PART FOUR

A Changing World Environment

As already mentioned in the beginning of Part Three, in the period from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s (1976–1983), which is the period examined in this book, Japanese–Russian relations reached one of the lowest ebbs since the end of World War II. What is, however, noteworthy here is the fact that, particularly at the threshold between the 1970s and the 1980s, Soviet–Japanese relations dramatically deteriorated further. Official Soviet pronouncements and writings admitted this deterioration in relations. In his speech presented before the Central Committee at the 26th CPSU's Congress (February 1981), General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev noted that in the Soviet Union's relations with Japan "negative factors are becoming stronger."[1] Iurii Kuznetsov also noted the same tendency in his article, published after Andropov assumed the post of General Secretary, entitled "Where is Japan Being Pushed?": "Since the beginning of the 1980s, progressive Soviet–Japanese relations have been noticeably blocked."[2]

A host of factors contributed to the deterioration of Japanese–Soviet relations at the threshold of the 1980s, including: 1) Soviet direct or indirect intervention in other countries, such as Afghanistan (1979) and Poland; 2) the buildup of Soviet military forces in the Far East, particularly in the vicinity of Japan (1979); 3) Japan's participation in Western sanctions against the USSR (1980); 4) the rebirth of a "national security consciousness" among the Japanese, including a revitalization of the campaign for the reversion of the Northern Territories (1981); 5) the arrival to the top political leadership in Japan of Nakasone Yasuhiro, who had strongly pro-United

States and anti-Soviet sentiments (1982); 6) the Soviet threat to transfer their SS-20s from Europe to Asia (1982–83); and 7) The Soviet shooting down of KAL-007 (1983).

The above list of factors reveals the complexity of actions and reactions linking the two countries. Indeed, it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish causes from consequences. Notwithstanding, the official Soviet perspective ascribes full responsibility for the deterioration in Soviet–Japanese relations to the revival of nationalism in Japan and to "the growing dependence of Japanese foreign policy on the United States."[3] For example, in an article entitled "The Soviet Union–Japan: The Course of Good-neighborliness and Its Opponents", N. Nikolaev and A. Pavlov wrote:

> At the turn of the 1980s, the shaping of Japan's foreign policy as a whole, and especially its policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, became increasingly influenced by *external factors* and by nationalistic circles seeking to revive the ambitious imperial policies. (emphasis added by H.K.)[4]

Further ascribing the "root of that (new) phenomenon in Japan's foreign policy" to internal political and economic trends within Japan, they continued:

> The Japanese ruling circles persistently pressed the line that national, historical and ideological specifics of Japan made it the second-most powerful economy in the capitalist world, and, moreover, gave it the right to uphold its "specific" Japanese interests in relations with other countries.[5]

The same authors also emphasized "external factors" influencing Tokyo's foreign policy:

> The U.S. increased pressure on Japan to contribute more actively to Washington's global anti-Soviet strategy and to undertake a larger share

> of the commitments in the Japanese–American alliance, especially in the military field.[6]

Nikolaev and Pavlov even directly linked the shift in Japan's Soviet policy with the U.S. pressure on Tokyo:

> Japan acceded to the American policy of "economic sanctions" and curtailed official contracts. That markedly complicated the atmosphere of Soviet–Japanese relations.[7]

In even clearer words, Kuznetsov supports this view in his article:

> It is no secret to anyone that the discriminatory measures adopted by Japan in her relations with the Soviet Union were forced upon Japan by the United States.[8]

The foregoing Soviet interpretation of the development of events concerning Soviet–Japanese relations is, of course, not immune to criticisms and counter-arguments from non-Soviet specialists, particularly the Japanese. Yet, the Soviet arguments serve us—however excessively—as a reminder of some subjects not covered sufficiently in the previous chapters of this book. In particular, more explanation is warranted concerning the following three important dimensions in Japanese–Soviet relations.

(1) One dimension is the significant role played by the United States in determining Japanese–Soviet relations. As indicated both explicitly and implicity in previous chapters, Japan–Soviet relations must not to be viewed simply from a Japan–USSR bilateral perspective but within a broader global context, or at least within the regional context of East Asia and the Pacific. Any analysis of Japan–Soviet bilateral relations would be incomplete if it does not take into account at least two additional powers—the United States and the People's Republic of China. Yet, so far I have neglected these important actors and their influences on Japanese–Soviet relations. The China factor was touched upon, though insufficiently in the discussion on the Sino–Japanese Peace Treaty (chapter 8). In the remaining section,

the United States' influence on relations between Japan and the Soviet Union must be addressed.

(2) Soviet writings also remind us of the gradual transformation process that was occurring within Japan and the impact this transformation had on Japan–Soviet relations. The increase in Japan's self-confidence in these years (for reasons to be addressed shortly) prompted some Soviet and Western observers to declare a "rebirth of nationalism" in Japan. Moreover, an increasing number of Japanese came to agree with the Western argument that Japan, as a member of "the Western community" with shared basic values, should shoulder a more positively political responsibility than before. The Japanese attitude toward national security was indeed undergoing some changes. As a result of these changing perspectives, people were witnessing a gradual shift in Japan's foreign policy from its previously submissive and passive posture to a slightly more forward-looking and even assertive posture. Similarly, though to a lesser degree and at a slower speed, Japan's defense and security policy began to show some changes. This latter change deserves particular attention, considering my basic premise that divergent Japanese–Soviet views on national security constitute a major stumbling block between Japan and the Soviet Union. It has thus become necessary to examine such transformations that took place in Japan and to measure the impact of these changes on Japan–Soviet bilateral relations.

(3) An additional third point deserving our attention in the remaining chapters is the change and continuity on the Soviet side. Assessment of Soviet global foreign policy is a difficult task and one that is certainly beyond the scope of this book. There is a basic consensus among Japanese and Western specialists, however, that toward the end of the 1970s the USSR failed to record any significant achievements in their Japan policy. The questions to be raised, then, are: Did the Soviet Union demonstrate any signs of altering such an "abortive"—to use the word of Professor Donald C. Hellmann at the University of Washington—policy toward Japan? What impact did Soviet conduct of foreign affairs elsewhere in the world have on Japanese–Soviet relations (e.g., Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, or Soviet political pressure exerted during the "Poland Crisis")? To what extent did Soviet relations with the United States from the late

1970s (e.g., Soviet arms control negotiations with the U.S. and Western Europe) influence Japan? Did any new developments within the Soviet Union (e.g., the leadership change from Brezhnev to Andropov) affect relations between Japan and the USSR? These are major questions that I will attempt to answer in Part Four.

Chapter 9

The Impact of the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (1979)

On August 4, 1980, Japanese Foreign Minister Itō Masayoshi expressed his interest in conferring with his counterpart in the USSR, Andrei A. Gromyko, should there be such an opportunity when both are in attendance at the upcoming United Nations General Assembly scheduled for September of that year.[1] The foreign minister of the newly installed Japanese cabinet under the premiership of Suzuki Zenkō, however, did not fail to add a caveat that mutual concessions were needed if his meeting with the Soviet Foreign Minister is to be fruitful. He said that there will be no point in talking with the Soviets as long as they persist in their self-righteous attitude about the Soviet military buildup on the Japanese-claimed Northern Territories and their intervention in Afghanistan, and he stressed that it is the Soviet Union that had to change its attitude.[2] Anyone who is interested in international relations in the Far East is aware of the fact that the issue of the Northern Territories has been the major issue in relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. The point here, however, is the fact that one additional prerequisite for the improvement of bilateral relations between these two countries was added by the Japanese side: the withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Afghanistan.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979 had a major impact on Japanese foreign policy—both in its general orientation and vis-à-vis the USSR. By their act of military intervention in Afghanistan, the Soviet leaders destroyed their bargaining position in relations with Japan.

The Japanese government of Prime Minister Ōhira Masayoshi adopted a policy of even closer cooperation with the United States, which was exemplified by the suspension of personal exchanges between high officials of the USSR and Japan and the freezing of joint economic projects with the Soviets, together with the boycotting of the Moscow Olympics. Furthermore, the "Pacific Basin Cooperation Design" promulgated by Ōhira and Foreign Minister Ōkita Saburō, appeared to mark a departure from Japan's policy of balancing relations, since it excluded specific reference to the Soviet Union. Finally, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan resulted in expanded concern in Japan for military security—a concern that seems to have superseded in most Japanese priority lists the territorial questions that had dominated Japanese–Soviet relations during the entire postwar period.

Several questions arise immediately. Why did the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, thousands of miles from Japan, so greatly influence the orientation of Japan's foreign policy? Are all of the shifts in Japanese policy since the end of 1979 the direct result of the Soviet invasion? Did the indicated changes in Japanese foreign policy take place in such a clear-cut or simplified way as described above? What are the ramifications of a continuing anti-Soviet attitude on the part of the Japanese?

This chapter attempts to answer these questions by examining Japan–Soviet relations from the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan (December 1979) until the formation of the Suzuki Cabinet (July 1980)—one of the worst phases in postwar Japanese–Soviet relations. I will first focus on the Japanese reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; then I will discuss Soviet policies and strategies toward Japan in general, and, in particular, the Soviet response to Japan's reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan.

1. ZIGZAGGING BETWEEN TWO POLICY ALTERNATIVES

In order to identify the position of the Ōhira government with respect to the Soviet Union during the period in question, it is helpful to distinguish

between the two approaches that have characterized postwar Japanese foreign policy. Although both approaches stem mainly from the physical environment and economic considerations of Japan (as a country poor in natural resources, Japan is destined to depend heavily on foreign trade), they suggest seemingly opposite foreign policy options.[3] One school of thought has stressed that, in order to survive, Japan must be engaged in a system of international trade from which a free flow of goods and information can be obtained. Thus, Japan must play a responsible role in cooperation with liberal capitalist countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and the EEC (European Economic Community, now EU, European Union) member states so as to preserve this political-economic system. Above all, cooperation with the United States is of vital importance to Japan's survival, because the United States is both its major trading partner and the chief guarantor of the system.

The second approach argues that because of the lack of essential natural resources, Japan must secure energy resources from any country that can provide them, regardless of the differences in political and economic philosophy that may exist. Dependence upon one country or group of countries for the supply of raw materials and demand for Japanese products may be risky in the long run. Even if a country is not a good trading partner with Japan, its capability to disturb either directly or indirectly the security of countries important to Japan or Japan itself would be of great concern. Consequently, there is no alternative for Japan but to pursue a policy referred to as "omnidirectional" diplomacy, although it is often criticized as "over-mercantilistic," because it does not adhere to any specific principle other than the promotion of business.

Although the two schools appear diametrically opposed, upon closer inspection, these two views actually complement each other. The second view is an extension of the first. Where self-preservation is concerned, Japan has no other option but to seek the help and cooperation of the United States and other Western liberal, capitalist countries. In other areas, however, Japan naturally tends to demonstrate a more expansive economic and political interest in non-Western nations, including the "Communist" states. Therefore, it is not surprising to find both views held simultaneously

by the same individual or group. In fact, since World War II, Japanese foreign policy has vacillated between these two differing concepts.

Against this background, I would like to describe more clearly the effects of the previously discussed views on the period covered in this book. During a six-month period from the end of December 1979 to July 1980, continuous bickering occurred among the proponents of these two schools of thought; despite some difficulties, the first school, which emphasizes a policy of cooperation with the United States, was dominant. Nonetheless, both before and after the death of Prime Minister Ōhira Masayoshi, who was a supporter of the first school of thought, there was a gradual resurgence of the second school.

On the level of principle, the Japanese government under Prime Minister Ōhira reacted promptly to the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979. On December 29, Foreign Minister Ōkita Saburō called for an immediate halt to the invasion and, at the same time, ordered his ministry to protest the Soviet action to Soviet Ambassador to Japan Dmitrii Polianskii. On January 4, 1980, the first working day after the New Year holiday, the Ōhira government agreed to support the United Nations' resolution condemning the Soviet incursion.[4]

However, although the Japanese government verbally protested the Soviet aggression, it introduced no concrete measures to back up its criticism. The Ōhira Cabinet also appeared to vacillate in the extent to which it cooperated with the Carter Administration's strategy of communicating to the Soviets how costly their military action would be.[5] It was not long, however, before this inaction and indecision came to an end. The Ōhira Cabinet was induced to take a concrete stand against the Soviet Union as a result of firm pressure from Washington, as well as from hawks in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), intellectuals, and other sectors of Japanese society. On January 5, after consulting with Vice-Foreign Minister Takashima Masuo, Prime Minister Ōhira decided that Japan should do something more to "express its displeasure" with the events in Afghanistan.[6] Two days later, the Foreign Ministry announced that it was considering possible countermeasures against the Soviets in two major areas: restrictions on personal exchanges between Japan and the USSR; and economic sanc-

tions, including the suspension of joint economic development projects in Siberia.[7]

The first measure, the suspension of person-to-person contacts, was not difficult to implement and was put into practice soon after the announcement: on January 8, 1980, the proposed visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to Tokyo was called off,[8] and on the same day, a planned meeting with Ambassador Polianskii was postponed indefinitely by top members of the LDP.[9] A few days later, on the January 11, the scheduled visit by members of the USSR's Supreme Soviet was cancelled by the speakers of both houses of the Japanese Diet.[10]

In marked contrast, however, the countermeasure of economic sanctions against the Soviet Union was not so easily implemented. Of course, there were some Japanese, those representing the second view of foreign policy outlined above, who feared that economic sanctions would have a "boomerang effect" on Japan and inflict great damage on the Japanese economy. Pressure from within the LDP, however, caused the Ōhira administration to advocate limited economic sanctions. On January 8, top LDP leaders publicly announced their view that economic sanctions against the Soviet Union by Japan must be made "even *in the face of resistance from the Japanese business community.*"[11] Pressure on the government to take more effective action against the Soviet Union continued. The LDP's Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by former Foreign Minister Kosaka Zentarō, expressed their view on January 11 that Japan should adopt stronger sanctions against the Soviet Union.[12] Viewing the Japanese response to the Soviet invasion as lukewarm and slow, Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser also insisted during Mr. Ōhira's visit to Canberra in mid-January that Japan take stronger reprisals.[13] At the same time, from January 16–18, Japanese governmental leaders were holding talks with White House special envoy Philip Habib, who reportedly insisted that Japan terminate its loans and credits to the Soviets, so as to cooperate with the American policy of containment against further Soviet expansion.[14]

After his return from a six-day tour of Oceania,[15] Prime Minister Ōhira delivered a speech at the Japan Press Club on January 22, in which three important points were made: first, Ōhira stated that Japan's foreign policy

was based on cooperation with the United States; second, he noted that "the Soviet Union is a defensive, cautious, diplomatically skillful and experienced country—not a reckless country"; third, concerning Japan's possible boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games, Ōhira evasively stated that, "for the time being, the government intends to observe the reactions of Western and other countries."[16]

The slow and inconsistent foreign policy stratagems of the Ōhira administration must be seen in the context of the indirect process of decision-making that characterizes Japanese leaders and often involves their waiting patiently until "the last minute," when there is no alternative but to finally decide. Unlike their Western counterparts, Japanese leaders do not dictate, initiate, or discuss various plans and alternatives with the general public and others concerned. Instead, they create an environment out of which they can later insist certain policies have evolved naturally. By taking full advantage of this contrived atmosphere, Japanese leaders are able to push through their politics without much effective resistance from those who are not "in the know." We may observe at this point that, although Prime Minister Ōhira was a relatively more articulate statesman than were many of his predecessors, he did not deviate significantly from the traditional patterns of Japanese decision-making.

2. COOPERATIVE POLICY TOWARD THE U.S.

Keeping in mind a favorite practice of Japanese politicians, the manipulation of public opinion at opportune times, it is interesting to analyze the two incidents reportedly involving Japan–Soviet intrigue that surfaced in mid-January 1980. The first incident, reported on January 9, occurred in the Nemuro area of Hokkaido, the northernmost island of Japan. It involved the arrest and fining of three local fishermen by Hokkaido police for having bribed Soviet coast guards with small gifts in an attempt to ease restrictions in fishing in Soviet-claimed territorial waters. Shortly thereafter, on January 18, Miyanaga Yukio, a retired major general, and two members of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense

Forces were arrested on charges of espionage. Miyanaga confessed his role in passing secret military information to the Soviet military attaché in Tokyo, Colonel Iurii Kozlov. Of course, it may be contended that mere coincidence governed the occurrence of these two incidents at the very same time that the Japanese government was debating the issue of stronger reprisals against the Soviets. Nonetheless, both incidents did serve to arouse an anti-Soviet mood in the Japanese general public. This mood, in turn, facilitated the government's subsequent decisions.

On January 25, 1980, in his program speech at the plenary session of the joint houses of the Diet, Prime Minister Ōhira finally clarified his administration's general policy regarding the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, when he declared:

> The [Japanese] government intends to make efforts suitable for Japan that are based on its policy of solidarity with the United States and that are in accordance with the stand of Western and other nations. Up to now, our country has made its stand clear through its activities in the United Nations and the suspension of personal exchanges with the Soviet Union. We will continue to consider and implement other appropriate measures, including a tightening of COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Exports to Communist Areas) controls on sales to Russia.[17]

Even more boldly, Ōhira continued, "I think that in doing the above our country should not hesitate to make *sacrifices*. Moreover, I would like to make it clear that our country will do nothing that will impede reprisals taken by other countries or undermine their impact." (emphasis added by H.K.)[18]

The Prime Minister reiterated this attitude in the remaining session of the Diet. On February 1, in the House of Representatives Budget Committee, Ōhira even made it a point to amend some of his former views. For example, he corrected an earlier statement that the Soviet Union was a "defensive country," which had been criticized both domestically and internationally, by saying: "It is an objective fact that recently the

Soviet Union has been greatly reinforcing its military forces, judging from the Soviet military deployment in the Northern Territories [and in other areas]. [Thus], I cannot but regard the Soviet troops [there] as a potential threat to Japan."[19] This constituted a sensational statement, as it was the first time in the Japanese Diet that a postwar Prime Minister had officially called Soviet forces a "threat to Japan."[20]

This shift in Mr. Ōhira's views greatly encouraged other government high officials, especially those with defense responsibilities. In one notable slip of the tongue, Director General of the Defense Agency Hosoda Kichizō, in a press interview given on February 4, commented that he personally regarded Soviet armed forces as "a *serious threat* to Japan."[21] (emphasis added by H.K.) Hosoda later revised this statement by saying that his view did not differ much from that expressed by Mr. Ōhira at the Diet session a few days earlier.[22] More significantly, in a Budget Committee meeting in the Diet on the same day, Mr. Okazaki Hisahiko, counselor of the Japan Defense Agency, disclosed for the first time that about ten SS-20 mobile intermediate-range missiles had been deployed by the Soviet Union in the Far East.[23] Following these revelations, the issues of defense and security assumed major proportions, and, in fact, became the biggest issues in the Diet during the first half of 1980.[24] Several books and articles with such titles as "Hokkaido Next After Afghanistan," "The Soviet Forces Have Landed in Japan," and "The 11-Day War in Hokkaido" were released, some of which reached the bestseller list.

In early February, the Ōhira administration agreed to include Japan in the U.S.-sponsored drive to boycott the Moscow Summer Olympics.[25] In addition, the Japanese government began to implement economic restrictions against the USSR. By refusing an entry visa into Japan to Vice-Foreign Trade Minister Viktor Ivanov, the Ōhira government effectively suspended the following economic projects, which the Vice-Minister was scheduled to discuss in Tokyo: the coke and coal mining production projects in Southern Yakutsk; the third-stage program for timber resources development scheduled to begin in 1980; and the exportation of large-diameter steel pipes from Japan to the USSR.[26] The Japanese government's policies at this time were of two types: the Export-Import Bank of Japan

was forbidden to extend credits for *new* projects; on the other hand, however, project agreements that had been previously concluded would not be suspended, although additional bank loans would be denied.[27] Moreover, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) adopted a policy of not permitting the export of goods enumerated in the so-called "COCOM List," which required special application, and of freezing two items that also required special application to be exported.[28] In an effort to rally behind President Carter's embargo of U.S. grain sales to the Soviet Union, the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture decided to purchase an additional one-million tons of wheat from the United States.[29] One group of professors boldly suggested that Japan go even further and purchase the entire seventeen-million tons of grain.[30]

It is necessary to point out here that the sanctions mentioned above were leveled against the Soviet Union despite the threat of "retaliation or countermeasures," particularly in the sensitive area of fishing rights between the two nations. Although lengthy diplomatic negotiations and the passage of time resulted in mutually satisfying policies on the "200-nautical-mile problem," the Japanese continued to find themselves in a weaker bargaining position with regard to fishing quotas. The fishing quota and zone questions did not escape the notice of Soviet Ambassador Polianskii, as was revealed in an interview with Kyodo News Service on February 10, when he threatened: "We have no intention of restricting Japanese operations; however, if Japan chooses to follow the U.S.'s lead in imposing economic sanctions, we will take appropriate countersteps."[31]

On March 13, following the initiation of the economic sanctions, the plenary session of the House of Representatives finally passed a resolution requesting the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The resolution was adopted by all of Japan's political parties except the Communist Party, which insisted that the Americans and Chinese also be condemned for their support of anti-government forces in Afghanistan.[32] The direction of the Japanese government's policies was further strengthened when Prime Minister Ōhira visited Washington from April 31 to May 1 and assured President Carter of Japan's continued support for the American policies towards Iran and the Soviet Union.[33]

3. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: DIFFICULT IMPLEMENTATION

As we have seen thus far, Japan's foreign policy during the first half of the 1980s emphasized cooperation with the United States. This policy orientation had seldom before been so clearly implemented. However, it must also be noted that this policy orientation, which emphasized cooperation with any country serving Japan's interests, especially in the economic sphere, also had its supporters during this period.

Mr. Nagano Shigeo, president of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, was a champion of the second school of thought, which separates economics from politics. In a press interview on March 6, 1980, for instance, he stated that Japan must deal with the Soviet Union more rationally than emotionally, stressing that economic cooperation with the Soviet Union is not to be regarded as assistance but as business.[34] Mr. Amaya Naohiro, then counselor of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), also stressed that Japan must avoid becoming engaged in what he termed "warrior diplomacy," saying that it is advisable for Japan to become more "mercantilistic," more like a successful merchant who exercises emotional and other restraints, in order to increase benefits.[35]

As a matter of fact, Amaya disclosed in a press interview that his ministry was requesting the U.S. government to allow Japan to make two exceptions to its policy of economic sanctions against the USSR: that the oil and gas resources project begun on the continental shelf off the coast of Sakhalin be resumed and that exports of large steel pipes to the USSR be continued.[36] These projects were two of the five projects automatically suspended by the Japanese government's decision to deny an entry visa to the Soviet trade official V. Ivanov. In May the Ōhira government decided to resume the extension of credits and loans to the Soviet Union by the Japanese Export-Import Bank for those goods that "do not help the USSR increase its military strength."[37] The government decided on May 22 to provide bank loans to the third stage of the program for timber resources development,[38] regarding it as a continuation of the first and second stages of a project previously initiated. As justification for this decision, the government ex-

plained: "If Japan shelves the third stage of this project, the Japanese investment in the first and second stages will be wasted."[39]

Of course, this rather haphazard, inconsistent practice of allowing one exception after another in the economic field, while using the "survival of a resource-poor country" as a justification, did not escape the criticism of many observers, even in Japan itself. Professor Sase Masamori of National Defense Academy (of Japan), for instance, pointed out that, whether or not it is accepted as such, Japan cannot be considered a purely "mercantilistic" state. The fact that Japan ranks eighth in the world in military might underscores its position as *both* a "mercantile" and a "warrior" state. Furthermore, Professor Sase noted that, because of its diplomatic position, Japan cannot hope to be accepted by other countries merely as a "mercantile" state. This last point stressed the priority of retaining the United States as a valuable trading partner and the desirability of preventing the United States from becoming unhappy with Japan.[40]

The sudden death of Prime Minister Ōhira on June 12 temporarily interrupted the debate on the issue of whether or not Japan was to be exclusively "mercantilistic"; however, ensuing events served to highlight its dimensions. The new Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō outlined his basic foreign policy in his first news conference on July 18. He stated that he was determined to continue the policies of his predecessor and that his selection as Foreign Minister of Itō Masayoshi, formerly Ōhira's Chief Cabinet Secretary and aide, was a concrete demonstration of this determination.[41] After characterizing the Japanese–American relationship as the pivotal point of Japan's foreign policy, Suzuki stated: "Japan's relations with its neighbor, the Soviet Union, are important; however, endeavors made only on the Japanese side are not sufficient. We expect the Soviets to initiate some action with regard to Afghanistan and the Northern Territories if it really wants to improve its relations with us."[42] This can be considered a statement of the Suzuki government's basic policy orientation toward the Soviet Union.

While repeating this policy line, Foreign Minister Itō also added that he deemed it necessary for Japan to keep open lines of communication with the Soviet Union despite the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.[43] In addition,

he granted an entry visa to Nikolai N. Solov'ev, the chief of the Second Far Eastern Department of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This action was interpreted as a gesture by the new government to break away from the former prime minister's restrictions on personal contacts between the two countries. During his stay in Tokyo, Solov'ev strongly communicated the willingness of the Soviet Union to improve relations with Japan.[44] However, Mutō Toshiaki, Director General of the European and Oceanic Affairs Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, clearly under instructions from Foreign Minister Itō, pointed out that: "The recent Soviet military buildup on the islands off Hokkaido claimed by Japanese and the Soviet military invasion into Afghanistan are the major causes of disharmony between Tokyo and Moscow and, hence, the Soveit Union is considered to be responsible for the strained bilateral relations."[45] Foreign Minister Itō later indicated that no entry visas would be issued to any other Soviet officials (for example, to Vladimir N. Sushkov, Soviet Vice-Foreign Trade Minister) because the government wished to continue its previous policy of not honoring personal exchanges or communications with the Soviets.[46] Japan–Soviet relations were further strained in August, when a disabled Soviet nuclear submarine was discovered in Japanese territorial waters without Japan's advance permission. The Suzuki government denounced the trespass as an "unfriendly act."[47]

It may be concluded that, with the exception of the Japanese government's hopeful pursuit of economic ties and dialogue with the Soviet Union, the general attitude and policies of the Suzuki administration toward Moscow, as those of the preceding administration, remained cool and reserved.

4. SOVIET PERCEPTION OF JAPAN

There are two schools of thought in Japan concerning the question of how the Soviets view Japan. One school postulates that the Kremlin leaders do not have any specific designs or policies toward Japan *per se*, while the sec-

ond school believes that the Kremlin cannot afford to be without such designs or policies.

Many Western observers[48] contend that, as a global power, the Soviet Union tended to view relations with Japan not only in bilateral terms, but also in a much broader, global context. When we consider the military aspect, the arguments of the first school become particularly persuasive. As a country with what Dmitrii V. Petrov, a leading Soviet expert on Japan, calls a "low level of military strength,"[49] Japan did not play any significant global military role. The Soviets understood well that Japan is dependent upon the United States for its own security. With this in mind, the abovementioned Western observers feel that the Soviets could ignore the formulation of any specific foreign policy toward Japan, and instead, simply include Japan in their global or U.S. and China policies.

On the other hand, proponents of the second school argue that Japan occupies a cornerstone position in Northeast Asia because of its geographical location and its economic and technological capabilities and, hence, represents significant military and political potential. According to this view, the Soviet Union was necessarily concerned about both the extent of U.S.–Japanese military cooperation and the extent to which Japan will cooperate economically with the PRC in the latter's modernization program. The Soviets also feared Japanese support of a possible "anti-Soviet" posture in conjunction with its participation in the Pacific Basin Cooperation plan. It appears to observers of the second school that, in light of these vital concerns and of recent developments in the Pacific region, the Soviet Union must make a concerted effort to formulate specific policies toward Japan.

Although these two schools appear to be diametrically opposed, it is the author's view that closer examination shows these two views to be actually complementary. Whereas the first school stresses fundamental principles, the second emphasizes the conditions that prompted the Soviet Union to alter its traditional views.

During the period covered in this chapter, namely, the six-month period from the Soviet invasion of Kabul (December 1979) to around the time of

the formation of the Suzuki Cabinet (July 1980), the Soviet Union maintained a defensive and uncompromising position toward Japanese protests of the Afghanistan invasion. First, the Kremlin leadership generally considered the foreign policy of the Ōhira administration as extremely anti-Soviet. The Soviets particularly began to take note in late January, 1980 of Japanese policy changes, which they viewed as indicative of a more dangerous, anti-Soviet course. Specifically, the Soviets severely criticized Ōhira's keynote speech in the Japanese Diet on January 25, 1980. In an article entitled "Amending Policy" in the January 20 issue of *Pravda*, Iu. Vdovin commented: "It is no longer being said, as it was a year ago, that the strengthening of friendship with the Soviet Union is one of the goals of Japanese diplomacy."[50] Another criticism of Ōhira's speech came on January 24 from Vladimir Tsvetov, the Tokyo correspondent for the Moscow Broadcast Service, who pointed out that "Ōhira's speech failed to include his views on Japan–Soviet relations."[51] In the February 9 issue of *Izvestiia*, Iurii Bandura sharply criticized Ōhira's view of the Soviet Union as having changed from defensive to "aggressive" and a potential threat to Japan."[52]

The Soviets perceived Ōhira as pro-Chinese because of his eagerness to improve Japan's relations with the PRC, demonstrated as early as 1972, when, as foreign minister, he signed the Japan–China Normalization Treaty in Beijing. Furthermore, Ōhira returned to Beijing in 1979, the first Japanese prime minister since the conclusion of the Treaty to do so, and extended an invitation to China's Hua Guo Feng to visit Tokyo in 1980.

More importantly, Ōhira was regarded as more pro-Western, especially pro-American, than were his predecessors. This belief was publicized by Vladimir Kudriavtsev in the May 27, 1980 issue of *Izvestiia*: "No postwar government leader has formulated foreign policies with such a lack of independence and authority as Mr. Ōhira."[53] V. Tsvetov also argued: "Prime Minster Ōhira has demonstrated Japan's total solidarity with the adventurist United States policy. In Washington he declared that Japan is ready to cooperate with U.S. policy at any cost."[54] Tsvetov went on to list examples of Ōhira's complicity with U.S. policies: "The Japanese," he wrote, "have joined in the U.S.-provoked actions against Iran; pledged full support of

President Carter's position on the Afghan issue; built up an attitude of anti-Sovietism; meddled with the Olympics; and catered to U.S. demands for a large-scale military buildup."[55]

5. "THE PACIFIC BASIN CONCEPT": THREE MAJOR SOVIET CRITICISMS

Probably no other criticism against Japan appeared so frequently in the official Soviet media during this six-month period than that against Prime Minister Ōhira's "Pacific Basin Concept."[56] It is, of course, understandable that the Soviets would be highly concerned about this concept, because it serves as a virtual counterbalance to the Soviet-designed "Asian Collective Security" concept, considered the cornerstone of Soviet Asian policy.

Historically, the "Pacific Basin concept" was being considered even in the early 1960s;[57] however, it was Ōhira who most enthusiastically promoted it in Japan.[58] Prime Minister Ōhira organized a special advisory group to study and work on Pacific Basin Cooperation and later appointed the chairman of this group, Ōkita Saburō, as his foreign minister. In a Diet session speech on January 25, 1979, Ōhira stated: "I consider it my obligation to promote further friendly and cooperative relations with the United States, Canada, Latin America, Australia, New Zealand, and other countries in the Pacific region."[59] In response, the Soviets developed three major criticisms of this concept.

First, the Soviets objected to the capitalistic aspects of the "Cooperation Concept." *The Interim Report on the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept* submitted to Prime Minister Ōhira on November 14, 1979, states:

> Our concept, is, in the first place, directed to *open* cooperation. . . . Secondly, it aims at the formation of a regional community based on *free* and *open* relations. In the economic sphere, the promotion of *free* trade and capital transfer is the ideal to be achieved. In carrying out this task, it is essential that the advanced countries take the lead in . . . making effective use of market-economy mechanisms and in maintaining

> and reinforcing the *free* international economic system. (emphasis added by H.K.)[60]

From the Soviet point of view, the report is contradictory and its authors "double-faced (*dvoistvennye*)" in their insistence upon an "open and free" system at one and the same time. According to Marxist-Leninist thinking, there are two kinds of "free" systems; one is capitalistic and bourgeois in nature, the other is socialistic. The Soviets interpret the word "free" in the *Report* to have the former meaning, as indicated in the part of the *Report* which explains that "in the economic sphere, the promotion of *free* trade and capital transfer is the ideal to be achieved." (emphasis added by H.K.)[61] According to the Soviets, the Japanese attitude toward the nature of the "Community" is contradictory: although it is called a "free system," it is also meant to be "closed," in the sense that membership is restricted to capitalist, bourgeois countries. While some Soviet observers regard the "Community" as, in fact, closed to socialist countries or potentially anti-socialist, others consider it simply "anti-Soviet." Obviously, "anti-socialist" and "anti-Soviet" have different implications, for the latter implies the participation of China in a united front against the USSR.

Regardless of the theoretical characterization of "Pacific Basin Cooperation" as an anti-socialist or anti-Soviet organization, Kremlin leaders are more acutely bothered by the possible practical effects of the formation of such a community. To begin with, Moscow fears the "strengthening of cooperation and interdependent relations" and the development of closer economic ties between Japan and the cooperating Asian-Pacific countries, instead of with the USSR. The Soviet Union is dependent upon Japan for credit and technology in its attempt to achieve its goal to develop Siberia and the Far Eastern regions of the country. In fact, Moscow was urging Tokyo to conclude a long-term bilateral agreement on economic cooperation. Needless to say, the Soviets were vitally concerned about the economic and geographical directions in which Japan would move in conjunction with "Pacific Basin Cooperation." A second practical Soviet concern about "cooperation" is based on the fear that it will eventually develop into a

Pacific version of the European Economic Community (EEC). Prime Minister Ōhira made it clear that it is not feasible to create an organization such as the EEC in the Asian-Pacific region, but this assurance did not allay fears. In interpreting another of Ōhira's statements concerning cooperation, Bandura suggested that the model for Ōhira's "Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept" is the system of economic solidarity between West Germany and the EEC.

A second major basis for the Soviet mistrust of the "Pacific Community" stems from a fear that the Community will not allow the participation of socialist governments. This fear lingered despite Mr. Ōhira's repeated assertion that "there is no reason to refuse the participation of any nation that wishes to join the Community."[62] On one occasion, the Japanese Prime Minister even indicated that he was "not opposed to the participation of the Soviet Union or the PRC."[63] Soviet doubts are well-expressed by Bandura in the January 17, 1980 issue of *Izvestiia*, in which he criticized the Community's *Interim Report*, submitted by Ōhira's study group. Bandura comments:

> In the recommendation submitted to the Japanese government, no mention was made concerning which countries Japan would agree to have as group members. Moreover, any analysis of the *Report* leads to the conclusion that the authors of the concept leave no room for the participation of socialist countries in the Pacific Ocean Cooperation.[64]

Bandura classified the candidate countries into four groups: the first group, to which he refers as "fixed candidates," are Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the ASEAN countries. The second group of countries, mentioned only "occasionally" as candidates, are certain Latin American countries, such as Chile, Panama, and Mexico.[65] The third group identified by Bandura consists of such "special objects" as South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Bandura did not discuss how these countries are to be treated in actual practice. He considered the PRC as a country in the fourth group. While Bandura is aware that both Chinese and Australian leaders advocate the participation of the

PRC in the "Community," he doubts that Japan will offer the PRC membership in the organization, at least for the time being, although "it is true that Tokyo feeds Beijing promises of admitting China into 'the Pacific Community' *in the future.*" (emphasis added by H.K.)[66]

It appears that one of the reasons the Soviets so bitterly criticized Ōhira's "Pacific Basin Cooperation" lies in their feeling that the USSR was not being rightfully recognized as a candidate for membership. Even worse, many Soviets felt that their country was purposely excluded. That the USSR considered itself a major power in the Pacific region further underscores its sense of being excluded and of being discriminated against. It is clear that since the late 1970s, the USSR had defined itself as an Asian-Pacific power, not simply an Asian power.[67] Thus, the omission of the Soviet Union in the *Interim Report on the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept* was a significant affront to the Soviets and stimulated some of the first criticisms of the "Cooperation." In the *Final Report*, the USSR, with other countries, was mentioned only in a rather insignificant section that dealt with a direct-broadcast relay satellite system.

A third broad Soviet criticism of "Pacific Cooperation" centers around the fear that one of its major goals is the establishment of a military alliance. Despite Japan's continued reassurances that the interests of the "Cooperation" are cultural and economic in nature, the Soviets were not assuaged. In a notable speech to the Lower House Budget Committee, Mr. Ōhira asserted: "We want to confine this idea of Pacific Basin Cooperation to economic and cultural spheres."[68] However, Soviet commentators believe that the primary purpose of the Japanese design of a "Pacific Community" is military in nature. A January 4, 1980 report from Moscow by *Tass International* is a typical example. Citing *Akahata (Red Flag)*, an organ of the Japanese Communist Party, the report insisted that "fact shows that the 'Ōhira Doctrine' is inextricably linked with plans to create a new military bloc in that region."[69] (emphasis added by H.K.) Soviet observer S. N. Nikonov also stressed the military purpose of Ōhira's "Cooperation Concept" by saying that the statements of Japanese state officials frequently suggest that "the proposed organization will have not a political but an increasingly *military* character." (emphasis added by H.K.)[70]

The participation, for the first time, of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces in RIMPAC-80, the program of naval maneuvers in the Pacific Ocean, together with forces from ANZUS member countries (the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) in February and March, 1980, reinforced Soviet suspicions that "there are military aspects in the Pacific Community design."[71] Vasilii Golovnin remarked in the February 28, 1980 issue of the *APN News*: "The participants in these military maneuvers are those countries that will play a central role in the Pacific Basin Community Design envisaged obstinately by Japan." He concluded that, "although Japan has defined this design to be of a purely economic and cultural nature, we see that the Pacific Ocean Cooperation has begun actual maneuvers in the military field."[72]

It is appropriate here to point out that the Soviet Union also had plans for promoting a community of mutual cooperation in the Pacific region. The proposal for Collective Security in Asia was formally introduced by Brezhnev himself at the World Conference of Communist Parties in Moscow on June 8, 1969: "We think the course of events is also placing on the agenda the task of creating a system of collective security in Asia."[73] Even more than ten years after this announcement, however, no such system was realized. Only three neighboring countries formally endorsed the Soviet initiative: Outer Mongolia, Iran, and Afghanistan. Since the Soviet Union had considered embracing Japan as a crucial member of its proposed organization, it came as a great shock that Japan was advancing its own scheme in the Pacific region. It would not be a mistake to relate the extreme sensitivity of the USSR toward the creation of a Japan-supported Pacific Cooperation system to its own unsuccessful efforts in this regard. As its name clearly implies, the Soviet's Asian collective security design is of a political-military nature. The Soviets never attempted to conceal this fact. CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev indicated as much in the above-mentioned address: "Asian collective security is the best substitute for the now-existing political-military grouping."[74] Apparently, the Soviets revealed their own political-military purposes in their criticism of the Pacific Cooperation advocated by Ōhira and others in Japan. Of course, the Soviets were primarily concerned about the development of a threatening military

alliance, evidenced in Bandura's warning: "Behind these activities the intention to create in the Pacific Ocean region a huge military bloc of imperialist states is quite clearly visible, and it is already being referred to as 'JANZUS' (a combination of the first letters of the following countries: Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States)."[75]

6. SOVIET TACTICS: SYMPATHY, BLUFF, AND MATERIAL INCENTIVES

Although they bitterly criticized Japanese participation in, and designs for, the Pacific Basin Community, as well as Japan's increasing military potential, the Soviets showed at the same time some conciliatory gestures. When faced with an international dilemma, the Soviets often adopt the well-known "carrot and stick" strategy, already mentioned. Let us now examine the more conciliatory side of the Soviet strategy toward Japan during the months after the Afghanistan invasion.

One example of this aspect of policy toward Japan is found in their tendency to regard Japan as an important victim of the United States and China. This allows the Soviets some space for manipulation. Moscow often sees Japan as a nation turned toward anti-Soviet and militaristic attitudes by overwhelming pressures from Washington and Beijing.

In the article "Dangerous Metamorphoses" in the February 9, 1980 issue of *Izvestiia*, Bandura commented: "These metamorphoses can be explained quite simply: the independence of Japanese diplomacy, of which Tokyo is fond of talking, is beginning to show cracks under growing U.S. pressure."[76] Bandura viewed Prime Minister Ōhira's "arm-twisting diplomacy" as the most important "instrument" of the White House. Col. V. Tatarnikov, in *Krasnaia zvezda* (March 25, 1980), also argues that the "buildup of the 'Self-Defense Forces' and anti-Soviet sentiment in Japan" is "being done under pressure from Washington."[77]

Specifically, the Soviets felt that the United States had been coercing Japan to participate in joint military plans with the United States and NATO against the USSR by joining the "RIMPAC-80"; to turn Okinawa

into a base for the transfer of U.S. marines to the Persian Gulf and other regions; to prepare for a naval blockade of three straits (the Sōya [La Peróuse], Tsugaru, and Tsushima straits) in case of an emergency; to take part in the "boycott" of the Moscow Olympics; to halt credits for the implementation of Japan–Soviet economic cooperation projects;[78] and to engage in other actions.[79]

According to the Soviets, China also exerted pressure on Japan to cooperate in adventurous anti-Soviet strategies.[80] V. Ganshi, a Soviet commentator for *Moscow Radio*, argued that pressure from the PRC is responsible for Japan's abandonment of its "equidistance" policy toward the USSR and the PRC. He asserted in the May 31 issue of *Izvestiia*, on the eve of Premier Hua Guo Feng's visit to Tokyo, that China intensified its efforts "to draw Tokyo into the stream of its anti-Soviet, hegemonistic policy and to push Japan away from more balanced approaches to relations with its neighbors."[81] The insinuation that the PRC is exerting its own pressure on Japan was directly made in a June 7 *Tass* report, following Hua Guo Feng's Tokyo visit. The report stated that: "The Chinese leader sought to use this opportunity to the utmost . . . to urge Japan to increase the might of its armed forces and to develop an aggressive military alliance with the U.S."[82] Later, Mikhail Demchenko reported Hua Guo Feng's complaint to Nakasone Yasuhiro, an influential member of the LDP, who was visiting Beijing in April, 1980, that "Japan's military spending is too low."[83]

The Soviets perceived the existence of an anti-Soviet military bloc into which the United States and China had enticed Japan. The *Tass* report mentioned above illuminates this view: "The U.S.–Chinese rapprochement is aimed at knocking together a reactionary anti-Soviet alliance and drawing Japan into its designs as well."[84]

The Soviets' use of the "stick" policy is most detectable in their economic relations with Japan. For example, the "stick" strategy was exercised in the area of bilateral fishing negotiations. Japan's vulnerable and relatively weak position in this area became the point of attack for Soviet countermeasures and threats. One of the first threats of retaliation against Japan's participation in the U.S.-led sanctions with regard to the Soviet invasion Afghanistan appeared in the February 16 issue of *Izvestiia*, in which Demchenko stated:

"Any sanctions against the Soviet Union can ultimately lead to only one thing—destruction of the system of Japanese–Soviet relations."[85] More specifically, Demchenko continued: "Japanese fishing circles are now concerned whether Japan's pursuit of the U.S. anti-Soviet course will influence the Soviet Union's attitude towards the [fishing] question, since the application of 'sanctions' against the USSR is a weapon that cuts both ways."[86]

Soviet Ambassador D. Polianskii indicated on February 10, 1980 that the Soviet Union could rightly impose restrictions on Japanese fishing operations within its 200-nautical-mile fishing zone if Japan implemented its proposed economic sanctions. Polianskii warned: "We have no intention of restricting Japanese fishing operations. But if Japan follows the lead of the United States in imposing economic sanctions, we will be forced to take appropriate countersteps."[87] This warning, however, turned out to be a bluff; there was no actual Soviet retaliation in this area. On the contrary, the Soviets responded fairly and even benevolently to Japanese salmon-catch quota pronouncements.

In another curious action, Polianskii, who had previously turned down all invitations to address Japanese journalists, agreed to discuss the Afghanistan affair and Japanese–Soviet economic relations at a Japan National Press Club luncheon on March 5, 1980. The Ambassador utilized this occasion to describe vividly the difficulties imposed on his country by the Japanese economic sanctions, particularly the suspension of the joint development project in Siberia and the Far Eastern region of the Soviet Union. Having expressed his country's determination to continue the projects without the cooperation of other countries, including Japan, Polianskii nevertheless added:

> I hope that Japan will act on the matter according to its own interests without giving ear to recommendations from other quarters [i.e., Washington]. Japan must ultimately decide the future course of bilateral relations between us, that is, whether to promote friendly relations or not. I myself am optimistic [in this regard].[88]

Three days later, Vladimir Tsvetov of the Moscow Broadcast Service, speaking in Japanese, expressed the view that the desires of Japanese business circles, including those of Nagano Shigeo, to continue trade and economic relations with the Soviet Union were quite reasonable. Here, Tsvetov was resorting to a favorite Soviet technique of "divide and conquer." He employed this same strategy in pointing out the rivalries and intrigues of Western countries: "Despite U.S. demands, France and West Germany have not taken economic sanctions against the Soviet Union in connection with the situation in Afghanistan. Thus, it will be a matter of course that the orders which Japan has received thus far will all go to West Europe."[89]

As we have seen, the low ebb in Japanese–Soviet relations is deeply rooted in the Afghanistan incident of December 1979 and in the issues and developments that have reverberated from it. Although long strained by the Northern Territories question, Japanese–Soviet relations had never before reached such a precariously low point. The Middle East problem awakened in the Japanese public an increased awareness of the "threat from the North." Although it was expected that trade and economic relations between the two countries would eventually resume and perhaps even be expanded, there was strong speculation that tense diplomatic relations would prevail into the 1980s. The period from December 1979 to August 1980 underscored the great influence of Japan–Soviet political-diplomatic relations in the northeastern region of the globe and the need for sensitive diplomacy in their preservation.

Chapter 10

From Clouded to "Somewhat Crystal"*: Suzuki to Nakasone

"Of all our allies, Japan has been without question the most supportive of all our shared interests and objectives [concerning the Afghanistan issue], in spite of the fact that it incurred significant economic cost as a result."[1] These words, from the speech made by U.S. Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield at the International Symposium on Security, Peace, and Survival on December 4, 1981, cannot be dismissed as simply a diplomatic compliment. The Japanese government under the late Prime Minister Ōhira Masayoshi engaged in a vigorous, cooperative policy, though marked by much zigzagging, to support the sanctions taken by U.S. President Jimmy Carter after the Soviet military invasion into Afghanistan—a policy that was interpreted as being exceptionally and unprecedentedly clear-cut in Japan's postwar diplomatic history.

This policy, as rightly admitted by the American ambassador, was pursued with some sacrifices on the Japanese side (e.g., Japan dropped from second to fifth place in the ranking of Soviet Western trade partners in 1980), and certainly it dealt some significant "body blow" damage to the Soviet Union. Although it is difficult to say which country suffered more, it is clear that Japanese–Soviet relations deteriorated to their lowest ebb in postwar history as a result of the Afghan incident.

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* the name of a novel, which became a bestseller in Japan in 1980–81.

In this chapter, I will discuss the aftermath of the foregoing policy, treating such questions as: 1) what changes occurred in the bilateral relations between Japan and the USSR after the sudden death of Ōhira Masayoshi on June 12, 1980? More concretely, 2) what were the features of the policy orientation toward the USSR of Prime Ministers Suzuki Zenkō and Nakasone Yasuhiro? Were they as clear-cut as those of their predecessors? 3) What kind of policies or strategies was the Kremlin leadership taking toward the new Japanese government and the Japanese people? Can any change be detected?

1. JAPAN'S PUZZLING POLICIES

It is almost impossible for anyone to pinpoint the major policy orientation of the Suzuki cabinet toward the Soviet Union. What the Suzuki administration did or did not do vis-à-vis the USSR during Suzuki's reign (July 1980–November 1982) was marked by ambiguities, inconsistencies, zigzaggings, and even mysteries.

First, let's examine Suzuki's attitude towards the Northern Territories issue. To be fair, the Suzuki administration did initiate with extraordinary enthusiasm a campaign to settle the territorial issue, which included the following measures: the declaration of February 7 as "Northern Territories Day"; incorporation of six towns and villages situated on three of the disputed islands—Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Shikotan—into the administrative district of Nemuro City, Hokkaido; financial assistance to areas adjacent to the islands for the purpose of promoting industries; and the tour of Prime Minister Suzuki himself by helicopter to view the islands from as close a vantage point as possible—the first visit ever made by a Japanese prime minister in the postwar history of Japan.

One cannot necessarily conclude from these measures, however, that the Suzuki government was more eager than were previous Japanese prime ministers to accomplish the reversion of the Northern Territories to Japan. Three main reasons can be mentioned to support this view.

The first is that there was no other major diplomatic objective left for Japan to pursue than the conclusion of a peace treaty with the USSR, which would resolve the territorial problem. This had been the case particularly since Japan's signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the People's Republic of China. In other words, any Japanese prime minister might have done what Suzuki did in order to demonstrate that his government was seriously coping with the task of correcting the irregular diplomatic heritage left by the Second World War.

The second reason, closely related, is that all the measures taken by the Suzuki cabinet were simply the kind of gestures that were exclusively oriented to home consumption, the imperatives of any Japanese top political leader. True, it is understandable and even necessary for any political leader to unite his home constituency before dealing with an external opponent. Unfortunately, however, unlike his predecessors, Suzuki stopped at this point; that is, in contrast to the measures he directed toward domestic voters, Suzuki did not do anything of consequence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Then what kind of plan did he have to deal with the Soviets?

This question bears directly on the third reason why I doubt that Suzuki was particularly enthusiastic about confronting the islands issue. In order to deal with the Soviets on the territorial problem, the Japanese government must put together a sort of comprehensive policy of strategies toward the Soviet Union, without which it seems almost impossible for Japan to undertake such an unprecedented confrontation as demanding the reversion of the Northern Territories. Such a grand strategy, in my view, must be formulated with careful consideration of such major problems as: How to secure Japan against the growing military buildup of Soviet forces on both a global and regional level; To what extent Japan should depend upon energy resources from the USSR; What kind of pressure—and how much—should Japan apply to the Soviet Union to regain the islands. Unfortunately, it seems that Suzuki never formulated such a grand strategy, or possibly never even realized the need for such a comprehensive policy toward the USSR.

Another example including a lack of eagerness by the Suzuki government to accomplish the reversion of the islands is the ambiguous attitude

of Prime Minister Suzuki toward the sanctions taken by Japan to protest the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan. True, Suzuki repeated the same line of contention as his predecessor, Ōhira Masayoshi, in this regard. For instance, in his first news conference as Japanese Prime Minister on July 18, 1981, Suzuki stated that he would endeavor to continue the policies of his predecessor, and that his selection as foreign minister of Itō Masayoshi, formerly Ōhira's Chief Cabinet Secretary and aide, was a concrete demonstration of this intention.[2] Since that time, Suzuki maintained, at least verbally, his position, stating repeatedly that "as long as the Soviet Union remains unchanged in its policy with regard to Afghanistan and the Northern Territories, any improvement in Japan–Soviet relations will be impossible." In practice, however, the Japanese government under Suzuki gradually softened, one by one, those measures that had been initiated by Ōhira.

The Japanese government under Ōhira had decided on three major countermeasures to demonstrate its "displeasure," together with that of other Western countries, at the Soviet move into Afghanistan. These represented a direct sign of Japan's intention to be an active member of "the West," and hence, ready to make sacrifices, to let the USSR know that such military aggression in Afghanistan would cost the invader dearly. The countermeasures were the boycott of the Moscow Olympics, the freezing of those trade projects that would make use of citizens' tax revenues through the Japanese Export-Import Bank, and the suspension of official personal exchanges between Japan and the Soviet Union. Although Japan followed through on the first countermeasure, the other two sanctions were gradually lifted almost to the point where the situation returned to that which existed before the Afghan incident took place. Let us look at the process by which these were related.

The Japanese government under Ōhira froze five big economic projects planned between Japan and the USSR: 1) plans for production of a plant to produce electro-magnetic steel plates; 2) the third stage of a program for timber resources development; 3) the Sakhalin offshore oil and natural gas resources project; 4) the coal production projects in Southern Yakutsk; and 5) the exportation of large steel pipes from Japan to the USSR. The first project remains inoperable, mainly because of the involvement of the U.S.

Company AMCO. But the second, third, and fourth projects were revived even during Ōhira's administration, the rationale being that a resource-needy country like Japan cannot get along without such vital natural resources as oil, gas, coal, and timber.

In contrast, however, it was difficult for Japan to settle on a satisfying rationale to justify the freezing of the fifth project, the selling of large steel tubes by several private Japanese producers to the Yamburg Gas Pipeline Project in West Siberia, for the three following reasons. To begin with, since it is engineered to provide natural gas to Western countries, the project has nothing to do with the energy question in Japan. Furthermore, the project is mainly financed by the Japanese Export-Import Bank, which is run by the government using tax revenues, thus enabling the USSR to purchase pipelines from Japanese industry. Lastly, the Reagan administration was strongly opposing this project, warning that it could lead in the future to too much Western dependence upon natural gas supplied by the USSR, which is not desirable from the security perspective. Despite the weak rationale employed to promote this project further, in 1981 the Suzuki government approved the contracts made by some Japanese enterprises and the Japanese Export-Import Bank, saying that otherwise "all the business of selling large pipelines to the USSR will be monopolized by West Germany, France, and other Western European countries."

In the wake of the Afghan incident, the Japanese government under Ōhira immediately put into effect a policy of suspending official person-to-person contacts at high governmental levels between Japan and the USSR. As a result of this policy, the following visits and meetings were called off: a planned meeting of the Soviet Ambassador to Japan, Dmitrii Polianskii, with top members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP); the scheduled visit to Tokyo by members of the Supreme Soviet; and any proposed visits to Japan by Soviet vice-foreign trade ministers. However, even this restriction underwent a gradual softening under Suzuki.

For example, in March 1981, Prime Minister Suzuki himself nearly accepted the request for a secret (?) meeting with Polianskii, although he eventually reconsidered and permitted Foreign Minister Itō Masayoshi to meet the Soviet ambassador first for the purpose of feeling out in advance

what the Soviet ambassador wanted to discuss. Since it turned out that Polianskii did not have anything new to propose, to say nothing of offering any concession on his country's stand with regard to the Northern Territories and other issues, Suzuki did not follow through and meet the ambassador. The fact that Suzuki even considered such a meeting, however, was regarded by some government observers as unfitting, since the Japanese ambassador to Moscow was not easily given the opportunity to meet even Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, not to mention General Secretary Brezhnev. Nonetheless, Suzuki overlooked this because he was misled by his own wishful thinking that the Soviet ambassador might propose some secret concession on the occasion of Suzuki's forthcoming visit to the United States for a meeting with the new American president, Ronald Reagan.

In late April–early May, 1981, ten Japanese LDP Diet members, who had once refused the visit of their counterparts, i.e., members of the Supreme Soviet, to Tokyo, initiated a week's visit to Moscow. This was not only the first visit since the Afghanistan incident, but also the first time in ten years that a mission made up only of members of the ruling Japanese party had visited the Soviet Union. Furthermore, according to the Japanese news agency Kyōdō, the Japanese emissaries, headed by former Foreign Minister Hatoyama Iichirō, went so far as to say that they would "plan to exert efforts on the Japanese government to encourage the lifting of the restrictions still imposed on Japan–Soviet exchange" and to express readiness to cooperate in the development of Siberia.[3]

Then in May 1981, Prime Minister Suzuki appointed one of his closest friends, Sonoda Sunao, to the office of Foreign Minister to replace Itō, who resigned in protest against the "double-standard diplomacy" of Suzuki, which I shall discuss later. Sonoda was reported to have called for a return to the so-called "omnidirectional" diplomacy, which was clearly abandoned by Ōhira when the Soviet military forces moved into Kabul. Shortly after taking the post, in June 1981, the new foreign minister decided to reverse the policy of his two immediate predecessors, Ōkita Saburō and Itō Masayoshi, by issuing entry visas to two Soviet economic delegations headed respectively by Soviet Vice-Foreign Trade Ministers

Viktor Ivanov and Vladimir Sushkov. Sonoda went a step further. Taking an opportunity afforded by a meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in New York in September 1981, which was attended by both the Japanese and Soviet foreign ministers, the new Japanese foreign minister proposed to his Soviet counterpart, Andrei Gromyko, that bilateral talks on a working or ministerial level be resumed between Japan and the Soviet Union. Needless to say, Gromyko immediately accepted Sonoda's suggestion, since this kind of high-level contact between Tokyo and Moscow had been officially suspended by the Japanese government. To be sure, there were some calculated rationales behind this bold initiative on the part of the Japanese.

The first one had to do with the change in certain international situations after December 1979. While still taking a tough posture with regard to Afghanistan and the Moscow-based political pressure on Poland, and continuing to build up military might to cope with the Soviet threat, the Western allies of Japan, e.g., the United States under President Reagan and West Germany under Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, had started to show signs of willingness to keep the door ajar for a dialogue with the Soviet Union. Apart from the question of whether Japan could imitate these so-called Western-type "dual" or "double-track" strategies in light of its inadequate military machine, the Tokyo government under Suzuki and Sonoda seemed to have come to a similar conclusion: that the time had come for Japan to open a channel for communication with Moscow to avoid being left dangerously isolated. The second rationale was that the Soviets most likely would not make any concessions to Japanese demands for the reversion of the Northern Territories, even if working-level or ministerial-level talks were held. Such an intransigent, uncompromising attitude by the Soviets would certainly reinforce the impression held by the Japanese general public that it was not Japan's but exclusively the Soviet's attitude that was to blame for the cold, strained bilateral relations between the two nations at the time.

Efforts by Japan to smooth out its relations with the Soviets were related to the inconsistent attitude of the Suzuki-Sonoda team towards the policy of cooperation with the United States in security affairs. In this regard, I

would like to touch upon Japan–U.S. relations, since Japan's Soviet policy is inseparably related to its American policy.

In the Joint Communiqué between Suzuki and Reagan issued on May 8, 1981, in Washington, D.C., the Japanese prime minister recognized that "the alliance between Japan and the United States is built upon their shared values of democracy and liberty." Acknowledging further "the desirability of an appropriate division of roles" between the two countries, Suzuki stated that "Japan will seek to make even greater efforts for improving its defense capabilities in Japanese territories and in its surrounding sea and air space." These words were undoubtedly interpreted by the U.S. side as a sign of Suzuki's willingness to take a very positive, cooperative posture towards Japan's security issues.

However, upon, or even before, his return to Tokyo from Washington, D.C., Suzuki showed signs of softening the words and commitments he made in this communiqué, giving his own interpretation to, for instance, the term "alliance" to the effect that Japan does not necessarily have to bear a greater military burden than she has so far. Foreign Minister Sonoda further underscored this attitude by stating in Manila that "a joint communiqué is not necessarily binding for Japan." If this were the end of the story, people would not be terribly surprised, as such verbal vacillations frequently occur. What surprises and puzzles us, however, is that Suzuki changed his position once again. Partially succumbing to external and domestic criticism of his double standard in the interpretation of the term "alliance" and the other commitments he made in Washington, which resulted in the resignation of Foreign Minister Itō, Suzuki pledged complete agreement with the U.S. and other Western countries at the Ottawa Summit in July of the same year, particularly stressing that the Soviet military buildup was a continuing threat to international security and stability and that the Japanese government was ready to negotiate and work with the Soviet Union only from a position of strength.

Another example of "double-talk diplomacy," which characterized the Suzuki administration and led many to doubt the prime minister's sense of political priorities, can be found in the way he treated the defense efforts of Japan. As stated above, Suzuki signed the Japan–U.S. Joint Communiqué,

in which he agreed with the notion of "division of labor" between the United States and Japan and promised "greater efforts for improving Japanese defense capabilities." In the interview at the National Press Club in Washington on the same day, Suzuki further clarified his position by promising that Japan would take steps to bolster its defense capabilities to cover several-hundred nautical miles off its shores and 1000-nautical-miles of its sea lanes.[4]

These statements may be regarded as particularly significant and encouraging in view of the fact that the United States called for Japan to step up its defense efforts in the seas west of Guam and north of the Philippines. Needless to say, these promises were more easily made than kept. In particular, Suzuki's final statement concerning the defense of the nation's sea lanes astonished even some specialists in the Japanese Defense Agency, who consider such efforts to be desirable and ideal but surely beyond the country's capability. For, apart from Japanese domestic and political constraints, it is clear that it is out of the question for Japan to extend its defense capabilities. Such drastic moves would demand an almost revolutionary change in the thinking of both the general public and administrators, a change which the Suzuki government seemed reluctant to make.

2. CAUSES OF AMBIGUITIES

The above, I believe, are sufficient examples to demonstrate the fact that there were observable ambiguities, inconsistencies, and even puzzling aspects in the policy orientations of the Suzuki government toward the Soviet Union. At this point, the important question that inevitably arises is: What factors are behind this inscrutable foreign policy orientation?

In order to answer this question, one cannot help but touch upon, first, the personal character of Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō. Many observers doubt strongly that Suzuki had any clear and definite opinion of the Soviets. Perhaps his first and most recent personal encounter with the Soviets was in the Japanese–Soviet fishing negotiations (in spring 1977), which took place as a result of the sudden Soviet declaration of an

exclusive 200-nautical-mile fishing zone in December 1976. (For details, see chapter 7.) During these talks, Suzuki must have experienced mixed feelings. On the one hand, being head of the Japanese delegation, he must have felt considerable humiliation, particularly when he was kept waiting all day long, very frequently in vain, for a meeting with his Soviet counterpart, Aleksander A. Ishkov, in the Japanese Embassy in Moscow. On the other hand, as the then Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries and a popular negotiator for the Japanese fishing industry, Suzuki must have found himself in a position of not wishing to strongly antagonize the Soviets or to risk losing the concessions desired by his supporters. It seems to me that the experience in 1977 helped to shape his perception of the Soviet Union as a country that Japan could not get along with, but one that it could not afford to antagonize either.

Another factor that appears to have made Suzuki take an ambiguous posture toward the Soviet Union is the situation that brought him to national leadership. When Ōhira Masayoshi died suddenly in June 1980, there were three powerful contenders for the premiership: Nakasone Yasuhiro, Kōmoto Toshio, and Miyazawa Kiichi. Because these three launched such a contentious campaign for the premiership, the LDP feared that its unity would be threatened, and thus, in its attempt to avoid fragmentation, the party nominated Suzuki Zenkō as a temporary compromise. Politically speaking, however, Suzuki was not the kind of politician who normally succeeds in claiming the coveted prize of national leadership. Although in the past he worked behind the scenes as a moderator in the party, Suzuki had never served in such offices as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Finance, or Minister of International Trade and Industry, as did his predecessors.

Seeming to recognize his limitations, Suzuki chose practically to accommodate different views of various contenders, factions, and groups, rather than assert his own personal view from a position of strong leadership. Nonetheless, he did not wish to forfeit his leadership, and thus in order to preserve his title, Suzuki became even more domestic and even faction-oriented than before. He perceived his domestic reputation to be of more value to him than his international one. This may explain my ear-

lier judgment of his Northern Territories campaign as a sort of gesture aimed mainly at earning politically useful credits on the home front and also the fact that he resorted to a double standard in interpreting the Suzuki–Reagan Communiqué he signed, particularly his independent interpretation of the Communiqué.

Some readers may be tempted to raise here the question of why, then, the Japanese electorate tolerated a leader who did not set forth a sound and workable foreign policy of his own. In regard to Suzuki's place in Japanese politics, I am tempted to point out the truth in the saying, "A people cannot have a political leader better than themselves," or, "Political leaders are the products of their environment." More concretely speaking, what I am suggesting is that the previously cited ambiguities, uncertainties, and inconsistencies of Prime Minister Suzuki were a reflection of the way the Japanese public deals with contentious situations. The Japanese were certainly changing, and yet it is still hard to say how fast and in what direction they were moving. In a sense, they found themselves in a transitional stage, and Suzuki himself might have been the embodiment of this stage.

In order to illustrate such ambiguous, inconsistent, and even opposing attitudes and tendencies of the Japanese public at that time, let us take a glance at an opinion poll conducted by the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, a widely read newspaper, in the fall of 1981.[5] According to this survey, more than half (54.4%) of the readers indicated their concern that Japan might become a target for some foreign enemy in the near future. Among those who gave this reply, about 70% pinpointed the Soviet Union as the aggressor nation. Moreover, approximately 70% of the respondents agreed that both the Japan–U.S. Mutual Security Treaty (MST) and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) were necessary for guaranteeing the security of Japan. On the other hand, the survey also showed an attitude that does not necessarily follow logically from the answers cited above; namely, that more than half of the respondents (56.9%) considered the present size of the SDF to be quite appropriate. Furthermore, 42%, the largest group of the respondents, still supported the Japanese government's basic policy of restricting defense expenditures to within the decided one-percent of the Japanese GNP.

It is not hard for Western observers, quite irritated by the logical inconsistencies demonstrated above, to criticize the ambiguous and contradictory stand of both Japanese leaders and public toward such important matters. By way of explanation, I would like to remind these rationally minded observers that the coexistence of apparently contradictory positions side-by-side is a sort of culture-bound feature of the Japanese, with a long tradition. Hence, it may be wrong and unrealistic for Western critics to expect the Japanese to abandon this deeply entrenched cultural characteristic overnight. Katō Shūichi, Japanese literary and social critic, has named the Japanese culture, which tolerates a variety of cultures coexisting side-by-side, a "mixed culture (*zakkyo bunka*)." Professor Nagai Yōsuke at Tokyo University of Technology went so far as to regard the Japanese capability of considering complexities and even contradictions at one and the same time as an example of the marvelous political wisdom of the Japanese nation.

What has been said so far about this Japanese characteristic can be put in a slightly different way: the Japanese do not necessarily have or want to have any fixed, distinct, clear-cut principle or standard, to say nothing of ideology, according to which they can make value judgments or policy decisions. They have tended to conceive of the world or life in general as being too complicated to be judged by a clear standard that distinguishes everything as either black (injustice) or white (justice), since they feel rather that the truth lies often in an in-between gray area.

What, instead, plays a significant role in Japanese decision-making is the "air" or "atmosphere" prevailing in a situation or environment at a given moment. No one else, to my knowledge, describes more accurately the role that "air" plays in Japanese decision-making than late Yamamoto Shichihei, social commentator, in the following passage of his book, *The Study of 'Air'* (1977):

> 'Air' is a monster with really great power [in decision-making in Japanese society]. It can be a sort of 'super-power'. . . . For 'air' leads top responsible persons into a situation in which they cannot explain why they did this or that . . . . Then statistics, documents, analyses or some scientific means of judging or logical arguments—all of these

> become useless. No matter how systematically all of these may be composed, they may simply fade away, letting 'air' decide everything.[6]

If what Mr. Yamamoto says is true in Japan, then political leaders in such a society are expected only to watch closely for a change of air on the domestic and/or international scene. If we study this phenomenon in regard to Japanese administrations, we can see that there are not many observable differences between the political determinations and activities of the Ōhira and Suzuki administrations. Ōhira participated in the policy encouraged by the Carter administration to protest the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan by "carefully watching how the Western nations reacted."[7] As a result of watching the drifts and changes in the international atmosphere following the application of this policy, especially the lifting of the grain embargo and a call to Brezhnev for arms control by U.S. President Ronald Reagan, and the Western European nations' interest in the Yamburg gas pipeline project and their positive attitude to keeping a door open for dialogue with the Soviet Union, Suzuki began softening the sanctions made previously. The "wait and see" approach of Japanese leaders clearly illustrates to Western observers that Tokyo's method of diplomacy has not yet overcome its postwar heritage of being reactive or passive rather than innovative or active in nature. At any rate, all that the best of Japanese political leaders can do is help create an atmosphere or environment in which a desired decision can be made smoothly rather than to persuade the people directly and aggressively to come to a certain decision. Naturally, such an indirect, evolutionary way of making a decision takes a longer time than does the direct way, and it may, of course, be particularly irritating to the more impatient non-Japanese, who prefer to get things done in a more straightforward way.

3. NAKASONE YASUHIRO AND THE UNITED STATES

In November 1982, Nakasone Yasuhiro succeeded Suzuki as the Japanese prime minister. In the words of Kenneth B. Pyle, professor at the University

of Washington, "the palpable nationalist mood of Japan at the beginning of the 1980s and the utter ineptness of Prime Minister Suzuki in handling the nation's foreign policy set the stage for Nakasone's emergence as the most imposing leader in foreign affairs that Japan had produced since Yoshida more than thirty years earlier."[8] In the 1970s and 1980s, all of the Japanese prime ministers were not only from the LDP but also served for only about two years each; for example, Fukuda Takeo (1976–1978), Ōhira Masayoshi (1978–1980), and Suzuki Zenkō (1980–1982). In such an apparently routine rotation there was one exception,[9]—Nakasone Yasuhiro, who served for a total of five years (1982–1987).

In fact, Nakasone Yasuhiro, perhaps the most articulate and outspoken political leader of postwar Japan, tried harder than any of his predecessors to accelerate the process of Japan's globalization. In order to clarify this position, Nakasone repeatedly stressed that "the fundamental principle of Japanese diplomacy" lies in making efforts "to promote solidarity with Western countries, particularly with the United States,"[10] and to "fulfill her [Japan's] obligations as a member of the Western community."[11] When the previous prime minister Suzuki referred to Japan–U.S. relations as an "alliance," quite a sensation resulted in Japan due to the term's strong *military* connotation. The furor, however, did not prevent the much bolder Nakasone from confirming that relations between Japan and the United States indeed constitute a military alliance,[12] nor going beyond that to describe those relations as "*unmei kyōdōtai* (a community bound together with a common destiny)."[13]

In addition, in regard to Japan's position on nuclear disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union, Nakasone clearly associated Japan with the United States and NATO member countries for the first time at the Williamsburg conference in May 1983. The final joint statement of that meeting contained a sentence that declared: "The security of our countries is indivisible and must be approached on a global basis."[14] This sentence was fully endorsed by the Prime Minister Nakasone, and according to some sources, was placed in the statement specifically at Nakasone's request.[15] In any case, one can conceivably interpret Nakasone's actions as a shift in policy orientation from the traditional postwar Japanese policy of "genuine

self-defense" to the concept of a more active commitment and larger Japanese role in security on a global scale.

Nakasone's policy toward the Soviet Union had three distinct features: 1) more coordination with U.S. Soviet policy; 2) manifestation of more self-confidence in Japan's own position; and 3) the gradual formation of a comprehensive Soviet policy.

Based on strong endorsement for solidarity with the Western alliance and his pledge of Japanese cooperation with the West on global security matters, the Nakasone government put into effect several concrete measures and actions. The first was Japan's continued support and participation in the sanctions initiated by the United States against Soviet misconducts in Afghanistan and Poland.

The expulsion in June 1983 from Japan of Arkadi A. Vinogradov, a middle-level Soviet embassy official who held the rank of first secretary, for suspected activities as a KGB agent provides another good example of the Nakasone government's firm intention to orchestrate its Soviet policy as much as possible with those of governments in the Western community.[16] This expulsion came just after similar moves against Soviet officials by France, Britain, the United States, and other Western countries over a three-month period. Although Japanese Foreign Ministry officials denied the connection with these incidents in the West, they also acknowledged that the Japanese government had first studied "these other precedents carefully" before taking action themselves. Some analysts also interpreted the expulsion as a direct response of the Nakasone government to U.S. criticism that Japan had not done much to prevent leakage of high-technology data and information to the Soviet Union. In his testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives held on June 14, 1982, Stanislav A. Levchenko, a former Tokyo correspondent of *Novoe Vremiia* who defected to the United States in 1979, said that "Japan is considered by the KGB to be the easiest country in which to run active operations."[17] Even calling Japan a "paradise for spies,"[18] a former KGB major identified about ten Japanese who served as his contacts when he worked as a Soviet agent in Tokyo during the 1970s.[19] Reports indicated that the Japanese government had been studying possible measures for restricting the flow of high or dual-use

technology information to the Soviet Union.[20] Whatever motivations were behind the Nakasone government's decision, it must have been made with the full knowledge that the expulsion of a Soviet diplomat was likely to worsen Japan's already deteriorated relations with the USSR.

In defense and military fields as well, the Nakasone government clearly demonstrated through concrete statements and actions its commitment to bring Japan closer to an alliance with the West. Resolving an issue handed down from his predecessor, Suzuki, Nakasone agreed to provide unconditionally to the United States advanced Japanese defense-related technologies. This decision, long-awaited by the U.S., signalled a major turnabout of Japan's strict policy of restricting the flow of weapon and military expertise to any foreign country. Tokyo's rationale for the decision was that such a transfer to the United States, with which Japan has a security arrangement, does not run counter to Japan's self-imposed principles on weaponry export.[21] The Nakasone government also demonstrated a serious commitment toward following up the concept of a 1000-mile sea-lane defense, which had been mentioned but never elaborated on by his predecessor, Suzuki.[22] *The White Paper on Defense* (1982) thus deliberately avoided use of the term "sea-lane defense."[23] Nakasone, however, put the concept in more concrete terms by explaining to an American audience during his January 1983 visit to Washington: "Our desire would be to defend the sea-lanes between Guam and Tokyo and between the strait of Taiwan and Osaka."[24] The Nakasone government agreed to a U.S.–Japanese study of joint sea-lane operations.[25] With an official endorsement, the 1983 edition of Japan's *White Paper on Defense* elaborated on this concept and used the term "sea-lane defense" for the first time[26] in a Japanese government official document.

Likewise, Nakasone responded more specifically than Suzuki did to the U.S. requests for Japan to blockade three straits—Sōya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima—in an effort to restrict the Soviet fleet in the Far East. During his January 1983 visit to Washington, Prime Minister Nakasone emphasized: "[One of Japan's] largest objectives is to have complete and full control of the three straits that go through the Japanese islands so that there should be no passage of Soviet submarines or other naval activities."[27]

4. SELF-CONFIDENCE AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

A second characteristic of the Nakasone government's attitude toward the Soviet Union is "self-confidence." In his attempt to stress Japan's need to increase her defense efforts, Nakasone made a slip of the tongue in June 1983, when he stated: "If we do not do anything much for our defense, Japan will end up becoming a country like Finland, which must ask favors from the Soviet Union [to survive]."[28] Aside from the question of whether his analogy was appropriate or not,[29] we clearly see the message that Nakasone wanted to convey to the Japanese voters in his election campaign for the Upper House of the Diet: Put bluntly, Japan would be "Finlandized,"[30] if she does not adequately prepare for her own defense. In our context here, the implication is simple—as long as Japan takes care of herself, particularly in regard to defense matters, Japan will neither have to worry about the Soviet Union nor ask favors of Moscow. More implicitly, this remark by Nakasone reveals the crux of his Soviet policy: There is no particular reason for Japan to take the diplomatic initiative to improve relations with the USSR.

This fundamental policy orientation stemmed from the Nakasone government's cold assessment of the situation at that time, as well as from increasing self-confidence on the part of the Japanese. It is true that the normalization and improvement of relations with the Soviet Union remains the largest diplomatic task facing Japan, and it is easy to imagine that an ambitious politician such as Nakasone—who wanted to be distinguished from his predecessors—would have been tempted to challenge and successfully solve this last and most difficult task in order to be remembered forever as the politician who finally broke through the long stalemate with the USSR. Yet, Nakasone seemed to have been convinced that as long as Moscow did not change its fundamental policy toward Japan, Tokyo must not initiate anything. More importantly, given the situation at that time, Tokyo was able to afford to refrain from taking action. In fact, in April 1983, Nakasone instructed the Japanese ambassador to Moscow, Takashima Masuo, to adopt a "wait and see" policy for a while, during which time Japan would take no initiative or action but instead would sit back to await a Soviet initiative.[31]

As might be expected, the Nakasone government demonstrated a firm, uncompromising stance on the Northern Territories issue. On February 6, 1983, one day before the annual "Northern Territories Day," Nakasone bitterly criticized the Soviet "illegal seizure"[32] of the islands: "We have a responsibility to *secure (kakuho suru)* the four northernmost islands as our territory." (emphasis added by H.K.)[33] The Nakasone government, indeed, regarded the solution of the territorial question as "the greatest prerequisite" (Foreign Minister Abe Shintarō)[34] for establishing genuinely friendly relations between Japan and the USSR. Nakasone himself stressed, however, that there was no need for Japan to "show any coquetry (*bitai o miseru*)."[35] Nor should Japan "beg" for the return of its territory. Instead, Japan should demonstrate, in Nakasone's words, "a resolute attitude in its diplomacy as an independent sovereign state."[36] Nakasone endorsed the movement for the reversion of the islands by sending three cabinet members on individual "visual inspection tours" of the islands, conducted from off the coast of Nemuro Peninsula, the closest accessible point to the disputed islands: The general cabinet minister made his inspection in January 1983, the director general of the Defense Agency made his first inspection in May 1983, and the foreign minister inspected the territories in August 1983 for the first time since 1976.[37]

While Prime Minister Nakasone himself paid visits to South Korea, the United States (twice), and to ASEAN countries within the first half of his term in office, he showed no interest whatsoever in sending cabinet ministers to the USSR for visits. Nakasone's rationale was to strictly adhere to the diplomatic principle of reciprocity. On April 23, 1983, Prime Minister Nakasone reportedly said: "For the purpose of improving bilateral relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, Japan wants, among other things, Mr. Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet First Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister, to visit Tokyo. We want this particularly because our foreign ministers have visited many more times than theirs have. At stake here is Japan's national prestige."[38] By the same principle, the Japanese Foreign Ministry approved a meeting between Soviet Vice-Foreign Minister Mikhail S. Kapitsa and Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone and Foreign Minister

Abe Shintarō only when Japanese Ambassador to Moscow Takashima was guaranteed a meeting with Soviet Premier Nikolai A. Tikhonov.[39]

The third feature of the Nakasone government's policy toward the USSR under Andropov concerned the need for a comprehensive approach. Recognition of the need for a comprehensive approach came about only gradually. The Japanese government finally seemed to have realized the Soviets' skill in arbitrarily linking economics with politics when convenient and disconnecting them when the link becomes inconvenient. The Nakasone government considered the best way to counter this tactic was to be not only fully aware of the method but to resort to the same technique oneself. Thus, the Nakasone government made an effort to keep Moscow from exploiting this favorite Soviet tactic of separating trade from political affairs.

The Nakasone government displayed their own intent for linking politics and economics when confronted with the so-called Nagano business mission. This large delegation of more than 200 Japanese businessmen, headed by Nagano Shigeo, visited Moscow in late February 1983. The Nakasone government, of course, was in no position to prevent the businessmen from visiting the USSR, but government officials showed their displeasure rather candidly. Reportedly, Nakasone himself declined Nagano's request to issue a personal letter addressed to Soviet President Andropov; Nakasone feared such a letter might have been interpreted as the Japanese government's full-fledged endorsement of the delegation's mission. At a meeting held prior to the delegation's departure, Katō Kichiya, Director General of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Bureau of European and Oceanic Affairs, carefully expressed the Japanese government's hope that delegation members would behave very cautiously and would not forget that Japan could not separate economics from politics.[40] Mr. Nagano and other businessmen in the delegation considered such remarks unnecessary and were even infuriated that the government would preach such a clear principle to grown-up businessmen, who were Japanese prior to being businessmen.[41] Katō's unusual interference in this case was rationalized by the belief at the Foreign Ministry that economic power is Japan's only effective trump card vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the Northern Territories question.[42]

For its part, the Japanese government under Nakasone purposely attempted, as much as possible, to link the territorial question with other issues. Advocating this comprehensive approach, Nakasone said that although the solution of the territorial question is the fundamental condition for the improvement of Japan's relations with the USSR, other issues exist as well. These include, fishing, the development of Siberia and Sakhalin, and scientific and cultural exchanges. "From such a *comprehensive (hōkatsu-tekina)* approach, I am trying to find a way out of the deadlock in negotiations on the territorial issue."[43] On the other hand, when Japan found it disadvantageous to link one field with another, the Nakasone government did not hesitate to separate matters. For example, when his government expelled the Soviet diplomat (Vinogradov) from Japan in June 1983, the Japanese Foreign Ministry tried to distinguish this incident from Japan's intention to improve relations with the Soviet Union by concluding a long-term agreement on fishing rights, a tax agreement, and plans for cultural exchanges.[44]

Chapter 11

ANDROPOV'S POLICY: ANY CHANGE?

1. CONTINUITY IN BASIC ATTITUDE

Soviet foreign policy under the new leadership of Iurii V. Andropov will follow the same course as that set out under Brezhnev. This seems to have been the message that Andropov wanted to convey in his maiden speech to the CPSU's Central Committee on November 22, 1982, which particularly underlined the "continuity"[1] of Soviet foreign policy. The new CPSU's General Secretary stated that "Soviet foreign policy has been and will be as it was defined by the decisions of the 24th, 25th and 26th Party Congresses [held in Brezhnev's days—H.K.]."[2] Needless to say, no serious student of Soviet foreign policy would take these official statements literally. Given the nature of foreign policy, official comments are rarely implemented in their original form; they must instead be interpreted, modified, or even abandoned, depending upon the situation. Furthermore, actual Soviet conduct of foreign affairs very frequently deviates from goals formally enunciated, at times to such an extent that one comes to think that words and deeds are two completely different things in Soviet foreign policy.[3]

Having the above caveat in our minds, however, we can still rather safely say that, regarding Soviet policy towards Japan, there was no change after the ascendence of the new Kremlin leadership. While Japan surely did not oc-

cupy a very high place on Andropov's list of foreign policy objectives, the Soviet government had to clarify its position toward Japan on a day-to-day basis. In fact, after the death of Leonid I. Brezhnev (November 10, 1982), there were significant actions and statements by Moscow toward Tokyo. Careful examination reveals that there was fortunately not a very large discrepancy discernable between official Soviet pronouncements and their actual engagements, and, more importantly, there was no indication of a shift in their foreign policy vis-à-vis Japan away from that of Brezhnev's days. In other words, the following passages in the editorial by a *Moscow Radio* commentator, Iurii Afornin, entitled "The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy Toward Japan," which was aired on November 19, 1982, about a week after Andropov assumed the top leadership in the Kremlin, happened to be correct in practice as well: "Statements by Soviet leaders in Moscow in the past several days [since Brezhnev's death—H.K.] have demonstrated to the world *the complete continuity of the Soviet foreign policy* and the USSR's resolve to follow the path pointed to by the decision of the 26th CPSU Congress. . . . It also reflects the keynote of Soviet policy toward Japan." (emphasis added by H.K.)[4] Let us look at this in more detail.

Vitalii Kobysh, chief of the U.S. section, International Department of the CPSU's Central Committee, made the following remark. I have already cited this remark in Chapter 1, but, since it was made in December 1982, shortly after both Andropov and Nakasone took office, let me quote it again:

> Although Japan does not belong to the category of a great power, her weight in the contemporary world is very significant and is constantly growing. . . . Toward the end of this century Japan's GNP will constitute 12 percent of that of the whole world. It is unrealistic not to take this into consideration when analyzing the correlation of forces in the world arena. . . . As demonstrated by the experience of this country, the influence of a state today is not determined by its military potential.[5]

Japanese specialists on Japan–Soviet relations wonder if and to what extent they can take such a remark seriously. If taken literally, the comment

by Kobysh signaled a revolutionary change in the Soviet mind-set in general and in the way of assessing the power of a nation in particular. Previously, in the Soviet concept of the "correlation of forces" and assessment of power of a nation, the military component had occupied the exceedingly dominant position, while the economic capability as such had constituted far less important weight. Such a peculiar Soviet conception resulted in Moscow's proclivity to underestimate the weight of Tokyo's voices both in international politics and in Soviet–Japanese relations. In marked contrast, however, what Kobysh was then observing and arguing is: 1) the military potential of a nation does not constitute the most important component of its political influence; 2) economic capability occupies a significant place in the "correlation of forces"; and, consequently, 3) the significance of the role that Japan will play in the next decade is much greater and should never be underestimated.

The question to be asked is: Was such a statement by a high Party official to be regarded as an indication of a real shift of Moscow's concept of the "correlation of forces," and hence its assessment and perception of Japan? Moreover, can we consider the remark as a reflection of the Andropov government's new policy orientation toward Tokyo, a line quite different from that under Brezhnev?

The first question concerns the nature of official Soviet pronouncements and writings. As influential Soviet commentator Aleksandr Bovin once candidly admitted, the verbal expression of a policy "can play a dual role"[6] in our terms: educational or guiding and propagandistic. The first function "reflects (*otrazhaet*) real political intentions,"[7] in the case of the Soviet Union, of the Kremlin's leadership so that the Party rank and file and Soviet general public can be informed of where the official Party line on a particular issue at the given moment is located. If we regard the remark by Kobysh as one intending to fulfill an educational and guiding role, we may say that a change in the relative weight of variables of the Soviet concept of "correlation of forces," particularly with regard to the assessment of the power of Japan, is slowly taking place in the Kremlin. In place of the traditional assessment derived from a heavy dependence upon military factors, a new mix with more emphasis upon nonmilitary elements, especially economic

and technological elements, may be gradually emerging. Conversely, the second (propagandistic) function of Soviet official pronouncements and public writings is called upon "to conceal (*skryt'*) the real political interests and intentions" (Bovin)[8] in order not to let the Soviet general public and the foreign observers learn what the Kremlin leadership really has on its mind. It is, of course, possible to regard the article by Kobysh as one intending to serve the second role. The article, which was written by Kobysh immediately after his visit to Japan,[9] could be nothing but a nice verbal compliment or gesture addressed to the Japanese, which does not cost much to the Soviets.

The one important example of the lack of any significant changes in Soviet attitudes towards Japanese–Soviet relations is provided by Soviet intransigence over the Northern Territories issue. Due to its function as a symbol of the more profound disparities between Japan and the Soviet Union, the Northern Territories issue serves as the best measure for detecting any significant changes in attitudes and policy regarding national security and basic determinants for solving international disputes.

Although Andropov did not have an opportunity to publicly enunciate his position on the territorial dispute between Japan and the Soviet Union, it did not appear likely that he would alter Soviet policy on this matter. In his maiden speech given at the plenary session of the CPSU Central Committee on November 22, 1982, he indicated that he rejected any possibility of the Soviets making efforts for the purpose of improving relations with Japan or making any unilateral concessions such as the return of the Northern Territories to Japan. As the CPSU's new Secretary General put it:

> The statement, in which readiness for normalizing [state] relations is linked with the demand that the Soviet Union pay for this with some preliminary concessions in different fields, does not sound serious to say the least. We shall not agree to this . . . . I want to stress once more that the Soviet Union stands for agreement, but that must be sought on a basis of reciprocity and equality.[10]

Having quoted the above paragraph, Iurii Kuznetsov concluded in the March 1983 issue of *Kommunist* that "there is no such thing as an unresolved territorial question between the two countries."[11] This is exactly the same phrase that was used under Brezhnev. In an article entitled "Fabrications and Truth about the 'Northern Territories,'" which appeared in the March 1983 issue of another important Soviet periodical, *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* (International affairs), Soviet authors likewise categorically denied Japanese claims to the disputed islands. Criticizing remarks made by Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone in his major policy speech delivered in December 1982, in which the Prime Minister stated that his government wanted to stabilize relations with the Soviet Union by concluding a peace treaty that would settle the Northern Territories question, Konstantin Andreev and Kiril Cherevko literally reiterated the official position of the Soviet government that Japanese demands for the islands were both "unfounded and unlawful."[12] These are exactly the same terms that were first used by former CPSU Secretary General Brezhnev during the 25th Party Congress held in February–March of 1976.[13]

In sum, it seemed to be premature to detect any meaningful change in the Soviet perception of Japan from Kobysh's remark. Furthermore, even if we admitted that the Soviet perception of Japan was undergoing some transformation, we should not associate such perceptional change directly or automatically with actual change in Soviet foreign policy conduct toward Japan. For, no matter how important a component it may be, decision-makers' image or perception of other nations constitutes, after all, only one of the determinants of foreign policy formation, which is formulated by many other variables, rational and irrational. It thus becomes more important for us to see what else the new Soviet government under Andropov was stating concerning Japan and, more importantly, what it was actually doing to the Japanese. Only after carefully examining these other statements and actions, can we safely say whether what Kobysh was saying is merely lip-service to the Japanese or a more serious manifestation of a real change in policy toward Tokyo.

2. MORE MILITARY BUILDUP IN THE FAR EAST

The first important thing we must draw our attention to in this regard is the Andropov government's continued interest in the military buildup in the Far East and the regions adjacent to Japan, the area that is roughly east of Lake Baikal and includes the maritime provinces, Sakhalin, Kamchatka, the Kurile Islands, and the Northern Territories. It may be true that the Soviet military forces that already were and would be deployed in this area are not targeted at Japan—as explained by Soviet spokesmen—but at the United States and China. However, given the geographically multi-targetable missions of the military forces, together with the technological nature and mobility of modern weaponry, such a Soviet explanation or excuse was not convincing to the Japanese. The majority of the Japanese regarded the Soviet military buildup in the above-mentioned area as one directed, if not wholly at least partially, at Japan. This was exactly the reaction that Moscow wanted to have from the Japanese.

Let us now compare the last three years of the Brezhnev era, i.e., 1980–82, with the first year of the Andropov period, 1982–83, in order to view clearly the intensified efforts of the Soviet military buildup in the Asia-Pacific region under Andropov's leadership. As indicated in Table 1, Soviet ground forces deployed in the Far East increased gradually from 34 divisions, totalling about 350,000 men in 1980 (through to 39 divisions of 360,000 men in both 1981 and 1982), to 40 divisions comprising some 370,000 men in 1983.

The Far Eastern naval forces, under the command of the Soviet Pacific Fleet headquartered in Vladivostok, also demonstrated steady growth. They increased their number of warships from about 785, with a total displacement of 1.52 million tons, in 1980, to 820 vessels, totalling 1.62 million tons, in 1983. Furthermore, the Soviet Union under Andropov and Chernenko appeared to be particularly interested in replacing submarines currently deployed in the Sea of Okhotsk with strategic ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBNs). The Soviet Pacific Fleet had already deployed 12–13 *Delta*-class submarines (SSBNs) armed with SS-N-18 missiles, which can reach the U.S. mainland from the Sea of Okhotsk. Furthermore, it

seemed that the Soviet government intended to add submarines armed with more powerful missiles, e.g., *Oscar*-class with SS-N-19 and *Typhoon*-class with SS-N-20 missiles.[14]

Although the Soviet air forces showed a slight decrease in the numbers of aircraft in 1982–1983, the quality of the forces improved. In fact, improvements in the Soviet air forces in the Far East greatly exceeded any improvements made in air forces elsewhere in the USSR. For example, the main type of bomber in the Soviet Far Eastern region was being changed from TU-16 *Badgers* (with a maximum speed of mach 0.8 and an operational radius of 6,400 km) to a vastly improved anti-surface and anti-ship supersonic bomber, the TU-22 M *Backfire* (with a speed of mach 2.5 and range of about 8,800–9,600 km without in-fkight refueling). About 20 *Backfires*, targeted against Chinese ground forces, were first identified at the Belaia airfield, west of Lake Baikal in Siberia. Later, about 50 more *Backfires* were detected in the naval aviation units stationed at the Alekseieskaia airfield, close to Vladivostok in the Soviet Far East. The deployment of *Backfires* in the Pacific theater undoubtedly added "a new dimension to the threat to sea-lanes in the area."[15] From their base in the Soviet maritime provinces, the *Backfires* could launch an attack against the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces or the U.S. Seventh Fleet and return without refueling. On September 14, 1982, eleven *Backfires* conducted an exercise in the Sea of Japan to practice an attack on a U.S. aircraft carrier, using the *Minsk* as a target.[16]

Under Andropov and Chernenko, the Soviet Union continued to improve the combat capabilities of its forces deployed on the disputed islands. One method by which the Soviets qualitatively enhanced their military potential on the islands was through replacement of old weaponry with more modern and sophisticated weapons. In December 1982, the Soviet Union sent twelve supersonic MiG-21 fighters to the Tennei airfield on Etorofu to replace a squadron of MiG-17s. Half a year later (May 1983), however, these MiG-21s were withdrawn and replaced by about 10 MiG-23 fighters, which presumably would be stationed in Etorofu on a long-term basis.[17] Another half a year later, the Soviet Union did not hesitate to add 10 MiG-23 fighters to the airbase on Etorofu—thus doubling the total

SOVIET MILITARY DEPLOYMENT IN THE FAR EAST

	Brezhnev era		Andropov era	
	1980	1981	1982	1983
Ground Forces				
Divisions	34	39	39	40
Men	350,000	360,000	360,000	370,000
Naval Forces (Pacific Fleet)				
Warships	785	800	810	820
Tonnages	1,520,000	1,580,000	1,600,000	1,620,000
Air Forces	2,060	2,210	2,120	2,100
Bombers	450	450	420	440
Fighters	1,450	1,600	1,550	1,510
Patrol planes	160	160	150	150

Source: Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan* (Tokyo: The Japan Times, Ltd., 1980, 1981, 1982, and 1983).

number of planes deployed there.[18] The so-called "third-generation" aircraft, the MiG-23, had greater air and surface attack capabilities than the "second-generation" MiG-21, not to mention the "first-generation" MiG-17. While the MiG-21s, with a combat radius of 650–740 km, covered only the northeastern part of Japan, the MiG-23s, with a doubled combat radius of 900 to 1,200 km, could fly to bomb Tokyo and return to Etorofu. In the middle of October 1983, an unknown number of Soviet fighters, probably the MiG-23s that had recently been deployed on Etorofu, violated Japanese airspace east of Hokkaido.[19] This action was believed to be a demonstrative flight intended to counterbalance a joint

U.S.–Japanese exercise occurring at that time in Hokkaido.[20] Regardless of Soviet intentions, it was the 14th recorded Soviet violation of Japanese airspace since 1967.[21] Only a month later, on November 15, the 15th Soviet violation of Japanese airspace was recorded, when three Soviet bombers, identified as two TU-16 *Badgers* and a TU-95 *Bear*, twice violated Japanese airspace over the Sea of Japan off Tsushima Strait.[22]

3. DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE WITH SS-20s

The second salient feature of Soviet conduct of foreign affairs regarding Japan after Andropov's assumption of power was the effort to use the Soviet military buildup as a diplomatic weapon. The Andropov leadership clearly revealed its intention to apply to the Japanese continuously, and even to an intensified degree, Moscow's traditional attempt to translate the Soviet physical might into political influence. Why didn't the new Soviet leadership change that policy which, under Brezhnev, turned out so frequently to be counterproductive? We can only guess at the reasons for this. Like his predecessors and many of his current colleagues at the time, Iurii Andropov was after all most probably neither a very flexible nor an imaginative leader. It is even conceivable that the new general secretary himself firmly believed that intimidation was in the end the best policy to be applied to the Japanese. Even in the case when he himself was, and did in fact intend to be, a flexible and innovative political leader, what could he do? He could not afford to take a bold initiative toward Tokyo, given the political system and climate in the Soviet Union at that time. The strong inertia of the past, his unstable domestic power position, and the high cost of Tokyo's request for the improvement of Japan–Soviet bilateral relations (i.e., the reversion of the Northern Territories) did not provide Andropov with an incentive to depart from the traditional Soviet policy toward Japan. The best that Andropov was able to do for the time being was to implement the traditional method more skillfully and effectively than his predecessors. In any case, the policy that the Soviet government under Andropov in fact followed with regard to Japan was its continuous resort to coercive diplomacy,

with the demonstration of the USSR's massive military might in the Far East and in the vicinity of Japan. A typical example is provided by Andropov's "SS-20 diplomacy," which will be elaborated upon below.

Although quite a number of SS-20s, mobile intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), had already been deployed in Asia during the Brezhnev era, it was under the Andropov regime (November 1982–February 1984), which threatened Japan with the possible transfer of more SS-20s from Europe to Asia, that the Japanese became greatly concerned about this extremely powerful and sophisticated missile. The shock came with a report by the West German newspaper *Die Welt*, according to which Andropov told Hans-Jochen Vogel, West German Social Democratic (SPD) leader, on January 12, 1983, that the Soviet government was then considering re-deploying "in Siberia" those SS-20s that exceeded an agreed-upon quota for the European zone by the possible conclusion of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement with the United States "in order to counter a new military base in Japan."[23]

It was quite clear that Andropov was apparently referring to Tokyo's decision in the fall of 1982 to accept the U.S. plan to deploy F-16 fighter-bombers, starting in 1985, at Misawa airbase in northern Japan. If this was what Andropov had in mind, it was nothing but a great surprise for us to find another example of the Soviet Union deliberately confusing the cause and consequence, or of the Soviets overreacting to the U.S. and/or Japan's action. For, from the perspective of Washington and Tokyo, the decision to deploy F-16s at Misawa was none other than an inevitable countermeasure on the part of the U.S. and Japan in order to balance what the USSR had already done to them—that is, deployment on the Northern Islands and in the vicinity of Japan of MiG-23s, MiG-27s and Sukhoi fighter-bombers, which can carry nuclear weapons. It was regarded as an overreaction on the side of the Soviet Union to later (1985) counter F-16 *fighter-bombers* with the threat of deployment of more SS-20 *missiles*, adding to the 108 already deployed in the Asian zone.

At any rate, Andropov's threat was confirmed shortly thereafter by his foreign minister. On January 17, 1983, five days after his boss's remark to Vogel and one day before Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone's sensational

statement about "an unsinkable aircraft carrier" in Washington, D.C., Andrei A. Gromyko in Bonn told his West German counterpart, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, that the Soviet government would move some of its European-based SS-20s to "Siberia."[24] According to the West German weekly *Der Spiegel*, the Soviet foreign minister explained to Genscher that the Soviets ought to counter the American military buildup in Asia, including the areas "around Okinawa" and "in the sea around Japan."[25]

What the Soviets later said reveals, wittingly or unwittingly, inconsistency with regard to the question as to whether the SS-20s to be transferred from Europe to Siberia would be particularly aimed at Japan. Faced with Tokyo's strong protest conveyed by the Japanese Ambassador to Moscow, Takashima Masuo, the Soviet foreign minister assured Takashima on February 23, 1983 that Soviet missiles [in Asia] are prepared against nuclear weapons in South Korea but not against Japan.[26] Confirming the words of Gromyko, Georgii Arbatov also clearly stated to the *Asahi Shimbun* on March 12 that "the Soviet intermediate-range missiles are not and will not be targeted against Japan."[27] Without hesitating at all to take back his own words to the Japanese ambassador less than six weeks before, however, A. Gromyko, in an exceptionally rare televised news conference with Western journalists in Moscow on April 2, 1983, tried to justify the possible transfer of SS-20s from Europe to Soviet territory in Asia and the Far East on the grounds that "Japan and the waters around it are stuffed with nuclear weapons and carriers for them. Okinawa is a huge base of nuclear weapons."[28] Surprisingly, this was not the end of the whole story. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail S. Kapitsa reversed, in Tokyo, what his boss Gromyko told foreign newsmen in Moscow only ten days earlier. In a meeting with his Japanese counterpart, Vice Foreign Minister Matsunaga Nobuo, and other high officials at the Japanese Foreign Ministry on April 11, 1983, Kapitsa noted that "the Soviet Union has no single SS-20 directed at Japan."[29]

As is clear from the above, the Andropov government on one occasion indicated that the Soviet SS-20s are targeted against Japan, whereas on another occasion, particularly when addressed to a Japanese audience, it denied clearly such a statement previously made by other spokesmen. How then is

one to understand these two apparently contradicting Soviet pronouncements? It would of course be conceivable to regard these mixed messages as a reflection of the fact that the Soviet government under Andropov in itself did not reach a unified view on the subject matter. A cynical observer can go as far as to comment that, particularly in view of the mobile nature of SS-20s, it is not worthwhile discussing at which target these Soviet intermediate missles are directed.

For all these and other critical remarks, however, it still seems worthwhile to try to understand the real reason why the Ahdropov leadership was sending such seemingly inconsistent or mixed messages to Japan. The interpretation of the author is that the Andropov government was sending a deliberately ambiguous message to Tokyo so that it could exploit the issue as one of the best political instruments for manipulating the Japanese. That is to say, the Soviet Union under Andropov conditioned the question of the targeting of Soviet SS-20s deployed this side of the Urals to Japan's behavior. As long as Tokyo behaved itself well, in particular refraining from increasing cooperation with Washington in the military field, the Soviet Union could pledge that those SS-20s would not be directed at Japan. If Tokyo did not behave as the Soviets wanted, however, the Soviet Union could not offer such a pledge because the Soviet Union would then—according to the Soviets—have no other means to protect its own national interests.

Careful re-examination of those Soviet remarks cited above helps prove the correctness of such an interpretation. Immediately after stating that "The Soviet Union has no single SS-20 directed at Japan," Kapitsa, for example, did not fail to make the following reservation: "Unless Japan is involved in an anti-Soviet strategy, Japan has nothing to worry about."[30] Having told the *Asahi Shimbun*, as cited previously, that "The Soviet intermediate-range missiles are and will not be targeted against Japan," G. Arbatov also did not forget to add in the same breath the following condition: "This will be the case as long as Japan will remain a non-nuclear power and not allow other powers to deploy and maintain their nuclear weapons in Japan or to use Japanese territory for launching an attack on the USSR."[31] If my interpretation is correct, the message that Moscow intended to convey to Tokyo

was not inconsistent and ambiguous but quite clear-cut, articulate and consistent—it was not up to Moscow but Tokyo to decide finally whether the Soviet SS-20s would be targeted against Japan. This, for the Soviets, was naturally a far better tactic than to declare categorically that the Soviet SS-20s in Asia were or were not directed at Japan.

4. ANDROPOV'S NEW PROPOSAL

Andropov did make a "concessionary" proposal on August 26, 1983.[32] Changing abruptly the Kremlin's earlier insistence on the right to move any of the mobile SS-20 missiles now targeted on Western Europe into Asia, Andropov proposed that his government would dismantle or destroy any missiles that it removed under the agreement in exchange for concessions from the West. The Soviet Union would not redeploy them elsewhere (presumably in the Asian part of the USSR) provided that the United States would accept Moscow's terms for limiting medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. This new offer by the Soviet top leader might have been regarded as a "positive sign,"[33] but only in the following limited sense. To begin with, from the Western perspective, the concession, if any, in the new offer was of a "peripheral"[34] kind, because it avoided addressing the central objections to the Soviet negotiating position in the deadlocked INF talks in Geneva. What Andropov was trying to offer could be regarded as a new condition rather than a concession. For, the Soviet decision to liquidate some SS-20s was contingent on U.S. acceptance of Moscow's terms, namely of Soviet missiles remaining equal in number to those of the British and French and on renunciation of NATO's plan to deploy Pershing-II and cruise missiles in Europe. It was quite obvious that what Andropov was aiming at was to exploit the question of whether or not to shift the SS-20s from Europe to Asia as a useful bargaining chip in the INF negotiations.

From the Japanese vantage point, Andropov's new offer was not regarded as a one-sided favor made by Moscow to Tokyo either. True, the proposal was "welcome news," as Prime Minister Nakasone reportedly commented,[35] so long as the reduction of SS-20s in Europe would not

mean a redeployment of SS-20s in the Asian part of the USSR. But, quite obviously, the new proposal did not refer to and would not affect at all those SS-20s that were already in place in Asia, and were presumably aimed at China, Korea, and Japan. Furthermore, without moving SS-20s from Europe, the Soviet Union had the means to increase the number of SS-20s in its Asian part, if it wanted to. This was the case, because there was neither an agreement concluded, nor even negotiated, with regard to the limitation of intermediate-range nuclear forces in the Asia-Pacific theater, unlike in the European theater. And the Soviet Union had in fact reportedly started construction of new missile sites in four areas in preparations that could lead to the virtual doubling of its SS-20s targeted on Asia in the future.[36] In short, by offering a small (or minor) "concession," even if it had to be carried out, the Soviet Union would not lose much in practice. On the contrary, the USSR could even earn the benefit of being able to justify or make indisputable the existence of those SS-20s that were already and would be deployed in Asia.

What Andropov was aiming at by his new offer on August 26 was not limited to this. It bore one more important function—to coerce as many politico-diplomatic concessions as possible from Tokyo in exchange for the "concession" of possibly refraining from redeployment of the missiles in Asia. Taking full advantage of his visit to the Japanese Foreign Ministry to formally convey to the Tokyo government Andropov's new proposal in the INF negotiation on August 29, 1983, Soviet Ambassador to Japan Vladimir Y. Pavlov made a request to Katō Yoshiya, Director General of the Ministry's European and Oceanic Affairs Bureau, that "the Japanese government give proper respect to the new Soviet proposal."[37] "Since the INF is not simply a question of Europe," the ambassador continued, "the Soviet Union is ready to respond to Japan, if the latter wants to have a dialogue with the former."[38] The message that Pavlov really wanted to convey to Tokyo is quite clear—that is, a request of a corresponding favor from Tokyo to Moscow in exchange for the "concession" that Moscow may make in the INF negotiations in Europe. More concretely speaking, what the Soviet ambassador suggested is that Japan should make some diplomatic initiative that would contribute to a

breakthrough in the long-deadlocked, chilly relations between Japan and the USSR. It is thus safe to say that Andropov did not change at all his basic strategy of exploiting the question of the SS-20s as the most powerful diplomatic instrument that his government ever had for manipulating Japanese behavior toward Moscow.

On October 4, 1983, Arai Hirokazu, Counsellor of the Japan Defense Agency, predicted that the Soviet Union would increase the total number of SS-20s deployed in the Far East from the 108 in 1983 to 135 in the foreseeable future.[39] Only ten days later, the Japanese learned that Arai's prediction had already partially materialized.[40] The USSR, it was learned, completed an additional deployment of 18 missiles—making a total of 126 missiles aimed at Asia.[41]

5. AN AGREEMENT ON NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

In Chapter 9, it was described how the Soviet government under Brezhnev tried hard to make Tokyo agree to concluding a treaty agreement with the USSR, an agreement short of a peace treaty, which would solve the territorial issue. A treaty of good-neighborliness and cooperation, an agreement on confidence-building measures (CBMs), and an agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons were some of the concrete proposals made, though in vain, by the former Soviet president. Andropov seemed to pursue exactly the same objective as his predecessor but with more reliance upon the threat of SS-20s. He appeared to argue that if the Japanese were so concerned about the deployment and/or redeployment of SS-20s, why did the Tokyo government not agree to the Soviet proposal of concluding an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons. Of course, Tokyo considered it unnecessary to conclude such an agreement with the Soviet Union, particularly because both Japan and the USSR, with other nations, had already signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which obligates the nuclear weapon-state party (e.g., the USSR) to guarantee the security of the

non-nuclear weapon-state party (e.g., Japan) from nuclear aggression or intimidation.[42] Such a situation did not at all keep Moscow, however, from hesitating to press Tokyo to individually conclude another separate, independent treaty with the Soviet Union, such as an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons and/or CBMs.

Mikhail Kapitsa, for example, during his visit to Tokyo in April 1983, energetically and persistently brought up the idea of concluding an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons between Japan and the USSR. On April 12, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister made the following proposal at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

> Let us conclude an agreement in which Japan pledges the three nonnuclear principles and the Soviet side promises non-use of nuclear weapons against Japan. . .
>
> *Furthermore, it would be a good idea to write also in the same agreement such basic principles regulating the bilateral relations between Japan and the Soviet Union as peaceful coexistence, good-neighborliness, and others.* (emphasis added by H.K.)[43]

Letters sent by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) and Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) in January 1983 also contained exactly the same proposal as the one made by Kapitsa to the Japanese Foreign Ministry.[44] The letter addressed to the DSP, for instance, reads as follows:

> If Japan adheres to its self-proclaimed principles of not possessing nuclear weapons and of refusing the development of nuclear weapons in her territory, then the Soviet Union is ready to provide Japan with an appropriate guarantee, upon which Japan can rely.[45]

Of course, one reason why Moscow wanted so badly to have an agreement with Tokyo on the non-use of nuclear weapons is ascribable to its intention and desire to make sure that Japan faithfully abides by

the three non-nuclear principles of not producing, not possessing and not introducing nuclear weapons into Japan. Soviet concern with and suspicion about the possibility of Tokyo changing both *de facto* and *de jure* these self-imposed principles into the so-called "two-and-a half principles" was particularly reinforced by the remark made by the former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Edwin O. Reischauer, at a press interview conducted in May 1981.[46] Reischauer stated at that time that the term "introduction" was from the beginning not meant to preclude the transit and port-calls of U.S. naval vessels carrying weapons.[47] Discussion of the question as to whether the former ambassador's remark was correct is not the point here.[48] The more relevant point in our present context is that such Soviet apprehension of a military nature did not fully or accurately explain why Moscow was so persistently pressing Tokyo to negotiate and sign an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons.

As the italicized part of the above-quoted argument of Kapitsa clearly reveals, the Andropov government expected such an agreement to include not only articles of a military kind but also "such basic principles as peaceful coexistence, good-neighborliness and other principles that regulate Soviet–Japanese relations," principles that are usually written in other types of treaties, such as a peace treaty or a treaty of good-neighborliness and cooperation. Thus, what Andropov was aiming at toward Japan was crystal clear to those who were familiar with Soviet–Japanese relations at the time. Since Tokyo was not interested in signing any treaty agreement with Moscow except a peace treaty that solves the territorial issue, Brezhnev's attempt to press Tokyo to sign a treaty on good-neighborliness and cooperation and an agreement on CBMs was not successful. What Andropov was trying to do was to pressure Japan, taking full advantage of the Japanese concern about the threat of the Soviets increasing the number of SS-20s, to conclude an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons, an agreement that Andropov expected to play the role of a substitute or a variant of the good-neighborliness treaty, thereby making a diplomatic breakthrough in the long-stalemated relations.

6. SHOOTING-DOWN OF KAL 007

The last, but certainly not the least, worthwhile discussion concerning the Andropov regime's conduct of foreign affairs with regard to Japan is the fact that it was fully ready and willing to use the Soviet physical might in practice, whenever it considered it necessary. In other words, the Soviet Union under Andropov was interested in a continuous buildup of its military forces in the Far East not simply to exploit it as a politically effective instrument to assist in the achievement of diplomatic objectives, but also to actually employ it as a coercive physical means to fulfill genuine military purposes. Undoubtedly, the latter function is an intrinsic and far more important one, and yet it is prone to be underestimated or at times even overlooked. The shooting down of Korean Air Lines (KAL) Flight 007 in the skies over Sakhalin on September 1, 1983[49] reminded us of the cold reality that the Soviet armed forces did exist and that they were not expanded just for appearance sake or for pursuing solely diplomatic functions.

It is true that this incident may not provide the best illustration to prove that the Soviet Union under Andropov intended to employ in practice its increased military forces in the Far East against Japan. To begin with, the downing of the Korean civil airliner is not to be regarded as a military action directed against Japan. Moreover, it is still not clear whether it was an accidental or intentional move. It is also not clear whether the Andropov leadership in Moscow was consulted in advance by the local military commander about the decision to fire on the South Korean airliner. For all these and other reservations, debates, and questions, the September 1 incident still serves to reveal to us one clear thing—that the Soviet armed forces were not a facade but a physical power that the Soviets did not hesitate to resort to, when they felt it was necessary.

First, the downing of the Korean civilian plane was a 100-percent military action in the sense that it was ordered and executed by the Soviet military forces to serve a military purpose. The disaster can hardly be discarded as an accident in view of the fact that transcripts recorded by the Japanese Defense Agency revealed without any doubt that every move of the Soviet

fighters and interceptors was carefully orchestrated by ground controllers. The Soviet leadership tried very hard to excuse itself from the shooting-down of the airplane by implying that the local military commanders made a hurried, inappropriate decision in a moment of panic and confusion, but the Soviet military would undoubtedly react to a similar situation in the future in exactly the same manner as it did this time. Having declared that "The Soviet armed forces have discharged their duties with honor," Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov, the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, flatly stated in a press conference on the KAL incident held in Moscow on September 9, 1983: "In the future, if need be, the Soviet military forces will also perform their combat tasks."[50]

Even if it were true that Andropov and other top political leaders in the Politburo were not in fact informed of the attack on the South Korean aircraft until it was over, they were not in a position to be dismissed from the responsibility for the shooting-down of a civilian airplane with 269 passengers aboard. For it was the very Andropov government that adopted the new "Law on the USSR's State Border" in November 1982, Article 36 of which specifically states that weapons may be used to stop border violators who refuse to cooperate.[51] The law makes no exception for civilian aircraft, perhaps because in the Soviet system, civilian planes and military planes were all managed on a military basis. The local Soviet military commanders and interceptor pilots in the Soviet Far East simply followed and fulfilled the standard procedures and instructions in giving the orders and firing at the aircraft that penetrated Soviet air-space, without having any doubt about the appropriateness of their behavior and measures. Of course, the chances are that, simply in order to evade the reprimand, criticism, and other pressure exerted against Moscow from the West, the Soviet government under Andropov acknowledged some mistakes committed by its local Air Defense Forces. Thus, in a broader sense, it does not make sense to argue that the Soviet leadership bore no responsibility for the downing of the Korean civilian jetliner.

In conclusion, however, it is neither appropriate nor correct to regard the KAL tragedy as an accident that has nothing to do with either the Soviet regime under Andropov or with its incessant efforts to buildup its military

forces in the Far East. In this regard the following remark made by Arkadii Shevchenko, former Under Secretary-General at the United Nations and the highest-ranking Soviet diplomat ever to defect to the United States, touches the core of the subject, though in a slightly exaggerated fashion:

> One of the most sinister aspects of this tragedy [the KAL 007 incident—H.K.] is that it was not an accident; it was a natural product of the standard functioning of the Soviet system.[52]

Or, as William Hyland commented, "the tragedy was that the system worked."[53]

7. IMPACT OF THE KAL INCIDENT

The impact of the KAL 007 incident upon Japan–Soviet relations was too great to be passed over without mentioning. Just before the incident took place, the bilateral relations between Japan and the Soviet Union had begun to show signs, though to a very limited degree, of improving. During his visit to Tokyo in January 1983, Soviet Vice-Foreign Minister M. Kapitsa agreed with high officials at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to resume and even expand cultural exchanges between the Soviet Union and Japan.[54] In August of the same year, when he paid a courtesy call at Moscow's Sheremetevo airport to Japanese Foreign Minister Abe Shintarō, who was in transit on his way back to Japan from Eastern Europe, Kapitsa conveyed to Abe the Soviet message that "the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko himself was 'aware of the fact that it was his turn next to make a visit to Tokyo.'"[55] The message conveyed by the Soviet vice-foreign minister to Abe was extremely important considering the Soviet foreign minister's poor record in the past ten years (1974–1983), during which, despite the Japanese–Soviet agreement to exchange visits to the respective capitals with the aim of negotiating a peace treaty, Gromyko fulfilled the obligation on the Soviet side only once (in 1976). The reason for Gromyko's reluctance to visit Tokyo was quite obvious: he did not want to

discuss a peace treaty which, in the understanding of the Japanese, must contain by definition the settlement of the territorial issue.

The Japanese side had also started to show some flexibility in its attitude, too. For instance, Foreign Minister Abe announced on August 22, 1983 the Japanese government's intention to embark upon the enlargement of economic and cultural exchanges with the USSR, "with the aim of breaking the chilly bilateral relations."[56] Abe was quoted as saying at that time that, while Japan's fundamental policy toward the USSR is to improve the bilateral relations by solving the Northern Territories question, it is still desirable, and even necessary, to maintain dialogue between these two nations. It was obvious that such a move by the Japanese government was precipitated by U.S. President Reagan's decision to conclude a grain sale agreement with the Andropov government, while requesting Japan and other Western countries to join the U.S.-sponsored "sanctions" against the Soviet Union. At any rate, the concrete measures that the Japanese foreign minister then had in mind were: 1) to resume shortly (in October) the Japan–Soviet bilateral trade conference, which had been suspended since January 1981 as a sanction against the USSR over its intervention in Poland; 2) to invite several leading Soviet journalists to Tokyo in 1983 in order to promote dialogue between the two nations; 3) to resume the Japan–Soviet film festival, which had been suspended since 1978, in two Soviet cities by the end of 1984; and 4) to expand cultural exchanges on governmental and nongovernmental levels.

The Soviet shooting-down of a South Korean jetliner, which included 28 Japanese among the passengers, however, destroyed in one stroke the slight upturn in Japanese–Soviet relations, including cancellation of almost all the above-mentioned concrete measures proposed by both sides. The indignation over the atrocity among the Japanese people was undoubtedly reinforced further by the Andropov government's insensitive attitude toward world reactions and clumsy, inept handling of the incident. As a result, Japan–Soviet relations were forced back to the worst stage they had ever been in the postwar period. Let me elaborate on this.

First, let's examine the official governmental level. In a major policy speech delivered to the Diet on September 10, 1983, Prime Minister

Nakasone Yasuhiro stated quite plainly the Japanese government position on this tragedy: "The downing of the Korean Airlines jetliner was clearly an illegal act by the Soviet Union, abhorrent on both legal and humanistic grounds, and Japan must deal firmly with such behavior."[57] Following this speech, both the Lower House and the Upper House of the Japanese Diet unanimously adopted a resolution on September 12 and 13, respectively—a unanimous action that had seldom occurred in the postwar history of the Japanese Diet—that demanded a Soviet-explanation, a formal apology for the attack, full compensation to the families of the victims, and assurance of the prevention of similar incidents in the future.[58] Katō Yoshiya, director general of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's European and Oceanic Affairs Bureau, tried, first, to hand over in person to Soviet Ambassador to Tokyo V. Pavlov and then to send by special registered mail to the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo the diplomatic note of the Japanese government, which, among other things, requested prompt and adequate compensation for the Japanese victims. But all these protests and requests made by the Japanese were completely rebuffed by the Soviet side. Pavlov refused to even accept the note and later instructed his embassy to send it back to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, reiterating the Moscow government's official stand on this subject that the Soviet Union bore no responsibility whatsoever for the incident and that the claim should rather be directed against the United States.

Faced with such an insincere Soviet attitude, the Tokyo government decided, in concert with measures adopted by other countries, to impose a package of measures against the Soviet Union that consisted of prohibition of Japanese government officials and employees from travelling aboard the Soviet government-run *Aeroflot*; a ban on nonscheduled Soviet charter flights to Japan, and restrictions limiting the number of regularly scheduled *Aeroflot* flights and aircraft size to the current level of that time. Since the Soviet Union adamantly continued to shirk its responsibility for the incident, despite its admission that it shot down the aircraft, Tokyo took the second in a series of punitive steps against Moscow, including a two-week (September 15–28) suspension of civil aviation services between Japan and the USSR.[59]

Other measures and concrete actions relating to the KAL disaster taken by the Japanese government that influenced Japanese–Soviet relations are as follows. A scheduled meeting between the foreign ministers of both countries in New York in late September was cancelled. True, this was an inevitable consequence of the Soviet decision not to send Gromyko to the United Nations General Assembly on the grounds that the Soviet foreign minister flying in an *Aeroflot* aircraft was banned from landing at a civilian airport. Still, the impact of such a cancellation upon Japanese–Soviet relations was significant, particularly in light of the fact that this foreign ministerial meeting in New York, which was a valuable opportunity for Japan and the Soviet Union to maintain dialogue, had never been cancelled before, even in the wake of the MiG-25 incident (1976) or the signing of the Sino–Japanese peace treaty (1978).

Moreover, at this U.N. General Assembly meeting, representatives from both Japan and the USSR publicly voiced harsh criticism specifically directed against each other, an action unprecedented in the history of these two countries at the United Nations. Japanese Foreign Minister Abe urged the Soviet Union to admit responsibility for the downing of the Korean airliner, describing the Soviet action as "an intolerable outrage against humanity and international law."[60] At the same time, Abe reiterated Japan's longstanding request to the Soviet Union over the Northern Territories. For his part, Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations Oleg Troianovskii condemned Japan for "recently accelerating the militarization of the country."[61]

The invitation once accepted by the Japanese Minister of Agriculture Kaneko Iwazō to Moscow became *de facto* pending. The Japanese Defense Agency cancelled its invitations to two military attachés at the Soviet embassy in Tokyo to its firepower drill at the Higashi-Fuji maneuver grounds to express the government's protest over the downing of the KAL jetliner and Moscow's subsequent insincere way of handling the incident. Likewise, the Agency decided not to invite any representative of the Soviet Union to the marching ceremony to be held the day before the Japanese SDF Memorial Day (October 1). The Tokyo government strongly advised the Japanese private sponsors and organizers

of the Seventh International Air show, scheduled to be held in Kakumuhara City in October–November, 1983, to refuse Soviet participation in the show. As a result of the Tokyo government's decision to suspend commercial flights between Japan and the USSR for two weeks, the Soviet ballet troupe from Buriat, which was scheduled to perform in Japan as part of an exchange program, was cancelled. The Japanese government also informed the Soviet Union that they wished to postpone their bilateral trade conference originally scheduled for October 1983 in Moscow.

In the economic sphere, too, relations between Japan and the USSR reached in 1983 a low point in terms of growth. Despite the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Tokyo's subsequent participation in economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, Japanese–Soviet trade relations since 1980 had remained stable and had even experienced a slight increase. In 1983, however, trade showed for the first time a decrease of 20 percent compared with the previous year.[62] In short, Japan–Soviet relations reached their lowest ebb in the fall of 1983.

Generally speaking, the measures adopted by the Japanese government against the USSR for the September 1 KAL incident may be considered to be "rather moderate or limited."[63] One reason for the mild measures lies in Tokyo's usual inclination to follow the U.S. and other Western countries' reactions, which happened to be "firm, but calm and controlled" (Ronald Reagan).[64] Another reason for the mildness is ascribable to the Nakasone government's basic policy orientation toward the Soviet Union, which was that Tokyo needed continued dialogue with Moscow so that the potential Soviet threat to Japanese security would not be carried out under any circumstance and furthermore that Tokyo could persuade Moscow to come to the negotiation table to make the return of the Northern Territories possible. Probably based on these considerations, Prime Minister Nakasone and other high government officials repeatedly stated that the government should handle the KAL incident in a manner not affecting what they called "the fundamental relations between the Soviet Union and Japan,"[65] thus regarding the incident as different in nature from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or intervention in Poland.

Yet, it seems to be wrong to the author of this book to underestimate the strong impact that the "termination" of a Korean civil airliner made upon the mind-set of the Japanese people. It would not be an exaggeration to say that, as far as the deep psychological level of the Japanese public was concerned, the impact of the KAL incident was greater than the impact of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan or Poland, events which, after all, took place in countries a great distance from Japan. A public opinion poll conducted by the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, the most widely read newspaper in Japan, three weeks after the KAL incident showed that 94.3 percent of those Japanese who answered the questionnaires were concerned with the incident, 85.6 percent regarded the Soviet action as impermissible, and 75.8 percent favored a request for an apology from, and sanctions against, the Soviet Union.[66]

The Korean airliner tragedy served to clarify in Japanese minds more than any other event the cold realities that Japan has to face. The major discoveries, confirmations and lessons gained from the incident were: 1) The Soviets had an extraordinary deep-seated obsession with secure borders. The national borders are sacred and inviolable to every state, and yet the Russian concept of borders proved to be an exceedingly special kind, even to a paranoiac degree. They automatically regarded even an accidental violation by a civilian aircraft as a criminal act, which called for immediate preventive reaction in the form of naked physical force. When Gromyko reportedly stated in Madrid on September 7, "Soviet territory and the borders of the Soviet Union are sacred," he was correctly interpreted as indicating that the Soviets would do the same thing again under the same circumstances.[67] 2) The Soviets were a hard partner to deal with and negotiate with. The Japanese witnessed anew with their own eyes that the Soviets were not only resorting to their favorite technique of stonewalling in a bureaucratic manner but were also not hesitating at all to lie, hide the facts, or be inconsistent in order to evade their responsibility and to make their position more favorable. 3) The military-strategic importance and tension of the Sea of Okhotsk area is at a very high level. Explaining the Soviet stand over the KAL incident at Tass, the Soviet News Agency, Marshal Ogarkov candidly acknowledged that Kamchatka and Southern Sakhalin is the location of "a

major base of the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear forces" and "important military installations."[68] Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone himself thus had to confess in the Diet session that "the Sea of Okhotsk has now become more important strategically and tactically than it had previously been thought to be."[69]

While basing their perceptions and observations on the same Soviet mind-set, the same Soviet system, and the same military situations surrounding Japan, the Japanese tend, surprisingly or interestingly enough, to reach different conclusions. It is conceivable, with good reasons, that at least two extreme views and policy recommendations appeared in Japan. One school of thought argued that Japan must increase its power, especially its military might, which alone would make sure that nothing similar to the KAL incident happened again and would allow Japan to deal and negotiate with the Soviets more effectively. This school criticized the measures taken against the Soviet Union for the KAL incident by the Nakasone government as being too mild to be effective. In contrast, however, the second school emphasized the urgent need and importance of negotiating on an agreement among Japan, the USSR, and other countries concerning arms control measures in the Far East, ascribing the real cause of the KAL tragedy to none other than the military confrontation and tension between the East and the West around the Sea of Okhotsk. It proposed, for example, a plan to make the Sea of Okhotsk a nuclear-free zone. The argument of this group in reality resulted in contributing to the long-standing Soviet offer to Tokyo of an agreement on CBMs in the Far East.