and etiquette books that reflected an avid public interest in suitable etiquette for the age of civilization and enlightenment. The Meiji era was a time of new horizons in the social aspirations of many after the abolishment of the hereditary class divisions of the feudal era. And many etiquette books were obviously geared for a public that was making a swift transition from their previous social status under the hereditary class divisions of Tokugawa society to a contemporary one with much more fluid delineations between commoners, gentry, and aristocracy. Many etiquette books were published to provide new guidelines for schools, the new middle class, the Meiji aristocracy, the Meiji bride, and so on.

The numerous reprints of the Ogasawara guidelines which were adapted to Meiji needs, revealed the Wa and Yō of the nineteenth century Japanese individual in ethical and social terms as well as in manners. The texts divided the world of etiquette into two—that of Wa which usually covered a major portion of the text. Sometimes this was the central portion of the page. The second section—that of the Yō or the western section was usually a much smaller appendix in the back or a thinner column at the top of the page. 44/ The Japanese section of the Ogasawara texts described the importance of social harmony and the consistency of morality and form in the classical Chinese, *Li*, or *Rei* concept. Special emphasis was given to describing the three seated bows, *shin*, *gyō*, *sō* which in that order paid respects to persons of higher, equal, and lower status. *Reigi* texts described daily life in detail from the manners of arranging dinner tables to attending festivals and the appropriate decorations in the home for each season and festival. Etiquette in married life described in detail the ways in which the wife was to show deference to the husband and his family members. A wise woman should spend at least an hour or so for her make up and grooming otherwise she might loose her husband warned one textbook. 45/

The new age required new forms of body behavior. Etiquette books had to grapple with the challenge of devising a standing etiquette that had not been an issue in Tokugawa days when propriety was restricted to seated positions on the tatami. Thus, the familiar Japanese standing bow was devised with gradations according to status in line with the classical sitting prostrations. 46/ The Meiji *reigi* for brides showed how one could bow while standing in a room with European furniture while wearing a kimono.47/ School textbooks were concerned with the manners of

general conduct as well as specific ceremonial gestures that served the needs of how the nation was to perform bodily expressions of obedience and respect to symbols of the state such as the flag. One school text illustrated in detail how students were to be instructed to advance a prescribed number of steps forward and pay their respects to the Emperor's portrait by raising their arms up straight in 45 degree angles with their eyes lowered to the floor. 48/ Most elementary school *reigi* texts also cautioned the reader about the separation of girls and boys in school activities, and explained different manners for each that enforced sexual hierarchy. 49/

In most of these texts, western manners were always included as part of the *bunmei kaika* agenda of Meiji reforms. A typical introduction to an etiquette book usually explained the need in terms of now that Japan was part of a competitive world of rivalry among nations and the international world, knowledge of western manners was necessary for the progress of the country. One text warned that while Japan may win a lot of battles, she will be doomed to loose all at the conference table by a lack of knowledge etiquette, for Western Powers use etiquette as a tool in war and competition. 50/ While many texts managed to posit etiquette in the political agenda of nation-building and gaining equal status with the West, some books which were meant more for the members of the aristocracy wrote in a more congenial manner. One such text with Count Okuma's introduction discusses how etiquette and good breeding are important for social interaction and conviviality, citing the teachings of Lord Chesterfield whose writings on manners were quite de rigueur for upper class British society. 51/

The etiquette books usually limited instruction in western manners to the handshake, wearing appropriate clothes for various occasions, how to eat properly at the table for example not to slurp one's soup, and a few other topics that advised proper behavior during brief encounters with westerners in their homes, or at dinner parties and so on. Special advise was given to the "ladies first culture of westerners". Japanese men were advised not to show their anger when western women are present. Proper manners for a western style marriage was described with the comment that marriage in the West was based on love and courtship that were peculiar customs. The reader is warned this is neither similar nor appropriate to the tradition of arranged marriage customary for Japanese couples.

After treaty revision at the end of the nineteenth century, nationalism also creeps into some etiquette textbooks. The Meiji 32, *Meiji reishiki* book argues against the "recent" opinions that claim it is no longer necessary to imitate the manners of those round eyed and red haired foreigners.

In contrast to the brief accounts of popular *reigi* books on western manners, the books for the aristocracy and the upper class elite had much more detail. It is clear that the authors assumed only the upper classes would have prolonged interaction with westerners and therefore detailed knowledge of their manners was crucial. Here texts for the women of the new Meiji aristocracy seem to carry special importance as in the example of the *reigi* book used in the School for Peeresses, which had the most voluminous discussion of western courtly manners including a rather detailed section on its history since the middle ages. 52/ Aristocratic elite women

in Meiji Japan were expected to know everything about the Ogasawara school but they were also expected to know in great detail the fine points of western courtly manners including the various dances to be performed at evening balls, and the manners of high tea.

The issue that remains unanswered in this fascinating body of literature on manners is where the morality of ethics fits with respect to western manners. While there is no explicit choice expressed in the books themselves, it would seem from the *reigi* texts that the *Wa Yō* dual eclecticism of manners delineated morality and ethics to be operative primarily in the *Wa* world of etiquette where each gesture revealed a certain virtue of sociability and morality. In every case the *Wa* etiquette was shown to be appropriate solely in a Japanese moral and social setting, whereas the *Yō* etiquette was to be used only with foreigners who were out of the Confucian setting of *reigi*.

One can imagine the dilemma this world of eclecticism offered for many individuals ranging from giving way to one's wife only when she was in western dress to a more profound issue of how to envision a stage of individual and civic morality in western style etiquette form that was prescribed for foreigners only when it was only the Japanese etiquette forms that dealt with the relation between etiquette and morality.

Ottoman Turkey

Dress and headgear:

Politics of dress starts in the Ottoman empire in the early years of the nineteenth century as part of the reforms of Mahmut II and the Tanzimat order of 1836 with the adoption of the European male dress coupled with the Ottoman headgear the "*fez*" for soldiers and state employees during the reign of Mahmut II. By 1874, Edmondo de Amici observed that old fashioned Turks continued to wear versions of the old turban and flowing robes, the kaftan, and especially religious men, the Islamic scholars ulema continued to dress traditionally. But, he notes that the Tanzimat, or the New Order Turks wore an Istanbulin *redingot*, an adaptation of the French word for the European tunic like the Meiji *haikara* was for "high collar", and had only kept the *fez*, as a distinct Ottoman headgear. The red maroon colored cap called the *fez* has a curious history reflective of this age of reform. Officially adopted as the headgear of the dynasty in the 1820's, the *fez* was said to have been inspired of possibly the north African or perhaps the Greek headgears in the empire. Sultan Mahmut II abolished the Janissary elite military corp of the Sultans since the 15th century, with draconian measures and established the new western style army who were at the same time given a very traditionalist Islamic name the *Asakir-i-Muhammediye*, "the soldiers of Muhammad". So was the traditional tall headgear and baggy trousers of the Janissaries which were supposed to have added a ferocious and dramatic affect as the elite corp marched to battle, replaced by the new western style uniforms for the new army that was to train in western style military science. It was designed to complement the new western style military uniforms which now replaced the tall headgear and baggy trousers of the Janissary elite military corp of

the Sultans since the 15th century who were abolished with the draconian measures of the reformist sultan. 53/

The *fez* was not simply a symbol of being a muslim, however, in an empire that had through long standing custom been based on the special political privileges of the Ottoman muslim elite and the military power of the Ottoman elite corp and the Turkish soldiers. By the middle of the nineteenth century the non muslim subjects of the empire such as urban Greeks and Armenians frequently chose to wear completely western outfits with a European hat. However, the non muslim elite who now had the chance with the new reforms of the 1820's and 30's to enter into the higher echelons of Ottoman service also insistantly wore a *fez*, which reflects the dynastic and elitist symbolism of the gear beyond its religious connotations. 54/

In contrast to the Ottoman reformist Pasha, the military and bureaucratic rank comparable to a General or top civilian administrator, the second generation Young Turks who were to become the opposition movement that organized the Young Turk revolution of 1908, had even discarded the *Istanbulin* tunic. Preferring European jaket and trousers, dainty small ties, the new intellectual figures of opposition cut a dandy figure with their walking sticks and carnations on their lapels. According to T. Gautier, by the end of the century there was even a museum of old attires convened in the mosque of Ahmet III known as the Blue Mosque which displayed 140 mannequins with former Janissary, Pasha attires. Thus the Ottoman experience with western male dress, became a permanent fixture of the emergent secular minded reformist elite in and outside of government, except for the headgear which was the sensitive area of controversy comparable to the Japanese debate over male hair-cuts as symbols of reform. 55/

In the case of the Ottoman Turkish male elite, what strikes one is the obsessive controversy over the European hat that was associated as a last draw of iconoclastic reformism that is reminiscent of the controversy over samurai top-knots and women's hair in Meiji Japan. By the early twentieth century, Turkish nationalists wore a fur cap inspired of Caucasian styles the so-called Enverite fur cap, instead of the 'old-fashioned' *fez* of the older elite that they had overthrown in the coup-based revolution of 1908. Those who were even more reform minded took the daring step of wearing a European hat especially when out of the country as it was prohibited by Sultan Abdulhamit II, the despotic modernist ruler of the last three decades before the 1908 revolution. The bowler hat was a symbol of defiance, but it was also a convenient means to blend into the crowd to escape the spies of Abdulhamit in the streets of Paris. 56/

The prevalent use of a distinct nascent headgear by the Ottomans throughout this age and the controversy over the European hat reveals the symbolic nature of Ottoman reforms in a sea of western oriented laws, edicts that transformed Ottoman polity profoundly from what it was before the nineteenth century. The western dress plus the *fez* reflected the typical Ottoman approach at this time of using western cultural elements and ideas as supportive components to Ottoman polity. The official ideology was not to incur an official process of westernization, unlike the early Meiji reformers, but to strengthen the empire in its own indigenous character.

The ideal of Ottomanism, though it failed in the long run, was to have an empire, albeit with some strong Islamic colors, constituting of the many religious communities who had been declared to be equal under law to muslims by the nineteenth century reform edicts of 1839 and 1858.

A photograph Tevfik Pasha, the ambassador to the court of St. James in London in 1912, together with ambassadors from Europe and Japan, reflects this eclectic mixture to maintain the status quo in a stronger and firmer state. In the photograph, Tevfik Pasha wears his *Fez* in addition to his uniform of protocol that distinguishes his attire from the other ambassadors including the Japanese ambassador who is in pure European style. 57/

By the Kemalist republican revolution of 1923 that rejected every eclectic mixture which the Ottomans had devised, the fez was banned as a symbol of the break with Islamic theocracy. But it can be argued that the issue was actually dynastic.

The *fez* experience reveals very conveniently the pattern of Ottoman eclecticism which envisioned a symbiotic amalgam of western culture and the nascent forms as a combined public image. The pure Western imagery of the Meiji elite that was balanced with the pure Japanese one was not attempted in the Ottoman case. The dynasty and the bureaucratic-military elite saw western culture as an irrevocable component to the Ottoman entity of the empire's reform that however did not favor a program of complete westernization.

A similar process can be recognized in female attire with however the distinction that Ottoman elite women were not expected to be symbols of westernization as public images in the sense of the Meiji elite women. The nineteenth century transformation of Ottoman female attire in Istanbul, the urban capital where most of the elite families lived, entailed first the discarding of the so-called Oriental *salvar*, or baggy pants and the three skirted flowing household dress, *üçetek*, which are familiar forms in the Orientalist oil-paintings by European artists such as Delacroix, Matisse and others. In place of the traditional house attire, Ottoman women privately adopted the nineteenth century European dress at home with the puffy skirts, the thin waisted corsets, and the chignon hairstyle. The Tanzimat lady of the nineteenth century wore the same fashions as the Meiji elite women of Tokyo except that she had to do it at home and not in public. 58/

Public life for Ottoman women dictated the requirement to wear a long skirted veil which covered practically every part of the body to fit the strict rules of covering required of muslim women. Yet, during this age while Ottoman elite women wore the veil whenever they were in public, even this garb of religious modesty and seclusion ended up being westernized. According to Seni, the veil was transformed to resemble the European women's coats as a public garb. By the late 1800's, the imperial government was forced to issue a series of edicts which had little effect, admonishing the Istanbulite women who were flaunting risqué veils that incurred the criticism of the muslim populace. Still the women insistently wore public garbs that looked more like coats and their faces were covered just so with a transparent silk veil.

Late nineteenth century and early twentieth century Ottoman women's magazines

of Istanbul reflect the transitions in the transformation of female attire. The ideal is the high-browed Edwardian lady with her loosely put up chignon, the 203 *atama* of Japanese women after the Russo-Japanese war of 1905, who stood graceful and erect in her excruciatingly corseted thin waist and long skirts. 59/ For the women of the Young Turk Revolution, a simpler middle class ideal was preferred perhaps reflective of the nationalist and mass oriented ideology of this group. The politically active women of the Young Turk organization such as Halide Edip, though from Istanbul elite circles, preferred the spartan look of a black veil much shorter than the garbs of the Ottoman ladies and her face usually uncovered even in public. 60/

By the late 1910's, the Turkist urban veil transforms itself into a quasi flapper demi-monde skirt and short hairstyles and becomes the stuff of "national fashions" as a popular journal of the day declared. The revolutionary Young Turk government in 1908 was forced to use military measures to control public attacks especially on educated muslim women who poured out into the streets after the declaration of the Constitution. There was an enraged male public outcry over women who now went about with their arms and legs naked and dared to even "talk" to men directly in the streets. 61/

At home where the western dress which was by now the permanent attire of the Ottoman elite women also underwent middle class modifications with the Young Turks. The mother figure in an education journal of the day is shown at home in a simple long western style dress with none of the frivolity of the Pasha ladies. The Young Turk woman suffices with a kerchief tied around her hair much like her contemporaries in Eastern Europe that serves as her modest head cover when entertaining relatives and friends at home. 62/

Compared to the male dress, the Ottoman and Turkish Republican controversy over women's attire is even more intense as it became part of the reform agenda which abolished in 1926 Islamic law together with the Christian and Jewish religious legal prerogatives with respect to marriage and family, that had served as the multi-legal basis for the complex customary civil code of the empire. By the early years of the 1923 Republic, it was clear that the modicum of veil left over from the gradual dress transformation in the ranks of the elite would be a symbol of the "half-baked eclectic Ottoman reforms which had failed". Nor surprisingly, the Kemalist leadership made an issue of banning the veil for the female government employees of the Republican state, who were expected to serve the cause of Revolution. Women in complete western dress now became symbols of pure westernization policies on par with the nineteenth century elite women of Meiji Japan. The difference however was that the republican revolutionary guard under the leadership of the first president Kemal Ataturk had made a permanent irrevocable choice of official public attire that symbolized westernization as the only road to Turkish modernization via secularism and state leadership. 63/

In comparison to the Japanese form of an eclecticism of duality, the Ottoman use of western cultural forms for women during the nineteenth century was again eclectic but of a different symbiotic quality than that for Ottoman men. The veil and the western dress were not interchangeable. Women were free to wear whatever they

wanted at home, but the public mores dictated that they had to wear the veil in public with its religious-political symbolism. The use of western dress at home however, represented what seems to be a collective trend for members of the elite in the transformation of the cultural identity at home in their private lives. The photographs of Ottoman royal women from the dynasty and their circle of elite women from the bureaucratic families shows us the full scale adoption of European fashions. But unlike the Meiji aristocracy who had similar pictures taken which were also used as public images, similar photographs of Ottoman princesses in tiara and gown were for the private eyes of only very close family members and had no public meaning ascribed to them. It was as late as 1910 that Kadriye Ihsan the secretary to the Ottoman Women's Association was to be the first woman, in veil of course, to allow her photograph to be published in the press. 64/

The use of western dress more liberally at home in privacy especially with respect to mixed company reveals that the self-perception of Ottoman Turkish men and women as progressives occurred first in the private realm of the family. Obviously, the public realm of reform did not allow for complete expression of westernization in dress in line with the more traditionalist quality to the reform program. Needless to say Ottoman women did not join balls and receptions in palaces *à la Rokumeikan*, as well. However, the Dolmabahçe, the new European style palace of the Sultan's which was built during the nineteenth century in Istanbul, has a curious clouded glass partition in the ball room that reflects the uneasiness which the partial westernization choice created sometimes. The Ottoman royal women and their entourage who were dressed in their European finery but "safely" beyond European sight, were allowed to sit in this concealed separate corner away from the public eye of the local and foreign dignitaries, while they could enjoy listening to the music and the conversations in the ball room.

Ironically, while Islamic dictates were very strict about the behavior and dress of men and women in public, religious custom left the individual free at home where cultural choices could be made with much more freedom. As long as one wore a veil in public, it did not matter what one wore under the veil, or so it seemed at the time.

Home:

The invasion of western cultural forms into the privacy of the Ottoman household is reflected in the adoption of western furniture and subsequent subtle changes in the inner arrangement of the rooms as well as interior decoration in elite urban houses during the same period. Duben discusses the character of the Ottoman Turkish family as a segmental structure of households which together constitute an extended family. Compared to the Japanese extended family where even for elite families separate branches tended to set up their own households, in the Ottoman arrangement most subordinate households usually of the sons tended to live with the patriarch of the family under the same roof, which meant that these homes had to accommodate fairly large populations of sons and their families plus the servants and other dependent members.

In many ways, the arrangement of the home reflected the same household segmentation on a physical plane. Each household member of usually a conjugal family of married children, elders, or unmarried close relatives lived in independent rooms that surrounded the main living room, or the sofa or the "head room" or *bas oda* as it was called. This was where the family members congregated. Similar to the multifunctional character of Japanese *tatami* rooms, the household rooms were multifunctional and flexible in use, serving as the quarters for day and night for each conjugal family or single or widowed relative and servants. The individual *oda*, or rooms were flexible units and could be added or subtracted pending transitions in the extended family. Not interconnected to each other through corridors, the rooms represented the privacy of the individual members as a household and at the same time their equal subordination to the male patriarch who had the prerogative of using the main living room. 65/

The living room was the public space of the home where visitors were entertained that compared to the *tokonoma* room in the *nihonkan*, the Japanese section, or the public dining room or parlor in the *yōkan*, Western section of an elite Japanese house of the Meiji period. Similar to the male character of the "*omote*" or the public rooms in the Meiji elite homes, the Ottoman sofa was also the place for the male gatherings of family and friends in a society that practiced the rules of sexual segregation which were perceived to be according to the customs of Islam. In Istanbul and Anatolian houses the living room was, therefore, also called the *selamlık* or the male quarters as opposed to the inner rooms, named the *harem*, where the women were dominant. Hence both in private homes as well as in the Istanbul palaces, there were clear cut divisions between the harem, the private quarters for women, and the public spaces were reserved for males only. Even nineteenth century Istanbul villas based on European designs tried to adapt to social mores in this respect and had an extra room in the interior that served as the *harem* for the women which could be visited only by the immediate male relatives of the family. In this sense, the practice of sexual segregation by the Ottoman families and their adaptation of architectural designs to that end were somewhat similar to the practice of sexual segregation among elite Meiji and Taisho families in room use as noted by Lebra. 66/

European furniture infiltrated elite homes during the nineteenth century with some adjustments. By the end of the century for most elite homes the use of furniture was quite prevalent in all the rooms. Sleeping habits changed for example as massive beds, brass or mahogany was recommended, replaced the traditional custom of spreading out mattresses and quilts of the floor similar to the Japanese style. Hence the multifunctional quality of the rooms declined as they became permanent bedrooms.

If one applies Elias to the Ottoman environment in this case, and sees the home as a reflection of an individual's perception of rationality and emotive sensibilities, one aspect of the European style interior of the Ottoman home was that as Ottoman Turkish family members lived in a culture which enjoyed communality. Therefore, the European chairs, and sofas were lined close to the walls of the rooms facing

inward to a common communal space. In a culture where communal conversation and deference to the patriarch prevailed, arranging separate sets of seats that would have to face each other back to back as frequently shown in the fashion journals of the time was unthinkable. In the European style palace Dolmabahçe that was built during the nineteenth century, the Sultan's imposing armchair took the central position in any given reception room with other chairs, which were leaned against the walls and lined in a circle, emanating toward the left and right of the Sultan's seat. What strikes the observer of this decorative arrangement is not so much the obvious deference shown to the Sultan's seat which is central and with the others facing it, but rather that the communal circular form of seat arrangement was preferred for the chairs of subordinates. Instead of having the ruler sit alone and supreme facing a hierarchy of subjects seated in front of him, in each room of the new European style palace his chair is placed in the middle of a familial form of arrangement as that of a patriarch. 67/

The intrusion of new ideals in human relations also made itself quite apparent in the Ottoman elite household environment. The Ottoman home was an active arena to practice the desire of progress as many accounts of the nineteenth century show. The nineteenth century home was frequently the first arena to break the strict segregation of men and women in Islam. Thus as in the case of the veil, Ottoman households had become the space where intermingling between the sexes, unveiled women in western clothing who were frequently being educated for the first time in a western curriculum in addition to the traditional subjects of religion, and the ambitious sons imbued with the ideas of progress and reform, had to face the existent authority of the patriarch—a combination that surely carried the potential for confrontation and conflict. 64/ During the nineteenth century Istanbul elite families started visiting close friends as mixed couples, diluting the male domain character of the *Selamlık* or the male public quarters of houses. By the turn of the century, women's magazines illustrated living room arrangements which were clearly no longer for just male friends but indicated the gradual transformation of the original *Selamlık* or the male quarters into the formal living room, or the *salon* of Turkish homes today, from the French term which was adapted into Turkish at the time. This was the public room assigned for entertainment and visitors which was furnished with the most expensive status symbols of the family with western furniture. The former male quarters, now the salon living room, had become a public space of sexual integration where men as well as women and reserved to present the best formal image of the family to society. 68/

One can sense that the transition in the Ottoman home to the "Europeanized" salon became the center of tension similar to the parlors and the *tokonoma* rooms of Meiji elite homes that required formal public behavior. Ayata sees the salon as the domain of a psychological tension for family members even today; You have to be on your best behavior, dress properly, and minding European-inspired manners. The salon therefore has continued to conflict with the relaxed, informal, emotional, and warm inner self of the individual family members. It is noteworthy that for their emotional relaxation, Ottoman family members who underwent this transition to the

salon still continued to use the inner rooms that derived from the harem as the domain of intimate and relaxed behavior and relations. Ayata notes that whereas the salon is arranged in communal style with the best European style furniture, similar to the patriarchal arrangement of the nineteenth century palaces, the inner rooms in present-day houses, which are frequently called the "sitting rooms" are decorated mainly with a functional purpose in mind with European style furniture or possibly a more distinct Turkish style of a raised bedding next to the wall looking out the window, of less quality and attention. It is in this inner domain however without a clear-cut public image of any claim that one can sit relaxed and free from the dictates of etiquette for the salon.

The tension of civilized behavior terms apropos Elias between the inner emotional self and the rational had invaded the sanctuary of the home. In Ottoman society the use of western cultural forms had intruded both the public and the private lives of the individuals which reflected their eclectic composition to be more western in its entire form in comparison to the Meiji elite who had divided the public spaces in the home into the parlor, the *tokonoma*-room, and so on of the *Wa* and *Yō* division. In close observation however, the Ottoman elites arrangement of western forms, in this case the furniture and the use of rooms, was an eclecticism of intimate symbiosis between the Turkish and the Western elements where the latter was made to conform to Turkish social and emotional sensibilities-the communal arrangement of the furniture and the extra sitting room for relaxation derived from the former harem.

Etiquette:

Just as the Meiji era etiquette texts reveal the social and ethical realm of *Wa* and *Yō* eclecticism, the nineteenth century and early twentieth century Ottoman etiquette and manner textbooks reflect the symbiotic character and dilemma of the educated Ottoman. While Ottoman etiquette did not have the written voluminous literature that *Reigi* did in the Chinese and Japanese traditions, *Adab*, or propriety was very important for the close elite circle around the palace in the empire. *Adab* in Islam meant to be cultured. Citing F. Gabrieli, Ohtsuka notes that *Adab*, which had a meaning of custom or habit in pre-Islamic days, attained delicately varied meanings with the evolution of Islam. The emphasis was on the ethical and practical meaning of the word, and it meant courtesy, good upbringing, and so forth.

In the Ottoman period, imperial polity as well as communal customs dictated a strong deference to elders as well as those in authority. One never turned ones back to either. The Ottoman gesture of greeting, the *temenna*, was the three phase hand greeting, the first one touching the heart, then the lips, and finally the forehead as an expression of loyalty and deference. Kissing the hand of again those who were older or in authority was customary. Eyes were to be kept to the floor while talking to a superior or a woman, and hands and feet were to be kept away from sight as much as possible.

In pre-nineteenth century elite homes as well as those of the non-elite, one sat on pillows in raised beddings which leaned against the walls of living rooms; one sat on the floor, sitting cross legged or on ones knees, the latter usually in the case of women

similar to the Japanese style. Taking off shoes at home was customary and survived not only because it was considered as part of cleanliness, but also because the gestures of prayer in the mosque or at home in privacy required sitting and prostrating on a carpeted floor after taking off shoes. Both styles were customary as it continues to be in Anatolian households even today. Ali Sami the first photographer of the palace in the late nineteenth century has a picture of his family members dress in historic Turkish attire with women sitting on the floor serving coffee and the men reading a book while cross legged on the bedding next to the wall. Predictably, this was a studied pose for an Orientalist image that Sami wanted to portray, because by the early 1900's his other family pictures show that everyone was usually in western dress sitting in European furniture. 69/

Although the clear transition from Ottoman manners to more European ones is not clear, one suspects that when in the early half of the nineteenth century Mahmut II ordered western dress for dynastic officials, which was followed by the construction of a western style palace for the Sultans, the mannerisms of the court changed accordingly.

Another concept that is related to manners is that of *Had*, or one's station in life or the limits of one's social position. Therefore custom required that one behave according to one's *Had*, in suitable deference shown to those in a superior position. 70/

Whereas *Adab* and *Had* referred to the proper gestures of manners to show deference to others according to one's station in life, Ottoman custom provided a separate term for the moral breeding that a person had to have which was *Terbiye*, a term difficult to translate. *Terbiye* means more than simply manners as it was inculcated through religion or *Din*, meaning Islam, and *Aile*, the family. Thus the concept is closer to the moral content of "propriety and breeding" or, *Reigi* in the Japanese sense, although the domain of physical behavior required of breeding is somewhat separate than the subject of *Terbiye* or breeding, as it is more dictated by *Adab* or proper manners.

By the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Ottomans made the distinction between *Din terbiyesi*, when they devised ethics textbooks for the newly instated secondary schools and *Adab-i-Muaseret*, meaning etiquette and manners in the secular sense. And here the distinction becomes more clear. A textbook from 1913 which has also incorporated the Young Turk ideology of the 1908 Revolution is quite explicit as to what religious breeding meant; it was to be a good and moral person and a good citizen. The book explains to elementary school children that to have religious breeding means did not simply mean to perform your religious duties, but also to be a good and kind person "who does not even harm an ant". For the author, love is what makes the hierarchal world of the Ottoman child go around. One was supposed to love ones parents, friends, relatives, the Sultan, the Ottoman state, and of course God, presented in that order. In this world of love, obedience to one's elders, or *itaat*, was a strict requirement.

Family breeding or *aile terbiyesi* in the same text presented interesting versions of the same themes. One was strictly forbidden to argue with ones elders as if they were

your friends, whereas argument between friends was a possibility. One had to be grateful to the protection and love of elders and should confess one's wrongs in a courageous manner. The Ottoman child was also expected to take care of his or her parents when they are older without complaints. European laws in which children are held legally responsible for disabled parents were cited in addition to the usual religious arguments for filial behavior. The family above all was the source of one's honor and respect (*seref-namus*). Hence breeding dictated that the young person behave in ways that would not bring shame to one's family honor. Toward the homeland, nation, the state, and the Sultan, one owed respect and loyalty as one does to one's father. 71/

While the ethical content of breeding was clear, for the Ottomans there was no clear cut distinction between Turkish manners or European manners in the Japanese sense. Things were left rather vague. However, late nineteenth century *Adab* books that introduced *alafranga* (alla Franca a Lerm that contrasts with "alla turca" meaning things Turkish), or European manners to elite circles did so not as an alternative to native manners but as a main teaching that ought to be adopted as "civilized behavior" for the worldly Ottoman in this new international world. Ahmet Mithat, known for his voluminous publications on the worthy aspects of western culture, a man who tailored for himself the role of being an Ottoman Diderot, wrote a famous book on the subject, *Alafranga Adab-i Muaseret*, on European Style Manners, which was published first in 1897 and became one of the most popular books of the day. Mithat starts his work with the admonishment that for 30-40 years the style of *alafranga* or European manners has been unfairly criticized as being a type of loose behavior, obviously the European style of the elite had not gone unnoticed by the general public. Ahmet Mithat states that he would like to correct this image once in for all to show how *alafranga* is a reasonable and necessary form of civilized behavior expected in our new age. The book deals with tips on proper behavior especially for the travelling Ottoman who frequently went to Europe in trains. The subjects deal with manners suitable at the Hotel, at restaurants, in balls, and the explanation of European customs such as Christmas and New Year.

In many ways this is a book comparable to the advice of the Meiji texts which were meant for the aristocratic elite, especially the one advised by Count Ōkuma on international social interaction, who were expected to have intimate interaction with westerners. In contrast to the Meiji texts on European manners for the aristocracy, however, there are limits to Mithat's adoption of western manners. He detests dancing as a form of corruptive behavior. Mithat declares in a fit of defiance that plying on the exotic strangeness of some Chinese dishes "As we do not need Chinese barbecued leeks for civilization! So we do not need western dancing!" 72/

The question is where does the issue of morality come in this context of European style manners. For Mithat the answer is simple as he passingly notes again in the introduction of his work that while travelling in Europe it is mandatory for one to keep one's conversations within the boundaries of *Din* and *Had*. In other words, within the European manners of "*alla franca*", the Ottoman individual was expected

to adhere to the norms of religion and breeding learned at home.

The close symbiosis of the Ottoman eclectic pattern is revealed once more in this advise. While western culture, in this case, the learning of European etiquette was presented as a proper and by implication an irrevocable process for the Ottoman reader, it had to be adjusted internally by nascent religious values and notions of behavior suitable to one's station in life, just as furniture had been adjusted to serve communal life in the family. Again as with the *fez*, the Ottoman was to be western in general demeanor but had to make sure he could keep a distinguishing identity through one's inner mores. The challenge of the "civilizing process" had become an internal issue that was irrevocable and at the same time a singular fairly inflexible mixture of the form and context of European and Ottoman elements.

Conclusion

The nineteenth century Meiji Japanese and the Ottoman Turkish elite created eclectic patterns which incorporated western culture into their personal lives as reflective of the "civilizing process" required for the reform milieu of the age. The Japanese devise was more overt in its categorizations of *Wa* and *Yō* whereas the Ottoman approach appeared more of a choice leaning toward the discarding of nascent ways and the adoption of western forms. On the other hand, it was clear that the Ottomans were actually combining the two elements, one nascent the other western, in a symbiotic fashion. In the Ottoman form of eclecticism, the European cultural forms such as household arrangements and the content and form of manners had to adjust to an inner mental nascent concern. At the same time, this modification was also reflected by native forms such as the *fez* or the veil that were attached to the western one. This seems to have compensated for giving up the old ways by Turkifying or Ottomanizing "internally" the western elements in turn.

The Japanese approach did allow greater freedom to the individual who could move in and out of Japanese and western identities both in dress and home, even in manners. However, the pattern was not a liberal one for it carried with it a high degree of rigidity in each category itself and the fact that each had to be kept apart. One could not easily transport aesthetics or principles from one to the other at will nor could the western forms be so easily "softened" by nativization and as in the Ottoman case.

The interchangeable quality to the Japanese form of eclecticism also left unanswered the question of whether the cultural identity of progressive Japan could continue to be strongly dependent on the western public image. As it became more obvious toward the end of the nineteenth century, the eclectic pattern of the early Meiji was debatable in a later Japanese agenda that chose to heighten the weight of the *Wa* category in place of the *Yō* with the intensification of nationalist desires. The Ottoman eclectic mixtures was less "western" than the pure western category of the Meiji, and less flexible as it constituted a singular system of eclecticism, but it seems to have had the stronger potential to be irrevocable. Once the mixture was established as a new lifestyle, the next Ottoman generation, at least within the boundaries of this circle, could only debate within these new terms and not in terms

of an alternative shift to a more nascent former cultural milieu that had already been discarded. In other words, once the Janissary costume and the Turkish furniture and dress were discarded, they no longer constituted an alternative self in the manner of the *Wa* forms of Japanese eclecticism.

It is clear that the Japanese pure western image of *Yō* that counters *Wa* represented a psychological attitude that was more accepting and flexible toward a swifter acceptance of western culture in its larger entity even if this was for a limited period of time and within a limited sphere of everyday life. In contrast, the Ottoman approach to western culture seems more restrictive and inflexible from the start which signified a slower invitation to the introduction of western culture. However when permanently accepted in this modified form, it permeated all facets of personal life as in the case of dress, household furnishings, and manners.

A comparison of the Meiji Japanese and the Ottoman Turkish elitist eclecticism also showed that the political and social meaning of the home environment differed. The Meiji home was also very much a public arena for reinforcing the public *Wa* and the *Yō* images of Meiji reform in addition to being the primary environment for reigi moral and social obligations. In contrast, the religious customs of dress and sexual segregation that determined the mores of individuals in the Ottoman case were primarily concerned with the public image and behavior of individuals. The sanctity of private home life meant that one did not need to adhere to public images of religion at home to that extent. This phenomenon curiously left a free home environment where cultural change could be exercised without interference from the outside. The eclectic pattern of the Ottoman veil was similar. It did not matter what one wore under it as long as one was veiled when in public.

The familiar taboos of both societies against that which was "alien" or "threatening" also influenced the way the Japanese and the Ottomans shaped their eclectic mixture. For the Japanese, being western had a ritualistic quality to it as it was sometimes a studied performance that did not necessarily have a direct bearing immediately upon the inner Japanese social world, although it certainly did in the long run. The western dress, the parlor, and etiquette while in the long run they became "nativized", for the duration of the Meiji period, these forms had a specific political agenda to revise the treaties and to realize successful interaction with the Great Powers. The initial purpose of these western forms was usually not to have them permanently infiltrate into the inner moral and social realm of Japanese among themselves, although exceptions were quite obvious as in the case of the Tsuda family. As the *Reigi* texts implied, western culture at the personal level was for public purposes, and was meant on many occasions for western eyes only. The eclectic pattern of *Wa* and *Yō* also meant that one could keep relations with westerners to defined and prescribed spheres.

The Ottoman taboo was to make sure that one would not convert to Christianity while adopting western forms and that one did not lose one's Ottoman dynastic identity. The obsessive concern with head-gear and women's veil even more so, brought out the controversy and taboo issues very well. In etiquette, one also had to keep to religious mores, lest western ways overtake. Hence while western culture

was infiltrating the home and personal life of the Ottomans perhaps at a greater scale than the Meiji Japanese, the Ottoman challenge of living thus imbued in western culture at home was to make sure that one did not convert to Christianity or lose one's dynastic identity.

Both the Ottomans and the Meiji Japanese experience showed however that western cultural forms carried important political messages for an individual. While the Japanese message on western culture as a reform image for Japanese society was more clear, it was also meant for a western audience, even if somewhat theatrical sometimes as in the case of the *Rokumeikan* affair. The Ottoman message was compromised to a nascent identity from the start and the western audience was not that important for their adoption of these cultural forms. This is most striking in the case of Ottoman women who swiftly adopted western fashions and discarded their old harem attire while remaining completely out of the sight of the Europeans. Hence they were hardly in a position to be a public message of westernization to westerners.

On the other hand the Ottomans, too, were quite sensitive about western opinion although in a more convoluted manner than the Meiji Japanese elite. In a rebuttal of Renan's harsh critic of polygamy in Islam as barbaric, Namik Kemal, a Young Ottomanist intellectual of the nineteenth century wrote an essay furiously defending the custom of polygamy. The defence is ironic for intellectuals like Ahmet Mithat and Namik Kemal himself, were also critical of arranged marriages and polygamy in essays for the Turkish audience. One has the impression that their defense was more for nursing a wounded pride than any firm conviction on the matter. Urban marriage behavior in the Istanbul households of the late nineteenth century also confirmed the critical attitude of intellectuals toward polygamy at home for there was a distinct decline of polygamous marriages. Response to western criticism of Islam on the subject of marriage was even more complicated by the fact that Namik Kemal attacked Renan in the Istanbul press, which did not give much chance for Renan, who wrote in Paris, to read the rebuttal. In a similar vein, Mustafa Kemal, who was to become the first president of the Republic after 1923, writes in his memoirs that he was very annoyed when Europeans made fun of his friend's *fez* while travelling to Europe. So when they came to Paris the first thing they did was to buy a hat and become anonymous. 73/

Sensitivity to western opinion also reflects the different role Westerners played in this nineteenth century quest of cultural adoption in both societies. While many Europeans also served the Ottoman government in its reform projects, in general Westerners were not that intensely involved in offering liberal amounts of public and friendly advice to the cultural choices of the Ottoman elite. In contrast, the Japanese and the Westerners, particularly those resident in Japan, appear sometimes to be partners in a joint venture of Japanese reform. One could not possibly imagine Mrs. Clearidge writing a letter to the Ottoman Porte to advise Ottoman ladies not to wear corsets that would harm their health, though they had started wearing them already just like the elite Japanese women of Tokyo. Eventhough the Ottoman realm was much closer to Europe geographically and there was certainly more contact at a private and public level between the populations of both worlds, there remained a

“psychological” distance between the Ottomans and the Westerners when it came to cultural choices about reform in contrast to the convivial atmosphere between enthusiastic Western advise and a receptive Japanese attitude that reigns especially in the early Meiji reform era.

Finally, it seems apparent that the use of western cultural forms also brought with it new tensions into the personal lives for the individuals in both societies. The nineteenth century Japanese and the Ottoman now had to reorient the customary rational and emotive phenomena of their nascent cultures, compounded with the rational and emotive of a foreign one that one had to live in. The personal requirement was a heavy task. The individual had to keep the tension between the rational and the emotive, plus the need to preserve a sense of cultural and personal identity. These tasks had to be consolidated in multi-cultural environments which also experienced a faster pace of social and economic change as time went by. Most members of either elite society probably managed to handle these conflicts and remain as normal healthy individuals. In retrospect, in both the Meiji Japanese and the Ottoman Turkish experiences, the individual family members of such households understandably must have felt most secure in the inner rooms of the home where little definable cultural consistency was attempted.

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19世紀の明治日本人とオスマン・トルコ

人の日常生活の西洋文化の物の使い方

セレック・エッセンベル

要旨：19世紀の日本とトルコのエリート層は、日常生活の中で西洋からの輸入文化と固有の文化を結びつけ、折衷的な文化パターンをつくりだしていた。この論文では、西洋における近代的個人の誕生を促した「文明化の過程」(ノーバート・エリアス)を枠組みとして、

両国の改革派エリート層の服装、家屋、エチケットなどを比較分析する。

近代化以前に存在していた固有の文化パターンや規範と西洋文化が重ね合わされることにより、両国の「個人」は、西洋とは異なった「文明化の過程」を経験することになる。改革と伝統のせめぎ合いの中でつくりだされた折衷的シンボリズムは、政治的な色彩を強く帯びたものであった。エリートたちは、公的な場において、西洋的な基準からして「文明的」な行動と、伝統的な基準からして「文明的」な行動との緊張の中で自我を維持しなければならなかった。しかし伝統（すなわち私的生活）とは近代（すなわち公的生活）の緊張に対する情的な「やすらぎの場」とする定説は、19世紀のトルコと日本にはあてはまらない。エリートたちがやすらぎを見出した私的生活では、西洋文化と固有文化とが公的生活におけるよりももっと複雑にまざりあっていたのである。