

History and Folklore Studies in Japan

Edited by
David L. Howell
and
James C. Baxter

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**International Research Center
for
Japanese Studies**

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History and Folklore Studies in Japan

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Foreword

James C. BAXTER

International Research Center for Japanese Studies

This collection of essays is one of the products of a three-year collaborative research project. Supported by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, faculty members of the International Research Center for Japanese Studies (Nichibunken) in Kyoto joined with scholars from other institutions—primarily but not exclusively North American universities—during the academic and fiscal years 2000, 2001, and 2002, to examine the theme “Historiography and Japanese Consciousness of Values and Norms” in a number of symposia and workshops. Altogether more than seventy scholars made presentations or acted as discussants in six events over the course of the project. The present volume contains some of the work originally presented in our second year, and is the second publication to result from the project, following *Historiography and Japanese Consciousness of Values and Norms*, edited by Joshua A. Fogel and myself (Kyoto: International Research Center for Japanese Studies, 2003). Another book, *Historical Consciousness, Historiography, and Modern Japanese Values*, of which I am editor, is in the final stages of production as I write this foreword; it will bring together versions of research first offered in 2002.

Historiography as we took it for purposes of the inquiry in this project refers not only to the writing of history—although it certainly does denote that—but also to work in other media that incorporates history (or more precisely, versions or constructions of history). We wished to reconsider or in some instances to think anew about how historiography influences peoples’ senses of values. One of the defining characteristics of Nichibunken is that we attempt systematically to approach problems from interdisciplinary, comparative perspectives. Although only a few members of our faculty are historians by training and self-identification, it was fundamental to the conception of this project that we perceived that interest in history in Japan is high, and understanding of history figures in the identity-formation of a great many people, by no means only professional historians. Non-historians on our own faculty could, we felt sure, contribute to and themselves profit from participating in an examination of historiography and its influence, and we hoped that by getting together with scholars from overseas and from a few other institutions in Japan, we could discover things that would advance the state of learning and be of wide benefit. It may be unnecessary to state explicitly that history does not mean exclusively national history. In this project, we did not confine our notion of history to national stories or any other single type of account. This volume evidences our embrace of multiple types of history. The essays here are informed by a focus on the local more often than the national, for example. What they have in common is an interest, not always expressly articulated, in illuminating how history writing and folklore studies can interact.

History and Folklore Studies in Japan (Kyoto: International Research Center for Japanese Studies, 2006).

The idea for this project was Ishii Shirō's. At that time a professor at Nichibunken, he authored the proposal for funding and served as chairman of the committee that was responsible for planning and executing this Center's activities in the series of symposia and workshops. Toward the end of the first year of the project, Professor Ishii was appointed to a new position as an advisor to the prime minister of Japan on science and technology policy, and when he left Nichibunken I inherited his responsibilities for coordinating this inquiry into historiography. Without his vision and his energy, this book and the other two that I mentioned above would not have been possible, nor would have another work (at this moment still in progress, but very near completion, under the co-editorship of Professor Fogel and myself) entitled *Writing Histories in Japan: Texts and their Transformations from Ancient Times through the Meiji Era*, which is descended from a conference that he helped to co-organize with the Center for Japanese Studies at the University of Hawai'i in the fall of 2000.

The main event in year two of the historiography and values project was to have been a workshop at Princeton University. David Howell, who had been engaged in the initial discussions that laid the groundwork for this project in a workshop in Honolulu in September 1999 and had presented a paper at the Maui conference that yielded *Writing Histories in Japan*, consented to play the principal part in making arrangements. Thinking that a venue on the East Coast of the United States would be desirable for our academic year 2001 meeting, Professor Ishii and I and some of our Nichibunken colleagues had approached Professor Howell and Martin Collcutt in Maui and asked if we might meet on their campus. We readily reached agreement that we could work together. David proposed that we concentrate on approaches that combined history and the insights of folklore studies, and that we limit the scale of the meeting. From Nichibunken, Komatsu Kazuhiko (who later would become David's host when he spent a year here as a visiting scholar) consented to cooperate in selecting and inviting a few scholars who could make interesting contributions. We set November 29 and 30, 2001, as the dates for what people at Nichibunken soon dubbed the "Princeton Symposium." The East Asian Studies Program at Princeton was able to allocate some resources to ensure that this small conference be a successful one, covering some items of local expense that the JSPS funding was restricted from paying for.

Earthshaking global events occurred and upset our plans. Terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., on September 11, 2001, and an outbreak of anthrax shortly thereafter when letters containing the anthrax bacteria—the first five of which were posted from Trenton, New Jersey, on September 18—were delivered to a number of news media organizations and two U.S. senators. Late in October, the Princeton post office was temporarily closed after an anthrax spore was discovered on a mail bin. Other terrorist attacks seemed imminently possible, and government entities and private organizations all over the United States scrambled to raise levels of alertness to danger. In these circumstances, it seemed risky to go forward according to our original schedule. Individually, some participants in this project might have taken the risk and gone on to Princeton in November, but the budget for this project came through the JSPS grant from the Japanese state, and as the institution receiving those funds and responsible for

carrying out the project, Nichibunken decided that the risk was unacceptable. It seemed most prudent to postpone. Rescheduling posed new logistical problems, and proved somewhat complicated.

In the end, the “Princeton Symposium” convened in Kyoto, at this Center, from January 15 through 17, 2002. Our sessions were bilingual, with some participants presenting in Japanese and others in English, and with discussion flowing in both languages. All of us, I think, will acknowledge that we did not exhaust the potential of the topic “History and Folklore Studies,” but we felt that we had gained useful insights from each other, and we hope that readers will find interesting things in these pages, and will be stimulated to continue with the effort to exploit the mutually enhancing riches of these fields.

In addition to the authors whose work appears here, Director-General Yamaori Tetsuo of Nichibunken, Professor Martin Collcutt of Princeton, Professor Henry D. Smith II of Columbia University, Professor Inaga Shigemi of Nichibunken, and Professor Seki Kazutoshi of Kyushu University were present. Each of them offered valuable comments and questions in our discussions, and Professor Seki did a brilliant job of summarizing and contextualizing the individual presentations as we concluded. I am pleased to have this opportunity to thank them all sincerely for their contributions. I am glad also to be able to express appreciation once again to our authors. Deepest gratitude is due to David Howell for his many efforts as co-organizer, author, and editor, to Komatsu Kazuhiko for his work as co-organizer of this workshop and author, and to the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, which made this project possible.

History and Folklore Studies in Japan

Introduction

David L. HOWELL

Princeton University

This volume traces its beginnings to a workshop held at the International Research Center for Japanese Studies (Nichibunken) in Kyoto in January 2002. The gathering brought together historians and anthropologists of Japan with the aim of seeing what effect the methodological and epistemological differences between the disciplines had on the study of common themes in Japan's past. Our hope was that dialogue between disciplines in Japanese studies would enrich the field by offering all scholars new ways to consider problems of sources and evidence.

As one of the organizers, I proposed this theme for the workshop because I was struck by the differences revealed in historians' and anthropologists' studies of violence in early Meiji Japan, which is the topic of my own contribution to the volume. In the wake of the Meiji Restoration of 1868, rumors spread throughout the countryside that the government was selling the blood and fat of its own subjects to sate the depraved appetites of the Westerners who had so recently established themselves in the country. Red wine appeared to be blood drunk straight up, while the iron beds of the first Western-style infirmaries looked like grills to broil off the fat of helpless cholera patients. Participants in the wave of antigovernment protests and violence in the early 1870s invoked these rumors to justify their actions, and the government took the rumors seriously enough to issue repeated denials of their veracity. When reading the secondary literature on these incidents, I was struck by the way historians duly noted the rumors but hastened to look past them for rational economic and political causes of disorder, while, in contrast, the authors of ethnological studies plumbed folk culture for the bases of the rumors yet devoted little attention to the violence of early Meiji itself. The two literatures complemented each other nicely in this instance, but I was left uncertain of the implications of this disparity for historical studies more broadly. In particular, I wondered if an ethnological reading of early modern peasant contention (*hyakushō ikki* 百姓一揆) might undermine historians' image of Tokugawa peasants as rational actors and, in contrast, why the folk in folklore studies seemed to be so thoroughly apolitical. Although the workshop did not provide specific answers to these questions, it did help to explain the differences between disciplines.

Once we gathered it quickly became evident that instead of a dialogue between two clearly defined disciplines, we were in fact dealing with at least three or four basic approaches—and, of course, as many individual styles of scholarship as there were participants. Perhaps the most striking contrast was that between ethnology and folklore studies. In Japanese the distinction between the two is blurred by an accident of homonymy: both disciplines are known as *minzokugaku*, but different characters are used to write the words. Ethnology is 民族学, the study of ethnic groups, whereas folklore is 民俗学, the study of people's customs.

Generally speaking, practitioners of *minzokugaku*-as-ethnology study foreign cultures, while practitioners of *minzokugaku*-as-folklore study Japan. The two *minzokugaku* scholars presenting papers at the workshop, Komatsu Kazuhiko and Kawamura Kunimitsu, write principally as folklorists. In contrast, the work of the one North American anthropologist present, Thomas Looser, shows the strong influence of critical theory.

The Japanese and North American historians at the workshop were not divided by formal disciplinary distinctions, but their work did reflect certain pervasive differences in style characteristic of historical writing in Japanese and English. Japanese scholars tend to write in a rigorously empirical style, firmly and thoroughly grounded in the sources, but with the broader implications of their work often left implicit. North American historians of Japan, on the other hand, almost necessarily aspire to write for a readership beyond the small community of specialists. The North American historians at the workshop—Susan Burns, Gerald Figal, David Howell, and Thomas Keirstead—started with an issue or problem and wrote outward, while the Japanese participants—Takahashi Satoshi and Sonoda Hidehiro (a sociologist by training but writing in a historical mode)—burrowed as deeply as possible into their topics. Each style has its strengths, and in practice the dialogue between the two proved as lively as it was fruitful.

Regardless of discipline and approach, every participant perforce had to consider the broader context of his or her work. In general, like participants in internalist discourses everywhere, scholars working in Japanese have the luxury of assuming the significance and interest of their work: after all, within Japan as a geographically, institutionally, and linguistically bounded space, any scholarship that contributes to a greater understanding of the nation is by definition worthwhile. The drawback of this style of writing is that it exempts its practitioners from looking beyond the debates within their fields to ask how their work contributes to scholarship outside the realm of Japanese studies. Sure enough, the Japan-based participants in the workshop seemed to be caught off guard by occasional challenges to look at Japanese studies in a global context.

In contrast, scholars writing in languages other than Japanese must at least take the rhetorical stance that their work—if not each individual scholarly effort, then the scholarship of the community of specialists—somehow incorporates Japan into broader debates within and across disciplines. As a practical matter, this meant that the workshop's North American participants' interventions into the general discussion tended to move quickly—perhaps too quickly at times—from the relatively specific to the relatively abstract.

The differences in scholarly style notwithstanding, there were intriguing overlaps among the papers. The best example is the role of the folklorist Yanagita Kunio (1875-1962) as the source and inspiration of much of the work presented at the workshop. Yanagita was the author of the foundational texts of Japanese folklore studies; in addition, many Western scholars of Japanese intellectual history write in dialogue with him. Only one of the papers (Kunimura's, which unfortunately is not included in this volume) dealt directly with Yanagita and his oeuvre, but his role in constructing an intellectual basis for the imagining of the Japanese nation was a touchstone for much of the discussion that occurred at the workshop. The discussion in this case boiled down to a series of questions about the "folk" in particularist and universalist discourses: Is the Japanese "folk" essentially different from any other "folk"?

Can there be an ethnography of the “folk” that is divorced from time? Do folklore studies as practiced in Japan provide a workable template for the study of the common people in Japanese history?

Although, once again, the workshop discussion did not provide definitive answers to these vexing questions, the dialogue proved very fruitful. I came away with a better appreciation of the value of carefully deployed particularism. Within the context of Japanese discourse, taking the “folk” out of history serves the useful purpose endowing the common people with a clear identity across place and time. That identity, ahistorical and thus artificial as it is, serves as a place of resistance for the “folk” against the grim history too often imposed on them from above by political leaders. Work influenced by folklore studies has transformed Japanese historiography over the past several decades, both in the form of “people’s history” (*minshūshi* 民衆史), which became influential in the 1960s and 1970s, and Amino Yoshihiko’s prolific work on medieval Japan. Japan’s particular version of social history was thus born out of a dialogue between history and folklore studies.

Seven papers are collected here. Komatsu Kazuhiko considers the practice of deifying historical figures in Japan. The topic is particularly relevant today in light of the ongoing debates over the status of Yasukuni Shrine, where Japan’s war dead—including Tōjō Hideki and thirteen other Class A war criminals—are enshrined as Shinto deities. Komatsu finds that although the custom of deification has a long history in Japan, its aims have tended to change over time. That is, he sees a general trend away from deification designed to placate vengeful spirits—as was the case, for example, at Kyoto’s Kitano Tenmangū Shrine, dedicated in the tenth century to the courtier Sugawara no Michizane—and toward deification designed to memorialize or commemorate the life of a notable person, as in the case of Tōshōgū, established in 1636 to memorialize the hegemon Tokugawa Ieyasu. Without taking a stand one way or the other on the Yasukuni controversy, Komatsu finds that there is in fact plenty of precedent for people taking it on themselves to enshrine others, with scant regard for the feelings of the person being enshrined or those of his or her descendents: “*anyone* can deify a human spirit”—even the Japanese state, which has unilaterally done so repeatedly since the beginning of the Meiji period.

Mori Ōgai’s (1862-1922) historical fiction is the point of departure for Thomas Keirstead’s methodological inquiry into the relationship between history and historical fiction. He argues that, for Ōgai, the crucial difference between fiction and history lay in the excessive neatness of fiction—the quality, that is, that allows an author to tie all the loose ends together into a clear narrative with a clear conclusion. Ōgai’s history, in contrast, is a messy, jumbled affair, presented not by an omniscient narrator but rather by an amateur scholar whose method is to have no method—a “posture of posturelessness” (*mutaido no taido* 無態度の態度)—and who gains pleasure from his sources rather than the stories they have to tell. In other words, Ōgai embraced antiquarianism and rejected the conventions of historical fiction as practiced by Takizawa Bakin (1767-1848) (and, for that matter, Walter Scott), who saw fiction as a more complete form of history insofar as it gave him the freedom to bring the past to life more vividly than conventional chronicles could.

In her essay, Susan Burns examines a number of legal cases from the period following the Meiji Restoration, all involving abortion or infanticide. The 1870s was a transitional decade in Japanese legal history, a brief period of Chinese influence before Western-style legal institutions were introduced in the 1880s. Burns looks specifically at cases heard on appeal by the Daishin'in, Japan's highest court. She finds that, in keeping with the Confucian tenor of the legal codes of the time, considerations of family relations and ethics figured heavily into the court's assessment of responsibility and assignment of punishments. Thus, a family that committed infanticide was likely to receive relatively lenient treatment if driven to the act by desperate poverty, but not if the house's reputation was the only thing at stake; likewise, a man who arranged an abortion for his girlfriend in an attempt to keep their relationship secret could count on receiving no sympathy from the court. Burns's most intriguing finding is that even amidst extensive testimony from relatives, doctors, and other witnesses, the mothers of the fetuses and infants remain silent and nearly invisible in the case records. Indeed, in none of the infanticide cases was the mother charged with a crime; rather, the courts assumed that the woman was completely passive as her parents and other relatives decided what to do with the newborn child.

My contribution to the volume focuses on violence against former outcastes in the early Meiji period. The Mimasaka Blood-Tax Rebellion of 1873 was the product of a confluence of anxieties wrought by the dawning of a new era. Its immediate cause was fear that the blood tax (*ketsuzei*)—an ill-chosen euphemism for conscription—was meant to be taken literally: rumors spread around the countryside that a mysterious figure in white was draining the blood out of the bodies of able-bodied young men for sale to foreigners. Fear of the new was compounded by anxiety over the regime's dissolution of the Tokugawa social-status system, and particularly its abolition of outcaste status in 1871. The essay tries to capture the uncertainty and violence of a particular historical moment, after the rules of engagement of Tokugawa-period peasant contention had been discredited, but before the Meiji state had gotten firm control over rural society.

Thomas Looser's essay considers some of the possibilities that lie with the notion of the folk in Japan, particularly in connection to the evolution of new media in the twentieth century. As Yanagita Kunio's coinage of the term *jōmin*, "the abiding folk," suggests, the idea of the folk is in many respects a modern invention, an imaginary counterpoint to modernity, situated in the countryside and presumed to transcend history. At about the same time in the early twentieth century that the folk were being invented, people in Japan and elsewhere began to consider the possibilities of cinema as a means to transform society and social relations. Looser thus suggests that the relationship between the folk and the modern is itself "cinematic," a point he makes through an examination of "The Traveler with the Pasted Rag Picture," a short story that Edogawa Ranpo (1894-1965) wrote in 1928. In contrast to the "analog" modernity of the early twentieth century, we now live in a digital age, yet Looser argues for the continued relevance of the past. Although "it may be that the countryside is no longer populated with the traditional agrarian peoples who might once have offered some possibility of thinking an essentialized identity . . . the place of the folk as a term of temporal and economic value continues to serve as a reference point for the contemporary world. . . . The 'folk,' in other words, is also a good example of the ways in which received institutional

and conceptual structures continue not only to subsist within, but also to hierarchize, new and supposedly emancipatory forms of identity and everyday life.”

Kume Kunitake's (1839-1931) account of his journey to Britain as part of the Iwakura Mission of 1871-73 is at the center of Sonoda Hidehiro's contribution to the volume. Kume, who wrote the official account of the mission and later went on to become a prominent academic historian, was deeply impressed by the technological achievements of Britain, particularly the development of steam power in the form of railroads and steamships. Sonoda argues that Kume saw Japan as being about forty years behind Britain: that is, by considering the state of British development at three points in its recent history—1800, 1830, and 1870—Kume realized that forty years earlier Britain had just barely begun its take-off into modern industrialization, and that it owed much of its recent development to the power of the steam engine. Although a gap of four decades might seem to be cause for despair, in fact, Kume saw it as evidence that Japan was separated from the West by differences of mere technology, and that, given the opportunity to catch up, Japan could become as advanced as Britain in due course.

Gerald Figal's essay examines the postwar reinvention of Okinawa around the three themes of World War II, the tropics, and the Ryukyu kingdom. In the immediate aftermath of the war there was little sense that Okinawa could ever offer anything to tourists except perhaps the opportunity to visit sites associated with the horrific Battle of Okinawa, which devastated the island in 1945. Eventually, however, with a push from consultants, an effort was made to market Okinawa as a tropical resort—Japan's Hawaii. The island's landscape needed a makeover with non-native plants—a few palm trees here, some hibiscus blossoms there—to make the new image convincing, but developers and the local government (both during the U.S. occupation and after reversion to Japan in 1972) managed to pull off the rebranding effort. Making Okinawa into an exotic yet unthreatening tropical paradise led eventually to a rediscovery of the island's history before 1879 as the centerpiece of the Ryukyu kingdom. Symbolizing Okinawa's Ryukyuan past was the rebuilding of the old royal palace at Shuri, beginning with the Shurei gate in 1958 and culminating in the reconstruction of the entire complex in 1992. Figal argues that the rebuilding of Shuri Castle has special significance because its utter destruction during World War II was due to the Japanese military's decision to locate its headquarters in a series of tunnels dug under the castle grounds. War, tourism, and history come together at the site.

In addition to the seven papers collected here, the workshop included presentations by Takahashi Satoshi on popular responses to the outbreak of Japan's first cholera epidemic in 1858¹ and Kawamura Kunimitsu on Yanagita Kunio's activities during World War II.²

As the foregoing summarizes reveal, the papers included here reflect a diversity of topics and approaches, but all of them engage to at least some extent with interdisciplinary scholarship. Two contributions—Keirstead's and Looser's—are particularly noteworthy in this regard, for they are explicitly methodological. Both test the disciplinary boundaries of history and anthropology (and folklore studies), and both make a strong case for the utility of literary sources and the insights of literary scholars in historical and anthropological inquiry.

Indeed, in very different ways, each makes an eloquent case for scholarship that is interdisciplinary to the point of transcending the parochial dictates of discipline.

The other papers fit more neatly into conventional categories, but are nonetheless interdisciplinary in orientation. Thus, Komatsu takes an ethnological problem—the deification of humans—and looks at its evolution in historical terms. Burns and I examine the conflict between longstanding folk practices and beliefs—concerning reproduction in Burns’s case, and social order in mine—and the policies of an impatient and rapidly modernizing state. Interestingly, a sociologist, Sonoda, authored the most conventional historical narrative in the collection. Figal’s work fits easily into a number of disciplinary frameworks, from history or anthropology to newly emerging fields like tourism studies.

In the end, the workshop did not produce a coherent new paradigm to consider the relationship between history and folklore studies in Japan, but it did provide us with an opportunity to interact across disciplinary lines, with results that were in many ways more satisfying than a simple focus on disciplinary binaries—history versus anthropology, *minzokugaku*-as-ethnology versus *minzokugaku*-as-folklore studies, and so on—would have been. Needless to say, we all benefited as well from the opportunity to interact with colleagues who work in different linguistic and institutional environments.

Finally, on behalf of all the participants in the workshop, I would like to acknowledge with gratitude the Program in East Asian Studies at Princeton University for underwriting a preparatory meeting for the North American participants and the International Research Center for Japanese Studies for sponsoring the workshop in Kyoto. Thanks go as well to Ishii Shirō, professor emeritus of the IRCJS, for proposing the series of workshops of which this meeting was a part, and to Professor Komatsu Kazuhiko of the IRCJS for serving as the main organizer on the Japanese side. Finally, I would like to offer my deepest gratitude and appreciation to Professor James Baxter of the IRCJS, who was involved in the planning of this meeting from the beginning and took an active part in all our sessions, and who has been patient and encouraging during the long process of bringing this volume to press.

NOTES

¹ Subsequently published in the twentieth anniversary issue of the Bulletin of the National Museum of Japanese History: Takahashi Satoshi 高橋敏, “Bakumatsu minshū no kyōfu to mōsō: Suruga no kuni Ōmiya-machi no korera sōdō” 幕末民衆の恐怖と妄想—駿河国大宮町のコレラ騒動—, *Kokuritsu rekishi minzoku hakubutsukan kenkyū hōkoku* 国立歴史民俗博物館研究報告 108 (March 2003).

² Kawamura later expanded on his workshop presentation in a related essay: Kawamura Kunimitsu 川村邦光, “Sensō to minzokugaku: Yanagita Kunio to Nakayama Tarō no jissen o megutte” 戦争と民俗学—柳田国男と中山太郎の実践をめぐって, *Hikaku Nihon bunka kenkyū* 比較日本文化研究 7 (2004), pp. 7–35.

Who Oversees the Spirit?

A Reassessment of the Custom of Deifying Humans

KOMATSU Kazuhiko

International Research Center for Japanese Studies

Translated by Sachiyo DINMORE

Looking Beyond Yasukuni Shrine

Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichirō's official visit to Yasukuni shrine 靖国神社 in the summer of 2001 became a cause célèbre in South Korea and China, both of which were invaded by Japan in the past. Domestically, however, the issue of visiting Yasukuni shrine seems to function nowadays as a sort of loyalty test or indication of the political leanings of the prime minister and other cabinet members.

Yasukuni shrine, formerly Tokyo Shōkonsha 東京招魂社, was founded in 1879. It enshrines as “*kami* 神 of Yasukuni” men who sacrificed their lives for the state since 1853, notably those who died in the Boshin Civil War (1868-69) and the Satsuma Rebellion (1877) and others who died in Japan's wars against foreign nations.

Needless to say, until the end of World War II, it was “the Empire of Great Japan” (actually the army and the navy) that was the principal body to sponsor religious services at Yasukuni shrine. Although the occupation army abolished State Shintoism, Yasukuni shrine was spared, and it still continues to serve as a private religious institution with support from groups such as the Japan Association for the Bereaved Families of the War Dead. Additionally, in 1978, in a move that was recalled in the dispute occasioned by Koizumi's visit to the shrine, Yasukuni quietly enshrined Tōjō Hideki and thirteen other Class A war criminals executed by the Allied Forces.

As of October 2001, the number of deities enshrined at Yasukuni had reached 2,466,364. The issues surrounding this shrine are complex. Discussions of these matters, regardless of the stance taken, tend to get emotional and beyond reason. People take widely divergent positions concerning Yasukuni shrine. Regardless of whether one thinks that World War II was justified and was lost only because of differences in military and economic strength, or that it was a ill-judged war of aggression, is it not appropriate for the state to mourn the deaths of and hold memorials for those who fell in battle? After all, the nation was reconstructed upon the sacrifices they made. At the same time, some argue that the visits by cabinet members—as public officials—to Yasukuni shrine, as well as government spending for such visits, should be considered a violation of the constitution, which bans the state and its agencies from taking part in and spending public money on religious activities. Others ask why, if Yasukuni is a shrine that deifies the war dead, other war victims such as those who “fought” and died on the home front—in the air raids, for example—are not consecrated. Some say the wishes of the dead and their family members should be respected when it comes to matters concerning

mass-enshrinement at Yasukuni, and that the shrine should not consecrate the war dead by its own unilateral action without giving regard to those wishes. If Yasukuni offers memorial services for the war dead, then should not all victims of war receive the same treatment, regardless of whether they were combatants or noncombatants, and without making any distinction based on where they died? Others may argue that public organizations should not hold religious functions, whatever their purpose, at private shrines and temples.

It was when I heard such divergent views as these that I began to wonder when the Japanese first started enshrining the spirits of the dead as *kami*. Why do people turn to such practices? Did customary rules exist on who should or should not be responsible for the “maintenance” (*kanri* 管理) of the spirits of the dead? Additionally, are the deities worshiped at Yasukuni shrine related to vengeful spirits (*goryō* 御霊 or *onryō* 怨霊), as is often argued? The issue of the maintenance and handling of spirits came up as I thought about these questions. This essay does not directly deal with the history or the current state of Yasukuni shrine. Rather, it suggests an approach to the Yasukuni problem by examining the treatment and handling of spirits by the Japanese public.

To address these problematic issues we must extend our search not only into the historical realm, but deep into the heart of the world of folk traditions, because examinations that remain in the dimension of the politics of the modern state are necessarily limited. What I want to discuss in this essay is who can oversee the spirits (*tamashii* 魂) of the dead, and also who can oversee the spirits of the living? Who has administrative power? Were there customs that prescribed, in former times, who would take care of these spirits?

Let me offer myself as an example. If I were to die, who would take care of my spirit? My surviving family? If my family did not believe in the existence of spirits, they would not perform any religious services at all for my spirit, would they? Or would they create another method to carry on the legacies of my soul? Whether my family holds religious services or not, would anyone who believes in my spirit be able to maintain it? And would such a person be capable of creating a shrine and consecrating my spirit there?

The Custom of Deifying Humans

Enshrining the dead as *kami* is one of Japan’s long-standing customs. An examination of the deities at shrines large and small throughout Japan would no doubt reveal an unexpectedly large number of shrines that deify humans. Among religious institutions at the national level, several from a variety of historical periods immediately come to mind. Kitano Tenmangū 北野天満宮 was created by the mid-Heian state and dedicated to Sugawara no Michizane 菅原道真. Nikkō Tōshōgū 日光東照宮 was founded in the early Tokugawa period and dedicated to Tokugawa Ieyasu 徳川家康. Toyokuni shrine 豊国神社 venerates Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豊臣秀吉. Meiji Jingū 明治神宮 was founded in the modern era to enshrine the Meiji emperor. Heian Jingū 平安神宮, likewise a modern creation, is dedicated to Emperor Kanmu 桓武天皇. At the local level, early modern domains and other authorities also created institutions that deified humans (“human deities”). At the lowest level, small shrines, typically called *wakamiya* 若宮 existed in local communities to appease “vengeful spirits” (*onryō* 怨霊).

Sites that deify humans and perform related religious services are overwhelmingly Shinto shrines. This is hardly surprising, since one would expect a person consecrated as a *kami* 神 to be venerated at a shrine (*jinja* 神社). But in fact we cannot be quite so definitive because some Buddhist institutions also deify humans, though in such cases the deities are generally given appropriate Buddhist names and attributes. Typical examples include the Tōshōji Sōgo Reidō 東勝寺宗吾靈堂, which enshrines Sakura Sōgorō 佐倉惣五郎, who is known from the oral tradition of peasant martyrs (*gimin* 義民) from the Tokugawa period; the Kōyasan inner shrine 高野山奥の院, which is a mausoleum dedicated to Kūkai 空海, the founder of the Shingon 真言宗 sect; and the Otake Dainichidō お竹大日堂 on Mt. Haguro 羽黒山.

For those who undertake the project of deifying an individual, the important thing is to create a religious facility of some sort at which worshipers can gather to revere the person who has been so deified. It does not matter whether the deity is called a Shinto *kami*, Buddhist *hotoke* 仏, *rei* 霊 (spirit), *reijin* (spirit-deity). In practice, if a Shinto cleric is heavily involved in the consecration, the deity becomes a *kami* and is venerated at a shrine; if a Buddhist cleric is involved, the deity becomes a *hotoke* (that is, an incarnation of Dainichi Nyorai or Bishamonten) and is venerated at a temple hall.¹

There are several reasons why most of the religious institutions that consecrate humans are Shinto shrines, but let me mention just two of them here. First, the practice originated in the calming of “gods of vengeance” (*tatarigami* 祟り神), an idea among Japanese that predates the introduction of Buddhism. A good example of this comes from an account in an early gazetteer, *Hitachi no kuni fudoki* 常陸国風土記. A pioneer named Yahazu no uji no Matachi 箭括の氏の麻多智 prays to Yatsu-no-kami 夜刀の神, a carrier of misfortune: “Please do not reproach me, please not curse me, for I will erect a shrine and consecrate you with my blessings.” Leaving aside the question of whether the *kami* causing misfortune in this particular example is a spirit of the dead, the notion of venerating a particular individual emerged as an extension of the idea of calming a vengeful deity by founding a shrine and consecrating it there. The Shinto priesthood and priestly families emerged from among those who performed such religious services. Later Shinto clerics, considered to be the progeny of those early practitioners, thus became central to the project of enshrining *kami*—and those among the *kami* who were humans consecrated after their deaths. It follows as a matter of course that the facilities related to the worship of deified humans were Shinto shrines.

However, Buddhism, a newly imported way of thought, gradually seeped into the concept of appeasing gods of vengeance and therefore into the long-standing practice of enshrining *kami*. Buddhism sought to spread its influence not by eliminating or destroying the long-standing idea of creating shrines for *kami*, but rather by pursuing cooperation and reconciliation with Shinotism. This is known as Shinto-Buddhist syncretism (*shinbutsu shūgō* 神仏習合). Buddhism came to play a key role in the administration of the spirit and oversight of its destination. Through Buddhism’s deep involvement in funerary rituals, eventually the dead all came to be seen as “Buddhas” (*hotoke*).

Additionally, *kuyōdō* 供養堂 halls and *jingūji* 神宮寺 temples were erected at shrines dedicated to the gods of vengeance, under the pretext of calming the deities, or in Buddhist terminology, “to have a mass for laying the spirits to rest” (*kuyō* 供養). In other words, Buddhism developed a method of worship that adhered to the Buddhist form of *kuyō*.

Buddhist monks erected stupas for the gods of vengeance, and also built temples that were the equivalent of small shrines. At facilities such as *jingūji* temples, both Buddhist monks and Shinto priests took part in various religious matters.

State authorities suddenly ended a thousand years of syncretism in the early Meiji period with the “denunciation of Buddhism and destruction of Buddhist temples” (*haibutsu kishaku* 廃仏毀釈) and the “separation of Shinto and Buddhism” (*shinbutsu bunri* 神仏分離). At many temples that practiced both Shinto and Buddhist rites around this time, Shinto priests obtained power with the backing of state authority, and transformed temples into shrines and eliminated anything related to Buddhism from the shrines. Most of the *jingūji* temples, which had been predominantly Buddhist for many years, were transformed into shrines, giving birth to many additional shrines that consecrated humans. Examples of such shrines include Tanzan shrine 談山神社, formerly Tōnominedera 多武峰寺, which centered around the mausoleum of Fujiwara no Kamatari 藤原鎌足; and Tada shrine 多田神社, previously Tada-in 多田院, which held the mausoleum of Minamoto (Tada) no Mitsunaka 源 (多田) 満仲.

The second point to note is that while certain individuals were deified after death, the spirits of many others were not. That is, those who died after leading an ordinary life were rarely deified. Only those who had led extraordinary lives were entitled to be deified. This entitlement, however, meant that the spirits of those individuals returned after death to “place a curse” (*tataru* 祟る) on the living.

According to Yanagita Kunio’s studies of folklore, the intrinsic nature of the Japanese concept of *kami* lies in the spirits of one’s ancestors. However, *kami* as a state of existence after death and *kami* as an ancestral spirit are different. Every person has the capacity to become an ancestral spirit. An ancestral spirit is a deity created by one’s descendants. However, not all descendants can become ancestors. Only the appointed successor who takes over the household, which is passed down through the generations by previous ancestors, can hold the position of ancestor. These successors, moreover, take the central role in performing religious services for their ancestors.

Although the word for “deification” (*shinkaku* 神格) can refer both to the practice of enshrining one’s ancestors and to the custom of deifying particular individuals—and although in both cases the object of the process is considered to be a “deity” (*kami* カミ)—there is a substantial qualitative difference between the two. Yanagita, who conducted in-depth examinations of these customs and practices, explains this difference clearly in his essay, “The Custom of Worshiping Humans as *Kami*” (“Hito o kami ni matsuru fūshū”). He writes:

The custom of deifying the deceased was certainly more widespread in earlier times than in the present. At the same time, however, a type of nationwide restriction that is no longer observed today was imposed until recently. Aside from private mausolea exclusive to a single family, called *shidō* 祠堂 in China and *mitamaya* 御霊屋 by the Japanese, certain conditions had to be met when it came to deifying humans at shrines that received public celebrations and many visitors. That is to say, the ones who simply aged and reached the natural end of life could not be enshrined in the first place. Rather, those who were consecrated as *kami* were ones who stirred up an

unrelenting sense of presence even after death and managed to express feelings such as anger and joy through what is called a curse.

What underlined the practice of deifying humans is the notion of this curse. Spirits that were unlikely to place a curse merely remained ancestors, and people did not worship them as *kami*. However, the custom of deifying humans evolved in many ways over time, and it eventually allowed those who were not likely to carry a curse after death also to be consecrated as *kami* at shrines, or as *hotoke* at Buddhist halls. The general consciousness of political authorities and the general populace regarding *kami* changed.

From God of Vengeance to God of Honor

When considering the custom of deifying humans, the first question to examine is who will assume responsibility for undertaking the deification. Who thought of consecrating the spirit of the dead as a *kami*? One can find the intellectual motivation for this within the process that led to the act of enshrining the spirit: that is, it came from the imaginations of the people who had to face the spirit of a particular deceased individual. Their feelings toward the dead led to the act of enshrining the spirit as *kami*. These feelings can be loosely divided into three types.

The first is the sense that since the spirit of the dead holds a grudge, it will bring misfortune to people unless it is enshrined and appeased. The second is that since the deceased, while alive, was responsible for outstanding achievements, he must be deified to honor those accomplishments. Finally, the third is that in mourning the deaths of those who passed away in the prime of life—whether because of accident, illness, or war—their spirits must be comforted so that they can rest in peace.

If we term the human deity in the first sense a god associated with a “curse” or a desire for “vengeance” (*tatari* 祟り), the human deity in the second sense can be called a god associated with “honor” (*kenshō* 顕彰), and that in the third sense a god of “consolation” (*irei* 慰霊). Examined historically, it is clear that the god of curses or vengeance is the fundamental form and that the human deities associated with honor and consolation emerged as its derivatives. As the notion of curses gradually weakened or even disappeared from people’s consciousness, a growing awareness of yet another function enshrinement could serve gradually emerged. This function was to serve as a mechanism of commemoration and memorialization (*kinen-kioku sōchi* 記念・記憶装置).

In the worship of gods of vengeance, emphasis was placed on the appeasement of the vengeful spirit because it was understood that the spirit’s curse was the source of various misfortunes. Hence the spirit was enshrined as a *kami* in an effort at appeasement, and festivals were held and shrines erected to comfort it. However, another function eventually emerged. Building a shrine and inviting the deity to which it was dedicated to make an appearance led to the telling of stories about the deity and about the circumstances of the shrine’s founding. As a result, stories of the life and afterlife of the deceased were recorded and remembered beyond time. The human deities related to consolation and honor were then linked to this mechanism of commemoration and memorialization. Even the spirits of individuals whose lives were so blessed that there was no need for concern about curses—such as powerful

figures and great men who lived to old age and died a natural death—were venerated in order to immortalize their achievements. Typical examples of this process include Toyokuni shrine, dedicated to Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Tōshōgū, which enshrines Tokugawa Ieyasu.

Deities of consolation most likely emerged as an offshoot of deities of honor. The concept of holding a service to console a spirit is quite old. What was called “the calming of the spirit” (*chinkon* 鎮魂) in antiquity, in other words, was an act of “consoling the spirit” (*irei* 慰靈). Therefore, religious services for vengeful spirits could also be considered acts of consolation for the spirit. However, “consolation of the spirit” as I am using it here means something slightly different. The object of consolation is not a spirit that has become vindictive and put a curse on others. On the contrary, consolation is a product of feelings of pity for those who died before completing a fulfilling life; these feelings, channeled into the practice of comforting the spirit of the dead, eventually developed into religious services for human deities and the creation of related shrines.²

These three types of human deities may appear contradictory, particularly those of vengeance and honor. However, if one traces the history of shrines that deify humans it is apparent that it was common for shrines consecrating vengeful deities to be transformed into shrines for deities of honor. Kitano Tenmangū in Kyoto and Warei shrine 和靈神社 in Uwajima 宇和島 were dedicated to deities of vengeance when they were founded, but as their curses eventually dissipated the deities came to offer protection and good fortune to believers; the behavior of believers concomitantly changed to exalt the deities. These deities were transformed into heroes and great men—in other words, they became gods of honor. The opposite phenomenon—of gods of honor being transformed into gods of vengeance—is rare, however. This is a significant characteristic of beliefs regarding human deities.

There is another way to look at the deification of humans and the establishment of Shinto shrines (and Buddhist halls) as a commemorative and memorial mechanism. The Japanese concept of the spirit did not allow for the spirits of individuals to persist for generations and generations without the existence of some sort of memorializing mechanism. The spirit of a person not subject to deification lost its individuality after either the thirty-second or forty-ninth anniversary of death, at which point it was incorporated into a collective ancestral spirit. The final commemoration of one’s death was sometimes referred to as *tomuraiage* 弔い上げ, and it generally coincided with the time when the dead individual had faded from living memory. In other words, the spirit expired along with people’s memories of the individual who had died. For a spirit to continue to exist beyond that point—for a hundred years, two hundred years, eternity—some sort of mechanism was needed to retain memory of the dead person.

It is not surprising to hear that some people, having realized the functions of deification as a mechanism of commemoration and memorialization, would want to let succeeding generations know of their lives and hence wish to be enshrined as *kami* after death. Indeed, powerful figures such as Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu expressed their own desire to be deified after death. Nevertheless, however earnestly one wishes while alive to become a *kami* after death, or hopes that the shrine at which one is consecrated will exist for ages to come, the spirit’s continued existence ultimately hinges on the presence of people willing to worship and remember it.

This leads us to yet another way to classify the various ways of deifying humans, this time based on the character of the agent of deification. Rulers sometimes actively erected shrines to human deities in the hope that doing so would facilitate their own political agendas. This trend was particularly marked in the early Meiji period, when the state erected a large number of shrines. Indeed, these shrines—known as “special government shrines” (*bekkaku kanpeisha* 別格官幣社)—were a concrete manifestation of the Meiji ideology. The first of these institutions was the Minatogawa shrine 湊川神社, dedicated to the medieval imperial loyalist Kusunoki Masashige 楠正成 (Nankō 楠公).

The authorities did not necessarily monopolize the ability to create deities: at times losers in political disputes or even the public at large could create their own human deities and pressure the state into holding services for them. Sōgo Reidō, the site of the peasant martyr Sakura Sōgorō’s enshrinement, and Nanshū shrine 南洲神社, dedicated to Saigō Takamori 西郷隆盛, differ considerably in many ways, but both are examples of popularly initiated deification.

Still another way of categorizing the practice of human deification centers on whether or not a shrine venerates a multiplicity or collectivity of deities. Although this question is not discussed often, it is central to any consideration of the Yasukuni problem. All sorts of incidents can result in many deaths at one time—natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods; fires; serious accidents on transportation networks; large-scale construction projects; riots; and war. On occasion survivors of the victims of such incidents hold memorial services to comfort the spirits of the dead, and at times even deify the victims.³

The Diversity of Services for Human Deities

There are too many examples of how spirits of the dead are deified to enumerate. Cases in which vindictive spirits were appeased and worshiped as *kami* are especially numerous, and it is these that have been the focus of belief in human deities. In fact, however, in the modern era the worship of human deities has moved away from a concern with gods of vengeance and instead has been reoriented toward a concern with gods of honor and consolation, both of which first rose to prominence during the Tokugawa period. The attitude that supports Yasukuni shrine is likely connected at a broad level to the worship of deities of honor and consolation.

Unfortunately, very little comprehensive research has been done on the worship of human deities, notwithstanding its value for an consideration of the issues surrounding the deities of Yasukuni shrine. In the paragraphs below I will introduce several case studies, drawn from the work of other researchers and myself, which may help to shed light on the Yasukuni problem.

The first case I will introduce is based on my own research in a number of communities in the mountains of Monobe village 物部村, Kami district 香美郡, Kōchi prefecture 高知県. (Monobe is an administrative village, comprising a number of communities scattered over a wide area.) It is a rather unusual custom, still practiced today, in which the family of the deceased head of a household follows the prescriptions of a religious practitioner to transform his spirit from a “Buddha” (*hotoke*) into a *kami*.

Among the old households of Monobe, it is customary for certain individuals to become *kami* after their deaths. These *kami* are known collectively as *mikogami* みこ神, and their consecration is performed according to a folk religious practice known as Izanagiryū いざなぎ流, which is learned by local residents. Specialist practitioners are known as *tayū* 太夫. The *mikogami* ritual comprises two stages: first, “sacred music and dance to take up the *mikogami*” (*mikogami no toriage kagura* みこ神の取り上げ神楽) is performed; this is followed several years later by the performance of “sacred music and dance to welcome the *mikogami*” (*mikogami no mukae kagura* みこ神の迎え神楽). Those qualified to become *mikogami* include the heads of old families, carpenters and blacksmiths, hunters who transmit a hunting technique known as Seizanhō 西山法, and the *tayū* involved in various religious practices. Today most of the objects of *mikogami* rituals are *tayū* or the deceased heads of old families.

The *mikogami* service is performed as part of a larger festival called *yagitō* 家祈禱 on behalf of deities such as *ten no kami* 天の神 and *osakisama* 御崎様, which are worshipped by old families. In fact, it is probably more accurate to say that the *yagitō* festival itself takes place so that the *mikogami* services might be held. In any case, a number of studies of the *yagitō* are available, and so I defer to them for an overview of the entire festival.

Since the Tokugawa period, most villagers in Monobe have been parishioners of Fukusenji 福泉寺, a Sōtō 曹洞 Zen temple. However, in a departure from typical practice in Japan—no doubt in part because of the difficulty of transportation in the area—priests from the temple rarely attend funeral services in the village. Instead, the residents of the deceased’s hamlet conduct the funeral themselves at the home of the deceased. When someone in the community dies, a messenger is sent to Fukusenji with the news, whereupon the temple holds a mass for the deceased, makes an entry in the death register, and bestows an ancestral tablet bearing the deceased’s posthumous Buddhist name for the messenger to take back to the hamlet. This practice reflects the influence of the Tokugawa-period temple registration system (*danka seido* 檀家制度), which left the villagers with the expectation that every deceased person will receive memorial services from a priest and be buried in a grave as a “Buddha” (*hotoke*).

According to explanations offered by the Izanagiryū *tayū*, the “new sacred music and dance to take up the *mikogami*” (*ara mikogami no toriage kagura* 新みこ神の取り上げ神楽) is performed in compliance with a request from the new head of the household. The aim is to summon the spirit of the deceased head of the household from his grave, where it rests as a Buddha, and to consecrate it as a *mikogami* in the rafters of the house, from which vantage point it can watch over the living members of the household. The first stage of the ritual, *mikogami no toriage kagura*, is comparable to birth. The second stage, *mikogami no mukae kagura*, is akin to a “coming of age” (*seijin* 成人—perhaps 成神 is more appropriate in this case) festival for the *mikogami*; it determines the name of the deity that will be worshipped and consecrates the *mikogami* permanently in the ceiling. After performing this ritual the ancestral tablet and posthumous Buddhist name given by the temple are discarded.

One thing to note here is that although the early modern registration system (*danka seido*) required in effect that all deceased become Buddhas (*hotoke*), only a very limited number of people—that is, household heads—could become *mikogami*. Although at a

glance the practice resembles typical ancestor worship, in fact emphasis of the ritual is on the deceased household head (the object of the ritual) and on the new head (the performer of the ritual). Once the *mikogami* service is completed, no additional rituals are held with that particular individual as the focus. Memories of the deceased as an individual are thus lost relatively quickly. The practice thus contrasts with Buddhist memorial services (*hōji* 法事) held on various anniversaries of a death, which provide an opportunity to recall and renew memories of the dead. In Monobe, retrospective memories of ancestors are very shallow, and the practice of this ritual may help to account for this.

The next case I will introduce is an example in which people other than the descendants deify the spirit of an individual in order to honor and memorialize his virtue. The shrine in this case is Ikosui shrine 葦湖水神社, and its deities are Tomono Yoemon 友野与右衛門 and four others. The worshipers are peasants who received their favors and others who carry on their spirit today.

The Hakone 箱根 aqueduct, completed in 1670, was the largest irrigation water supply in Japan, stretching from Lake Ashinoko 芦ノ湖 in Hakone to Suntō district 駿東郡 in Shizuoka prefecture 静岡県. It is characterized by an underground tunnel some 740 *ken* (1,345 meters) long. The following oral tradition has been transmitted about the aqueduct.

In 1663, Tomono Yoemon, a townsman from Asakusa 浅草 in Edo 江戸 (Tokyo), undertook the construction of the aqueduct in response to a request from the headmen of the villages in Suntō district. He vowed to attend religious services at Hakone Gongensha 箱根権現社 every day, and further promised to build the aqueduct and thereby develop new paddies and to offer in perpetuity 200 *koku* 石 of the proceeds from the water intake to the shrine. He then made a petition to this effect to the shogunate. The ranking Buddhist priest (*bettō kaichō sōjō* 別当快長僧正) at Hakone Gongensha was so impressed with the plan that he also petitioned the shogunate and otherwise did what he could to promote the plan. The shogunate was slow to act, but finally approved the plan in 1666. Groundbreaking took place at Fukara 深良 village at the western end of the tunnel. The construction employed the techniques of fortification developed by the Takeda 武田流 school of military science, which was handed down through the Tomono family. Excavation proceeded simultaneously from the eastern and western ends of the tunnel, and when the two sides connected there was an error of only about three *shaku* (about 90 centimeters).

The shogunate was wary of the construction project from the outset: it was conducted on the shogunal demesne but without any financial support from the shogunate, and work began shortly after the Keian Incident 慶安の変—a failed conspiracy against the Tokugawa regime. The authorities repeatedly summoned Tomono Yoemon and submitted him to severe interrogations. Moreover, some of the local peasants were also opposed to the project. However, construction work proceeded with the support of those peasants who backed the plan and was completed in 1670 at the enormous cost of 7,340 *ryō*. Despite this achievement, however, the shogunate arrested and executed Tomono and other supervisors of the construction project for no apparent reason.

Based on this tradition, local villagers who benefited from the Hakone aqueduct later erected a small shrine to honor the spirits of the five men who had been executed. This was made into the village shrine in 1875, and in 1902 the shrine hall (*shaden* 社殿) and shrine-name marker (*shagōhyō* 社号標) were rebuilt.

It is uncertain whether the peasants obtained the survivors' permission to enshrine the spirits of the five men. Based on what we know about similar cases, however, we can speculate that the family members were informed of the enshrinement. It is also believed that the men's graves, which the survivors would have maintained for their own worship, were not abandoned even after the establishment of the small shrine in the men's honor. In other words, the five men's spirits became *kami* while continuing to exist as Buddhas (*hotoke*). The deified men in this case were both deities of memory and honor and collectively enshrined at the initiative of ordinary people.

Next let us consider the case of Saigō Takamori, one of the "three heroes" of the Meiji Restoration era. In 1873, Saigō resigned from his government post and returned to his home in Kagoshima 鹿児島 after losing a political struggle with Iwakura Tomomi 岩倉具視 and Ōkubo Toshimichi 大久保利通 over policy toward Korea. In Kagoshima he founded a private school and devoted himself to the education of its teachers and students. However, he was eventually driven to take action against the state by the agitation of the students and staff at the school, who were sympathetic to the numerous uprisings of former samurai occurring at the time. He thus launched the Satsuma Rebellion, often termed the last civil war in Japanese history. Fighting against the far more numerous and better equipped government forces, Saigō's rebels were doomed to failure from the outset. After a series of setbacks, Saigō and his men fled to the hills of Shiroyama 城山 in Kagoshima, where they committed *seppuku* at the conclusion of their last stand.

Saigō became the object of worship immediately after his death, first in his home region and then throughout the country. In parallel with this phenomenon, the area around his grave was treated as a sacred ground on which to honor Saigō's memory and to comfort his spirit. Following a post-mortem inspection, the remains of Saigō and his officers were buried on the grounds of a local temple, Jōmyōji 浄明寺 and grave markers were erected. This became the location of a pilgrimage site, and in 1883 the remains of soldiers from Saigō's army who had died throughout Kyushu were gathered and buried in the temple graveyard. In 1913 the pilgrimage site was refurbished and renamed Nanshū Shidō 南州祠堂. Then, in 1922, the site was elevated to the status of a shrine; renamed Nanshū shrine, it was clearly distinguished from Saigō's grave site. The shrine was founded through the efforts of people with a deep attachment and even reverence for Saigō and his accomplishments and lasting influence. It communally enshrines the soldiers who died in the Satsuma Rebellion, with Saigō as the head deity.

The examples presented thus far all entail the deification of the spirits of the dead. Let us now look at the phenomenon of deifying the spirits of the living. This important report is from the research of Katō Genchi 加藤玄智, who calls the practice of enshrining the living *seishi* 生祠. The practice was widespread in the late Tokugawa and early Meiji periods. It served to honor and memorialize the virtue (*toku* 徳) of a wide variety of people, from domain lords and the emperor down to village headmen and artisans.

In the eleventh month of 1840, the lord of the Shōnai 庄内 domain, Sakai Tadakata 酒井忠器, was shocked to receive an order transferring his domain to Nagaoka 長岡 in Echigo 越後 province as part of a three-way shuffle of lords by the shogunate. His subjects were equally dismayed, for the house of Sakai, and Tadakata in particular, was known for its

benevolent rule. They accordingly launched a protest against the transfer. They deployed a variety of tactics to press their demand that Tadakata be left in place, and in the seventh month of the following year they were rewarded with the news that the shogunate had rescinded the order. The protest movement is well-known for the picture scrolls (*ezu* 絵図) that illustrate the details of the event. Less known is the fact that Tadakata was worshiped as a *kami* while alive and enshrined at Wakamiya shrine 若宮神社 (present-day Sakai shrine 酒井神社), which was founded in 1852. Among the pictures illustrating the uprising is one that shows a banner inscribed with Sakai Daimyōjin 酒居大明神 [*sic*]. The idea of enshrining the living lord was first proposed by a peasant named Sakubei 作兵衛 at a mass meeting at Sugio 楯尾神社 shrine at the outset of the uprising. By 1849 the movement had gathered further momentum and a shrine was founded at which the retired Tadakata and his successor Tadaaki 忠発 were enshrined together.

Let me give another example of living deification (*seishi*). Before the government built the Meiji shrine to enshrine posthumously the Meiji emperor, a number of small, private shrines were established to worship the still-living sovereign.

In June 1876, while on his tour of northeastern Japan, the emperor stopped at Matsushima 松島. A local man named Konishi Kyūhei 小西九兵衛 of the port of Ishinomaki 石巻 presented the emperor with a boat for his use. Afterward the emperor bestowed the boat on Konishi, who was deeply moved by the gesture. Konishi disassembled the boat and preserved the lumber. He also built a model of the boat and worshiped it as if it were a symbolic proxy of the Meiji emperor's spirit (*mitamashiro* 御霊代). At the same time Konishi erected a small shrine in a corner of his garden, and after the emperor died he named it Meiji shrine 明治神社.

In 1919 a plan surfaced to erect a monument in honor of the eighty-five-year-old Meiji oligarch, Prince Matsukata Masayoshi 松方正義, in the town of Hita 日田 in Kyushu. The connection was that Matsukata had once served as governor of Hita prefecture. The monument scheme failed, but a private Matsukata shrine was erected on the grounds of Hinokuma shrine 日隈神社 in Kameyama 亀山 park in the town. Matsukata had a bad reputation as a politician, but the founders of the shrine were said to have admired his personal virtue. Matsukata himself never visited the shrine, but his son did make a pilgrimage during his father's lifetime.

As we have seen in this review of the deification of non-vengeful human spirits, anyone who wanted to enshrine a spirit privately was free to do so. Commoners were even able privately to consecrate the spirits of emperors and nobles. To be sure, it was believed that it was most appropriate for a person's descendants to honor his or her spirit. However, even those outside the family could worship a person's spirit if they so wished. Accordingly, worshiping and maintaining a spirit is not reserved for a particular category of person with some relation to the individual. At the outset of the modern era, anyone could establish a shrine dedicated to the spirit of any individual so long as it was done privately. By extension, the nation could similarly undertake the enshrinement of anyone it chose.

Finally, let us build on the preceding discussion and look at the forms of worship that form the background to Yasukuni shrine. Political authorities such as domainal lords performed religious services in tribute to soldiers who died under their command. These

services took a Buddhist form, and so it was generally the case that no special shrine was built for the purpose. Similar measures were taken to honor the victims of natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods. For example, there is an illustrated broadsheet (*kawaraban* 瓦版) depicting a service (*ōsegaki* 大施餓鬼) held for the victims of the massive Ansei 安政 earthquake that hit Edo on the second day of the tenth month of 1855. According to the text, a month after the earthquake, on the second day of the eleventh month, major temples around the city held services for the dead—Tōeizan Ryōun'in 東叡山凌雲院 and Sensōji 淺草寺 of the Tendai 天台宗 sect; Ekōin 回向院 in Honjo 本所 of the Jōdo 淨土宗 sect; Seinan'in 西南院 in Nihon'enoki 二本榎 and Enman'in 円満院 in Shirokanedai 白金台 of the Kogi Shingon sect 古義真言宗; Daigoin 大護院 of the Shingi Shingon sect 新義真言宗; Tōkaiji 東海寺 in Shinagawa 品川 of the Rinzaï Zen sect 臨濟禪宗; Seishōji 青松寺 in Kaizuka 貝塚 of the Sōdō sect 曹洞宗; Rakanji 羅漢寺 of Honjo of the Ōbaku Zen sect 黃檗宗; Nichirinji 日輪寺 in Asakusa 淺草 of the Ji sect 時宗; Sōenji 宗延寺 in Shitaya 下谷 of the Itchi school 一致流 of the Nichiren sect 日蓮宗; Keiuiji 慶卯寺 in Asakusa for the Shōretsu school 勝劣流 of Nichiren; and Nishi-Honganji 西本願寺 in Tsukiji 築地 and Higashi-Honganji 東本願寺 in Asakusa of the Ikkō school 一向流 of Nichiren. These services were probably held on orders from the shogunate. In any case, no facilities to memorialize the victims permanently were erected. Incidentally, another print illustrates what looks to be scenes of memorial services held within local neighborhoods to appease the victims' ghosts.

The Emergence of Shrines for the War Dead and the History of Yasukuni Shrine

On the fourth day of the fourth month of 1851—before Matthew Perry's forcible "opening" of Japan, in other words—the lord of the Chōshū 長州 domain, Mōri Takachika 毛利敬親, had his family temple, Tōshunji 洞春寺 of the Rinzaï Zen sect, hold services in honor of the domain's many generations of loyal retainers. In the tenth month of the same year he had a roster compiled of retainers who had demonstrated their loyalty through death in battle and other such circumstances. The roster went as far back in time as possible, and included whatever information could be uncovered, such as the retainers' names and the sites of their deaths. The roster was presented in 1853 to Tōshunji, where it was held as a temple death register (*kakochō* 過去帳). Takachika had Buddhist services held at the temple to honor and pay tribute to the memory of the fallen vassals.

In this manner, services for Chōshū vassals were conducted for some time in the "Buddhist" style, but as a result of the growing influence of nativist (*kokugaku* 国学) scholars they were switched to a "Shinto" style. The domain suffered heavy casualties in the shogunate's punitive expeditions against it, and it accordingly felt the need to provide elaborate burials for the war dead. In 1864, after the bombardment of Shimonoseki 下関 by the Western powers, the domain established a "shrine to summon the spirits" (*shōkonsha* 招魂社) of the war dead. The domain later erected additional *shōkonsha* at battle sites and held memorial services for the war dead at Tōshunji. It was the only domain to found *shōkonsha* before the end of the Tokugawa period, building sixteen of them in all.

Among the noteworthy shrines erected at this time were Akazumasha 阿賀都麻社, later renamed Akazuma Shōkonsha 赤妻招魂社, dedicated to Nishikinokōji Yorinori 錦小

路頼徳, a court noble of the expulsion (*jōi* 攘夷) faction who died of illness while in exile in Chōshū; and Nakayama shrine 中山神社, dedicated to Nakayama Tadamitsu 中山忠光, a leader of the Tenchūgumi 天誅組 who was assassinated after fleeing to Chōshū.

At about the same time these developments were occurring in Chōshū, private Shinto services in honor of those who had died for the nation were held in various locations in response to an order from Emperor Kōmei 孝明天皇, who was acting at the behest of loyalist activists. This movement continued to evolve. In 1862, nativist scholars conducted services for the spirits of war dead (*shōkonsai* 招魂祭) who had demonstrated “patriotic will” (*hōkoku chūshi* 報国忠志) at the Reimeisha 靈明舎, a national facility for Yoshida 吉田 Shinto-style funerals in the Higashiyama 東山 district of Kyoto. Moreover, in 1863 a small shrine was erected on the grounds of the Gion shrine 祇園社 in Kyoto, at which the spirits of Sanjō Sanetsumu 三条実万, Tokugawa Nariaki 徳川斉昭 [text has 斉明] and sixty-four others who had died for the country were consecrated privately.

In 1868 the new Meiji regime began considering plans for a shrine to honor and tribute Kusunoki Masashige, the medieval warrior whom nativist scholars and their adherents in the loyalist faction had latched onto as the archetypal imperial loyalist. At the same time, the authorities considered building a shrine for those who had died for the country. In 1870 the government issued an official proclamation that the shrines would be erected. The shrine for Kusunoki was built at the site of his grave, while the one for those who had sacrificed themselves for the imperial cause was built in Higashiyama, where many of the victims were already buried.

In 1869, still in the midst of the Boshin Civil War, the state used the de facto transfer of the capital as an opportunity to erect a *shōkonsha* in Tokyo. The authorities aimed to intensify the will to fight among the government troops. The state appropriated land for the shrine at the site of the present-day Yasukuni shrine. Later that year a temporary shrine was erected and a service for the spirits of the war dead was performed before an assemblage of domainal lords. The spirits of “loyal subjects” who had died for the imperial cause during the civil war (from the initial battle at Toba-Fushimi to the final struggle at Hakodate) were enshrined at the site. The shrine, Tokyo Shōkonsha, later became Yasukuni shrine.

Yasukuni shrine was positioned at the top of the prewar national religious institutional structure known as state Shinto. As its prehistory reveals, it was established with the aim of honoring and quieting the spirits of men who died in wars persecuted by the ruling authorities. Moreover, the authorities (read: the state) regarded the dead as “loyal subjects” (*chūshin* 忠臣).

Who Oversees the Spirit?

Let us return at last to the question of Yasukuni-as-*shōkonsha* and reconsider it in light of the many patterns of human deification that we have examined thus far.

Historically, Buddhist conventions were followed in paying tribute to and honoring the casualties of war and other disasters; the Chōshū domain's first services for its war dead—which established the precedent that would eventually result in the dedication of the first *shōkonsha*—and the response to the Ansei earthquake in Edo illustrate this point.

Buddhist memorial services drew on the traditional belief that the spirit of the dead would haunt the living unless sufficient measures were taken to appease it and put it to rest. At the same time, the weakening of the spirit's vengeful character nevertheless required services to console its grief, sorrow, and agony, for only by doing so could it break its attachment to this world and thus be freed from drifting around in the other world unable to become a *hotoke*. These services simultaneously comforted the spirits of the survivors by relieving the grief, sorrow, and agony that necessarily accompanied the severing of their attachment to the deceased.

Conducting periodic memorial services certainly served to remember the deceased, but also to forget them. The tradition of conducting Buddhist services for the war dead and victims of natural disasters survives today. The Tokyo Metropolitan Memorial Hall (Tōkyō-to Ireidō 東京都慰霊堂) is a representative site: the hall is managed by the metropolitan government and operated through a non-profit group, the Tokyo Metropolitan Memorial Foundation (Tōkyō-to Irei Kyōkai 東京都慰霊協会). The Buddhist practitioners invited to perform services at the hall are volunteers and are not limited to members of any particular sect.

Conversely, beginning in the early modern period another type of service for the dead, one that differed from Buddhist practice (*kuyō*), penetrated into public practice. Likely behind this phenomenon was the founding of sites like Toyokuni shrine in honor of Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Nikkō Tōshōgū for Tokugawa Ieyasu—itself a reflection of the efforts of the politically influential practitioners of Yoshida Shinto.⁴ This opened the door to the creation of a new mechanism, which had not existed in Buddhist memorialization practices, of honoring those who had attained great things in this world and of transmitting their names and deeds to future generations through the founding of shrines (*shidō* 祠堂). In other words, the new practice can be called “hero worship” or the “worship of living deities.”

To be sure, this type of religious practice was not without precedent. The remains of the politically powerful were buried in mausolea and ancestral shrines and accorded special treatment. On occasion temples managed the mausolea. Many of these temples were transformed into shrines after the Meiji Restoration. Moreover, in Buddhist institutions it was common to enshrine in a special building, separate from the mausoleum, a portrait or sculpture of the founding monk or a prominent abbot. This sort of practice also served as a precursor to the worship of deified humans.

In the late Tokugawa period there was a certain fad to create small shrines to honor and remember those viewed popularly as heroes or great men; individuals who had accomplished heroic undertakings at the risk of their own lives were often honored with shrines set up as branches of local tutelary shrines. Rather than the burial site, a Shinto shrine was considered the most appropriate venue for the public worship and veneration of individuals by those unconnected by family ties to the deceased—such shrines, in other words, were established on behalf of whomever wished to participate in the worship and veneration of the deceased. The evolution of the Nanshū cemetery and Nanshū shrine as a site honoring Saigō Takamori and his soldiers who were killed during the Satsuma Rebellion illustrates this point particularly clearly.⁵

In my view, the most important point is the disassociation of worship of the spirit from the family of the deceased. A spirit resting in a grave is managed by the person's descendants.

However, a spirit summoned to a shrine is managed by the people who happen to want to venerate it.

“Shrines to summon spirits” (*shōkonsha*) thus emerged out the history of deification among the Japanese people. As noted earlier, the Chōshū domain’s services for the war dead were initially performed in the Buddhist manner. Eventually, the influence of nativists, combined with a tradition of vernacular human-deity worship practices, gave rise to the creation of shrines—*shōkonsha*—detached from the burial sites of the dead. In this manner, the spirits of the dead were separated from the survivors’ maintenance and initiative. Nonetheless, the *shōkonsha* built in the final years of the Tokugawa period in Higashiyama, Kyoto, was located at the burial site of many imperial loyalists who had died during the late Tokugawa political struggles. But by the time the Tokyo Shōkonsha was created just a few years later, it had metamorphosed into a shrine maintained by those who wished to honor the dead—that is, the national political authorities—completely separate from the graves of those enshrined.

In 1941, the head priest of Yasukuni shrine, Suzuki Takao 鈴木孝雄, wrote an article entitled “On Yasukuni Shrine” (Yasukuni jinja ni tsuite 靖国神社に就て) in a special, internal-use-only edition of the journal *Kaikōsha kiji* 偕行社記事 (number 80), in which he argued, “Services held at the funeral hall here function to invite spirits to this place. At that point they are the spirits of human beings (*bito no rei* 人の霊). We then hold a service to inform the *kami* of the imminent enshrinement of the new spirits, after which we enshrine the spirits in the main hall, and act that makes the spirits divine (*shinrei* 神霊). The significance of this act must be carefully considered, particularly by the family of the deceased. The family must not think that the spirit will forever be their own son—they must understand that the spirit is no longer their son, but rather is a *kami*.”

Suzuki’s comments illustrate perfectly the process in which a spirit maintained at its gravesite by its survivors is detached and venerated by those who wish to venerate it—in this case, of course, the state. The state, in other words, expropriates the spirit of the son from the family of the deceased. The difficulty here is that the state followed a clear precedent from the early modern period in enshrining whatever spirits it wished, regardless of the intentions of the affected families.

Yasukuni shrine’s origins lay in customary services for the dead and folk traditions concerning human deities. It builds on the notion that the spirit of a person who could not live a full life will not rest unless services are held to appease it. Yet, even as it built on and maintained these folk practices, there was a fundamental and decisive gap between tradition and Yasukuni shrine. This is because the shrine took on a new function in response to the demands of the modern state and its armed forces. This function was to make the state’s maintenance (appeasement and honoring) of the spirits of the war dead a centerpiece of state Shinto. Deification practices once performed by the people to appease, honor, and memorialize individuals who had served them were appropriated by the state for its own purposes. *Anyone* can deify a human spirit—this is surely the basic notion underlying the *kami* (spirits), in Yasukuni as elsewhere.⁶ The key to addressing the complex issues surrounding Yasukuni shrine lies in finding more profound ways to dissect these questions.

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NOTES

¹ Buddhist services for human deities can be observed in temples, mausolea, and images that commemorate the works of high-ranking abbots and saints who founded or restored temples. For example, a *torii* 鳥居 stands at the entrance of the mausoleum of the head priest of the Tendai sect as a relic of Shinto-Buddhist syncretism (*shinbutsu shūgō*) and as a manifestation of the memorialization of a human deity.

² It is unclear when or by whom the word *irei* 慰霊 was first used. The term became widespread in postwar Japan, as observed in its frequent use by the Japan Association for the Bereaved Families of the War Dead. The Tokyo Metropolitan Memorial Hall (Tōkyō-to Ireidō), built to console those who died in the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923, also enshrines the spirits of the victims of the air raids. This facility was formerly called the Earthquake Memorial Hall (Shinsai Kinendō 震災記念堂), and its origins lay in Buddhist-style temples that did not discriminate based on sect. The word *irei* does not appear in prewar dictionaries. Expressions that correspond to this may include *shōkon* 招魂 and *chōkon* 弔魂.

³ The act of mourning the death of victims of wars and natural disasters was generally performed in the form of Buddhist services for the dead. The mourning service for the victims of the Great Kantō Earthquake also followed this format.

⁴ Murakami 1974. Japanese nativist scholars were heavily involved in services for the war dead. The *shinsōsai* held at the Reimeisha in Higashiyama was no exception.

⁵ The parishioners of shrines for human deities including Nanshū shrine are not the family members of the deceased but organizations with names like *kenshōkai* 顕彰会 (commemorative society), consisting of people who want to honor the achievements of the deceased. Therefore, if the *kenshōkai* were to cease to exist, the shrine would lose the party that worships the *kami* there. However, it is possible for the priest responsible for that shrine to preserve the shrine at his own discretion, even after the loss of the sponsoring organization. This is another way in which the question surfaces on who is responsible for overseeing the spirit dedicated to a shrine.

⁶ As Ōe Shinobu (1984) points out, other, lower-ranking shrines and monuments served the same role as Yasukuni of honoring the war dead at the village, town, district level. Services held at the local levels used a mixture of Shintoism and Buddhism.

Ōgai's Antiquarianism: Parting with History

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In a curious essay, “*Rekishi sono mama to rekishi banare*” 歴史其儘と歴史離れ (History as It Is and History Abandoned), published one month after *Sanshō Dayū* 山椒大夫 in January 1915, Mori Ōgai 森鷗外 muses about the status of his historical fiction. “There has been considerable discussion,” he begins,

as to whether or not my recent works, which deal with actual historical figures, are really fiction. . . . Certainly, the kind of work I’m now writing doesn’t resemble any one else’s fiction. As a rule, fiction involves freely picking and choosing among facts and pulling everything together into a coherent whole. My recent works have none of these features. . . . [Although I used to write in this way] I completely reject such methods nowadays.

“Why? My motives are simple,” he declares. To write in a “fictional” manner would violate the integrity of historical sources. As he composed his historical tales, he came increasingly to value the “reality” (*shizen* 自然) he discovered in old records and “wantonly changing that reality seemed distasteful.”

The bulk of the essay is therefore taken up with the question of how much fictional distortion is permissible in dealing with history. Ōgai offers what he terms a “frank, behind-the-scenes look” at how he rendered history into fiction in “*Sanshō Dayū*.” As one might expect, given Ōgai’s professed aversion to “fiction” (at least as practiced by others), his concerns focus on the liberties he took with the original tale. He notes how he changed the ages of the main characters, dropped a couple of minor characters, and fiddled with dates—all in order to make the story cohere. He also admits to “antiquing” the language of the story so as to achieve a period effect: he used archaic terms for clothing and other furnishings and introduced old-fashioned phrasings into the speech of certain characters.

Ōgai defends these alterations of the original material by claiming that they make the story more plausible. Nonetheless, that Ōgai felt he needed to comment at all on what were, after all, trivial alterations of the original—of an original, moreover, that was itself a folktale, not a factual account—indicates that something rankled. Despite his defense of the ways he “fictionalized” the story, he clearly seems to prefer taking history as it is. In the long-running debate on the status of history and fiction, Ōgai evidently sides with those who place history on the side of reality and characterize fiction by its “wanton” and arbitrary tinkering with reality. Ōgai thus poses his historical fiction on the same uncertain terrain this genre has occupied ever since Walter Scott’s day. In setting fiction against history, falsity against fact, he implicitly raises the questions that, as Ina Ferris notes in her discussion of Scott’s *Waverley*

novels, have been asked of historical fiction these last 200 years: “what will count as history? what are the limits and rules of historical discourse? . . . what is it to which history must be true?”¹

History and Historical Fiction

This is of course a well-worn path, as much in Japan as in Europe. The relationship between the “history” and “fiction” in historical fiction has long been an issue of contention, a contention long focused on fiction’s supposed infidelity to historical fact and, from the other side, on the adequacy of history to represent the real world of lived experience. Almost exactly a year before the appearance of “History as It Is,” for example, Ōgai raised precisely this question about his treatment of Ōshio Heihachirō’s rebellion: “My interest in Ōshio Heihachirō began when I happened to borrow a manuscript from Suzuki Honjirō. . . . The manuscript contained a number of eyewitness reports [of the rebellion]. Much of the material in the manuscript seemed mere rumor; as I attempted to pick the historical facts from among these reports, I found the pickings to be very slim. But, because the reports were full of holes, I found that my imagination was greatly stimulated.”² But the most sustained investigation of the relationship comes earlier: in Takizawa Bakin’s defense of his historical romances and (a generation later) in Tsubouchi Shōyō’s complicated assessment of Bakin in *The Essence of the Novel* (*Shōsetsu shinzui* 小説真髓).

Interspersed throughout Bakin’s great historical tale *Chinsetsu yumiharizuki* 椿説弓張月 (Crescent Moon, 1806–10) are prefaces and postscripts that defend the fiction in historical fiction—along with episodes drawn from the life of a genuine twelfth-century hero, Minamoto Tametomo; manifestly unhistorical battles with dragons, monstrous snakes, and demons disguised as beautiful women; and other things that properly have no place in a tale set in the twelfth century, including ritual disembowelments and Edo-period currency.

Bakin, for instance, goes to some length to justify a further career for his hero—one that takes place after what most histories regard as Tametomo’s death. Though, as Bakin admits, evidence for Tametomo’s survival and further adventures “cannot be found in any of the military histories or chronicles of our land,”³ he scours Chinese histories, roots out legends about Tametomo’s sword, tracks down the annals of shrines associated with his hero, and draws on other sources to extrapolate from them the possibility that Tametomo may have made it to the Ryukyus, and there to have married the daughter of a local chieftain and sired what would become the royal line of the Ryukyu kingdom.

The implausibility of much of what happens in his novels notwithstanding, Bakin struggles to maintain a certain kind of plausibility. In this instance, instead of simply admitting that he was making up a set of further adventures for his popular hero, he seems determined to prove that Tametomo could indeed have had a second career in the Ryukyus. To further the effect, he supplies copious amounts of detail about time and place—he prefaces the first sequel to *Crescent Moon*, for example, with a guide to the geography and customs of the Ryukyus.

Bakin’s fiction presents us with a puzzle. He seems at once excessively devoted to history and excessively cavalier about it. His method, he writes at the end of the second part of *Crescent Moon*, is to offer “half truth, half fiction”—this in contrast to “those picture books,

which make up everything without discrimination."⁴ In the preface to the third sequel, he elaborates:

Historical fiction (*haishi*) attempts to explicate what appears in official histories and make their contents widely available to the general public. Vulgar histories (*bōkan yashi*) by contrast follow the wind and seize the shadows, deluding the public. There is no question which of these [*haishi* or *bōkan yashi*] is erroneous and groundless, or which confuses people. Although *Crescent Moon* is a work of fiction, it draws on historical records and is faithful in every respect to the official histories. It does not contain clever fabrications. . . . It does not mislead or confuse the reader.⁵

Elsewhere Bakin provides more specifics.⁶ His method, he writes, is to take genuine figures (*seimei*) from history, to be meticulous about times and dates (*nengetsu*) and the general sense of the age (*jidai*). But instead of repeating what the official histories say, he “weaves [these elements] into a wondrous tale.” He describes himself as “fleshing out the historical record,” “introducing a measure of drama, yet without losing sight of the old records.”⁷ While humbly representing himself as simply adhering to the historical record, Bakin in fact implies that his “half truth, half fiction” is much to be preferred. Official histories, he indicates, are too stuffy, too narrowly conceived, to be of wide appeal. Only an imagined history, of the carefully circumscribed sort he himself wrote, could capture the imagination of a broad populace.

Nonetheless, shadowing Bakin's defense of his fiction is the argument from the other side, which faults his novels for the liberties they take with history. This attitude dominates, for example, Tsubouchi Shōyō's discussion of Bakin's works in *The Essence of the Novel*, a seminal work in the academic study of literature in Japan. Tsubouchi acknowledges Bakin's importance to Japanese literature (“every novel published recently has been a reworking of Bakin”), even as he takes Bakin to task for violating just about every rule he sets out for the novel.⁸ Tsubouchi delivers a series of backhanded compliments, revealing a deep ambivalence about Bakin and his work. His *Hakkenden* is a “great work,” even though its heroes “cannot be described as human beings” (25, 67). Similarly, while characters in novels should be drawn true to life, “The eight heroes of the *Hakkenden* . . . are wizards who encounter no difficulties and never die. . . . Inue no Masashi, in particular, does not die even though he is killed. . . . Thanks solely to Bakin's literary talent, this defect goes unremarked throughout the novel. Any other author would have had the reader yawning and throwing the book away by the eighth or ninth chapter” (85, 155). Or, on the “grave fault in a historical novel” of anachronism: “How unfortunate it is that even a great writer like Bakin not only sinned frequently in this respect but made no attempt whatever to reform” (93, 168–9).

Tsubouchi seems to be of two minds about the subject of historical fiction itself. At times, history and fiction seem allied. “Both,” he writes near the beginning of *The Essence of the Novel*, “arise from a common source” (13, 38), and it is “difficult to distinguish between novelist and historian solely on the grounds that one writes fiction and the other fact” (89, 163). Both novelists and historians are prone to the same errors: like historians, writers of historical novels must avoid “chronological inconsistencies, factual errors, and misrepresentation of customs” (92, 167). Historical fiction serves as a supplement to history. It affords readers a way to fill in the gaps in history, to bring to light those matters that cannot

be known for a fact:

[the novelist] begins with a time and place of no particular importance and proceeds to fill in the full picture by stages, luring the reader ever onward toward a marvellous climax and causing him to feel that past events have come alive before his eyes. . . . That is the forte of the novel! (91, 165)

Elsewhere in the same work, however, Tsubouchi describes history and fiction as opposites. History, concerned with the “surface” (*omote*) of things, with facts, differs fundamentally from historical fiction, which is properly concerned with the “inner recesses” (*ura*) of history, those things which “cannot be known to true history (*seishi*)” (91, 166). Nor does it seem possible for the two to coexist in the same body: “an aptitude for writing history being essentially different from a talent for writing poetry or fiction, those who have a talent for writing fiction are never those with an aptitude for history, while those whose aptitude is for history will never have a talent for fiction” (89, 161). The chapter Tsubouchi devotes to the historical novel ends up with a distinctly mixed-up account of the genre. Historical fiction, as a genre that necessarily requires a talent for both history and fiction, would seem to be an impossibility. Ultimately, Tsubouchi relies on tautology to distinguish the two: history is factual, fiction fictitious. History is concerned with “narrating events,” and historians must “substantiate every incident” (163, 90). Writers of historical novels, by contrast, are under no such obligation. In exploring that which “cannot be known to true history,” the novelist is free to exercise his imagination in order to “supply the missing facts” (90, 163-4).

I’d like to call your attention to the familiarity of this debate: for it is exactly the debate opened up by the publication of Scott’s Waverley novels in the West. In the reaction to Scott we can find the same positing of history and fiction as binary opposites, with history aligned with rational qualities like accuracy, argument, and so on. Fiction by contrast is associated with frills and mannerism, with artifice.

Still, history and fiction have enjoyed a very long association; the adversarial relationship has more than a little flavor of sibling rivalry. Scott and his supporters defended his novels as a superior form of history: they pointed repeatedly to orthodox histories’ inability to address how it *felt* to live in the midst of social upheaval, and they suggested that only fiction could adequately chronicle the experience of historical change. And when Scott’s critics decried his novels for the damage they might do to an unwitting public, they assumed that the novels could and would be read as histories: “The guides of public opinion cannot be too jealous in guarding against the encroachments of the writers of fiction upon the province of true history, nor too faithful in pointing out every transgression, however small it may appear, of the sacred fences by which it is protected.”⁹ Such protestations only suggest that the sacred fences are perhaps rather too easily breached.

But more to the point (and to shift the focus to the ways historians nowadays operate), it has become a commonplace that history is both a fiction and the antithesis of fiction. Nearly thirty years on since Hayden White’s *Metahistory* (1973) and the ‘linguistic turn’ many historians seem quite willing to admit that their work is emplotted and troped, that the history they write about is over (past) and present only in the form of complex discursive objects (sources) that are themselves plotted, troped, etc. And yet we’ll also insist that there’s

an irreducible kernel of reality in our sources that dictates against certain representational strategies (let's call these fiction). Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob, for example, argue in their recent *Telling the Truth about History* that artifice necessarily plays a role in the writing of history, but also maintain that

History is crucially distinguished from fiction by curiosity about what actually happened in the past. Beyond the self—outside the realm of imagination—lies a landscape cluttered with the detritus of past living, a *mélange* of clues and codes informative of a moment as real as this present one.¹⁰

We are still, evidently, caught in the same rut, trying to ascertain where history ends and fiction begins (or vice versa), worrying about how much imagination may be brought to reconstructing the past, and, while admitting that the two are perilously similar, but insisting nevertheless that they can be prised apart. Nor, indeed, have the terms of the debate shifted much in the last two hundred years. For most historians, the debate between history and fiction still unfolds as a contest between the reality of history and the irreality of fiction. Writers of historical fiction stressing, just as Scott did, the amount of research that underpins the fiction and asserting that they are as true to the past as any historian.

Ōgai and the Problem with Fiction

I remarked at outset that Ōgai's "Rekishi sono mama to rekishi banare" is a curious essay. This is so for several reasons. The foremost oddity may well be the choice of "Sanshō Dayū" as a vehicle for thinking about history and fiction. For the story isn't a rewriting of actual events—as was case with his other historical fiction—but a retelling of a story from the past. Ōgai's "Sanshō Dayū" is distilled from seventeenth- and eighteenth-century redactions of a family of legends and tales that date back to the sixteenth century or earlier. The "historical reality" that Ōgai seems so anxious to respect just isn't to be found. The work is fiction, based on other fictions, and therefore doubly (triply?) removed from any sort of "reality."

Second, despite defense of his "fictionalization" of the story, Ōgai is not really interested in upholding fiction as an alternative to history. Unlike Scott or Bakin, he doesn't stand up for historical fiction as a more accessible or more complete kind of history; he doesn't make the argument that he's offering a kind of history—the history of manners, for instance—that official history is ill equipped to deal with. At the same time, interestingly, he isn't really an advocate for history either. As he researched and wrote his historical tales, he found himself, he says, increasingly and "unknowingly" "bound by history" (*shirazu shirazu rekishi ni shibarareta* 知らず識らず歴史に縛られた). It's with the idea of escaping those bonds that he wrote "Sanshō Dayū." When he admits at the end of the essay, in what he terms a "true confession," to being disappointed with the results achieved in the story, we might, I think, do well to wonder what exactly it was he hoped to accomplish. Fiction doesn't seem to be an antidote to the feeling of being "bound" or "choked" (*aegikurushinda* 喘ぎ苦しんだ) by history. On the other hand, respecting historical reality and refusing to change the historical record—these don't seem very satisfying ways of proceeding either.

Ōgai, it would seem, has a different set of problems in mind. It's not the fiction/reality binary that really exercises him, as a closer inspection of "Sanshō Dayū" will reveal. The first

thing to note is that Ōgai isn't at all forthcoming in "Rekisho sono mama" about the ways he's reworked the story. The changes he admits to are the least consequential of the alterations he's made to the original tale. He emphasizes, as I noted earlier, his fiddling with the facts, (which is essentially meaningless, n.b., with respect to "Sanshō Dayū"), but says nothing about more profound ways he's changed his source materials. As Carole Cavanaugh notes, Ōgai reworks the Sanshō Dayū legends into "the unrealistic structure of a fairy tale."¹¹ (This includes manufacturing a happy ending for the story, "powerful talismans, separation from parents, parallel but gender-specific experiences, the repetition of the number three, coping with strange surroundings and unfamiliar tasks, the attainment of practical knowledge through the assistance of older strangers.") The "original" legends came out of the *sekkyō bushi* tradition, and scholars have identified dozens of didactic and religious tales as possible sources for "Sanshō Dayū." Ōgai's immediate source, a seventeenth-century compilation of Buddhist parables and sermons, orders and edits these loosely connected legends into something approaching a coherent story, but it still retains some crucial *sekkyō bushi* features, including the narrator (i.e., the voice of the one delivering the sermon). In addition to telling the story, this narrator offers a running commentary on the story as it unfolds, mentions alternative plot lines, and in other ways makes his presence known. Perhaps the greatest change Ōgai made to the story was to recompose it according to the conventions of modern, realist narrative.

This suggests that Ōgai's problems with "Sanshō Dayū" have less to do with what he identifies in "Rekisho sono mama" as the issue—that is, altering the sources—as with another feature of fiction. Ōgai defined fiction as a practice that involves "freely picking and choosing among facts and pulling everything together into a coherent whole" (*jijitsu o jiyū ni shusha shite matomari o tsuketa narai* 事実を自由に取捨して纏りをつけた習い). It's this trick of tying everything together into a neat conclusion, in short narration, that truly vexes him.

Ōgai as an Antiquarian

Of course this trick, which Ōgai explicitly identifies with fiction, applies (as he surely knew) just as easily to history. Though he doesn't articulate it in "Rekisho sono mama," his sense of escaping from or overthrowing history develops along a different axis from the typical history vs. fiction debate. Even as he was writing historical fiction like "Sanshō Dayū," he was beginning to write the "historical biographies" (*shiden* 史伝) which would "crown" his career. These are stupendous, flabby, massive things, compounded of undigested source material and digression upon digression. Their most obvious characteristic is that they consciously resist narration, story-telling.

In the introduction to *Izawa Ranken*, Ōgai lays out his "method":

Since I am only a novice historian, I intend to take certain liberties with my use of source materials. It will not much matter if I happen to lose my way. And if it turns out that I end up hopelessly lost, then I will simply lay down my pen. A random, hit-or-miss plan, to be sure, something that I should like to term a "posture of posturelessness" [*mutaido no taido* 無態度の態度]. Navigating one's course by such a planless plan may well appear perilous and foolhardy to the casual observer. But

the novice historian is also an incurable optimist. I picture him lost in aimless meandering, when suddenly the path opens out onto an unanticipated vista, broad and stunning.

Pursuing this “planless plan,” Ōgai offers readers reams of undigested source materials and tidbits of poetry, biographical data, indeed any information that came to hand, as he wanders through the web of relationships—intellectual, familial, etc.—in which his subjects are enmeshed.

Though he describes his goals in the language of fact vs. fiction—e.g., midway through *Izawa Ranken*, he avows that

In my writing I have devoted myself entirely to transmitting facts and have studiously avoided crossing over into imaginative narration. I have sought a secure foundation in what is objective; indulging in the subjective has not interested me. Those instances where I appear to have violated this rule are mere touches of imagination that supplement deficiencies in the factual record. If I were suddenly to cross over into critical or evaluative commentary, . . . I would inevitably overindulge myself in subjectivity. There would be no way to prevent my imagination from running off at full gallop. This sort of thing I absolutely reject—

his real aim is to avoid any suggestion that there is someone “behind” the material, organizing it and shaping it into something coherent and meaningful. In works like *Izawa Ranken* and *Shibue Chūsai*, Ōgai reveals that the “historical reality” he so respects has two characteristics. First it is thoroughly materialist: Ōgai is interested in sources, not interpretations, ideas, or the like. Second, and more important, it is purposeless by design: “As I have said many times, it does not interest me to debate whether or not these works serve any useful purpose. I write them because I want to, and that is all.”¹²

In these respects, Ōgai seems very much the antiquarian: enraptured by his materials, which he pretends to have stumbled across, determined not to pull them into some semblance of order, but to revel in their randomness and their distinctiveness, their ability to resist ordering. He resists as well the temptation to “unmask” his materials, to reveal them to stand for something else. It would be relatively easy to convert *Ranken* and *Chūsai* into emblematic figures. As intellectuals living through the tumults of the bakumatsu period, when the orthodoxies of Tokugawa rule came increasingly under question, their lives and struggles might be read as symptomatic of the twilight of the shogunate; alternatively, since he stresses the ordinary and everyday, Ōgai, were he to operate as a historian, might find in the ordinariness of their lives a lesson about the ways political turmoil translates (or fails to translate) into the realm of everyday life. Ōgai, however, declines to look past his characters to the “real” political or economic context. He resists the historical imperative to turn them into exempla; he refuses to make their lives meaningful in the ordinary way.

Antiquarian knowledge has for these reasons been ridiculed by historians as being excessive and fundamentally deranged; but there is a method to the antiquarian's madness. The insistence that there is something valuable to the thing in itself—not in the narratives in which it is made to play a part or in the arguments for which it serves as data—comprises a double rebuke to our conventional practice of history. On the one hand, it accords materials

that are not readily included in historical narratives a place and a value. Much of daily life and material culture—or in Ōgai's case, the everyday lives of insignificant scholars—falls within the category of things easily overlooked by history, either because they don't seem to change or because they can't be connected with bona fide events (such as the French Revolution or the Meiji Restoration). Second, antiquarian practice turns to the very material out of which history builds its narratives to obstruct that fundamental propensity of the discipline. To historians, who insist that the past can be explained, that we can adduce beginnings and endings, that the material of the past is significant because it can be shown to lead somewhere, antiquarians like Ōgai seem to respond, "No, there's just stuff, fascinating stuff that's of no practical value." Ōgai's *shiden* highlights, indirectly to be sure, the most fictional aspect of historical practice: the belief that history coheres, that it isn't just one damn thing after another. Walter Bagehot objected to Macauley's *History of England*, "It is too omniscient. Everything is too plain." One can imagine Ōgai concurring. ("We want historians to confirm our belief that the present rests upon profound intentions and immutable necessities. But the true historical sense confirms our existence among countless lost events," Foucault says in "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.")

Coda: History and Antiquarianism

The long collaboration between anthropology and history mimics, at least from a historian's perspective, the division of labor between historians and antiquarians (without, I hope, quite as much of the condescension). The study of material culture and everyday life, of structures, and other things that stubbornly resist change (and therefore the narration of change) has by and large been left to anthropologists. At the same time we historians have been plagued by the suspicion that anthropologists are onto something important, that we might be missing something by not paying attention to the realms they investigate. Hence, I suspect, the vast and long-lasting interest in Clifford Geertz and "thick description." (Far more important, I'd guess, in history than in anthropology; even the much heralded return to narrative of the past decade is emphatically post-"thick description." Simon Schama's narratives are rife with the kind of telling moments Geertz made famous. In Japan, Amino Yoshihiko's widely influential style was born out of a long encounter with anthropology.) Here was a method that bridged anthropology and history, allowing one to attribute significance to the seemingly random eddies of daily life (for, of course, thick description showed them to be far from random or insignificant). By such means, cat massacres could be connected to the French Revolution or *eejanaika* carousing to the end of the Tokugawa order.

One wonders whether historians will ever be similarly moved to pay attention to the products of antiquarians knowledge. A love of old things is supposedly fundamental to historical study, yet our desire to assign greater meaning to these things can easily lead to our forgetting the fact that they didn't arrive ready-made with significance. It takes something of an antiquarian sensibility to put objects (events, social movements, etc.) into their true context, in which their meanings were not certain, in which they could play a part (or none at all) in a plurality of possible futures. History as a discipline is altogether too interested in explaining why things had to turn out the way they did; it takes something of the antiquarian to remind us that things might have been otherwise.

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NOTES

¹ Ferris 1991, p. 137.

² *Ōgai zenshū*, v. 6, p. 229.

³ Takizawa Bakin, *Chinsetsu yumiharizuki*, NKBT, 60:227.

⁴ Ibid., 60:411. See also Ishikawa 1988, pp. 40–51.

⁵ Takizawa Bakin, *Chinsetsu yumiharizuki*, 61:129. I have slightly modified the translation of the passage found in Suzuki 1996, p. 17.

⁶ In *Haichi shichi hōsoku*, 1835. For a German translation, see Woldering 1993. Tsubouchi Shōyō discusses some of these rules in *Shōsetsu shinzui* (1936), pp. 90–95; in English, see Tsubouchi 1981, pp. 75–77.

⁷ Takizawa Bakin, *Okame hachimoku*. Quoted in Ishikawa 1988, pp. 44–45.

⁸ Tsubouchi 1981, p. 2. For the Japanese original, see Tsubouchi 1936, p. 11. Subsequent references are to these works and appear in parentheses in the text.

⁹ These are the words of one Thomas McCrie, Presbyterian clergyman and author of biography of John Knox. Quoted in Ferris 1991.

¹⁰ Appleby et al. 1994, p. 259.

¹¹ Cavanaugh 2000, p. 14.

¹² *Kanchōrō Kanwa*.

When Abortion Became a Crime: Abortion, Infanticide, and the Law in Early Meiji Japan

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Regulating Reproduction

In recent years, historians working on issues of gender and women's history have identified the inclusion of the "crime of abortion" statute in the new criminal code of 1880 as an important moment in the creation of modern gender ideology in Japan. Most notably, in her influential work *Sei no rekishigaku* 性の歴史学 (The Historiography of Sex), Fujime Yuki 藤目ゆき aligned the criminalization of abortion with state policy towards prostitution, venereal disease, and contraception and argued that these efforts on the Japanese government to regulate sexuality and reproduction were inspired by specific vision of a modern Japan nation with a large healthy population of workers and soldiers.¹ Working in the wake of Fujime's analysis, some scholars have raised questions about her conclusions. Ishizaki Shōko 石崎昇子 has explored the legal context and evolution of the abortion statutes and concluded that the Meiji state's policy toward abortion was inspired not by concern for producing a healthy citizenry but rather by Confucian notions of ethicality, which made the continuity and prosperity of the family essential to social order.² Kanazu Hidemi 金津日出実 examined the negotiations that went on between Gustave Emile Boissonade de Bontarabie, the French legal scholar hired to draft the criminal code, and the Japanese officials who were assisting him.³ She argues that Japanese officials viewed the acts of abortion and infanticide in Japan as quite distinct from such practices in Europe and America: they were desperate if unacceptable responses to dire poverty and the decision to resort to them was made by the family. Rejecting Boissonade's assertion that the resort to abortion was evidence of the immorality of the individual woman involved, his Japanese counterparts argued successfully for the establishment of penalties that were far lighter than in the French criminal code that was Boissonade's model.

In this paper, my aim is to contribute to this debate over the motives and impact of the Meiji state's policy towards reproductive "crimes" by examining an important but heretofore largely unexamined moment; that is, the decade before the 1880 "crime of abortion" statute came into effect. In 1871, as a provisional solution to the need to create a new legal system, the Meiji government promulgated the *Shinritsu kōryō* 新律綱領 (The Essentials of the New Law), a penal code compiled by Japanese Confucian scholars who drew upon the statutes of the Chinese codes of the Ming and Qing periods. Then, in 1873 the government promulgated the *Keitei ritsurei* 改定律例 (Amended statutes and substatutes), which had the goal of clari-

fyng the *Shinritsu kōryō* statutes and bringing them more into line with Western concepts of punishment.⁴ Within the *Shinritsu kōryō*, abortion itself was not specifically identified as a crime, but a common if unintended consequence of the act was: the section on homicide specified punishment for the male partner of an “unchaste woman” (*kanpu* 姦婦) who died as the result of an abortion.⁵ The *Kaitei ritsurei* contained the same provision: according to article 198 of the statutes on homicide, if a woman died as a result of an abortion, the man who instigated it was to be sentenced to penal servitude for three years. But the *Kaitei ritsurei* also specifically designated abortion itself as a crime. In the section covering “Household and Marriage” article no. 144 stated, “Those who abort [are to be sentenced to] one hundred days [of penal servitude]. As for those who know of their intention and sell medicine or use some other technique to effect an abortion, this is the same crime. Even in the case of a woman, it is not allowed to commute the punishment.”⁶ In addition, both the *Shinritsu kōryō* and the *Kaitei ritsurei* defined infanticide as an act of homicide.⁷

That scholars have focused on the abortion statute in the 1880 code, rather than these earlier laws, is not surprising: the *Shinritsu kōryō* and the *Kaitei ritsurei* were in effect for only a decade and were based upon a legal philosophy and system that was already coming under criticism from an increasingly Western-oriented elite. Thus, the codes of the 1870s seem to be a transitory and discontinuous moment in Japanese legal history. Nonetheless, the prosecutions that occurred under these statutes are significant because they marked the first attempts by the new central government to police the reproductive actions of its citizens and to impose a coherent “national” police upon the plurality of local practices, customs, and beliefs that shaped popular recourse to abortion and infanticide. Moreover, it was in this period that the discussions between Boissonade and his Japanese counterparts were taking place, and it seems likely that the information “produced” by the implementation of these early laws influenced perceptions of how, why, and by whom the acts of abortion and infanticide occurred. In fact, the number of cases prosecuted in these years was by no means insignificant. For example, in 1878, the first year for which statistics on reproductive “crimes” are available, 262 women were convicted of having an abortion, seventy men and sixty-five women were convicted of selling abortifacients or using other methods to induce an abortion, and 173 men and sixty women were convicted of for encouraging or aiding in the planning of an abortion. Two years later, in 1879, 306 women were convicted of having an abortion, seventy-two men and seventy-nine women were convicted of inducing abortions with drugs or other means, and 108 men and fifty-six women were convicted of encouraging or aiding an act of abortion.⁸

More suggestive than just these numbers of the cultural impact of these earlier laws is the popular discourse on abortion and infanticide that took form in the wake of the arrests, prosecutions, and convictions of the 1870s. Reports of reproductive crimes abound in the so-called “small newspapers” (*koshinbun* 小新聞) of the early Meiji period that specialized in human interest stories and had readership largely made up of urban commoners.⁹ Typical of this kind of reportage is an article that appeared in the *Yomiuri shinbun* in 1878.¹⁰ It tells of a pharmacist who, after the death of his adopted father, came to have a “strange relationship” with his adopted mother before becoming intimate with his young sister-in-law. Before long, “the stomach of the sister began to grow bigger and bigger.” The worried

couple are described as trying various things until a dose of “poison” produced the desired result. The article then concludes by noting that the abortion had come to light, and those involved arrested. A follow up article appeared a few weeks later.¹¹ It gave the name of the man involved (Yokoyama Ryūzō) and the name and age (O-Haru, fourteen) of his sister-in-law *cum* lover and repeated the facts of their case: after doing “bad things” to O-Haru and making her pregnant, the pharmacist Yokoyama gave her a drug that induced an abortion. The two were sentenced to one hundred days of penal servitude, although O-Haru’s sentence was reduced to a fine of twenty-five sen because of her age. The article concluded by declaring that O-Haru would probably never be able to make a good marriage.

Thus, an odd mixture of voyeurism, coyness, and moralization color these articles, leaving the reader to wonder whether laughter, contempt, or sympathy for the ruined O-Haru was the expected response. This lack of a clear narrative perspective points to the new opaqueness that the acts of abortion and infanticide acquired in this era as the new laws thrust these practices into a newly constituted public realm, exposing those involved to censure and punishment. The moral ambivalence associated with these practices is apparent as well in the ethnographic record. In the 1930s, a group of Japan folklorists endeavored to compile a record of customs related to reproduction in localities throughout Japan. Later published as *Nihon san'iku shūzoku shiryō shūsei* 日本産育習俗資料集成 (Collected Materials on Japanese Birth Customs), their work reveals that local informants believed that a fundamental shift in attitudes towards abortion and infanticide had taken place in the Meiji period. For example, a report from Chiba-ken states that “before Meiji, abortion and *mabiki* (i.e., infanticide) occurred openly and without shame. ... In fact, people felt ashamed instead if they were poor and still had many children.”¹² Describing another common motive for abortion, an informant in Niigata related that “in the case when the child did not have a father because [the pregnancy resulted from] an illicit relationship, it would be aborted.” Similarly, another informant stated that “in this region, before Meiji, people called an illegitimate child ‘a child of immorality’” and thus unmarried women typically sought an abortion.¹³ What these fragmented pieces of information suggest is that after 1868, what had been commonplace, indeed socially expedient, acts began to be transformed into objects of sanction and shame.

In interrogating this moment of transformation, I want to focus not on the formulation of the *Shinritsu kōryō* and *Kaitēi ritsurei* statutes, but rather on how they functioned in practice as the law became an important medium for diffusing and enforcing state policies. In other words, I want to examine who was prosecuted, for what kind of acts, and how such crimes were judged and punished. To this end, my analysis is centered on the legal record constituted by the cases of infanticide and abortion that were prosecuted in local courts between 1877 and 1882 and then appealed upward to the Daishin'in, the Grand Court of Judicature, in Tokyo, which in 1875 began to function as the final court of appeals. The records of these cases, fifteen in all, reveal the traces of interaction between the fledgling new state, represented by police, prosecutors, and judges, and ordinary citizens, in relation to one of the most important issues in female experience and family life, the question of how to manage an unwanted pregnancy. To be sure, the cases that came before the Daishin'in represent only a tiny fraction of the prosecutions that occurred at the local level. For example, in 1878, a year in which 630 people were convicted of crimes related to acts of abortion and

infanticide, only one case involving abortion was reviewed by the high court. However, while the number of appealed cases was small, the very fact that they came before the Daishin'in suggests that some issue of legal significance or some dispute over the nature of the justice rendered was involved. Useful too is their geographic distribution.¹⁴ Drawn from seven prefectures and from various regions of Japan, these cases allow us to see a sampling of the judgments made by courts from various regions of Japan, while the review of the high court in Tokyo and the decisions it rendered reveal how judges in Tokyo evaluated the decisions of the local courts.

In analyzing these cases, my aim is not to attempt to determine what “really” happened, nor to comment on the quality of the justice rendered by the Meiji courts. Rather, taking a hint from the work of Natalie Zemon Davis, I want to read the records as set of conflicting stories told about an act of abortion or infanticide.¹⁵ The record of an appealed case in fact takes the form of a series of narratives.¹⁶ Typically, it begins with a long summary of the testimony offered in the local court by the accused, which is then followed by a statement of the judgment of that court and its sentence. Next we encounter the objections raised by either the prosecutor or the defendant to court’s decision: here another story is told as the appealing side explains how the original judgment conflicted with the statutes or with the evidence. The record then concludes by recording the decision of the high court to either uphold or revise the judgment of the local court. Needless to say, these stories were highly structured, not only by the story-tellers’ varying degrees of knowledge of the law but also by a set of cultural assumptions about the nature of sexual relationships between married and unmarried men and women, about what constituted “normal” behavior within a family, about how wives and daughters, husbands and fathers should act. In crafting their stories before the judges, the defendants surely sought to explain their motives and describe their actions in terms they thought would resonate with the court. Thus, these carefully constructed stories reveal the interaction of ordinary people and the state (represented by its prosecutors and judges) in relation to the emergent government policy of pro-natalism.

Telling Tales in the Courtroom

Let me begin with a case that came before the Daishin'in in 1878. Originally tried in the Muraoka court, it involved four members of Kikuchi Ryūhei's family, all of whom resided in Sogei village in Iwai county in Iwate Prefecture and concerned the death of an infant born to Ryūhei's unmarried daughter Etsu.¹⁷ Worthy of note at the outset is the fact that Etsu herself was not among the defendants, and no testimony from her is included within the record of this case. Indeed, not a single direct statement is attributed to her in the lengthy record of this case. Instead, the story of her pregnancy, and the birth and death of her child is revealed in the testimony offered by Ryūhei and his fellow defendants, his wife Kotono, his mother Kan, and his eldest son Katsujirō, and Toda Gen'ei, the doctor who attended her. It is the statement of Kotono, her mother, that is most complete. As Kotono relates the story of this family crisis, sometime in August 1877, she became suspicious that Etsu was pregnant: the girl was not eating as usual and seemed bothered by stomach problems. Then one day, she saw Etsu binding her stomach with a long cloth known as *hara-obi*, an act typically performed by pregnant women from the fifth month onward. She questioned Shio, the wife of Katsujirō, who related

that Etsu was intimate with a man named Fujiwara Ankichi—this in spite of the fact that her family had recently entered into marriage negotiations with another family.

All but certain that Etsu was indeed pregnant, Kotono states that she then conferred with her husband. They agreed that the pregnancy would not only bring an end to this marriage proposal but also ruin Etsu's chances for a good marriage in the future and damage the reputation of the family as a whole. It was decided that Etsu would be taken to a local physician, Toda Gen'ei, and if she was indeed pregnant, the pregnancy would be aborted. When Toda confirmed Etsu's pregnancy, Kotono told him of the family's concerns and asked him to help abort the fetus. He advised her that an abortion would be difficult since Etsu was already at least five months pregnant but agreed to provide a drug. After returning home, Kotono informed Ryūhei of what had transpired, but—according to her account—he continued to insist that an abortion was the only solution. Etsu then took the three packets of medicine Toda had provided but to no effect. Several days later Toda was consulted again, and he responded by providing another oral abortifacient, and when that failed he made use of *sashikusuri*, inserting a drug vaginally. When these efforts too failed, Toda advised Kotono that an abortion was not possible and suggested that she raise Etsu's child as her own. In her statement, Kotono relates that she again conveyed the doctor's opinion to her husband and the rest of the family but that Ryūhei in particular continued to voice concern for the shame this birth would bring.

On December 31, Etsu's labor began, and Toda was summoned. When it became apparent that Etsu was having difficulty delivering the child, the physician asked that another doctor be summoned, but the family was reluctant to involve anyone else. Finally, the next morning, Etsu's baby was born. Kotono stated that the infant did not appear well: it did not cry and moved its arms and legs weakly. Believing that it would not survive in any case, she asked Kan to kill it. While Toda was engaged in caring for Etsu, Kan smothered the infant with some old rags. After the departure of the physician, Kotono told Ryūhei and the other members of the family that the infant had died soon after its difficult birth. Ryūhei was relieved and told Katsujirō to bury the infant in the family garden. Kotono concluded her statement with the declaration that, with the exception of Toda and Kan, no one else had any knowledge of how the infant died.

In summarizing Kotono's testimony, I have tried to preserve some of the significant aspects of her story as she told it: her concern for establishing that the family had discussed repeatedly the issue of how to resolve this problematic pregnancy, her reiteration of the family's fear of public humiliation and its consequences for Etsu, and her insistence that the child, born after a traumatic delivery, seemed to be on point of death, precipitating her sudden decision to end its brief life. On the face of it, Kotono's story seems convincing, the reality effect strengthened perhaps by the homely details she includes—the glimpse of the *haraobi*, her conversations with her young daughter-in-law about Etsu's behavior, and the mention of the old rags used to smother the infant—but Ryūhei and Toda, and to a lesser extent, Kan and Katsujirō, tell the story of Etsu's pregnancy in very different terms. A case in point is the story told by Ryūhei, whom Kotono portrayed as the driving force behind the family's quest to end Etsu's pregnancy. He stated that after the failure of the first attempt at abortion, he himself was willing to allow Etsu's pregnancy to continue with the intention of raising the child as his

own. Indeed, according to Ryūhei, he took the failure of the abortion as evidence that “the child in the womb was surely destined to survive,” and he claimed to have no knowledge of further efforts to abort the fetus.

Toda Gen’ei was equally concerned to downplay his involvement. According to his statement, from the first he was convinced that an abortion was impossible because of the advanced state of Etsu’s pregnancy, and thus he had advised Kotono early on to resign herself to raising the infant. In fact, Toda claimed that none of the so-called abortifacients he had provided presented any danger to Etsu or her fetus—an assertion that was confirmed by another physician who offered testimony. Toda stated that he supplied these harmless drugs in order to placate the family until they accepted the inevitability of this birth. In relating the events surrounding the death of the infant, Toda asserted that Kotono was still unwilling to accept Etsu’s pregnancy and even in the “birth room” (*san’ya*) requested that he kill the infant upon its birth. Later, as Etsu’s conditioned appeared grave, the family refused to call in another doctor to aid him because they wished to keep the birth a secret. Moreover, Toda stated that he became aware of Kan and Kotono discussing the need to dispose of the infant as Etsu labored. Shortly after he finished attending to Etsu, he realized that they had in fact killed the infant. Toda acknowledged that he should have reported this to the authorities at once but had not, because “in any case it would not have revived the child.”

In contrast to these three stories, those offered by Kan and Katsujirō are far briefer. Kan’s account follows that of Kotono, with two important departures. Even more than Kotono, Kan stressed the poor condition of the new-born infant, noting that in her long experience, both bearing children herself and aiding other women, she had never seen such a baby, so weak it was unable to cry. She also insisted that the decision to smother it had been made by Kotono—and only after the birth. Thus, Kan adamantly denied Toda’s charge that they had spoken to him of killing the child when he arrived to treat Etsu. Katsujirō’s story coincides neatly with that of Ryūhei. He asserted that after the first failed abortion attempt, his understanding was that Etsu’s child was to be raised as the child of his parents. When the infant was killed, he had not even been present, having left the house to go to a local shrine in order to evoke its deity to save his sister’s life. Upon his return, he was told that the infant had died soon after birth and had buried it in the garden, at his father’s direction.

In making sense of these conflicting stories, we need to take note first of how they responded to the requirements of the *Shinritsu kōryō* and the *Kaitei ritsurei* statutes. The codes, like the Chinese statutes they were based upon, articulated different degrees of punishment according to the circumstances of the crime. Commenting on the codes’ exhaustive delineation of penalties according to who did what to whom, for what reasons, and under what other circumstances, one scholar has declared that within premodern Chinese law acts of homicide had nothing in common but a dead body.¹⁸ Thus, the role of judges was to carefully determine punishment by analyzing the circumstances of the crime according to the multiple criteria used to determine its severity.

Addressing the issue of intent, the *Shinritsu kōryō* and the *Kaitei ritsurei* made an important distinction between “preconceived” murder (*bōsatsu* 謀殺) and “willful” murder (*kosatsu* 故殺). The former was defined an act of homicide in which the participant had prepared weapons in advance and acted with deliberation, while the latter was carried out in a state of emotion

in which the intent to kill was conceived at the time of the act and without preparation or planning.¹⁹ Secondly, the codes distinguished between varying degrees of culpability when multiple people were involved in a criminal act. The term “participant” (*juhan* 従犯) was used to describe someone who assisted in carrying out a homicide but at the instigation of some other person, labeled the “principal” (*shuhan* 首犯). The codes called for more severe punishment for the principal with whom the intent to commit the crime had originated, even if that person was not directly involved in its performance.²⁰ A third important feature of the two codes was the concept of mitigation: judges were allowed to reduce the severity of the punishment by one to five degrees based upon factors such as the offender’s age, gender, health or well-being, status as a male heir or an only child, and so on.²¹ From the perspective of these points of law, certain aspects of the competing narratives of the death of Etsu’s infant assume new meaning. Kotono’s concern to establish that she had consulted with others within the family, Ryūhei’s insistence that he had resigned himself to raising the infant, and Kan’s statement that she had acted only in response to Kotono’s prompting—all seem to be prompted by an awareness of the legal distinction between “principal” and “participant.” In the same way, Kan’s insistence that no one had asked Toda to kill the infant before its birth and that she had only acted after viewing the weak and seemingly abnormal infant carefully negotiates the distinction between “preconceived” and “willful murder.”

The record does not reveal how the judges came to their decision, but—whether out of sympathy for the accused or because of an unwillingness or inability to untangle the conflicting narratives—the sentences they issued were far lighter than might be expected. For one, they judged this to be a case of “willful” murder, even though this act of infanticide followed multiple failed attempts at abortion. Kotono was delineated as the “principal” and was sentenced to three years, but this was then reduced five degrees to a mere one hundred days, in recognition of what are vaguely described as “the circumstances” of her act. Kan was accordingly judged to be a participant and was sentenced as well to one hundred days. Ryūhei perhaps benefited greatest from the court’s largesse: while it recognized that he had “incited” the initial efforts to abort, he was sentenced to only thirty days because in the end the attempts at abortion had failed. Moreover, even this sentence was commuted to a fine of two yen and fifteen sen. In addition, Ryūhei was not found guilty of any involvement in the infant’s death and was fined one additional yen for its unlawful burial. Similarly, Katsujirō was fined a mere five sen for his role in the burial. In contrast, the physician Toda was treated with relative harshness. While the court accepted his argument that his drugs had had no ill effect, it held him responsible for not intervening to prevent Kan’s act, citing article 237 of the *Shinritsu kōryō* which made it a crime to fail to intervene to prevent an act of violence. He was sentenced to ninety days, but this was reduced to forty days based upon mitigation, and this sentence was then commuted to a fine of three yen.

But the case did not end with these judgments. The Muraoka prosecutor, Takeuchi Naoyoshi, disagreed with what he characterized as the undue lightness of the sentences and appealed the lower court’s rulings. In his lengthy statement to the high court, Takeuchi spoke contemptuously of what he characterised as the Muraoka court’s affirmation of the Kikuchi family’s concern for reputation and argued that none of those involved should be granted a reduction of the statutory sentences. For example, in relation to Kotono, Takeuchi ar-

gued that she had decided to kill her grandchild merely in order to conceal her daughter's misconduct, behavior for which Kotonno, as Etsu's mother, was ultimately responsible. He contrasted Kotonno's lack of concern for the life of the infant, with the motivation of impoverished parents who, in a misguided attempt to provide for their child, abandon it at the gate of a wealthy household. Noting that acts of child abandonment were punished by one hundred days of confinement, Takeuchi asked, can the act of Kotonno be weighed the same? The prosecutor dealt harshly with Ryūhei as well, pointing out that whatever the outcome, his intention had been that Etsu end her pregnancy. In regard to Toda, Takeuchi argued that he had full knowledge of the family's desire to abort the fetus and thus should have reported them to the authorities.

In the end, however, the verdict of the Daishin'in fell far short of the stiff sentences requested by Takeuchi. It confirmed the sentences of the lower court in relation to Kotonno, Toda, and Ryūhei and found Katsujirō to be not guilty of any crime. Only Kan suffered at the hands of the high court. As in the Qing penal codes upon which they were modeled, within the *Shinritsu kōryō* and *Kaitai ritsurei*, crimes were viewed through the prism of Confucian social relationships, and concepts of hierarchy based upon age, gender, kinship, and so on functioned to define the severity of the crime committed.²² Generally, acts committed by a "senior" (*sonchō* 尊長) against a "junior" (*hiyō* 卑幼) were punished less severely than the reverse, but in addition, in the case of crimes committed against relatives, the closeness of the kinship relationship became another decisive factor in determining punishments. The degree of kinship was defined by the five kinds of mourning relationships specified in Chinese law, which specified different lengths of mourning behavior based the relative valorization of different kinds of kinship ties. Transferred to the realm of criminal law, this meant, for example, that in the case when a "junior" killed a senior relative of the third degree, his punishment was to be increased by three degrees over the penalty for the same crime against a non-related person, while the killing of a senior relative of the fourth degree brought an increase of only two degrees. This logic was reversed in the case when a "senior" killed a junior relation. A "senior" who killed a "junior" relative of the third degree was to have his punishment reduced by three degrees, while the murder of a junior relative of the fourth degree was to receive a reduction of only two degrees and that of a junior relative of the fifth degree carried a reduction of only one degree.²³ Thus, in the case of offenses against junior relatives, the penalties became heavier as the kinship relation becomes more distant.

Applied to the case of the Kikuchi family this meant that even though Kotonno was judged to be the principal in this act of homicide, her status as the maternal grandmother of the victim meant that she was punished less severely than Kan, the maternal great-grandmother. The high court ordered that Kan's sentence be increased to death by strangling, but then reduced this sentence six degrees, to a term of two years of penal servitude.

Reproduction, the Family, and the Law

The new legal system thus situated the Kikuchi family's crisis within a new regime of justice: one in which intention, motive, premeditation, and agency vied with conceptions of kinship to determine who would be punished and how. In conceptualizing the difference between the early modern and modern policies toward reproductive "crimes," Sakurai Yuki

桜井由幾 has argued that in the Tokugawa period abortion and infanticide were treated as “crimes of the family” (*kazoku no tsumi* 家族の罪), while in the Meiji period they began to be viewed as “crimes of individuals” (*kojin no tsumi* 個人の罪).²⁴ Using Sendai and Tsuyama as examples, she argues that in domains that established penalties for abortion and infanticide, it was generally the household head (that is, the father or husband of the pregnant woman) who was singled out for punishment. Sawayama Mikako 沢山美果子 has also examined the case of Tsuyama and has suggested that Sakurai’s conclusions need some modification: she argues that before the 1830s, it was often the members of the *goningumi* who were held responsible for suspected acts of abortion and infanticide for failing to exercise adequate supervision over its members, while only after 1830, responsibility for reproductive crimes began to be assigned to the household—but in this case both husbands and wives were punished.²⁵ Nonetheless, Sakurai is correct in her recognition that after 1868 emergent legal system required a new and unfamiliar consideration of individual intentions and responsibility, even as—as the Kikuchi case reveals—reproductive choices often did not rest with a single person. Thus, prosecutors, judges, and defendants struggled over the issue of who had acted and why, questions that required them to make judgments about the relations of power and authority that exist within families and between sexual partners.

As the “silence” of Etsu within this record suggests, in those cases in which a abortion and infanticide took place within a clearly defined family context, authority for this decision either rested—or was presumed to rest—with someone other than the young pregnant woman herself. This is evident from another case originally in the Muraoka court, which involved the death of a female infant born to Terakura Banzō and his wife Tatsu.²⁶ Charged with the death were Terakura Tami, the mother of Banzō, Terakura Fuyo, his maternal grandmother, and Furutata Shiru, the mother of Tatsu. According to the statement offered by Tami all three women were present when Tatsu gave birth to her second child, a girl. After conferring with Fuyo and Shiro—but not with Tatsu apparently—she smothered the infant because it was born before its older brother was weaned, and she believed that Tatsu would be unable to successfully nurse both children. The lower court had convicted all three women guilty of willful murder, but their sentences differed: Tami was sentenced to three years of penal servitude, Fuyo to three years with a reduction based upon mitigation to two, and Shiru to death by strangling, with a reduction based upon six degrees of mitigation, to two years. As in the case of Kikuchi Kan, the harsher sentence of Shiru reflects the principle that distant relatives were to be punished more harshly than close ones in acts of violence against those viewed as “junior.”

In this case, too, the appeal was brought by the prosecutor who argued that the sentences were too lenient. He stated that Tami should have been found guilty of preconceived murder, that there was no basis for reducing Fuyo’s sentence, and that Shiru’s sentence should only have been reduced to three, not two years. But the high court disagreed. It confirmed the legality of the lower court’s decision in relation to Tami and Fuyo—but reduced Shiru’s sentence to only one year, an interesting departure from the decision rendered the year before in the case of Kikuchi Kan, whose sentence had been lengthened by the Daishin’in. In her statement to the high court, Shiru asserted that when the issue of the infant’s fate came up soon after her own daughter had given birth, she in fact was opposed to smothering it, because

she had few grandchildren and wanted another, but since her daughter had married into this family, she felt she could not strongly protest and that ultimately the decision was Tami and Fuyo's to make. It seems that this argument proved convincing: the judgment of the court was that, given the context, Shiru's passive stance was understandable, if still criminal, and thus reduced her sentence.

As these cases suggest, the decisions of the Daishin'in tended to confirm specific patterns of authority within the family, patterns generally oriented by Confucian conceptions of familial relations as the codes themselves required. At the same time, however, the high court did upon occasion reject the statutory requirements when a defendant or prosecutor successfully articulated their stance in relation to a seemingly shared cultural norm. Thus, Shiru's evocation of her "outsider" status within the household of her daughter's husband seems to have resonated with judges of the Daishin'in, with the result that she fared far better than Kan, whose defense was that she had acted at the direction of her daughter-in-law.

The court's concern to confirm patriarchal conceptions of familial authority is apparent in the case of Nakajima Matabei, who was tried and convicted in the Himeji court for participating in the murder of an infant born to Nishigaki Maki, his wife's niece. He was sentenced to three years of penal servitude.²⁷ Nakajima appealed his sentence to the Daishin'in. According to the testimony presented to the court, Nishigaku Maki had lived with Matabei and his wife Rie for several years before her marriage in 1879. However, the marriage soon failed, and Maki returned to the Nakajima home pregnant early in 1880. When she gave birth three months later, the child was smothered by Rie, who was later convicted and sentenced. Matabei was convicted of failing to intervene to stop this crime and was sentenced to ten years with a reduction based upon mitigation to three. In his appeal, Matabei argued that although he was present in the home at the time of the birth, he was drunk and knew nothing of what went on, that his wife told him the child was stillborn, and so he had buried it. He insisted that his wife had implicated him to lighten her own sentence. To this, the prosecutor countered by citing the story Matabei had told upon his arrest in which he related that Rie had questioned him about what to do with Maki's infant and that he had replied "do what you want" (*katte ni shiro* 勝手にしろ). In the end, the Daishin'in apparently concluded that, drunk or not, Matabei bore responsibility for this act, given that his wife had attempted to consult him, and his original sentence was confirmed.

Matabei's charge that his wife implicated him merely to lessen her own culpability may not have been baseless. In fact, the courts did indeed show sympathy to women who argued that they had deferred to their husbands in relation to decisions about reproductive matters, although, as the case of Kikuchi Kotono suggests, this defense did not prevail in every case. It was just such an argument that won Takenaka Shika, a thirty-seven year old woman who resided in Osaka prefecture, a reduced sentence.²⁸ Shika had been convicted of procuring an abortion and sentenced to one hundred days, but this decision was appealed by none other than the prosecutor, who asserted that the sentence was overly harsh in that Shika, a married woman, had sought out an abortion at the insistence of her husband Shōgorō who felt the family's poverty made it impossible to support a child. The prosecutor argued that the lower court had failed to consider the involvement of her husband, arguing that this was not her crime alone, but "a crime of family complicity" (*ikka kyōhan* 一家共犯). The response by

the court was to state that article 144 of the *Kaitai ritsurei* specifically held that women were to be held accountable for this crime and allowed the court to distinguish between principal and participant, but there was no foundation upon which to assert “family complicity.” That being said, the high court judges, while affirming Shika’s conviction, reduced her sentence significantly to sixty days.

The Morality of Motive

As the Osaka prosecutor’s sympathy for the impoverished Shika and the Muraoka prosecutor’s scathing dismissal of Kikuike Kotono’s concern for reputation suggests, the motives that were perceived to have prompted an act of abortion or infanticide factored significantly in how a case was adjudicated. While prosecutors and judges could be lenient with obedient wives and desperate mothers, they regarded more harshly men and women who sought abortions in order to conceal illicit sexual relationships.²⁹ Of the fifteen appeals heard by the Daishin’in, five involved men found guilty of “instigating” an abortion in such circumstances. The appeals, four of which were initiated by the convicted men, rested upon the assertion that the decision to abort had in fact been made by the pregnant women themselves. Thus, it was the legal distinction between principal and participant that was at the heart of these cases.

The story told by Takagi Kyukichi revolves around just this issue.³⁰ In 1881, Takagi was convicted in the Sakai district court for encouraging Machitani Masu to procure an abortion and sentenced to one hundred days. In his statement before the high court, Takagi argued that when Masu became pregnant in 1880 after the two had become intimate, she told him at once that she wanted to abort the fetus rather than face the censure of “the world” (*sejin* 世人). According to Takagi, he was aware from the outset that “human life was not something to be killed,” but in order to take some time to consider what to do, he agreed with Masu for the moment. Then, before he could intervene, Masu secretly sought out a woman named Umamo Ino and had her perform the abortion. When he heard of what she had done, Takagi stated, he had immediately confessed his involvement to the police in the hope that it would win him some consideration from the court, but in fact he had been sentenced to the maximum. Takagi’s portrayal of himself as ethical, well-intentioned, and law-abiding apparently did not impress the judges of the high court: the Daishin’in simply confirmed the earlier sentence without comment.

The appeal brought by Sakuragi Tokujirō was similarly unsuccessful.³¹ Sakuragi was sentenced in 1881 in the Kyoto district court to three years of penal servitude for instigating an abortion on the part of his lover Oi Toyo, who had died as a result of the abortion. According to Sakuragi, Toyo had sought the abortion without his knowledge while he was away on business for about ten days. He learned of it only when she visited him after his return, and then sometime later he learned that she had died. Sakuragi acknowledged that he had affixed his seal to a confession but insisted that this had been coerced and that he had had in no way participated in Toyo’s abortion. The response of the high court was once again to confirm the earlier sentence without comment.

A far more interesting defense was offered by Shimada Hisahachi who was been convicted in the Sakai district court in 1880 for compelling Sakamoto Ryū to seek an abortion and

sentenced to one hundred days. He appealed and in 1881 his case came up for review by the Daishin'in.³² According to Shimada, in 1879, he had hired Ryū as a household servant in August 1879, after an introduction by Nakano Seizaburō. Sometime in mid-May of 1880, he began a sexual relationship with her, and a few months later she told him she was pregnant. According to Shimada, from the outset he had questioned whether he was responsible for her pregnancy. Nonetheless, fearing that exposure of their sexual relationship would cause an uproar in his family and out of feelings of “compassion” for Ryū he tried to help her by sending her to live with Nakano Seizaburō until she gave birth. In addition to providing for her support, he also gave her money so that she could buy medicines if she did not feel well. However, insisted Shimada, it was never his intention that she use this money to procure an abortion, nor had he encouraged her to seek one. However, he was later told by Nakano and Ryū that she had in fact had an abortion, and the two began to press him for money under the threat that they would expose his involvement. He argued that the evidence Nakano and Ryū had later presented against him in court was malicious and untrue. Like Takagi and Sakuragi, Shimada thus portrayed himself as the real victim in this case, although he surpassed them in presenting a negative picture of his one time lover. He argued he had been seduced by Ryū, who together with Nakano, manipulated him, took advantage of his generosity and concern for reputation, and tried to blackmail him. The court however was seemingly unimpressed: it confirmed his earlier conviction and sentence without comment.

Thus, in every case, the courts dealt severely with the men implicated in ending pregnancies that resulted from illicit sexual relations, suggesting that concern for punishing promiscuity was one intent of the prosecution of reproductive “crimes.” It is unclear whether the judges in fact believed that women were unlikely to have acted on their own to end their pregnancies, as the male defendants claimed, or were simply unwilling to have the men who figured in these relationships walk away unpunished. Certainly, little sign of sympathy for the women involved appears in the legal records of these cases. In court documents, prosecutors, judges, and their former lovers as well routinely refer to the woman in question, not by name, but by the disparaging term “the unchaste woman” (*kanpu*). And in each case, the women too were prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced. Worthy of note is the fact that these young women appear to have been “working girls” (*hōkōnin* 奉行人), that is, women employed as household servants or as workers in family enterprises who were no longer living within their natal households. Like the errant Etsu, Masu, Toyo, and Ryū too are “silent” within the record of the Daishin'in, and we hear of them only through the words of their former lovers. But unlike Etsu, who escaped prosecution while her mother, father, and grandmother were convicted, the court viewed these young women, not as passive before family manipulation, but as active agents who were complicit in ending their pregnancies.

The Business of Abortion: Abortion Providers and the Law

Among the fifteen cases of reproductive crimes that came before the Daishin'in for review, six involved defendants who were charged with providing abortifacients or using other methods to cause an abortion. There is a good deal of evidence that abortion providers, many of them associated with the obstetrically-oriented medical schools, the *Chūjō-ryū* 中條流 and the *Kagawa-ryū* 賀川流, operated openly in early modern cities and towns.³³ The Meiji

government's desire to de-legitmate such forms of medical practice is evident in its 1869 edict prohibiting midwives from providing drugs or using other means to induce an abortion. This was followed in 1874 by the issuance of the Medical Act (*isei* 医制) that included a ban on the performance of abortions by both midwives and physicians. And as we have already noted, in 1873, promulgation of the *Kaitai ritsurei* made it a criminal act for anyone to use drugs or other means to induce an abortion. However, the testimony offered by defendants before the Daishin'in suggest that there was a good deal of ambiguity surrounding what might cynically be termed the "trade" in abortions. We have already encountered the figure of Toda Gen'ei who emphasized his efforts to save the life of Etsu's infant in spite of the frenzied efforts of the Kikuchi family to end their daughter's pregnancy. Yet, as we noted, even though the court accepted his assertion that the drugs he had supplied were not really abortifacients, it found him guilty of not intervening aggressively to save Etsu's child. His forty day sentence was significantly more severe than that of Etsu's father.

The harshness with which the high court dealt with Toda is typical of its dispensation of physicians charged with similar crimes. Another doctor convicted of providing an abortion was Sakamoto Shigehachi, who in 1881 had been sentenced to one hundred days by the Osaka district court for performing an abortion on Matsu, the wife of one Matsumoto Senjirō, at the request of her husband.³⁴ In his appeal, Sakamoto protested that Matsu had come to him complaining only of amenorrhea and had never mentioned the possibility of pregnancy. They had not spoken of abortion, and he had treated her only for "menstrual stagnation." As evidence, Sakamoto—like Toda Gen'ei—produced the prescriptions that named the contents of the medicines he had given her, which presumably did not include notorious abortion-inducing elements. Sakamoto's appeal rested upon the assertion that he had been deceived by his own patient, who had withheld essential information from him. In fact, it would not have been at all unusual for a woman to consult a doctor for just the complaint that Sakamoto attributed to Matsu, because, as Sawayama Mikako had demonstrated, in early modern Japan, the cessation of menstruation was often interpreted as a sign of bad health until fetal movement occurred, confirming pregnancy.³⁵ But it was equally true that abortifacients were often euphemistically described as medicines that would "make the month flow" (*tsuki wo nagasu* 月を流す). Thus, the ambiguity that surrounded the failure to menstruate made it possible for both women and those who provided them with medical treatment to obfuscate the issue of whether it was an abortion that was being sought. The response of the prosecutor was to point to the statement of Sakamoto's wife, Tei, who had testified that, at the direction of her husband, she had inserted something into Matsu's uterus—a "surgical" intervention that apparently was viewed as evidence that Sakamoto was not providing treatment for irregular menstruation. In the end, the judges of the Daishin'in seem to have accepted that Sakamoto did indeed know what he was doing, because they confirmed the original conviction and sentence without comment.

It was not only the "treatment" of physicians such as Toda and Sakamoto that came under the scrutiny of the courts, so too did the actions of "irregular" providers, often older women who had some knowledge of abortion techniques. For example in 1879, the Daishin'in reviewed the case of Chiba Matsuyo, a fifty-six-year old woman originally convicted in the Muraoka district court for providing abortions to two young women, both of whom later died

as a result.³⁶ According to Chiba's statement, she knew that ground cherry root (*hōzuki no ne* ほうずきの根) inserted into the uterus would cause an abortion, and young women came to ask her about this method. In August 1878, she was approached by Itō Tome, an unmarried woman, and in September 1878 by Kyū, the wife of Satō Fukuzō, both of whom requested help in ending their pregnancies. Chiba insisted that she had refused to treat them directly, but she acknowledged that, when pressed, she had given each of them small pieces of ground cherry root and described how to insert it vaginally. As a gesture of thanks (not payment, according to Matsuyo), both women had given her twenty-five sen. Sometime later she heard that both women had died as a result of their failed abortions. The lower court convicted her, stating that while she had not directly performed the abortions, she had aided these criminal acts by providing instruction. She was sentenced to seventy days of confinement but this was commuted that to a fine of one yen seventy-five sen because she was in ill health.

The appeal was brought by the prosecutor who argued that the sentence was too light, because Chiba must have done more than just provide information. The use of ground cherry root as an abortifacient was widely known, and the women would not have paid twenty-five sen (a substantial sum in the countryside, according to the prosecutor) to be told what they surely already knew. They had, he asserted, paid this amount, because Chiba had in fact actually performed the procedure upon them. He argued that Chiba should be sentenced to the three years specified in the statutes as the penalty for instigating an abortion, from which the woman involved later died. In fact, the prosecutor's argument is supported by ethnographic record of birth customs, *Nihon san'iku shūzoku shiryō shūsei*, in which references to the use of ground cherry root as an abortifacient abound. But while the high court agreed with his argument about the state of popular knowledge, it ultimately rejected the sentence of the lower court. The judges of the Daishin'in refused to hold Chiba directly responsible for the death of the two women, as the prosecutor demanded. In their statement, they pointed to medical testimony that direct cause of the women's death, heart failure, could have occur during a spontaneous miscarriage or a normal birth and argued that there was no clear causal link between her actions and their deaths. In the end, it increased Chiba's sentence to one hundred days but allowed this to be commuted to a fine of two yen fifty sen in consideration of her age and health.

Conclusion

In the records constituted by the legal system of the 1870s, we have discovered ordinary citizens attempting to negotiate the Meiji state's new concern for regulating reproduction, a concern that situated reproduction in a new public arena, open to the scrutiny of police, prosecutors, and judges. A good number of questions have remain unanswered. One such issue is how these particular acts of abortion and infanticide came to light, when presumably most others did not. To be sure, in some cases the undoubtedly bloody and painful deaths of young women forced an inquiry that brought to light their fatal attempts at abortion, but it is unclear of how the apparently successful cases attracted the attention of police and prosecutors. Equally puzzling is the question of how defendants such as Sakuragi Tokujirō and Shimada Masaichi—men of apparently ordinary means, status, and education—marshalled the resources to appeal their convictions, to force the judges of the highest court of their day

to consider whether one hundred days was sufficient punishment for the role they played in the ending of the pregnancy of their lover. And of course, one is left to ponder the aftermath of the final judgments rendered by the Daishin'in. What happened to the Kikuchi family? So fearful of the loss of reputation, Ryūhei, Kotono, and Kan found themselves arrested, tried, convicted, and sentenced. It is impossible to know, and thus there is a frustrating lack of closure to the stories I have been trying to tell.

Yet, such lacunae notwithstanding, the records of the Daishin'in offer a new perspective on the goals and impact of the Meiji state's pro-natalist policy and the criminalization of abortion and infanticide that were part of its apparatus. As we have seen, the judgments of the high court defy easy generalization: whether the appeal originated with the defendant or the prosecutor, the Daishin'in in some cases increased sentences, in some cases reduced them, and in many cases simply confirmed the decisions of the earlier court. But in making these judgments, the men who sat on the high court adopted discernible patterns in rendering their decisions, employed a certain logic in order to valorize some forms of behavior and sanction others. We have seen, for example, that in evaluating the criminality of an act of abortion or infanticide, the judges viewed some motives as more valid than others: poverty was a mitigating factor, a desire to conceal illicit sexual activity was not. As this suggests, the emergent legal system of the Meiji state was implicated in enforcing a certain vision of social/sexual order. Implicit to this order was the confirmation of patriarchal authority within the family. The Meiji courts required fathers and husbands (and by extension mothers-in-law!) to be responsible for the sexual behavior and reproductive potential of their daughters and wives. Female defendants whose acts seemed to conform to this vision of social relations—Kotono, Shiru, and Shika, for example—were treated fairly generously by the judges of the high court, while such “unchaste women” as Masu and Ryū, who seemed to have stood outside the sphere of familial authority were treated harshly. But this validation of patriarchal authority also meant that men whose behavior failed to mesh with this vision of the family received little consideration from the high courts, as the fate of poor drunken Matabei reveals. Whether the defendants and their families in fact enacted these norms in their everyday life is of course a different question—what is apparent is that some defendants recognized the expediency of invoking such values in relation to the court, the representative of state power.

The stories told within the Daishin'in records thus seem to confirm the conclusion of Ishizaki Shōko, who argued that it was Confucian-influenced concepts of social order that led to the articulation of abortion and infanticide as crimes in the early Meiji period. Yet even as the courts worked to legitimate forms of family authority that resonated with Confucian norms, the legal system simultaneously required that the “crimes” of abortion and infanticide be viewed as acts committed by individuals—a position most explicitly demonstrated in the Daishin'in's rejection of the concept of “family complicity.” As the stories told to the Daishin'in reveal, the new arena of the law pitted family members against one another, requiring them to rethink, to articulate, and to identify who had made the decision about whether a pregnancy was to continue or not, whether an infant was to live or die. The result was to force the reconceptualization of abortion and infanticide into acts of “choice” of the part of a self-conscious subject. Historians of abortion and infanticide in Europe and North America have most often explored the prosecution of reproductive “crimes” as an the issue of

female bodily self-determination, arguing that from the nineteenth century onward women's desire to control their own fertility for financial, health, or other reasons came into conflict with state and civic forms of authority, among them religious institutions acting upon changing definitions of fetal life and medical professionals attempting to establish their control over reproductive strategies.³⁷ As the case of Japan suggests, the notion of "choice" too clearly "has a history"—it took form as new conceptions of gendered social subjects were being produced and enacted.

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NOTES

¹ Fujime 1997, esp. pp. 11-47.

² Ishizaki 1997, pp. 53-70.

³ Kanazu 1996, pp. 26-43.

⁴ On these two early Meiji codes, I have found the following useful: Mizubayashi 1992 and Tezuka 1956. In English, see Ch'en 1980. Many of the statutes are available in English translation in Longford 1887, pp. 1-114.

⁵ Mizubayashi 1992, pp. 262-263.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 211.

⁷ See articles no. 164 and 224 in the statutes on homicide in *ibid.*, pp. 244 and 275-276, respectively.

⁸ *Naimusho nenpō hōkokusho, Bekkan 1*, pp. 83-83. In contrast to the large numbers of prosecutions in Japan, in 1900, in England and Wales, only eight women were charged and five found guilty of aborting a fetus, while in France in that year, seventy-three women were charged and of these twenty-eight were found guilty. In Germany, however, in the same year 411 people were convicted. See Koizumi 1934.

⁹ On the nature of the "small newspapers," see Huffman 1997, pp. 89-95.

¹⁰ *Yomiuri shinbun*, 30 April 1878.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 9 May 1878.

¹² Onshi Zaidan Boshi Aikū Kai 1975, p.162.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ The number of cases per prefecture was as follows: Chiba 2, Iwate 3, Hyogo 2, Shiga 2, Osaka 4, Fukuoka 1, Tokushima 1.

¹⁵ Davis 1987.

¹⁶ The form of the records of the appeals changes dramatically after 1882. The narrative elements I describe are no longer present: instead the record of the case becomes a rather dry summary of the legal issues involved.

¹⁷ *Meiji zenki Daishin'in keiji banketsu roku* vol. 5, pp. 21-34. This 29-volume collection reprints Min-

istry of Justice records from Meiji 8 to Meiji 17.

¹⁸ Meijer 1991, p. 24.

¹⁹ Mizubayashi 1992, pp. 494-500.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 501-507.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 531-538.

²² On Confucianism and Chinese law, I have found the following useful: Bodde and Morris 1967 and Sommer 2000.

²³ For the relative portion of the statute, as well as a useful commentary, see Mizubayashi 1992, pp. 165-166.

²⁴ Sakurai 1993, p. 126.

²⁵ Sawayama 1998, pp. 161-190.

²⁶ *Meiji zenki Daishin'in keiji hanketsu roku*, vol. 12, pp. 325-327.

²⁷ Ibid, vol. 15, pp. 294-295.

²⁸ Ibid., vol. 18, p. 24-25.

²⁹ In contrast, Sawayama Mikako has suggested that in early modern Tsuyama, married couples were punished more severely than unmarried couples, because it was thought "natural" that people should seek to hide the consequences of an illicit relationship, while a married couple had no such excuse. See Sawayama 1998b, pp. 170-171.

³⁰ *Meiji zenki Daishin'in keiji hanketsu roku*, vol. 19, pp. 222-223,

³¹ Ibid., vol. 9, pp. 61-162.

³² Ibid., vol. 18, pp. 170-171.

³³ On the Chūjōryū, see Ogata 1914 (1980), pp. 233-244, and Takada 1928, pp. 254-290. On the Kagawaryū, see Burns 2002.

³⁴ *Meiji zenki Daishin'in keiji hanketsu roku*, vol. 17, pp. 247.

³⁵ Sawayama 1998a, pp. 133-157. This ambiguity was not limited to Japan; see for example Duden 1991 and van de Walle and Reene 2001.

³⁶ *Meiji zenki Daishin'in keiji hanketsu roku*, vol. 5, pp. 67-71.

³⁷ This is certainly the dominant narrative in the histories of abortion in the U.S. and Great Britain. See, for example, Mohr 1978 and Brodie 1994). On the British case, see Keown 1988 and McLaren 1984.

Making Sense of Senseless Violence in Early Meiji Japan

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The period surrounding the Meiji Restoration was a time of unprecedented violence in Japanese history. Emblematic is the terror of the Restoration movement itself, in which “men of high purpose” (*shishi*) and other activists cut down officials, foreigners, and one another in the name of loyalty to the emperor. Peasants and townspeople rose in protest with especial frequency during this time, and urban riots (*uchikowashi*) and other large-scale incidents often resulted in the destruction of considerable property. Although surveys of the period devote due attention to this violence, they tend nonetheless to portray the Restoration as a generally peaceful revolution. Even scholars who emphasize the radical transformation of social relations and thought over the Tokugawa-Meiji divide focus less on murderous violence than on sporadic inversions of hierarchy, such as the carnivalesque revelry of the *eejanaika* disturbances, as evidence of the tumult of the times. Violence thus appears to be an incidental feature of the transfer of power, rather than an integral characteristic of Japan’s initial encounter with modernity.

In this paper I shall focus on one particular type of violence in the Restoration period, bodily attacks by commoners inflicted in the course of protest. I refer here to cold-blooded murder committed to make a point about the condition of the economy, the state of social relations, the direction of government policies—in short, political violence, broadly construed: violence that is not the tragic outcome of a family dispute, or commonplace thuggery, or crime; violence that is not personal, or if it is, it is transformed into something universal by virtue of the politically charged moment in which it occurs.

Murderous violence as an instrument of protest deserves a central place in our narrative of nineteenth century Japanese history, and the way to accord it that centrality lies, ironically, in setting aside—for at time, at least—our model of peasant contention (*hyakushō ikki*). By disengaging the discussion of popular uses of violence from the analysis of peasant contention, we can expose the tensions that led to its eruption without reducing it entirely to a function of class conflict. That is, by looking at violence separately from the historiographical category of peasant contention, we are reminded that a tenuous balance between conflict and harmony—weighted ever so slightly in favor of harmony—is the usual state of affairs in any community. Conversely, focusing on moments of clearly articulated protest encourages us to overlook the sorts of tensions over participation in community activities and access to resources, and indeed over the rhythms of everyday life—often quite minor when considered in isolation—that sowed the seeds of an anger more gnawing, by virtue of its very integration

into the fabric of daily life, than the major crises that led to the incidents that survive in our log of peasant contention. This is not to say we should ignore peasant contention or overlook the pressures that arose in the face of economic-structural change. Quite the contrary: my point is merely that only by recognizing that conflict was endemic to Japanese society in the middle of the nineteenth century can we proceed to a consideration of the social and political conditions that governed the translation of conflict into physical violence.

To that end, I propose to perform a methodological sleight of hand in an effort to circumvent familiar binaries of uprising versus normality, discord versus harmony, and the like. I shall organize my discussion around one specific incident from the early Meiji period, the notorious Mimasaka Blood-Tax Rebellion of 1873. However, my principal aim is not to offer a new interpretation or even a detailed account of the incident itself, but rather to focus on several telling details of the rebellion that suggest ways to think about murderous violence beyond the analytical framework of studies of peasant rebellion. By the same token, this discussion is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of violence in the Restoration period, but an illustration of an approach to the study of violence, cast in the context of one particular incident, framed in the context of abrupt institutional change.

Violence in early Meiji Japan was intimately connected to collapse of the status system. In the long run, the dismantling of the institutions of status was for most people a liberating process, for it permitted individuals to engage in economic, intellectual, and political activities previously barred to them. At the same time, however, the disruptions attendant on the collapse of the status order gave rise to new patterns of physical violence: individuals briefly became free to express violent impulses—not at will, perhaps, but certainly in accordance with principles that neither the early modern regime nor the Meiji state would have accepted as valid. For a few years, the individual impulse to violence was like a free electron, liberated from the orbit of the status system but not yet captured by the disciplinary order of the modern regime.

The murderous violence of the Mimasaka Blood-Tax Rebellion and other early Meiji incidents occurred during this unstable interval.¹ Mimasaka province, in the hilly interior of present-day Okayama prefecture (at the time of the incident it was under the administration of Hōjō prefecture), was the site of a number of major peasant protests in the late Tokugawa period, some of which featured the practice of *hinin-goshirae*, in which peasants dressed as beggars for their procession to government offices. Although the term *hinin* here refers to beggars generically and is not a status label, oral traditions in the contemporary Buraku community suggest that outcastes participated alongside commoners in a massive protest in 1866, and in other incidents as well.² The region was also the site of intermittent unrest in the aftermath of the abolition edict. Two groups of villages submitted petitions demanding repeal of the abolition edict in the tenth month of 1871, just two months after a Burakumin had been assaulted by a mob during the course of a protest calling for the reinstatement of the former daimyo as governor of Majima prefecture.³ Later that year, commoners in one village entered into a compact promising join in any protests that might occur in response to abolition.⁴ Thus it is not surprising that the province would be the site of anti-Buraku violence. In any case, combine this animosity toward Burakumin with persistent rumors that villages would be forced to turn over oxen and young women to the government so that

their blood might be given to foreigners, and with attempts to subvert implementation of the household-registration system—seen as the mechanism by which such levies would be assessed—and it is clear that peasants in the region were overcome with anxiety in the first years of the Meiji era.⁵

The authorities in the area responded by issuing official denials of the rumors of blood collecting.⁶ They also urged mutual courtesy in relations between commoners and Burakumin, though peasants interpreted this exhortation (perhaps correctly) to mean that the authorities intended for the Burakumin to respect previous standards of deferential behavior; some of their Buraku neighbors agreed with this interpretation, for one village drafted a document refusing to honor the exhortation.⁷ At the same time, officials mandated the monetization of outcaste duties related to the disposal of animal carcasses in the third month of 1871, but then ordered the Burakumin to continue to perform such duties eight months later, after they had been made commoners.⁸

The Tokugawa roots of antipathy toward the Burakumin in Mimasaka are not clear. In 1864, *eta* accounted for about seven percent of the Tsuyama domain's non-samurai population of 60,000.⁹ This was higher than the two or three percent estimated for the archipelago as a whole, but was probably similar to the figures for other regions in western Japan, which had far more outcastes than areas east of Edo. Outcastes in Mimasaka were scattered about the region according to the usual pattern for rural outcastes, in communities attached to commoner villages, and were subject to the control of headmen from the Kaiami house of Miho village.¹⁰ Evidence from the late 1870s suggests that the outcaste community was riven by disparities in wealth—and concomitant tensions—similar to those that affected commoner villages throughout Japan.¹¹ In addition to the performance of status-based duties, outcastes in Mimasaka farmed and produced charcoal, a common enough livelihood in the heavily forested province.¹² In any case, available collections of early modern documents contain few references to outcastes, but it is possible that relevant materials either remain in private hands or have remained inaccessible because archives tend to limit public access to materials that contain discriminatory language or genealogical information.¹³

The Mimasaka Blood-Tax Rebellion was one of the bloodiest conflicts in the early Meiji period; eighteen of the twenty-four people killed and eleven of the twenty-one injured were Burakumin.¹⁴ The rebellion began when a thirty-three-year-old resident of Teieiji village in Hōjō prefecture, Fudeyasu Utarō, disillusioned with early Meiji state-building policies, manipulated popular misunderstanding of the term “blood tax” (*ketsuzei*) to launch an uprising against the new regime. The term, which was used in government pronouncements concerning the new conscription law, resonated with longstanding beliefs in the existence of figures who roamed the countryside in search of human blood and fat, and connected as well to fears raised by the Western presence in Japan.¹⁵ Under repeated torture Fudeyasu confessed to having spread rumors that a man in white was making his way around the area draining the blood of men aged seventeen to forty, and to having staged an incident in which such a figure showed up in Teieiji. The appearance of the man in white provided the desired impetus for an uprising, but Fudeyasu almost immediately dropped out of the picture. Instead, several bands of peasants from neighboring villages, acting without identifiable leadership, rampaged around the countryside for six days from 26 to 31 May 1873.

During the course of the disturbance a group of protesters marched on the Hōjō prefectural capital of Tsuyama, and a list of demands—perhaps composed after the fact—denouncing every major Meiji reform eventually appeared. Nevertheless, it is clear that the incident was driven by its violence, rather than by specific grievances the protesters hoped to rectify. The rioters identified their two principal targets within the first hours of the uprising: local officials charged with carrying out government reforms and the recently “liberated” outcaste community. They treated their targets quite differently: on the one hand, they destroyed government property but avoided harming officials. On the other hand, however, the protesters brutally attacked the residents of Buraku communities, killing eighteen and injuring many more; in addition, they burned down a total of 263 houses in Buraku villages. Moreover, the nature of the rebels’ violence changed over the course of the disturbance. The protesters began with one technique of late Tokugawa *ikki*, the “smashing” (*uchikowashi*), in their attacks on government property and several Buraku villages. As the disturbance progressed, they turned increasingly (but not exclusively) to arson—an indiscriminate form of destruction that departed significantly from the focused anger of the selective wrecking of property—when attacking Buraku villages. It was in the context of this escalating violence against property that the murder of the Burakumin occurred.

In the aftermath of the uprising nearly every commoner household in the province was fined for participating in the disturbance. Several hundred people faced punishments ranging from flogging to imprisonment, and fifteen men were beheaded: Fudeyasu for instigating the rebellion, the others for participating in the massacre of former outcastes in the village of Tsugawahara.

The Mimasaka rebellion is one of the most thoroughly researched incidents of the early Meiji years.¹⁶ To oversimplify a bit, interpretations have split over the question of how central the attacks on the Burakumin were to the rebellion’s greater significance. On the one hand, there is an impulse to valorize the rebels’ opposition to the Meiji state’s heavy-handed centralizing policies; historians on this side of debate tend to downplay the significance of the Buraku attacks, treating them as spontaneous incidents or even the product of goading by disaffected samurai. On the other hand, scholars who situate the incident within a narrative of Buraku resistance against discrimination tend to cast the murdered Burakumin as heroic martyrs to the cause of Buraku liberation, but offer little further insight as to why the attacks occurred at that particular historical moment. (Raw violence of this sort directed against outcastes was virtually unknown in the Tokugawa period, and ceased after about the mid-1870s.)

Of course, the best studies of the rebellion offer subtler analyses than this summary suggests, but the fact remains that the incident is inevitably subordinated to a broader literature of peasant contention or of Buraku resistance. As a result, it has been difficult to discuss events like the Mimasaka rebellion outside the context of a predetermined narrative of class conflict and state repression. Rather than dwell on these important but familiar themes, I would like instead to consider the conditions that pushed the conflict over the edge into the realm of murderous violence.

First, let us consider the motives of the men who participated in the massacre of Burakumin at Tsugawahara village. The official history of Hōjō prefecture includes the con-

fessions of the fourteen men who were executed for their role in the massacre, as well as that of Fudeyasu Utarō.¹⁷ The documents must be used with care. They are composed in highly stylized language, with considerable overlap in phraseology. Moreover, judicial torture was used to extract some of the confessions (most notably Fudeyasu's). Nonetheless, they offer important insights into the motivations of the rebels.

From the confessions it is clear that the fourteen men sentenced to death for the Tsugawahara massacre were not the only participants in the killing of Burakumin. Indeed, reading through their confessions leaves one with the impression that most of them just happened to have been identified as participants. It is reasonable to suppose, then, that their fellow rioters shared their attitudes toward the Buraku community. In any case, the message that comes through the confessions is anger with the Burakumin's lack of deference toward commoners. In the eyes of the defendants, the elimination of formal status distinctions had emboldened the Burakumin to behave as commoners themselves, liberated from the burdens of their previous status. As one of the defendants, Uji Teizō, put it, "Ever since the abolition of the label *eta*, the former *eta* of Tsugawahara village have forgotten about their former status and have in many instances behaved impertinently (*furei no shimuki sukanakarazu*)."¹⁸

This sort of resentment appears repeatedly in accounts of the tensions that emerged in the aftermath of the promulgation of the abolition edict. In western Japan in particular, commoners took measures to contain social interaction between Burakumin and themselves, especially in matters that exposed commoners to the Burakumin's supposed pollution. Thus, hairdressers, bathhouse owners, and publicans posted notices that their services were available only to residents of the immediate neighborhood. They did so at the cost of considerable economic hardship, for to prevent the occasional Burakumin from patronizing their businesses they were forced to turn away commoner travelers and other unfamiliar customers. As we have seen, other conflict arose over rights to participate in Shinto festivals, the drawing of school-district boundaries, and the disposal of animal carcasses.¹⁹

In short, the reasons given by the defendants in Mimasaka for attacking Buraku villages and killing their residents were identical to those expressed in other conflicts—some violent, most not—between commoners and Burakumin in the early Meiji period. As a result, the attacks cannot be explained entirely within the context of the uprising, but rather must be considered more broadly as part of the general reaction to the elimination of the status distinction between commoners and outcastes. In other words, the uprising served as the medium in which tension and resentment escalated into murderous violence, but it did not "cause" the underlying conflict. At the same time, the uprising was nominally sparked by the fear and confusion engendered by the imposition of conscription and other early Meiji reforms; hence, opposition to the abolition of outcaste status—a policy announced nearly two years previously—did not alone "cause" the rebellion. Furthermore, the uprising served as the medium in which the resistance of Buraku communities took place, but it did not "cause" their resistance, which must be attributed to the ardor with which they welcomed the abolition edict. This is not to depreciate the importance of the uprising as medium—after all, it is unlikely the attacks on the Burakumin would have occurred independently of the more general antigovernment disturbance; at the same time, however, there is no *necessary* progression from uprising to murder—indeed, it is the very rarity of killing in peasant

contention that makes the Mimasaka incident so distinctive.

Thus we are faced with the question of what pushed preexisting conflict over the edge into deadly violence. It is tempting to attribute the killings to the rage of the moment: after all, manslaughter in a fit of emotion was common enough in Japan in the 1870s. Yet to dismiss the massacre in this way begs the question of why killings in the heat of an uprising were so rare in general, and yet were concentrated in the period immediately following the Restoration.

But killing is a funny business, utterly unimaginable in normal times, utterly mundane under certain peculiar circumstances. Obviously, weaponry is an important issue here, for the presence of deadly weapons facilitates the translation of rage into murder. In the Mimasaka rebellion, as in other early Meiji uprisings, the peasants armed themselves with bamboo spears, guns, and swords. The rioters in Tsugawahara relied mostly on bamboo spears and guns to kill their victims, though they battered a number of Burakumin with stones first, and set at least one woman afire.

The presence of deadly weapons in early Meiji uprisings was a novel development in the history of peasant contention, as Yabuta Yutaka and others have demonstrated. Protesting peasants in the Tokugawa era rarely armed themselves, but rather carried agricultural implements such as sickles, hoes, and axes; during urban riots peasants and townspeople added carpenters' tools like saws and awls to facilitate the destruction of property.²⁰ These implements were known as *emono*, a term that normally refers to a weapon one is particularly adept at wielding; in the context of peasant contention, however, "tool" rather than "weapon" better captures the sense in which the word was used.

This particular use of the term *emono* dates to about the middle of the eighteenth century, and is one manifestation of a distinctive etiquette (*sabō*) of protest that evolved over the course of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.²¹ In accordance with this etiquette, peasants deliberately avoided carrying deadly weapons, and their use of sickles, hoes, and other farm tools was intended explicitly to emphasize their status as peasants.²² Yabuta attributes this eschewal of bodily violence to a series of adaptations during the seventeenth century to Hideyoshi's disarmament edicts (*sōbujirei*). To be sure, weapons designed primarily to inflict bodily harm—guns, swords, bamboo spears—do occasionally figure into protest narratives, but they never predominate, particularly in accounts written by people close to the events.²³

In any case, bloodshed was rare in early modern peasant contention. Although protesters often destroyed property, and the samurai authorities frequently threatened to use force to put down protests, only rarely did people actually get killed during the course of a rebellion, and when they did it was often accidental. This remained the case up to the onset of Meiji, even as the conventions governing peasant protests evolved into a new form in which symbolic assertions of the burdens and privileges of peasant status took a back seat to graphic demonstrations of outrage. In the early nineteenth century, an increasing number of incidents occurred in which the protesters failed to present specific demands to the authorities, but rather destroyed property as an end in itself. By the last two or three decades of the Tokugawa period, references to bamboo spears and other weapons gradually became conspicuous in descriptions of protests. Nonetheless, cases of weapons actually being used against other humans remained quite isolated, though they could be quite spectacular

when they did occur, as in a case in which angry peasants murdered their lord, a profligate and corrupt bannerman (*hatamoto*).²⁴

To some extent we can disengage weapons from the question of the etiquette of protest. Weapons were in fact quite common in the countryside: Hideyoshi's sword hunts did not extend to short swords (*wakizashi*) or for that matter guns (*teppō*), with the result that peasants could in fact arm themselves if they so chose. Tsukamoto Manabu has demonstrated that guns were surprisingly common in the countryside; aside from Tokugawa Tsunayoshi's reign at the end of the seventeenth century and the 1850s and '60s, the authorities rarely attempted to restrict their ownership.²⁵ Incidentally, although guns in early modern villages were used occasionally by hunters to kill game, they were more commonly employed to scare off wild boars, deer, and other animals that harmed upland fields. This helps to explain why the guns that occasionally appear in early modern protest narratives seem to have functioned mostly to sound signals.²⁶ In Mimasaka, however, at least one Burakumin was shot to death by a peasant who had brought along his gun.

Perhaps the most suggestive evidence about weapons comes from the Kantō region in the 1860s, where social disorder was a severe problem for the shogunate. As we have seen, efforts to reestablish order in the Kantō began systematically in 1805 with the creation of the Kantō Regulatory Patrol, a police force with the authority to arrest gamblers (*bakuto*), masterless samurai (*rōnin*), and unregistered commoners (*mushuku*) without regard to domainal or other political boundaries.²⁷ The patrol and related efforts to impose order—never very successful in the first place—proved particularly inadequate in the face of the political, economic, and intellectual dislocation of the Bakumatsu period.

During the last decade or so of Tokugawa rule, injunctions from the patrol magistrates to Kantō villages included instructions to set up a system by which local temple and fire bells (*kane*, *hanshō*) would be rung to alert residents of neighboring villages to the presence of "bad guys"—an amorphous category of disorderly elements, referred to in contemporary documents as *akutō*, *akuto*, *warumono*, and so forth—whom the peasants were to apprehend and hold for the arrival of the patrolling magistrates.²⁸ When so summoned, the villagers were to follow the orders of the local village officials regardless of their own place of residence; in the Kantō this could easily mean that peasants would be hurrying to enforce the law not only in another village but indeed in another domain entirely. Some injunctions included calls for the peasants to arm themselves with guns (whether registered or not) and gave leave to villagers to use deadly force to stop "unwieldy" (*te ni amarisōrō*) outlaws.²⁹

These injunctions are important for a number of reasons. First, telling peasants to grab a weapon and come running at the sound of a nearby temple bell—perhaps summoned by an official with whom they had no formal relationship—marked a significant departure from the normal principles of governance in early modern Japan. Yet the routine would have been familiar to anyone who had participated in a peasant uprising, for the ringing of bells as a call to action was a standard feature of protests—including the Mimasaka Blood-Tax Rebellion, which began with the sounding of bells and blowing of shell horns.³⁰

More serious was the shogunate's abdication of its monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Giving peasants free rein to use deadly force against an ill-defined population of unwieldy "bad guys" threatened to dissolve the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate

violence, for “bad guys” roamed around the Kantō plain (and everywhere else) in great abundance in the 1860s. Adding to the confusion was the fact that the Regulatory Patrol—like all law enforcement agencies in early modern Japan—relied heavily on the services of marginal characters as deputies, including the very sorts of gangsters and gamblers it was charged to control. In fact, as the Regulatory Patrol itself made clear in its various exhortations to good behavior, the line separating the law-abiding peasant from the dangerous outlaw could be quite fuzzy, as attested by the popularity of fencing lessons and other inappropriate activities among the peasantry and the more general tendency of young men to imitate “bad guys.”³¹

The confusion and disorder of the last years of the Tokugawa period thus forced the shogunate to compromise some of the basic principles of the status order in an attempt to maintain control over the countryside. Not only did this foster considerable uncertainty among the peasantry, but it signified that the authorities had surrendered to the reality of a heavily armed countryside.

Legitimizing the presence of weapons and their use in the cause of preserving order may have had the further effect of disrupting the etiquette of peasant contention by blurring the distinction between protests and normal vigilance: the ringing of a temple bell could be a call to action in righteous anger against rapacious merchants or corrupt officials, or it could be a plea for the good denizens of the community to gather in defense against the forces of criminality. Or in an instance like the Shinchūgumi uprising of 1864, in which a motley band of masterless samurai, unregistered commoners, and local farmers banded together to take from the rich and give to the poor in Kazusa province, peasants may well have asked themselves for whom the bell tolled.³²

The shogunate’s policy of giving peasants permission to use deadly force to control disorderly elements is particularly interesting when considered in light of its official attitude toward peasant participation in fencing and other martial arts. In 1804 and 1805 the shogunate issued prohibitions against commoners’ taking up martial arts; the first one was directed at urban commoners (*chōnin*) and the other at both urban and rural commoners. Both were reissued several times during the remainder of the Tokugawa period. These prohibitions notwithstanding, it is clear that peasants throughout the countryside in late Tokugawa Japan participated in fencing and other martial arts.

For example, Sugi Hitoshi has examined the spread of a regional school of fencing, the *tennen rishin-ryū*, in the Tama region of Musashi province west of Edo. He finds that before the 1840s fencing practitioners in the area were overwhelmingly members of a group of rusticated marginal samurai retainers of the shogun (the Hachiōji *sennin dōshin*), but fencing came to attract the young heirs of village headmen and other prominent peasants (typically men in their teens or early twenties); by the 1850s, nearly eighty percent of the practitioners at the local *dōjō* were commoners.

Sugi argues that participation in fencing was part of the *gōnō*’s response to “world renewal” (*yonaoshi*) movements, or the threat of such movements, in the countryside west of Edo. Indeed, the area was the site of a number of large uprisings, particularly the Bushū Rebellion of 1866.³³ Many of the peasant fencers later became involved with peasant militias, though none enjoyed much martial success. Sugi further notes that participation in fencing was, along with participation in poetry circles, one of the two main axes around which peasant

cultural networks in the Kantō revolved at the time.

In the orders prohibiting martial arts practices among the peasantry at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the shogunate expressed a fear that commoners who took up swordsmanship would lose sight of their proper place in society, either by “losing their occupations” (*sono shokubun o ushinai*) or by assuming a bravado (*kigasa*) inappropriate to commoners. This feeling is echoed in one official’s opposition to the formation of peasant militias in the 1860s: he was afraid that the peasant soldiers would not defer to samurai officials, but rather that bosses would emerge from their ranks, leading them to roam around the countryside without any fear of the authorities, the wealthy among them aspiring to independence, the poor turning to thievery, and all shunning agricultural labor.³⁴

Thus the shogunate’s calls for peasants to use deadly force against “bad guys” were issued against the background of its own repeated prohibitions of commoners’ participation in martial arts organizations. No doubt the hypocrisy reflected in this contradiction is a measure of the authorities’ desperation at the end of the Tokugawa period. At the same time, the shogunate may have distinguished between peasant participation in fencing groups, which it saw as an inappropriate emulation of the samurai, and proper defense of the village community in the absence of members of the Kantō Regulatory Patrol. Well-to-do peasants may not have made such a distinction—whether practicing their swordsmanship or shooting down marauding outlaws, they were protecting themselves because they could not count on the samurai authorities’ protection. In any event, it is clear that the shogunate’s claims to monopolize the legitimate use of violence were being undermined from within and without during the final years of the early modern era.

Of course, the Kantō and Mimasaka are hundreds of kilometers apart, but the shogunate’s fear of disorder in the hinterland of Edo appears to have been an exaggerated version of an anxiety felt by political authorities throughout the country. In any case, my purpose here is not to establish a causal link between the Kantō and Mimasaka, but rather to suggest that one by-product of the turmoil of the 1860s and ’70s was a simultaneous normalization and diffusion of force—or at least the threat of force—in response to conflict and disorder. Needless to say, were it not for the assassinations, urban disturbances, civil war, the threat of foreign invasion, and so on, we would not speak of the “turmoil” of the Restoration period at all. But below the surface of such obvious tumult was a more subtle problem: that the normalization of the use of force effaced the distinction between “good people” (*ryōmin*) and outlaws.

During the Tokugawa period, the samurai authorities maintained a theoretical monopoly over the legitimate use of force, and they justified that monopoly by protecting the public peace. In reality, of course, violence occurred frequently in early modern Japan, just as it does in every society. Habitually violent elements of society—gangsters, gamblers, sumo wrestlers, and other outlaws—existed on the margins of the polity, often in an ambiguous state as masterless samurai or unregistered commoners. To police this violent margin, the authorities deputized members of a variety of groups on the periphery of society, including some elements of the outlaw community itself. This approach to preserving order was cumbersome and inefficient,³⁵ but it meshed well with the technological and political conditions of the times, with the result that Japan was a reasonably orderly society by the standards of the early modern world.

In the last years of the Tokugawa period, however, in response to its evident inability to control the violent margin in places like the Kantō, the shogunate took the further step of deputizing the commoner populace in its entirety. In so doing, the authorities effectively admitted that they could no longer distinguish between the violent margin and the law-abiding core of society, for every member of the core—and particularly its young men—was a reserve member of the forces of the “bad guys,” tottering on the precipice of criminality. In openly accepting the widespread presence of weapons in the countryside, and in attempting to harness elements of the peasantry’s etiquette of protest in the service of law enforcement, the shogunate effectively enjoined the entire countryside to suspect and police itself, for the entire countryside threatened to descend into the violent margin.

This brings us back to Mimasaka and a third telling detail of the incident there. The man who by his own confession opened the door to the most brutal violence in Mimasaka was Kobayashi Kumezō, a fifty-one-year-old former sumo wrestler and local boss (*oyakata*), who lived in Myōbara, a commoner village near Tsugawahara. Let us consider his role in the massacre in some detail. In his confession,³⁶ Kobayashi said that people had always come to him for advice whenever disputes (*motsuregoto*) arose, and that they did so once again when news of the rioting arrived. His advice was to avoid joining the rebellion if possible, but to go along if the protesters insisted. On 28 May, the protesters arrived in an insistent mood, and so a group of villagers duly joined the crowd.

Kobayashi himself remained in the village, however, and used the opportunity to try to persuade the leaders of Tsugawahara to submit a formal apology for their supposed effrontery toward commoners in the months following the promulgation of the liberation edict. (A number of Buraku villages in Mimasaka avoided attack by presenting such apologies to the protesters; in the aftermath of the violence, the prefectural authorities ordered that all such documents be burned.³⁷) In addition, he advised the Burakumin to honor the customary protocols of status difference—to go barefoot when business took them to commoner villages, bow their heads to the ground when encountering a commoner on the road, and so forth—and, as a sign of their sincerity, to agree to take up a position in the vanguard of the procession to Tsuyama. The Buraku leaders refused, saying they had no interest in participating in the rebellion and that they were determined to stand up to any attack that might be launched against them.³⁸

Soon thereafter the rioters returned to Myōbara, vowing to attack Tsugawahara unless an apology were forthcoming from the villagers. Kobayashi and another man went once again to negotiate, this time with a different group of village leaders, but with the same result as the first time. Disgusted by what he saw as the Burakumin’s intransigence, Kobayashi urged the rioters to proceed into the village “and attack as they pleased” (*katte shidai ni rannyū itasubeshi*).³⁹

Although Kobayashi makes no mention of it in his confession, other accounts of the massacre state that one reason for the extreme brutality of the attack on Tsugawahara was the crowd’s anger at the residents’ overt resistance. The Burakumin constructed a series of false fortifications to give the impression that cannons and other firearms were trained on the crowd, ready to fire in case of an attack. Once the protesters saw through the ploy, they poured into Tsugawahara and destroyed it completely, burning down every single one of the

hundred or more houses in the village.⁴⁰

Kobayashi claims to have remained at home during the initial attack. The following day, 29 May, he learned that the village had been destroyed and that a number of residents who had fled to the hills overnight had been caught and brought down to the bank of the Kamo River to be killed. He went back to Tsugawahara at that point, this time with the intention of settling old scores: "It was a chance to kill some people and clear up my longstanding hatred of them, and so I went down to lead the crowd myself."⁴¹

Going down to the riverbank, he did not see the men he particularly hated, but he did find seven or eight women and children being held near the riverbank. He got the guards to turn the prisoners over to him after agreeing to provide them with a receipt for the women and children they had captured. As a list of names was being drawn up more prisoners were brought to the riverbank, bringing the total number to about thirty.⁴²

At that point the crowd captured two prominent members of the community, Saimu Kiichirō and his son, Ryūtarō. The crowd called for their immediate deaths. Kobayashi thought this fortunate because the two had long been contemptuous of nearby commoner villages.⁴³ The mob dragged the two off to the riverbank. Kobayashi claimed to have left the area at that point because he thought he might be recognized if he accompanied the crowd, which could cause him problems later. By the time he returned, the two had been killed along with six or seven other villagers. He told the crowd to spare the remaining prisoners—all women and children—and went home.

In his confession, Kobayashi said that the following day, 30 May, he "felt rather bad" (*nan to naku sokokimi ashikusōrō*) about his involvement in the massacre, even though his actions were the product of the heat of the moment.⁴⁴ Worried about repercussions from the attack, and about the possibility of the protesters returning to the Buraku village, he went to Tsugawahara to survey the damage and see the survivors. He persuaded one of the surviving villagers to draft a promise that the Burakumin would return to their previous status, which he then delivered to the mayor of his own village.

As a former sumo wrestler and local fixer, Kobayashi was the sort of person whom the authorities might have labeled a "bad guy," but even more, he was the sort of well-connected man of local influence whom the same authorities would have wanted to enlist in their efforts to control disorder. Indeed, if his confession is to be believed, Kobayashi could have prevented the massacre at Tsugawahara. In any case, his role suggests that elements of the etiquette of protest survived even in the darkest moments of the uprising, elements reflected in the crowd's deference to Kobayashi in launching the initial attack against Tsugawahara, in the negotiations with the Buraku leadership over the presentation of apologies for past behavior, and indeed in the exchange of receipts for captive Tsugawahara villagers.

In Mimasaka, the rules that had governed social relations between commoners and outcastes collapsed with the formal abolition of the outcastes' base status—rules that had given structure to discrimination and channeled aversion and interaction in ways recognized and accepted (or at least tolerated) by both sides. Kobayashi's inability to influence his Buraku neighbors reflected the collapse of those rules. At the same time, the dismantling of the status system and the political order of which it had been a part rendered invalid the script by which Mimasaka peasants could present grievances to the state. (In his confession, Fudeyasu states

that he was against all the early Meiji reforms and had considered presenting a petition to that effect, but abandoned the idea because he knew it would be futile—as indeed it would have been.⁴⁵) The collapse of the early modern order took the petition out of the peasant's hand and replaced it with a bamboo spear.

In their confessions, the Mimasaka defendants gave a very personal view of their actions. One said that he had decided not to participate in the uprising, but on hearing that the mob was headed to a Buraku village, he grabbed his bamboo spear and joined the rioters; most mention a sudden welling up of murderous desire (*kotsuzen satsunen shōji*) that led them to plunge their spears into the helpless Burakumin lying before them.⁴⁶ Of course, people have been killing one another for millennia, and early modern society had its share of murders. Here, however, we have people killing strangers—or directing others to kill old acquaintances—for reasons explicitly political, yet at the same time rooted in resentments and tensions that had built up in the course of everyday interaction and everyday aversion. It is telling in this context that except for Kobayashi and one other resident of Myōbara, the other men condemned for participating in the massacre simply went home after the killings: for them, the rebellion had served its purpose.

The Mimasaka Blood-Tax Rebellion suggests that murderous violence underwent a process of “modernization” in the years following the Restoration. As we have seen, the shogunate's abdication of its monopoly over the legitimate use of force undermined the “feudal” mode of violence in Japan. Violence became detached from state power, a development that simultaneously undermined the legitimacy of the early modern state and obscured the distinction between the law-abiding core of society—that is, those secure in their status as peasants—and the violent margin.⁴⁷ At the same time, the rules that had governed the peasantry in the resolution of disputes broke down during the final decades of the Tokugawa period, as Yabuta and other students of protest etiquette have demonstrated. Or rather, the rules changed, so that protest, like violence more generally, was detached from the confines of the status system and allowed greater play within society.

In places like Mimasaka, the result of this combination of developments was a further evolution of the protocols of protest, such that the individuated murderous impulse of the participants in the Tsugawahara massacre found release. Mimasaka was not the only place to see such violence, however. Other protests in the early Meiji years saw a similar escalation from the controlled, collective violence of the crowd, to arson, and in some cases, to the killing of individuals. During the 1879 cholera epidemic, for example, a mob in the town of Numatare, Niigata prefecture, killed Yasuda Hannosuke, a former samurai (*shizoku*) who had been seen pouring a mysterious substance—stomach medicine, it turned out—into the river. The crowd turned on Yasuda and a peddler who happened to be passing by after the police refused to arrest Yasuda as the person responsible for the epidemic. The police apprehended the killers, but only after battling a crowd of about seven hundred—many armed with bamboo spears—that had been summoned to the scene by fire bells.⁴⁸ In Niigata, shreds of an etiquette of protest rooted in the early modern status system survived only to call the mob to do battle with the police.

The collapse of the early modern order rendered systematic expressions of the sanctity of peasant status meaningless. Without recourse to valid, traditional means of collective political

expression, peasants turned increasingly to violence, killing to make statements about Meiji policies ranging from conscription to public sanitation, and killing to assert their liberation from the status-based strictures of membership in the law-abiding core of early modern society.

Conclusion

The appalling violence of the Mimasaka rebellion fits into a familiar pattern of popular response to uncontrollable social dislocation, in which vulnerable groups direct their anger and fear against society's weakest elements. Although this no doubt explains much of the motivation behind the attacks on Burakumin, it is worthwhile to consider the matter more closely. During the Tokugawa period, peasant contention often occurred when cultivators felt the feudal authorities had abrogated their moral covenant to provide benevolent rule. Protesters commonly referred to themselves as "august peasants" (*onbyakushō*) and rationalized their actions by asserting the centrality of their contribution to the stability and prosperity of the realm.⁴⁹ The Mimasaka protesters implicitly replicated this strategy by complaining that, in sharp contrast to the former daimyo, the Meiji leaders were behaving in all respects like "Chinamen" (*tōjin*—a generic pejorative term for foreigners). Recognizing that the new regime would no longer honor the moral covenant of the early modern period, the peasants struck out, lest they "be treated no differently from the *eta*."⁵⁰ Hence the virulence of their anger against the Burakumin, particularly their insistence on the restoration of the norms of deference that had applied during the previous regime. If the protesters could not be "august peasants" in the eyes of the authorities, they could at least force the Burakumin to reaffirm their status as such.

As we have seen, the exchange of obligations for benevolent rule was a cornerstone of the early modern status system insofar as it provided the rationale for the authorities' exactions of tax grain and corvée labor. Let us briefly examine the transition from occupation to livelihood and its relationship to early Meiji violence in light of the moral covenant of feudal rule. At the close of the Tokugawa period, the status-based occupation of the peasantry in places like the Kantō plain had come to include elements that went beyond the payment of land taxes and the performance of normal corvée such as construction work and post-station duties. Because the authorities abdicated their monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, the maintenance of order became, in effect, part of a peasant's occupation.

The shogunate and domains that followed its lead may not have seen the delegation of violence as a fundamental departure from the principles of status: keeping a look-out for "bad guys" and serving in the various peasant militias organized in the waning years of the Tokugawa period were simply ways of ensuring the military preparedness of the regime and thus not intrinsically different from such indirect means as the provision of warriors' sustenance. The problem, of course, is that assigning peasants the duty of maintaining order raised questions concerning the obligations of those groups whose monopoly that duty had been—the samurai as a military class and the outcastes as agents of law enforcement. Thus, although it was hardly the intent, giving peasants leave to engage in violence undermined the moral covenant that lay at the heart of the status order, without, however, negating a basic premise of that order, which called for the peasantry to assist the authorities' attempts to

provide benevolent rule.

In the early Meiji period, peasants in Mimasaka and other sites of antigovernment protest took it upon themselves to recalibrate the status order through the exercise of the very technique—murderous violence—that had undermined it in the first place. That is, the authorities, deluded by “Chinamen,” had clearly abdicated their duty by enacting policies that upended the proper order of things. The abolition of outcaste status ruptured the containment field that had regulated the violence of killing (who would oversee the deaths of animals and criminals if the outcastes were liberated from such duties?), and was thus particularly disturbing. But other early Meiji reforms had the same effect, too. Conscription was all about violence, after all, though in the eyes of many peasants it was not the instruments of violence soldiers wielded that were so scary, but rather the prospect that conscripts themselves would be killed for their blood. Public health policies prompted a similar anxiety, as seen in the fears of protesters in Kōchi prefecture, who were convinced that the metal beds used in quarantine hospitals were actually grills designed to drain off the fat of the hygienists’ victims.⁵¹ Universal education imperiled peasant livelihoods and the performance of status-based duties by removing valuable labor power from the fields and moving it to the classroom. The land-tax reform both undermined agriculture as an occupation and, through its corollary practice of household registration, created a roster of potential victims of blood-draining. And so on. Thus, violence against Burakumin can be seen as a way to reinstitute the normal balance between occupation and livelihood by forcing outcastes back into their proper place and thereby alert the authorities to the errors of their ways.

On a national scale, the Burakumin and their problems were a relatively minor concern, as much larger and more powerful social groups voiced their opposition to the new politics of the quotidian. The wave of peasant movements during the years right after the Restoration—the vast majority of which had nothing to do with Buraku liberation—fit into this category. Perhaps the greatest threat came from dispossessed samurai, who rose repeatedly and sometimes extremely destructively in opposition to the loss of their status privileges. Indeed, the largest such incident, the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, took seven months to suppress and nearly bankrupted the government.⁵²

The Meiji state prevailed through these and many other difficulties, however, so that by the end of the 1870s, debate—even in its insurrectionary guise—had largely shifted from the question of whether Japan *ought* to embrace Western-style modernity to specific issues of the means by which modernization would be attained. No doubt the rapid economic growth of the late 1870s and early 1880s helped peasants to accommodate themselves to the monetization of obligations—after all, their lives had improved, at least temporarily, as a result; and if they did not, the fact that the state eagerly reclaimed its monopoly over the legitimate use of violence through the creation of a modern police force and a shoot-to-kill approach to quelling unrest surely encouraged dissatisfied elements of society to make their peace with the reality of a modern nation-state.

Although the samurai participants in the Satsuma Rebellion and similar movements preceding it had a clear counterrevolutionary intent, peasant protesters had largely given up their calls for a restoration of the Tokugawa status order by the mid-1870s. Peasants did keep rebelling: they launched a number of serious challenges to the state during the

economic dislocation of the Matsukata Deflation of 1881-85 in particular. In incidents like the Chichibu Rebellion of 1884, protesters loaded their plate high with condiments from the salad bar of nineteenth-century discourse—a traditional insistence on the right to benevolent rule, world renewal from late Tokugawa uprisings, and democracy and even revolution from the Meiji freedom-and-popular-rights movement—to express their sense that in placing so much emphasis on economic development the state had neglected its obligations to the people.⁵³ But it was clear both from their entrepreneurial behavior before the rebellion and the tenor of their demands during it that they had largely accommodated themselves to the idea of the individual as an autonomous economic and political actor.

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NOTES

¹ All important materials relating to the incident have been published in Nagamitsu 1978, 5: 1973-2159. My account of the rebellion is based mostly on *Hōjō-ken shi*, reprinted in *ibid.*, 1977-2012. See also a nearly contemporary account of the rebellion, “Meiji rokunen natsu Mimasaka zenkoku sōjō gaishi” [n.d.], in Hirota 1990, pp. 100-12.

² Regarding *hinin-goshirae*: Kurachi 1987, pp. 28-29. In the sixth month of 1871, the Tsuyama domain, which controlled most of Mimasaka, did not mention *hinin* (as a status group) in a population report submitted to the central government, but it did refer to them in an order issued concerning the promulgation of the household-registration system in the third month of the same year: see docs. 469 [1871/6/20] and 467 [1871/3/25] in Harada and Uesugi 1984, pp. 397, 396. On local oral traditions, see Tsuyama no Ayumi Henshū Inikai 1986, 16. These traditions are corroborated in an account of a protest in the Tsuruta domain in 1868: doc. 462 [c. 1870] in Harada and Uesugi 1984, pp. 390-394. For accounts of the 1866 protest, see Walthall 1991, pp. 193-217, and Bix 1986, pp. 174-193.

³ See docs. 479 [1871/10], 480 [1871/10], and 478 [1871/8/17-1872/2/5], in Harada and Uesugi 1984, pp. 406-407, 407, 399-406.

⁴ Doc. 482 [1871/11/12], in *ibid.*, pp. 408.

⁵ *Tsuyama-shi shi* 1980, 6: 49-51.

⁶ Doc. 478 [1871/10/23], in Harada and Uesugi 1984, p. 399.

⁷ *Tsuyama shi shi* 1980, 6:51; doc. 486 [n.d.], in Harada and Uesugi 1984, p. 409.

⁸ Docs. 468 [1871/3] and 483 [1871/11], in *ibid.*, 396, 408.

⁹ Nakano and Zushi 1985, 163.

¹⁰ Harada and Uesugi 1984, doc. 484 [1871/11], pp. 408-409, on attachment to commoner villages but not in Mimasaka. On the Kaiami house, see Nakano and Zushi 1985, pp. 81-123.

¹¹ An order from Hōjō prefecture (5 March 1876) decried wealth-based discrimination within the Buraku community: Okayama-ken Buraku Kaihō Undō Rokujūnenshi Hensan Inikai, ed., *Okayama-ken buraku mondai shiryōshū*, 64-65.

¹² On charcoal production, see Iwama 1996, 318.

¹³ Archives routinely limit access to documents referring to outcastes and Burakumin, probably to avoid the problems that would arise if private detectives used the materials to identify Burakumin for the purpose of discriminating against them in matters of marriage and employment. I have encountered this problem personally at the Saitama and Chiba prefectural archives, both of which are otherwise very accommodating in granting access to materials. When using published collections of documents one therefore always faces the question of whether a lack of materials reflects a true absence or is a by-product of editorial suppression. Materials that are published are generally (but not always) issued by research institutes affiliated with various Buraku organizations, as the publication data in the references cited here show.

¹⁴ See Imanishi 1993, pp. 186-90.

¹⁵ Satake 1977, pp. 197-252; Figal 1999, pp. 21-37.

¹⁶ Hirota 1980; Yoshinami 1987, 3-36; Iwama 1996; and Imanishi 1993.

¹⁷ Nagamitsu 1978, 5: 1989-2009.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 1990.

¹⁹ Ishitaki 1987, pp. 37-75; Imanishi 1993; Suzuki 1984, pp. 91-124.

²⁰ Yabuta 1992; Uchida 2000, pp. 117-42.

²¹ Hosaka 2000, pp. 5-45.

²² Yabuta 1992, p. 190.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 190-202.

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 202-11; Uchida 2000, pp. 132-36; Hosaka 2000.

²⁵ Tsukamoto 1983, pp. 7-81.

²⁶ Yabuta 1992, p. 191.

²⁷ Mori 1981; Yasumaru 1995, pp. 279-312.

²⁸ See for example, "Ofuregaki no hikae" [1860.i3], Hishinuma-kuyū monjo *o*-38, Chiba Prefectural Archives; Kamifukuoka-shi 1997, p. 604.

²⁹ "Kantō otorishimari goshutsuyakusama gokaijō utsushi" [1861/2], Maejima-ke monjo *shi*-85, Chiba Prefectural Archives. Similar orders can be found among the documents of numerous Kantō villages; for example, see "Toridoshi rōnin toriosaketa gosatagaki" [1861/4], Asō-ke monjo *u*-36, Chiba Prefectural Archives. The original order is reprinted in Ishii and Harafuji 1994, as doc. 5028 [1861/2], 5: 538-539.

³⁰ Yabuta 1992, 174-78; Nagamitsu 1978, 5: 1981-82.

³¹ "Kantō otorishimari goshutsuyakusama yori ofuregaki utsushi" [1867/4], Maejima-ke monjo *so*-22, Chiba Prefectural Archives; Kamifukuoka-shi Kyōiku Iinkai and Kamifukuoka-shi Shi Hensan Iinkai, *Kamifukuoka-shi shi: Shiryōhen*, 2: 606. On the popularity of fencing lessons in the countryside, see Kurachi 1988, pp. 1-8, regarding a number of groups active in the Okayama domain, and Sugi 2001, pp. 259-73, on the Tama region near Edo.

³² See, for example, "Totō rōzekisha uttaegaki" [1864/1], Takagi-ke monjo *a*-22, and "Ofuregaki utsushi" [1861/6], Takagi-ke monjo *a*-33, Chiba Prefectural Archives.

³³ See Sippel 1977.

³⁴ Sugi, *Kinsei no chiiki to zaison bunka*, pp. 267-71. Sugi notes that the use of the term *keigasa* is unusual in legal documents. He compares it with *furachi*, which is extremely common in documents concerning commoners' behavior. *Furachi* suggests a failing committed by one who is not intelligent or knowledgeable enough to follow the rules necessary to maintain order, so while one who commits a *furachi* is guilty of a wrongdoing, it does not carry with it any suggestion that the perpetrator questions the legitimacy of the underlying order. *Keigasa*, conversely, is the attitude of an underdog who is putting on the airs of actually winning, and thus suggests an active flaunting of status-based rules of social interaction.

³⁵ See the extremely complex networks described by Kanda, "Saikoku no kyokaku to chiiki shakai."

³⁶ Nagamitsu 1978, 5: 2000-1.

³⁷ The order was issued on 5 June 1873. See Okayama-ken Buraku Kaihō Undō Rokujūnenshi Hensan Iinkai, ed., *Okayama-ken buraku mondai shiryōshū*, 104-5.

³⁸ Nagamitsu 1978, 5: 2000.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 1977-78, 2002-3.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 2001.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 1981.

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 1990, 2003.

⁴⁷ White 1988.

⁴⁸ Niigata-ken, ed., *Niigata-ken shi: Shiryōhen* (Niigata: Niigata-ken, 1982), 15: pp. 572-76.

⁴⁹ See Scheiner 1978.

⁵⁰ Quoted in Imanishi 1993, p. 187.

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 104-5.

⁵² See Vlastos 1989, pp. 367-431.

Media and the Folk

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Thinking about the folk (and folklore), both as an identity and as a category that defines a field of study, is inevitably a historical project. To think of the place of the folk and of folklore studies, now, therefore, surely has its own historical specificities. This is especially the case given the current context, in which globalized structures of economy and new media technologies are arguably transforming the very basic grounds of orientation away from a world in which the “folk” might have any relevance. What does it mean to think of the folk now (who would they be)? Especially, what does it mean to think of the *Japanese* folk now?

For the purposes of this brief and schematic paper, I am assuming the category of the folk to be a term of relation as much as an actual content—though the category most certainly always has an actual content. As a term of relation, the folk operated as a critically important point of orientation in the anchoring of modern identity. But again, how, or where, might one think of locating the folk now? I think this is a question worth raising not only to consider how the world has changed—that is, to consider how or if we have moved away from a world in which the folk is a relevant point of reference—but also because folk-like imagery does continue to be raised in popular culture (even for example in *anime*), and because the possibility of an “outside” of our current conditions also continues to be raised.

I want to consider the historically changing place of the folk only in terms of a delimited perspective: that is, the transformations of media, and differing experiences of those media technologies, that have occurred between Taisho and contemporary Japan. New media technologies have for some time now been consistently described as the principal grounds for social transformation, constructing novel grounds of social and cultural form. Given that this seems to be the way that new media technologies are being experienced, it is worth taking a careful look at what kinds of orientation are felt to emerge from the differing technologies, and then, what the implications might be for our understanding of the folk and of folklore studies, among other things. I should admit right away, though, that this is not only very preliminary, but more really just an initial attempt to look for a possible way to frame such a study.

In many ways a product of modernity, the concept of the folk articulated relations to modernity that are well known. In general terms, the relations and distinctions between the folk and the modern helped to secure a more or less unified subject, structured along the lines of what might be called a depth model.¹ One of the best depictions of this modernist subject remains Georg Simmel’s “The Metropolis and Mental Life.”²

Simmel sets up a series of oppositions that emerge within the modern subject. These are in part spatial, with the folk typically being tied to the rural life of the countryside in

opposition to the city and the urban life. These are of course temporal oppositions as well, with the folk located as sites and repositories of tradition and the past, in a time that was either slow or without change altogether. This is in contradistinction to the very contemporary character of the urban, with its time of disjunctive rapidity—so that it too is ultimately a time almost without history, but in this case precisely because of its disconnection from the traditional past. To some degree, the temporal disjuncture of the folk from the urban meant that the folk arises (*within* modernity) as a term that is held to be outside modern life, and against which modern life finds definition and orientation.

Attached, then, to these spatial and temporal orientations, are oppositions of modes of production, which imply different orders of socioeconomic value. The folkic countryside remains a place of barter, and unchanging values (profit and interest do not figure much in this economy), while city life is dependent on cash economies and exchange values. Because the rural, folkic economy of barter entails a more essentialist understanding of value, it produces a social order that not only is fixed, but also is based on essential, qualitatively real and meaningful, distinctions of identity within the social order. The urban exchange value economy, on the other hand, homogenizes the value of everyone and everything in such a way that yields only social indifference, and a general abstraction of meaning (in other words, the kind of indistinction that makes for meaninglessness). The countryside, furthermore, serves as a kind of emplaced locality, embodying real, rooted identity, whereas the city is a place of flow, and impermanence of identity.

It should be kept in mind that Simmel is not just laying out oppositions between the modern and the non-modern (though he is sometimes read this way); these oppositions *collectively* make up the modern subject. The time, place, and value of the countryside folk on the one hand and of the modern urban dweller on the other are thus related to each other as “private” and “public.” Furthermore, while the public character of the urban is associated with cold intellect, the private world of the rural folk is the place of warmth and emotion; the urban is the brain, and the rural the heart.

All this is organized into a depth model of the modern subject. At its interiority lie true, essential uniqueness, local identity, genuine value, and authentic meaning. This depth furthermore is panoramic—entailing a relation to the world in which that which is distanced seems yet to also be most stable and true (I return to this briefly below). Here, the source of rootedness and authenticity of social and economic value, identity, and meaning is the traditional, folkic past, but that past yet persists both as the countryside and as the private interiority of the modern subject.³

The terms thus outlined by Simmel are, to varying degrees, evident in the modern institutionalization of folk and folklore studies (as *minzokugaku*) in Japan as well. Yanagita Kunio’s early twentieth-century valorized focus on rural culture, against city life—whether understood as a critique of or complicitous with the national government’s fostering of new, sometimes agrarian-based ideologies—was dependent on similar spatial and temporal axes of country versus city and traditional folk versus contemporary modern worlds.

For Yanagita and others, one could look to the countryside for practices of everyday life that were not only more traditional than city life, but also somehow purer. As with Simmel’s pastoral folk, the purity of the folk was determined in part as a socioeconomic value form

(pitting agrarian practices against capitalism), that structured a more enduringly meaningful order of time (thus, Yanagita's new category of the *jōmin*, or "abiding folk"),⁴ and a more essentially rooted identity grounded in a more localized sense of place.⁵

Also as with Simmel's modern subject, the folkic pole in Yanagita's framework existed as the originary source of meaningful identity—a "deep layer" or "deep culture" (*kisō bunka*) underlying the surfaces (*hyōsō*) of modern Japanese subjectivity.⁶ To some extent, Yanagita and others did seek this folkic quality quite literally in the countryside, and in the agrarian classes. But especially as used by Yanagita by the 1930's, the *jōmin* was a truly new conceptual category, and one that in some ways was still more transcendent than Simmel's folk. Already existing terms such as the *minshū* (folk, masses), *shōmin* or *heimin* (commoners or plebians), had actual referents, including as specific socioeconomic classes and, potentially, specific political constituencies. The *jōmin*, on the other hand, came very quickly to refer to a kind of commonality and continuity that underlay *all* Japanese, from all eras, and whether rural or urban, traditional or modern, lower class or rich. It was therefore transcendent not only of historical context, but also of any specific economic value form; it therefore would not be so easily mobilized as a position of critique against (or for) capitalism, for example, or an aristocratic ruling class.⁷

Instead, the "ordinariness" (*jō*; "ordinary" in the sense of custom, or that which persists through change and difference) of the *jōmin* formed the foundation of something much closer to the German *volk*—a universalized folk community forming an ethnic nation.⁸ This impulse towards transcendence is perhaps endemic to modernism in general,⁹ but in Japan it contributed to the particularly strong unification of a subject form that was at once ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, and national.

Nonetheless, as in Simmel's depiction of the folk, the *jōmin* can be thought of as operating in a panoramic, and nostalgic, relation to the modern—distanced from the immediate surface of everyday life, but privileged as its heart and ever-stable true origin.

Since the time of these early twentieth century frameworks, the place of the folk as an operative term of social orientation has changed, perhaps even dissolved. Clearly, this is in part due to the rapid disappearance of many of the real peasant societies to which at least some ideas of the folk did refer. But the transformation in social orientations also, by some arguments, has something to do with the increasing prevalence of new media technologies in everyday practices. I want to turn to some of these changes now.

The belief that new media technologies could somehow place people in a new relation to each other and to the world, however, thereby fundamentally shifting world horizons, is also endemic to modernity in general. At the same time that the folk was being conceptualized in the early twentieth century, debates were even then developing around the possibilities and implications of cinema as a new visual technology. While these debates about film as a new media and the discourse on the folk were perhaps not immediately related, it is also worth considering to what extent there was a correspondence, or even a complicity, between the modern idea of the folk and the modern experience of cinematic conditions. That is to say, not only may modern conditions have been experienced to be somehow "cinematic," but the relation between the "folk" and the modern can itself be thought of as cinematic; the folk might be thought of as having been cinematically located. I will look at this possibility first,

before turning to the apparent transformations brought by new media forms.

One reading of the “cinematic” conditions of early twentieth century Japan can be found in a Taisho-era short story by Edogawa Rampo (*Oshie to tabisuru otoko*; “The Traveler with the Pasted Rag Picture”).¹⁰ Edogawa was a well-known observer of, and in some ways a critic of, Japan’s urban modernity (as his pen-name hints at). Although the story I look at here by no means is directly concerned with the folk, it does lay out the general terms of orientation within which the “folk” was an important point of reference, and places these terms within a framework of media technologies.

The story is short but complicated. In brief, it tells the tale of a man who falls in love with a woman. He only seems to be able to see this woman, however, when looking through a telescope from the heights of a twelve-story tower, newly built in the entertainment and spectacle area of Tokyo; down below, in the labyrinthine maze of spectacles, she is nowhere to be found. It turns out that the woman is in fact only an image, in a pasted rag picture, which itself is located in a peep show booth. But by the trick of having his brother look at him through binoculars held in reverse, the man is placed within the space of the rag picture, and is united with his object of desire—sort of; at the story’s end, it seems that the man within the picture continues to age, though the woman does not.

Those are the basic relations, but it is more complicated, especially in terms of the relations of spaces and media. The story begins in the past—specifically, in 1895, which was the year before cinema was introduced to Japan, and it then shifts to Edogawa’s own time (the ’20’s), which was the first peak of cinema’s popularity in Japan. This is also phrased as a shift from the countryside (Uotsu) to the city. At the outset, the setting is an almost surreal blurring of boundaries and scale—the sky is undifferentiated from the land; faces become enormous clouds; etc.—and the narrator is unsure if it was a real event of memory or a mirage, or a dream. But gradually things take shape and find clear definition. Matter itself, Edogawa writes, evolves from shifting blobs into the form of a train. The setting also is then described as film-like (“like the flickering of a black-and-white picture,” in which the narrator “stood and stared at the mysterious scenes projected on the sky...,” etc. So the world takes on some clarity, but in the form of a train, and under conditions that are somehow cinematic. This, then, allows the narrative itself to take shape, and the remainder of the story takes place within the space of a train.

Thus the very material certainty of the world, as well as the clarity of the story itself, occurs in this shift from the country to the city, and from the uncertain into the spaces and forms of the train and the cinema. Edogawa also equates the space, and movement, of the train with the cinema. This is a classic and often-noted modernist correlation, so again I will avoid detail. Basically, the space is panoramic: from a train, for instance, what lies immediately in front of oneself is blurred, or fragmented, but what lies in the distance remains stable, static, and clear (Edogawa describes the slats of a fence next to the train as “flickering” by).¹¹ The most important point here is that this is a space that does provide a stable, clear, and firmly identified orientation in the world, but it is also a space in which the observer is necessarily distanced from that world of stable identities.

These relations are then further emphasized by the monumental twelve-story tower (the *jūnikai*), the other central architecture of space in the story. The main character can only

clearly see his object of desire—and in fact desire itself only arises—from the heights of the tower; once he descends into the networks of city streets below, the woman is nowhere to be seen.

Yet there are still other kinds of media, and spaces, that are placed within this panoramic space—in particular, the rag picture itself. In contrast to the lack of depth of the picture (and the alienation from it) when viewed from the perspective of the tower, the picture itself is eminently a space of organic corporeality and of three dimensionality. The woman's image, which is in fact made not only with real cloth but with real human hair, is described as “uncannily realistic,” so that the narrator sees “the swelling of [her] breasts, the bewitching line about her thighs, the scarlet crepe of her undergarments showing from beneath her kimono, the natural fleshy texture of her white skin...(etc.).”¹² And in contrast to the filmic flatness of the story's opening, the rag picture's space is that of a theater stage, which has both depth and 3-D perspective (there are also contrasts of filmic grayness versus full color in the picture; etc.; the picture is in effect the most “real” of spaces). Lastly, in contrast to the uncertainty of memory and reality at the story's opening, this rag picture is the space of history: it is a scene, supposedly “well-known,” from a famous and by then “traditional” kabuki play.

There is accordingly a panoramic relation to history itself implied. By contrast to the “cinematic” conditions, this picture of history does create an image of fully dimensional and firmly placed identities. But like the woman in the rag picture, one can only get a sense of this kind of identity from across the distance of other spaces and times. I might note too that this is also a form of knowledge—one which desires and believes in the possibility of a complete, or panoramic knowledge of a stable, true world, but one in which, as the man who climbs the tower to get a better view, one can only gain such knowledge by distancing oneself from that world.¹³

So, in all of these ways, Edogawa's story constructs a set of relations of media and space-times, that entail different orientations of identity and being in the world. There is the organic space of the kabuki theater stage, which is trapped within the flat space of the rag picture, which itself is caught within the cinematic space of the train. As emphasis, all of these media spaces are brought together at the end of the story, which draws to a close with the pasted rag picture, and the organic space it supposedly holds, being held up to the window of the train, so that the man in the picture could panoramically gaze out of the window at the passing scenery, and, ultimately, the “new Tokyo.”

In sum, by bringing these different media together, Edogawa give us a picture of the modern world of Taisho Japan. This is a world that brings together a varied set of horizons of orientation, into a larger, hierarchically coherent order.¹⁴ These horizons of orientation include the differing relations that most commonly are thought to define the modern world, including not only city versus country, but also past versus present, tradition versus mass cultural modernity (with the more distant past of populist, even folkic tradition of kabuki being the site of fuller, more organic identity), and so on.

The principal point is that all of these relations are understood as being brought into coherence only through the framing conditions of what Edogawa seems to understand as the “cinematic.” The traditional horizons of kabuki are still present, as an apparently more “real” and whole world—a transcendent, interiorized world (in the sense that the layers of narrative

leading to the more organic world of desire and fulfillment are also ever more privatized levels of narrative), but that very transcendence and wholeness nonetheless still finds its definition only within the larger media conditions of the cinema. In the same way that Simmel's folk was very much a term of relation *of* the modern subject, rather than truly an outside element from the past that might or might not persist during the modern, Edogawa's vision of the cinematic order of things was dependent on a panoramic distance that gave stability and depth to the modern subject.

Thus, for Edogawa, modernity was defined by the cinematic. This cinematic horizon created an image of the traditional past as a desired world of wholeness and unity (figured by the sensual bodiliness of the kabuki actress), while it yet also envisioned that world as panoramically distanced, or alienated from, the modern. (The popular, folkic, media of the pasted rag picture itself seems to retain some of those non-modern qualities.) This "cinematic" relation thus functioned by eliciting desire and a sense of the real through distance, in such a way as to anchor a reality that was transcendent to the more superficial conditions of modern urban life. This cinematic understanding of the world thus created and depended upon a privileging of rooted origins and authentic identities—as did the early twentieth century concept of the folk.

The idea of the cinematic modern gains additional specification in the context of relations that are emerging out of late twentieth century new media (primarily, electronic digital technologies), and I return to this below. First, though, a general summary of some of these new conditions.

In contrast to the kind of earlier twentieth century cinema just outlined, the media conditions that are employed by and thematized within *anime* are different—supposedly creating different relations to the past, and to the kinds of rooted, traditional identities generally associated with the folk. Yet there are claims being made again that the new technologies do allow a connection with pre-twentieth century, non-modern Japanese identities (sometimes specifically presented as the "folk," though sometimes more generically as a non-modern tradition). To consider this, the media technologies I focus on here can for the moment be thought of through the increasingly common analytical opposition of the analog versus the digital.

In part, these technologies are simply the new forms of electronic communication, the internet in particular, with which nearly everyone is now familiar. Paul Virilio's classic critique of the spaces and times that emerge from the internet emphasizes what he calls the new "ubiquity" of time and space.¹⁵ By this he means that, as we focus on an architecture based on looking at computer screens rather than out windows, we enter into a space which is everywhere (especially now that, at least in Japan, people are connecting to the internet via cell phones even more than via laptops), but everywhere the same—it matters not whether you hook up in the middle of the city or on top of Mt. Everest. Nor do the classic, organic orders of time (including night versus day, or the differentiation of global time zones) mean anything anymore. So for Virilio, electronic technology produces a loss of antipodes—a loss of the organic means by which different identities can find orientation in the world. We have lost the dimension that allows both identity and critique. Virilio's critique, in other words, really ends up in many ways a panoramic structure like Edogawa's, which holds up a notion

of singular organic identity, based on firmly placed positions of identity and difference, which nonetheless are also already distanced or lost.

There are, however, other arguments, particularly about the workings of digital technology. Most of these emphasize that these technologies allow for ways to think of identity as “emergent” rather than as fixed and unitary; for some, this is a positive thing (because it supposedly allows a more open, flexible and creative understanding of identity). One of the most basic claims is that analogic technologies always insist on reproduction, for example of images or sounds, based on mimetic equivalence. There is a point of origin (the image or figure that is being reproduced), with all its complexity, and a good analogic reproduction maintains at least some of this complexity in a stable way. This is therefore a kind of identity that insists on stable origins and authenticity, and these origins then guarantee that identity itself remains stable.

Digital technology, on the other hand, proceeds through a fragmentation into relatively simple code. This simple code then works in a recombinant way to reproduce an image or sound. But there no longer is any claim to one form of recombination being truer than any other (thus, for example, digital photography can no longer be “trusted” in the same way that filmic photography can be). Also, theorists of computer-generated design technology say that while computer programs designed to generate new designs (for robots, for example) similarly consists of relatively simple code, out of this code will emerge—at the surface—complex and unpredictable forms. So by these technologies, identity is understood to have only an uncertain relation to a point of origin. Identity is in this sense “emergent,” and identity can be located only at the surface—not some earlier, or interior, point of origin. This does not mean that the idea of having a point of origin is discarded, nor that identity itself is being given up on; it is just that the point of origin, or points of origin, do not guarantee an authentic and singular concept of identity.¹⁶

These “digital” conditions are being played with throughout popular culture in Japan and elsewhere. One of the more interesting art movements in Japan (actually it is global too), for example, is what is know as “superflat” art. In part the idea of a superflat perspective is to maintain this idea of identity as having only an uncertain, emergent relation to a point of origin—whether that point of origin is an image in the real world, or in one’s own personal history, or somewhere else. But the idea also is to maintain a sense in which we are all caught in a number of different “surfaces” of identity at once, and these differences can all be thought of as coexisting on a single plane of existence (or a single plane of an artwork), in something like an open dialectic. One could think, for example, of all of the different media times and places narrated in the Edogawa story, but without the hierarchical privileging of one or another that comes from the panoramic perspective.

By these terms, Edogawa’s cinematic modern subject was an analogic formation. As with Simmel’s depiction, it found orientation through stable reference to a singular and transcendent point of origin. The surface expression of this identity, however variable or alienated (again, one could think also of Freud), could always be excavated to find the more authentic identity within.

“Digital” formations on the other hand—which, it should be kept in mind, almost inevitably still retain some analogic structures within them—almost inevitably reconfigure

the place and role of a folkic or any other essentialist identity. This is being taken up within new media arts. Among other things, some of the superflat artists (and others, including for example Uchiyama Shotaro) say that this is a means of reimagining a “Japanese” identity, including a relation to Japan’s traditional, and even folk, past. Though not clear, this seems to imply the possibility of a belief in a real traditional past, that does in some ways serve as a real origin and ground of identity—but only as one “layer” that exists within an increasingly global variety of contexts, or layers. This is not then a simple postmodernist rejection of tradition, either.

Anime, as opposed to photographic film, is not only using these digital technologies, but it is highlighting the “digital” conditions of identity as basic thematic grounds of its world views. Or at least, these conditions become a source of debate. Miyazaki Hayao, one of the most interesting and complex animators, has produced a whole set of films that ultimately seem to argue for the cinematic/analog as opposed to the digital (he accordingly has continued to insist that his films not be categorized as anime; he also long refused to utilize digital technologies at any level in the production of his films). In *Nausicaa*, for example, a potentially idyllic world is set up (the “Valley of the Wind” being the homeland), which is nonetheless threatened by a larger set of “pollutions.” To again simplify greatly (to the point of meaninglessness, perhaps), in *Nausicaa* the world is good when a large set of oppositional relations (the forest versus the city; the past versus the present; even good versus evil) are maintained. When the boundaries between these oppositions become blurred, then life itself is threatened; the maintenance of these oppositions retains a kind of identity that is unified, organic, singular, and stable, and this is the truly “good” kind of identity. Thus, too, *Nausicaa* holds up two different figures of identity. One is the arboreal, literally: trees (obviously a rooted form of being, that may branch out, but will always have a stable connection to its roots) are good (they even clean the atmosphere of the poisons that threaten *Nausicaa*’s world), while the poisons themselves are figured by spores (a kind of identity which is without either stable roots or clear boundaries). And thus too, in happy moments, Princess *Nausicaa* has a clear connection to her past through the emergence of memories—and these memories are indicated by little more than the appearance of a huge tree; when the spores appear, on the other hand, the picture itself becomes blurred and indistinct, the colors blend into a uniform blue-gray, etc. The “arboreal” good thus also implies a stable, rooted and singular relation to memory, and therefore to the past. In *Nausicaa*, it is only when all the above oppositions are retained that the world can return to a pure, unpolluted state—including not only a stable relation to the past, but also to the past as tradition, and even folkic (Miyazaki cites a variety of traditions, legends, and folksongs, to indicate the happy past in *Nausicaa*).

In all of these ways, Miyazaki ultimately seems to be arguing that all the relations of opposition that ground a stable modernist concept of identity, and that Edogawa equated with a “filmic” world, are the true and good orientations of life in general. Miyazaki is in a sense using animation to argue against the digital, and the “anime-ic.”

But a great deal of anime argues in favor of a more digital view. To take just one obvious example, one could look at *Serial Experiments Lain*. The artwork itself is produced out of both analog and digital methods, and through these methods it tries to produce effects from a variety of different media, including film, photography, and digital forms. The story—which

also is a mystery of sorts, but really is the story of a girl named Lain—is not produced in a linear narrative, but rather works through what are called “layers”—which include things like “society,” “religion,” and ultimately “ego.” Each of these segments is done by a different art director, so each is different even at a formal level. And each one starts over at the same starting point, but ends up somewhere different. All of these layers, though, with their different orientations, help to make up who and what “Lain” is. Thus, *Lain*’s layered understanding of everyday life is close to the superflat view of the world, and of the possibility of constructing a relation to the past, to tradition, and to the folkic as somehow “outside” the present.¹⁷

This “digital” view of the everyday is not only being worked through in cinema or *anime*. To cite just one last, quick example, one could look at the theme park built by Arakawa Shūsaku and Madeline Gins in the countryside of Gifu Prefecture, called the Site of Reversible Destiny (*Tenmei Hantenchi*). This theme park consists among other things of a house and a huge pit; the pit contains “landmarks” associated with different well-known moments from Japanese history. The architecture is meant to be completely disorienting, with physical space that might be thought of as stochastic rather than Euclidean. In fact the park closes if it rains because of the dangers of slipping on irregular terrain; reportedly at least one person fell and broke bones on the park’s opening day, and one can now rent rubber-soled shoes and helmets. The park attempts to bring together not only different points of historical memory, but also different kinds of space and temporality (including domestic space, the world of leisure, and the countryside) in ways that randomly conflict but nonetheless coexist—so that each visitor might emerge with their own sense of things. In other words, it is almost like a “superflat” park.

* * *

At least as part of more general changes that include transformations in global economics (and shifting relations between economics, received political entities, and popular culture), new media *have* brought real changes to our world. Not only have the peoples once defined as the “folk” themselves been transformed by these conditions, but within the new media (broadly understood), we increasingly are finding ourselves in a different relation to those histories and places that in the twentieth century were sites of the folk.

This does not mean that the folk, and folklore, are no longer with us at all. Miyazaki Hayao’s animated films, after all, are consistently centered around folkic and mythological themes, often in very traditional ways—and Miyazaki’s works continue to outsell all other animated and cinematic films in Japan. Just as analogic relations continue to be active within, rather than simply replaced by, a supposedly digitized world, the folk it seems continues to have some role as a point of identity. But as a term of relation, the folk *is* being repositioned.

In view of these changes, one of the effects within the field of Japanese folk and folklore studies has been a literal turn away from the countryside, and toward locating the folk within the urban (including in the form of urban folklore, urban festivals, and so on). A typical claim, though, is that although the rural locales and economies of the traditional folk may be disappearing, one can still find an element of genuine folk culture sedimented within the urban. Thus, the rhetorical and conceptual framework of an abiding authenticity, somehow existing at a different stratum but nonetheless undergirding the modern, is retained. Arguments then continue to revolve around the degree to which these urban manifestations

are truly preservations of local folk traditions, or, to the contrary, are merely marketing ploys of a commoditized as opposed to a real folk tradition.¹⁸ The oppositional framework not only of a transcendent time, but also a truer economic value form, to the times and capitalist values of modernity, is hence rejuvenated as well.

The disciplinary turn to the urban folk is therefore not altogether adequate to the kind of open relations between origin and identity that superflat artists and others see as increasingly definitive of our world—including our connections to tradition and the folk. If anything the search for the urban folk simply returns to the classic, and what now can be defined as analogic, role of the folk as an anchoring position of modernity.

Yet this very persistence of earlier twentieth century models of the folk and the modern should also be paid some attention. It may be that the countryside is no longer populated with the traditional agrarian peoples who might once have offered some possibility of thinking an essentialized identity. It may also be that, at least to some extent, digital technologies are truly transforming our grounds of orientation, in such a way that the idea of a deep, transcendent origin no longer holds the weight that it once did. But at least as much as analog relations are inevitably folded into and retained within digital media,¹⁹ so the place of the folk as a term of temporal and economic value continues to serve as a reference point for the contemporary world. And it continues to do so in often classic ways—not as just one more origin, or one more open layer of experience among many, as described by the more liberatory readings of digital relations, but rather, according to the panoramic ordering of experience described above. The “folk,” in other words, is also a good example of the ways in which received institutional and conceptual structures continue not only to subsist within, but also to hierarchize, new and supposedly emancipatory forms of identity and everyday life.

In sum, if one is going to locate the place of the folk today, it would therefore seem that this point between the analog and the digital would be a good place to start.

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NOTES

1 This depth model is very much tied not only to the privileging of three-dimensional space, but also to the unity of single-point perspectival space.

2 Simmel 1969, pp. 46-60. Simmel's essay "Die Grosstädte und das Geistesleben" originally appeared in 1903.

3 Simmel therefore writes: "the general conclusions of this entire task of reflection become obvious, namely, that from each point on the surface alone—one may drop a sounding into the depth of the psyche so that all the most banal externalities of life finally are connected with the ultimate decisions concerning the meaning and style of life." Ibid, 50. Freud could clearly be invoked in this context as

well.

4 The identification of the folk with an agricultural cycle that is more “natural” continues in postwar Japanese ethnology. A very common model describes pre- and early modern Japanese societies as based on a ritual temporal order that cycled between “everyday” (*ke*) and “non-everyday” (*hare*) moments, which ostensibly were dependent upon, and expressions of, the natural cycling of life and death seen in the annual progression of seasons. Modern modes of production then “freed” industrial society from any adherence to this natural calendar, resulting in a temporal order more dependent on the arbitrary vagaries of industrial production and urban contingencies. For a more recent expression of this argument, see for example Ashida 1994. For a discussion of village calendars as still based on good communal time rather than on individual interest, see Miyata 1981.

5 This view is also basic to some of postwar Japanese studies of folk religion. Sakurai Tokutarō, for example, argues that folk religion is distinguished by its emphatic locality and particularity, as opposed to the “great” or “established” religions (such as Buddhism and Christianity), which are universal and translocal. See Sakurai 1976. For a summary discussion, see also Havens 1994.

6 See Fujii 1956, 7. Norman Havens therefore argues that for Yanagita, the very study of folk customs “would eventually allow one to intuit Japan’s ‘basic’ or ‘deep culture’ ...and ‘deep religiosity (*kisō shinkō*) which lay as bedrock beneath the ‘superficial’ ...levels of literate culture and religion.” Ibid, 3.

7 Yanagita in fact felt that terms like *shomin*, *minshū*, and *heimin* had become overly politicized. See “*Jōmin*,” in Yanagita 1951.

8 Norman Havens argues that Japanese folklorists borrowed the concept of ‘basic’ or ‘deep’ culture from the German folklorist Hans Naumann’s *Kultur der Mutterschichten* (he also points out that this would later be utilized in the German racial myth fostered by the Nazi). See Havens, *ibid*, f.n. 17.

9 Yanagita himself apparently noted that he formulated his concept of *jō* on the basis of the English usage of “common” cultural activities. See Miyata 1990.

10 Edogawa 1928. I am utilizing an argument I develop more fully elsewhere, and in a different context; the aim is to use this framework to think through a broad range of issues related to new media and social transformation in the early and late twentieth century. See Looser 2002.

11 So too in film, one can get a complete picture only from across the breaks between and within still shots.

12 I am using here the translation by James B. Harris, *Japanese Tales of Mystery and Imagination* (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1956), p. 206.

13 Michel de Certeau’s discussion of the “panoramic city” is apt here--especially if thinking in terms of the space of the twelve-story tower. De Certeau describes a transcendent, panoptic kind of knowledge, that is ordered as a Euclidean, geometric space of totality, and is opposed to a practice of knowledge that is intertwining, “shaped out of fragments of trajectories and alterations of spaces,” into intersecting and moving networks. See De Certeau 1984.

14 This order of encompassment and transcendence included Edogawa’s own national political context: as described in the story, the walls of the tower the man climbed each day were hung with macabre war paintings of the Sino-Japanese war.

15 See Virilio 1991.

16 For example, see Hayles 1999, 1-26. See also Rosen 2001, chapter 8. Rosen, however, tends to reduce digital conditions to an indexical relation.

17 This is complicated. Even some of Lain’s visions of death refer to folk “spirituality,” but again, this “folk”-ness is only one layer of meaning within the world of Lain.

18 For example, from the perspective of folk religious studies, Norman Havens writes, “the very self-consciousness of ‘tradition’ represented by a festival preservation association seems somewhat an aberration in the context of a genuine folk culture. Certainly, from one perspective, it cannot help

appearing as little more than a product of modern ideologues' claims about the 'value of tradition' coupled to the economic motive of marketing folk religion—as a commodity—to people from *outside* the community. Whether, and in what form, Japanese folk religion will survive modern marketing techniques remains an open question.” See Havens, *ibid.*, 9.

19 This happens at nearly every level. One could think, for example, of the digital notion of “movement capture” within video games, in which “natural” motion is captured by attaching electronic sensors to real human actors. This organic movement is then analogically recreated (albeit through digital technology) within the video game world, in a space that is very much three-dimensional and perspectively oriented.

久米邦武における「40年の遅れ」の意味

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(1) 久米邦武のイギリス観察

この文章は、『米欧回覧実記』のイギリス観察に見る、使節団一行、とりわけこの報告書の執筆者であった、久米邦武の歴史意識を問題として取り上げたい。結論を先取りして言えば、日本はヨーロッパ諸国に40年遅れているという、認識の根拠を分析し、あわせて今から近代化に向かおうとする使節団一行に、なにをもたらしたかを考えてみたい。

岩倉使節団は、西暦1871年12月23日に「太平会社飛脚船」のアメリカ号に乗って、横浜からサンフランシスコに向かった。太平洋横断の蒸気船の就航は、1865年にアメリカ議会が、日本と中国への郵便事業のために補助金を出すことを決めた結果である。この決定には、東アジアへの郵便の送達を、イギリスの郵便システム (P&O) を利用することへの、戦略的不安があったからである。『米欧回覧実記』に「太平会社飛脚船」と表現されている会社は、通称パシフィック・メールと云われている太平洋郵便蒸気船会社 (Pacific Mail Steamship Company) であり、同社は1848年に設立され、カリフォルニアとパナマの間の運行に従事していたが、65年の決定を受けて、1867年から郵船会社としてサンフランシスコ・横浜・香港の間の運行を開始したのである。岩倉使節団が横浜を出航する、わずか4年前のことである。

パシフィック・メールは、チャイナ号・ジャパン号・グレートリパブリック号・アメリカ号を、この航路に投入した。これらの船は、大型の外輪を持った蒸気船であった。大西洋航路では、鉄製のスクリュウ船が一般的になっていたが、大西洋航路の一流船と比べて、いささかの遜色があったのは、南北戦争後のアメリカの限界であった。外輪船は、燃料効率が悪く(石炭の消費量は1日50トン、スクリュウ船は25トン)、しかもスピードも遅かった(外輪船は9ノット、スクリュウ船は13ノット)。

しかし、『回覧実記』に書かれているように、アメリカ号は4554トンの「美麗ノ船」であった。同号は、1500トンほどの石炭を積んでいたものと思われる。パシフィック・メールの航路にも注目すべき点があった。本来なら、大圏航路 (Great Circle) を採用するはずであったが、北太平洋は荒天の日が多いために、距離的には2500マイル長い、南よりのコースを採用せざるを得なかった。石炭の不足に対応するために、貯炭場をミッドウェイにもうけていた。

ともあれ、使節団一行は、22日かけて、1872年1月15日に、晴れ渡ったサンフランシスコに入港した。一日の行程は平均、約220海里であった。

アメリカでの、観察記録の分析については別の文章に書いたので、ここでは省略する。同年8月6日、ボストンより『キユナルト』会社ノ郵船、『オリンハス』号』で出航したところから、この文章を始めよう。『久米博士九十年回顧録』(以下では『回顧録』と呼ぶ)に興味ある言葉が出てくる。「余は先に船中十日を消し、その間の話に米国新旧の都会を巡って構造建設の壮麗奇抜なのを見『驚く』の語を濫発してきたが、今は新約克・費府・波士頓の文明を観察したので、是から欧州の倫敦・巴里を観ても、此の規模の圏外には出でまい、『驚く』の語は最早不用になったろうといった処、木戸・大久保両副使は『堅くは言われまいぞ』と微笑された」(『回顧記』下巻、p.298)。

使節団の一行は、アイルランドを通過しリヴァプールへ到着し、港の沖合2マイルのところまで待っていたイギリス政府の「小蒸気船」に乗り換えてミルシール河をさかのぼり、汽車の駅のすぐそばにある「波止場」から上陸。駅舎の中の「旅館」で休息をとった。「旅館」のサロンからは、目の前に駅の構内が見えた。『回顧録』の記述を見てみよう。「今駅の旅館に上がった処、サロンは恰も汽車の発着の歩廊(プラットフォーム)に面して四条の軌道があり、一方に着すれば一方に発車し、此処で乗客降りると見れば、彼処には乗り込むなど、蜂集蟻散する人波は右往左往に動揺し、車輪の響きは絶えず殷々轟々と響き、午餐する食堂の前庭は、数回の石造屋に取り囲まれ、而もその石の堅牢巨大にして蒼然古色を帯び懸り、米国では見ない構造で」、そのために久米は木戸・大久保に向かって『「驚く」の語はまだまだ保留しておかなければならぬ』と「笑った」という。

久米の、イギリス観察は3つの時点の時系列的比較から、なりたっている。一つが、1800年、二番目が1830年、そして3番目が岩倉使節団一行が、現に立っている1870年代という時点である。『米欧回覧実記』(以下『実記』と略する)の結論のような部分で、イギリスを観察した部分の記述に、早々に出てくる。岩波文庫版の『実記』の66ページ以下である。「当今欧羅巴各国、ミナ文明ヲ輝カシ、富強ヲ極メ、貿易盛ニ、工芸秀テ、人民快美ノ生理ニ、悦樂ヲ極ム、其状況ヲ目撃スレハ、是欧州商利ヲ重ンスル風俗ノ、此ヲ漸致セル所ニテ、原来此洲ノ固有ノ如クニ思ハルルトモ、其実ハ然ラス」。この文章は、一字下げの部分に出てくるので、直接的には久米の個人的意見と見なすべきであろう。上に述べた文章に引き続き、次のように述べる。

「歐洲今日ノ富庶ヲミルハ、千八百年以後のことにて、著シク此ノ景象ヲ生セシハ、僅ニ四十年ニスキサルナリ」。久米が、1800年に注目しているのはナポレオン戦争が、落ち着き、国内の生産が盛んになったからである。ロンドンの人口は、1800年には96万人(岩倉使節団一行が到着した、1872年には325万人)、リヴァプールは8万5000人(72年には40万人)、マンチェスターは9万5000人(72年には48万人)グラスゴーは7万8000人(72年には47万7000人)であり、1830年代に汽船や汽車が実用化され、「歐洲ノ貿易、一変」したとされる。

ここで、正確を期せば、蒸気船が内陸水路や近距離・中距離の航行を始めたのは、19世紀の初頭からのことであるが、後ほど述べるように本格的蒸気船の時代は、久米が言っているように1830年代に始まった。また、現代の鉄道につながる蒸気機関車が実用化されたのは、まさしく30年に開通したマンチェスターとリヴァプール間の鉄道で

あった。久米にとって、ヨーロッパ諸国が本格的に近代社会に突入したのは、この1830年を起点としていた。「汽船汽車ノ流行ヨリ、商業ノ目的一変シ、旧商ハ倒レ新商ト代リシモ、近四十年間ノコトニススキス」。1870年から40年前とは、ちょうど1830年である。もう一つ引用しておこう。「欧州農工商ノ三業ミナ、今日ノ繁昌ヲ致セルハ、如此ク僅僅ノ年数ニスキササルヲ知レリ、今ノ欧州ト四〇年前ノ欧州トハ、其觀ノ大ニ異ナルコトモ、亦想像スヘシ、陸ヲ走ル汽車モナク、海ヲ史スル汽船モナク、電線ノ信ヲ伝フルコトモナク」という世界が、40年以前のヨーロッパの現状であった。久米は、1800年から1830年間の社会の変化について、たんなる統計的な資料集(多分、年鑑のたぐいであったと思われるが)を利用するだけではなく、この時代の変化を身をもって体験した「古老」から、さまざまな話を聞きだしている。

グラスゴーでは「其開化ノ始メニアタリ、府中ノ人心ハ殆ド狂スルガ如ク」であって、社会の変化の方向は定まらず、「総テ迷霧ノ中ニ陥リ」、多くの企業家が新しい産業・商業を起こしては「俄ニ倒産」してしまった。旧来の財産を、現在まで保持している家は、ほんのわずかである、という。この30年の混乱と、その後の40年の確実な進歩、久米がイギリスの観察で得た結論というものは、このようなものであった。言い換えれば、世界の中心的大国であるイギリスの、今の(つまり1870年代の)繁栄の着実な出発点は、わずか40年前に始まったに過ぎないという「発見」であった。この認識は、近代化のモデルを探すために西洋諸国を「回覧」していた一行には、大きな自信を与えたのではなかろうか。西洋の富強といっても、まだ一世代ほどしか経ていない。これならば、十分キャッチ・アップの可能性があるとということではないのか。

あの、世に名高い、世界で最初の1851年の万国博覧会も、「マサニ我嘉永四年ノコトニススキス」。この久米の言葉は、幕末以来の日本人の西洋観を引き継ぐものであった。アヘン戦争における中国の敗北や、黒船来航(蒸気船ショック)などは、「文明ノ利器」という言葉に代表されるように、物質文明の遅れを強く意識した歴史観であった。そしてそれは、日本人だけの特異な歴史観と言うよりは、19世紀の西洋社会が共有していた歴史観でもあった。いわゆる、文明史観である。

1857年に、初代アメリカ総領事のハリスは、通商の重要さを幕府に説いたとき、次のように言っている。「五十年来、西洋は種々変化仕り候。蒸気船發明以来、遠方懸へだて候国々も、極く手近のように相成り申し候。エレキトル・テレカラフ發明以来、別遠方の事も相分り候やうまかりなり候。右器械を用い候へば、江戸表よりワシントンまで、一時の間に、応答出来致し候。カリホルニアより日本へ、十八日にて参り候義出来いたし候も、蒸気船發明の故の義に候。右蒸気船發明より諸方の交易も、いよいよさかんに相成り申し候。右様相成り候故、西洋諸州何れも富み候やうまかり成り申し候。西洋各国にては、世界中一族に相成り候やういたし度き心得にこれあり。右は蒸気船相用ひ候故に御座候」(高麗環雑記、堀口貞明筆記、ハリス『日本滞在記』坂田精一訳の訳注に引用。下巻、p.89)

ハリスは、このように述べたが「世界中一族」になるには、まだ時間がかかった。久米が述べているように、それは形成途上の段階にあった。

また、貿易には、「蒸気船」ではなく「帆船」が幅広く利用されていた。カリフォルニアと

日本が、蒸気船航路で結ばれるのは、岩倉使節団が出発する4年前に過ぎなかった。しかし、ハリスの予感間違いではなかった。世界は、急速にハリスの「予言」の方向に向かって、進んで行っていた。アメリカ大陸が、電信で西海岸と東海岸で結びつのが、1861年の10月。ヨーロッパと北米が、海底ケーブルによって電信でつながるのが1866年の夏のことである。

(2) 鉄道の時代

ここで、1830年まで戻って、久米の観察が正しかったかどうか、検証してみよう。ヴォルフガング・シベルブシュは『鉄道旅行の歴史－19世紀における空間と時間の工業化－』の中で、鉄道の導入を「時間と空間の抹殺」や「旅行の工業化」という観点から、鋭い分析を行っているが、残念ながら、彼は、同じ蒸気力を用いた「蒸気船」の導入には関心を示していない。私は、久米と同様に「鉄道」と「蒸気船」、さらには「電信」に関心を向けて、この転換期の世界的見取り図を考えなければならないと思う。

ジュール・ヴェルヌの『八十日間世界一周』(1873年刊)に、次のような会話がある。英国銀行から巨額のお金が盗まれたのだが、ロンドンの社交クラブでは二つの立場に分かれて会話がなされている。「でも、その男がいったいどこに逃げられるとおっしゃるのですか」「どこだっていいですよ。いずれにせよ世界はかなり広いのですから」。主人公フィリアス・フォッグは言う「たしかにかつては広がった」。「なんですって、かつては広がったですって。地球が小さくなったとでもおっしゃるのですか」「もしかしたらその通りですよ——私はフォッグス氏と同意見だ。地球は小さくなった。今や、一〇〇年前の一〇倍以上の速さで、地球を一周することができるのです」(引用は岩波文庫版より)。

岩倉使節団の出発は、『八十日間世界一周』が出版される、二年前の一八七一年(明治四年)のことである。久米が、後年になって自分の生きた時代を『回顧録』で述べている時代認識は『八十日間世界一周』の世界観と重なって興味深い。

久米によると、彼が生まれた頃までの歴史は(久米は1839年の生まれ。アヘン戦争の1年前であることに気づいてもらいたい)、それぞれの地域が、それぞれに孤立して存在し、一つの国の変化は、他の国に影響を与えることはなかった。「欧羅巴各国は欧羅巴の舞台丈で変革すると云うように個々の世界が出来て居たのである」。ところが、蒸気船(後では電力)が、18世紀の後半にフランスで「玩具的の蒸気船」が作られ(蒸気船の起源については諸説ある。関心のある方は園田英弘『西洋化の構造』の第一部を見られたい)、さらに改良が重ねられ「実地に応用」されるようになってきたのである。これこそが、世界を根本的に変えることになったと久米は考える。明治初頭の久米と、昭和の久米は、ほとんど変わっていないのである。

「余の生まれる前後から海洋に蒸気船が往来し、風の順逆に拘わらず波頭を乗り切って」、世界を駆けめぐるようになった。このため、「日本は日本、支那は支那、欧州は欧州と、別々にしては居られぬ様になってきた」「是が即、世界の大変化を惹き起こす原因となり、余の生まれる(前の)三百年間の変化と、百年に足らぬ余の一生涯に起こった変化とが、殆ど比較にならぬような大変化を観た訳である」。またこれは、ハリスの

「世界中一族」という考えともつながる。

現代的意味での最初の鉄道は、1830年に開通したリヴァプール・マンチェスター鉄道である。久米が、1830年にこだわったのは正しかった。この鉄道は、運河や有料道路とは、はっきり断絶した思想の上に成り立っていた。すなわち、鉄道会社が線路と列車と駅、その他の鉄道の運行に付随する施設一般を統一的に運営することによって開業されたのである。しかし、この新しいタイプの鉄道においても、1838年になっても個人の乗り物が往来していたという。自由放任主義思想を背景として、運河や道路という「自由交通空間」という発想からの断絶がなかなかできなかったのである。1840年になって、議会は競合する他の運送業者が、同一の線路上に蒸気機関車を走らせてはならないという決議をした。鉄道は統制された、新しい交通体系であった。

初期の鉄道は、郵便馬車の約3倍のスピードであった。郵便物も、30年におけるリヴァプール・マンチェスター鉄道の開業の当初から、鉄道で運ばれるようになった。30年代と40年代の、2度の鉄道建設ブームによって、イギリスの鉄道は急速に整備されていき、1860年には、営業キロ数は16000キロメートルに達した。

鉄道の性能は、日々向上したので、いつの時点かで所要時間は異なるが、1750年の段階で、冬3日、夏2日かかっていたロンドンとバーミンガムの間を、1840年の時刻表によると、朝6時にロンドンを出発した列車は11時30分には、バーミンガムに到着することになっていた。5時間半の所要時間である。「時間と空間の抹殺」の時代は、開幕を告げていた。

(3) 大西洋の両岸

ロンドンの北東部のターミナルであるパディントン駅の構内の、あまり目立たない場所に一人の男の像が建っている。イザンバード・キングダム・ブルネル (Isambard Kingdom Brunel) という、日本では一部の専門家以外ではあまり知られていないが、ヴィクトリア朝を代表する万能的な技術者だった男の像である。鉄道と蒸気船の関係を、ブルネルほど見事に体現している人物は見あたらない。

この物語は、パディントンからウエールズの中心的都市であるブリストルまでの「大西部鉄道」(Great Western Railway)の開通をめぐる議論の中から始まる。「大西部鉄道」は、1838年開業したが、彼は、1838年に次のように述べている。「私はスピードの向上を不必要と考える輩と議論するつもりはない。一般公衆はもともと完全な乗り物を常に好むだろう」(1838年)(この部分は、小池滋『英国鉄道物語』を参考にした)。

ロンドンから「西へ」向かう鉄道が「大西部鉄道」の基本的性格であったが、設立をめぐる会議でブルネルは次のように言った。「どうしてもっと(鉄道を)長くしないのか。どうしてブリストルからニューヨークへ行く蒸気船を導入しないのか。そしてまた、それをグレート・ウエスタン号と呼ばないのか」。ブルネルにとって「大西部」とは、たんにロンドンの西部に広がるウエールズではなく、ウエールズの「西」(正確には西南)に位置する、新大陸であり、その象徴としてのニューヨークであった。

1822年に、ブルネルはフランス留学からイギリスに帰国し、父親が取り組み始め

ていた、テムズ川の下を鉄柱を用いたシールド工法で掘るトンネル事業に従事した。このテムズ遊歩トンネルは18年もかかり、1843年によく完成した。この河底トンネルの完成から30年後、岩倉使節団は「倫敦ノ奇中ノ一」として評判の高かったこの河底トンネルの見物に出かけている。曰く、『ブルーネル』ト云人ノ發明」として「高名」であった、このトンネルは「河底ノ隧道ハ、世ニ高名ナル築造ニテ——船舶ハ上ニし行シ、行客ハ下ニ通行ス」。このブルネル親子の苦心の工事も、岩倉使節団が訪問したときは、馬車も通れないこの歩行者専用の河底トンネルは、「近来ニテハ余り繁盛セズ」と書き残している。

父親のマルク・ブルネルは、長年かかったトンネルの完成を見て、1849年に81歳で没した。時代は、確実に息子のブルネルの時代に入っていた。ブルネル自身の仕事としては、エイボン川の釣り橋や港の改修工事に従事し、1832年にロンドンとブリストルを結ぶ鉄道の建設決定を受けて、翌年、この鉄道建設の主任技師に就任した。彼はまだ、27歳の若さであった。かれは、この鉄道を完成させるために、メイデンヘッドのテムズ川を渡る橋や、バース近郊に作られた2マイルに及ぶトンネル、ブリストルの駅舎など「大西部鉄道」の完成のために、万能の才能をふるった。そしてブルネルが偉大な才能を発揮したもう一つの分野が、蒸気船の設計であった。

ブルネルが、鉄道と蒸気船航路を結びつけた背景にあるのは、ブリストルとリヴァプールのライバル関係である。マンチェスターとリヴァプールの間は、すでに1830年に鉄道が開通しており、リヴァプールは「帆船」による大西洋航路の拠点としての位置を確立しつつあった。イギリスの工業化の中心であるマンチェスターとリヴァプールの鉄道による連絡は、綿花などの原料供給地アメリカとの結びつきを強め、ブリストルは劣勢に立っていた。この劣勢を、一挙に挽回する方法こそが「鉄道」と「蒸気船」の連結による、新しい交通路の開拓であった。ブルネルは、どの鉄道よりも早い7フィートのゲージの蒸気機関車と、帆船よりも速い蒸気船を結びつけることによって、ブリストルの優位を確立しようとしたのである。

また、ロンドンにもライバルが生まれつつあった。1836年にはイギリス—アメリカ汽船会社 (British and American Steam Navigation Co.) が設立され、ロンドン—ニューヨーク間の航路の開設の準備をしていた。この会社は、そのために豪華客船のブリティッシュ・クイーン号 (1795トン) の建造を開始していた。この船は、かつて計画された蒸気船の中で最大のものであり、25日分の石炭、800トンの物資、500人の乗客を乗せることができることになっていた。

このように、19世紀30年代の後半には、大西洋横断の定期蒸気船航路の開設の機は熟していた。それは、かつてダブリンの牧師のジオニシウス・ランデラーの「月に行くのと、イギリスからニューヨークへ(蒸気船で)直接に行くのは、同じほど容易だ」という皮肉な「有名な予言」に対する挑戦であった。しかもその挑戦は、政治家や実業家などの願望を背景としていた。後ほど、アメリカの国務長官として日本遠征を決断することになる上院議員のダニエル・ウェブスターは、1838年のボストンの集会で「蒸気力」発展に対する期待を込めて、次のように述べている。

「過去と比べてみると、この一つの力が50年という短い期間の内に何世紀にもあたる

進歩遂げてきたことか！-----どれほどのさらなる改良が、この驚くべき力の利用を可能ならしめるのだろうか。それを知ることはほとんど不可能だ。推測することは、無駄骨だ。われわれがいま知っていることは、それ(蒸気力)が多くのも事の姿 (face) を、最も本質的に変えてしまったと言うことだ。そして、その進歩の限界がまだ見えてこないと言うことだ。

また、ある資本家は言う。「両国(イギリスとアメリカ)の間を蒸気力によるコミュニケーションの確立によって、もたらされる利益を計算することは不可能だ」。

大西洋を蒸気力だけで横断することは、さまざまな技術的限界があった。蒸気船は、アメリカでは河川や沿岸の交通手段として、発達してきた。イギリスでは、ヨーロッパ大陸やアイルランドなどの中距離の航海を中心に発達してきた。波が荒く、長距離の航海を要する外洋へ蒸気船が乗り出すには、さまざまな困難が横たわっていた。その詳細については、ここで書く余裕はないが、最大の問題は、蒸気機関の熱効率が悪かったので、長距離を長時間かけて気走できるために必要な石炭を、積載できないことであつた。石炭をいっぱい積み込めば、乗客や荷物のためのスペースが確保できなかった。この困難を、克服するためには蒸気機関の燃料効率を上げるとともに、船を大きくし、船に積み込まれる石炭の相対的比率を下げる必要があつた。

ブルネルのグレート・ウエスタン号は、1836年7月にブリストルで建造が開始され、一年後には進水を迎え、ロンドンで作られていた蒸気機関を船に取り付けるために同船はロンドンに回航された。このニュースに接したイギリス-アメリカ汽船会社は、大西洋の定期蒸気船航路の一番乗りを目指して、他の汽船会社のシリウス号 (Sirius) を雇った。シリウス号は、ブリテン島とアイルランド間の航路を走っていた蒸気船であつたが、急遽、大西洋横断航路用に改造が施された。大きさも703トンしかなかった。1320トンのグレート・ウエスタン号と比べると、貧弱な船である。しかし、戦いの幕は切つて落とされた。

1838年3月28日、ロンドンを出航したシリウス号は、途中でアイルランドの南部にあるヨークに寄港した。ロンドンから、直接ニューヨークに向かわなかったのは、石炭の不足をできるだけ避けたかったからだと思われる。残念ながら、シリウス号が積載していた石炭の量はわからないが、毎日の石炭の消費量は24トンであつたとされている。ヨークを4月4日午前10時に出航して、荒天にも関わらず同月22日午後6時に、ニューヨークに無事到着した。18日の航海であつた。

一日24トンの石炭の消費を、18日間も続けたら、シリウス号は少なくとも432トンの石炭を積んでいなければならない計算になる。わずか700トンの船に、しかも47人の乗客を乗せて大西洋横断の航海は、非常にきわどい成功であつた。シリウス号の航海日誌を見ると、風の都合などで何回も、エンジンを止めている。また、帰りの航海の記録では、イギリス近くになったとき石炭がほとんど消費されてしまったので、石炭の「経済的」利用のために、スピードを半減し、最後には燃やせるものはなんでも燃やしたという。

多分、往路でも事情はそれほど変わらなかつたのではなからうか。シリウス号がニューヨークに到着したときには15トンの石炭が残されているだけであつたが、客室のバ

ネルや家具類まで燃やしたという。同号の航海の目的は、イギリス—アメリカ汽船会社が、とにかくグレート・ウエスタン汽船会社に負けないようにすることが主目的だったのだから、多少の無理をして勝負に賭けたのであった。興味深いことには、「ニューヨーク・クリア・アンド・エンクワイア」(The New York Courier and Enquirer) 紙の4月23日号(到着の日)に掲載された、イギリス—アメリカ汽船会社の広告には、5月1日に復路の便が出発することと並んで、ブリティシュ・クイーン号が現在建造中(1836年に建造を開始した)であり、6ヶ月後には「いかなる蒸気船よりも優れた」船として、ロンドンとニューヨーク間に就航すると宣伝がなされている。大西洋の蒸気船による横断の第一号の栄誉に浴したシリウス号は、いわばピンチヒッターであった。

グレート・ウエスタン号は途中にゆるんだボルトを締め直すために、2度エンジンを止めたが、あとは全力の気走を続け16日の航海の後、全速力で4月23日の午後のニューヨーク港に到着した。これが、シリウス号とグレート・ウエスタン号の、同日到着というドラマティック結末の真相である。モーニング・ヘラルド紙は、この日のニューヨーク港の情景を次のように伝えている。

「グレート・ウエスタン号が港に近づき、波止場に横たわった姿は最も崇高であった。それは、昨日のおよそ夕方4時頃のことであった。空は晴れ上がっていた——大群衆が集まった。波止場は人々でいっぱい、その半分は女性たちであった。彼女らは、みんな笑い、優雅な人たちは最も華やかな服装を着ていた。青い海原にしだいに、4本マストの大量の煙を吐き出す、この巨大な生き物のようなものが、立ち現れてきた。それは、黒く、ならず者のような——軽快そうで、よそよそしく、向こう見ずなような、そして荒々しく見えた。それは、極端に黒ずんだ色になることを禁止しているかのようであった。グレート・ウエスタン号がシリウス号に近づいて行ったとき、同号はスピードを弱め、カーヴを描いて、一種の半円を作った。グレート・ウエスタン号の優美なプロポーションが人々の前に顕わになった瞬間、波止場のすべては喜びの騒々しい叫びに満ち満ちた。スタッテン・アイランドに向かって方向転換した後、グレート・ウエスタン号はイースト・リヴァーに向かってものすごいスピードで突き進んだ時、再び、多くの人たちの歓声が回りいっぱいに広がった。ハンカチや帽子を振り回しながら、万歳の声が上がった」

いささか、長い新聞記事の引用になってしまったが、ニューヨークの市民たちの興奮が手に取るように、理解できるだろう。それは、新しい大西洋の時代の開幕を告げていた。

ここに、大西洋横断の最初の定期「帆船」である、ブラック・ボール・ラインの記録がある。定期の帆船航路は、1818年からリヴァプールとニューヨークの間に就航したが、大西洋横断に要した日数は、航海によって非常なばらつきがある。最短で16日、最長で73日もかかっている。帆船のサイズは、時代が経つとともに300トン代から、1000トンを超えるものまで大きくなっていったが、スピードの向上は見られなかった。平均してみると30日代の後半といったところであろうか。グレート・ウエスタン号の16日での大西洋横断は、気象条件とはそれほど関係なしに示された記録である。定期帆船の16日という最短記録を出したヨークシャー号は、最長記録では58日という数字を残している。帆

船によるこの航海の不安定さこそが、定期蒸気船の長所を遺憾なく発揮している。安定していて、しかも速い。しかも、蒸気船の性能は、まだ開発途上であった。

ある意味では、シリウス号やグレート・ウエスタン号は、新興国アメリカにとっての「黒船」ではなかったであろうか。もちろん、日本にやってきた「黒船」とは、蒸気船の「軍艦」であり、異質の、高度な文明のレベルが凝縮されたものと、軍事的脅威がミックスしたものが、あわさって到来したのであるから、「歓呼の声」はなかった。日本にとっては、まさしく国難の象徴が「黒船」であったが、アメリカの場合は事情はいささか複雑である。そもそも、蒸気船はアメリカでいち早く実用化された「文明ノ利器」であった。1807年に、ロバート・フルトンがニューヨークとアルバニーの間を、クレアメント号で営業航行に成功したのが、蒸気船の実用化の始まりであった。アメリカは、蒸気船の実用化の最先進国であった。

ところが、アメリカの蒸気船は広大なアメリカの大地に適応するような発展の傾向を見せる。ミシシッピー川に見られるような巨大な内陸の河川や、五大湖のような湖水、ロングアイランドやチェサピーク湾など内海化した海面。アメリカの蒸気船は「外洋」にはではなく、「内陸」の河川や湖水に向かって発展を遂げた。アメリカの蒸気船発達史には、必ずと言っていいように、1819年にアメリカ船のサヴェンナ号が、最初に大西洋横断をした蒸気船として描かれているのだが、データを詳細に調べてみると、380トンの同船が「完全気走」で、27日かけて、大西洋を横断できたわけがない(この問題に関心のある方は『西洋化の構造』p.28,p40を見られたし)。それは700トンのシリウス号の、きわどい大西洋横断からも、容易に理解することができるだろう。そして、アメリカ船が外洋の航行能力があまりなかったことの、なよりの傍証は、サヴェンナ号の(自称)大西洋横断から28年間、つまり1847年まで、アメリカの蒸気船が大西洋の横断に成功した例はないのである。

1838年の、先進国イギリスの2隻の蒸気船は、アメリカに「歓呼の声」と同時に、外洋を航行する能力を持つ蒸気船がアメリカにはないということを顕わにし、ショックを与えたという意味では、一種の「黒船」だったのではなからうか。

グレート・ウエスタン汽船会社は「ニューヨーク・クリア・アンド・エンクワイア」紙に、シリウス号と同様に復路の広告を出した。5月7日午後2時に、ブリistolへ向けて出航すると、その広告は告げていた。乗客は、往路と異なり68人であり、15日後には母港のブリistolに帰還し、ここでも多くの人々が、歓声の声をもって迎えた。グレート・ウエスタン号は、大西洋横断が蒸気船によって可能であることを明白にした。

この年、ニューヨークには、もう2隻の大西洋横断をした蒸気船が入港した。1隻はトランス・アトランティック汽船のロイヤル・ウィリアムズ号で、シリウス号と同様に、他の会社の船を傭船した617トンの船で、19日かけてリヴァプールとニューヨークの間を走った。もう一隻の船のリヴァプール号は、最初は1150トンの船であったが、大西洋横断用に1543トンに船に改造され、リヴァプール港を出航したものの悪天候のために、ヨーク港に避難し、そこから16日17時間でニューヨークに到着した。翌年には、ブリティッシュ・クイーン号がようやく完成し、同年7月、ニューヨークへの処女航海に出かけた。ブリティッシュ・クイーン号は、7回大西洋を横断し、初期の大西洋横断の蒸気船と

しては成功した部類に入る。

このブリティッシュ・クイーン号の最初の横断の帰路に、有名なエピソードがある。8月1日の出航の時に、乗船客には大きな興奮が渦巻いていた。同じ日に、グレート・ウエスタン号がニューヨークを出航するのが知れ渡ったからである。本来なら前年に実現されていてしかるべき、運命の対決が図らずも実現するかたちになってしまったのである。勝負は、グレート・ウエスタンの勝ちであった。同号は、8月14日の夕刻にブリストルに到着、ブリティッシュ・クイーン号は、翌日の朝にポーツマス港に到着した。イギリス・アメリカ汽船は、ブリティッシュ・クイーン号の外に、1841年には最新鋭船のプレジデント号(2366トン)を導入した。このような、表面的現象を見ていると、大西洋横断の定期蒸気船は、1838年から順調に定着していったように見える。

ところが実状は、そうではなかった。40年には、リヴァプールを拠点とするトランス・アトランティック汽船は採算が合わずに解散し、リヴァプール号はP&Oに売却された。イギリス・アメリカ汽船は、41年に、プレジデント号が乗客136人とともに沈没し、同社は破産し、ブリティッシュ・クイーン号はベルギー政府に売却された。

グレート・ウエスタン汽船会社は、ブルネルが心血を注いで、外洋船としては最初の鉄製船であり、最初のスクリュウ船であるグレート・ブリテン号(3618トン;船客定員360人)を45年に完成させた。進水式には、ヴィクトリア女王の夫君であるプリンス・アルバート公の臨席を仰いだ。同号は、しかしながら、翌年にはアイルランド沖で座礁してしまい、大西洋航路からは撤退を余儀なくされた。このように、38年から始まった蒸気船による大西洋横断は、10年後の1848年の段階では、グレート・ウエスタン号だけが、ニューヨーク航路を走っていたことになる。同号は、実に大西洋を78往復という記録をうち立てた。

そもそも、危険が伴い、しかも、表面的には華々しいが、大半の航海が赤字であったのにも関わらず、大西洋横断に多くの汽船会社が乗り出したのは、いったい何のためであろうか。この問題に答えるためには、少々、時間をさかのぼらなければならない。シリウス号の例からもわかるように、当時の蒸気船は、大量の石炭と、巨大な蒸気機関が、船内の多くの場所を占めるために、乗客や貨物の運送だけでは、ペイしなかった。多くの汽船会社が目を付けたのが、かさばらないで高価な積み荷である「郵便物」であった。

イギリスは、その地理上の条件から、1つにはヨーロッパ大陸と、1つにはアイルランドと、そして新大陸アメリカと西インド諸島のあいだを、郵便船で結ばなければならなかった。基本的には、これらの地域には官営の郵便船で運ばれることになっていた。しかし、かなりの郵便が、普通の商船や軍艦で運ばれていた。19世紀の30年代になると、中距離の航海が蒸気船によって可能になり、帆船の郵便船(船客と郵便物の両方を運んでいたのは、郵便馬車と同じである)は、蒸気船との競争に勝てず、しだいに民間の蒸気船会社を利用するようになる。

(4) 郵便船;イギリスとアメリカ

1833年には郵政長官 (Postmaster-General) ははじめて、リヴァプールからマン島への郵便物を週2回輸送する契約を結び、1837年には民間の蒸気船会社に郵便物の輸送契約だけではなく、船会社に補助金を出して蒸気船会社の積極的な育成に方向転換した。それにもなつて「郵便船」の管轄は、郵政省から海軍省 (Admiralty) に移管されることになった。政府が補助金を出すのだから、補助金で建造された蒸気船には、いざというときは軍事目的に転用可能なように、船の性能などに海軍が注文を付けられるようにしたのである。アメリカも同様の政策を採った。この政策の変更によって、蒸気船は「郵便蒸気船」としての活路を見出していくことになる。

グレート・ウエスタン号も、1838年の処女航海の時、郵便物を運んでいた。しかし、まだ大西洋においては体系的な蒸気郵便船の利用方法は、確立されていなかった。グレート・ウエスタン会社は、グレート・ウエスタン号が運んだ郵便物の、郵便料金の半分を支払うように政府に要求した。ちょうど、「陸上」で郵便馬車が、蒸気機関車に置き換えられたのと同様のプロセスが、「海上」でも始まっていたのである。郵便船の管轄が、郵政省から海軍に移管されたのには、蒸気船時代の本格的な到来を前にした、配慮が働いていた。

1838年11月、イギリス政府は蒸気船会社への郵便の輸送と補助金政策を、大西洋横断航路にも適応することを決めた。1838年に三つの蒸気船会社が、大西洋横断に「挑戦」したのは、この補助金を獲得するための実績づくりという側面があった。しかし、大西洋横断の郵便事業の補助金を獲得したのは、イギリス・北アメリカ郵船会社 (British and North American Royal Mail Steam Packet Company) であった(後ほどの、キュナード汽船。以降は、キュナード汽船と呼ぶ)。キュナード汽船の申請には、月一度、イギリスからカナダのハリファックスへ行き、それからニューヨークへというルートであった。イギリスの母港としては、リヴァプール・ブリストル・プリマス・ファルマス・サザンプトンのいずれかとされた。

申請が認められると、ただちにブリタニア号・コロンビア号、アカディア号・カレドニア号(いずれも1154トンの外輪船)の建造を開始した。第一号船のブリタニア号の完成をまたずに、事実上のキュナード汽船の就航第一号船となったユニコン号が、1840年5月16日にリヴァプールを出航した。乗客27人(24人という説もある)を乗せて、ハリファックス経由でボストンに到着した。同船には、5月13日のパリの新聞、5月15日のリヴァプールの新聞が、のせられていた。到着の翌日のボストンの新聞には、「ヨーロッパからわずか一六日の遅れ」という見出しで、次のように書いてあった。

「ボストンとリヴァプール間の蒸気船によるコミュニケーションの確立によって期待しうる最も大きな利益は、旧世界との、過去にないほどの迅速なニュースの交換である」。この新聞記事が、はからずも言い当てているように、この時代の蒸気船はヒトと情報を迅速に、しかも定期的に運ぶための道具であった。このようにして、19世紀の40年代に大西洋は、ようやく本格的な蒸気船時代の開幕を告げたのである。

一方、アメリカは、1845年によりやく大西洋横断の蒸気船を走らせることに成功(マ

サチューウセツ号)したが、営業的にはなり立たなかつた。47年になって、アメリカ政府は、イギリスと同様に海外郵便を運ぶのと引き替えに補助金政策を導入したが、営業的には失敗続きだった。1847年にはフランスの大西洋横断汽船が、シェルブールとニューヨーク間を走った。

1848年、キュナード汽船は、大西洋の最重要航路であった、リヴァプールとニューヨークの間に、アメリカ号(1800トン)・カナダ号(1900トン)・ヨーロッパ号(1800トン)・ナイアガラ号(1800トン)という4隻の巨大な外輪船の蒸気船を導入した。これに対抗して、アメリカ側はニューヨーク・リヴァプール郵船会社(New York and Liverpool Mail Steamship Company、通称コリンズ汽船。以下それに従う)を設立し、キュナード汽船を迎え撃つ体制を整えた。

この両雄の対決は、初期の大西洋横断航路のハイライトであった。コリンズ汽船は、アメリカの郵政長官との契約で、ニューヨークとリヴァプールの間を、年に20回往復させ、しかもそのスピードは、キュナード汽船の蒸気船より速く、大きさは2000トン以上で、いざというときは第一級の軍艦に転用可能なことが求められた。コリンズ汽船の建造は、アメリカ海軍の監督の下に進められた。海軍の郵船監督者は「アメリカ蒸気船海軍の父」と呼ばれた、M.C.ペリーであった(在任は1848年から1852年)。あの、浦賀沖に四隻の「黒船」(うち蒸気船は二隻であったが)を率いて日本にやってきたペリー「提督」その人であった。こうして、ペリーの監督下に、1849年に進水したアトランティック号(2845トン)を皮切りに、アークティック号(2856トン)・パシフィック号(2707トン)・バルティック号(2723トン)が、次々に完成した。

アメリカの国力を投入して完成した、コリンズ汽船の郵便蒸気船群は、キュナード汽船と対等以上の成績を上げた。この両雄の対決によって、ニューヨーク・リヴァプール間の船賃は、半額にまでなったといわれている。キュナード汽船は、50年にはエイシャ号(2226トン)・アフリカ号(2226トン)を新たに投入し、52年にはアラビア号(2402トン)も就航させ、競争力の強化をはかった。1851年の、キュナード汽船とコリンズ汽船の大西洋横断の記録は、いささかコリンズ汽船に分があるように見える。52年の記録では、コリンズ汽船は西航(つまり、リヴァプールからニューヨークへの航海)で50パーセント、東航では30パーセント多くの船客を運んだ。

海上帝国イギリスの象徴キュナード汽船だとすれば、大西洋と太平洋の2つの大洋をもつアメリカは、まぎれもない海洋国であった。それまで、最初の工業国イギリスへの原料供給国に甘んじていたアメリカは、まず海運において、イギリスからの経済的な自立を目論んだのである。この時期、アメリカ大陸横断鉄道の路線調査も始まっており、アメリカは世界戦略として、「海」と「陸」の制覇を意識し始めていた。このことは、コリンズ汽船の全盛期に、アメリカの日本遠征が決定されたのは、興味深い事実である。

1851年6月10日、時の國務長官ダニエル・ウェブスターは、実際は途中で解任された遠征隊の責任者であったオーリック(その後任者になったのがペリー提督である)に対して、次のような「訓令」(instruction)を、与えている。「外洋を航行する蒸気船航路の鎖の最後の環が完成される日も近い。中国・東インドからエジプトまで、そして地中海や大西洋を通過してイギリスや、それから再びわれわれの祝福されたこの偉大な大

地の他の部分まで——、文明が拡大していく限り、我が国やその他の国の蒸気船は、情報や世界の富や幾千もの旅行者を運ぶのである。」

先に述べたように、ウエブスターは1838年、蒸気力の無限の可能性に対する(期待を込めた)演説をしていたが、「外洋を航行する蒸気船航路の鎖の最後の環が完成される日も近い」という表現で、「世界中一族」の時代が間近いことを指摘している。「蒸気船航路の鎖の最後の環」とは、北太平洋の蒸気船航路のことである。

(5) 暫定的結論

1867年、パシフィック・メイルは、ようやくサンフランシスコ・横浜・香港間の定期蒸気船航路を開設した。それイギリスから、地中海・スエズ越え (overland route) ・インド洋・シンガポール・香港・上海と伸びてきたP&Oの定期蒸気船航路に対する、アメリカのチャレンジであった。P&Oは、1859年に上海・長崎間の蒸気船航路を開設し、64年には、その航路を横浜まで延ばした。地球を西回り(つまりアメリカから日本へ)で行く終点が横浜であり、イギリスを起点として東回りで行く終点も横浜になった。1869年、このような世界の構造に、2つの新しい要素が加わった。スエズ運河の開通と、アメリカ大陸横断鉄道の完成である。久米邦武のみならず、岩倉使節団一行が快適な世界一周をすることが出来たのは、このように見てくると使節団一行が出発した2年前のことに過ぎなかった。

久米は、急速に移り変わっていく西洋社会を冷静に分析した。自分たちの視察旅行を可能にした歴史的起源を求めて。そうして見出したのが「僅々四十年」前に、本格的な胎動を始めた「世界中一族」への動きであり、私の表現を用いるならば「初期的グローバリズム」であった。

The Battle of Tropical Ryukyu Kingdom Tourist Okinawa

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If there were ever a concrete case of wartime loss transmuting into postwar gain, the pulverization of the Shurijō (Shuri Castle) during the Battle of Okinawa and its subsequent rebuilding as Okinawa prefecture's premier heritage tourism site would be it. After its opening in 1992, which featured the restored Seiden (Main Hall), Shurijo Castle Park¹ quickly became Okinawa's most visited tourist site, even before the restoration was completed. It drew over two million visitors in 2000, the year Shurijō, along with eight other historical sites, were registered as "Gusuku [Castle] Sites and Related Properties of the Kingdom of Ryukyu" in UNESCO's World Heritage Sites list.² What UNESCO did not recognize and what goes unnoticed by most tourists is the extent to which the Shurijō owes its present material form and symbolic function to the Battle of Okinawa.

Recognizing this connection is among my concerns in this essay. I also want to begin an analysis of the construction of "Ryukyu Kingdom" as Okinawan heritage from the 1960s to the present, a period during which Okinawa has become increasingly tropicalized for mainland Japanese tourists. Viewed in this way, the history of postwar Okinawa tourism presents a fascinating case of the "tourist gaze" confronting unexpected local realities and reacting by envisioning a place that was largely unimagined by the local population.³ This Japanese vision has since shaped the commodification of the islands for tourist consumption, raising questions of autonomy and authenticity in the production of "heritage" and physical environment in Okinawa today. By the time of Shurijo Castle Park's opening, twenty years after Okinawa's reversion (1972) to Japanese rule following U.S. occupation since 1945, a kind of "reversion to Ryukyu" had taken place, offering a sense of cultural and historical autonomy while at the same time catering to the gaze from the North by invoking an exotic, tropicalized South located conveniently within Japanese political and linguistic boundaries. In other words, local Okinawan cultural and historical identification with an independent premodern Ryukyu Kingdom—often with political overtones—co-exists with an Okinawa wishfully cast as "Japan's Hawaii" for local economic development that has increasingly been tied to tourism within the prefecture. And all of this has been taking place in the long historical shadow of the bloodiest conflict of the Pacific War. With these issues in mind, I would like to engage the postwar creation of "Tourist Okinawa" as an encounter among representations of the war, the Ryukyu Kingdom, and the tropics.

First of all, the idea that Okinawa had anything marketable for tourism took a long time to catch on among Okinawans after the war. The Battle of Okinawa had left the southern half of main island stripped of greenery, bereft of cultural assets (including twenty-four National Treasures, among which Shurijō edifices figured prominently) littered with bones

History and Folklore Studies in Japan (Kyoto: International Research Center for Japanese Studies, 2006).

and unexploded ordnance, and populated by a foreign military that occupied prime real estate and rebuilt the island's infrastructure according to its own strategic needs. The utter devastation of Shurijō was assured by the Japanese 32nd Army locating its headquarters in



Fig. 1. The outer walls of Shurijō after its pulverization, May 1945.




Fig. 2. Japanese 32nd Army Headquarters tunnel system under Shurijō grounds.

a system of tunnels under the castle grounds (figures 1 and 2). Assuming Shurijō was lost forever, the Okinawa Tourism Development Corporation sought in 1969 to capitalize on the remains of the underground headquarters. It surveyed the site and drew up ambitious plans




Fig. 3. Blueprint for plan to turn the Japanese Army HQ into a tourist site, 1969.

to turn it into a tourist attraction, but concluded that the damage to the entrances inflicted by the retreating Japanese army rendered such a plan impractical (figure 3).

Under these conditions of devastation it is not surprising that during the 1950s and 1960s visitors to Okinawa as well as members of the Okinawa Tourism Association (Okinawa Kankō Kyōkai, OTA, founded in 1954) complained frequently about the lack of “tourism consciousness” among the local population. This referred to two things: first, not recognizing the potential value of Okinawa as tourist destination; and second, once tourists arrived, not knowing how to meet their expectations. Visitor surveys and consultant reports typically identified an “utter lack of service consciousness” (*sābisu ishiki mo nai*), by which was meant the inability of Okinawan hosts to know what guests required without being asked for it. In other cases, poor service meant that what was asked for (hot bath water, a meal, a taxi, a bus) came late or was of poor quality, which reinforced stereotypes of backward and lazy Okinawans operating on “Okinawa time.” A 1962 survey of mainland student visitors, for example, listed “noticed the dull-wittedness [*noromasa*] of the Okinawan people” as one of the “things bad about Okinawa.” In contrast, “the exceeding kindness of all Okinawans” was noted among the best things about the place.⁴ Mainland visitors also routinely expressed revulsion at Okinawan food (calling it “*mazui*,” disgusting) while insisting that local cuisine should be featured, albeit in a form made more palatable to mainland tastes, perhaps by Okinawan chefs visiting Nagasaki to see how that “southern” place adapted its cuisine to Tokyo tongues.⁵ Fashioning a cuisine of “local flavor” palatable to Japanese tourist was a serious issue, still present today.

Having *sābisu ishiki* or not, with Shurei-no-mon (Gate of Courtesy) Okinawa had a ready-made sign for its nascent hospitality industry, one that purportedly had roots in the Ryukyu Kingdom (left center of figure 3; figure 4). The gate’s identification with Okinawa as “The Land of Courtesy” (“Shurei no kuni,” which is the inscription on the gate, originally given by the Chinese emperor to the Ryukyuan king in recognition of loyal tributary relations)




Fig. 4. Bus guides at Shurei-no-mon, from the cover of the January 1961 issue of *Kankô Okinawa* (Tourist Okinawa), a publication of the Okinawa Tourism Association..

stretches back to the sixteenth century when it welcomed foreign ambassadors, particularly official emissaries from China, on their way up to Shurijō, the central seat of government. Refurbished and designated a Japanese National Treasure in 1933, Shurei-no-mon was completely destroyed in the Battle of Okinawa twelve years later. In 1958 it became the first major icon of the old castle complex to be rebuilt and quickly reassumed its status as symbol of Okinawa and the hospitality of its people toward foreign visitors, namely increasing numbers of Japanese tourists. Ryukyu postal stamps, issued by the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI) during U.S. occupation on Okinawa, attest to Shurei-no-mon's place as Okinawa/Ryukyu icon (figure 5). Even the impressively rebuilt Seiden has not completely displaced Shurei-no-mon as Okinawa's cultural heritage icon; it was, after all, selected over the Seiden for the two-thousand yen notes printed to commemorate the July 2000 G-8 Summit held in Okinawa (figure 6).




Fig. 5. Ryukyu Postal Service stamps featuring Shurei-no-mon, 1958-1969. From left: commemoration of the gate's restoration, anti-malaria campaign, Olympic torch relay through the Ryukyus, 22nd Annual National Modeling Education and Research Conference, airmail.

The recognition that a growing number of middle-class Japanese were interested in travel to Okinawa prompted the OTA in 1962 to commission Senge Tetsuma, the Executive Managing Director of the Japanese National Park Association, to examine Okinawa's current state and future prospects. His fifty-page report, "Okinawa kankō shindansho" (A Diagnosis of Okinawa Tourism, 1962) covered natural and built environments, cultural assets, battlefields

Fig. 6. Two-thousand yen note issued to commemorate Okinawa's hosting of the July 2000 G-8 Summit. Shurei-no-mon's reputation as symbol of Okinawa and as welcoming gate for foreign dignitaries made the gate a natural choice.



and memorials, and “customs” such as women dressed in traditional Ryukyuan elite attire (not enough of them except at ports of entry, in Senge’s opinion), Ryukyu dance (seen better at the Ryukyu Dance Preservation Clubs in Tokyo), village tug-of-wars, *Eisā*,⁶ the dragon-boat races of Itoman, karate, and bullfights. Among cultural assets Senge singled out Shurijō, the wartime destruction of which represented for him an irrecoverable loss, hardly replaceable by a facsimile of Shurei-no-mon:

One would naturally expect that Shurijō, as a historical site, would be an important sightseeing spot, but the entire edifice and the surrounding forests were destroyed in the flames of the recent Great War and in vain the only thing you see are stone hedges and withered broken trees. This is truly sad. Moreover, at the center of the ruins the University of the Ryukyus was built in the modern concrete block architecture prevalent throughout the main island, and all traces of the castle have vanished. Shurei-no-mon, which today adorns postcards and posters as a symbol of Okinawa, used to be in the area between middle gate and front gate of the castle approach, but it too was burned down. The present one is a restoration. The stone gate of Sonohyan Utaki [a site of worship for Ryukyu royalty] was also restored. These two things are uniquely Okinawan structures and because Shurei-no-mon is so completely different from the type of gate seen in the mainland it somehow draws our interest as something expressing Okinawanness.⁷

The January 1961 cover photo of *Kankō Okinawa* depicting bus guides in front of Shurei-no-mon shows the gate much like Senge viewed it in February 1962 (figure 4). Although he considered the University of the Ryukyus (seen in the distance under the gate in figure 4) an eyesore, Senge praised the bus guides that the OTA and the four major bus companies had recruited and trained since 1955. Full of plans for developing tourism, the OTA was perpetually strapped for cash and lacking in institutional support from the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI), the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyus (USCAR) and the Government of Japan (GOJ). Annual records of their meetings from the 1950s indicate that they busied themselves most with designing sightseeing courses, producing guides, putting up signs, conducting surveys of tourist sites and facilities, holding exhibitions of local goods, hosting important mainland visitors, trying to convince the GRI to establish a Tourism Bureau (which it finally did in 1961), and explaining to the local population what tourism was. Among these public relations efforts were the seven “bus guide competitions” that the OTA sponsored annually from 1956 to 1963 to raise tourism consciousness. For these contests the guides, single women in their late teens or early twenties, selected part



Fig. 7. Twenty-two year-old Toma Shizuko of Showa Bus, winner of the 1960 Okinawa Bus Guide Contest. She took the audience from airport to inn in her narration.

band playing folk tunes: “Without doubt, what was operating behind my feeling of embarrassment was a psychology that held in contempt an amateurish welcoming scene that smacked of provincialism.”⁸ Toguchi’s embarrassment was symptomatic of the gap between what locals experienced unremarkably as home and what outsiders envisioned desirously as an escape away from home, even if they were spending some of that escape time paying respects at war memorials. Closing this gap preoccupied Okinawa tourism promotion from the 1950s on. Okinawans from the tourist mecca of Hawaii who visited their homeland in April 1954 provided the first external critique of Okinawa’s tourism: at the battle sites, you should plant hibiscus like in Hawaii; and you should build restrooms.⁹ As mainland visitors to Okinawa gradually increased during the 1960s (14,829 in 1960; 133,453 in 1970), they added to these critiques and implicitly defined the Okinawa that they expected to experience along with the battle site tours.

An authoritative view of what Okinawa should be for tourists came in 1962 when experts from Japan, like Senge Tetsuma, assessed tourism in Okinawa, focusing specifically

of a sightseeing course to narrate on stage in front of a public audience and a panel of judges (figure 7). The winner went to the national competitions in Tokyo as Okinawa’s representative. Becoming minor celebrities in what was a new and glamorous job opportunity for Okinawan women, bus guides, noted for their poignant narrations of the war history that shaped the popular battle site tours, stand out as one of the few features of early Okinawa tourism that Japanese visitors uniformly praised. Indeed, because the origins of Okinawa tourism rested quite literally on war ruins visited by mainland Japanese (since the April 1954 arrival of members of the Hokkaido Bereaved Family Association), bus guides were in the spotlight (figure 8).

But attractive bus guides alone would not sustain tourism in Okinawa. In a 1979 address on tourism consciousness, Toguchi Masao recalled his embarrassment watching bus guides greeting visitors at the airport in the 1950s with shell leis and a brass

Fig. 8. Showa Bus ad for Southern Battle Site Tour, Kankō Okinawa, February 1956.

on the main island's "image problem." Although Senge also recognized the lost cultural assets of the Ryukyu Kingdom and insisted that a war memorial museum be built to explicate the Battle of Okinawa, the heart of his recommendation was simple: make Okinawa look and feel more tropical, or, in his words, cultivate and enhance its "southern island feel" (*nangokuteki na kibun*). This repeated phrase marks Senge's geographical and, perhaps, temporal viewpoint as it echoes a nostalgic longing for colonial Taiwan or even the South Pacific of the wartime empire. In fact, later afforestation and landscaping campaigns in Okinawa would rely significantly on Taiwan as a source of models, plant species, botanists, and businessmen to achieve Okinawa's tropical effect.

Senge details the kind of (mostly non-native) plants, such as palms and exotic flowers, that should be planted alongside the native tropicalesque *sotetsu* and *adan*, which for him conjure up that "southern island feeling" and "a brightness and warmth you can't taste on the mainland" when viewed against the backdrop of a vivid blue-green ocean.¹⁰ The cover of the first handmade tour guide pamphlet that the OTA published in 1954 approximates this sea and *sotetsu* scene (figure 9). *Sotetsu* (a cycad, sometimes mistaken for a type of palm) were probably the



Fig. 9. Cover of the Okinawa Tourism Association's first guide book, 1954.



Fig. 10. Sotetsu (cycad).

most familiar flora image of pre-tropicalized Okinawa (figure 10). Even the Ryukyu Postal Service recognized the plant's iconic status when it featured *sotetsu* among the first set of stamps issued when regular postage resumed in American-occupied Okinawa (figure 11).¹¹ Today it is practically unimaginable that *sotetsu* would be featured as representative of "Beautiful Okinawa." The 1998 postal issue of that name showcased pineapples and

Fig. 11. The first official postwar Ryukyu postage stamp, featuring native *sotetsu*, July 1948.





Fig. 12. “Beautiful Okinawa” series of stamps featuring tropical summer fruits, 1998. The deigo, Okinawa’s prefectural flower, is printed only in the margins.

mangoes, non-native tropical fruits cultivated as cash crops (figure 12). When selecting an official tree and flower in 1966 (which became the prefectural tree and the flower in 1972), the GRI passed over the sotetsu for the Ryukyu pine and *deigo* (Indian coral bean, seen in the margins of the “Beautiful Okinawa” issue). Subsequently, while the deigo is still the official prefectural flower, the more overtly “tropical” hibiscus, with all its Hawaiian associations, has become the ubiquitous unofficial symbol of Okinawa. Even the banner of the current Okinawa Prefectural Home Page is flanked by the Shurijō Seiden and a hibiscus, not the official prefectural flower (figure 13).




Fig. 13. The banner of the Okinawa Prefecture Home Page, December 2001.

Japanese tourism officials with whom OTA representatives met in May 1962 were blunt about encouraging this flora face lift: “the floral scenery is horrible; cultivate southern island-like plants and bring forth Japan’s Hawaii”; “Ginza willows are planted on Kokusai-dōri [Naha’s central shopping strip]; it would be better to plant flora peculiar to southern islands.”¹² The latter comment is a telling example of how Okinawa’s aspirations of parity with the mainland could clash with mainland desires for an exotic yet accessible tourist destination. Like Senge’s chagrin at seeing modern concrete buildings across the island, the desire of outsiders to keep Okinawa from developing like the mainland was at odds with Okinawans for whom the Reversion movement meant the chance for equal economic development as

well as equal rights and protection under the Japanese Constitution, both of which were lacking under U.S. occupation.

Senge also urged the development of swimming beaches and envisioned seaside resort zones complete with hotels, restaurants, shopping and entertainments: “To make Okinawa Japan’s Hawaii and attract droves of tourists, it seems best to think along these larger lines. . . . It’s a pity that the seaside scenery that Okinawa is blessed with is completely neglected and that hotels and inns are concentrated within Naha city limits.” And perhaps even tours of U.S. bases might be arranged, he opined, so that after beachcombing tourists might take in the interesting nightlife of the base town Koza, “as long as it can be made safe.”¹³ These were items that had scarcely entered the “tourism consciousness” of the locals.

In short, these outside observers were dismayed upon seeing a place that didn’t match their image of an exotic southern island and insisted that the reality be “fixed.” In Senge’s summation, mainlanders imagined Okinawa as: 1) islands south of Kyūshū having beautiful southern island scenery; 2) having tropical and subtropical weather with warm winters; 3) green islands of abundant tropical and subtropical vegetation; 4) having a unique, distinctive culture; 5) a place where Battle of Okinawa sites can be seen; and 6) the location of U.S. strategic bases.¹⁴ His recommendation to the OTA was to groom Okinawa to deliver on these images related to nature, culture, and war history. The product would be some kind of amalgam of southern tropics, Ryukyu Kingdom heritage, and Battle of Okinawa memorial, hosted ideally by young women in native costume. Japan’s Okinawa also had to remain sufficiently exotic, but familiar and inexpensive enough, to have any appeal to Japanese tourists. “Taste foreign travel while speaking Japanese!” is the way a GRI Tourism Bureau official put it in his caption to a scene described in the 1962 scenario of the GRI’s first promotional film which depicted Japanese shopping (with U.S. dollars) beside Americans in a department store.¹⁵ The number of Japanese desiring to go to Okinawa in the 1960s, one commentator surmised, was dropping relative to those wanting to go to Hawaii and Hong Kong precisely because Okinawa had no “*ekizochizumu no mūdo*” (exotic mood). And, the beer there was too expensive as well, even though Okinawa was gaining a reputation for “shopping tourism” because of significantly lower tariffs on foreign goods while under U.S. occupation and on a dollar economy since 1958.¹⁶ Okinawan tourism officials took this advice to heart—the first prize in the OTA’s 1963 “catch phrase” contest was “For a Southern Island Mood—Okinawa” (*Nangoku mūdo wa, Okinawa*).¹⁷

In the wake of the 1975 Marine Expo, which squarely put Okinawa on the mainland Japanese tourist map with over 1.5 million visitors to Okinawa, earlier advice in image-building and consciousness-raising became the commonplace foundations of the prefectural government’s tourism development policy. As the 1979 *Okinawa Prefectural Plan for Tourism Landscaping and Afforestation* announced: “We should emphasize that the great appeal of tourism, symbolized by ‘Tropical Okinawa,’ is the natural scenery of our nation’s only subtropical zone, but the state of our prefecture’s flora does not sufficiently merit it the moniker ‘Southern Islands Wrapped in Flowers and Greenery.’ In response to this condition, the present plan aims to enhance the image [*imēji appu*] of ‘Tropical Okinawa’ through planned landscaping and afforestation. . . .” And just to make sure that “tropical” in this

context is sufficiently exotic-sounding and isn't confused with the technical term "*nettai*," the Japanese English "*toropikaru*" (glossed as "*nettai teki*"; that is, "tropical-like") is used in katakana, the script commonly used for foreign words.¹⁸ The plan specifically targeted the port and the airport areas, Kokusai-dōri, the main arteries of Route 58 and 332 in Naha, the beaches and tourist areas in Onna Village, and other tourist-exposed areas for "tropical-type" plants.¹⁹ The beach resort boom that began in the 1980s, with its emphasis on island leisure and marine sports, reinforced this push to cast Okinawa in a more tropical light (figure 14).



Fig. 14. Cover of 1984 Okinawa tour guide booklet published by the Okinawa Tourism Federation: "Okinawa: The south is resort paradise." (Note the federation's logo in the lower left: Shurei-no-mon floating on waves).

At the same time that Okinawa's tropical transformation was in full swing, plans were being laid for the rebuilding of Shurijō that Senge Tetsuma assumed impossible twenty years earlier. Popular interest in this project fueled growing expressions of Ryukyu identity in cultural and political spheres during the 1980s so that by the early 1990s "Tropical Okinawa" was being fully grafted onto overt markers of "Ryukyu Okinawa," both of which still existed alongside reminders of war. Perhaps no better image of this grafting is the look of present-day Shurei-nomon, which stands a stone's throw away from the ruins of unmarked bunkers that protected one of the entrances to the Japanese Army underground headquarters. The only thing it needed to fit within the prefecture's "Tropical Okinawa" beautification plans was a stand of palm trees that had no roots in the Ryukyus (figure 15).

The physical transformation of the Shurijō site from 1945 to the present is remarkable (figures 1 and 19). But, the castle's rebuilding and its present look were by no means inevitable. Despite widespread desire to overcome the war by restoring this icon of Ryukyu Kingdom identity—"Okinawa's postwar will not end until Shurijō is restored" was a popular slogan during the restoration campaign—the project faced numerous obstacles.²⁰ First, the American-built University of the Ryukyus occupied the site since 1950, as the stamp issued to commemorate its founding made clear (figure 16).



Fig. 15. Tropicalized Shurei-no-mon, July 2001.

It had to be relocated, which it was in 1982. Second, the Finance Ministry argued that because all tangible assets of Shurijō had been destroyed in the war the project could not be properly called a restoration (*fukugen*) to be funded under the tangible cultural assets provisions. The Finance Ministry had a point. This was not going to be the restoration of damaged edifices as they had existed before the war (figure 17). Rather, it would be bigger and better and based on what Shurijō looked like just after its last complete rebuilding in 1715.²¹ Ironically, if not for its pulverization in the Battle of Okinawa, such a grandiose rebuilding would not have likely happened. In addition, the rebuilding was planned since 1972 to commemorate Reversion, thus tying it to U.S. postwar occupation.



Fig. 16. Stamp commemorating the building of the University of the Ryukyus on the former site of Shurijō. Despite the association suggested here, the University's Main Hall was no modern architectural equivalent to Shurijō's Main Hall.

Local historians objected to the plans on the grounds that the money necessary to build what would amount to an “imitation” or “replica” would be better spent on actual historical edifices and cultural assets in dire need of repair and preservation.²² Shuri area residents feared the ill-effects of increased traffic in the area. While these obstacles still persisted, the Seiden *was* restored—in ice, at the 1984 Sapporo Snow Festival (figure 18). After heavy lobbying and a very public promotional campaign, the Shurijō Restoration Realization Association (Shurijō




Fig. 17. The Seiden undergoing repairs in 1931 after its designation as a National Treasure in 1925.



Fig. 18. The Seiden “restored” in ice at the 1984 Sapporo Yuki Matsuri. Shurei-no-mon had been similarly built in ice at the 1978 Snow Festival.

Fukugen Kisei Kai), with help from the Prime Minister’s Office, ultimately shepherded the reconstruction of the central buildings and gates, most notably the Seiden (figures 19 and 20). Complementing Shurijo Castle Park’s opening in 1992 was the studio stage park in Yomitan Village for the filming of the NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) television saga “Ryūkyū no Kaze” [Winds of Ryukyu], which aired for six months in 1993. The studio park featured a reconstruction of Naha Port, the Chinese emissary quarters, and the townscape around Shurijō around the time of the Satsuma Invasion of 1609. The Seiden’s completion



Fig. 19. The restored Seiden, where the Ryukyu kings presided.

segued with intense beach resort-building, widespread tropical landscaping in tourist zones, rising mainland interest in Uchinā (Okinawa) pop music and all things Ryukyuan, and NHK’s “Ryūkyū no Kaze.” All Nippon Airlines’ Okinawa tourism campaign at the time seized upon all of this in one compact image and two words: “Ryukyu blossoming” (*Ryukyu kaika*, figure 21). Appearing on the inside front cover of an NHK-published guide to the Okinawan history and culture behind “Ryūkyū no Kaze,” ANA’s ad was tied directly with the newly opened Shurijo Castle Park and NHK’s historical drama without directly showing either.²³ Instead, sand, sea, and sky—the *real* reasons to go to Okinawa—form the backdrop for Rinken Band, the colorful icons of Uchinā pop whose members, posing seriously in flamboyant Ryukyuesque/Eisā costumes, are clearly not suited up to swim and sunbathe. Shurijō and “Ryūkyū no Kaze” are implicit in the dragon logos used in NHK’s promotions and in the ad copy that appeared below the image, which offered this invitation to (re)discover the Ryukyu Kingdom within Tropical Okinawa:




Fig. 20. The rebuilt Shurijō. The roof of Shurei-no-mon is visible in the lower left.



Fig. 21. “ANA’s Okinawa” as Ryukyu Kingdom Beach Party.

A Ryukyu Dynasty that boasted prosperity from the 14th to 16th century.

A unique culture nurtured by relations with various Asian countries.

The most Okinawan heart of Okinawa—Ryukyu.

This winter’s theme is about rediscovering the splendor of the Ryukyu Spirit that has continuously flowed and is deeply rooted throughout Okinawa even today.

It’s the Ryukyu Spirit itself that allows you to sense a new Okinawa because it reveals to you the Okinawa you didn’t know until now.

Predictably, the ANA ad on the inside back cover of the same publication highlights seven ANA resort hotels in Okinawa under a huge hibiscus (figure 22). As a catch phrase, “Ryukyu blossoming” was brilliant for marketing Okinawa tourism at this time. It not only suggested Okinawa’s now-famous faux-tropical flowers; it tapped into the Ryukyu Kingdom boom that peaked with the opening of Shurijo Castle Park and is—along with “Tropical Kingdom Okinawa”—still going strong today (figure 23). “Kaika” (blossoming) is also homonymic with the “kaika” in the Meiji-period slogan “bunmei kaika” (civilization and enlightenment), suggesting a certain coming-of-age for this “new Okinawa.” At least, it is hoped, the food and service will be improved by now.

原色の楽園に、くつろぎのバックステージ。

ANAホテルズからあなたへ、鮮やかな旅のワンシーンを贈ります。




Fig. 22. “In a paradise of primary colors, the backstage of relaxation.”

Conclusion: The Other Image Problem

Alongside its sun, sea and Ryukyuan landmarks, Okinawa’s war memorials and U.S. military facilities complete the outsider image of Okinawa. They are arguably part of its “heritage” and definitely part of its tourist interest. Yet, despite its historical significance and deep, abiding impact for over a half century now, the Battle of Okinawa and its consequences are not promoted as heritage tourism; they figure even less in pure beach resort tourism. Somehow, it would seem obscene to include *this* modern history and *this* form of foreign relations in a



Fig. 23. One of many examples of “Tropical Kingdom Okinawa,” complete with buttressed palms to prevent damage during typhoon (nature’s reminder that palms don’t belong in Okinawa).

sources of touristic interest since the 1960s and figure significantly in bus guide tours of central Okinawa.²⁵ Not only do bus guides narrate facts about the bases; certain base-related spots—notably the ironically dubbed “Anpo no oka” (Security Treaty Hill)—are now regular stops for student excursions, general tourists, peace guides, and aviation fans (figures 24 and 25).

“Real” heritage tourism in Okinawa derives from its Ryukyu past, and in effect exists to offset unpleasant aspects of recent history in the same way war memorials are designated peace memorials. The “peaceful nature” of Okinawans is itself advertised in tourist literature as deriving from the peaceful relations the Ryukyu Kingdom had with foreigners as players in Asian trade networks. Nonetheless, this war and postwar history has provided the enabling conditions for a positive sense of Okinawan/Ryukyu heritage. With the slate wiped clean, Shurijō could be rebuilt better than it had existed in prewar and be filled with greater significance as a symbol of recovery and as a recovery of symbols (of past prosperity, of relative autonomy). And with prewar vegetation cleared, the island could also be replanted as tropical paradise to meet tourist desires and expectations. Even base perimeters have acquired tropical camouflage thanks to the Defense Agency planting palms and bushes, particularly the hardy *kyōchikutō* that the locals refer to as “kichi no hana” (base flowers, figure 26).

Wartime destruction in Japan in general has led to rebuilding things bigger and better than before, fueling a narrative of postwar prosperity being founded on wartime sacrifice. This formulation makes the past more palatable and the present more livable by making an otherwise meaningless loss meaningful, but it invites criticism when overdetermining meaning for the present oversimplifies events of the past. In the case of Shurijō, there is more overdetermination of meaning than meets the tourist’s eye. By building over and leaving unmarked that

display of heritage centered on the premodern history of the Ryukyu Kingdom and its foreign relations. The war and its reminders are not ignored in Okinawa tourism; they are just not part of “heritage.” As we have seen, bus guide tours of battle sites and memorials are the oldest form of organized tourism on Okinawa Island and they are still routine for mainland Japanese interested in the history of island and for school groups involved in peace study programs.²⁴ Likewise, U.S. bases have rarely been openly promoted by Okinawa tourism officials—let alone be considered a part of heritage tourism—but they have been




Fig. 24. “Security Treaty Hill,” on the north edge of Kadena Air Base.



Fig. 25. Ryukyu Bus tour group on “Security Treaty Hill,” June 2001.

removal of the American-built University of the Ryukyus. Finally, its rebuilding went beyond redemption of war loss; restoring the site to its early eighteenth-century form overcomes the history of its modern dilapidation from the time when the last Ryukyu king, Shō Tai, was abducted from Shuri in 1879 and the kingdom dissolved. Given this history and local efforts to develop some autonomy, I find it difficult to criticize Shurijō-centered heritage tourism on the grounds that it is only a replica or that it (literally) buries the wartime past while resuscitating the glory of the Ryukyu Kingdom. It is perhaps more appropriate to question Shurijō as heritage icon of the entire prefecture when in the historical view of the outlying islands it represents at worst an oppressive centralizing authority and at best nothing to get too excited about.²⁶

would-be tourist site, the Japanese Army Underground Headquarters, the Ryukyu Dynasty trumps the Japanese Army. The rallying cry “Okinawa’s postwar will not end until Shurijō is restored” also means more than simply recovering what war had taken away and thus putting an end to a highly-charged physical absence; it also suggests overcoming the American Occupation because the restoration necessitated the




Fig. 26. “Base flowers” outside the gate of Camp Foster, July 2001.




Fig. 27. Your caption here.

This staging of a reversion to the Ryukyu Kingdom in Okinawa heritage tourism—albeit a tropicalized one that suspends otherwise painstaking efforts to evoke historical authenticity—raises not only the issue of viewpoint and power of representation in packaging the tourism product; it prompts a consideration of the stage itself. To what extent has tourism transformed the place and the routines of place so that the props—those castle gates, those

costumed women, those palm trees—no longer seem staged to guests and hosts alike? In practical terms, how narrow is the gap between “Tourist Okinawa” and “Okinawa,” especially given that Okinawa has aspired since Reversion to be Japan’s “Tourism Prefecture”? How should this souvenir photo (figure 27), destined for the “My Trip to Okinawa” scrapbook, be captioned?

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NOTES

¹ Despite the redundancy of “Shurijo Castle Park” (Shuri Castle Castle Park) and the lack of macron on “jo” (*jō* 城) that is the park’s official English designation, which I will recognize when referring to the park. Likewise, “Ryūkyū” is rarely written in English with macrons in the contexts I will be examining so I too will dispense with them.

² “Okinawa Gains World Heritage Sites,” *Okinawa Times Weekly Times* (online English edition), 2 December 2000, <http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/eng/20001202.html>. It must be noted here that Okinawa tourism dropped precipitously in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States. The concentrated presence of U.S. military bases on the main island of Okinawa—amounting to about 20% of the land and upwards to 40,000 military personnel and their dependents—brought fears from would-be mainland Japanese tourists that these bases would be targets of terrorism as well as sources of nuisance given the heightened security alerts and exercises in and around the bases. School field trips from the mainland to Okinawa—a growing mainstay counted on by many middle-sized hotels and bus companies—also experienced a severe drop post-9/11. This economic downturn in Japan’s poorest prefecture prompted the prefectural government, tourist industry officials, and local businesses to unite in a high-profile campaign aimed to assure travelers that Okinawa is a safe tourist destination. By August 2002, there has been a gradual recovery in visitor figures.

³ To my knowledge, the only original treatment of early postwar tourism in Okinawa is the first chapter of Ishikawa 1979, pp. 6-49. It relies heavily on an in-house history of the early Okinawa Tourist Association not for sale to the general public, Okinawa Kankō Kyōkai 1964. I too draw considerably on this document as a primary and secondary source.

⁴ Ryūkyū Seifu Keizai-kyoku Kankō-ka, “Hondo gakusei no Okinawa ryokō jikken chōsahyō,” Okinawa Prefectural Archives (OPA), R00070382B.

⁵ Okinawa Kankō Kyōkai 1964, p. 76.

⁶ *Eisā* is the Okinawan form of *Bon odori* (dance for the spirits of the dead) which takes place between the 13th and 15th of the seventh month of the lunar calendar. Developed into a performing art, the lively performances of local *Eisā* groups are a source of cultural identity as well as considerable tourist interest in recent years. *Eisā* is now frequently conducted year-round out of the traditional context at Ryukyū heritage theme parks. *Eisā* rhythms and motifs also inform a good deal of Uchinā (Okinawa) pop music that consciously invokes identification of Okinawa with a cultural heritage distinct from that of Japan.

⁷ Senge 1962, p. 16.

⁸ Toguchi 1979, p. 37.

⁹ Okinawa Kankō Kyōkai 1964, p. 20. The type of hibiscus display mentioned here is actually associated with Buddhist notions of the ephemeral nature of physical existence and is thus often seen at grave

The Battle of Tropical Ryukyu Kingdom Tourist Okinawa

sites. That this association of hibiscus is transformed over the years from funerary symbol into “tropical paradise” is yet another instance of redeeming the war dead within the context of tourism in Okinawa.

¹⁰ Senge 162, p. 4.

¹¹ There was some controversy over this issue of stamp given that the sotetsu held for many of the older generation of Okinawans negative connotations of desperate poverty in the 1920s and 1930s following the sugar market crash of 1920-21. During that time, many starving Okinawans turned to boiling out the poison of the fruit of the ubiquitous sotetsu to render it edible. See Christy 1993, pp. 611-612.

¹² Okinawa Kankō Kyōkai 1964, p. 75.

¹³ Senge 1962, pp. 46-47.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

¹⁵ Ryūkyū Seifu Keizai-kyoku Kankō-ka, “Kankō eiga no shinario ni tsuite” (29 August 1962), OPA, R00070386B, p. 7.

¹⁶ Okinawa Kankō Kyōkai 1964, p. 76.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

¹⁸ Okinawa-ken 1979, vol. 1, pp. 14-15.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 24, 27.

²⁰ Shurijō Kenkyū Gurūpu 1997, p. 155.

²¹ Shuri Castle is thought to have been first built by 1427 and to have been burnt down three times prior to the Battle of Okinawa: in 1453 during civil war; in 1660 by accident; and again in 1709 as the result of an accident.

²² Shurijō Fukugen Kisei Kai 1998, pp. 44-45.

²³ NHK 1993.

²⁴ See Figal 2001 for details about peace guide tours in Okinawa.

²⁵ Linda Angst has, however, examined how Koza, which developed adjacent to Kadena Air Base in pre-Reversion days as a base town of bars, brothels, clubs, has since, under its new name Okinawa City, co-opted the U.S. military presence as part of a reimagined “international city” that is well-known in Okinawa guide books for mainland Japanese. Her concern is mainly with the hybridized base town—not the base itself—as a tourist draw founded on the stereotype of Koza’s nightlife, especially of Koza women servicing U.S. military personnel. See Angst 2001, pp. 276-288. The recent history of Okinawa City as tourist destination that Angst details—especially as place where a foreign country could be experienced in the comfort of one’s own language—actually has pre-Reversion roots.

²⁶ Hara Tomoaki has conducted an interesting analysis of the “message” and differing reactions within Okinawa prefecture to NHK’s 1993 saga “Ryukyu no Kaze” in the context of the “Ryukyu Kingdom boom” of the early 1990s in his *Minzoku bunka no genzai* (Hara 2000), pp. 149-213.

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