International Symposium

Understanding Contemporary Japan

日本の文化と社会の潮流

Edited by

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International Research Center

for

Japanese Studies

序言 / Foreword

　　国際日本文化研究センター（日文研）は、2010年10月5〜7日にインドネシア大学において、第17回海外シンポジウム「日本の文化と社会の潮流」（Understanding Contemporary Japan）を同大学と共催した。本書はそのシンポジウムの報告書である。

　　シンポジウムの目的は、インドネシアで年々顕著に関心が深まっている日本研究の実態を踏まえ、両国の文化的な交流の歴史的過程と現状を把握することであった。インドネシアを含む東南アジアでの日本に対する関心は、初期の段階では日本語や日本の文化・文芸に集まっていた。その後、これらの研究を基礎にしながら、社会・経済・政治にも関心が広がり、近年はマンガ・アニメ・テレビドラマ・音楽などの日本の大衆文化が東南アジアの市民や研究者の注目を集めている。日本の固有文化とされている文化的現象に、東南アジアからの影響を解明する研究や、各国の近代化の過程で日本からの思想的・歴史的モデルがいかに水面下で取り入れられたかなど、欧米の理論的枠組みを批判的に読み替える研究もなされている。これらの研究の特徴は、グローバル・スタンダードとみなされてきた西洋のアカデミズムや思考法を打破し独自の視点と方法を導入していることにある。

　　シンポジウムでは、そのような研究現状を踏まえ、「経済・経営・国際関係」「開発政策と社会」「現代文化」「若手研究者と大学院生のセッション」「歴史・宗教・文学」の各セッションとふたつのラウンドテーブルが行われた。日本・インドネシア・タイ・オーストラリア・シンガポール・フィリピンから23件の研究発表と討議があった。聴講者はインドネシア大学の院生を中心に、実数で約200名にのぼった。ラウンドテーブルでは、東南アジア各国で日本研究がどのように推移しているのか、日本研究に日本語が必要かといった課題に多くの時間が生産的に費やされた。

　　いま求められているのは、欧米や日本の基準ばかりではなく、インドネシアを含む東南アジアの視点をも相対化し、互いの足場を再確認する機会を生むことであろう。そのような目論見を達成するためには、今後もインドネシアや他の東南アジアの国々と日本の研究者が顔を合わせ、議論をつづけることが必要である。本書がそのような潮流の一角を占めることができたら幸いである。

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第17回海外シンポジウム実行委員長

山　田　奨　治

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The Roots of Ise Shrine and the Folk Architecture of Sulawesi

Inoue Shoichi

Today I want to present you a story about architecture of *jinja*, the shrines of traditional Japanese Shinto. Sometimes Japanese gods come down on these *jinja*; sometimes they dwell in them. According to an old custom, people often pray in front of these shrines.

Usually we think of Shinto as a religion which appeared in the pre-historical age.

In the 6th century, Buddhism was introduced into Japan from China, Korea and the Asiatic continent. Shinto is considered as a religion, which goes back to the days before the introduction of Buddhism.

Buddhism was a newcomer in the 6th century, and brought with it many forms of belief, which Japan had not previously provided. For example, the huge sacred spaces of the Buddhist temple were now introduced into Japan for the first time. Until then there had only been small shrines across Japan. Indeed, in prehistory, Japanese had treated certain miniature houses as the dwelling space of gods, but they had never built large religious architecture on the scale of Buddhist temples.

The people of that age must have been surprised at the appearance of Buddhist temples. The native religion, Shinto, tried to model its shrines on these newly-arrived temples, and shrines larger than ever before, began to appear on the landscape. The enlargement of shrines took place in response to the stimulation of Buddhist temples.

However, shrines did not copy the shape of Buddhist temples. They kept the traditional and folk style known as *takayuka tatemono* (literally "high floor structure"). This is a wooden building in which the floor is raised, placed in high position, and so separated from the ground level. Many scholars think that some traditionalism operated in the way in which foreign architecture was adopted in the case of Shinto.

Chinese Buddhist temples were roofed over with tiles. But *jinja* or Shinto shrines did not follow suit. Their roofs were made of grass, following the old style. Buddhist temples lined up flat stones on the ground, and stood wooden poles on these stones, but *jinja* erected their poles by sinking their base into the ground, according to folk ways. The walls of Buddhist temples are built of mud, but *jinja* retained the wooden wall. Chinese Buddhist temples painted their buildings red, green and so on; they were as decorative as could be. But *jinja* refused coloring, and disliked showy ornaments; they insisted on plain wood.

Buddhist architecture was more civilized than Shinto architecture. Where they were built with high-grade technology, Shinto shrines were built simplistically with low technology; Shinto shrines were soon damaged and easily so. The rain and wind easily ruined the grass roofs, and the lower sections of the wooden poles under the ground were quick to rot.

Nevertheless, Shinto shrines did not select a new architectural style. This was the age of new

technology, and yet Shinto shrines were built in the way of old architecture. Shinto people persisted in old customs, in the knowledge that they were not rational.

Afterward, the situation changed, and the shape of Shinto shrines became more and more similar to the shape of Buddhist temples. In the 15th or 16th century, some Shinto shrines were built just as though they were temples.

But the Ise shrines have kept their old style right up to the present day. The Ise shrines may be thought of as the ancestral mausoleum of the Japanese imperial family. And it is said that the Ise shrines have repeatedly rebuilt themselves every 20 years in the same fashion. Anyway, the ancient form of the Shinto shrine still remains only in Ise and related shrines.

The Ise shrines have in fact received a measure of influence from Buddhist architecture, so that the ancient way has not been handed down with precision in the Ise shrines. Still, usually it is said that the Japanese traditional way of architecture has been transmitted in Ise shrines, at least to some degree. The roofs of the Ise shrines are elevated by two ridge-supporting poles in what is a very old style. These poles began to disappear elsewhere in the age when Buddhism was introduced into Japan; and yet they still survive in Ise shrines.

It is certain that the high floor structure with the ridge-supporting poles existed widely in prehistory. Today's archeologists have discovered many traces of poles, which prove the existence of this structure. And we know many prehistoric paintings which represent this structure.

The archeological restoration of ancient buildings, including the high floor architecture with the ridge-supporting poles, is attempted often in today's Japan. This sort of restoration is a work of social education designed to illustrate for the public the style—sometimes in full-scale—of ancient architecture. However, except for the pole holes in excavation sites, there are in fact few materials on which to base restoration of ancient architecture.

Thus the scholar has these holes, and nothing else, on which to base his or her imagination of the figure of ancient architecture.

The historian of architecture tends to refer to the shape of the Ise shrines. They are recognized to be examples, which retain the ancient style of pre-historical Japan before the introduction of Buddhism. Indeed, the restoration of ancient architecture is usually attempted according to the shape of the Ise shrines. Here and there we can find examples of restoration, which follows the lead of the Ise shrines in a simple or naive way.

However, it is my argument that the shape of the Ise shrines does not constitute a reliable model on which to base restoration.

I really should not use the word restoration. I had better transform this word info "recreation," because these revivals of ancient architecture have been based on an illusion. But, these works have been carried under the name of restoration, or *fukugen* in Japanese. I therefore use this word with ironical connotations.

In the 20th century, the Ise shrines were reconstructed as the finest architectural specimens. The selected master carpenters rebuilt the shrines using parts of outstanding quality. Indeed, the architecture of the Ise shrines today can be compared to a large craft object, refined by the movement of the Shinto revival after the Meiji restoration of 1868.

Japan entered a great epoch of civil war in the 15th century which endured till the 16th century. In that age, the Ise shrines abandoned the custom of the periodic building for a hundred years. The architecture of Ise was reduced to ruin. After the civil war, Shinto priests and carpenters at Ise rebuilt the shrines, but they had no exact memory of the shrines. As a result they rebuilt without precision.

The figure of today's Ise shrines is thus different from that of the original Ise shrines. Probably, the original Ise shrines would be related to that of pre-historical high-floor architecture with the ridge-supporting poles, but we can not picture that ancient past through modern Ise.

I said earlier that Chinese Buddhist architecture exerted no influence on Ise shrines, but actually, Buddhist architecture had some influence on Ise. For example, in the Ise shrines each building is placed symmetrically, just as in the case of the Chinese Buddhist temples. Like Buddhist temples, the main buildings of Ise shrine have their steps before the front entrance, and are surrounded by wooden-floored corridors. Not all of the elements of ancient architecture before the age of Buddhism's introduction remain in Ise.

As I have already intimated, today, we can not see the architecture of high-floor structure with the ridge-supporting poles except at Ise and related shrines. However, this is perhaps an argument of narrow horizons. After all, it is applicable only to the Japanese islands. In fact, we can see these very same architectural styles on the islands of the South China Sea and the South Pacific. For example, the ethnic buildings of the Philippines and Sulawesi are erected in this way.

A long time ago, before the Han Empire, the architecture comprising the high-floor with the ridge-supporting poles spread widely throughout, and to the south of, the Long River valley in China. But the civilization of the Yellow River valley drove primitive architecture like this from China so that, in fact, some ethnic architecture, which has survived in the Philippines, Sulawesi and elsewhere, has its origins in China.

This architectural style was also then introduced in pre-historical Japan. The original form of Shinto shrines, including Ise, is indeed derived from it. The figure of early Ise shrines which endure to this day, involving some transformation by later generations, was inspired by two types of Chinese architecture.

In China, the architectural culture of the Yellow River valley drove away the architectural culture of the Long River valley. But in Japan, the former refined the latter. And thus was the early Ise architecture born. I think this is one of the routes by which—one of the typical ways in which—so-called traditional Japanese culture developed.

But this is the story after Buddhism's introduction. This progress did not work in prehistory or before Buddhism's advent. We should not overlook this history when we imagine the figure of ancient architecture. We have to take account of the ethnic architecture of the Philippines, Sulawesi and elsewhere, when we try to recreate pre-historical architecture. The reason for this is that the pre-historical architecture in proto-Japan and the ethnic architecture in the southern islands share a common ancestor in the architecture of the Long River valley before the Han Empire.

In prehistory, Japanese culture was not yet clearly in evidence. We should imagine this age in its true international context. I propose that we stop the established way of restoration based on the Ise shrines. I want to advocate an alternative way that is connected rather to cultures beyond Japan's shores such as can be found in the ethnic architecture of Sulawesi in Indonesia.

Rest assured that recently some architectural historians have been changing their ideas. A few attempts at recreation of early Japanese architecture that seek inspiration in the ethnic architecture of Indonesia have begun to appear gradually. These historians are still in the minority, but the academic environment is on the cusp of change.

Culture, Civilization and Globalization:
A Theoretical Approach to Japanese Studies[1]

I Ketut Surajaya[2]

Introduction

Academically, the study of Japan in Indonesia has developed through a number of relatively distinct periods: Japanese language education (1950s and 60s), Japanology (1960s and 70s) and Japanese studies (1970s to the present). As an academic field, Japanese studies can be seen as a kind of area studies. Theoretical approaches in Indonesia start from a mono-disciplinary perspective, and have evolved towards inter-disciplinary perspectives. These individual disciplines cover the study of culture, literature, linguistics, history, economics, politics, sociology, as applied to Japan on its own and also to comparative studies of Japan alongside other places, in particular in comparison with Indonesia. In Indonesia, the approach taken in Japanese studies, especially in Japanese studies programs, originates from the theory of nihonjinron, which is an approach originating in Japan itself, from cultural anthropology or ethnography and intercultural studies.

In Indonesia, Japanese studies from the perspective of civilization have not yet gained the status of a separate field of inquiry, even though the term "culture" is often associated with "civilization" in scientific works. This occurs in conceptual contexts or definitions of civilization, which tend towards enlightenment or urban culture. This is found frequently in scientific works that have originated in the West from as far back as the Industrial Revolution (17th century). In Japan itself, the term "civilization," as discussed by Fukuzawa Yukichi in works such as his *Bunmeiron no gairyaku* (Outline of a Theory of Culture), has caught the attention of scholars in Japan since the time of the Meiji Restoration. Here, civilization is treated with a focus on definitions of "enlightenment," or values, or advances in technology that set societies, which possess it, apart from those that do not. Culture is seen as something that initially precedes civilization, but later co-exists alongside it. In Indonesian academic circles, this view of civilization as a kind of enlightenment is fairly strong.

As far as I am aware, there is not yet a study program dealing exclusively with the concept of "globalization." Nor is there any particular focus on investigations of the concept implied in this term. The concepts of culture, civilization, and globalization do, of course, frequently appear in scientific

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[2] Dr. I Ketut Surajaya, M.A., Professor in Japanese history, alumni of UI and Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo (1982), and former head of the ASJI (1990–2003).

discussions, but they tend to be defined and treated in isolation.

At present, civilization, globalization, and culture each have their own distinct but separate theories, areas of investigation and research methods, and each has independently produced many significant findings. The question can therefore be asked, whether it would be feasible to put together a study program in which civilization, globalization, and culture were treated together, in one new supra-discipline. We can also ask the question of whether it would be possible to use such a new supra-discipline involving civilization, globalization and culture could be used as the theoretical foundation for new work in Japanese area studies? There is always the risk that even asking such a question as this might seem "sensationalist" to some, a mere ploy to grab attention but something without any substance academically, and therefore of no significance whatsoever.

Be that as it may, as a researcher in the field of Japanese history, I feel a sense of responsibility to invite my colleagues in the field of Japanese studies here in Indonesia to grapple with, and to discuss, issues in just such a forum as the present symposium. I have spent about thirty years immersed in Japanese studies and have experienced in so doing the warmest of emotions. I have, though, never had occasion to bring up for discussion in any depth, the topic being raised here, whether theoretically or as a sketch for a methodology that might underlie such a project of creating this new academic study program.

Among the thousands of essays and other writings, the dozens of theses, and several dissertations in the field of Japanese studies that I have come across, which have been authored by the Indonesian "Japanese Studies" school, the vast majority are based on, or borrow heavily from, scientific approaches and methodologies found in already well established and distinct branches of science, namely culture, literature, economics, politics, and the like. Their references come primarily from Western scholars of Japan, while references from Japanese scholars are rather sparse. In particular, we find few references to works published in Japanese, and very few based on field research.

I would suggest that we need to think seriously and deeply about the kind of theory that might serve as a basis for developing a comprehensive understanding of Japan. How can we approach this so that we move from where we are now, with Japan as an object of study, to a position where we can say that our research methods are truly reliable and valid and that the approach we are taking is independent and free from all kinds of subjectivity and bias?

1. The Approach from Culture and Civilization

Over the past ten years I have pursued research from a historical perspective in order to investigate or discuss culture, civilization and globalization in Japan.[3] Thirty years ago, an ethnographer and ecologist, Umesao Tadao, made something of a breakthrough in developing the discipline of civilization studies. For him, civilization was not merely a concept that existed only within cultural studies, but was a distinct academic discipline in its own right. Umesao promoted the discipline of civilization studies in

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[3] See I Ketut Surajaya. "Jepang dalam Proto Globalisasi dan Dinamika Globalisasi Baru di Asia Pasifik" (Proto-globalization in Japan and the New Globalization Dynamic in the Asia Pacific), a monograph to be published in *Kumpulan Tulisan Guru Besar* (Writings by Professors), Faculty of the Humanities, Universitas Indonesia.

a number of academic works.[4]

According to Umesao, the relationship between culture and civilization was essentially synchronic, as for example in the following:

> I propose to define civilization as the entire system of daily life, a system which includes various devices and institutions. Culture on the other hand, would designate the system of values held by those living within this whole system of civilization. Human beings always attribute meaning and spirituality (*seishinteki*) value to their devices and institution. Culture in this sense is a projection of devices and institutions into the spiritual dimension. [5]

By taking this stance, Umesao was suggesting that civilization should be studied with empirical research, rather than by taking a more philosophical approach.[6] If civilization studies are to be developed as a scientific discipline, then it is essential that the phenomenon is treated as a system. First, it should be analyzed as a "synchronic system," and the basis of this analysis should be elaborated from historical change.

In history, the study of systems represents a relatively new discipline, which has evolved since the end of WWII. The study of civilization from a historical perspective can be seen as taking a diachronic perspective. In this way, a theoretical treatment of civilization can rely on these two methodologies, making it comprehensive, multi-dimensional and holistic.

According to Umesao, there is a significant difference between "fabricated systems"[7] and "scientific systems." While fabricated systems have concrete goals, scientific studies do not, and are more abstract in nature. In other words, scientific systems exist, but without concrete goals. A good example of a system without a goal is the "ecosystem." If ecosystems have goals, then we would have to ask the question, "Do ecosystems possess concrete, practical goals?" An analogous question might also be leveled at civilization. Does civilization possess any practical meaning? According to Umesao, the answer to this question has to be that the goal of a system is "self-generating development," which is a tautology, and because of that, cannot be said to possess any real meaning. [8]

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[4]   Academic writings of Umesao Tadao including *Bunmei no seitaishi-kan* (An Ecological-Historical Approach to Civilization, 1974), "Seitaikei kara bunmeikei e" (From Ecological System to Civilization System, 1980), *Gengogaku no bunmei-ron* (A Linguistic Theory of Civilization), *Chikyū-jidai no Nihonjin* (The Japanese in the Global Age, 1980), *Kindai Nihon no bunmei gaku* (Japanese Civilization Studies in Today's Japan, 1984), *Kindai sekai ni okeru Nihon bunmei* (Japanese Civilization in the Modern World, 2000), and others.

[5]   Umesao Tadao, in keynote address, "Japanese Civilization in the Modern World," given at the opening of the first symposium on "Japanese Civilization in the Modern World: Life and Society," 28 February to 7 March 1983, in *Senri Ethnological Studies,* vol.16 (Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 1984).

[6]   Ibid., p. 5.

[7]   Fabricated systems (original: *sistem rekayasa*)

[8]   Umesao, op. cit., p. 9.

Ethnographic or cultural anthropological approaches have well-established methodologies that can provide powerful descriptions and analyses of the myriad cultures and societies that exist. However, my question is this: Can we reliably use these methods or tools to provide a comprehensive description and analysis of the paradigm of civilization in general? While the methods of cultural anthropology are obviously well suited to the task of elucidating "cultural patterns" such as in the work of Ruth Benedict and her associates, we might think twice about applying them for the purpose of analyzing contemporary civilization. I believe that we need to search for another way of investigating civilization. The problem that we all, including myself, face is finding a suitable methodology for this task.

2. Civilization Studies and Globalization

Progress in science has led to the invention of technological innovations in transportation, telecommunications and computing. Together, they have triggered the post WWII information technology revolution and subsequently globalization. Definitions of "globalization" found in scientific works commonly refer to the rapid flow of goods, people, information, communication, business transactions and money, without being limited by geography, communities, peoples, and nations.[9] These processes and phenomena can be described by the term "new globalization" or the paradigm of a new civilization. I use these terms to assert that I avoid discussions that involve similar phenomena brought about by the communications revolution in the immediate aftermath of WWII whose sub-systems were transportation, telecommunications and tourism (the so-called Triple T System).

An overview of globalization that uses a cultural approach as a new paradigm such as this can not, in my opinion, produce valuable scientific results. This is because changes in the dimensions of such detail, complexity and inter-relatedness, can not be captured by the independent methods of cultural studies, political science, psychology, economics or sociology. Only an approach that we might call "the science of civilization" can do this. On the other hand, this must remain somewhat hypothetical as the concept of "the science of civilization" still needs further discussion, and the methodologies it might use have still not been worked out or tested. Umesao, among others, has suggested that comparative studies among civilizations would be a useful way of going about such a project. I consider that the questions which Sepp Linhart has raised about Umesao's idea are valid:

> What is to be compared in this comparison? Is a region to be compared with a region, a period to a period, or a developmental stage to a developmental stage? To what discipline should civilization studies belong? Should it be a part of ethnology or apart of historiography as a total discipline? Or is the only way to realize this discipline to take an interdisciplinary approach?[10]

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[9]   I Ketut Surajaya. "National Policies and Globalization." In *TELSTRA (Telaah Strategis),* no. 32, January–February 1995 (Jakarta: Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional).

[10]   Sepp Linhart. "The Family as a Constitutive Element of Japanese Civilization." In *Senri Ethnological Studies,*vol.16, op. cit., pp. 51–59 ; Josef Kreiner. "The First Symposium on Civilization Studies." Ibid., p. 120.

Up to now, no one has come up with an adequate answer to these questions posed by Linhart. I would like, however, to attempt to throw some light on them, based on my own research. The study of civilization can be accomplished using a system-based approach. Civilization can be understood as a system in itself. Consequently, it is highly likely that the view of civilization as a system, and also that civilization can be described in the context of a system theory. This can result in a description of the characteristics, interactional processes, and modes of operation of civilization itself. In other words, this would be the description and analysis of a system and how that system works. Consequently, if we can use the definition of civilization put forward by Umesao, "the entire system of daily life, a system which includes various devices and institutions," then globalization would represent a process of civilization which gives rise to a huge and complex system. A large-scale or global system comes from historical processes that take place over long periods of time, and which have both synchronic and diachronic aspects. So, analogously, approaches to the study of globalization can be performed using approaches based on civilization.

3. Japanology and Japanese Studies

Development and change in trends of the study of Japan can be understood from their history. At the end of the 19th century, the field of Japanology emerged in a number of countries in Europe. These studies mostly dealt with philology and the Japanese language, and most of the scholars had experienced living in Japan. Japanology and Sinology also took root in the USA. Most of these studies were based on sources in the Japanese and Chinese languages. The emergence of Japan as an important economic power in the 1960s saw the emergence of Japanese studies, which for the most part took a socio-cultural approach. Studies in Indonesia also tended to take this approach.

In the post WWII period, a number of competing schools of thought could be seen:

a. Japanology[11] (*Nihonron*) emerged because of a "crisis of cultural identity," and as a reaction against the dominance of Western culture since the Meiji Restoration. According to Harumi Befu, the cultural identity crisis was the trigger for the birth and development[12] of the rapid ascent of Japanese studies, which have been called Japanology.[13] A number of concepts connected with *Nihonron* emerged, for example: *Nihon Bunkaron* (The theory of Japanese Culture), *Nihon Shakairon* (The theory of Japanese society) and nihonjinron (The theory of Japanese national character). All of these are concerned with the idea of a Japanese identity. I prefer to render *Nihonron* as Japanology since it better accommodates the idea of its association with praise for Japan's success.

b. Japanese studies emerged as result of the admiration and respect that was acknowledged in much of the world for Japan's achievements in various areas, such as the economy, technology, science and

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[11] *Nihonron*: alternative translation "A theory of Japan"

[12] As an example, a number of works oriented towards *Nihonron* include: in the field of business, Hazama (1971), Inuta (1977), Iwata(1978), Clark (1979), in the field of sociology and psychology, Chie Nakane (1967), Takeo Doi (1971).

[13] See Harumi Befu. "Civilization and Culture: Japan in Search of Identity." In *Senri Ethnological Studies,* vol. 16., op.cit. pp. 59–79.

culture. Examples of works in this vein include Edwin Reischauer's *The Japanese*, and Ezra F. Vogel's *Japan as Number One*, which appeared in Indonesian under the title *Jepang Jempol* (Thumbs up for Japan). Japanese studies tended to take a socio-cultural approach to their investigations.

c.   The study of the Japanese language, and of aspects of Japanese culture such as Japanese cuisine, has attained a huge popularity in many parts of the world, and this includes Indonesia. This has been spearheaded by the acceptance of such things as Japanese cartoons (anime), comics (manga), popular music (J-pop) and fashion trends, all of which are well-known to, and admired by, young people here. These cultural phenomena have all been motivators for young people who decide they want to learn Japanese.

I believe that we can conclude from a review of the various standpoints from which Japan is studied that Japan is indeed an extremely interesting object of study. The approaches based on *Nihonron* and those using a socio-cultural approach have been popular, and they continue to produce a rich vein of work up to the present.

4. Japanese studies and the study of civilization

In this section I would like to share my worry about whether the references that I have made in my own scientific work meet desirable academic standards. I would be glad to hear your opinion on this issue during the symposium. In a paper I delivered recently, "Japan in Proto Globalism and New Emerging Globalism in the Pacific Region."[14] I received some positive feedback on my proposals for a "holistic" approach. This was gratifying as they were still at a stage where they could be called a sketch, or an outline that was being used as lecture notes.

I wrote the article with the intention of a civilization-based approach in studying globalization in Japan. However, on reflection, I began to think that the article had in fact leant too heavily on history, culture, religion and civilization over a rather long time scale, during which Japan might be characterized by its relations with its geographical neighbors. It might be possible to criticize the article as being a historical outline of Japanese civilization, covering all the ground in between its proto-historical emergence, up to modern and contemporary times.

Investigating proto-globalization, I begin with the interaction of the Japanese in the Kofun period with Japan's neighboring peoples, China and Korea. This is followed by the introduction of Buddhism via the Silk Road which stretched all the way to Europe by both land and sea routes. We can identify similarities in the artifacts that were produced in the Neolithic and Bronze ages, despite variations due to community and geography, but there is still quite a bit of disagreement about how these artifacts were made, what their exact functions were, what spiritual significance they had. I personally favor the view that the differences resulted from differences in the ecosystems. The differences indicate cultures. Meanwhile the similarities indicate civilizations. The field of archeology can tell us a great deal about the

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[14]   Paper presented at the Second International Conference of the Japanese Studies Association in Southeast Asia, "Japanese Studies in Southeast Asia: The Past, Present and Future," Hanoi, 22–23 October 2008, hosted by the Vietnamese Academy of the Social Sciences.

people who produced and used these artifacts, their function, spiritual meaning and a great deal more about their daily life.

We can identify the similarities and differences from systems such as sociology, religion, politics, education, economics, and so on. Anthropological studies in particular are helpful. In the development and decline of civilizations, literary works, fine art, architecture and so on can provide excellent data. If we want to evaluate patterns of change over time, then the study of history is appropriate as its methodology is properly attuned to the kind of detail we need and to phenomena such as time, events, systems, thought, ideology, and agency, or even ecology and science. History of course cannot deal with the finest detail, and this can sometimes be problematic. This is one "blind spot" for this discipline.

Suzuki Sadami from Nichibunken proposes three scientific approaches for the study of Japan which he refers to as *gakujutsu sōgōka* (collaboration, or synthesis of sciences), and is composed of studies of a new life view, the study of genre or the history of ideas and the study of history in Imperial Japan.[15]

The study of a new life view can be done in collaboration with the humanities and the natural sciences. This involves the integration of ecology with contemporary problems of ethics, with theories of diversity, theories of ecosystems and theories of cloning. This field is still not integrated, however, with the study of civilization. Genre studies or the history of ideas are extremely important, according to Suzuki, because genres, taken as a whole, can form study systems or scientific knowledge. The study of the history of Imperial Japan has a strong relation with the history of area studies in East Asia, Korea, China, the countries of South-East Asia, and even parts of the world such as America, Italy, Britain, Germany, and Russia.

I consider Suzuki's proposals to fall within the study of civilization. By employing a number of scientific disciplines as described above, it should be possible to study civilization properly. I would like to pose the question, however, of whether the combination of the methodologies mentioned constitutes in itself a methodology of civilization. I would be happy to hear the opinions of colleagues on this matter, because I personally have my doubts.

Despite this, I still feel that there is some merit in using both inter-disciplinary and comparative approaches to the study of civilization. This would involve the relativism of civilization, or help to improve mutual understanding among different civilizations, and even help to promote a supra-regional spirit of understanding.

A number of nagging questions remain. For example, should we attempt more of a partial integration of different strands of science or a more holistic one? Would it be useful for scholars from different disciplines to sit down together as a team with the intention of working out what civilization studies should be like? How, also, should we go about researching civilization as conceptualized here? I believe that questions such as this would best be answered if we did so together. The different branches of thought could inform and enrich and also challenge each other, using a nihonjinron approach, which

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[15]   See Suzuki Sadami. "Nihon kokugai ni okeru Nihon kenkyū no genzai, soshite gakujutsu sōgōka ni mukete no mittsu no teian" (Paper delivered at the 11th national seminar on Japanese Studies and the 4th congress of ASJI, Japanese Study Center, UI, 21–23 July 2005, pp. 1–10).

implies that Japan indeed is a unique, independent culture.

I believe that all cultures have their own uniqueness, depending on how they develop. Perhaps the study of civilization would help to throw light on the many unanswered questions that I still have about these matters.

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Depok, 20 September 2010

◆第 1 セッション◆

経済・経営・国際関係 /
Economy, Business and International Relations

A Lost Chance?:
The Question of the US Air Bases in Okinawa and an East Asian Community

Hirano Kenichiro

1. The Futenma Question and East Asian Community

To keep a stable alliance relationship with the United States and to maintain and increase good relations with the other Asian countries: these two tasks are no doubt the main stones of the foundation of Japan's international relations and foreign policies. When he became the Prime Minister of Japan, as head of the first Minshuto or Democratic Party cabinet, in September 2009, Mr. Hatoyama Yukio declared that his cabinet would make it its diplomatic goal to construct the Japan-U.S. relationship on the principle of equal partnership, and to do its best to build an East Asian community with the other Asian countries. He gave us high hopes with these promises, but betrayed us with miserable failures. I would like to explain, in my own way, why Mr. Hatoyama failed.

As the first step of his endeavor to construct Japan-U.S. relations as an equal partnership, Mr. Hatoyama proposed to relocate Futenma Air Base out of Okinawa to another prefecture, or outside Japan. Futenma Base is in the middle of a residential area in the center of Okinawa Island; it had to be removed. Allegedly, an agreement had been reached between the governments of Japan and the United States to move the base to the Henoko area, off-shore next to another U.S. base, in Nago city.

Why did the new Prime Minister of Japan make his proposal, breaking the agreement with the U.S. government? The following are some of the reasons news analysts and commentators have guessed at:

1) Mr. Hatoyama was hopeful that U.S. President Obama's pledging for "a world without nuclear weapons" would create a situation favorable for Japan to negotiate the move of U.S. bases out of Okinawa.

2) The United States was already set to move some of its Marine forces from Okinawa to Guam. Mr. Hatoyama might have thought, then, why not relocate some of the air bases in Okinawa to Guam, too.

3) Mr. Hatoyama did not share the view that the U.S. Marines were a deterrent force vital to the international security arena of Asia-Pacific. Later, in the last days of his incumbency, he admitted that he had finally arrived at that understanding.

4) Mr. Hatoyama was an optimist who believed that he could build with President Obama a good personal relationship. He was reported to have said to President Obama in their first official meeting, "Trust me."

5) Mr. Hatoyama was conscientious in thinking that mainland Japan must bear a greater burden of the Japan-U.S. security alliance, with diminished burden for Okinawa. And

6) simply, Mr. Hatoyama is an idealist.

The Hatoyama cabinet could not obtain from any prefecture of Japan or from the U. S. government cooperation for the plan to transfer Futenma Air Base. Despite all the wrangling, the issue is still pending, with Futenma Base still where it was, and many people are forced to think that Futenma Base, if moved, would be relocated to Henoko. The people of Okinawa are deeply disappointed and hurt, having first warmed to Mr. Hatoyama and his euphoria, only to be betrayed by the return to square one. In the meantime, Nago city elected a mayor who was resolutely opposed to the Marine base coming to Henoko. So now, it is far more difficult than ever to find a solution to the problem.

Mr. Hatoyama and his cabinet do not seem to have had a well-prepared plan for negotiation with the U. S. government, nor do they seem to have engaged in purposeful negotiations. At the same time, Mr. Hatoyama declared that his administration would do its best to promote the formation of an East Asian community. But again, he did very little toward that goal either.

To go back to the start of his short-lived cabinet, Mr. Hatoyama listed, first, a solution to the question of Futenma Air Base and, second, the promotion of East Asian community building as the two main foreign policy goals of his cabinet. It was, and it is, my view that the key issue here is how the Japanese government correlates these two goals, and how Japanese diplomacy takes measures necessary to realize them by correlating them step by step. They are so closely related with each other that neither goal can be reached in isolation from the other. In order to correlate these two goals, we need to set a series of simultaneous equations and to solve them one by one. Since Mr. Hatoyama is a doctor of engineering science, I expected him to do that job skillfully, but he failed to do so.

2. U.S. Air Bases in Okinawa

It has been pointed out that the Japan-U.S. security treaty has been a common good for the Asia-Pacific region as a whole since the early 1970s when mainland China normalized diplomatic relations with the United States and Japan, and when Okinawa was reverted to Japan. It so happened that during the period of the Hatoyama cabinet, the question of "*mitsuyaku*," secret agreements between Washington and Tokyo concerning the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, was debated and some of the "*mitsuyaku*" were disclosed. Those tortuous negotiations were designed to get Okinawa reverted to a nuclear free status. We can believe that Okinawa has indeed been nuclear free, if not since the beginning, at least for some time now.

No one can deny that Japanese security has been guaranteed by the nuclear umbrella of the United States. No one can deny either that the security of the whole Western Pacific region is balanced by the U.S. forces in Okinawa. Okinawa is really situated in the strategic center of the whole region, covering the Japanese archipelago, the Korean peninsula, the Russian Far East, Mongolia, mainland China, Taiwan and the Taiwan straits, the whole of Southeast Asia, and Australia. From a geopolitical point of view, it must be admitted that the U.S. Marine forces in Okinawa are a deterrence indispensable and irreplacable for regional security.

The people of Okinawa know this fact better than anyone else. Yet, deeply disappointed and hurt by the failure of the DPJ administration, they are more resolutely than ever opposed to the U.S. bases remaining in Okinawa. The Okinawa economy and the Okinawan people's livelihood have been deeply dependent on the military bases. But rapidly increasing portions of the population are now opposed to

the bases remaining in Okinawa. It is for sure that the current Kan cabinet finds itself in a long stalemate on the issue of Futenma. It is more difficult than ever to find a solution to the problem. But somehow or other a solution must be found.

3. An East Asian Community

In November 2005, in Kuala Lumpur, the first summit meeting of the East Asian Community was held, with the governments of ten ASEAN countries and three Northeast Asian countries attending. Recently, however, politicians express no enthusiasm for East Asian community building. Mr. Hatoyama, despite his announcement at the outset of his administration, did little for community building.

In my opinion, it is only the *politicians'* call for regionalism that is at a low ebb in East Asia now; regionalization by the people is proceeding steadfastly. Here, we must distinguish regionalization from regionalism. Regionalism is not the same as regionalization. While regionalism is an expressive political act by governments, or government officials and political leaders, regionalization is an actual process that proceeds with the movements of people, goods and information within a region. I would like to point out that regionalization has been going on in East Asia since the beginning of the 1970s, well before Prime Minister Mahatir bin Mohamad of Malaysia proposed the EAEC (East Asian Economic Caucus) in 1990–91.

What happened, then, back in the beginning of the 1970s? Jumbo jets started flying civil air routes in 1970. This facilitated the people of East Asia, as of other regions, to move around the region. Today, people take mid-range flights between any airports in the region for business, for overseas study, family reunions, tourism, shopping, cultural exchange, NGO activity and so on. The intra-regional airline network has developed into an ideal pattern, connecting any two airports in the region almost directly. In short, it can be said that regionalization has been a fact of East Asian life for some time, and it is a consequence of people's intra-regional transnational movements. Crossing national borders and moving around in the region, increasing numbers of visiting people make contact and interact with their hosts. It is the most significant fact today that ordinary people move around in East Asia and exchange with each other, however shallow those exchanges might be.

What is more, East Asian people nowadays tend to find similar cultural elements anywhere they visit in the region. Pop music is heard everywhere; manga and anime, which originated in Japan, are now enjoyed, and even produced, in many places; and movies and TV dramas produced with Korean taste are appreciated by many people across East Asia. We can say that these cultural exchanges are little by little creating conditions for East Asian people to share a common culture.

To repeat, as more and more people move across national borders in the region, regionalization proceeds in East Asia. Ordinary people move around and contact each other and so bring about the possibility of their sharing an East Asian common culture, although still to a limited degree. This ongoing process is brought about by popularization and equalization, which are characteristic of today's mass transportation. In other words, today's mass transportation, represented by jumbo jets, has expanded the range of ordinary people's movement throughout the East Asian region, pushing regionalization ahead and bringing forward the possibility of a shared common culture for the region. An East Asian community is no longer an impossibility and, as an extension of the current phenomenon, we can hope

to see a regional community by the people, for the people and of the people, which is incidentally the exact opposite of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.

Mr. Hatoyama could have taken advantage of the trend of regionalization in East Asia to advance his concept of an East Asian community.

4. Constructive Thinking to Find a Solution

Mr. Hatoyama listed two goals for Japan's foreign relations, but did not correlate them at all. They must be correlated, because only then, can solutions be found for each of them.

How do we correlate them? I think I have suggested the basic thinking by which to set a series of necessary equations. The first method is to correlate them in terms of space. East Asia is the whole space; Okinawa is a part of it. When East Asia becomes a more peaceful region, comprising a more friendly community, the Okinawa problem becomes easier to solve; similarly, when Okinawa reduces its military bases, East Asia will become more secure.

The second method is to correlate the two goals in temporal sequence. We place one of them in a shorter-range perspective, and the other in a longer-range perspective. It may be normal to see the Okinawa question on a shorter-range time scale, and the task of East Asian community building on a longer-range one. I would rather suggest that we place the task of East Asian community building on a shorter-range time scale, and the question of the Okinawa bases on a longer-range time scale. Try to construct East Asia as a community, that is, as a region without war, and we will have an Okinawa without military bases. Of course, the real world, and its security questions in particular, are not as simple as that. I wished in vain that Mr. Hatoyama would set up an intricate series of essential equations in such a constructive manner, and would negotiate persistently with the United States government and the governments of Asia, especially of the ASEAN countries. If it is difficult for governments themselves to engage in building a regional community on the state-to-state level, we ordinary people of Asia will continue to engage in constructing a community by social communication and cultural exchange in a people-to-people dimension.

What we need is a fresh grand design, that is to be created by constructive thinking.

アジアにおける日本の国際文化交流と人材育成

杉 村 美 紀

要旨

　今日、アジアの高等教育は多様化・民営化が進み、あわせて国際化への動きとして留学生政策が活発化している。しかし同時に、マレーシアの事例にみるとおり、留学生移動が生む多文化化とそこで生じる「新たなナショナリズム」の問題に伴う社会変容が生じている。そのことは、単に交流の機会を増やせば相互理解や協力が深まるというのではなく、交流が行われる国や地域の持つ社会の特性や文化状況、またその時々の政治・経済状況を反映して、様々な文脈のなかで国際文化交流が行われるべきであることを示唆している。日本においても、日中韓による大学間交流「キャンパス・アジア」構想が議論され、国際連携による人材育成が注目を集めている今日、各国の歴史・文化の多様性とそれに基づく国家の高等教育制度の自律性を尊重しつつ、今日の知識基盤社会におけるアジアの持続的発展のために、地域全体を視野に入れた「グローバル人材」を国際文化交流を通じて育てることが求められている。

はじめに

　今日、アジアでは、高等教育における留学生政策が政治的経済的戦略として活発に展開されるようになっている。留学生は知識基盤社会の実現と国家発展を目指すうえで重要な「国際人材」、すなわち専門的知識や技術をもち、多様な文化的背景のもとに国際社会で活躍できる人的資源とみなされ、各国は留学生の獲得と活用を競いあっている。特に、高等教育の多様化、民営化とともに改革の柱として導入された国際化は、より多くの留学生を獲得することで国際社会におけるプレゼンスをあげようとする国際競争を加速させている。

　しかしながら、実際に留学生政策が活発化しているのは、かつてのような国を代表するごく少数のエリート中心の留学とは異なり、留学するだけの経済的余裕をもつ「普通の人々」が国境を越えて盛んに行きかうようになったからである。今日、世界の留学生の９割を占めるといわれるこうした私費留学生は、自分の意志により他国で学んでみたいと思う個人であり、自分のキャリア形成にはどの教育機関のどのような教育プログラムを履修し、どのような学位や資格を取得すべきかを柔軟に考えている。

　こうした状況の中で、アジアにおける留学生移動の実態はどのようなものであるのか、またそうした状況の下で、今日の日本にとって、「人材育成」はどのような観点からとらえられているのかということを、留学生の国際移動の潮流と、それに対する日本の留学生政策の動向、ならびに日中韓三カ国で議論が開始されている大学間交流「キャンパス・ア

ジア」構想に照らして考察する。

1. 国際文化交流と留学生移動の潮流

　高等教育の国際化が進み、国際文化交流の一環として展開される留学生政策は、今日、自国の留学生を送り出し、あるいは外国人留学生を受け入れることによって、人材の育成・確保を図る国家発展戦略として位置づけられている。そこには、かつてのように、相手国との相互交流や相互理解・友好関係を育むものという意味づけだけではなく、いかに留学生を送り出し、あるいは受入れるかによって、国際文化交流の拠点としての自国の位置づけと国際社会におけるプレゼンスを確保するという観点が盛り込まれている。

　こうした留学生政策は労働力確保のための重要な施策でもある。しかも、そうした国際的な人材争奪戦は、かつてのように留学がそのまま自国の人材の損失になってしまうという「頭脳流出」という発想ではなく、たとえ留学生が修業後もそのまま国外で活躍することになったとしても、自国との間のパイプ役として貢献してもらえれば良いとする「頭脳還流」という考えに基づき、留学生の送り出しや受入れをより柔軟にかつ戦略的にとらえている点に特徴がある。

（1）「英語留学」の新たな留学ルート

　今日の留学生政策が展開される背景には、「普通の人々」が様々な移動を展開し、それに対して各国政府が政治的経済的戦略をとっているという状況がある。しかも、今日の留学生移動は、かつてのように南側諸国から北側先進諸国に技術や知識、学位や資格を求めて一方的に移動するだけでなく、多様化しているのが特徴である。たとえば中国および韓国からの「英語留学」はその一例である。両国における英語学習および英語によるプログラムへの関心は大変強く、近年では、高等教育のみならず中等教育段階、さらには初等教育の段階からも英語圏へ留学する人々も登場するようになった。小中学校の段階では親が付き添って留学する事例も多く、韓国では母親が子どもに付き添って一緒に留学し、父親は韓国に残って仕送りをすることで留学生活を支える「雁家族」とよばれる例や、教育のために家族全員が海外へ移住する「教育移民」とよばれるケースも登場している。その留学先は、アメリカ、カナダ、ニュージーランド、オーストラリアなど英語圏が中心であるが、ここ数年、新たなルートが広がり、欧米に比べて安い経費で英語を学ぶことができるという目的から、フィリピンやマレーシア、シンガポール等に英語留学をする事例もみられるようになっている。

（2）アジア域内にみられる新たな留学生移動

　留学生移動の多様化は、アジア域内の移動にも起きている。森川裕二（2006）がユネスコの文化統計資料を基に、アジアからの留学生数を経年変化で解析した結果によれば、東アジア（ASEAN＋中国、韓国、日本）各国から出国する留学生総数は確かに増加しているが、他方、日本、中国を主要な受入れ先とする東アジア域内の留学生移動は、アメリカへの留学の増加率を上回っており、「従来のアメリカ留学に過度に傾斜した従来の構図から、東アジア域内に分散する動きがみられる」と分析している[1]。

　また杉村美紀（2008）は、1980年代には中国からアメリカへの移動の他、韓国と日本からアメリカへ、あるいはASEAN（東南アジア諸国連合）の国々からアメリカやオーストラリアへといった英語圏の先進国への移動が中心であったのが、1990年代の半ばになると、アメリカをはじめとする欧米先進国への留学数は引き続き増加する一方で、中国からマレーシアといったアジア域内の新たな動きがみられるようになると同時に、中国と日本、韓国と中国、韓国と日本といった東アジア域内の移動が活発化していると述べている[2]。

（3）アジアとアジア域外との留学生移動

　一方、アジア諸国の留学生移動は、アジア域外との交流とも関係している。たとえばエジプトにおける留学生の出身国はマレーシア、シリア、インドネシアといった国々が中心となっており、地理的・宗教的な要因が留学生移動に関係していることを物語っている[3]。また、マレーシアは、中国、インドネシア、ベトナム、ドバイに海外教育プロモーション事務所と呼ばれる拠点を設け、マレーシアの文化広報活動と海外からの学生のリクルートを展開している。ここには、知識基盤社会を目指し、トランスナショナル・プログラムを通じて高等教育の拡充と人材育成を図り、国際競争力を強化するというマレーシアの高等教育戦略の方向性が反映されている。

　しかしながら、こうしたマレーシアの国際化戦略は、実際にマレーシアに来る留学生の個人的な目的とは異なっている。留学生にとってマレーシアは最終目的地ではなく、マレーシアのトランスナショナル・プログラムを利用し、比較的安い費用で英語を習得した上で、イギリスやアメリカ、カナダ、オーストラリアなど欧米の英語圏に再留学することを狙う留学生が増加している。この傾向は、近年増加しつつある中東やアフリカ諸国からの留学生にみられる。言い換えれば、中東やアフリカがアジアを介して欧米と結ぶ留学生移動のトランジット・ポイントとなっているのである。こうした状況は、マレーシアの留学生政策にとって、さらに複雑な構造を生み出す。すなわち、マレーシアにおいて、高等教育の国際化はたしかにマレーシアへの留学生増加を生み出し、アジアにおける新たな国際交流拠点となる可能性を高める。しかしながら、それはマレーシアにとっての人材獲得に直結するのではなく、留学生は一時期マレーシアに滞在するものの、数年後には欧米の先進国へとふたたび移動していくため、マレーシアは北側欧米諸国留学へのトランジット・ポイントとなっているのである[4]。

[1]　森川裕二（2006）「留学生交流」毛里和子・森川裕二編『東アジア共同体の構築4：図説ネットワーク解析』岩波書店、2006年、228–229頁。

[2]　杉村美紀（2008）「アジアにおける留学生政策と留学生移動」『アジア研究』第54巻第4号、アジア政経学会、10–25頁。

[3]　De Wit, Hans, *et al.* (2008). *The Dynamics of International Student Circulation in a Global Context*, Sense Publishers, the Netherlands, pp. 242–249.

[4]　杉村美紀（2010）「高等教育の国際化と留学生移動の変容：マレーシアにおける留学生移動のトランジット化」『上智大学教育学論集』第44号、37–50頁。

2. 留学生移動の背景

以上述べた留学生移動の多様化の様相をみると、その背景には複数の要因が指摘される。

まず第1に、留学先の教育機関が提供するプログラムの質やその評価、卒業後の就職機会とのつながりに左右されていることである。アメリカへの留学は引き続きアジア諸国において圧倒的な人気を博していることは言うまでもないが、そこには多様で国際的に評価の高い高等教育機関が多くあり、かつ卒業後の就業や進路選択の幅が大きいことが背景にあるといえる。

もっともアメリカにおけるアジア出身の留学生の移動動向については、ここ4、5年の間に「新たな頭脳流出問題」が起きている。従来、アメリカで学ぶインド人および中国人留学生は、卒業後もアメリカに残留・就職する例が多かったが、最近では、アメリカでは就職せず、それぞれ母国に戻って起業をしたり技術者として働く「母国回帰」現象が進んでいる。この背景には、留学先には欧米の教育機関を選んでも、実際のビジネスチャンスは中国やインドにあるという考え方がある。元留学生の中国やインドへの帰国率を調べた調査によれば、1991年に中国人で留学後に帰国したのは全体の1％、インド人は0％だったのに対し、2000年にはいって帰国者が増え始め、2007年には中国人、インド人ともに17％が帰国したといわれる。ここには、中国やインドの経済成長の伸びとそれに伴う留学生帰国奨励政策[5]と、経済危機に直面したアメリカとの間で、巧みに移動する留学生の戦略がみられる[6]。

第2に英語学習を求めるアジア諸国への留学は、諸外国の教育機関と連携して教育を行うトランスナショナル・プログラム[7]の普及によるところが大きい。アジアにおけるトランスナショナル・プログラムの特徴は、欧米の教育機関との提携により英語を享受言語とするプログラムである点にあり、進学や就職に有利な英語と技能・資格を身につけたいという留学生のニーズに適うものとなっている。

アフリカ諸国からマレーシアを経て第三国に向かうトランジット型の留学生移動も、単位互換や二重学位などを通してトランジットを可能にするトランスナショナル・プログラムの有無が大きな要因となっている。タン（2010）が行ったマレーシアにいるナイジェリ

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[5]　たとえば、中国人留学生の帰国奨励政策として、中国は、「国民経済および社会発展に関する第10次五カ年計画」（2000）のなかで、中国人留学生の送り出しとともに留学生の帰国と中国本国での就業・企業を奨励することを提示している。また2001年に中国人事部、教育部、科学技術部、公安部、財政部が発表した「海外留学者の多方面での国家事業への貢献に関する意見」でも、帰国留学生に対する優遇措置に触れている。この結果、帰国留学生、特に高度な特殊専門技術者・研究者を中心として、中国での新技術開発事業への優遇措置、社会保障の特別待遇、子女教育に対する配慮など、その厚遇ぶりは、単に帰国留学生の企業活動にとどまらず、福利厚生全般にまで及んでいる。

[6]　「米国見限る元留学生たち」『朝日新聞』2009年8月3日付。

[7]　トランスナショナル・プログラムとは、国境を越えた提携によって運営・実施されるプログラムであり、具体的なプログラムとしては、自国と提携国の間で一定期間ずつ学ぶツイニング・プログラムや、一方の国の教育機関が、教育内容や教育方法をパッケージとして提供するフランチャイズ・プログラム、一つのコースで修了時に両方の学位が取得できるダブル・ディグリー・プログラム、遠隔地教育などが含まれる。

アやウガンダ、ボツワナ、ケニア、タンザニアなどからのアフリカ人留学生の調査によれば、アフリカ人学生がマレーシアを留学先として選ぶ第1の理由は英語で教育が受けられることであり、その他、マレーシアがアメリカ、イギリス、オーストラリアなどへのトランジット・ポイントとなっていること、留学仲介業社の勧め、マレーシア社会の安定性といった順序になっている[8]。

　第3に、アジア域内での留学生移動が活発化している背景には、このトランスナショナル・プログラムの影響もさることながら、出身国との経済交流の活発化、さらにはASEAN域内の大学連携にみられるような地域統合の影響など政治や経済的要因と地理的要因が関係している。

　さらに第4の点として、地理的要因に加え、エジプトに向かうマレーシア、シリア、インドネシアからの移動に示されるとおり宗教的な要因も付加されている。この宗教的要因は、マレーシアにおける中東諸国やインドネシアやモルディブからの留学生移動にもあてはまる。留学生獲得競争を展開するアジア諸国のなかで、中国や韓国、シンガポール、タイのいずれにもないマレーシアの特徴はイスラームを国教として文化的基盤においているという点であり、特に、2001年の同時多発テロ以降、イスラーム圏からアメリカへの留学は、ビザ規制の強化から出入国管理が強化されるようになったことをうけ、マレーシアのようなイスラームを基盤とする国や地域への留学が注目されるようになった。

3. 国際移動時代の日本の人材育成

（1）日本人学生の内向き傾向と留学者の減少

　以上述べたように、アジアにおいては、アジア域内外との交流も含みながらさまざまな要因のもとに留学生移動が起きている。そのなかで特徴的なのは、日本人留学生の留学動向である。2007／2008年度の場合、日本人学生のアメリカ留学は第4位で33,974人（同5.4％）となっており、引き続き数の上では多くの日本人留学生がアメリカで学んでいるが、前年度からの伸びをみると、他国とは異なりマイナス3.7％と減少に転じている。実は日本人留学生のアメリカ留学が減少に転じたのは、1990年代末のことであり、1997年の47,000人をピークに減り続け、2007年には34,000人となった。日本人留学生の数自体は、たとえば2005年では約80,000人と10年前に比べて1.3倍になったが、アメリカ留学は1997年には全留学生の75％を占めていたのが、2005年には5割弱になった。留学するにしても、「競争が厳しい」という印象のアメリカではなく、カリキュラムが緩やかな国や地域を希望したり、英語が母国語でない国を希望する学生もいるという[9]。

　さらにここ数年では、留学生数全体も減少しており、文部科学省が、OECD等における2008年統計をもとに集計海外の大学等に留学した日本人は各国・地域で約67,000人となっ

8　Tan, Irene Ai Lian (2010). "An Exploration of African Students in Malaysia." 杉村美紀（研究代表）『アジア・オセアニアにおける留学生移動と教育のボーダーレス化に関する実証的比較研究』（2007–2009年度文部科学省科学研究費補助金研究・基盤研究B・海外学術調査最終報告書）、2011年1月、137–144頁。

9　「米留学　尻込み」『朝日新聞』2009年12月11日付夕刊。

ており、前年が約75,000人であったことを考えると、対前年比約11％の減少となっている。その内訳は、アメリカ合衆国（29,264人）、中華人民共和国（16,733人）、イギリス（4,465人）であった。さらにアメリカのInstitute of International Education（IIE）による「Open Doors」の発表（2010年11月15日付）によると、2009年のアメリカ合衆国での日本人留学者数は24,842人にまで減少している。ここには、近年、日本社会において問題視されている若者の「内向き志向」が見え隠れしている[10]。

（2）留学生・研究生の受入れと送り出しによる人材育成策

　こうした状況に対し、文部科学省が組織した科学技術・学術審議会の人材委員会は、2008年10月に発表した「国際化に対応した人材育成方策について」のなかで、次世代を担う人材育成方策として、国際化に対応し、かつ社会の多様な場で世界をリードする研究人材の養成政策を提案している。すなわち、我が国が世界をリードする科学技術水準を保持し続けるためには、研究人材の国際的好循環の一翼を担うための方策として、優秀な外国人留学生及び外国人研究者の受入れ制度を強化するとともに、日本から海外への日本人学生の留学及び日本人研究者の派遣の拡充など、国際化・グローバル化という観点からの人材養成・確保が重要であるとしている。そして、海外の研究機関、国際企業への就職の促進策、ならびに海外で優れた実績を上げた日本人研究者を呼び戻すための方策についての検討を提言している[11]。こうした主張は、2007年11月に示された総合科学技術会議による「大学・大学院の研究システム改革～研究に関する国際競争力を高めるために」においても、日本が研究人材の国際的循環の一つのコアとして国際的に認知されるように、日本の人材の海外での活躍、我が国の研究水準の海外への発信力の強化し、我が国の研究人材の海外での活躍の場を拡大していく、という形で指摘されている。具体的には、1）博士課程在籍者の１割程度を１年間留学させる、2）英語による授業を標準とする等により、国際的な研究者コミュニテイで自己主張できる人材を早くから養成することを目指す、3）学生の海外派遣、4）若手研究者の国際学会での発表等の支援の拡充、5）研究者の海外での就職支援等を挙げている[12]。

　このように、日本における高等教育の国際化は、日本人学生の内向き志向という現状を背景に、今日、多くの高等教育機関が留学生や研究生の積極的受け入れと日本からの送り出しを通じて国際文化交流を実施しようとしているのが実態である。こうした状況は、同じ東アジアの国々ながら、海外留学者数が急増している中国や韓国とは異なり、日本人学生や研究者の目を国際社会にいかに向けさせていくかということを求めている。

（3）国際連携を通じた人材育成政策の模索——日中韓の「キャンパス・アジア構想」

　一方、日本が打ち出しているもうひとつの人材育成政策として、国際連携による留学生

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[10]　文部科学省「日本人の海外留学者数について」（平成22年12月22日）。http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/houdou/22/12/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2010/12/22/1300642_1.pdf（2011年3月14日閲覧）。

[11]　文部科学省科学技術・学術審議会人材委員会第45回（2008年10月27日）。http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/gijyutu/gijyutu10/siryo/attach/1289476.htm（2011年3月12日閲覧）。

[12]　注11と同じ。

政策と国際交流の促進がある。これは、前述の留学生の送り出しと受け入れが、基本的には「日本からの送り出し」と「日本への受け入れ」という日本と留学関係国との間の直線的な関係を軸とするものであるのに対し、国際連携と交流という形態をとることにより、二国間のみならず三カ国以上の間の留学生移動を軸として展開する人材育成政策である。

　アジアにはすでに、ASEAN域内の大学連合プログラム（ASEAN University Network: AUN）やアジア太平洋大学交流機構（University Mobility in Asia and the Pacific: UMAP）のように、地域連携教育のフレームワークが始動しているほか、個別の大学相互の間で様々なトランスナショナルなプログラムが展開されている[13]。こうした地域教育交流を背景に、現在、日本と中国、韓国の東アジア三カ国間で議論が始まっているのが、大学間交流・連携推進事業「キャンパス・アジア（Collective Action for Mobility Program of University Students: CAMPUS Asia)」構想である。同構想は、2009年10月の第2回日中韓サミットにおいて、鳩山由紀夫前首相（当時）より、大学間での単位互換や交流プログラムの推進のための有識者会議の設置、ならびに大学間交流強化のための国際シンポジウムの開催が提案され、それを受けて、2010年4月に開催された第1回日中韓大学間交流・連携推進会議において「キャンパス・アジア」構想とすることが決まった。また2010年5月の第3回日中韓サミットでは、ASEAN等への拡張を視野に入れた同構想の早期実現について意見の一致をみており、2010年8月には、大学間交流ワーキンググループ、質保証ワーキンググループ、質保証機関協議会が開催された。「キャンパス・アジア」の趣旨は、「学生・教員の移動の活発化、経済活動の一体化が進展する中、地域全体を視野に入れた人材育成を実行するためことが不可欠」という考えにたち、日中韓三カ国の間で、東アジアの高等教育の発展のため、各国の質保証システムを国際通用性や国際展開の観点から整理するとともに、交流を推進することの必要性をふまえて提案されたものである[14]。

　「キャンパス・アジア」は、もともとはヨーロッパで展開されている学生・研究者交流のプロジェクト「エラスムス・ムンドゥス（Erasmus Mundus）」の影響をうけており、複数の大学の学位を同時に取得できるダブルディグリーやジョイントディグリーの導入や、将来的にはアジア以外の学生も組み入れた多様な文化の学びの場を構築することで、大学を国際化することが期待されている[15]。

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[13] アジアにおける国際連携の具体例については、杉村美紀・黒田一雄（研究代表）（2009）『アジアにおける地域間連携教育フレームワークと大学間連携事例の検証』（文部科学省平成20年度国際開発協力サポートセンター・プロジェクト）を参照。同報告書は、http://www.scp.mext.go.jp/archives/pdf/erasmus/all.pdfに全文が掲載されている。

[14] 「第1回日中韓大学間交流・連携推進会議」（概要）。

[15] ムン・ウシク、伊藤元重「キャンパス・アジア：日中韓の学生交流が新時代の人材を育てる」『NIRA』（2011年2月、総合研究開発機構）所収の対談による。白石さや（2008）は、そうした複数の地点を経由する留学生移動を「環流する遍路型モデル」と表現し、従来のような中心の大学に留学生が周辺から集中する「メッカ巡礼型モデル」と区別している。「環流する遍路型モデル」は、「どこを起点としてどこを終点としてもかまわない、開かれたモデル」であり、「国境を越えて開かれた地域共同体が想像される可能性」を持つものであるとする（白石さや（2008）「どこから？どこへ？——遍路札所を結ぶアジア・太平洋の高等教育ネットワーク構築」『アジア研究』第54巻第4号、44–55頁）。

　この「キャンパス・アジア」構想を実施するうえで重要となるのは、連携プログラムにおいてどのような人材を育てたいのかというビジョンであり、それに基づいてプログラムの質をどのように保証していくかということである。大学間連携プログラムが含まれる高等教育におけるトランスナショナル・プログラムは、今日のアジアにおける高等教育の変容の過程で重視されるようになったものである。こうした大学間や地域間連携には、国際教育市場における国家間の効率性と競争を重視したものである場合と、そうではなく、高等教育の新たなあり方を模索するモデルとして各高等教育機関が個別に連携を結ぶものがある。また実際に、連携プログラムを実践する場においては、それが複数の高等教育機関の教育・研究体制を基盤として行われるなかで、必ずしも学位取得だけを目指すものばかりではなく、グローバル・イシューや当該地域の問題に特化した取り組みなど、問題解決型のプログラムも多く含まれており、アジアの共通基盤形成につながるプログラムが展開されている。そこでは、旧来のバイラテラルな二者間の交流と比べ、より複眼的な思考や考え方をもった人材が育つことが期待されよう。

（4）国際連携と国家のオートノミーの課題

　「キャンパス・アジア」構想を実現するためには、留学生移動が活発化するなかで、実際の主役である「留学生」を域内の共同プログラムによってどのような人材としてとらえ、それをどのように育てるかというビジョンが必要である。特に「キャンパス・アジア」では、将来的にはアジア以外の学生も含め、「地域全体を視野にいれた人材育成」が期待されている。そこで目指される「グローバル人材」とは何かという点は、本プロジェクトの枠組みを決めるうえでも大変重要なものであると考える。

　しかしながら、そのためには、各国のもつ政策の色合いや留学生政策に対する意図の違い、ならびに留学生個々人がもつ文化的背景や価値観が異なるなか、大学間連携によって育てるべき地域の人材像と問題意識を共有しておくことが求められる。それらは、トランスナショナルなプログラム連携を図るうえで必要な出入国管理制度や実施言語、単位認定とカリキュラム調整、質保証、プログラムの運営と人的基盤といった課題ともかかわる。これらの課題はいずれも、トランスナショナル・プログラムへの参加国・地域および参加教育機関のオートノミーと深く関係している。特に、国際競争力を高めるための国際化の取り組みが、各国や機関本来の体制やシステムに影響を与えることになった場合の問題は複雑である。

　たとえば、トランスナショナル・プログラムに伴う教授用語としての英語の導入が、その国や地域・参加教育機関の言語政策や教育プログラムならびに国家課題である国民統合問題にどのような影響を与えるかといったことはその一例であろう（杉村2009：62-64）[16]。「キャンパス・アジア」構想においても、プログラムをどの言語で行うかという問題は、大きな焦点となっている。プログラムを早急に実施するためには、英語によるプログラムの実施が鍵になるといわれるが、他方、日本語、中国語、韓国語というそれぞれの国の言

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[16]　杉村美紀（2009）「マレーシアにおける高等教育の国際化と教育の質保証」『上智大学教育学科論集』第43号、53-66頁。

語で実施されるプログラムをどのように位置づけるかも重要な課題であるといわれる。実際、ヨーロッパの「エラスムス・ムンドゥス」では、４〜５カ国語を話す学生も多く、さまざまな言語を勉強できることも、こうしたプログラムの付加価値であるというとらえ方もある[17]。その際、日中韓三カ国それぞれの国際教育政策がどのように絡み合うのかという点が、プロジェクトを行ううえでの要点となると考えられる。特にアジアの場合は、各国の教育省がそれぞれの国の履修規定や学事規定を厳格に規制している。たとえば、韓国の教育科学技術部は、履修単位の80〜90％は韓国で取得しなければならないという規定を定めており、そのことは、キャンパス・アジアで目指されるようなダブルディグリー・プログラムの実施を不可能にしてしまうからである[18]。

　平野健一郎（2006）[19]は、こうした国際移動に伴うナショナリズムの問題の重要性を指摘している。平野によれば、ナショナリズムには「①国境を越えて『出ていく』人々のナショナリズム、②国境を越えて『入ってくる』人々のナショナリズム、そして③国境のなかに留まる人々のナショナリズム」があり、ヒト、情報、モノ、カネが通過して国境に無数に穴のあいた状態になる「国境の多孔化（porous borders）」が、「ヒトの国際移動を増大させ、増大する人の国際移動が国境をさらに多孔化させる、という相互亢進関係にある」と論じている。そして、「多孔化」によって、「相互理解と友好」が生まれる可能性がある一方、「相互反発と排斥、敵対の関係を結果する危険性」もあり、「その微妙なバランスの上に、今、人々の間に新しいナショナリズム感覚が生まれつつあるように思われる」という。

　この論点は、今日の留学生移動が、国家が定めた計画やルートだけではなく、個人の意志によって選び取られていることをふまえると一層複雑である。留学生の移動先が一つに定まらず、留学生が複数の社会に跨って文化接触を経験することになる場合、「国境の多孔化」による「現代ナショナリズム」も、それ自体が場所と時間を経ながら、接触する地域との関係性のなかで変容していくことになるからである。現代における留学生移動は、一方で新たな人の流れを生み出しながら、他方で「現代ナショナリズム」を新たに生じさせ、不安定要因を増やすことにもつながりかねない。

　この意味で、2011年９月に行われた「東アジア高等教育質保証国際シンポジウム」において、議長声明の中で、「大学間交流を活性化し、個別の交流プログラムを進める上で、各国の大学で学位、単位等に関する制度について、各国の歴史・文化の多様性を尊重しつつ、情報の可視化を進め、共通認識の醸成を図ることが重要である」と指摘されたことは、大きな意義をもつものといえる[20]。

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[17]　ムン・ウシク、伊藤元重「キャンパス・アジア：日中韓の学生交流が新時代の人材を育てる」（前掲資料）に掲載の対談による。

[18]　注17と同じ。

[19]　平野健一郎（2006）「国際移動時代のナショナリズムと文化」『インターカルチュラル』第４号、日本国際文化学会年報、2–22頁。

[20]　「東アジア高等教育質保証国際シンポジウム議長声明」2011年９月30日。

まとめ 「グローバル人材」の育成と国際文化交流の今日的課題

　留学生移動が生む多文化化とそこで生じる「新たなナショナリズム」の問題は、留学生交流という国際文化交流が持つ今日的課題を提示している。すなわち人の国際移動が多様化した今日、国際文化交流が持つ意義は、単に交流の機会を増やせば相互理解や協力が深まるというだけではなく、交流が行われる国や地域の持つ社会の特性や文化状況、またその時々の政治・経済状況を反映して、どのような文脈のなかで交流が行われるかという視点が、従来以上に重視されるべきである。

　その際に留意すべきことは、考慮されるべき文脈が複数あるということであろう。従来の留学生移動のように、送り出し国と受け入れ国という二地点の関係でとらえられる場合には、少なくともその二地点相互の文脈を考えることが必要であった。しかしながら、今日のように、従来にはなかった南側諸国間の移動や、トランジット型移動のように三地点以上を経由する留学生移動が登場してくると、そこで考慮される変数も二地点のものでは不十分である。今後、「キャンパス・アジア」構想など、アジア域内の大学間交流・連携プログラムが具体的なかたちで展開されるにあたり、そこで育成される人材は、特定の国家にとっての人材という狭い意味にとどまらない、まさに「グローバル人材」である。国境を越えた人や文化の移動が加速的に進む今日、そうした人材観はいずれの国家にとっても重要であり、かつ追求されるべき課題であるが、同時に、そうした「国際人材」の育成を深めるためには、国際文化交流が引き起こす社会文化変容とそれへの対応を視野に入れることが必要不可欠であると考える。

Japanese Diplomacy in ASEAN and Its Relevance to Indonesia[1]

Syamsul Hadi[2]

Abstract

This article analyzes Japanese increasing interest in its relations with ASEAN in the contemporary era, with the emerging of Chinese economic power, the withdrawal of substantive parts of the US presence in East Asia, and the intensification of economic integration in ASEAN. It will be argued that Japan continually uses its method of "checkbook diplomacy" in dealing with ASEAN, due to its inability to reformulate a new position to adjust the international dynamicss. As the *de facto* leader of ASEAN, Indonesia should address Japanese policies towards ASEAN in line with its national interests, as well as its regional visions.

Key Words: regional integration, Japanese diplomacy, Indonesian interest, bilateral relations.

Background

The end of the Cold War and the rise of China have caused Japan to adopt adjustment measures in international and regional diplomacy. Chinese progressivity to advance its relations with the Southeast Asian region, both collectively with ASEAN and bilaterally with each respective countries, has posed serious challenges for Japan as one of the most important partners for ASEAN countries.

Japanese interest in preserving and, if possible, strengthening its relations with ASEAN was reflected very clearly at the 10th ASEAN-Japan Summit in January 2007, where Japan recommended the establishment of a Japan-ASEAN Eminent Persons Group (EPG). This EPG would elaborate the Joint Statement on Deepening and Broadening the ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership, which was signed in Kuala Lumpur, 13 December 2005. The Joint Statement emphasizes that Japan will fully support ASEAN's active contribution toward East Asia regional cooperation, especially in its role as the driving

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force to advance regional integration.

This article will analyze some dimensions of Japanese interest in relations with ASEAN in historical, political, as well as economic aspects in accordance with Japanese ODA-based diplomacy. The end of the Cold War, regional dynamics in ASEAN after the Asian Crisis, and the rise of China constitute important variables in these relations, besides Japanese own domestic political dynamics. Subsequently, this paper will explore relevances and challenges from these Japan-ASEAN relations in regard to the Indonesian position as the biggest country in ASEAN, as well as one of Japan's most important raw material suppliers in the region.

ASEAN, Checkbook Diplomacy, and Japanese International Role

During ten years after the Japanese loss in World War II, the country was under the occupation of the United States (US), which laid the constitutional foundation of Japanese post-war society. Article 9 of this constitution forbids military usage and Japanese troop missions abroad, hence practically puts Japan under the US protectorate. Faced with these demiliterization measures, the government of Japan has ever since adopted the Yoshida Doctrine,[3] which concentrates fully on economic development limiting its politics and military role in international relations. Intimately engaging private sectors, the huge government role in the economy has enabled the country to receive "Japanese miracle" status (Johnsons, 1982),[4] and to position itself as the world's second largest economy since 1980s.

Japanese military history and invasion in East Asia inflicted very deep wounds on her neighbouring countries, especially China and Korea. This not-too-harmonious relationship with Northeast Asian countries has caused the country to choose Southeast Asia to be its basis for foreign policy in Asia. Although in the early 1970s there were some protests in several Southeast Asian countries including in Indonesia, anti-Japan feeling seems only moderate in this region. Southeast Asian countries tend to overlook Japan's murky history, although her past invasion indeed caused huge fatalities. Even in the Cold War era, these Southeast Asian countries became partners of Japan and the US in order to contain the influence of the Soviet Union and China.

This is completely different from Northeast Asian countries, especially China and Korea, which constantly blame Japan for its colonial "sins." The issue of *jūgun ianfu* (comfort women), for example, is still raised by these two countries. Another issue, Japanese historiography, is also the source of diplomatic tension and protests. The situation is about the same to some other issues, such as Junichirō Koizumi's frequent visits to Yasukuni shrine, a site for the comemoration of Japanese military who died in the World War II.

These backgrounds are important for Japan to define its position and role in international

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[3] The "Yoshida Doctrine" was after the name of Japanese post World War II Prime Minister, Shigeru Yoshida, who emphasized national priority on economic development and simultaneously chose to be low profile on international diplomacy. The doctrine was aimed to focus all efforts on post-war economic reconstruction and development. See, for example, on Jun'ichi Kyōgoku. *The Political Dynamics of Japan*. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1987.

[4] Chalmers Johnson. *MITI and Japanese Miracles: The Growth of Industrial Policyin Japan 1925–1975*. Tokyo, Charles E Tuttle Company, 1982.

politics. A report by the Ohira Government (1978–1980) on comprehensive security explicitly stated that, due to Japan's limited military capability, the country should seek compensation by some non-military instruments, such as economic cooperation and technology. The usage of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and foreign aid as the main instrument of foreign policy has been called "checkbook diplomacy," which departs firstly from security-sensitive domestic condition and political-military limitation on Japanese constitution.[5]

To be sure, the massive flow of Japanese ODA to Southeast Asia cannot be just viewed from a security perspective; it must also be seen from an economic one. As shown by Wendy Dobson (1993),[6] Japanese ODA activities in Southeast Asia have decreased investment costs to Japanese companies, as they provide accesss to the infrastructure of each countries. In this context, Kit G. Machado (1992)[7] stated that Japan has in a real sense already established and widened its economic hegemony in Southeast Asia. For government and private sector interests, Japan has always put concern on agreed specialization principles with its economic partners, so that it can optimize complementary relations of international division of labour and transnational industry.

Whereas ASEAN as a regional economy has been engaged in the "Japanese embrace,"[8] international dynamics over the last two decade have given new causes for concern related to Japan's international role and identity. In *Japan Rising* (2008),[9] Kenneth Pyle figured the decreasing effectiveness of the Yoshida Doctrine on the post-Cold War era. Thereafter, Japanese economy reached saturation, due to the bubble economic bondage and prolonged economic recession. Economically, the "big government" strategy is no longer effective, yet politically engrained cooperation between the government and private sector has made it hard to break the habit.

On the other hand, the US wants Japan to play a bigger role as its partner to maintain regional and international security stability. Nevertheless, prolonged economic stagnation, the bubble economy, and the rising of China seem to cause Japan to lose some of its self confidence. Politically, after the Gulf War (1991), Japan looked troubled to take any initiative beyond that of "blind supporter of the US." According to Soeya Yoshihide (2003),[10] the feeling of Japanese international humiliation coming from its lack of manuvering in international politics was the main driving factor behind the establishment of the

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[5]   Haruko Satoh. "Japan: Towards a Future-Oriented Relationship with China?" Paper presented in the international workshop "East Asia Facing a Rising China," East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, in cooperation with Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 11–12 August 2008.

[6]   Wendy Dobson. *Japan in East Asia: Trading and Investment Strategies.* Singapore: ISEAS, 1993, p. 20.

[7]   Kit G. Machado. "ASEAN State Industrial Policies and Japanese Regional Production Strategies." In Cal Clark and Steve Chan, eds. *The Evolving Pacific Basin in the Global Political Economy: Domestic and International Linkages.* Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1992, pp. 169–201.

[8]   Related to Japanese strategy on establishing production chain in Asia, see Walter Hatch and Kozo Yamamura. *Asia in Japan's Embrace: Building a Regional Production Alliance.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

[9]   Look on Kenneth Pyle. *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose,* New York: the Century Foundation, 2007.

[10]   Soeya Yoshihide. "Japan as a Regional Actor." In Narongchai Akrasane et al., *ASEAN-Japan Cooperation: A Foundation for East Asian Community.* Tokyo, New York: JCIB, 2003, p. 49.

International Cooperation Law on June 1992. By this law, the government of Japan is justified to send Self-Defence Forces (SDF) abroad on peace-keeping missions, which have already been implemented in Cambodia, Zaire, and the Golan Heights.

Japanese diplomacy after 9/11 shows that Japan does not have alternatives in responding to the hawkish US foreign policy other than following the superpower. The government of Japan was actually oppressed by unilateralist policy brought by the Bush administration, and deeply hoped that the United Nations (UN) would give justification to attack Iraq (2003). Nevertheless, when this proved impossible, Japan had no other choice than once again to follow the US.[11]

Japanese interest in gaining a better international image, especially amongst developing countries, is manifested in its efforts to distribute ODA more equally across the globe. As stated by Dennis D. Trinidad (2007),[12] in the decade of 2000s geo-economic importance was no longer the sole driver of Japanese ODA consideration, but Japan started to respond to its need to increase soft power over developing countries in general. Nevertheless, the amount of Japanese ODA tended to decrease after 1995 (Table I), whereas it seemed to correlate heavily with prolonged Japan economic recession.

Table I. Japanese ODA Regional Distribution
(in US$ Million)

Region	1985	1990	1995	1998	2000	2002	2004
Asia	1732	4117	5745	5372	5284	4085	2544
ASEAN	800	2299	2229	2356	3129	1748	897
	(46%)	(56%)	(39%)	(44%)	(58%)	(43%)	(35%)
Middle East	201	705	721	392	727	209	1031
Africa	252	792	1333	950	969	585	647
Latin America	225	561	1142	553	800	592	309
Oceania	24	114	160	147	151	94	42
Europe	1	158	153	144	118	121	141
Total	2557	6941	10557	8606	9640	6726	5954

Source: *Statistical Handbook of Japan 2002*; *Diplomatic Book 2004*

Table I above shows that, until 1990s, more than half of Japan's ODA was distributed to Asia, where almost half went to Southeast Asian countries. Nevertheless, since 2000 ODA to Asia has decreased significantly. In 2004, the ODA gap between Asia and Africa narrowed more than ever. Yet, as stated by Trinidad (2007), this did not necessarily mean that ASEAN was no longer important nor significant for Japan.[13] Otherwise, as emphasized in the Japanese Diplomatic Bluebook 2004, preserving Japan-ASEAN relations remains top priority for Japan's foreign policy.[14] Japan's concerns will not change, yet its ODA to ASEAN will be more directed to reducing the gap between old ASEAN members (the ASEAN-6) and the new ones (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam). This is due to efforts to consolidate more

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[11] Ibid., p.53.

[12] Dennis D. Trinidad. "Japan's ODA at the Crossroads: Disbursement Patterns of Japan's Development to Southeast Asia." In *Asian Perspective*, vol. 31, no. 2, 2007, p. 107.

[13] Ibid., p.108.

[14] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. *Diplomatic Book 2004.* In http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/index.html, p. 54.

on ASEAN integration and regional stability.[15]

China Factor, Domestic Dynamics, and International Changes

Japanese diplomacy in ASEAN after the Asian Crisis tends to be reactive. When Japan tries to widen its influence to developing countries by distributing more ODA to other regions, China intensifies its diplomacy toward ASEAN. This can be seen from the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreements (CAFTA) in November 2001, when it was very clear that China wanted to widen its influence here. In ASEAN, China's positive image has been improving after the Asian Crisis, when China did not devalue her currency, and gave US$ 4 billion aid through IMF and in bilateral ways. A survey conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in six ASEAN countries (2008) concluded that China's influence in ASEAN exceeded that of Japan.[16]

In security, China has abandoned its coercive approach in South China Sea territorial disputes by signing the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002, which it then followed by signing ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2003. China's agression in ASEAN cannot be matched by Japan; this can be seen from the very fact that Japan has only signed the ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in the beginning of 2004. Japan seems to be only reactive to China's proactive behavior in ASEAN, indicating the lack of Japanese grand strategy in dealing with regional and international dynamics.

In January 2002, PM Junichirō Koizumi visited five ASEAN countries: the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. On 13 January 2002, Koizumi signed the Economic Partnership Agreement with Singapore, which was to be followed by negotiations and agreements with other ASEAN members. On 14 January 2002, during his visit, Koizumi released a statement entitled "Japan and the ASEAN in East Asia—A Sincere and Open Partnership," which was then widely known as the "Koizumi Doctrine." The doctrine emphasized the need to act and advance together as "candid partners" in the following endevours: (1) to undergo reforms and to increase prosperity; (2) to strenghten cooperation for stability; (3) to cooperate more in the future, especially on (a) education and human development; (b) enacting the year of 2003 as "Year of ASEAN-Japan Exchange"; (c) initiating Japan-ASEAN Economic Partnership; (d) launching "an Initiative for Development in East Asia"; (e) intensifying security cooperation between Japan and ASEAN, including on transnational issues.[17]

The "Koizumi Doctrine" (2002) once again constituted the "instant response" of Japan in facing the same measures taken by China through the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) on November 2001. The so-called "Koizumi Doctrine" was basically no different from the "Fukuda Doctrine" (1977), delivered by PM Takeo Fukuda, which stated the importance of ASEAN as a Japanese partner in international relations based on equal partnership. The doctrine also emphasized that Japan, in order to improve its relations with Southeast Asia, would employ cultural measures, as expressed in the phrase "heart to heart relations." The "Koizumi Doctrine" advocated intensifying ASEAN-Japan

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[15]   Ibid.

[16]   Syamsul Hadi. "Menyikapi Kebangkitan China." In *Kompas*, 2 September 2008.

[17]   The National Institute of Defense Studies, Japan. *East Asian Strategic Review 2003*. Tokyo: Japan Times, 2003.

economic relations as well as transnational security issues. The doctrine also stated an initiative to start negotiation on Japan-ASEAN Economic Partnership Agreement. Thus, Japan had a specific strategy in accruing this "free trade plus" (EPA) agreement. On the one hand, Japan used regional measures, in which ASEAN countries negotiated collectively with Japan, and on the other hand, Japan negotiated the EPA bilaterally with each ASEAN country. This strategy had a deliberate ambiguity in order to avoid commitment in liberalizing its agriculture sector.[18]

Nevertheless, when Japanese economy fell into recession, China's economy was rising, and the US expected Japan to contribute more actively to the East Asian security arrangement. It was clearly seen that checkbook diplomacy lost its relevance. Moreover, international discourse after the Cold War went increasingly beyond the conventional wisdom of stark Westphalian concepts of security and power. Concepts such as "soft power" and transnational society afforded a wider understanding of current international affairs than a traditional realistic approach. In these circumstances, on the contrary, Japan still struggles over the need to equip its nation-state with military power to be a mere "normal state." This is in accordance with Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution which limits Japanese manouvers in international relations. Next, it was actually the main agenda of PM Shinzō Abe (2006–2007), to proclaim the need for constitutional amendment, called the Diet to pass a law which regulates procedure for a national referendum to amend the constitution. Abe stressed that Japan would create its "own constitution," a phrase referring to the fact that the Japanese constitution was a demiliterization product of the US Occupation Forces after World War II.[19]

Uniquely, Abe's campaign faced strong resistance from the Opposition, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) led by Ichirō Ozawa. Ozawa responded to Abe's campaign on military "normalization" and Japan's increasing international role by insisitng that more efforts be placed on Japan's own economic development (the "life first" slogan). The Japanese themselves seemed to be not too interested in Abe's campaign. A poll conducted by *Mainichi Shinbun* in 2007 showed that only 6% of respondents supported changing the constitutions' pacifist clause. Abe was even forced to resign in September 2007, only two months after the LDP was totally defeated by the DPJ on the Upper House Elections. Abe resigned after he failed to receive support from the Opposition, who ruled the Upper House, on the issue to extend Japan's support on anti-terrorism cooperation in the Indian Ocean.[20]

Due to its ruling majority in the Lower House, the LDP still retained power. Yet, Abe's successor, Yasuo Fukuda, faced the same political situation; such strong opposition caused political paralysis so that political initiatives by the government would always be halted. Fukuda's successor, Tarō Asō, seemed to face the same situation. Japan's political dynamics nowadays is characterised by power struggles in the Diet, causing Japan to lose direction on economic development and in the international arena.

It is interesting to note that although competition between China and Japan has been very keen, especially in the Koizumi era (2001–2006), Japanese ODA to China also increased pretty significantly.

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[18] Ibid., p. 211. As one of the main proponent of ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Japanese farmers enjoy special political treatment, such as protection in agriculture sector against foreign products.

[19] Syamsul Hadi. "Ambivalensi Politik Internasional Jepang." In *Kompas*, 21 March 2007.

[20] Syamsul Hadi. "Jepang Pasca Abe." In *Kompas*, 14 September 2007.

As can be seen in Table II, China became the second largest recipient of Japan's ODA in 2003 and 2005 after Indonesia, and even received first position in 2004. Despite political tensions between these two countries, Japanese ODA to China increased from US$ 760 million in 2003 to US$ 965 million in 2004 and US$ 1,064 million in 2005. This indicated that in many cases Japanese political interests would always be overlooked by economic interests. According to the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), Japan investment to China boomed in 2001–2005, covering 14% of all Japan foreign investment.[21] In 2004, Japan investment to China amounted to US$ 5 billion, whereas Japan investment in ASEAN only amounted to US$ 3 billion.[22] In China's case then, what had been proposed by Wendy Dobson (2003) that Japanese ODA is a complementary element to Japanese investment, was once again confirmed.

Table II. Japanese ODA Distribution 2003–2005
(in million US$)

Country	2003	2004	2005
Indonesia	1,142	-319	1,223
China	760	965	1,064
Vietnam	484	615	603
Sri Lanka	172	180	313
Philippines	529	211	276
Cambodia	126	86	101
Pakistan	266	134	74
Afghanistan	134	173	71
India	326	-82	71
Kazahstan	136	131	66
Total of developing countries	6,014	5,954	10,485

Source: MOFA, 2006.

Indonesia and Japanese Diplomacy in ASEAN

After Japan signed the Economic Partnership Agreement with ASEAN, many said that ASEAN would again become the first priority of Japanese investment, most of its investment having since gone to China. One important clause of this agreement was tariff reduction and various facilities for Japanese investment in ASEAN countries. Individual[23] and collective agreement with ASEAN countries are indeed advantageous for Japan. Those EPAs are not only FTA liberalization in nature, but also include facilitation measures such as trade procedure efficiency, adjustment mechanisms for the business environment, and cooperation on human resources development and small and medium enterprises (SMEs). All these measures are expected to boost Japanese investment in ASEAN.

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[21] "Japan's Investment in China Changing." In *People's Daily Online*, 6 February 2007.

[22] "ASEAN to be Focus for Japan Investors." In *The Nation*, 26 November 2005.

[23] Bilateral Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between Indonesia-Japan has been concluded at 20 August 2007 and would come into force at 1 July 2008. Despite of this individual agreement, Indonesia also committed to colletive EPA between ASEAN-Japan. For critical analysis on this agreement, see Syamsul Hadi. "Kerjasama Indonesia-Jepang." In *Kompas*, 20 August 2007.

ASEAN countries' commitment to an ASEAN Economic Community in 2015, which is basically to form a single market and production base, would arguably boost ASEAN competitiveness against China (and India) and so attract more foreign investment. Japanese advantages from all this FTA with ASEAN countries, even compared to those with China, are related to booming Japanese investment in this region in the past. Besides having regional production networks in ASEAN, Japan also has had human resources networks with local companies for decades. In the China context, the market is indeed remarkable with 1.3 billion people living there. But in the ASEAN context, one might consider ASEAN's importance as due to its huge population of 500 million people, the enforcement of ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 2003, which has substantially reduced tariffs between ASEAN members, and a well-treated market for decades.[24]

Regarding a more progressive tariff reduction and various trade facilitation resulting from the ASEAN Economic Community in 2015, the ASEAN vision is indeed in line with the interests of Japan which, as has been stated before, also wants ASEAN to be a single market and single production base. Giant Japanese companies will not only be eased in terms of trade and investment, but also enjoy advantages on various facilities, such as a single window in customs, so that producing in ASEAN resembles producing in a single country.

Despite all this economic-strategic thought, political consideration such as the Japanese interest in preserving its engrained influence has made ASEAN much more significant for Japan. Due to its position as the biggest country in the region, Indonesia can be seen as the most important partner for Japan in ASEAN. This means that Indonesia will play a big role in determining where these relations are going. Indonesia is also the most populous Muslim country in the world, making it an important partner not only to other Muslim countries, but also to Western countries that are traditionally supported by Japan. Indonesia has plenty of natural resources needed by Japanese industry, besides having the Malacca Straits which are considered the main trade channel in Southeast Asia. Indonesia's geographical position, which is very strategic both economically and politically for Japan, is also an important factor that contributes to Japanese consistency in preserving good bilateral relations with the country.[25]

The Malacca Straits are the most dense waters in the world which contribute to 25% of all world trade, and are the channel for half of world oil shipping, approximately 50,000 ships every year.[26] These straits are also a route from and to Japan, especially related to Japanese trading, industry, and investment activities. Moreover, they become the channel for oil shipping from the Middle East to Japan, which is essential for Japanese industry. Let alone cargo shipping containing Japanese products to all around the globe. Almost 80% of Japanese energy needs are shipped through these straits.

They are so important as a hub for Japanese economic security interests that at the end of 2004 the Japanese minister of trade, Shōichi Nakagawa, proposed offering military hardware during his visit

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[24] Atsuo Kuroda (President of JETRO Thailand). "Japanese Companies' Response to FTAs in ASEAN (Summary)." In http://www.asean.or.jap/invest/archieve/speech.

[25] Abdul Irsan. *Budaya & Perilaku Politik Jepang di Asia*. Jakarta: Grafindo, 2007, p. 248.

[26] Syamsul Hadi. "Jepang dan Beberapa Isu dalam Hubungan Internasional di Asia Pasifik." In *Nihon shakai bunka kenkyu*, Center for Japanese Studies, Universitas Nasional, vol. 1, no. 1, May 2008, p. 43.

to President Yudhoyono. Nevertheless, the offer was hard to realize because the Japanese government emphasized that it should be in full recognition of three countries sharing responsible for the Malacca Straits, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.

The motive behind this offer was Japanese deprivation due to piratical activities in the straits. In March 2005, mass media also reported that Japanese citizens were being held hostage here. Moreover, the Vice Ambassador of Japan stated that there were still no concrete formulations to manifest Japanese willingness to involve in Malacca Strait security arrangement.[27] Clearly the offer was not in the form of dispatching Japanese troops, because this would have violated the constitution.

Next, in regards to its importance in ASEAN, Indonesia should play a more positive role, and take as many benefits as possible from its relation with Japan. Achieving technical support and continuing cultural exchange programs are, indeed, a not-too-difficult endeavour, because until now Japan has not moved from its main pillar of foreign policy, checkbook diplomacy. Moreover, whatever assistance it delivers to Indonesia, Japan will gain benefits both economically and politically, considering its huge interest in Southeast Asia. Thus, in the period when Japan faces "stagnation" in formulating a new identity in international relations, Indonesia can provide a more measurable definition, as well as more concrete benefits in its relations with Japan, both bilaterally as well as regionally.

Concluding Remarks

ASEAN is still regarded as one of the top priorities in Japanese foreign policy, although there are many dynamic changes that have taken place in East Asia, such as: (1) the rise of China as a new big power willing closer relations with ASEAN; (2) the growth of a new pattern in Japan-ASEAN relations, as can be seen from the Economic Partnership Agreement between Japan and ASEAN countries; and (3) the agreement amongst ASEAN countries to establish the ASEAN Community in 2015, which will further integrate the Southeast Asia region.

These changes have in fact provided a new chance for Japan to deepen its relations with ASEAN. Japanese economic and business interests, which have been engrained here in the region, will be promoted more intensively due to a clearer form of ASEAN regional integration. Japanese interest in this aspect is balanced with the emerging of new political aspects in Japan-ASEAN relations, which are the rise of China and substantive US withdrawal from East Asia. Japanese leaders' failure to convince their domestic constitutents on the issue of restoring Japan's international profile, by meeting economic with military power, has made it hard for Japan to escape from repeating its pattern of "checkbook diplomacy".

Regarding Indonesia's central role in ASEAN, the main challenge for Indonesia concerns how to direct that Japanese role in accordance with Indonesia's own national interests as well as the vision of ASEAN regional integration. Related to its domestic interest, for instance, Indonesia should direct Japanese aid to empower the lower levels of society, such as farmers, fishermen, and SMEs. Meanwhile, in relation to the vision of ASEAN regional integration, Indonesia should involve Japan on programs aimed at "ASEAN Awareness," especially those programs that engage ASEAN youngsters and people at the

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[27] Ibid., p. 44.

grassroots, in order to make ASEAN a more people-oriented and less elite-driven regional organization. Hopefully, Indonesia can maintain its constructive leadership in ASEAN, without giving up its truly basic national interest, namely just and equal prosperity amongst its people.

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◆第２セッション◆
開発政策と社会 / Development Policy and Society

Exploring Shopping Malls and Shopping Arcades in and around Japan's Provincial Cities:
Problems, Policies and Perspectives

Hendrik Meyer-Ohle

Abstract

This paper is based on preliminary research that I conducted during a one-year sabbatical in Japan in 2008. Based on an initial interest in the rapid increase in the number of shopping malls in Japan, I visited a number of shopping malls many of them located in and around Japan's provincial cities. However, shopping mall development needs to be seen within the overall development of cities. Inner city shopping arcades were in a very poor state; with many vacant stores and very few shoppers; they were showing clear signs of aging and neglect. Some initiatives for revitalization can be observed, but considering that these initiatives are in a situation where populations are shrinking and aging, their success is not assured. This paper introduces this situation by presenting several short case studies and a brief overview of relevant policies. The main purpose of this paper is to frame the topic so that questions can be developed to drive further research.

1. Introduction

Foreign visitors to Japan are often amazed by the lively shopping scenes that await them in the metropolitan centers of Osaka and Tokyo. Different shopping areas scattered around the cities create succinct atmospheres by catering to certain needs or distinctive age groups. People roaming the streets prove themselves to be as much creators of fashions and trends as they are consumers.

Yet, what visitors seldom see is the situation in Japan's lesser cities on the fringes or far away from the large metropolitan centers. Here, much of the shopping no longer takes place in the central shopping arcades but is instead done in the home centers, discount stores, diners, pachinko parlors, karaoke establishments or fast food restaurants that line the long stretches of arterial roads in the city outskirts. More recently, these stores have been complemented by large-scale shopping malls that offer most and more of the above under one roof.

The construction of large, centrally-managed and enclosed shopping malls in green field locations outside of cities, and also on more centrally-located brown field sites within cities, has been the trend dominating Japanese retailing and consumption over the last decade. I thus made it the focus of my research during a one-year sabbatical in Japan in 2008, where I visited as many shopping malls as I could. My visits often took me to the cities that they were located in or close by. While shopping malls were all new and shiny, the inner cities were often in a state of disarray with many shops in the inner city shopping arcades standing vacant, and the remaining stores seeing few shoppers. At first sight, the two

developments seem to be connected, and it is easy to blame one for the other, which is what happens with Japanese policy makers who have recently put tighter regulations in place to make the opening of new shopping malls much more difficult.

With this paper, I want to take a first look at recent developments. Based on impressions during relatively short visits, as well as available materials such as newspaper articles or development plans published by the cities, my aim is not to provide a full and proper analysis. Rather, it is to show what needs to be taken into account to provide such a comprehensive analysis. It will be shown that a multifaceted approach to the topic is necessary; how this approach can lead to significant findings about the state of society and political economy in contemporary Japan will be explored. In the following, I will first provide short sketches of the situation in certain cities that I have visited (problems), followed by an outline of how the situation has led to some responses by policy makers (policies). Finally, I will discuss the various points that need to be taken into account before proceeding to a proper analysis (perspectives).

2. Sketching the Situation

In this section, I introduce the situation of shopping mall development and inner city problems through sketches of several cities. By purposefully not developing the sketches along a uniform pattern, I offer a collage that will be structured by the discussion in the section that follows.

2.1. Niihama

Niihama is an industrial town on the northern coast of Shikoku, the smallest of Japan's four main islands. With a population of about 123,000 people, the town is known for its copper mining as well as for a huge, wild and colorful annual harvest festival where, for three days, tribes of men move 50 huge festival floats around town, shaking them wildly and competing over who can lift the several tons heavy floats into the air longest. The event involves the whole town and, during one evening, the large parking lot in front of the Niihama Aeon Shopping Mall becomes the main meeting point for several of the floats and a large crowd of onlookers. At this time of the year, the inside of the center is decorated for the festival, the main inner atrium displaying a large hanging arrangement composed of distinctive traditional over-jackets worn by the participants from the different neighborhoods. This setting is notably different to other Aeon shopping malls that, at this time of the year, display a generic Halloween theme, a custom alien to Japan. It was extremely busy inside the Niihama mall where groups of young people sporting similar gangly looks use the food court as a meeting point, and gather in and near the large entertainment and cinema spaces. Niihama Aeon, while being similar in size, design or store portfolio to the usual Aeon shopping center, seems to have established itself as the new center of the community, something that other shopping centers are still striving for.

photo 1. Festival Float in front of Aeon Niihama Shopping Mall

The mall operators achieved this through the mall's central location in the city that makes it easily reachable not only by car but also on foot or by bicycle. The original center of the city in terms of shopping is only about 1.5 kilometers away. What remains of it today is a 350 meter long roofed arcade that has lost nearly all of its liveliness, with some of the buildings demolished to make way for a parking garage; a large gaming hall has become its main source of attraction.

photo 2. Niihama Shopping Arcade

Niihama shopping mall was opened in June 2001 with a sales space of about 50,000 square meters. The initiative for opening a large-scale shopping center in the central location of Niihama did not come from the developer, Aeon, but from the local chamber of trade and industry and in the face of opposition from existing retailers. In 1998, the chamber had diagnosed a general decline in the economic vitality

of Niihama, with manufacturers downsizing, the branch of a major self-service department store closing down, and over 80 of the existing 240 retail store buildings in the city center standing vacant. Any attempt to revive the existing shopping district was deemed to be a costly and uncertain endeavor. The shopping mall sits on the site that formerly housed an amusement park and is, despite its inner city location, very suburban in appearance, surrounded by car parking and not linked up with the traditional shopping district at all. Yet, the development seems to be successful, with sales exceeding expectations ("Ehime Niihama, shōgyō shisetsu yūchi meguri hibana"; "Niihama shōtengai ga kasseika-saku").

2.2. Kurashiki

Kurashiki is a major tourist destination in western Japan and, as such, it is somewhat surprising that its substantial shopping arcades are struggling to survive. Arriving late in the evening and taking a first stroll through the shopping arcades left me with a rather eerie feeling. Seeing how all the shops had their shutters down and the streets were merely dark windy narrow tunnels, it was hard to imagine how this gloomy and desolated place could possibly be the major shopping area of Kurashiki. Devoid of people and only used by the rare cyclist to race home, I wondered why in a supposedly safe country like Japan every shop needed a massive steel shutter that prevented window shopping and made the arcades a very uninviting place outside opening hours. While the shutters were already down in the main street, the nearby Aeon shopping center, that was a mere two kilometers to the back of Kurashiki station, was still in business. The mall was opened in 1999 with parking for 4,500 cars, and is supposedly one of the operator's most profitable malls. More than 100 tenants, among them a major superstore, a large sports goods discounter, a toy discounter, a mega book store and a multi-screen cinema complex, draw a constant flow of visitors (Kyōgoku 2006).

photo 3. Kurashiki Shopping Arcade at Night

When I visited the shopping street again during the day, it was livelier than at night-time but not all the store shutters were up. This was partly due to some shop-keepers not opening their stores on certain days of the week, while other shops simply stood vacant. The stores that were operating in the arcades showed a mishmash of products and different levels of sophistication in terms of store decoration and architecture. While some store-owners had restored traditional shop houses and were selling fashion or souvenirs with the intention to appeal to tourists, other shop owners were operating basic fruit or vegetable stalls out of rather makeshift premises. A number of shop buildings had already been torn down with the gaps in store frontage boarded up; some of these gaps were somewhat concealed by art displays put up by the merchant associations. Gauging from the length of these empty boarded up store fronts, they seemed to be former locations of larger supermarkets or general merchandising stores that had relocated to suburban roadside locations or to the shopping centers on the fringes of the city, leaving the city arcades without anchor stores. The last remaining large store in the shopping arcades, a regional department store, was holding a closing down sale at the time of my visit, raising concerns about the future of a substantial section of the arcades that appeared to be still relatively lively at the time of my visit.

photo 4. Tearing down a Section of the Arcade in Kurashiki

However, some attempts at revitalization could be observed. In one section closer to the touristy part of Kurashiki, the roofing was taken down, not to be restored but to be completely done away with, thus restoring the street to its original state before the arcades were constructed. Indeed, while at the time of my visit, the work was not fully completed, the whole atmosphere of that section had already changed, with natural light allowing buildings to show their mercantile heritage, proper structural dimensions and also how they had once interacted with their immediate environment.

2.3. Takamatsu

Looking at a satellite picture of the city of Takamatsu in the north-eastern part of the island of Shikoku, what stands out are several long white axes that span the whole breath and length of the city center. The two longest axes constitute a T-shaped structure of 850 and 1,200 meters respectively in length. These are the roofs of the arcaded shopping streets of Takamatsu that, with several side extensions stretching to 4 kilometers in total, are said to be the longest in Japan. These shopping arcades house a wide array of shops and restaurants in terms of size and products. However, increasingly vacant stores can be seen not only on the fringes but also in more central locations, often in clusters. Store vacancy seems to be carrying the characteristics of a contagious disease that spreads rapidly across the shopping arcades.

photo 5. Vacant Stores in Takamatsu Arcades

Once having been the place to shop for a population of over 670,000 people, the role of the central arcades has become increasingly challenged by regional shopping centers, and long stretches of freestanding stores and restaurants along the arterial roads. Between 1995 and 2004, 100,000 square meters of shopping center space were constructed. The largest development was You Me Town that was opened in 1998 as a regional 38,000 square meter shopping center just 3 kilometers south of the center of the city. In 2007, the dominating position of this mall was challenged by the Aeon group with a 61,000 square meter regional mall 4 kilometers to the east of the city in a former industrial waterfront location. To strengthen further its position, Aeon opened another shopping mall at the end of 2008, just 10 km to the southeast of the city with a floor space of over 60,000 square meters (Aeon Kabushiki Kaisha 2008). As a result, the inner city shopping arcades experienced a dramatic drop in visitors, from over 10.2 million annually in 1996 to just 5.8 million people in 2004, and this was even before the two Aeon shopping malls had opened (Takamatsu Marugamemachi Shōtengai).

photo 6. You Me Town Takamatsu

Faced with this situation, the city of Takamatsu and retailers in the affected shopping district came up with a comprehensive plan to revitalize the central shopping arcades. The first step was to set up a town management organization with the task of redeveloping the existing shopping streets. This involved new infrastructure such as parking for cars and bicycles and renovating the arcades. However, the plan for revitalization went further than this. The central square where the two main axes of the arcades meet was redeveloped into a multilevel shopping center with a floor space of about 5,000 square meters under a newly constructed glass dome. This attracted retailers who until then had preferred to open stores in shopping centers ("Dōmu wa saisei no shōchō"). Furthermore, by employing shopping center principles, the town management cooperation also assumed responsibility for reorganizing the 470 meters of arcades that link up to the square. This includes the reorganization and relocation of the still active shops into seven distinctive zones based on the merchandise that they carry. The plan also aims for the reintroduction of shops that offer everyday goods or services; such shops having been driven away from the arcades by escalating rents and land prices during the bubble economy. The whole initiative was made possible by a drastic drop in land prices. The value of land stood in 2004 at just 10% of what it had been in 1992 at the height of Japan's bubble economy (Takamatsu Marugamemachi).

photo 7. New Central Square in Takamatsu Arcades

Takamatsu has become a much-studied case among town planners in Japan. However, it remains to be seen whether Takamatsu's inner city will really be able to withstand the still increasing competition from shopping centers.

2.4. Yao

Located close to Osaka, Yao city differs from the other cities chosen for consideration in this paper. Many of its 270,000 people work or go to school in Osaka, and Osaka is also within easy reach for shopping and entertainment.

Ario Yao is the first major shopping center in western Japan by Aeon's main competitor, Seven & I Holdings. The shopping mall opened in December 2006; it has a sales floor size of about 41,000 square meters and stretches over four levels. The mall is connected by an elevated walkway to Yao station and also to a Seibu department store that was opened in 1981. Seibu Department Stores became a part of Seven & I Holdings in 2006. The anchor tenant of the mall is a general merchandising store by group company, Itō Yōkadō. It occupies a significant portion of the mall and stretches over three levels. It is complemented by 168 tenant stores, among them the largest cinema complex in the Kansai region and an automobile mall where five branches of Toyota and Daihatsu dealers display cars on the ground floor. Housing various educational facilities, branches of financial institutions, a large play zone for children, entertainment spaces and health care providers, the mall developer wants the mall to be a self-contained city, and is cited as having allocated 53% of space to service tenants (Kotani 2007). Compared to other malls, the center stands out for its clear zoning, even having names for the different areas of the mall such as Kids, Sweets, Ladies, Beauty, or Cute Avenue. Following a pattern that is consistent with what can be found in other large shopping centers by Seven & I Holdings, the large food court is located on the ground floor and provides something of an easily accessible meeting place for people in the

neighborhood, which is quite different from other developers that usually use food courts to bring traffic to the upper levels ("Osaka Yao ni SC yokka kaigyō"; "Yōkadō sōzai senmon ten o honkaku dōnyū").

photo 8. Yao Ario Shopping Mall

Yao's inner city shopping arcades are only a few steps away from the shopping center but do not seem to interact at all with the busy shopping malls around the station. Compared to the brightly-lit mall, the aged roofs of the arcade allow only limited daylight and the tiled pattern that covers the pavement speaks of a distant period. Many shops are empty with some of the buildings already torn down. Shops that might once have seen good business are mostly in a poor state, with many displaying merchandise that is clearly outdated. Some shop owners have not updated their window displays for several years, if not for more than a decade. Signs advertising the area as Family Road point to some initiative to keep the streets lively, but are contradicted by the mostly elderly people that make up the few shoppers. Most people seem to see the arcades only as a thoroughfare to cycle to the railway station or the adjacent shopping malls. The decline of the shopping arcade clearly began well before the Aeon mall opened in 2006. The inhabitants of Yao were drawn to the abundant and growing places of shopping in the Osaka area. Thus, the new mall serves to encourage more people to shop in their own city again and, in addition, even draws people from neighboring cities.

photo 9. Neglected Shop Window in Yao Shopping Arcade

3. Policy Responses

Japan has a long history of regulating activities in the wholesale and retail sector. It has done so by pursuing various objectives and with varying levels of success. The origin of many current policies is in the Department Store Law that was introduced in the 1920s and has gone through a series of adaptations since then. It was abolished after the war by the Occupation forces and reintroduced in the 1950s. After which, it was renamed the Large Store Law to include general merchandising stores in the 1970s. The minimum size limit was reduced to include discount stores in the 1980s. At that time, its application was also toughened to bring all opening activities of large stores to a halt. Later, in the 1990s, its application was eased as a response to demands by Japan's trade partners, and it was replaced by a law concerned with the environmental consequences of large stores and promoting the revitalization of inner city shopping districts. Finally, it was reintroduced in 2008 with a law that regulated the opening of shopping malls.

Yet, looking at the current state of shopping streets, these policies were not successful in general. The reasons are complex and can only be indicated here (e.g. Meyer-Ohle 2003)

- Large retail companies always found ways to work around regulations that normally should have limited their development.
- Small retailers did not use the breathing spaces that the law provided them with to become more competitive and to come up with concepts that were attractive to consumers.
- Social changes led to a lack of successors. However, owners often regarded family identity as being closely linked to their retail business, and thus they were reluctant to close unprofitable businesses. A tax regime that favored business ownership also played into the decision to keep businesses running.
- High real estate prices that developed during the bubble economy led to unrealistic expectations of land owners, and this stood in the way of swift and effective city renewal by making spaces available

to retail entrepreneurs with more attractive concepts.

- Japanese consumers fully embraced modern retailers, especially the convenience of using the car for shopping, and seemed to attach relatively little sentimental value to city centers.
- Cities realized that the lack of attractive shopping spaces affected their own attractiveness and began to collaborate with large retailers and developers to build shopping malls.

Yet, Japanese policy makers have not given up, and have engaged in ambitious projects to revive the inner city spaces of provincial cities. Current measures include the creation of event spaces, the relocation and concentration of stores and the systematic shrinking of the size of the shopping districts; the refurbishment of buildings that formerly housed department or general merchandising stores into small shopping centers; attempts to increase the residential population of inner cities by rezoning store sites for residential use; the provision of parking spaces; and the improvement of public transport. The current measures are still underway, and it remains to be seen whether they will really develop inner city districts that are economically sustainable and can contribute in terms of civic vitality.

4. Perspectives

The above collage of the situation of shopping malls and shopping arcades, as well as the short overview of policy responses, has demonstrated the potential that the study of this topic has for an understanding of the economic and social development of contemporary Japan outside of the metropolitan areas. Inner city shopping streets are not only places for shopping but also provide employment, nurture local entrepreneurship, provide places and resources for social, political and cultural activities, and define the physical appearance of cities. Policies for revitalization are framed on the central level but need to be implemented locally.

Considering the complexities involved, any assessment of the situation clearly needs to go beyond classical academic disciplinary boundaries. Even more importantly, it needs to start from an investigation of the values and positions that underlie the discourse on shopping centers and city development. With much of the academic discourse being based on western experience, it is interesting to see whether it is possible to go beyond this. Indeed, there are approaches that define the Japanese city differently. Yet, even within Japan itself, the discussion about the decline of Japanese inner city districts and possible solutions seems to reference itself closely to European concepts of cities and city revitalization.

4.1. Concepts of the City

When I tried to order my thoughts after hours of walking around the shopping arcades and shopping malls in Japan, I realized how deeply my understanding of, and expectations towards, cities were shaped by my own experience. From a very young age onwards, people are socialized into certain environments and styles of consumption. These not only concern the choice of certain products, but also a preference for certain shopping hours or days, buying certain products at certain places or activities, and experiences that are combined with the act of shopping and make the act of shopping more meaningful.

Having grown up in a German city that is comparable in terms of size and position to those that I looked at in Japan, I expect a city to have a clearly defined center, part of which is a pedestrian-only

shopping district that features stores with some individuality. Here, people not only come to shop but also to just stroll, to meet in outdoor coffee shops or listen to street musicians. This is also the place where political parties and non-governmental groups set up their stalls and hand out flyers. Activities and access are not tightly regulated, so some beggars or groups of truant students are part of the open experience. The shopping area is complemented by a historically old quarter, a town hall and several churches with market squares that house open-air fresh produce markets on certain days of the week. Away from the center along the arterial roads are a few hypermarkets that people use for weekly big shopping trips by car, as well as furniture discounters and home centers, but there are no large integrated, enclosed and climate-controlled shopping malls.

photo 10. German Pedestrian Shopping Zone in Osnabrück

The layout of the city is a result of people's shopping preferences, but just as much is due to regulations. For example, Germany largely does not allow the operation of large shopping malls outside of the city centre as the comprehensive choice they offer would threaten the existence of downtown areas. Though liberated to a certain extent over the last few years, Germany still regulates the opening hours of stores.

Yet, even my image of a town and its consumption spaces is that of a certain generation and might well involve some sense of nostalgia. My parents' generation grew up with shops much closer to their homes that have since closed down. The pedestrian shopping zones are largely an innovation of the 1970s, and are today drawing some criticism for their uniformity. More and more, family-owned shops are being replaced by those run by chains, and some stretches of shopping streets seem to have problems attracting quality tenants.

I am of course not the first to notice the differences between the Japanese and the "Western" city.

Shelton (1999: 9) has stated that:

> *"To most Westerners Japanese cities remain cluttered, garish, unfathomable and, seemingly, without trace of urban planning. At best, there may be a delight in the vibrancy and intensity of city life but an unease and distaste with the form, without the grace of Morris who acknowledges that the wearing of cultural spectacles may have severely skewed her view. To most Western eyes, Japanese cities lack civic spaces, sidewalks, squares, parks, vistas, etc; in other words, they lack those physical components that have come to be viewed as hall marks of a civilized Western city. The reaction reflects an underlying attitude in the West that Japanese cities are somehow inferior—that in spite of their densities and liveliness, they are somehow less than 'urban.' Further, and sadly, these are notions that many Japanese architects and planners have themselves taken on board."*

Later in his book, he singles out the level of activity that holds Japanese cities together and gives them their characteristic feel.

> *"It is the intensity of activities, the colour of events and the profusion of signs which collectively leave the lasting and livelier though far-fuzzier impressions. The power of content (people, activity and signs) over context or setting in Japan cannot be underestimated and has long surprised Westerners whose urban experience is generally rather different."* (Shelton 1999: 87)

Even as my perspective might be leaning towards a certain ideal, I can also sense something similar in the current discussion on the development of shopping malls and the state of inner city shopping arcades in Japan. Shopping mall design is clearly following the foreign—mostly US examples—and city planners have been conducting visits to European cities. Although the following points take this discussion further, they are at this point just illustrative and need further discussion and substantiation before becoming part of a larger framework for analysis.

4.2. Quality of Spaces and Stores

In the Japanese shopping street, most of the space is taken up by shops. Merchandise overflows into the street in front of shops, creating a lively atmosphere but also occupying most of the available space. The shopping arcades are molded onto existing street patterns, and there are usually no squares or wider sections. Space has to be shared by both pedestrians and cyclists, and thus is usually not sufficient to cater for events or for people to hang out and meet. In contrast, many shopping malls provide open spaces just to meet and rest, as developers realized that this convenience makes shoppers spend longer hours in the mall and increases the probability of more people spending money. Based on my observations, malls have become meeting points for young mothers, pupils, and also the elderly. The large food courts in the malls that allow people to get their own food through self-service and to stay as long as they please (in contrast to most proper restaurants that seem to have made it their policy to move through as many people and as quickly as possible) have become informal places for people to meet. Such informal places were not previously available in Japanese cities.

The same is true for the quality of stores and shopping experiences. While the onlooker who has been to several shopping malls may easily dismiss the stores and restaurants as all the same, shops can still be a novelty to the residents of a certain city. In terms of design and merchandise, they may also be more exciting than the stores in the arcades. Many stores and restaurants in the mall bring fashion or food that was previously only available in the metropolitan centers to the periphery. Some mall owners or management companies have even come up with policies to renew their store base systematically. For example, through a policy of not renewing 20% of tenant contracts every year regardless of the results achieved by store tenants.

The western literature largely describes the mall as a sterile, centrally-managed place that is exclusive rather than inclusive, and largely inferior to the city. Yet, some researchers have pointed out that it is necessary to take a closer look:

> *"In their search for global influences, postmodern scholars have emphasized structural similarities of malls while deemphasizing locality and human agency. …, however, malls are geographically bound expressions of a negotiation between mall developers as representatives of a global logic of capitalist accumulation, on the one hand, and local characteristics, on the other. In the context of the United States, the ideological construction of the mall and the tendency toward a preoccupation with surveillance and social exclusion may merely reflect particular aspects of U.S. culture and politics. When malls in other countries are examined, it becomes clear that they are the outcome of 'glocalization' processes that combine the post-Fordist capitalist logic of mass production and consumption with local political, social, and cultural influences that introduce significant variation."* (Salcedo 2003: 1084–1085)

Thus, a careful study of the Japanese mall in terms of what it offers and how it is used and seen by its visitors, is required before passing any judgment.

4.3. Vitality of Communities

Japan's local store-owners have been described as playing a vital role in their local communities:

> *"In addition to tending to business matters, merchants form the backbone of local community activities, participating in everything from political clubs to volunteer fire brigades, from shrine parish boards to Little League teams. The self-employed entrepreneurs, working according to their own schedules, are always present in their communities—something factory or office workers can never be. Merchants clearly have ulterior motives behind their good works, but as Adam Smith suggested, it is not the butcher's benevolence but his self-interest that makes the world go around, in Tokyo as elsewhere."* (Bestor 1990: 31)

The above engagement is an important reason for policies to promote small and medium sized businesses, not only in Japan but also elsewhere. It is difficult to imagine how any corporate social responsibility initiative by a large retailer or shopping center developer could, in a meaningful way,

replace the multitude of initiatives on the local level that individual retail store owners and their families were engaged in or supported.

Yet, Ishii's (1994) careful study of small retailers in Japan shows that the lifestyle and ambitions of retail store-owners have changed, and that their lives are far less intertwined with the local community than previously. Today, many store-owners and their families reside away from their stores, and their lives and ambitions largely resemble those of salaried employees. This inclues their ambition for children to have a secure career in a large corporation or in public administration, instead of taking over the store.

It thus needs to be asked and investigated whether the restoration of shopping streets through the renewal and addition of facilities and infrastructure will bring back more than vitality in economic terms. This may happen if the new environment can nurture a new class of independent retailers who are able to build strong ties with their customers and fellow retailers in the neighborhood. However, this will not be the case if the new environment is populated by only branches of chain stores that are managed by salaried store managers and run by part-timers paid by the hour. Japanese chain retailers have by themselves developed a model of customer interaction that, at first, seems cheerful and highly reliable, but on second sight is highly standardized through the use of manuals and sometimes lacks the individual touch and flexibility. In British high streets or German pedestrian shopping districts, the number of stores under individual ownership has dramatically declined, a fact that Japanese city planners and retailers on study tours to Europe might easily overlook.

4.4. Diversity of City Life

"The highly managed character of these spaces is reflected in regulations which govern tenancy, permissible activities and environmental design. Thus, the character of these spaces is as much defined by what is excluded as by what is included." (Christopherson on shopping centers. 1994: 414)

In their aim to revive shopping streets, many city planners seem to be applying principles of shopping center management. This includes the relocation of stores by arranging them based on the products that they are selling, the creation of event spaces and the organization of events, or the introduction of a professional management team that takes charge of the overall development of city centers. Yet, this seems to go against the view of Shelton introduced earlier that sees the Japanese city as more defined by its vibrancy in terms of people, activities and signs than by its outer form. Turning the inner cities into just another planned shopping mall would take much of this away. If there is agreement that the Japanese city is different, this means that the grocery store next to the jeweler, the garishly lit and oversized store signs, the drug store appropriating most of the public space in front of the store to display its merchandise, the Pachinko parlor, the ever repeating, loud store jingle, or the red light and entertainment district should not be banned or regulated as has already happened in the mall.

4.5. Constant Change of Consumer Geographies

A close look at Japanese cities shows that, historically, the location of the main centers of retail activity has not been static in many cities. Traces of an early commercial center can often still be found near a river or a former land trade route. Activities might have shifted away following the decision of a merchant to open a department store in a new location and other retailers following this move. Another shift might also have occurred with the opening of general merchandising stores close to train stations. From this perspective, the move to the fringes and to shopping malls is just another shift of retail activities, as such activities are viewed by companies and consumers as being only relatively loosely anchored in the city. Different from European cities, Japanese inner city shopping districts are often not flanked by heritage sites and architecture. Thus, protection of the inner cities seems to have no inherent benefit that can easily be communicated to residents. Not only has retail activity been shifting, other urban institutions such as town halls, hospitals or schools have done the same. It can thus be asked whether it is appropriate to arrest or turn back this development. Having lived in Asia for more than 16 years now, and comparing the fast changes in cities like Tokyo, Singapore or even Kyoto with the arrested development of many cities in Europe, I wonder what state of city development should be regarded as the more natural one.

5. Conclusion

In this paper I have tried to bring forward some of the key issues that a proper analysis of shopping malls and shopping arcades in Japanese city development needs to address. It is clear that a treatment of this issue needs to ask questions that go beyond the pure study of retail institutions as businesses. Instead, by recognizing the key importance that retail institutions play in city development in economic and civic terms, larger questions need to be addressed. They include these: Who defines the city and in which way? What do Japanese city planners, retail consultants, politicians, ministry officials and, most importantly, the Japanese people expect from the city in terms of its retail landscape? How do they see places of shopping and consumption within the overall development of cities?

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Municipality and the World:
Sister City Relationships and the Challenge for Japan's Local Governments in the Twenty-First Century

Ross Mouer

1. Background to Understanding Japan's Sister City Relationships

This story begins in Australia where I was professor of Japanese studies from 1994 to 2010. Seriously engaging with Japan long-term requires learning Japanese and absorbing aspects of Japanese culture over an extended period. It also demands of one an on-going interest in how Japan is changing and gives one a stake in speculating about Japan's future, both professionally as an academic, and socially as a person networked on both professional and personal levels in Japan. Many who engage in area studies come to combine a disciplinary focus with an interest in contributing to one or more bilateral relationships. Each of these thrusts colors the research reported in this paper.

As an industrial sociologist interested in the dynamics of industrialization, economic growth and the way work is organized, my specific interest is in how Japanese citizens have mobilized or been mobilized to make the ultimate sacrifices that generate the surpluses necessary for growth-spawning investments to occur. This involves two concerns. One is the exploitation and harnessing of resources, the most important being people. The other involves the strategies to "keep it all together", that is to maintain social cohesion and keep foremost in the minds of citizens that the sacrifices and benefits are somewhat equitably distributed. This is a task connected to the widespread perception of Japan as a 90% middle class society that was pervasive at least until the mid 1990s when the mention of various *kakusa* (inequalities) began to emerge.

Throughout most of the post-war period, the management of these processes has been conceived and debated as a national project. Along the way, both Marxist and modernization theories, as well as those specifically concerned with late development and world production systems, have highlighted the extent to which processes and practices allegedly unique to Japan have served as functional equivalents to those elsewhere when it comes to the generation of the economic surpluses that underpin economic growth. Such perspectives have pointed also to some of the supra-national interdependencies or global interconnections that have now become common features of global society in the 21st century. Those perceptions are fairly widespread, and most observers today would argue that the acceleration of globalizing processes following the end of the Cold War have come to challenge policy makers in new ways. This is seen not only at the level of relations between nation states in the creation of the WTO or the Kyoto Protocol, but also in the recognition of many cross-national commonalities affecting municipalities. I refer here to trends such as the aging of populations, urbanization and the resultant pressures felt by those administering social welfare programs at the local level.

The second characteristic of many who study Japan from afar is an interest in how Japan interfaces

with their own country of residence. In my case, the bilateral relationship of record has been that between Australia and Japan. The intersection of those two shared domains—an interest in the bilateral relationship and an interest in the future of Japan—has led me to reflect over nearly forty years on mutual images Japanese and Australians have of each other, person-to-person exchanges, cultural flows between the two nations, the cross-cultural education of Australian and Japanese youth through programs of Japanese studies in Australia and Australian studies in Japan.

Among those various interests in the bilateral relationship, one focus over the past two to three years has been on "sister city" or "friendship city" relations between Japanese and Australian municipalities. I was once asked for advice by an Australian colleague who was to attend the People's Consultative Assembly in Beijing, an advisory body convened in the lead-up to the CCP's National Congress, which is where policies are decided. Wanting to make a positive contribution to the deliberations in Beijing and noting the fairly strong anti-Chinese sentiments that accompanied coverage of Tibet, the global journey of the Olympic torch relay, the growing economic presence of China abroad, certain human rights abuses and even the running of the Olympics itself in 2008, he was interested in how the racist-tainted acrimony characterising Australia's relations with Japan following World War II had given way to strong expressions of friendship over just four or five decades. That kind of query gives the study of sister city relations an added significance and a new impetus. Of course, as a form of soft power, one needs to recognize that the involvement and official encouragement of the Japanese government was behind the establishment of CLAIR (Council for Local Authorities' International Relations) in the 1980s, and its efforts to promote sister city ties and the JET program in subsequent years.

This paper traces Japan's engagement with the global community by looking at Japan's sister city relations with municipalities in the state of Victoria in Australia, considering those ties in the context of larger changes that are pushing Japan toward a more comprehensive interface with the world beyond Japan, and, probably most pressing, toward deepening ties with nearby nations in Asia, particularly South Korea and China.

2. Local Governments Retreating from International Engagements?

The attention given Japan's soft power diplomacy in recent years needs to be understood in the context of Japan's on-going internationalization over the past few decades. It began with the teaching of English in Japanese schools, efforts to increase the number of foreign students studying in Japan, and the transformation of soft power institutions, such as the Nihon Bunka Shinkōkai into the Japan Foundation in the early 1970s. These developments can in turn be seen as an extension of an even longer trajectory, stretching back to events surrounding the Meiji Restoration and of the presentation of Japan to the world at the World Exhibition held in Paris at the end of the nineteenth century. At the same time post-war Japan's export economy generated brand names for Japan, "business tours" intent on transferring abroad the "principles of Japanese-style management" (or at least its rhetoric) and an interest in studying Japanese as a major language.

Despite the emergence of nihonjinron-based ideologies stressing Japanese distinctiveness and the appearance of "Japanese who can say 'NO!'" as "Japan incorporated" began to flex its economic muscle in the 1970s and 1980s, the internationalization of Japanese society and culture has continued unabated

until the present. Although the 1990s have frequently been referred to as "the lost decade," culturally Japan experienced a kind of renascence that was accompanied by a multicultural flowering at the grassroots level while, at the national level, a significant foreign presence was appearing in the sumo ring and in other sports. Increasingly, local governments came to grapple with the teaching of Japanese to non-native speakers, the growth of NPOs, evolving gender roles, better facilities for the handicapped and the aged, and intermarriage. In 1980, only one of 200 Japanese married a non-Japanese; by 2005 that figure had risen to one of out fifteen to twenty marriages.

While Japan's trajectories of internationalization and multi-culturalization are likely to extend into the foreseeable future, the move in those directions seems to be uneven. For example, financial support for Japan's sister city programs has been questioned in many city councils over the last decade. The figures in Table 1 suggest that the enthusiasm for sister city ties that characterized the 1990s may have waned since 2000. Whereas the number of Japan's sister city links doubled between 1989 and 1999, those links grew by only 20% over the next decade to 2009. In fact, those with the US even peaked after rising to 441 in 2004 before coming back to 434 in 2009. Although it might appear that Japan had reached some kind of threshold by 2000–2005, that would be an argument hard to sustain on the basis of the evidence currently available. In 2009, there were 1728 municipalities, meaning that the number of sister city relationships (1576) already stood at 91.2 percent of the former number. Because some municipalities had multiple agreements, the percentage of cities with such ties was a bit smaller. The levelling off may also reflect a period of realignment as municipalities realign their ties to accommodate the growing presence of Japan's two closest neighbours, South Korea and China. A further factor is the restructuring of local government as the number of municipalities has decreased from 3233 in March 1999 to 1728 ten years later. On the financial side, early tabulations from the National Census in 2010 suggested that 7% of municipalities had experienced a decline in their population base since the previous Census in 2005 (Yano Tsuneta Ki-nenkai 2011: 67–68).

Table 1. Growth in the Number of Japan's Sister City Links, 1989–1999 and 1999–2009

Areas with which links exist	Number of sister city links			Change expressed as a ratio (by dividing the figure for the latter year by that for the former year)	
	1989	1999	2009	between 1989 and 1999	between 1999 and 2009
United States	229	408	434	1.82	1.06
China	115	262	332	2.28	1.25
South Korea	27	76	123	2.81	1.62
Australia	38	91	108	2.39	1.19
Other countries	284	508	579	1.79	1.14
Total	688	1345	1576	1.95	1.17

Source: Calculated by the author using data from *CLAIR,* available at http://www.clair.or.jp/e/indexd.html in May 2009.

Many of these changes can also be seen in Australia, with amalgamations being imposed on municipalities in Victoria in the 1990s. The informal feedback I have received from interviews and other sources is that many Japanese municipalities, like their Australian counterparts, have had to reconsider some activities owing to financial pressures. As for English language teaching assistants and international coordinators coming to Japan on the JET program, those numbers also peaked between 2001 and 2003, apparently for similar reasons. Even at the national level, some of the work of bodies such as the Japan Foundation, which stands at the cutting edge of Japan's person-to-person and cultural exchanges with the rest of the world, has had to be curtailed owing to budget cuts.

One other piece of evidence comes from the author's very small exercise in content analysis comparing the focus of articles in two Japanese journals (*Toshi mondai* [Issues Facing Municipalities]) and (*Chihō chiji* [Local Government]) over the last decade. Articles listed in the table of contents in each journal were analysed for 48 issues in 1996–1999 and then for 48 issues in 2006–2009. Although a fuller analysis must wait for another occasion, some preliminary findings are shown in Table 2. The limited discussions I have had with experts in the field suggest to me that *Toshi mondai* provides the more robust test as it has a more popular focus that deals with current topics appealing to a wider audience interested more generally in local government. *Chihō chiji* is seen as a more academic journal which is less swayed by public opinion and slower to reflect changes on the "front line". At this stage, one might conclude that *Toshi mondai* shows a clear drop in international focus whereas *Chihō chiji* shows very small change, too small to be deemed significant. The hypotheses which emerge from these data are at best tentative, and beg more comprehensive testing in terms of the general public, perhaps through the close examination of a journal such as *Chūō kōron* (although the emphasis here is on what is seen as making sense for local governments which serve a demographic that is different from that of *Chūō kōron's* readership).

Table 2. Percentage of Articles in *Toshi Mondai* and *Chihō Chiji* Mentioning or Focusing on International Connections in Their Titles

Mention or focus indicated in the title	Toshi mondai		Chihō chiji	
	1996–1999	2006–2009	1996–1999	2006–2009
●**International mention (number of articles in which relative word appears)**				
Sister cities	0	0	0	0
国際・国際的・国際化・グローバル化	0	3	5	0
外国人・外国銀労働者	3	1	0	0
21世紀・世界	1	0	1	0
その他	18	2	19	33
Total	22	7	26	33
●**International focus**				
Sister cities	0	0	0	0
国際・国際的・国際化	0	1	4	0
外国人	3	2	0	0
21世紀・世界	0	0	0	0
その他	12	4	16	22
Total	15	7	20	22
●**Other foci**				
Economic/Regional development	22	22	5	5
Particular industry（例えば、地場産業）	2	11	0	0
Government（例えば、分権の課題）	29	29	72	63
Provision of civil / Social services	34	32	2	8
Total	87	94	74	76
Grand total	100	100	100	100
N (number of articles)	381	545	272	228
Number of issues	48	48	48	48

Notes:
(1) The unit of analysis is the article; each article was given just one value.
(2) The classification of articles according to whether a certain term did or did not appear was fairly straightforward; in no cases did two or more such terms appear in a title.
(3) Deciphering the focus was less straightforward; some article titles contained an international-type term, although the article itself did not deal much at all with non-Japanese phenomena. Accordingly, the number of articles mentioning something international was greater than the number focused on something international.
(4) Because the percentage figures have all been rounded, the line totals do not necessarily equal exactly the subtotals and the grand total.

The descriptions just provided may not be the full picture, but one impression emerging is that attention has shifted away from person-to-person exchanges at the local level to the role of popular culture—especially manga and anime—as the most contemporary expression of Japan's soft power. The suggestion is that a very important part of Japan's post-war diplomacy is being turned over to the market for such culture.

From the outside it is easy to oversimplify, but it seems to me that two major forces are at work. One emerges from the economic changes associated with Japan's lost decade, changes that are likely to be universal in nature: the financial pressures felt in many advanced economies as the opening of global

markets have been accompanied by a greater demand for public accountability and the rationalization (e.g. outsourcing) of many kinds of public services. As populations age and the cost of pensions and related social services rise, the challenge to welfare states such as Greece, the United Kingdom, Ireland, France, Portugal, the United States and Japan mounts. The *shiwake* (budget cutting) exercises both in Australia and in Japan have exposed the vulnerability of the very small budgets allocated for sister city type exchanges in the public area. The second consideration is in no way less political, and is indeed the source of that vulnerability: namely the difficulty of quantifying the benefit or economic return that flows from cultural exchange to the public at large. This situation does not bode well for the future of Japan's sister city ties. While this may be of importance in terms of national interest as Japanese firms seek a competitive edge abroad, it is also a matter of importance for those who live in and want to support local communities in an increasingly globalized era. The remaining sections of this paper are an attempt to explain why that is so.

3. Seeking a Rationale for Japan's Sister Cities: Toward an Explanatory Model

In the limited literature on sister city relationships, two related themes emerge. One concerns the matching of municipalities and the likely factors accounting for success in a relationship; the other concerns the benefits that are likely to flow from such relationships. The rationale for establishing such a relationship lies in the assessment of those two dimensions.

Cremer et al. (2008) suggest that sister city relationships evolve through three stages. The first centres on a loosely defined notion of fostering international friendship and cross-cultural understanding. The promotion of person-to-person exchange is usually a first step. The relationship then enters a second stage when groups and organizations institutionalize those links, often with the injection or addition of cultural exchanges of various sorts. At this stage the relationship comes to have a momentum of its own. The third stage comes with the introduction of commercial interests. The authors argue that this progression was evident in their case study of the relationship between Hastings in New Zealand and Guilin in China.

O'Toole (2000 and 2001) laid out a generationally defined model, arguing that the first "associative stage" (combining phases 1 and 2 of the Cremer et al. model) appeared in the 1960s and 1970s, when the global goal was international friendship, and there was a perception that a municipality's economic goals would eventually require an international dimension. In his view, this is followed by a "reciprocative stage" with educational exchange becoming a goal and the involvement of various NPOs at the local level representing a "safe haven approach." His third stage is the commercial stage of "place marketing," which involves the recognition for a local municipality of its value as a "brand." This is seen as an important strategy as the wider economy becomes more globalized. He adds as a fourth stage a period during which cost-benefit assessments come to be made, but notes that only six of eighty Australian municipalities in his study had developed a formal mechanism to ensure such an evaluation occurred. Summarising the perspectives presented in those two articles, the general model that was derived is presented below in Figure 1.

Research by Martin (2003) indicated that broader medium-range economic benefits might flow from sister city ties. Based on the US experience with Japan, his research found that, among the nearly

forty American states maintaining an office in Japan, those states having more municipalities with sister city ties to Japan did significantly better at exporting to Japan than states embracing fewer such links. It was the number of such ties at the city level, rather than the budget or the nature of activities associated with an American state's representative office in Japan, that made the difference. A number of studies show that effective relationships are those that can meld educational/cultural activities with the implementation of significant economic initiatives. However, such studies have demonstrated that a quantitative relationship (i.e. a correlation) exists, but they do not elucidate the exact nature of the processes that constitute the chain of causative events, leaving one to ponder whether the causation flows in the opposite direction.

Past studies have focused mainly on the larger cities, which emphasise "place marketing" and strategic cooperation. The data of Tsutsumi and Mouer (2010 and 2011) on smaller municipalities in Australia, however, reveals that the selection of cities abroad to partner with has often been driven by non-economic considerations. As a result, it is only after the fact that the importance of suitably re-jigging such relationships has come to the fore, as the parties involved have come to see the need to derive economic advantage from such ties if the relationship is to develop any further, or indeed, if it is to survive at all. Using examples from Japan, Tabe (1998) illustrated ways in which sister city relationships might serve to enhance the social and economic possibilities in local communities. They include the exchange of information about the development of tourism in rural areas, the challenges of aging and the gender imbalances in many rural areas (a problem being tackled in innovative ways by a number of small rural municipalities in Japan), and the exchange of agricultural technologies.

An earlier test of the model shown in Figure 1 by Mouer and Tsutsumi (2010 and 2011) found that the evidence from sister city relationships between 17 Japanese municipalities and their counterparts in Victoria, Australia, indicated that the paths of causation might be run in a different direction (as shown in Figure 2. Interviews in Australia and in Japan suggest that at both ends of the relationship those responsible were struggling with financial/budgetary pressures, and groping for what might become the next stage in the development of their sister city relationship.

The remaining part of this paper argues that one scenario for local governments in Japan might be to engage their sister city counterparts in programs that would help to prepare citizens in their jurisdictions, especially young people who are so vital for the future of such communities, for what is likely to be a continuing process of globalization for Japan. In painting this scenario, it is helpful to step back and look at some facets of Japan's globalization and the opportunities on which local municipalities might capitalize.

Figure 1: Model of How Sister City Relationships Develop (A la Rolf Cremer et al. and O'Toole)

| Instigation of cultural relations | → | Institutionalization of cultural exchanges (e.g. student exchanges or the regular sharing of artwork) | → | Incorporation of commercial dimensions | ⇢ | Evaluation and fine tuning |

Figure 2: Victorian Model of How Sister City Relationships Have Developed and/or Are Likely to Develop

Instigation of cultural relations / Introduction of commercial dimensions → Institutionalization of cultural exchanges ⇢ **?** → Information exchange / More instrumental use of exchanges / Place marketing

4. Some Ideas about the Requisites for Japan's Globalization and Opportunities for Local Government to Serve Their Constituencies

A common adage is that without learning from the past people are doomed to repeat it. Today, however, the speed at which the world is changing makes more difficult, and individuals and governments alike often find that such assessments are too time-consuming and will only leave them further behind and unable to escape their past. Two aspects of change are particularly pertinent for local governments.

One concerns the extent to which similar technologies and organizational structures are resulting in an increasingly common set of challenges for local governments, particularly those in small rural communities. The mega trends are increasingly similar: urbanization, aging populations, the changes in gender roles, among others. Globalization aside, these trends present municipal governments and civil society at the local level with a growing list of challenges that can better be met by sharing information with similarly placed communities around the world. Transport, information and communications technologies facilitate the sharing. In the past, Japanese governments, particularly at the national level, and business firms have been fairly adept at going abroad and "cherry picking" the best that the world has to offer. They have been less adept at evolving bilateral exchanges of mutual benefit. For example, overly bureaucratized structures have no doubt slowed the process of incorporating non-Japanese into their operations. Coupled with the organizational inertia that is fostered by such structures are the relatively low levels of second language proficiencies required in order to keep up with developments abroad. Although in the past Japan has done extremely well borrowing from abroad and innovating with knowledge gained, Japan is now no longer catching up, and the world is changing in ways that are making it more difficult to simply take away the necessary information for free, or even to protect what information or technological advantage it might currently have.

This relates to the second facet of change: the interactive dimension. This dimension means that cross-national networking and transnational relationships are increasingly important in the flow of ideas. This is a dimension increasingly being picked up by Japanese corporations. However, although some individual firms (and that might be the best way to progress for the time being), they have not yet quite found out how best to undertake the changes now being required, and nothing approximating a national strategy has yet emerged from any of the peak employers organizations. The challenge is no longer a straightforward matter of learning what global standards might be and then responding as a national collective, as was often done in the past. The challenge now being faced is one of fully integrating or articulating with the emerging world system. As an industrial sociologist, I sense that the efforts to manufacture the necessary docking mechanism will create pressures that will alter substantially the way the corporate world is configured in Japan. This is an outcome that needs to be considered in more detail on another occasion.

The two sub-sections that follow develop the above ideas a bit further. The first considers challenges that have arisen wholly from changes within Japan but are commonly found in other developed economies and represent domains in which local governments can profitably share experiences with municipalities overseas. The second sub-section considers challenges generated from outside Japan; these are changes in the world beyond that challenge Japanese to respond. While these several challenges are often interpreted as being unwelcome pressure to change, and indeed are sometimes referred to as "*gaiatsu*" (meaning

"foreign pressure"), in this paper they are presented as opportunities.

4.1. Internationalization from Within

It is common for pundits focusing on Japan to refer to the 1990s as "the lost decade". For example, in the second edition of her otherwise excellent survey of Japan's modern history, the respected historian, Elise Tipton (2008), tends to paint a picture heavily tinted with the negatives of that decade—shortcomings that are being carried over into this century. To be sure, there was plenty of doom and gloom. But at the same time, some amazing transformations occurred. When mentioning the rising unemployment rate, for example, one needs also to see ways in which the employment system was changing. While pointing to continuing racism, no doubt encouraged some by nascent neo-nationalist undercurrents, one needs also to recognize the jump in inter-marriages—already accounting for 1 out of 13 marriages in Tokyo by 1991 (Kitamura 1997: 173)—and the shift away from the dominant pattern of Japanese women marrying American men. In terms of gender relations, Tipton's focus on the increased levels of domestic violence, must be balanced by acknowledging the positive changes that have occurred in notions of sexuality and the very significant decrease in sexual harassment in public domains.

While criticizing as dysfunctional the constant changing of the political guard as a merry-go-round of self-interested politicians keeping statesmen with a big vision for Japan at bay, Takahashi (2006) and others acknowledge ways in which room has been created for civil society and a broad range of voluntary service groups. The national government, once decisively leading the nation with heavy-handed administrative guidance and an extremely disciplined approach to social welfare, has receded considerably from the front lines. Whether this is because of incompetence, the revolving door of prime ministers or the financial constraints owing largely to the aging of the population and the associated costs, it is a process also underway in a number of other East and Southeast Asian countries. One outcome seems to be the widening of income differentials, and a number of *kakusa* becoming more pronounced. While being propelled by business-driven policies of deregulation, many of the related changes were set in motion largely by market forces (albeit with various power imbalances in Japan's segmented labour markets still in place). After two decades of propaganda about Japan as a middle class society, there has since the mid 1990s been a growing acceptance and awareness that inequality is a fact of life in Japan, and that the stratification mosaic in Japan was not too different from that found in other advanced countries. In Japan, the peculiarly Japanese forms which such problems took have come increasingly to be seen in terms of functional equivalents with commensurate phenomena to be found abroad. This change opens the door for the meaningful exchange of ideas concerning such issues as unemployment, and the new class of working poor and *furītā*, homelessness, environmental issues, *karōshi*, the financial pressures of population aging and the cost of pension systems, the exploitation of sub-contracted labourers in Japan's nuclear plants and in manufacturing more generally, the provision of medical benefits, bullying, disruptive behaviour or the drop in some kinds of academic excellence at school or the gambling of some sumo wrestlers.

Across a wide range of domains, the nihonjinron rhetoric of Japanese uniqueness was receding, giving way to a greater appreciation that most, if not all, of the above-mentioned problems were shared with other societies. To reiterate a point made above, one needs only to read a smattering of the Japanese

press in 2010 to sense the geographic spread being cited in the media. Alongside articles bemoaning Japan's massive debt and the general complacency with which the problem is being viewed by the general public in Japan are articles reporting on the Greek meltdown, the Hungarian comparison, the crumbling welfare model in Europe, Spain's overhaul of its labour markets, the welfare drag on the Israeli state, the move of global capital to low cost manufacturing in Indonesia. (Manufacturing costs in Indonesia are now lower than in China, and are starting to cause a "hollowing out" in a country that only one or two decades earlier contributed to the hollowing out of high cost Japanese manufacturing.) The key concept is presented as the "new austerity" but, in one way or another, all these issues have to do with the ability of each society to generate economic surplus in ways that are socially acceptable. As one might expect, an undercurrent in reporting is the resentment that ordinary people feel toward those who have accumulated wealth "at their expense". This frustration is simultaneously aggravated and blunted by the complexities of world production systems and financial and trade interconnectivities. As recent newspaper article noted, privately accumulated Chinese surpluses that are not shared with the poor in China (or with the state as their keeper) ended up in the US and facilitated the bad lending policies, which later give way to a banking crisis affecting the demand for Japanese exports to that country. People in small communities around the world struggle to understand those complexities, and often find it easier to swallow the parochially generated stereotypes associated with life in rural small-town communities around the world. That in itself is a challenge for municipal governments. The sense that there is some universality in the push for austerity stands juxtaposed with the fact that Japanese society as a whole has throughout the lost decades been able to maintain a very high standard of living that supported a range of increasingly diverse, but globally connected, life styles or life courses, especially in terms of IT-generated pop culture, so prevalent among younger generations around the world.

The impact of the 1990s has been twofold. One fold is the awareness of commonality with other societies. While not necessarily picked up by local governments, this has led to a new openness on the part of individuals willing to experiment with a wider range of personal choices. Through work-holiday schemes, for example, young Japanese have extensively experienced life "outside the system," and have made cross-cultural connections and learnt about new ways from what was happening outside Japan. At the same time, governments have been left behind with pressing financial realities. One result may have been that government, taxpayers and local communities have to some extent become inward looking. Such a conclusion would be consistent with the findings presented above in Table 2. This seems to have been particularly true of local government. As responsibility for many welfare functions was devolved under what is referred to as the "*bunken* exercise" accompanying the administrative reforms of the late 1990s, the amalgamations during early years of this century left many local administrators wondering about how to define their legal responsibilities after the realignment of the bureaucracy. The leeway to think about international affairs at the local level seems to have diminished considerably.

4.2. Internationalization from Without

Until recently, a similarity shared by Japan and Australia was the difficulty of picking up a morning newspaper and finding a sequence of front pages that did not have a reference to the USA. That has certainly changed in Japan. The USA is still there, but that coverage is buttressed by constant reference to

China, and to a lesser extent South Korea. More subtle is the increased attention given to India further back in the print media. This shift in attention is not driven by an interest in the shared problems being uncovered by internationalization at home. Rather, it is an awareness—maybe a xenophobic fear (as suggested by recent concerns that a cashed-up Chinese might start buying up Japanese real estate)—that the gap is closing on Japan's economic competitiveness in international markets (which increasingly are coming to include the once highly protected Japanese markets).

The current discourse regarding strategies that will improve corporate competitiveness in a globalized world has at least two bases. One grows out of a slow warming to the idea that a population more literate in English is inevitable. A slowly building commitment to English language education can be seen at all levels, and follows several decades of heavy investment in Japanese language education for foreigners. Perhaps as a public relations exercise, that strategy was very successful, but a cost-benefit analysis would likely reveal that it was simply not producing the numbers of native level users that Japan is likely to require for its global interface in the near future. Japan struggled to draw the 100,000 overseas students targeted for its educational institutions in the late 1980s. Rather than investing further in undergraduate programs with supplementary Japanese language units for foreign students, the emphasis over the past decade has been to develop high-level postgraduate programs that could be taught in English. In the corporate world, several firms have declared openly their commitment to making English the language for internal communications. Rakuten and Uniqlo are the most recent companies of note to join that still small group. Sony and Nissan are perhaps the best known examples of Japanese firms that have called in overseas talent to head their companies.

As mentioned above, China and South Korea are seen in the Japanese media as the two societies most vigorously "taking the game up to the Japanese" at the present time. It is often pointed out that it is no longer enough for Japan to rely on its technological advantage. The advantage of China and South Korea is in the ability of their employees to network abroad. In this regard, special attention has been paid to Samsung's program of sending large numbers of new recruits overseas for extended periods, not to work but simply to study and acculturate themselves in a range of different societies. Obviously, some of those employees opt to follow other paths after two years or so abroad, perhaps marrying locally and not returning home to continue working for Samsung. However, rather than cutting such deserters off, ways are found to maintain affiliations and keep them within the Samsung network of contacts for future use. As for China, many of its most successful entrepreneurs also have their contacts among the widespread Chinese diaspora abroad. In the background is India, a society that has developed a solid competitiveness in the software service industries by having in place the systems and a pool of workers with the English language skills necessary to set up huge call centres. In commenting on India's development of overseas markets, Vizciany (2006) describes how the Indian IT industry benefits from the networks formed by former Indian students who remained behind in the US and who, after twenty years working in American firms, are now in positions of influence useful to the emerging industry "back home." It is the absence of these networks that puts Japanese firms at a distinct disadvantage in today's global economy.

Improving English skills and extending interpersonal networks internationally are only part of a strategy for Japanese firms. They will be increasingly pressured to open up to having non-Japanese employed as regular full time staff. Achieving that will no doubt require employment practices that

remove a number of barriers—most noticeably the door to tenured positions, but also practices that provide certainty regarding housing and pension issues as well. What does "one that…" refer to? One approach is to aggressively recruit and hire bilingual foreigners. I suspect that the pool of such persons with the right business skills and good enough Japanese is still too small to meet the needs of a rapidly globalizing corporate sector in Japan. In this regard, however, it should be noted that an academic association interested in the teaching of business Japanese formed in 2010. The other approach is to make English the language for internal business communications in Japanese companies seeking full engagement with the business world abroad—if not across the board, then at least for the higher level meetings and important business communiqués, reports and other documentation. At the present, the number of Japanese firms that have already moved in that direction is small, and there is probably a large enough pool of bilingual or semi-bilingual Japanese to satisfy their immediate needs for communicating (as opposed to interacting) with business partners and other organizations abroad. But that will not serve as a long term efficient solution that attaches a premium on interactive engagement. It is too early to detect a megatrend, but perhaps the writing is on the wall.

5. The Challenges/Opportunities for Local Government

In the preceding section I have tried to sketch a likely scenario for Japanese society as a means of indicating the kind of context or milieu in which local governments will be challenged to serve their communities. The demands on local governments will be various, but central to any plan or policy designed to revitalise a local area—or to maintain such vitality as an area already has—will need a vision as to how Japanese society at the national level is being impacted by, and responding to, the facets of globalization outlined above. By the late 1990s, the international initiatives of local governments were beginning to draw attention. Their involvement in international affairs was highlighted by a number of scholars, of whom the most notable perhaps were Yabuno (1995), Jain (1991) and Jain et al. (2006). Although local governments may have withdrawn some from the front lines of Japan's global engagement in terms of their support for JET programs and for sister city exchanges, the need for them to remain involved has not diminished. There is ample reason for municipal governments in Japan to remain involved in the cross-cultural training of their younger citizens, especially in terms of their English language competencies and their capacity to be part of larger cross-national networks. Failure to do so will position small local communities at a severe disadvantage in the new global stratification system that is emerging.

Here two facets of that system might be mentioned. One is the urban-rural, or megacity-small city, dichotomy. Small regional communities are finding it difficult to articulate a favourable "glocal nexus" in nation states bent upon branding themselves along with their major cities as "international." In Japan, local revitalization (*saiseika* or *kasseika*) is a major issue. To deal adequately with the set of challenges these processes involve, local communities need to retain their most able human resources, and combat the brain drain to the globalized city. As this suggests, small municipalities face a catch-22 situation. Training their youth in the requisite skills and providing the necessary knowledge and experience that will allow them to facilitate their local community's global engagement are not only costly. They will always carry the risk that youth, so trained and so exposed to the outside world, will migrate permanently to urban

centres that offer more opportunities for an even fuller international career.

Another related facet is the emerging pattern of the rural-urban *kakusa.* Already ample attention has been paid to Japanese society as a "*kyōiku kakusa shakai,*" an approach to social organization that ties wealth to education and then education on to the creation of additional wealth in a circular fashion. We learn from the economics of education that this arrangement is by no means unique to Japan. Not only is higher education concentrated in Japan's urban centres, but the content is shifting so that an even greater premium is placed on the use of English. Even without reference to the rural-urban gap, we can see that this dimension will produce a two-class system with (i) an elite that is bilingual and able to work and live globally and (ii) a monolingual group of citizens who will work for the elites and rely on their interpretation of how the global system works and what their own community can expect from the global system. When the rural-urban cleavage aligns with the monolingual-bilingual cleavage, the crevice between the two groups will widen and provide the dynamic for a new kind of tension. In this regard, a good deal has been written about multinational corporations that become worlds unto themselves, shifting resources—goods, people, work, and financials assets—with little regard to national interests and even less for small local communities. It will be interesting to see how the emerging bilingual elites deal with issues of personal and national identity in the new world system.

In conclusion two types of opportunities are opening up for local governments. One is to build into their sister city relationships mechanisms for the useful exchange of information with similarly positioned governments overseas. The other is to develop exchange programs that promote not just second language acquisition but also the skills and attributes required for cross-cultural networking. For such an approach to be effective, however, ways must be found to foster, strengthen and maintain local identities and affinities in those so trained. Finally, returning to the initial propositions concerning the benefits of simple cultural exchange, Japan's local governments should not overlook the benefits that flow to Japan as a whole from their relationships. These are the warm feelings of friendship and goodwill toward Japan that underpin many of Japan's efforts abroad. As China and South Korea begin to flex more economic muscle, it is this type of soft power that may well buttress Japan's efforts to enjoy full global partnerships in the twenty first century. The challenge for local governments in Japan is to quantify those benefits, and then to pressure national governments to pay for the value added that is created for the nation.

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Beyond Protest:
Proposal-Style Citizens' Movements in 1970s and 80s Japan

Simon Andrew Avenell

1. Introduction

From the mid 1970s, the language and strategy of Japanese citizens' movements began to change. Rejecting what they viewed as the inadequate logic of protest in earlier social movements, citizen activists conceptualized, articulated, and implemented a new proposal-style (*teian-gata*) of activism. Rather than accuse the state and corporate Japan of exploitation or environmental destruction, activists encouraged citizens to channel their energies into the creation of self-sustaining alternatives working within the system, in the process, laying a foundation for less idealistic and more efficacious social activism. Instead of tackling power head-on, activists suggested that movements get behind the wall of domination and use the tools of the system to change the system—what one activist graphically conceptualized as "giving up on ideological masturbation" and "going to bed with capitalism."[1] To give focus to their novel approach, activists in the mid 1980s coined the term "proposal-style citizens' movement" (*teian-gata shimin undō*), contrasting this with earlier "accusation-style" (*kokuhatsu-gata*) movements.[2] Though ultimately replaced in the 1990s by the language of "civil society," "NGOs" and "NPOs," the idea of proposal-style activism was important because it succinctly articulated activists' single-minded attempt to transform the prevailing language and strategy of social movements. But more than this, the idea of proposal became a kind of blueprint for activism in later decades promising, as it did, success through the hazardous tactics of engagement and symbiosis.

The shift in language and strategy poses some intriguing questions for the historian of social movements, particularly in the context of Japanese history after the student upheavals of the late 1960s. What was the nature of social movement change? Why was change perceived as necessary? Who effected the change? And, to what extent did the change involve substantial divergence from over two decades of earlier citizen activism? Herein, I put forward some initial answers to these questions through investigation of an organic produce distribution movement at the center of the proposal generation, the Association to Preserve the Earth (*Daichi o Mamoru Kai*; hereafter Daichi). I show how activists' ideas and their articulation in written forms of communication, such as movement pamphlets and articles in the mainstream media, were central in conceptualizing the language and strategy of social movements

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[1] Interview with Takami Yūichi, 17 June 2002. Also see Takami Yūichi. *Deru kui ni naru: NGO de meshi wo kū* (Tokyo: Tsukiji Shokan, 1998), pp. 12–43.

[2] "Seikatsu Teian-gata Shimin Undō no Atarashii Nami." In *Asahi Journal* (1 August 1986), pp. 16–21. The term "proposal-style citizens' movement" can be directly attributed to Takami Yūichi of the Japan Recycling Citizens' Association (Takami interview, 17 June 2002).

in the wake of a decade of "accusation" and "protest." Socio-economic change, conservative political institutions, and earlier citizen activism all played a role in facilitating the new movements, but it was leaders' ideas that most directly stimulated the transition to proposal-style grassroots activism.[3] From a broader historical perspective, this paper reveals how the proposal generation forms a crucial link between the citizen and resident protests of the 1960s and 1970s and the NPO/NGO activism so conspicuous in recent years.[4] By nurturing activists and legitimizing a pragmatic approach to social activism, citizens' movements of the 70s and 80s became prototypes for Japan's non-profit organizations in the 1990s. Indeed, citizen activism, I argue, did not disappear after the residential movements of the 1970s, only to miraculously reappear two decades later in the form of professional civil society organizations. Instead, it charted a course that lead away from protest in the direction of less antagonistic and, arguably, more effective social movements.

The key to bringing about substantive change, activists argued, was a civil society comprised of effective—that is, results-producing—social movement organizations (SMOs), manifest, for example, in the "citizen enterprise" (*shimin jigyō*) model adopted by key movements. Herein, SMOs were conceived of as profitable (or at the very least, financially self-sustaining) independent entities pursuing realistic and realizable agendas such as recycling, peace, nuclear power, organic food distribution, and support for the disabled. The leading lights in the creation of model citizen enterprises were Daichi (organic food, 1974) and the Japan Recycling Movement Citizens' Association (recycling, 1977), while the Dandelion House Foundation (*Tanpopo no Ie;* support for the disabled, 1973), the Peace Boat initiative of Tsujimoto Kiyomi, the activism of self-described "citizen scientist" Takagi Jinzaburō, and other similar movements, extended the proposal model into other areas not so easily "commercialized." The following table provides a breakdown of issues for movements that proactively associated with the discourse and praxis of proposal-style activism.[5] Note how broad systemic issues relating to "democracy" or "rights" now took a backseat to specific material issues rooted in everyday life. Here the proposal generation followed a trend already emerging among the myriad of local residents movements from the late 1960s. But different to these, 1970s and 80s activists made intentional efforts to avoid the strategy of protest.

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[3] My approach to ideology and its influence on social movement mobilization and development has been greatly enriched by a growing body of sociological literature on framing processes. Specifically: David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford. "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment." In *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol. 26 (2000), pp. 611–639; David A. Snow et al. "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation." In *American Sociological Review*, vol.51, no.4 (August 1986), pp. 464–481; and Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison. *Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991).

[4] Other than studies on regional anti-pollution or anti-development movements, there is a dearth of Japanese language scholarship synthetically tracing the development of citizens' movements from the 1970s through to the emergence of the NPO sector after the enactment of the NPO Law in 1998. Some Japanese activists I interviewed speak of the 1970s and 1980s as the "citizen movement ice age" (*shimin undō fuyu no jidai*).

[5] The professionalization of Japan's social movement sector from the 1970s mirrors a similar process in the US theorized upon by Zald and others under the rubric of resource mobilization. Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy. *Social Movements in an Organizational Society* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1987).

A List of Issues for 1300 Citizens' Movements in 1986 [6]

Natural soap	300	Medical	58
Collective purchasing	289	Politics (local and national)	56
Environment and conservation	249	Information networks	55
Village and town revitalization	162	Recycling	49
Agriculture	153	Anti-smoking	48
Energy (including anti-nuclear activism)	132	Fruit and vegetable stores	39
School lunches	125	Welfare	37
Pollution	108	Women	37
Consumer issues	98	Assistance to developing nations	33
Safe milk	87	Freedom of information	15
Food	81	Okinawan issues	15
Education	63	Cultural / performance	9
Peace	59	Other	13

As important as the new array of issues, however, was the overtly pragmatic approach these movements adopted toward internal organization, and also toward conservative political, economic, and legal institutions. Within movements, activists argued that citizens need not cling to amateurism, and that professionalism was the one realistic path to the autonomy so idealized by earlier generations of activists. Similarly, this pragmatism carried over into activists' approach to the outside world. Reacting to and learning from what they perceived as the fatally-flawed praxis of protest, activists began to assert that change could only happen if movements adopted a realistic approach to institutional power. *Kyōsei*, or symbiosis, became the symbolic expression of this approach. If movements wanted to succeed, they would simply have to tap into—or, at the very least, learn to live with—the power concentrated in bureaucracies, political parties, and corporate Japan, regardless of ideological colors. In short, any ally was a good ally, and any resource potentially useful.

To an extent this pragmatism was nothing new. Citizen activists, from at least the 1950s, displayed a pragmatic impulse both ideologically and in the realm of nuts-and-bolts activism.[7] But in the hands of 1970s activists, this impulse took on specific connotations. It implied that citizens' movements would be far better off if they abandoned rigid idealism or fruitless protest and focused on changing the things they could. Devotion to principles was certainly admirable, but in the end what really mattered was the condition of the ordinary individual in everyday life. The system needed to be changed, no doubt. But change, activists argued, had to begin at home in the "small universes" of daily life—what the intellectual and activist Tsurumi Shunsuke some decades earlier had called a bugs-eye, as opposed to a birds-eye, approach to social activism.[8]

As it turned out, pragmatism was an important choice since it would have historical repercussions

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[6]   This data is drawn from a list of 1309 citizens' movements compiled in Banana Bōto Jikkō Iinkai, ed. *Inochi, shizen, kurashi: Banana bōto—Mōhitotsu no seikatsu o tsukuru nettowākāzu no funade* (Tokyo: Hon no Ki, 1986), pp. 162–226.

[7]   Ui Jun, for example, suggests that pragmatism was a common feature among resident protest movements in the late 60s and early 70s. Ui Jun. *Kōgai genron: Gappon* (Tokyo: Aki Shobō, 1990), p. 10.

[8]   Oda Makoto. *Nani o watashitachi wa hajimeteiru no ka* (Tokyo: San'ichi Shobō, 1970), p. 88.

well beyond the movements at the center of the proposal generation. On a practical level, such movements certainly opened a window to the professionalization of civil society and the legitimization of certain kinds of citizen activism, but in the realm of ideology and public discourse, the appeal and subsequent spread of pragmatic social activism served to narrow further a discursive field already wounded by the popular backlash against violent and ideological social movements in the late 1960s and early 1970s. To use Alberto Melucci's words, proposal movements "broadcast" a new "message" to society, which reconfigured the obligatory association of protest with social movements and the seemingly natural antagonism between capitalism and progressive causes.[9] The impact of these two developments—one strategic, the other ideological—on Japanese democracy and civil society is still playing itself out today.

2. The Background to Proposal-Style Citizens' Movements

Underlying the emergence of proposal-style movements were a cluster of environmental, economic, and social transformations in Japan during the 1970s, all of which filtered into activists' pragmatic ideology and strategy. The environmental crisis from the late 1960s was certainly a key factor, but so too were the value-transforming impact of affluence, the legacies of earlier social movements, and the impact of new ideas on grassroots networking imported from abroad. These factors shaped the environment in which activists formulated their new pragmatic ideology by providing a recipe of strategies, a listening audience, and a bank of learning.

The Environmental Crisis: The environmental crisis of the late 1960s and early 1970s was a crucial facilitating factor in the emergence of proposal-style movements. After a "miraculous" decade of sustained high economic growth during the 1960s, Japan was one of the most polluted nations in the industrialized world with inordinate emission rates for toxic gases such as nitrous oxide. The country's rivers and bays became dumping grounds for industrial waste which, as in the infamous case of Minamata Bay, reentered the food chain reeking havoc on the ecosystem and surrounding human communities. In fact, by 1973 there were some 3,000 local residents' movements protesting against environmental pollution in one form or another. By 1970, pollution had reached such proportions that it became a national political issue. Late in that year the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was left with no choice but to pass some of the most stringent anti-pollution laws in the industrialized world in what was to become known as the "Pollution Diet." Fourteen pieces of legislation submitted for debate were enacted into law with some modification. The legislation covered a broad range of pollution issues including roads, waste management, pesticides, sewage, national parks, and even noise levels.

The mass media also chimed in to the new concern with pollution. The number of articles mentioning "pollution" (*kōgai*) in the *Asahi shinbun* increased dramatically from 84 in 1965 to 2,506 by 1970.[10] Reflecting the rising public concern, from 1974 through 1975, the same newspaper ran an influential serialized novella by the author Ariyoshi Sawako, titled *Fukugō osen* (Complex Pollution). This personal account by Ariyoshi set out in graphic and minute detail the structure and logic of environmental pollution in Japan. But most importantly, for the first time, it turned the spotlight on consumers as

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9   Alberto Melucci. "A Strange Kind of Newness: What's 'New' in New Social Movements?" In Enrique Larana et al., eds. *New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), p. 102.

complicit "aggressors" (*kagaisha*) in the pollution problem, opening the way for self-examination and, later, individual action.[11] Many in the proposal generation cite Ariyoshi's novel as important not only in awakening them to their complicity in the pollution problem but, more significantly, in opening their eyes to the kinds of realistic solutions ordinary citizens could propose. In this sense, Ariyoshi's work was significant because it opened a new discursive space previously dominated by the logic of accusation and protest.

Coupled with this attention in political and media circles, the proposal generation benefited greatly from less overt, though nonetheless significant, socio-economic transformations underway in 1970s Japan. Affluence clearly facilitated new concerns with respect to health and the environment in mainstream consciousness—concerns which activists skillfully incorporated into their message of proposal. Moreover, Japan's high-growth economy, which on the one hand liberated middle-class women from the household and on the other virtually excluded them from the full-time workforce after marriage, quite inadvertently created a mobile, highly educated, and socially-attuned constituency toward which proposal activists could direct their message.[12]

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[10]   Articles in the *Asahi shinbun* mentioning pollution by year:

Year	Articles #	Year	Articles #	Year	Articles #
1965	84	1969	408	1973	1410
1966	170	1970	2506	1974	782
1967	177	1971	1892	1975	1253
1968	230	1972	1644		

My thanks to Chikako Miyamoto of International Christian University for extracting this data from the *Asahi shinbun* CD article database.

[11]   Ariyoshi Sawako. *Fukugō osen* (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1979).

[12]   Trends in the nationwide surveys on the Japanese national character provide supporting evidence for changing values with respect to Nature. Respondents were given three choices with respect to the relationship between man and nature: in order to be happy man must (1) follow nature; (2) make use of nature; (3) conquer nature. In 1968, on the eve of the environmental crisis, response percentages were 19%, 40%, and 34% respectively, but by 1973 they had shifted to 31%, 45% and 17% respectively. In other words, there was still strong support for the idea that nature should be utilized, but less support for the idea it should be conquered and more support for the idea it should be followed. If we trace these figures through to 1998, we find that now 49% believed nature should be followed, 39% believed it should be utilized, and only 9% believed it should be conquered.

	Follow Nature	Make Use of Nature	Conquer Nature
1953	26	41	23
1958	20	37	28
1963	19	40	30
1968	19	40	34
1973	31	45	17
1978	33	44	16
1983	36	47	11
1988	42	44	9
1993	48	38	7
1998	49	39	6

Adapted from Research Committee on the Study of the Japanese National Character. *A Study of the Japanese National Character: The Tenth Nationwide Survey* (Tokyo: Institute of Statistical Mathematics, March 1999), p. 51.

Thus, by the mid 1970s, public consciousness vis-à-vis the negative impact of economic development was extremely high as a result of, first, protest movements which exposed rampant pollution, second, government legislation to alleviate this, and third, exponential attention in the media. This national awakening, together with socio-economic changes afforded by affluence, provided a favorable opportunity for activists who could come up with practical solutions or alternatives to the prevailing logic of "violent" industrial development.

Social Movement Legacies: The pragmatic strategy of activists stemmed in large part from their visceral reaction to the movements of the 1960s. Activists learned first hand the limits of social activism, and by consequence, the kind of strategies likely to end in failure. The radicalization and ultimate suppression of the student movement was key because many in the proposal generation either cut their activist teeth during this period, or witnessed its unfolding in the national media. Activists such as Fujita Kazuyoshi and Fujimoto Toshio, who established Daichi in 1974, joined the ranks of the student movement from the latter half of the 1960s when university upheavals reached their peak. As Fujita later recalled, infighting among student groups and the turn in public opinion against students after the violent clash with police at Tokyo University in 1969, forced him to rethink the very notion of social activism. That he and other radicals such as Fujimoto ended up with jail terms only reinforced this feeling. "I learned the limits of accusation and protest in a visceral way," Fujita remembers.[13] Indeed, the message was clear: the structure of conservative rule was almost impenetrable through frontal assault—particularly when supported by constituencies anesthetized by the spoils of growing affluence. Activists who could shed their radical skin and adapt to the conservative environment survived and their ideas came to dominate the social movement sector, while those who could not disappeared along with their message. This was the reality imparted by the 1960s.

Many activists also cite their visceral reaction to the postwar consumer movement as a source of motivation. Fujita Kazuyoshi of Daichi felt that the consumer movement's carte blanche support for consumer issues blinded it to the wider socio-economic structure of mass production and mass consumption. In his interpretation, the consumer movement was ultimately about cheaper prices, and in this sense, really just another player in the market system. Its failure to engage with producers—to see their problems, to empathize with their plight—made the movement into just one more "aggressor." As Takami Yūichi of the Japan Recycling Movement Citizens Association pointed out, proposal-style citizens' movements were almost an "inevitable" reaction to such movements: "[W]hen I looked at the failure of the student movement and the accusation-style of the consumer movement, I thought to myself 'this is wrong'," Takami explains. "One reason for the decline of the consumer movement was its failure to make any proposals to society. I really dislike the term consumer movement. People don't live in the world to merely 'extinguish' and 'use up.' I believe the next movement—the next stage of our engagement with society—will emerge through the very denial of the notion of 'consumer.' In that sense, I really want

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[13]   Interview with Fujita Kazuyoshi, 3 April 2002.

to end our attachment to the consumer movement."[14]

Yet proposal generation activists were not only reacting to the downfall of the student movement, and nor was earlier social activism wholly negative or devoid of useful strategies and ideas. Though the student movement never achieved its revolutionary goals it was the formative social movement experience for proposal movement activists. Student radicals learned important skills as they forged movements independent from the Japan Communist Party (JCP). Instead of marching to the JCP-led tune, students took independent control of their campus movements in the 1960s. In the process, they learned how to mobilize participants and manage resources—skills put to good use as they pursued new activist careers in the 1970s.[15]

Activists also found the tried-and-true tactic of movement promotion through grassroots publication—he so-called *mini-komi*—an extremely effective means to spread information about their movements. Publications of *mini-komi*, as opposed to *masu-komi* or the mass media, exploded during the 1960s in the wake of the US-Japan Security Treaty protests. Originally mouthpieces for grassroots pacifism and opposition to the treaty, many ultimately shifted focus to issues of democratization in daily life. With the advent of chronic pollution from the late 1960s, *mini-komi* became mouthpieces for local opposition, helping to forge ties and build activist networks among geographically separated residents' movements. Proposal generation activists skillfully adopted the *mini-komi* form, using similar homegrown publications to articulate their new ideology to target groups.[16]

Important too, were the ideological legacies of earlier movements, and in particular, ideas associated with the *shimin* or citizen activist. Here again, the proposal generation's novelty was clearly contingent upon an extant historical legacy. Central in the ideology of proposal-style citizens' movements were notions of internal democracy, individual responsibility, autonomy, horizontal organization, political non-alignment, and part-time participation. These were not new ideas. Indeed, grassroots activists had been debating, testing, and refining such issues from at least the 1950s when small cultural and learning circles (*sākuru*) began to mobilize in workplaces and in association with academic groups. The Security Treaty struggle in 1960 also proved to be important in this ideological development as activist-intellectuals attempted to define the contours of a new political subject different from the student activist, the party member, or the proletarian.[17] Intellectuals such as Tsurumi Shunsuke and Kuno Osamu spoke for the first time of "political citizens" (*seijiteki shimin*) who were motivated not by devotion to a vanguard-produced

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[14] "Extinguish" and "use up" are the two characters for the Japanese compound meaning "consume" (*shōhi*). Instead of *shōhisha* (consumer) many in this generation and after prefer to use *seikatsusha* (lit. "daily life person"), a term close to Habermas' "inhabitant of the life world." Banana Bōto Jikkō Iinkai, ed. *Inochi, shizen, kurashi: Banana bōto—Mōhitotsu no seikatsu o tsukuru nettowākāzu no funade*, 16–17; Jürgen Habermas. "New Social Movements." In *Telos*, no. 49 (1981), pp. 33–37.

[15] My thanks to Patricia Steinhoff for this insight.

[16] For a historical discussion and introduction to some representative *mini-komi* see Maruyama Hisashi. *Mini-komi no dōjidaishi* (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1985).

[17] See Wesley Sasaki-Uemura. *Organizing the Spontaneous: Citizen Protest in Postwar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001), for a detailed study on the significance of the Anpo protests in postwar citizen activism.

ideology, but rather, a pragmatic attachment to daily life as an autonomous realm worth defending. Such ideas reverberated among many normal individuals who felt unease with the domestic and international implications of conservative rule, yet were unwilling to align themselves with the established left.

With the advent of the anti-Vietnam War movement, *Beheiren*, from the mid-1960s, ideas on citizen activism reached new levels of sophistication, as intellectuals like Oda Makoto redefined the ordinary citizen as both an "aggressor" and a "victim" within postwar Japanese society. *Beheiren*, with its loose organizational style and focus on individual responsibility and action, turned the critical eye inwards, using this self-reflexive posture as a basis for social activism. Though the proposal generation turned away from the anti-establishment rhetoric and praxis of *Beheiren*, it clearly drew on the movement's self reflexive impulse. Thus, we must recognize that underlying the conceptual breakthroughs of activists in the proposal generation was an almost two-decade long intellectual legacy addressing the fundamental questions of agency, ethos, organization, and strategy within citizens' movements. In their eagerness to promote newness, proposal generation activists more often than not overlooked these important legacies imparted by decades of earlier activism.

Learning from Abroad: Finally, the proposal generation also drew on strategies and conceptual developments from abroad, particularly networking theory imported from the United States. Through such theoretical discovery, activists learned how their self-styled networking model could become a tool for overcoming the disadvantages of smallness, decentralization, and institutional rigidity. Practical guides to networking theory, such as Lipnack and Stamps landmark work, *Networking: The First Report and Directory*, were translated into Japanese almost as soon as they were published abroad, and activists traveled to the US and Europe to study the activities of domestic and international non-profit organizations.[18] Such exposure taught activists that SMOs need not cling to amateurism and informality as marks of authenticity. The US example proved that pragmatic professionalization led to sustainability and not necessarily cooptation. The question, of course, was whether or not such models could work within Japan's conservative institutional environment—a challenge activists began to take up from the early 1970s.

3. Case Study: The Association to Preserve the Earth

Theoretical Foundations

In 1974, Fujita Kazuyoshi was very much an activist in search of a movement. Born in Iwate prefecture in 1947, he went on to study at Sophia University in Tokyo. Fujita entered university at a crucial moment in the history of postwar Japanese social activism. His experiences in the increasingly radical student movement became the foundation of his approach to social activism. "Our 60s and 70s style struggles were an attempt to overcome modernism (*kindaishugi*)," Fujita recalls, "but looking back,

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[18]   Jessica Lipnack and Jeffrey Stamps. *Networking: The First Report and Directory* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1982). Lipnack and Stamps also visited Japan in the mid 1980s to discuss networking on the invitation of Japanese citizen activists (Interview with Harima Yasuo, 22 April 2003).

I don't think we ever transcended the framework of modernism we were trying to overcome."[19]

The student movement experience convinced Fujita that accusation-style movements were ultimately self-destructive, since dogmatism ruptured their sensitivity to daily life. Outright opposition, regardless of its ethical purity, did not produce anything and in the end amounted to no more than self-indulgence. As the dispute at the New Tokyo International Airport at Narita proved—a dispute in which Fujita became involved as a student radical—opposition only led to stalemate, and in some cases, violence at the hands of the state. The mistake of student radicals at Narita had been to focus on broad, abstract issues such as "Japanese Imperialism" or the "*Amakudari* State." In fact, the Narita problem, Fujita eventually concluded, could only be solved as a single issue in its own "small universe." To be sure, Narita was linked at the very deepest level to the political and economic structure of conservative rule, but this did not automatically demand a movement of similar scale. The failed history of the student movement proved this. Complex modern societies were built on a basis of many smaller embedded universes. Social movements, to be successful, would have to attack the overall problem by engaging in specific problems located in specific universes. But Fujita's views on social activism were not only shaped by the legacy of radicalism. For Fujita, both the labor and the consumer movements had gone too far in the opposite direction. By replacing ideals with specific demands—wage rises, shorter working hours—they were ultimately coopted by the system, becoming nothing more than economic utilitarians.[20] The consumer cooperative was a typical example in Fujita's view: by focusing on the consumer with little or no regard for the producer, such movements helped sustain the system of mass-production and mass-consumption, and by connection, the intensive use of pesticides. Falling for the rhetoric of the "free market," coops became perpetrators and aggressors, compelling farmers to use pesticides and synthetic fertilizers. Surely, Fujita thought, there must be an alternative to the extremes of radicalism and utilitarianism.

It was around this time in the early-1970s that Fujita met a doctor engaged in natural pesticide research, and subsequently hit on the small universe of "food" and "agriculture" as one way to reform the universal via the specific. After all, the small universe of food represented a "central artery" (*kansen*) in the process of life, so it should also be a concentration of all the contradictions in wider society. Through a social movement focused on "food and agriculture," Fujita believed he could realize "specific universality" (*gutaiteki fuhensei*). Of course, on a practical level, the object need not necessarily be food. As Fujita remarked: "Right now, we are dealing with agricultural problems, but medicine and education are exactly the same." In the same way that farmers and consumers form alternative systems, so too could doctors and patients, or schools and students. The point was that overall problems needed to be tackled through specific universes.[21]

Fujita translated the idea of small universes into his model of an SMO. On the one hand, SMOs needed to become self-supporting (*jiritsu shita*). In terms of internal structure, movements had to discard

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[19]   Fujita Kazuyoshi and Komatsu Kōichi. *Inochi to kurashi wo mamoru kabushiki gaisha* (Tokyo: Gakuyō Shobō, 1992), p. 53.

[20]   Ibid., p. 80.

[21]   Ibid., pp. 80–81.

the old pyramid-style in favor of a series of inter-linked, yet autonomous, localized movements. On this point, Daichi could draw on the earlier experience of movements such as Beheiren, which experimented with a loose network style in the 1960s. But Fujita developed his notion of movement self-support to include an economic element, which went beyond earlier citizens' movements. Once again, he drew on the bitter experience at Narita Airport. There students had had to rely on membership fees to pay for necessities such as helmets and weapons—hardly a sustainable source of income. True independence, as Fujita saw it, was nothing other than the creation of "material strength" internally. So long as movements relied on donations and "free lunches" (*gochisō*), their members would not become independent. Activists had to "aim for an organization whereby people can earn a living via the movement, wherein they can feed themselves via the movement." This philosophy ultimately led Fujita and his associates to the idea of incorporating Daichi into a stock company—a move which took it beyond the limits of earlier cooperative and citizens' movements.[22] Takami Yūichi of the Japan Recycling Movement Citizens' Association succinctly articulates the logic behind such decisions: "[O]ver the past ten years I have continuously restated the easily-misinterpreted idea of 'making a living through citizens' movements' (*shimin undō de meshi o kū*)….I don't think the popular term volunteer (*borantia*) should be valorized.…I just want citizens' movements to give up the idea that everyone has to bring their own lunch. I can't go along with such dogma. Underlying the idea of 'making a living through citizens' movements' is our desire to raise societal awareness vis-à-vis the existence of so-called NPOs….To put it rather crudely, company employees work for the organization, NPO activists work for society."[23]

But, on the other hand, while Fujita's model of an SMO called for self-sufficiency, it also warned of the dangers of "communalism" (*kyōdōtaishugi*). The ultimate aim was to provide an alternative to current socio-economic realities so, from the very outset, Daichi's leaders aimed at an open, network-style of movement in touch with wider society. If Daichi created an exclusive commune of farmers and consumers, it would lose touch with the mainstream. Fujita wanted to bring about social change through activism in specific social universes, but he did not want to create social movement islands. Harima Yasuo of the Dandelion House movement for the disabled echoed a similar sentiment: "[W]e realized that Japanese organizations have a tendency to end up like Maruyama Masao's 'octopus pots,' so that is why we imported networking theory from the US." "Networking gave us an opportunity to relativize ourselves and keep things in perspective. Once [our networks] became internationalized, we could compare Japan with the outside world." Like Fujita, most in the proposal generation were convinced that only open-ended movements could overcome the tendency for organizational isolation in Japanese citizens' movements.

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[22] Ibid., pp. 83–84.

[23] Takami carried this same sentiment into his campaign for an NPO Law from the mid-1990s while a member of the House of Representatives. Instead of an NPO Law, Takami originally wanted an NGO Law (Non-Government Organization) because the latter would allow civil society organizations to purse profits and "make a living" (Interview, 17 June 2002). He makes a similar argument in his book, *Deru kui ni naru: NGO de meshi o kū*. For the original quote see Banana Bōto Jikkō Iinkai, ed. *Inochi, shizen, kurashi: Banana bōto—Mōhitotsu no seikatsu o tsukuru nettowākāzu no funade*, pp. 34–35.

Fujita thus imagined Daichi as a principled, yet pragmatic and open movement that would avoid the dual polarities of idealism on the one hand, and economism on the other. Of course, balancing ideals and economics would not be easy. Would members be willing to pay more for produce because it cost farmers more to grow organically? Would they accept deliveries of insect damaged produce as part of their involvement in the movement? Would they part with the convenience of going to the supermarket to purchase any kind of produce they desired? These were real challenges facing Daichi's leaders as they attempted to grow their movement from the mid 1970s. In the end, success would hinge on two factors: the formation of realistic solutions to these problems, and the degree to which they could convince potential members that these solutions were indeed realistic—in other words, the persuasive power of their discourse of proposal.

Members and Shareholders: Mobilizing a Movement

From its inception in 1975 until early 1977, Daichi operated on a customer base of only 200 to 300 people, roughly organized into about 20 collective purchasing stations in the Tokyo area.[24] The fact that 200 to 300 people would join their movement gave Fujita and his colleagues confidence in the quality of their produce and their message. But the reality was that with such small numbers the movement would never be self-sustaining. If Fujita's ideas were to function as a truly effective mobilizing force they needed to reach a wider audience than that provided by word of mouth.

The solution came in April 1977 when, with support from the Seibu Department Store, Daichi held a "Pesticide-free Vegetable Fair" in the store's *Shopping Park* at Ikebukuro station in Tokyo. Together with vocalist Katō Tokiko, "guest salespersons" included actress Nakayama Chiatsu, actor Ei Rokusuke, commentator Yoshitake Teruko, and novelist Nosaka Akiyuki.[25] Fujita views this vegetable fair as a crucial event in Daichi's development. After attention in the mass media, the member base surged immediately from 300 to around 800 and, more importantly, Daichi's message now reached many more ears than it had to date. As Fujita recalls: "We figured that if these 800 members told just ten friends about the movement we would be able to reach self-sufficiency." His prediction turned out to be correct: what was a movement of 20 stations before the April event rose to 200 member stations by late 1977, comprising a total membership of over 1,000.[26]

But this spectacular growth brought with it a new set of challenges that forced Fujita and his associates to rethink their developmental plans for Daichi. While the movement was still small it could rely on financial support from Fujimoto Toshio and his celebrity wife, Katō Tokiko. But as operations expanded Daichi's leaders realized the limitations of relying on individuals—particularly in matters financial. In simple terms, Daichi could not continue to grow if it remained an informal "association." "We couldn't even borrow money to buy a delivery truck—Fujimoto had to do it in his own name," Fujita recalls. Economic realities thus called for some kind of organizational transformation.

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[24]   Fujita interview, 3 April 2002.

[25]   Fujita and Komatsu, *Inochi to kurashi wo mamoru kabushiki gaisha*, p. 65.

[26]   Fujita interview, 3 April 2002.

Until the enactment of Japan's Special Nonprofit Organization Law in 1998, civil society organizations in Japan were stifled by "one of the most antagonistic regulatory frameworks among industrialized democracies."[27] Specifically, articles in the 1896 Uniform Civil Code made it extremely difficult for civil society organizations to gain legal status as so-called nonprofit public-interest legal persons. In effect, this meant that groups either had to remain informal (in a legal sense) or, in some cases, choose the path of incorporation. While the former path was certainly less complicated, as Daichi discovered in the late 1970s, the lack of legal status proved a significant barrier to organizational expansion and sustainability. The path of informality meant that groups could not "open bank accounts, hire staff, own property, sign lease agreements for office space, undertake joint projects with domestic government bodies, or even, on a mundane level, lease a photocopy machine."[28] In Daichi's case, it was not only a photocopy machine, but also a delivery truck. Moreover, as the number of staff members increased, questions relating to labor standards and staff insurance also surfaced. Operating as a "private store" (*kojin shōten*), while simple, obviously had its limitations.

It was around this time that Fujita and his associates began to meet together regularly on Fridays to discuss their ideas for the future of Daichi. These meetings, which they informally called the "Friday Group" (*Kin'yō no Kai*), ultimately laid the foundations for Daichi's organizational structure and the Association's ideas vis-à-vis the organic movement in Japan. The Friday Group's brainstorming on organizational form reveals how ideas were a crucial factor shaping the strategy of proposal and the approach of such movements to conservative institutions.

As the Friday Group discussed Daichi's options, they realized there was another possible organizational form: the consumer cooperative. But as Fujita explains, from the very outset the group was opposed to the coop form on a number of ideological grounds. First, legal stipulations meant that becoming a cooperative would have forced Daichi to break up its operations into legally independent prefectural units. Division, all agreed, would only produce isolated prefecture-level "octopus pots" with little need to interact outside their own membership of producers and consumers. This conflicted with the group's concept of networking and represented the kind of "communalism" that Fujita wanted to avoid. Second, the cooperative model potentially diverged from Daichi's ideal of organizational independence. Official recognition by prefectural bureaucracies as a lifestyle cooperative union, the group worried, might ultimately compromise Daichi's independence.[29] Third, the consumer cooperative model conflicted with Daichi's vision of the organic food movement. In the end, consumer cooperatives were only interested in price. They may give lip service to the plight of farmers, but when push came to shove, they always came down on the side of the consumer and lower prices. Conversely, Daichi was in search of a holistic solution that embraced, rather than accused or ostracized, farmers, so conversion into

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[27]   Robert Pekkanen. "Japan's New Politics: The Case of the NPO Law." In *Journal of Japanese Studies*, vol. 26, no. 1 (2000), p. 111.

[28]   Ibid., p. 113.

[29]   In my meetings with Fujita he repeatedly expressed his desire to avoid any bureaucratic interference in Daichi's operations.

a consumer cooperative made no sense at all.[30]

Similar ideological reservations, coupled with legal restrictions on membership numbers and capital base, also prevented Daichi from becoming either a corporate juridical person (*shadan hōjin*) or a legally incorporated foundation (*zaidan hōjin*). The only pathways were to remain a "private store" or to incorporate as a stock company (*kabushiki gaisha*). In September 1977, Fujita and his Friday Group chose the latter. The influence of legal barriers certainly was a key factor in this decision. But we miss some important details if we fail to take our analysis beyond the effect of such institutions. Indeed, institutions can only partly tell us why Daichi rejected the cooperative model. Moreover, they tell us almost nothing with respect to the specifics of the company Daichi ultimately created. After all, how would the Association to Protect the Earth—a group which claimed to be an alternative to the leviathan of mass production and mass consumption—maintain its principles, and at the same time adopt an organizational form that lay at the very heart of the modern market system?

The answer, as it turned out, lay in the past, as Daichi drew on the pool of strategies formulated by earlier movements. By loosely implementing a single share system (one share per member), similar to that used by *Beheiren*, Minamata activists, and other movements in the early 1970s, Daichi could simultaneously avoid creating "oppressive violent capital," and promote its basic principles of individual participation and internal democracy. Daichi would use the single share model to propose a different style of company driven not by the bottom-line desire for profit, but instead, the transformation in patterns of agriculture, distribution, and consumption. As Fujita explained, stock capital was really an empty vessel into which the modern market had inserted its own interpretation. But this was not the only interpretation possible. Drawing on Beheiren's reconceptualization of the "share," Daichi could propose a new kind of company and in the process become the model for a new socio-economic order.

The adoption of a single share model, according to Fujita, solved one of the greatest flaws of Japanese social and cooperative movements. Previously, employees (*shokuin*) in unions, coops and the like were not considered members of the movement. Officially, they were merely office staff. "In reality, however, [they] controlled the movement, and this produced Japanese style bureaucratization. Members had no agency. Instead, office bureaucrats, under the guise of officialdom—indeed by brandishing this pretense (*tatemae*)—skillfully manipulated movements." But Daichi Incorporated would be different. Staff would be shareholders too, empowered to make proposals and guide the movement openly as equals with consumers and producers. If consumer-members failed to exercise their rights as shareholders, they could potentially lose out. Of course, in reality, Fujita expected that this system would lead to more rather than less participation, creating an environment in which all members took responsibility for pursuing their own interests. This would make Daichi different from run-of-the-mill, for-profit stock companies.

The articulation of innovative ideas by Fujita and other leaders at this stage proved crucial in translating the Friday Group's ideas into reality. Drawing on, and further developing, ideas and attitudes that had been percolating within citizens' movements for over two decades, Daichi's leaders set about

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[30]   Fujita interview, 3 April 2002; Fujita and Komatsu, *Inochi to kurashi wo mamoru kabushiki gaisha*, pp. 104–105.

reframing their movement as a professional, locally-organized network of like-minded individuals. Leaders consciously avoided rigid ideological discourse in favor of a pragmatic ethos based on the affirmation of daily life. In keeping with the movement's support for Japanese farmers, Daichi set about convincing consumer-members that limited use of pesticides was unavoidable given current realties, and hence had to be accepted. Instead of an all-or-nothing approach, Daichi argued that eradication of pesticides was a goal to be achieved through cooperation between consumers and producers. The Association would only ask members to do what they could. Farmer-members would promise to avoid pesticide use "as much as possible," and consumer-members would partially sacrifice their freedom of product choice in return for a promise of variety and safety. But, as explained above, the most innovative proposal of the Friday Group was to convert the organization into an incorporated stock company with thousands of single shareholders: in other words, to transform citizen activism into a capitalist project.

Daichi's leaders presented their ideas for the stock company to members in September 1977 in a proposal titled "For the Development of a New Life Industry." Members would be asked to invest 5,000 yen for a single par-value share in the company. Fujita decided on this amount because, on the one hand, this was the minimum level required to raise the necessary capital, and on the other, was an amount housewives could invest without their husbands' knowledge. Moreover, as Fujita explains, it was an amount housewives would probably be willing to lose in the event the company went bust. The following extract from the 1977 proposal is a typical example of the discursive strategy used by Daichi to conceptualize its new social movement model, and for this reason deserves reproduction at length.

For the Development of a New Life Industry

Building on the experience and achievements of two years of [Daichi] activism, we intend to establish "Daichi Incorporated." Rather than simply another stock company, we want to create an organization in which everyone will participate, and in that way protect the interests of all people connected to the company. Producers, consumers, and those who contribute at the distribution stage will all be the shareholders who form this "stock company contributing to the lives and health of people." [Our enterprise] will not be [based on] the questionable "bottom-line profit motive," and opposition between producers and consumers will be non-existent. This is because [our] company's first priority will be to "guard the interests of shareholders." […]

We will establish "Daichi Incorporated" to protect life and health, and also as a lively dialogue with nature. This company must not start out as one which protects the interests of a particular group, or is manipulated by a specific stratum of people. To this end, the following represent the founding principles of our company. By staying faithful to these principles, Daichi Incorporated will be able to fulfill its social mission and its social responsibility.

(1) Daichi Inc. will proactively contribute to the reconceptualization of diet, which sustains human existence, and agriculture, which sustains societal existence. Moreover, by growing, distributing, and consuming safe, delicious, and nutritious foods we want to fulfill our responsibility toward the current age and the future.

(2) In keeping with the aspirations our age, Daichi Inc.'s primary principle will be "to protect life and health." We will do this by protecting nature, by harmonizing social relations, and by doing work that, in terms of human daily life, is self-fulfilling.

(3) Daichi Inc. must be run so that the flow of people, goods and information is not impeded. By impediments, we refer to bureaucratized and exclusionary human relations, speculative trading of produce, or secretive, misleading use of information. We will establish Daichi Corporation as an "open stock company" (*hirakareta kabushiki gaisha*) without impediments to the flow of people, goods, or information. It will be a corporation engaged in a landmark endeavor.[31]

Daichi's mobilizing efforts were extremely successful. At a par-value of 5000 yen, Daichi Inc. managed to raise 16 million yen—a total of 3,200 shares. Katō Tokiko invested 4.5 million yen, making her the largest shareholder with some 900 (26%) shares. This meant that the remaining 2,300 shares were spread among a membership approaching 2000—close to Fujita's ideal of a single share distribution.[32] On 3 December 1977, shareholders in the new company met at Daichi's office in a Baptist hall in Shinjuku. Answering criticisms in the media and from other grassroots organizations, Fujimoto Toshio—Daichi's first president—defended the decision to incorporate on the basis of "movement independence" and because this decision would "create a movement in which producers and consumers were united." Moreover, unlike agricultural associations (*nōkyō*) or consumer coops (*seikyō*), Daichi Inc. would not be bound by bureaucratic rules and regulations.[33]

Defending the Message of Proposal

Of course not all corners of society agreed with Fujita's idea of SMOs becoming stock companies. From the time they first aired the idea until at least the mid 1980s, Daichi's leaders came in for severe criticism from both producer and consumer organizations. Beginning in the early 1980s, Daichi faced a constant barrage of criticism from the Japan Organic Agriculture Association (JOAA) for "creating unnecessary barriers between consumers and producers," and from the consumer movement for its decision to become a stock company instead of a coop. Moreover, in 1982, Daichi came under the spotlight in the mainstream press when a high-circulation monthly magazine, drawing on discord within the movement, published an article questioning the very validity of the movement's supposedly "organic" produce.

Fujita and his associates were quick to respond to these criticisms since they realized the survival of the movement depended as much—if not more—on the legitimacy of Daichi's message as it did on the authenticity or "organic-ness" of farmers' produce. As explained above, Fujita wanted to create a movement, first and foremost, to transform consumer attitudes, so from the outset movement ideology and its articulation by activists received close attention. This was true of most other movements claiming

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[31]   Fujita and Komatsu, *Inochi to kurashi o mamoru kabushiki gaisha*, pp. 107–109.

[32]   Katō Tokiko's shares were later sold to individual members.

[33]   Fujita and Komatsu, *Inochi to kurashi wo mamoru kabushiki gaisha*, p. 109.

to propose alternatives in the early 1970s: proponents of recycling had to justify the use of second-hand goods in the face of rising affluence; peace activists needed to convince a skeptical audience that grassroots dialogue between nations was a productive alternative to official diplomacy; and advocates for the physically and mentally impaired had to explain how disabled people could be creative and productive in a complex, technological society. In short, the challenge for the proposal generation was to convince a skeptical public that politicians, bureaucrats, academics, and corporate leaders did not have a monopoly on innovation, and that normal people could change their society from the bottom up using strategies other than protest or revolution; hence, the vigor with which Daichi and others responded to critics and defended their proposals in the public sphere. Though certainly a threat to the authenticity of Daichi, external criticisms actually had a positive impact in that they forced Fujita and others to clarify to their constituency just what a "proposal-style citizens' movement" meant in practice.

Daichi's greatest public challenge came in the form of an exposé titled "Distinguishing the Facts and Falsities of Natural Foods" in the October 1982 edition of the monthly magazine, *Ushio*.[34] The article's author, Hiraoka Yōichi, claimed that the recent boom in "natural" "safe" foods was, in fact, built on a series of untruths. Specifically, he declared that organic producers regularly used synthetic fertilizers and pesticides, and that organic retailers were well aware of this practice. Moreover, based on his own investigations, Hiraoka pointed out that the label "pesticide-free" did not amount to "non-pesticide use," but merely that inspected produce did not reveal significant residual levels. "In other words," he argued, "the vast majority of processed foods [in organic stores] are by no means pesticide-free. It is simply that no residual pesticides are detected."[35]

Hiraoka laid out his attack on Daichi towards the end the same article under the ominous subtitle "Organic Farming Laid Waste." Here Hiraoka recounted his experiences in the farming town of Tamazukuri in Tochigi prefecture. "I heard about Iida Mitsugu, an organic farmer in Tamazukuri-chō who was extremely upset about dishonest practices among other organic farmers, so I decided to pay him a visit." Hiraoka described how Tamazukuri-chō had become a kind of "organic farming Mecca." Local farmers contracted with distributors—primarily Daichi—who in turn delivered their produce directly to consumers and organic retail outlets in the Kantō region. He explained how Iida had engaged in organic farming for about ten years, during which time Daichi distributed his produce. But as a result of Daichi's "halfhearted" (*iikagensa*) practices he withdrew from the organization about a year ago. According to Iida, of the fifteen or sixteen organic farmers in Tamazukuri-chō, all were "phonies" (*inchiki*). Iida based his criticism on four facts. First, farmers did not make their own compost but merely spread manure and in some cases human feces. As a result, produce was easily diseased, and in the end most had no choice but to use pesticides. Second, tomatoes and cucumbers were being cultivated in plastic greenhouses. Third, it was common practice for organic farmers to purchase damaged produce from regular farmers and ship it as "organic." And fourth, in the same way, organic farmers often purchased damaged produce on the retail market and reshipped it as "organic produce." And even worse, Hiraoka claimed that Daichi

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34 Hiraoka Yōichi. "Shizenshokuhin no uso to hontō no miwakekata." In *Ushio* (October 1982), pp. 182–191.

35 Ibid., p. 184.

"knows full-well of these practices and yet it remains silent."[36]

Hiraoka recounted his visit to one of the farms in the area with Iida Mitsugu. "The cucumber leaves were infected with Donwy Mildew and had turned a yellowish color. Actually, most of them were withered. There was a large plastic greenhouse with a boiler attached, and inside tomatoes were being cultivated. To be sure, there was a sign outside reading 'Organic Farming Area.' There was a huge pile of black, solidified manure that had been exposed to the rain. 'This won't end up as compost, it will just rot,' Mr. Iida commented." But perhaps most damaging of all for Daichi was Hiraoka's interview with Horita Tatsurō, leader of the organic farming group that shipped its produce via the Association. "Of course, Mr. Horita didn't say that he *himself* was doing so," Hiraoka recounted, "but he admitted that others were using pesticides when he said 'there are various kinds of people selling vegetables on the premise of organic farming methods. Some of them use pesticides, some do not'."[37]

What then of Daichi's response? "The Association to Preserve the Earth does not deny the use of pesticides," Hiraoka reported. "But they say these are…vegetable-based, and moreover, are utilized far less than normal [farms]." For example, in the case of tomatoes, organic farmers working with Daichi only sprayed vegetable-based pesticides six to ten times in one growth cycle, as opposed to the normal practice of ten to twenty times. For bell peppers, Daichi farmers sprayed a maximum of three times as opposed to the usual six to ten times. Daichi admitted that its fruit farmers used synthetic chemical pesticides, but that they did so in a much reduced way. To Hiraoka's suggestion that such practices hardly differed from regular farming methods, the Daichi representative "cleverly" commented: "[Farmers] are required to report vis-à-vis fertilizers used for contracted produce, and we have faith in this. Though we do indeed contract with farmers, we do not contract with the totality of their fields. So it may be the case that they use pesticides and chemical fertilizers on areas not under contract."[38] For Hiraoka, however, the sum total of these practices in the "natural food" market ultimately left consumers with only one choice: "In the end there may be no other way but to purchase produce directly from an organic farmer you can trust and then clean it yourself."[39]

For Fujita, Hiraoka's critical article in *Ushio* was a classic example of the misguided accusatory logic of the 1960s, and while it posed a serious threat to Daichi's legitimacy, it also provided an excellent opportunity for Fujita to articulate Daichi's alternative model for production, distribution, and consumption. Fujita's response to Hiraoka appeared in the December 1982 edition of *Ushio*—two months after the original article. "From my reading of this article," Fujita began, "I can only conclude that the author, Mr. Hiraoka, has misunderstood today's organic farming movement in a fundamental way." As Fujita explained, the organic farming movement originally stemmed from a coming together of aspirations. On the one hand, consumers wanted to purchase safe produce, and on the other, farmers felt more and more uncomfortable with the pesticide-intensive agriculture demanded by the market. With the enactment of the Basic Law on Agriculture (*Nōgyō kihon hō*) in 1961, the Ministry of Agriculture,

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[36]   Ibid., pp. 188–189.

[37]   Ibid., p. 189.

[38]   Ibid., p. 190.

[39]   Ibid., p. 191.

Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) fervently implemented a policy of agricultural modernization. This policy, according to Fujita, was itself part of the more general postwar project of returning Japan to international society as a major industrial nation. Agriculture, like all other areas of the economy, was subject to a form of "forced industrialization." In return for their loyal obedience to this project, the government promised farmers a "bright future." But the reality, however, was different.[40]

"Seeing the affluent, convenient society of the cities, youths began to abandon farming villages […] With a decreased working population [farmers] had to rely more and more on mechanization, pesticides, and chemical fertilizers." Furthermore, "produce in short supply was imported, all in the name of the 'international division of labor'." In return, Japan sent its textiles, electronics, and automobiles out onto the world market. "Japan achieved high economic growth as an industrialized nation; amid cries for mass production and mass consumption it made the 'affluent and convenient society' a reality—it was indeed a brilliant national policy." But there was a price to be paid for this national success: "convenience" obliged farmers to break with the natural cycle. Consumers wanted to eat tomatoes and cucumbers in winter and the only way to do this was with pesticides, mechanization, and chemical fertilizers. The result was new forms of plant disease, decreases in soil fertility, the creation of wasteland, and ultimately a kind of "vicious cycle of drug dependence" in agriculture. The more farmers relied on chemical fertilizers, the more they needed them. Moreover, constantly exposed to synthetic chemical agents, farmers themselves started to become sick. This, Fujita suggested, was the true legacy of MAFF's fanatical campaign for modernization in agriculture after 1961.[41] "But it's not that anyone [in particular] was to blame," Fujita pointed out, rather "this is how our pursuit of an 'affluent and convenient daily life' ended up. In the midst of high growth both farmers and urban consumers were gratified by convenience and affluence. [It was both] who promoted mass consumption, squandered natural resources, increased environmental destruction, and devastated agriculture to a point from which it could never return." All of this was the starting point of the organic farming movement.[42]

"More than anything else, a change in consumer mentality was called for….That is, an absolutely vital element of this movement had to be close cooperation constructed on a basis of deep trust between producers and consumers." Agriculture did not turn for the worse of its own accord. It happened, according to Fujita, because "[w]e Japanese, as a totality," demanded an "affluent and convenient society." "Without a second thought we gave our children food filled with preservatives because it was 'convenient and easy.' We used synthetic soaps. Without a hint of hesitation, we used electricity produced at nuclear power stations as though this was totally normal. We seized the latest electronic and manufactured goods that appeared [on the market] one after another. We continued to squander petroleum. If there is such a thing as a trend of the times, then we—all of us—joined together to produce this trend." Here Fujita approached the crux of his argument.[43] "The thing I want to problematize,"

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[40] Fujita Kazuyoshi. " 'Shizenshokuhin no uso to hontō no miwakekata' e no hanron." In *Ushio* (December 1982), pp. 328–329.

[41] Ibid., pp. 329–330.

[42] Ibid., p. 330.

[43] Ibid.

Fujita continued, "is Hiraoka's preconception that organic farmers must not use pesticides or chemical fertilizers….It is consumers' self-righteousness and lack of understanding of farmers that produces such a preconception….To simplify things, let's say for example that the farmers Hiraoka refers to are actually using pesticides and chemical fertilizers. What is missing from this article is any explanation as to why farmers are forced to use pesticides and chemical fertilizers [in the first place]." What Hiraoka failed to point out was that all Japanese—he included—were responsible for creating a system and a society in which farmers have no choice but to resort to such methods. "In other words, [Hiraoka] and I too are the aggressors (*kagaisha*) who create such a society. At the very least we bear some of the responsibility. This is something we need to realize."[44]

Sixteen years earlier in 1966, Oda Makoto first articulated his idea of the individual citizen as aggressor in the Vietnam War. Ariyoshi Sawako did this again in the early 1970s, characterizing consumers as aggressors. Now, in 1982, Fujita Kazuyoshi used the same logic to conceptualize Daichi's approach to consumption and production. But unlike Beheiren, and similar to Ariyoshi, Fujita and his associates took this logic beyond the realm of criticism and accusation. All Japanese—farmers and consumers— were implicated in the postwar project of economic growth and environmental destruction. Yet there was no ground to be made through continued accusation. Consumers needed to rethink their approach to consumption, they had to reconsider their role in creating the "vicious circle" of pesticide dependence and, above all, they needed to reappraise their own expectations vis-à-vis the kind of demands they would make on organic farmers.

Fujita, in fact, had been developing this logic since Daichi's inception in the mid 1970s under the rubric of organic produce as "food for thought" (*kangaeru sozai*). Within this alternative logic, an insect-damaged organic *daikon* radish was no longer "unsellable produce," but rather was conceptualized as "food for thought." As consumers removed insect-damaged portions, as they made allowances for misshapen produce, as they washed off residual soil—as they did all these things they would simultaneously learn something important about their role in the food cycle as produce moved from the field to the kitchen. Moreover, their acceptance of such produce would be a pragmatic expression of the desire to break away from their earlier role as consumer-aggressors. Thus, participation in Daichi was as much about transformation of individual values and practices as it was about obtaining organic produce. It is this emphasis on individuals changing, indeed, reforming, their own patterns of life that distinguishes Daichi and other cohort organizations from the 1960s generation of citizen activism. The critical eye turned inwards and became self-reflexive. But more than this, proposal generation activists put a pragmatic spin on this self-reflexivity, connecting it directly to real solutions in the real world. Fujita articulated this sentiment to members succinctly in 1981.

Obtaining safe produce is not in itself the objective of our movement. Rather, the origin of our movement is a reconsideration—through the process of obtaining safe-to-eat produce—of the age in which we are living and of our lifestyle. To this end, agricultural produce is our "food for

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44   Ibid., p. 331.

thought"….Nobody wants to eat vegetables covered in pesticides. But we too have played a role in creating this situation, and have no right to look at farmers and say: "Hey, your use of pesticides is a mistake!" Moreover, it should come as no surprise if we are criticized as personifications of egotism for racing back and forth in search of safe food.…Yet we are given no choice but to do so. We have no choice but to pursue safe foods, fully conscious of the fact that our behavior has been self-centered. Such humility is the only way we can avoid the error of succumbing to egotism. We need to escape from a world in which others are criticized and denounced, where people abuse each other, and fight for things.…You want organic vegetables, don't you? I want them too. Our movement will stand at its starting point for the first time, when we create a world in which people begin to think about what they can do together.[45]

The innovative ways in which Daichi's leaders answered their critics during the early 1980s were a crucial element in helping the movement solidify its social credibility as both a business and an SMO and, moreover, in establishing the legitimacy of the proposal generation's strategy. By 1985, Daichi boasted a membership of 3000, and after the introduction of an individual home delivery system that year, membership increased rapidly, currently standing at around 50,000.[46] To be sure, not all—or even most—of these 50,000 members consider themselves citizen activists. Most are ordinary people (mainly housewives) who join out of a desire to obtain safe produce. Most are probably not interested in laying the basis for a new civilization. Yet, as Fujita argues, Daichi members, simply by way of their membership, tacitly express their consent with respect to values that guide the organization's operations. By becoming members and by purchasing Daichi produce, consumers directly support Daichi's activist agenda and its message of proposal.

4. Conclusion

To the skeptical eye, Daichi's leaders may have "commodified" a set of ideas better left outside the market system. True or not, there is no doubt that the ideas themselves—and specifically, their pragmatic standpoint—appealed to target constituencies, influenced members' behavior, and ultimately, impacted on movement organization. When activists at the center of the proposal generation organized a cruise to the Islands of Okinawa in October 1986, they mobilized over 500 individuals from some 170 citizens' movements around Japan. Though the official aim of their cruise was to forge links with young organic banana farmers in the prefecture—hence the tour's title, *The Banana Boat Cruise* — it proved to be much more. For the first time, citizen activists openly, and with one voice, acknowledged the shift in grassroots social movement praxis from protest to proposal. In August of the same year, the high-circulation progressive weekly, the *Asahi Journal*, ran an article titled "The New Wave of Lifestyle Proposal-style Citizens' Movements," in which it announced that the Banana Boat Cruise would be "the very first networking space for proposal-style citizens' movements throughout Japan."[47] The hype was not

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[45] "Yūki nōgyō undō no atarashii nagare o tsukuru tame ni." In *Daichi*, no. 37 (10 May 1981), p. 1.

[46] Fujita interview, 3 April 2002.

misplaced. Together with activist groups on the cruise, over 1,300 other groups registered their names for a networking list to be published by *Hon no Ki*, a small Tokyo publishing house. As *Hon no Ki*'s owner, Shibata Keizō, later recounted, this in itself was a revolutionary event. "By 1986, most citizen groups weren't afraid to put such information in a list," Shibata notes. "They were no longer afraid that the government would put them on some kind of hit list. There was no risk in going public."[48] For better or worse, then, by 1986 the citizen movement landscape had undergone major changes, and it was activists themselves who had played a central role in effecting this change. And this brings us full circle to the questions raised at the beginning of this paper. What changed in citizen activism during this period, and why?

The question of what changed is obvious. On a discursive level, the language used by activists underwent significant transformation. "Protest," "demonstration," "opposition," "movement" and other such terms faded into the background, replaced now with ideas such as symbiosis (*kyōsei*), participation (*sanka*), activism (*katsudō*), and of course, proposal (*teian*). Coupled with this discursive shift, citizen movement strategy also underwent significant change. What we might call the "pragmatism of ends" came to dominate the social movement sector. Citizen activists began to tap into and engage with existing legal, economic and political institutions instead of blindly opposing them. When possible, they pursued strategies to promote financial independence and professionalization. Activists tended to avoid broad systemic questions, focusing instead on discrete issues. So, on the surface, at least, the movements of the late 1980s looked and felt a lot different to their predecessors in the 1960s and early 70s. The ways movements articulated their message and the strategies they adopted spoke to a remarkably new praxis in the social movement sector.

The question of why citizens' movements changed in the ways they did is more complex. At the broadest institutional level, there is no doubt that the conservative political and legal environment of post Red Purge Japan played a significant role in guiding activists away from the confrontational model of social activism; we might view the 1960s as a steep learning curve in this respect. The experience of the late 1960s not only shaped the realm of the possible but, more importantly, the realm of the imaginable, and hence we must account for the impact of such institutions in shaping the playing field for the new movements. On a more nuts and bolts level, the shift in activism also clearly benefited from the fruits of growing affluence during the 1960s and 70s. Affluence affected macrosocial value change, and this produced mobilizable constituencies for the movements of the 70s and 80s. But more than this, affluence and the reaction to affluence also produced new opportunities for the activist community in areas as diverse as recycling, aged care, and organic foods. In a sense, the new issues raised by the shift to post-industrialization guided the focus of the social movement sector. So the availability of resources—constituencies, finances etc.—also helped to stimulate the shift from protest to proposal. Here the Japanese experience mirrored a similar process in the industrialized nations of the West, where social

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[47]   "Seikatsu teian-gata shimin undō no atarashii nami." In *Asahi Journal* (1 August 1986), p. 21.

[48]   Interview with Shibata Keizō, 27 June 2002.

activism shifted from protest to more mainstream strategies.[49]

However, as I have argued throughout this paper, the transformation in citizen activism during the 70s and 80s was not merely an epiphenomenon; nor can it be explained entirely in structural terms. As the case of Daichi reveals, activists made key decisions within the bounds of institutional limits and available resources—decisions which contributed to the overall shift in the social movement sector. Indeed, if we look closely at the philosophy behind many of these decisions—for example, the desire for movement autonomy, political neutrality, financial independence, or direct democracy—we discover that the citizen activists of the 70s, 80s and beyond, may not have been so different to their forebears in the "protest" generation. Unlike the analysis of academics, activists did not take a "glass half empty" approach to activism. In other words, they did not discard the earlier principles of citizen activism and recommence with the question: "How do we survive given the terribly constraining environment?" Their "glass half full" approach began with the question: "How do we organize ourselves and accomplish our goals in the way we want to, given the reality out there?" Working from this perspective, activists then sought out ways to preserve their principles on the basis of new strategies and new discourses. The case of Daichi is instructive here: leaders did not choose the stock company form by default. They chose it because the single share idea fit with their philosophy of an internally democratic and responsible movement. The ideas of activists were thus crucial factors in the shift from protest to proposal. But we should also recognize the fact that, in many cases, the impulses informing these ideas resonated closely with earlier grassroots ideology and activism in Japan. Activists certainly moved beyond protest, but they shared many principles with the diehard protestors of old.

So what then of the wider impact of the proposal generation? There are at least four outcomes we can tentatively label positive, and one, tentatively negative. First, through a combination of business entrepreneurship and idealism firmly rooted in daily life, proposal-style citizens' movements helped reframe citizen activism as a professional undertaking. In stark contrast to the movements of the 1960s, activists challenged the entrenched beliefs that indigence was proof of sincerity; that legitimate social movements should be funded by donations; and that profitability was somehow corrupting. The extreme version of such logic was that only profitable or financially self-sustaining movements are socially significant. For most activists, however, the primary implication was that social movements could legitimately and ethically pursue profits or professionalism, if this could support their agenda. From this perspective, proposal movements represent a historical "missing link" between the protest-based residents' and citizens' movements of the late 60s and early 70s and the NPO generation from the 1990s.

Second, by adapting to the realities of legal, political, and economic institutions, proposal-style citizens' movements forged a less confrontational relationship with traditional enemies, particularly

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[49] For more on the institutional (political opportunity structure) and resource mobilization approaches to social movements see, respectively: Doug McAdam et al. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings* (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne and Spain: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy. *Social Movements in an Organizational Society* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1987).

local and national bureaucrats, conservative politicians, and the business community. The pessimistic interpretation of this shift is that citizens' movements were co-opted and defanged. To an extent this is true, but we must also recognize the movement- and society-level benefits gained through symbiosis. The strategy of cooperation and participation opened doors in many prefectural administrations and national bureaucracies, and though this clearly suited the bureaucratic preference to "privatize conflict," it also arguably gave activists greater input into the policy-making process from the bottom up, introducing bureaucrats to new and innovative approaches to social problems, and forging mutually rewarding lines of communication.[50] And importantly, by removing the red stain from grassroots activism, symbiosis empowered activists to pursue their agendas with a minimum of official interference. In short, though limiting the range of choices, symbiosis made activism by small groups more effective than ever before. Further, over time, the combined effect of such activism arguably impacted on the attitudes of those in power with respect to citizen activism itself. Though anecdotal, the case of the Dandelion House movement for the disabled is instructive. As Harima Yasuo recalls, "in the 1970s bureaucrats treated us as though we were a front for the JCP or JSP." By the 1990s however, these same bureaucrats were bringing foreign dignitaries to Harima's organization, which they now described as a model of grassroots mobilization for the disabled in regional Japan.[51] The same might be said of the attitude of big business to the third sector in Japan.

Third, the proposal generation nurtured future politicians who would translate their 1970s and 80s activist experiences into progressive politics during the 1990s, most notably through their active participation in the drafting of NPO legislation after the Kobe earthquake in 1995. In fact, though the real drive for an NPO law began in earnest after the Kobe disaster, such activists were discussing the issue as early as the 1980s.[52] This new generation of *shimin-ha* (citizen-side) politicians injected a pragmatic idealism into policymaking that drew directly on their social movement experience during the 70s and 80s and, crucially, it was they who began the reconstruction of progressive politics in the wake of 1989 and the death of the socialist dream. These were the leaders who would translate the proposal experience into the public discourse on the third sector and civil society during the 1990s.[53]

Fourth, proposal movements helped attract new talent into civil society organizations by promising material compensation in return for activism. Through proactive pursuit of financial independence, Fujita, Takami, Harima, and others transformed the nature of participation in citizens' movements

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[50] For a fascinating case study on how minority groups maintain a degree of independence while simultaneously maintaining symbiosis with conservative bureaucratic institutions in Japan see Karen Nakamura. "Resistance and Co-optation: The Japanese Federation of the Deaf and its Relations with State Power." In *Social Science Japan Journal*, vol. 5, no. 1 (2002), pp. 17–35. On the issue of privatization of conflict see Susan J. Pharr. *Losing Face: Status Politics in Japan* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1990), particularly pp. 207–211.

[51] Harima interview, 23 April 2003.

[52] Various groups formed to discuss the legal and organizational aspects of networking from the mid 1980s. For example the Networking Study Group and the Networkers Conference both spent time looking at NPO legislation in other countries (Harima Yasuo interview, 23 April 2003).

[53] For example, Takami Yūichi and Tsujimoto Kiyomi both entered national politics after their activist experience.

by making it both possible and legitimate to "make a living" from social activism. Highly educated young people who might otherwise have chosen a traditional career path were now presented with valid alternatives in Japan's growing third sector, and some began to take the plunge. By the late 1990s the idea of a career in an NPO or NGO, while by no means mainstream, possessed a legitimacy unheard of during the 1960s and 1970s. The professionalized SMO models produced by proposal activists deserve some credit for this shift in attitudes.

But the legacy of the proposal generation is by no means the stuff of fairytales. After all, such activism was built on the premise of symbiosis—and symbiosis usually involves compromise. In this case, at least one of the prices paid was in the realm of ideology and public discourse, which brings us back to Alberto Melucci, who reminds us that, on a societal and even global level, social movements are far more than organizations for the attainment of specific ends. Indeed, a critical function of social movements is to challenge "the apparatuses that govern the production of information," and to prevent "the channels of representation and decision making in pluralist societies from adopting instrumental rationality as the only logic with which to govern complexity." In short, social movements must also address the "criterion of efficiency and effectiveness" as the "only measure of sense."[54] From this perspective, the proposal generation's open-armed approach to conservative rule and capitalism brings to mind the roughly-translated Japanese saying of "going for wool and coming home shorn."[55] In other words, could social movements really use the tools of the system to change the system? Or did use of these tools, by default, reduce the realm of the utterable—and in turn the doable—to a state of insignificance? In their effort to transform the losing strategy of protest, activists often failed to realize how, in the realm of public discourse, losing movements often have the loudest voice and most enduring legacy, and winning movements do not necessarily result in victory for society as a whole.

Despite the overwhelming shift in the public discourse of activists from the mid 1970s, earlier accusation- and protest-style movements continued to exist in an attenuated form, and even some of these now adopted the language of proposal and symbiosis.[56] Movements such as Daichi clearly defined a powerful, new, and overtly pragmatic model of social activism, strikingly different from the dominant movements during the 1960s. The question, of course, was whether the bet on pragmatism would truly pay off. To be sure, the anarchism inherent in 1960s movements, while certainly not effecting any change in the structure of conservative rule, at the very least, sustained an alternative discourse in a period when economic growthism ruled supreme. In a sense, protest movements kept the discursive universe open. Conversely, movement discourse during the 1970s and 80s cast a shadow over this earlier "reactionary" history, shifting attention from the problem *of* the system to problems *within* the system. What this discursive and strategic shift will mean for Japan's "civil society" remains an open bet.

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54   Alberto Melucci. "A Strange Kind of Newness: What's 'New' in New Social Movements?," p. 102.

55   Literally translated, the Japanese saying is "going for a mummy but coming home mummified."

56   One need only look at the language of the current-day Japanese peace movement to see how discourse has shifted. Antiwar demonstrations are now sometimes called "Peace Festivals."

The Ogasawara Islands:
Native Species and Environmental Protection

Nanyan Guo

Japan's Ogasawara (or Bonin) Islands 小笠原諸島, dubbed the "Galapagos of the East," are a group of oceanic islands situated in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. Many of their numerous indigenous fauna and flora are at the brink of extinction, mainly caused by human settlement and construction during the last half century. However, during the last decade, a movement to get Ogasawara registered on the World Heritage List is being carried out. This paper looks at the history of Ogasawara's development, which destroyed its natural surrounding, and discusses recent efforts to protect the environment.

Discovery of the Islands

The Ogasawara Islands, at longitude 136°04'–153°59' E. and latitude 20°25'–27°44' N., are located about 1,000 km due south of Tokyo and about 1,400 km due east of Okinawa. They are part of the administrative district of Tokyo, but are accessible only on a once a week, 25 hour long journey on a diesel-powered ship.

The islands were formed by eruptions of submarine volcanoes about 50 million years ago. They are the only place on the earth where the origin and growth of island arcs caused by plate subduction can be observed.[1] Having no connection with any continent, geologically they are "oceanic islands." They took biological shape over millions of years as flora and fauna gradually crossed the 1,000 km of ocean from Polynesia, Southeast Asia or south west Japan, thanks to the wind, or the birds, or logs floating on the ocean waves.[2] Settled on the islands, the various species evolved uniquely according to their environment, becoming distinctive, and remaining mostly undisturbed until human settlement began in 1826.[3]

By comparison with the better known oceanic islands such as Galapagos, Hawaiʻi and Easter Island, the Ogasawara Islands are tiny in scale, with a total area of a mere sixty-one square kilometres, which amounts to just one fortieth of Okinawa, one hundredth of the Galapagos and two hundredths of Hawaiʻi. The largest island, Chichijima (Father Island), is twentyfour square kilometres. In Okinawa, in an area of twenty by twenty metres it is possible to find at least fifty species of trees, but in Ogasawara, no more than twenty species are found even in the most densely forested area.[4]

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[1]   Tokyo Metropolitan Government, *The Nature of the Ogasawara Islands*, August 2007, p. 4.

[2]   Shimizu Yoshikazu, *Ogasawara shizen nendaiki* [A Historical Record of Ogasawara's Nature], Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1998, pp. 22–23.

[3]   Ono Mikio, *Kotō no seibutsu tachi: Garapagosu to Ogasawara* [The Animals and Plants of the Isolated Islands: Galapagos and Ogasawara], 2nd ed., Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1997, p. 65.

[4]   Shimizu, *Ogasawara*, pp. 15–17.

Ogasawara is a perfect place to observe the development of a species. Some species, which might not have survived the processes of competition and natural selection on a continent, could survive in these oceanic islands because of the lack of natural predators.[5] Birds living in Ogasawara tend to combine functions usually shared by different birds on continents. A typical example is the *meguro* (warbler, *Apalopteron Familiare Hahasima*), which like the silver-eye eats flowers and fruits at the top of trees, like the titmouse runs up and down the branches of trees to catch insects, and like the thrush also hops along the ground to search for food. With few rivals, the *meguro* was able to develop an ability to search for different sorts of food.[6] However, island species were extremely vulnerable to change because the small area offers them no place of refuge. The new environmental conditions brought by human settlement and imported animals and plants proved fatal to many indigenous species.

The islands were long thought to have been discovered in 1593 by Ogasawara Sadayori, an historical figure known to have been in the service of the warlords, Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537–98) and Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542–1616). However, the evidence for such a claim is tenuous. The claim was made—or perhaps reiterated—in 1675 by Ogasawara's son, in 1702 by his grandson and in 1727 by his great-grandson, all seeking official permission to travel to the islands. Although these claims were subsequently found to be dubious, the islands nevertheless came to be known as "Ogasawara Islands," and were also given names that suggested a large, extended family.[7]

The first confirmed record of the discovery of the islands concerns a Japanese ship blown off course and wrecked there in 1670 on its way to transport mandarin oranges from Kishū (today's Wakayama Prefecture) to Edo (today's Tokyo).[8] Five years later, in 1675, the Edo government sent an exploration ship led by Shimaya Ichizaemon to investigate the islands. This expedition called the islands Bunin shima (Uninhabited Islands), and built a shrine to commemorate their landing.

The 1820s mark a period in the islands' history of increasing contact with humankind. In 1823, the British whaling ship, *Transit*, arrived and its American captain wrote of the abundance of turtles and rufous turtledoves, the absence of four-legged animals, snakes and ants, the thick forest coverage that extended over the island, and the absence of any human habitation.[9] In 1826, another British whaler, the *William*, was wrecked on the shore, where the crew took refuge. Most were later rescued, but two of the sailors decided to remain on the island and began cultivation and raising pigs. In the following year, 1827, H.M.S. *Blossom* arrived, its captain describing the islands as a paradise of green turtles, "so numerous that they quite hide the colour of the shore" and so inactive that they could be easily upturned. Already, he observed, the pigs introduced by the *William* had become wild and, he predicted, would in a

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[5]   Ono, *Kotō*, p. 76.

[6]   Shimizu, *Ogasawara*, pp. 30–33.

[7]   According to *Tatsumi buninshima sojō oyobi kōjō tomegaki* [Petition for the Uninhabited Islands in the South-East and Record of a Conversation] in *Zokuzoku gunsho ruijū* (Collection of books), vol. 9, Tokyo: Kokusho Kankōkai, 1906–1909; Tabata Michio, *Ogasawara-jima yukari no hitobito* [People in Ogasawara's History], Tokyo: Bunken Shuppan, 1993, pp. 8–10; Tanaka Hiroyuki, *Bakumatsu no Ogasawara* [Ogasawara at the end of the Edo Period], Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Sha, 1997, pp. 9–15.

[8]   Tanaka, *Bakumatsu*, pp. 2–6.

[9]   Tabata, *Ogasawara*, pp. 43–44.

short time destroy all the tree roots on the island.[10] One year later, in 1828, the Russian exploration ship, *Seniavin*, arrived with zoologists, botanists and ornithologists who documented and took specimens of native birds that were soon to become extinct. The Russian captain observed that profits gained from the pigs were cancelled out by the damage they caused, since the pigs consumed a huge amount of turtle eggs.[11] In 1830, a group of two Americans, one Dane, one Italian, one Briton and fifteen islanders from Hawai'i arrived. Cultivating corn, pumpkin, potato, bean, melon, banana, sugarcane and pineapple, and raising pigs, chickens, turkeys, ducks, goats and deer, they became suppliers of provisions to the crews of various whaling ships. Their lifestyle was documented by Commodore Matthew Perry's American naval squadron, which passed by the islands en route to "open" Japan in 1853.[12]

As a multi-racial, multi-lingual society began to take shape, the Japanese government in 1861 sent the ship *Kanrin maru* to explore and formally name the island group.[13] The name Ogasawara was officially adopted for the whole complex of islands. The central cluster, Chichijima Rettō (Father Island Archipelago), consisted of Magojima, Otōtojima, Anijima and Chichijima (Grandchild, Younger Brother, Elder Brother and Father Islands); the southern cluster of Hahajima Rettō (Mother Island Archipelago) included Hahajima, Anejima, Imōtojima and Meijima (Mother, Elder Sister, Younger Sister and Niece Islands); and the most northerly Mukojima Rettō (Bridegroom Archipelago) comprised Mukojima, Nakōdojima and Yomejima (Bridegroom, Go-between and Bride Islands). The scattered islands were united in the idealized form of an extended family.

In 1876, a Japanese government office was built on Chichijima to govern the then motley group of sixty nine inhabitants.[14] Teaching of the Japanese language was started and settlement systematically encouraged. In 1882, the early settlers all took Japanese citizenship. Six decades later, just before the advent of the Pacific War 7,711 people lived on ten of the islands, but in 1944 virtually the entire population was evacuated. When the war ended, only those islanders of American and European origin were permitted to return, and the islands remained under United States military occupation, and became known as the Bonin Volcano Islands until 1968. After the US government handed sovereignty of the islands to Japan, the evacuated Japanese also returned. At present, only Chichijima and Hahajima are inhabited, and the total population on 1 March 2011 was 2,487.[15] In this multi-racial society, one in ten of the islanders is descended from Europeans, Americans and Pacific Islanders. In the late twentieth

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[10] F. W. Beechey, *Narrative of a Voyage to the Pacific and Beering's Strait*, 2 volumes, London: H. Colburn and R. Bentley, 1831, pp. 230, 232.

[11] Tanaka, *Bakumatsu*, p. 33.

[12] Francis L. Hawks (compiler), *Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan, Performed in the Years 1852, 1853, and 1854, under the Command of Commodore M. C. Perry*, Washington: A.O.P. Nicholson, 1856, pp. 196–214.

[13] The origins of the residents are Ogasawara, Britain, Italy, Denmark, France, Germany, Portugal, Azores, Cape Verde, Bermuda, America, Hawai'i, Tahiti, North Marquesas, Kiribati, Ponape, Bougainville, the Philippines, China, Madagascar, etc. Daniel Long, ed., *Ogasawara-gaku kotohajime*, Kagoshima: Nanpō Shisha, 2002, pp. 274–276.

[14] Russell Robertson, "The Bonin Island," *Transaction of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, 4 (1875–1876), p. 141.

[15] *Ogasawara sonmin dayori* [Ogasawara Villagers' Newsletter], no. 580 (March 2011).

century and early twenty first century, people have moved to the islands to escape the stresses of city life. For humans and botanical and zoological species alike, Ogasawara is often regarded as a kind of fantasy land, as its name suggests an ideal family frozen for eternity, and a remote island paradise beyond the reach of modern civilization.

Destruction of Nature

However, what today excites visitors as untouched nature is actually an environment transformed beyond recognition. In almost two centuries of human settlement, the islands have been subject to two different waves of development, the first lasting from 1826 to 1945, and the second beginning in 1968 and continuing recently. The former approximated to the classic description of "future eating," and resource depletion.[16] After the arrival of the Japanese settlers in 1876, about two to three thousand turtles were removed from the islands to be consumed.[17] Similarly, albatross soon disappeared after massive slaughter in the quest for their feathers and eggs.[18]

This was accompanied by a timber and sugar boom in 1880s. In only a decade, half of the islands' forests disappeared. On Hahajima, huge and ancient trees were felled, some over two thousand years old. The forest was either burned to produce dead trees for growing *kikurage* (fungus), or cleared to make way for farms and sugar cane plantations and to provide fuel to fire the sugar kilns. Only trees that did not seem to be profitable or were located in inaccessible places survived this onslaught.[19] During World War Two, Chichijima, Hahajima and Iōtō (commonly known as Iwojima) were so heavily bombed that their very topography was transformed.[20] Not only was the human toll immense, but also the plant and animal world suffered dramatically.

After 1968, following their reversion to Japanese control, the Ogasawara islands were subject to development plans. Funded by lavish central government subsidies, importance was placed on the development of infrastructure and public works. During the twenty-six years to 1995, the government poured more than 83 billion yen into the islands. Construction replaced primary industry as the major sector of the economy and accounted for 43.3% of its total income.[21] Had the construction works been occasioned by need, one would expect the role of public works to have been high in the early years after reversion to Japanese rule, but, as that need was being met, it began to decline. The fact that this did not occur points to the inherently pathological quality of the process. Public works-led development

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[16] Tim F. Flannery, *The Future Eaters: An Ecological History of the Australasian Lands and People,* Port Melbourne, Vic.: Reed Books, 1995.

[17] Charlotte M. Salwey, *The Island Dependencies of Japan*, London: Eugene L. Morice, 1913, pp. 84–85.

[18] Kurata Yōji, *Shashinchō: Ogasawara hakken kara shizen made* [Photo album: Ogasawara, from Discovery to Nature], revised second print, Kamakura: Abokku Sha, 1993, pp.196–198; Shimizu, *Ogasawara*, p. 89.

[19] Tanaka, *Bakumatsu*, pp. 255–258; Shimizu, *Ogasawara*, pp. 88–92.

[20] Ogasawara Shizen Kankyō Kenkyūkai, ed., *Ogasawara no shizen: Tōyō no Garapagosu* [Ogasawara's Nature: the Galapagos of the East], third ed., Tokyo: Kokon Shoin, 1998, p. 43.

[21] Tada Minoru, "Kūkō wa dare no tame?" [For whom is the airport plan?], *Shūkan kinyōbi* (31 January 1997), p. 35.

did not satisfy social need, but tended to breed more and more public works.[22] Roads, harbours, bridges and coastal and river works proliferated. The environmental effects of this construction "boom" were widespread. As the bulldozers used in construction felled native trees, and roads were widened and paved, the ferns in surrounding areas dried up and died, and it became easier for imported plants to supplant native ones.[23]

On the islands, the human impact on nature has been extensive. Among 109 kinds of birds sighted in Ogasawara today, fifteen are known to breed there, yet only one native species, *meguro,* and five native subspecies have survived. The latter are *Ogasawara nosuri* (buzzard, *Buteo buteo toyoshimai*), *Akagashira karasubato* (red-headed-pigeon, *Columba janthina nitens*), *Ogasawara kawarahiwa* (brambling, *Carduelis sinica kittlitzi*), *Ogasawara hashinaga uguisu* (long-beaked-bush warbler, *Cettia diphone diphone*) and *Ogasawara hiyodori* (brown bulbul, *Hypsipetes amaurotis squamiceps*). *Meguro's* closely related species, *Mukojima meguro*, have disappeared, following the extinction of four native birds, *Ogasawara mashiko* (brambling, *Chaunoproctus ferreorostris*), *Ogasawara gabichō* (fly-catcher, *Cichlopasser terrestris*), *Ogasawara karasubato* (Bonin fruit-pigeon, *Columba versicolor*) and *Hashibutogoi* (thick-beaked-heron, *Nycticorax nycticorax*).

As for sea birds, the short tailed albatross (*ahōdori, Diomedea albatrus*) disappeared a long time ago probably during the Meiji Period (1868–1912), although small colonies of laysan albatross (*koahōdori, Diomedea immutabilis*) and black footed albatross (*kuroashi ahōdori, Diomedea nigripes*) still survive in remote outcrops.[24] Ogasawara accounts for five of the thirteen species of birds that have been lost in Japan as a whole.[25] It is estimated that only forty of the highly endangered pigeon *karasubato* are now living in Ogasawara.[26] From April 2001, the Ueno zoo in Tokyo started an artificial breeding project, and managed successfully to breed twenty two chicks by May 2008.[27] But this success is still very limited, and the problem of returning them to Ogasawara and protecting them from cats remains formidable.

Nor is the destruction limited to birdlife. Ogasawara has various native butterflies, moths and dragonflies and, as was recently discovered, some rare kinds of snails. Two of twenty three kinds of butterflies, five of twelve kinds of dragonflies, twelve of 247 kinds of moths, 30% of about 300 kinds of beetles and 90% of about 100 kinds of snails are native. However, many of the snails are now extinct because of environmental changes: desiccation caused by forest destruction, illegal gathering and the use of agricultural chemicals.[28]

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[22]   Gavan McCormack, *The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence*, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996, ch.1.

[23]   Yasui Takaya, "Ogasawara no shokubutsu ni shinobiyoru kiki" [The crisis of Ogasawara's plants], *Puranta*, 63 (May 1999), p. 28.

[24]   Shimizu, *Ogasawara*, 12, pp. 104–106.

[25]   Maki Hirozō, *Yachō* [Wild Birds], Tokyo, 1998, p. 79.

[26]   *Ogasawara sonmin dayori*, No. 569 (June 2010).

[27]   Tōkyōto, "Tōkyōto akagashira karasubato hogo zōshoku jigyō keikaku" [Tokyo Metropolitan Government Plan of Protecting and Increasing Red-Headed Pigeons], homepage of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, http://www2. kankyo.metro.tokyo.jp/sizen/akagashira/index.htm, accessed 24 March 2009.

[28]   Shimizu, *Ogasawara*, pp.113–117, 128.

Among trees, many of the common species to be seen today, such as the Ryukyuan pine, the camphor tree, the Indian rubber tree (*mokumaō*) as well as banana and pineapple, are imports. The introduced trees *akagi* and *ginnemu* proliferate and threaten native plants.[29] Giant trees, such as *momotamana* (*Terminalia catappa*), *Ogasawara-guwa* (mulberry, *Morus boninensis*), *udonoki* (*Pisonia umbellifera*), *akatetsu* (*Pouteria obovata*), and local varieties of palm that were sighted by seventeenth century visitors and featured in nineteenth century paintings and engravings, are now rare. At present, 42% of 121 native flora species are being harmed by goats. Among 73 endangered species, 55% have been severely damaged.[30] The rat, *kuma nezumi*, is another major pest, introduced and responsible for destroying native plants.

Currently, 40% of about 400 flora species are indigenous. Many smaller native botanical species, including distinctive varieties of fern, fungi, chrysanthemum, orchid and azalea, may still be found in the more inaccessible mountains and valleys or on the uninhabited islands. In 1985, the "Emergency Investigation for Ogasawara Native Plants Protection" project discovered that eighty species, about half of the native ones, were on the brink of extinction, twenty of them unable to grow and propagate in the natural environment.[31] One decade later, the "1997 New Red List of Plants," published by Japan's Integrated Biodiversity Information System managed by the Ministry of Environment, listed 134 species of Ogasawara as endangered. Elsewhere in Japan, only Okinawa has a comparable density of endangered species.[32]

The wild peony, *Munin nobotan* (*Melastoma tetramerum*), and the azalea, *Munin tsutsuji* (*Rhododendron boninese*), are especially rare because only a few plants survive in the wild. Scientists have succeeded in planting about two hundred cuttings from the surviving wild peony, but these cloned "children" have the same genes as the mother tree, and have difficulty adapting to the changing environment.[33] Since the early 1980s after countless failures, the experts from the Botanic Gardens of the University of Tokyo have succeeded in multiplying several endangered species and then transplanting them back to Ogasawara, including the wild peony and the azalea, the native shrub *kobanotobera* (*Pittosporum parvifolium*), native orchids *asahiebine* (*Calanthe hattorii*) and *hoshitsuru ran* (*Calanthe hoshii*). In 1998, the wild peony even germinated by itself and blossomed.[34]

The Airport Plans

From 1968, the Village Office began to press the Tokyo Metropolitan Government to construct an airport in Ogasawara. With the Japanese bubble economy of the late 1980s, the resort development

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[29] Ibid., pp. 106–111.

[30] *Ogasawara sonmin dayori*, no. 517 (October 2006).

[31] Wakatsuki Kunio and Shimozono Fumio, *Horobiyuku shokubutsu wo sukuu kagaku* [The Science which Saves Endangered Plants], Tokyo: Kenseisha, 1989, p. 30.

[32] Shimizu, *Ogasawara*, p. 128.

[33] Wakatsuki and Shimozono, *Horobiyuku*, pp. 81–82.

[34] Shimozono, Fumio, "Zetsumetu kigushu no fukugen no mondaiten" [The Problems in Reviving Endangered Species], *Puranta*, 63 (May, 1999), pp. 31–35. The white flowers were sighted in August 2000 by the author with a local guide, Mr. Harada Ryūjirō.

"boom" seemed irrepressible, and in June 1988 Tokyo governor Suzuki Shun'ichi announced that an airport would be built on Anijima (Elder Brother Island). In 1991, an Ogasawara airport plan was incorporated in the "National Airport Development Plan," which was enthusiastically endorsed by local construction companies.[35] However, the proposal was rather implausible. A modern airport with an 1,800 m long runway was to be built on the uninhabited island, and then linked to the population centre on Chichijima by a 500 m ropeway across a windswept ocean.

Pleas of opposition to the plan were entered by Ogasawara residents and conservation groups inside and outside Japan. Local people, led by botanist and high school teacher Yasui Takaya, argued that a large scale commercial airport was unnecessary, and urged that proper attention be paid to possible alternatives such as a turboprop plane requiring just a 1,200 m runway; other types of plane requiring even shorter runway; an airship; a flying boat; re-use of a war-time airport in the Suzaki region of Chichijima with an 800 m long runway; a vertical take-off and landing aircraft; an amphibian; a flight that connects Ogasawara and the Izu Islands via Iōtō; a high-speed ferry; and a floating airport.[36]

In 1991, researchers conducted a five day investigation along the planned runway. New discoveries were made one by one, including more than ten species of snails, already lost in Chichijima and Hahajima.[37] It was, in the end, the fact that Anijima was home to the biggest area of salt tolerant shrubs (*xeric sclerophyll*) and the most concentrated population of terrestrial snails in Japan that proved decisive. In January 1996, the Environment Agency (today's Ministry of Environment) called on the Tokyo Metropolitan Government to reconsider its plan, and to give due weight to preservation of biodiversity. The decision by the Japanese government to give priority to environment over development was at that time unprecedented.

When the airport plan was also referred for environmental assessment, nine potential sites—five on Chichijima, two on Hahajima, two on other smaller islands—were considered, and in April 1998 the best solution, according to the advice received, was held to be Shigureyama of Mt. Tsutsuji, slightly to the south of the centre of Chichijima.[38] It would involve extensive works over the years 2001 to 2008 to level a 1,720m strip of land across the island, at a height of 230m above sea level. The airport would completely transform the island's topography.

This location, however, was a nesting site for the native buzzard (as mentioned above), and home to the wild peony and the azalea. The sole surviving wild clump of the azalea happened to grow just below the summit of Mt. Tsutsuji because it is the only place moist enough to allow the azalea to survive. Its favoured topographical and climatic conditions simply could not be reproduced elsewhere. Besides, the

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[35] Tada, "Kūkō wa dare no tame?," p. 36.

[36] Ogasawara Shizen Kankyō Kenkyūkai, ed., *Ogasawara kūkōmondai 13 nenkan no kiseki* [The Record of 13 Years of the Ogasawara Airport Controversy], 2002, pp. 31, 17–18, 44, 86–88, 170–175, 219, 269–270, 279, 381, 407, 439–440.

[37] Shimizu, *Ogasawara,* p. 143.

[38] Ogasawara Kūkō Kensetsu tō Senmon Iinkai, *Ogasawara kūkō kensetsu tō ni kansuru teigen* [Suggestions for the Ogasawara Airport Construction], 1998; Purekku, Kabushiki Kaisha Purekku Kenkyūjō, *Heisei 9 nendo Ogasawara kūkō kankyō chōsa hōkokusho* [Report on the Investigation of Ogasawara Airport Environment in 1997], Tokyo, 1997.

forest around the location forms part of the catchment area for drinking water.[39] A survey conducted by Yasui Takaya found that 88 of the 217 plant species on the Shigureyama site were native, including twenty seven which were classified as "endangered," and another five as "at some risk" according to the "Red List of Plants."[40] Under pressure from local opposition, the airport plan was officially withdrawn by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government in November 2001.

Meanwhile, in January 2001, the Ministry of National Land and Communication considered introducing the newly developed TSL (technosuper liner) by which an express ferry of 15,000 tons could shorten the voyage time between Tokyo and Chichijima from 25 to 16 hours.[41] That project, which would have cost an estimated 11.5 billion yen, was abandoned on the eve of its launch in October 2005 because the fuel cost could not be subsidised by the government and might incur at least a 2 billion yen deficit annually.[42]

The withdrawal of the two airport plans and the TSL project left many residents with mixed feelings. Some could not understand why native species had to be prioritized over their want of an airport, which they believed would overcome the long distance between the mainland and Ogasawara and provide better medical treatment and economic opportunities. Based on my experience of taking the 25 hour ferry six times, constantly tossed about by rough seas, I sympathize with the residents who long for a faster means of transportation, especially for emergency medical treatments. A plane requiring only a small scale airport, and causing minimal impact on the native species can be justified.

Instead of pouring more concrete on to the islands, many people there have realized the possible benefits of eco-tourism, fully utilizing the value of Ogasawara's nature. An effort to promote Ogasawara by the Ministry of Environment and register it as a World Heritage Site began in 2003.[43] Based on the information from the monthly "Ogasawara Villagers Newsletter" 村民だより, published by the Village Office from May 2002 to March 2011, the publications from NPO, and my own observations, residents' attitudes to nature are changing, and an appreciation is growing of the need to maintain the sensitive balance between native species and human life if both are to have a future. [44]

Protection of Environment

The uniqueness of the islands can be seen from the research pioneered by local resident, Abe Tetsuto. Over the last thirty years, he and colleagues have been investigating the newly formed oceanic

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[39] Shimizu, *Ogasawara*, p. 146.

[40] Yasui Takaya, "Chichijima no Ogasawara kūkō kōhochinai oyobi sono shūhen no ikansoku shokubutsu risuto" [List of Plants in the Area of the Planned Ogasawara Airport on Chichijima], *Ogasawara kenkyū*, 24 (1998), pp. 17–23.

[41] *Yomiuri shinbun*, "Jisedai kōsokusen no hatsushūkō Tōkyō Ogasawara kan de kentō" [Discussion about a new generation High Speed Ferry between Tokyo and Ogasawara], 27 January 2001 (on-line).

[42] *Asahi shinbun*, "Kokusaku no chōkōsoku TSL, To ga Ogasawara kōro dannen wo seishiki happyō" [Tokyo Metropolitan Government officially gives up the Route to Ogasawara by the Super-Speed TSL], 18 October 2005 (on-line).

[43] *Ogasawara sonmin dayori*, no. 468 (April 2003), p. 10.

[44] In 1999, 2000 and 2002, I visited Chichijima and had various opportunities to meet and talk with local residents.

island, Nishinoshima (Western Island), located 130 km west of Chichijima, which formed when a volcano erupted in 1973. This research is the first of its kind to detail the process of how an oceanic island, isolated from any continent by more than 1,000 km, becomes colonized by plants and animals. Nowhere else on the planet is there so remote a new-born oceanic island.[45] In other words, it is thought that this tiny island may display the process of evolution the Ogasawara Islands went through during the last million years.

Thanks in part to the activities of botanist Yasui Takaya and his colleagues, as well as the efforts of various local organizations, more and more residents have become conscious of the fragility of their natural surroundings, and an environmental culture is developing in Ogasawara. "Protection of Biodiversity" has recently become a buzzword in the islands at various levels, from ordinary people to the Ogasawara branch of Tokyo Metropolitan Governmentand the Ogasawara General Office of the Japanese government. Activities by volunteers to eradicate introduced plants and goats, and to help plant native plants are becoming commonplace. For instance, the introduced grass, *kurinoiga*, has been cleared from Minamijima (South Island) because the island's karst landscape was considered to be "the most precious ecosystem in the world."[46] And the karst landscape was designated "Japan's natural monument" 日本天然記念物 in May 2008.[47] The native trees, *Shima horuto no ki* (*Elaeocarpus photiniifolius*), have been planted on parts of Hahajima after the invasive tree *akagi* was removed.[48] The local government's Construction Section participated in the movement to clear the introduced Taiwan tree, *mokugenji*. [49]

From 1997 to 1999, about 400 goats were removed by local hunters from Nakōdojima (Go-between Island) at a cost of 100 million yen. In 2002, Mukojima (Bridegroom Island) was declared free of goats. By 2005, the northern Mukojima Archipelago was made goat free, and newly planted native plants are growing surprisingly well and enjoying a paradise without natural predators.[50] Currently, goats have been eradicated on Higashijima, Nishijima and Anijima. Extermination is being carried out on Chichijima and Otōtojima.[51]

In Ogasawara, cats remain a serious threat to endangered native birds. The red-headed pigeon *karasubato* sometimes comes to visit villagers and eat papaya without noticing the waiting cats.[52] Research has shown that between 1998 and 1999 a single cat could kill five of the native warbler *meguro* and at least one brambling *kawarahiwa*. About one hundred cats are still wandering in the forest of Hahajima,

[45] Abe Tetsuto, "Shinseikaiyōtō, Nishinoshima no seibutsusō kara no kōsatsu" [An Observation of the Plants on the New-Born Oceanic Island, Nishinoshima], *Ogasawara Yasei Seibutsu Kenkyūkai kaihō*, no. 24 (29 November 2004).

[46] *Ogasawara sonmin dayori*, no. 455 (June 2002).

[47] Ibid., no. 539 (June 2008).

[48] Ibid., no. 472 (July 2003), p. 6; No. 481 (March 2004).

[49] Ibid., no. 478 (December 2003).

[50] Yasui Takaya, "Nakōdojima so no go" [Nakōdojima and its development], *Ogasawara Yasei Seibutsu Kenkyūkai kaihō,* 26 (1 April 2005).

[51] Ministry of the Environment, Japan, "For Protection of Ogasawara's Natural Environment," March 2010, p. 3.

[52] Yumura Fumiko, "Karasubato ga minka ni!?" [A Pigeon Enters a Village Home?!], *Ogasawara Wildlife Research Society News Letter*, 16 (July 2002), n.p.

driving the number of brambling down to 200.[53] Between 1996 and 2006, more than 370 wild cats were caught and sterilized. In January 2006, during the breeding season of the native pigeon, it was deemed necessary to send the cats to the mainland to be adopted. Now the Islands aim to make Ogasawara free of feral cats.[54]

Other native species are also being protected. A re-discovery made in 2005 of one of the two native butterflies, *Ogasawara Shijimi* (*Celastrina ogasawarensis*), thought to have disappeared after 2002, aroused interest in a project designed to rescue them from the introduced iguana, *green anole* (*Anolis carolinensis*), their primary predator. An "Association of Ogasawara Shijimi" to protect the butterfly was even started.[55] 30% of the insects on the Islands are native. But their populations are decreased by the *green anole*, and it is very time-consuming and costly to eradicate it.[56]

The most representative conservation organization in the islands is the Ogasawara Wildlife Research Society (OWRS), headed by Yasui Takaya. Since its establishment in 1997, OWRS has energetically conducted research on native flora and fauna, issuing newsletters to disseminate research results, raising seedlings, planting trees, cleaning beaches, culling goats, and organizing public lectures and observation trips. Yasui and his members successfully planted the native trees *takonoki* (*Pandanus boninensis*), *Ogasawara biro* (*Livistona chinensis var.boninensis*), *momotamana, hasunohagiri* (*Hernandia sonora*) and *kusatobera* (*Scaevola sericea*) on Yomejima (Bride Island) after the goats were cleared in the year 2000. They keep going back to see how the trees are enjoying their newly rival-free environment. In May 2006, OWRS was awarded the "Prize of the Ministry of Environment" for its nine year activities and achievements. In 2007, another NPO organization which has been actively engaged in the protection of the birds and plants, the Institute of Boninology 小笠原自然文化研究所[57] received a similar award.

Education and entertainment groups have also put much weight on promoting a closer connection between humans and the land and sea. The Ocean Center, Ogasawara Whale Watching Association (OWA), the OWRS and the Ogasawara Nature and Culture Research Institute, have organized various exhibitions and lectures on Ogasawara's nature. The monthly newsletter by the Village Office has reported the efforts of school pupils to protect turtle eggs, and the joy of the students on seeing baby turtles hatching. The OWRS encouraged children to plant seedlings of the native orchid *asahi ebine*, successfully raised by students outside Ogasawara, on Mt. Asahiyama. Education for the younger generation is an effective way of deepening the connection between nature and humans.

Profits from Eco-tourism

The Village Office has decided to make eco-tourism the main industry of the islands, along with

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[53]   Kazuto Kawakami and Hiroyoshi Higuchi, "Bird predation by domestic cats on Hahajima Island, Bonin Islands, Japan," *Ornithological Scienc*e, 1 (2002), pp. 143–144.

[54]   Ministry of the Environment, Japan, "For Protection of Ogasawara's Natural Environment," March 2010, p.4.

[55]   *Ogasawara sonmin dayori*, no. 516 (September 2006).

[56]   *Asahi shinbun*, "Establishing a Sanctuary for Endangered Insects: Efforts by Ministry of Environment in Ogasawara," 24 January 2009 (on-line).

[57]   *Ogasawara sonmin dayori*, no. 542 (September 2008).

a promotion of recreation, leisure and historical sites, as well as further development of agriculture and fishery in order to make Ogasawara a sustainable society. Encouragement to consume locally produced vegetables and fruits and save energy in transporting goods has been made recently.

In Japan, Ogasawara is the only place where dolphins and whales can be seen almost all year round. The OWA is a pioneer in eco-tourism. In 1988, for the first time in Japan, it organized a whale watching tour near Hahajima, and produced a guideline for whale watching, which is Japan's first for protecting tourism resources. The OWA started dolphin tours in 1992, during which 250 people swam among dolphins. According to OWA's estimation, one whale and one Ogasawara flying fox can bring 550,000 yen and 63,000 yen respectively each year.[58] By July 2004, the profit gained from whale watching and dolphin tours amounted to 436 million yen. Ogasawara's native plants have also been an attraction to tourists. During Japan's long depression from the early 1990s when there was a downturn in tourism, diving, tramping and whale watching remained profitable.[59]

In June 2002, the "Committee for Promoting Eco-tourism in Ogasawara" was established, and has been actively engaging in activities such as conferences and observation tours. For instance, it endeavoured to become familiar with Australia's system of certifying eco-tourism, and to study the experiences of the Barbados Island of the Caribbean Sea, Norfolk Island of Australia, the Galapagos Islands, and the Oze region in Japan.[60] In Okinawa, members were taught that it was important to conduct eco-tourism by local guides so that profits could be returned to the local community. Also, they understood that it is essential to establish a research institute to supply high quality information and guides, and to avoid harming the ecosystem by eco-tourism.[61]

In July 2002, the Village Office signed with the Tokyo Metropolitan Government an "Agreement on Proper Use of Natural Environment Protection and Promotion Areas in the Ogasawara Islands." Visits to Minamijima's karst landscape are restricted by a ban, which prohibits landing during the November–February period. Outside that period, only 100 people per day are allowed to the island for no more than two hours, and each guide may have no more than fifteen tourists in a group. Hahajima's Sekimon area can be viewed only with guides who have been educated by the "Forest Guide System," and can be visited by no more than 50 people per day. Visitors must also be in a five person group accompanied by one guide. More and more local people want to become guides.[62]

From August 2004, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government established a policy to respect the uniqueness of the Islands while still maintaining public works.[63] This is an impressive shift, since the Government had long ignored the fragility of Ogasawara's ecosystem and applied only the rules for metropolitan cities. The Village Office also started a series of workshops from February 2002 on using renewable energy as part of eco-tourism industry. A new school complex in Hahajima utilizing solar

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58 Ibid., no. 469 (May 2003).

59 Ibid., no. 487 (August 2004).

60 Ibid., no. 480 (February 2004).

61 Ibid., no. 457 (July 2002).

62 Ibid., no. 458 (August 2002).

63 Ibid., no. 487 (August 2004).

power generation (50 kw/ hour) and rain water collection was completed in February 2005.[64]

In April 2008, in order to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the return of the Ogasawara Islands from the US to Japan, a one day cruise tour was organized by OWA to watch two kinds of albatross, which have been living on Mukojima Archipelago, the laysan (*koahōdori, Diomedea immutabilis*), the black-footed-(*kuroashi ahōdori, Diomedea nigripes*), as well as one other albatross which was transported by helicopter to Mukojima in February 2008 by the Ministry of Environment and the Yamashina Institute for Ornithology from Itō Islands and Torishima[65] where volcanic activity posed a threat to the birds. Among the ten birds which grew up on Mukojima and left the nest in May 2008, one returned to the island for breeding in February 2011.[66] This means that the bird remembered Mukojima, instead of Torishima, as its birthplace, and those who left the nest at the same time may return, too. Eventually, Mukojima will have an established colony of short-tailed albatrosses, which disappeared from the island about one century ago. In the Northern Hemisphere, Mukojima Archipelago is the only place where the three kinds of albatrosses can all be observed.[67]

A movement for getting Ogasawara registered as a UNESCO World Heritage Site began in 2002, but failed because of a lack of sufficient systems to protect the environment. The Village Office eventually realized that only when the local people understand the value of the ecosystem and are determined to pass the islands to future generations, will the islands be successfully recommended. The Tokyo Metropolitan Government decided to concentrate on promoting Ogasawara from 2004. Fortunately, in 2004, the Ministry of Environment also decided to choose Ogasawara as one of thirteen model regions for its programme, "Promotion of Eco-tourism in National Parks." With the support of the Ministry, Ogasawara could do more to investigate natural resources, develop tourism organizations, create different tours, train staff and establish rules.[68]

In January 2006, the Ministry of Environment eventually decided to recommend about 60% of the Ogasawara islands for UNESCO registration. To help lift the image of Ogasawara's ecosystem to the level required for successful registration, about 61% of Chichijima and 59% of Hahajima were designated as Japan's "Protected Forest Ecosystem Areas" 森林生態系保護地域 in August 2006.[69]

However, several problems slow the process of registration. Firstly, Ogasawara's capacity to supply itself with livelihood essentials is extremely low: only 32%. Of local commodity requirements of about 15.5 billion yen, local industries only provide 5 billion yen worth, and the rest is supplied from the

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[64] Ibid., no. 495 (March 2005).

[65] *Asahi shinbun*, "Albatrosses Safely Arrived at Mukojima," 5 February 2009 (on-line).

[66] *Yomiuri shinbun*, "Albatross Returned to Mukojima after Three Years, Taking the Island as Its Birth Place," 14 February 2011 (on-line).

[67] *Ogasawara sonmin dayori*, nos. 535 (February 2008), 536 (March 2008).

[68] Ibid, no. 486 (July 2004).

[69] Ibid., no. 514 (July 2006), 10; *Asahi shinbun*, "Ogasawara shotō wo hogochiiki settei, sekai isan tōroku wo mezasu" [Designation of the Protection Area in the Ogasawara Islands to aim for World Heritage Registration], 29 August 2006 (on-line).

mainland. By contrast, Okinawa's self-dependence is 72%. The cost of transport of mainland products to Ogasawara is high, and two thirds of the profits occurring from eco-tourism will mainly go back to the main island. Secondly, there are very few connections among local industries. For instance, the agriculture and fishery products from the islands are mainly sent to the mainland, and therefore the proportion consumed by local restaurants or hotels is low, which in turn depresses the development of local industries. Thirdly, tourist accommodations are not fully used because the weekly ferry only stays in Chichijima for three nights after each journey, and tourism activities other than whale and dolphin watching are limited.[70] Fourthly, the limited infrastructure of water supply and sewerage discharge on Chichijima and Hahajima will be quickly under pressure with a larger number of tourists, and the fragile forest environment can be easily destroyed by the footprints of sightseers. Therefore, if one day Ogasawara is registered as a World Natural Heritage site, the number of tourists must be strictly controlled in order to protect the islands' nature.

In January 2007, Ogasawara was put in a Tentative List submitted to UNESCO's World Heritage Centre as the first step towards the inscription of the Ogasawara Islands on the World Heritage List. In September 2009, "Draft Nomination of the Ogasawara Islands for Inscription on the World Heritage List" was submitted to UNESCO. In July 2010, two members of the International Union for Conservation of Nature conducted an investigation on the Ogasawara Islands.[71] They reported to UNESCO on how the problems of foreign invasive plants and animals, especially wild cats, goats, pigs, green anole, ants and rats, had been dealt with. In June 2011, UNESCO made a decision to inscribe the Ogasawara Islands on its World Heritage List.

Conclusion

In December 2009, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government stated in its "Ogasawara Islands Development Plan" 小笠原諸島振興開発計画 (2009–2013) that an airport plan will be discussed with special attention to the environment.[72] According to the local government's survey, by April 2008, 70.65% of the population wants to have an airplane connection, and the rest either seem not to want it, or have no particular opinion.[73] The lack of such a means of transportation has caused an apparent resistance to the preservation of native species in the islands. This is one of the major obstacles in saving the ecosystem of Ogasawara, along with indifference to eradicating introduced species, the persisting thirst for construction works, and a lack of knowledge of the natural surroundings.

Nevertheless, as discussed above, many local residents have decided to live with nature as humbly as possible. They acknowledge that Ogasawara is a place where nature has to be prioritized over construction works, and where civilization will not have a future unless the ecosystem is protected. In other words,

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[70]   *Ogasawara sonmin dayori,* no. 533 (December 2007).

[71]   Ibid., no. 580 (March 2011).

[72]   Tokyo Metropolitan Government, "Ogasawara Islands Development Plan" (2009–2013), September 2009, p. 3.

[73]   *Ogasawara sonmin dayori*, no. 537 (April 2008). Out of the 1,397 people who participated in the survey, 48.39% want the airport, 22.6% want it conditionally, 19.97% do not want it, and 9.02% do not have particular opinion.

they believe the natural environment of Ogasawara should not be sacrificed for commercial reasons or daily convenience.

Note:

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◆第３セッション◆
現代文化 / Contemporary Culture

Recent Japanese Film

Hirano Kyoko

What does film mean to Japanese today? Is it an important part of their entertainment and cultural life? Or is it something trivial for distraction? We will first consider the film industry's position in the Japanese entertainment business. In the year 2009, 448 Japanese and 314 foreign films, a total of 762 films, were released; and a total of 169,297,000 people went to see movies at theaters in Japan. According to Japanese government statistics, the Japanese population in 2009 was 127,510,000, and so a Japanese in average went to see from one to two (1.32) movies in 2009. It is hard to judge how important film is to Japanese from these figures.[1]

The size of movie attendance in 2009 was merely one sixth of its highest point of 1,088,111,000 people who went to see movies in the year 1958. Film used to be a primary entertainment form and business until the late 1950s when television came on the scene, and immediately became its fierce competitor. Today film and television have been threatened by more diverse forms of entertainment from DVD, and video games to the internet, and have endeavored to secure their places.[2]

In 2006, box office income from Japanese films (107,944,000,000 yen) became larger than that from imported films (94,990,000,000 yen) for the first time since 1985. This phenomenon took place again in 2008 (115,859,000,000 yen vs. 78,977,000,000 yen) and in 2009 (117,309,000,000 yen vs.

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[1] Eiren, "Statistics of Film Industry in Japan." The Japanese population statistics for 2009 were taken from the information on Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications website. The updated 2010 figures indicate that 408 Japanese films and 308 foreign films were released, a total of 716 films. The movie admission in the year 2010 was 174,358000, according to the above Eiren statistics; and the Japanese population for the year 2010 was 128,056,000, according to the above Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications website. For the latest comparison of Japanese film attendance with other countries, see "Cinema: Exhibition of feature films" in UNESCO Institute for Statistics. The average movie attendance in the year 2006 in the US was 4.7 times per year, the third largest in the world; Japan was 1.3 times per year, the 29th in the world; and Indonesia was 0.2 times per year, the 59th in the world.

[2] Eiren, ibid. In Japan, many households purchased TV sets in 1959 wanting to see the royal wedding parade of the then Crown Prince Akihito and commoner Michiko, which took place in April 1959. TV's supremacy over film now began. According to "Contentsu gurōbaru senryaku kenkyūkai ni okeru ronten: Sōkatsuhyō, sankō shiryō 3-1," the Japanese contents industry domestic market share in the year 2005 was as follows: movies for 198 billion yen, anime for 234 billion yen, games for 314 billion yen, TV programs for 3,700 billion yen, music for 601 billion yen, and character merchandises for 1,610 billion yen.

88,726,000,000 yen).[3] Hollywood films had been predominant in Japan for a long time. However, they seem to have become less exciting to the Japanese viewers, constrained by the big budget formula using the same kind of marketable stars and predictable stories in order to reduce risks.

In addition, Japanese youth have recently lost interest in foreign culture. Young people in Japan are no longer interested in studying or working abroad. They are content with listening to Japanese pop music, reading Japanese manga and watching Japanese films.[4] There have also been changes in the Japanese entertainment business. Japanese television stations are more aggressive in promoting the films they co-produced through their advertising spots, faced by the bad economy, reduced advertisement income and competitions coming from games and internet. Once the market for Japanese films expanded, more filmmakers began to participate with films of various subject matter and style, thus

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[3]   Eiren, ibid. and "Box Office Leaders." According to the above statistics, in 1985, box office income from the Japanese films was 35,295,000,000 yen and that from the imported films was 34,080,000,000 yen. In the year 1985, there was no significantly large box office hit among Japanese films (the top box office leader, *Biruma no tategoto* made 2.95 billion yen) compared to the box office leaders among imported films (top box office leader, *Ghostbusters*, a Hollywood production, made 4.1 billion yen), and a combination of the high grossing Japanese films seemed to oustrip imported films. In 2006, the two top grossing imported films, *Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire* made 11 billion yen, and *Pirates of the Caribbean: The Curse of the Black Pearl* made 10 billion yen respectively, while the two top grossing Japanese films, *Gedo senki* made 7.65 billion yen, and *LIMIT TO LOVE Umizaru* made 7.1 billion yen respectively, so again, the combination of high grossing Japanese films made better business than the combination of high grossing foreign films did. In 2008, there was a mega Japanese box office leader, *Gake no ue no Ponyo*, which made 15.5 billion yen, contributing significantly to the Japanese box office income, while the top grossing imported film was *Indiana Jones and the Kingdom of the Crystal Skull*, which made 5.71 billion yen. In 2009, the top grossing Japanese film, *ROOKIES: Sotsugyō,* made 8.55 billion yen while that of the imported film *Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince* made 8 billion yen. The updated statistics for the year 2010 from the Eirin website show that the box office income from Japanese films was 118,217 million yen and that from imported films was 102,521 million yen. The box office leaders were *Karigurashi no Arietti* at 9.25 billion yen; *THE LAST MESSAGE Umizaru* at 8.04 billion yen; and *Odoru daisōsasen THE MOVIE 3* at 7.31 billion yen. *Umizaru* is also based on a popular manga, which was adapted to TV drama series. Its drama is about the dangerous rescue missions of the Japan Coast Guards, and is based on real-life incidents.

[4]   For example, see "Naze wakamono wa kaigai ni dete mushashugyō shinai no ka." According to this article, the number of young people aged between 15 and 29 who traveled abroad decreased by 34% during the last 10 years. Various reasons have been discussed such as economic reasons (they do not want to spend money), and the system in the work place (the job-hunting period starts early now, and the corporate system will not utilize people returning from abroad with special skills and experience). The lack of incentive comes from the high Japanese living standard, so that young people do not want to leave the comfort of Japanese life to experience hardship; the wealth of information on foreign countries and cultures easily acquired on the internet may help explain the phenomenon as well. I would argue that all these elements contribute to the formation of conservatism among young Japanese who want to avoid physical and philosophical challenges, and be content with what they already know or are familiar with. As for how the film business fared from 2009 to 2010, four companies distributing foreign films went out of business (Wise Policy, Movie Eye, Cine quanon and Tornade Films) due to a lack of interest in foreign films and the shrinking market in video and DVD rentals. See "2009 nen Nihon eiga sangyō gaikyō."

making Japanese films more attractive to Japanese viewers.[5]

The film boasting the largest box office income in Japan in 2008 was *Gake no ue no Ponyo*, an anime or animated film by Hayao Miyazaki (1941–), making 15.5 billion yen. The story of a fish named Ponyo falling in love with a human boy is marvelously rendered by the world renowned animator Miyazaki, without using computer graphics technology. Miyazaki's films have consistently attracted huge commercial and critical success in Japan, and are widely recognized internationally, for example, *Majo no takkyūbin* (the top grossing Japanese film of 1989, making 2.15 billion yen), *Mononoke hime* (the top grossing Japanese film of 1997, making 11.3 billion yen) and *Sen to Chihiro no kamikakushi* (the top grossing Japanese film of 2001, making 30.4 billion yen).[6] Rich and sophisticated in his visual design and stories, Miyazaki changed the notion of anime, traditionally considered to be made for children, to an art form fully appreciated by adult viewers as well.

The top grossing film of 2009 in Japan was *ROOKIES: Sotsugyō*, making 8.55 billion yen. This is a high school baseball drama based on a popular manga by Masanori Morita, which first appeared in a weekly manga magazine from 1998 to 2003, and later became a manga book in 24 volumes. Thereafter, television network TBS (Tokyo Broadcasting System) adapted it to its drama series in 2008. The film version was made in 2009 featuring young male pop stars, including Ryūta Satō, Keisuke Koide and Hayato Ichihara; and directed by Yūichirō Hirakawa (1972–) who also directed some of its television episodes. The story is quite simplistic: a bunch of losers guided by an enthusiastic teacher prove that they can win while they learn about life, friendship and themselves. It is hard to find the reason why this film attracted so many people, but it was probably owing to the heavy promotion through repeated television advertising and wide exposure of its story and talents in all facets of broadcasting, print, and internet media.

In 2010, a television network led film like *Odoru daisōsasen THE MOVIE 3 Yatsura o kaihō seyo!* directed by Katsuyuki Motohiro (1965–) achieved a strong showing. This film stems from a television comedy series created by network Fuji Television in 1997, and its first movie version in 1998 grabbed 10 billion yen, and its sequel in 2003 earned 17 billion yen, both record-breaking hits.[7] The film's success is much ascribed to its star Yūji Oda, writer Ryōichi Kimizuka and director Motohiro, all immensely popular in television; they know how to appeal to the masses. As a police drama, the approach of *Odoru daisōsasen* is refreshing, making its detectives and policemen struggle in the situations normally found in typical Japanese corporate culture. For example, the protagonist must retrieve the missing receipts for his petty cash expenses, while frictions between the "main office" and "local branch" are constantly created.

Even more popular is *Karigurashi no Arietti*, an animated film from Miyazaki's Studio Ghibli, planned and written by Miyazaki and directed by newcomer, Hiromasa Yonebayashi (1973–). Based on a Western children's story, the film is about the friendship between 14 year-old Arietti of the tiny people,

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5   "Genki na hōga butaiura wa? Terebi to no korabo de seichō."

6   These box office income figures are taken from the aforementioned Eirin website.

7   These box office income figures are taken from the film's official website. Using some of the same characters but not the main character, Detective Aoshima played by Yūji Oda, two "spin-off" films were also made in 2005, *Kōshōnin Mashita Masayoshi* directed by Katsuyuki Motohiro and *Yōgisha Muroi Shinji* directed by Ryōichi Kimizuka.

and a human boy. The story is somewhat less complicated than Miyazaki's. However, this new director's visual style and color design are sufficiently elaborate.

The producers of these four box office leaders during the last two and a half years consist of the film studio Toho; production companies like Studio Ghibli; the American studio Disney and the French production company, Wild Bunch; combined with TV networks like Nippon TV, TBS and Fuji Television; and local TV stations like Chubu-Nippon Broadcasting and Hokkaido Broadcasting; the music and entertainment company Amuse; talent agencies, Hori Productions and Watanabe Entertainment; advertising agencies, Dentsu and Hakuhodo DYMP; major newspaper companies like Yomiuri Shimbun; internet media company Yahoo! Japan; and telephone company NTT Docomo.

If the film is based on a book, as in the case of *ROOKIES*, its publisher Shueisha will join in. In addition, companies from other fields also participate, such as the trading company Mitsubishi Corporaition, insurance companies MS & AD Holdings, drink manufacturer Asahi Soft Drinks, tea manufacturer Ito En, the confectionary giant, Lotte, Myojo Foods known for *rāmen* instant noodles, detergent and toothpaste manufacturer Lion, and local store chain, Lawson. A project like *Odoru dai-sōsasen THEMOVIE 3* aroused particular kinds of interest. Because this is a police drama, automobile giants like Toyota wanted to get involved by providing police cars; and because its story is about an office moving, transportation company. Nippon Express came in.

Nowadays, box office income cannot solely cover the film's production cost, and filmmakers have to depend on broadcasting and foreign sales rights, merchandising license fees of character products, and tie-ups with all sorts of media-related companies and manufacturers. As seen above, companies from a wide variety of trades participate in big budget filmmaking in Japan. Investing money or tying up is alluring for businesses coming from other areas, in exchange for their company name's exposure in successful films.

Television network led films featuring pop stars and based on manga or TV drama series should guarantee such commercial hits. *Okuribito*, which received the Foreign Language Academy Award in 2009, is a unique case because it was made thanks to a TV network's participation in production, but not based on a manga or TV drama series. Deeply inspired by his experience of watching how people bid farewell to the dead in India, actor Masahiro Motoki initiated this project, which portrays a former musician who returns to his home town in the north and becomes an encoffiner who prepares bodies for the funerals. Nobody wanted to finance this project about death. Finally TBS came in, and other companies then joined, forming the *Okuribito* Production Committee [*Okuribito* Seisaku Iinkai].

The serious theme of the film, of how to face death, is handled deftly in an entertaining form full of laughter and tears. The conflict between father and son, and that between husband and wife, are universal themes, and both are solved nicely in the end. The protagonist also overcomes the sense of social discrimination against his chosen profession, and learns to be proud of his work. The beauty of nature is also portrayed in cherry blossoms and green mountains. These factors are essential for the film's international embrace. The film's success is much due to the high craft of its screenplay writer, Kundō Koyama, who is popular in television; its director Yōjirō Takita (1955–) known for making skillfully entertaining films who started his career in the "Pink Film" (adult film) genre;[8] and Motoki's passion in maintaining this project for more than ten years.

More films recognized internationally have been made independently based on the original ideas of filmmakers, carrying strong messages and distinctive styles. From the year 2008 to 2009, a number of international film festivals screened *Okuribito* in addition to *Tōkyō Sonata* by Kiyoshi Kurosawa (1955–), *Aruitemo aruitemo* by Hirokazu Kore-eda (1962–) and *Jitsuroku rengō sekigun: Asama sansō e no michi* by Kōji Wakamatsu (1936–).

Kiyoshi Kurosawa has been popular for his unique horror films including *Cur*e (1997), *Kairo* (2001) and *Loft* (2005), attracting international fans. International financing is thus behind *Tōkyō Sonata's* production. Like Takita, Kurosawa started his career in the "Pink Film" genre, has published books on film criticism, and is teaching filmmaking at a university.

Tōkyō Sonata portrays a dysfunctional family of four: a father lost his job but cannot tell his family and keeps dressing up in the morning and pretends to go to work; the mother as a full-time house-wife feels a void in her life; the elder son, a university student, enlists himself in the US Army in order to fight in Iraq; and the younger son, a sixth grader, secretly studies playing piano.

They gather at the dinner table, but nothing is discussed. Kurosawa has stated that in typical Japanese family dramas, family members sit together at the dinner table, and there the main dramatic development takes place, such as a fight starting or a secret being revealed. He consciously de-constructs the dinner table symbol as a family's unity, and instead makes it a symbol of a ritualistic gathering place for family members who cannot communicate with one another.[9]

His story realistically reflects the contemporary Japanese social problem of white-collar unemployment and job shortages. The young generation's frustration with the stagnated Japanese society is also depicted through the son, who seeks some thrill in extreme action in war zones.

Kore-eda started his career as an independent TV documentary maker, pursuing such controversial subject matter as people who are HIV positive, and the fingerprinting requirement for foreign residents in Japan. He achieved international acclaim for his contemplative look on memories and death in his films *Maboroshi no hikari* (1995) and *Wondafuru raifu* (1998), and his observations on the stark survival of children abandoned by their mother in *Dare mo shiranai* (2004).

Aruitemo aruitemo is about a family reunion in which each member has an awkward relationship

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[8]   The "Pink Film" genre has been recently internationally recognized for the ideological and stylistic radicalism of some directors. In Japan, some critics in the 1960s began to pay attention to this extremely low budget genre. Pink films are typically made for 2 to 3 million yen, in all location shooting in a week or so, with a complete film running for about 60 minutes. As long as the directors fulfill its commercial requirement of including several sexual scenes, or once they attain commercial success, they are given artistic freedom in subject matter and styles and some directors experiment in narrative, visual and auditory modes. From this genre, there emerged main stream directors such as Yōjirō Takita, Kiyoshi Kurosawa and Masayuki Suō (*Shall We Dance?* [1996]). In the Japanese film industry, there is no strict hierarchical distinction between adult film and main stream film, and directors can shift from the former to the latter without much trouble unlike in the US film industry.

[9]   Kiyoshi Kurosawa at the press conference of the New York Film Festival following the screening of *Tōkyō Sonata* on 9 October 2008.

with one another. Nothing dramatic takes place, but feelings are quietly ebb out. The parents still mourn the accidental death of the eldest son from 15 years ago; the younger son, who has brought his wife and her young boy from her previous marriage, encounters a mixed response from his parents; the daughter and her husband covet the parents' house so that they can move in with their children, an idea not welcomed by her parents. Some English writing critics compared this film to the classic films on family by Yasujirō Ozu (1903–1963), particularly *Tōkyō monogatari* (1953), in which the parents realize their disappointments with their children.[10] Kore-eda's film is rich in detail and powerful in feelings.

Wakamatsu is a celebrated political activist and was a pioneer in the "Pink Film" genre from the 1960s. In *Jitsuroku rengō sekigun* he examines the human dynamics of internal struggles of the ultra-radical group of student activists of the United Red Army. The group became a focus of the Japanese media and captured the whole Japan's attention when they prepared for a military uprising and trained in the snowy mountains in 1972, ending in their taking hostages and fighting with police.

Wakamatasu followed his political analysis of the Japanese society with this year's film *Catapillar*, through the eye of a wife during World War II whose husband has returned from the front, with his arms and legs missing and half his face disfigured. His sexual and eating desire continues to her dismay, and she gradually begins to resist the conformist attitude of the village to place him on a pedestal as a living "military god" with her as the "honorable wife of the military god." Meanwhile, the husband begins to be haunted by his memory of raping and murdering women in China. Shinobu Terashima's powerful performance brought her the Berlin International Film Festival's Best Actress Award, and makes *Catapillar* a harsh indictment of the militarist ideology and of Japanese war crimes in China.

In 2009, two films made by the old and young generations were much talked about: *Tsurugi-dake: Ten no ki*, the directorial debut of 70-year-old acclaimed cinematographer Daisaku Kimura (1939–); and *Dear Doctor* by 35-year-old female director Miwa Nishikawa (1974–).

Kimura adapted his screenplay from Jirō Nitta's book on the dedication of the men who ventured in the last uncharted area on the top of Mt. Tsurugi in order to complete the map of Japan. He also shot the magnificent landscape. Top-level Japanese actors collaborated with this project and, inspired by Kimura's passion, endured severe physical conditions high in the mountains. The shooting took place at real locations for two years, and the actors created a sense of authenticity in the grand-scale nature. The film's story contains a nationalistic ideology of the mission imposed by the government in preparation for the upcoming wars at the beginning of the twentieth century. There are not many films for mature audiences in Japan and *Tsurugi-dake* attracted many older film-goers.

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[10]   Stephen Holden in *The New York Times* (16 April 2009), Joshua Rothopf in *Time Out New York* (25 August 2009), Anthony Kaufman in *The Village Voice* (25 August 2009), Don Willemott in *filmcritics.com* (28 August 2009), James Bernadinelli in *reelreviews.net* (23 September 2009), Peter Bradshaw in *The Guardian* (14 January 2010), and Tom Charity in *The Times* (16 January 2010). Kore-eda himself commented on this comparison, saying that it is probably because foreign audiences are limited in what kind of Japanese films are available to them. In my interview with Kore-eda on 29 April 2009 in New York, he wondered why nobody cited another Japanese film classic master, Mikio Naruse. Naruse is known for his *shomingeki* or the film about common people.

Dear Doctor is the third film that Nishikawa wrote and directed. The film features popular comedian Tsurubei Shōfukutei as a man who pretends to be a doctor and works in a remote village. Nishikawa ingeniously depicts the subtle human relationship of the doctor, his capable nurse, an idealistic intern and villagers surrounding them. Nishikawa's film also addresses the current Japanese social problem of the lack of doctors in provincial areas inhabited primarily by an aged population.

Nishikawa started her career working for Kore-eda, who produced her first film *Hebi ichigo* (2003) about a dysfunctional family. She writes her own screenplays, and her keen observations of human behavior and psychology, demonstrated masterfully in her first and second film (the latter being *Yureru* (2006) on the relationship of two brothers), has been widely praised.

Japan has seen the emergence of more and more female directors. Another talented female director is Yuki Tanada (1975–) who, in 2001, came through from the PIA Film Festival's competition for new talent. She has since made a documentary on musician, Wataru Takada, in 2003; this was followed by seven films, one screenplay, and one TV drama. She appeared as an actress in two films and has published one novel. Tanada wrote and directed *Hyakuman-en to nigamushi-onna* (2008), featuring popular actress Yū Aoi as a 21-year-old girl taking a series of part-time jobs. The heroine has difficulty expressing herself and communicating with others, but is serious in her own way. Once she saves one million yen, she packs her things and moves on to another town, working at a seashore restaurant, picking peaches at a farm in the mountains, and at a home appliance center in the suburbs. This is a refreshing youth drama, vividly portraying a sensitive young woman surviving in contemporary Japanese society. The heroine projects the image of a typical Japanese youth, not wanting to make any commitment in life and work.

During 2010, one of the most controversial films was *Kokuhaku* by Tetsuya Nakajima (1959–), based on the first novel written by local housewife Kanae Minato, about the revenge of a high school teacher whose infant daughter was murdered by two of her own students. Nakajima is a successful television commercial director, and employed stylistic music video-like usage of close-ups and slow motions in adapting this serious subject matter: the apathetic attitude and violent nature of troubled teenagers in today's Japan, and how education at school and at home fails to cope with this problem.

Confession was praised as a film not produced by a TV network led scheme but by the film producers at Toho Studio, and was selected as Japan's entry to the Academy Award Foreign Language Section for 2011. It made the short-list of the semi-final nine films.

As can be seen, Japanese films take diverse approaches in portraying the trends of Japanese society and culture in the manner in which only the camera can capture. Whether it be a compelling human drama set against grand scale landscape, or nuanced feelings of a human relationship which cannot be easily verbalized, the aforementioned films succeed in expressing these elements in the cinematic medium of the three dimensional world on the big screen.

It is encouraging that some Japanese directors like Miyazaki, Kurosawa and Kore-eda have been internationally recognized, and received international financing. However, the majority of Japanese films, particularly by young directors, are remarkably domestic in their cinematic vision. They are only interested in themselves or the very tiny world of a young couple, with the addition of a few more uninteresting young people, trying to "find themselves [*jibun sagashi*]." These young directors in their twenties and thirties totally lack the consciousness of where they stand in relation to their national

history and to the world, unlike young directors emerging in other countries. These Japanese films of the younger generation are provincial and self-indulgent, infantile in thinking and immature in style.[11]

Another problem in the current Japanese film industry is the prevailing production committee [*seisaku iinkai*] system, which makes copyright issues complicated. For important decisions, permission from all parties involved in production is required. This process takes a long time and sometimes meets the opposition. For example, the entry of a film to the Academy Award Foreign Language section cannot be done easily. During the last few years, only twenty some films have been submitted. If one party from the Production Committee opposes, for example, by complaining that it will be costly to make an English-subtitled 35 mm film print, the film cannot be entered.[12] This will be also true of the submission of the film to international film festivals. Such decisions could result in shutting out the possibilities of a film being recognized internationally, and gaining potential financial profit. More enlightened thinking is necessary both philosophically and financially in order for Japanese film to be recognized internationally, and become part of the global cinematic map.

In the end, I would like to mention the interesting questions that were put in response to this paper from the floor at the University of Indonesia on 6 October 2010. The first question addressed the issue of whether Japanese filmmakers were conscious of foreign recognition. In the case of independent filmmakers, they are likely to be because they depend on success at foreign film festivals in promoting their films in Japan. If they are commercially successful directors domestically, they do not have to worry about foreign successes. Traditionally, the internationally recognized directors such as Yasujirō Ozu, Kenji Mizoguchi (1898–1956) and Nagisa Ōshima (1932–) have been art house directors, not necessarily successful in the box office but among critics in Japan.

A second question related to the fact that, in Indonesia, horror films are very popular and how this genre fares in Japan. Coming from the stage convention, Japanese film studios used to screen ghost story films during the summer *obon* festival period when dead spirits are believed to come back to this world. The chilling effects that these ghosts may exert on the viewers are also welcomed during the hot weather season. Therefore, as a profitable entertainment form, ghost stories have been made consistently in Japan. However, from the 1990s, a new type of horror films, represented by *Ringu* (1998) by Hideo Nakata (1961–), began to be produced and became popular domestically and internationally. Hollywood began to remake these films, which are labeled "J-horror." J-horror films are typically set in the present, combining the image of technology such as TV and the internet. The motivation for the supernatural power to appear is not necessarily vengeful. In traditional Japanese ghost stories, ghosts are usually women victimized in male-chauvinistic or feudalistic society, and thus appear to weak revenge in response to their

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[11]   Literary critic Mitsuyoshi Numano stated that the literary world of young Japanese is currently represented by the same kind of problem. The young writers only interested in themselves or one young couple, totally lacking the historical and social consciousness (in my conversation with Prof. Numano at the University of Tokyo on 16 June 2010).

[12]   I was a member of the selection committee for Japanese films to be entered for the Academy Award Foreign Language Category in 2009, and wondered why only 24 films were submitted after the success of *Okuribito* and was given this answer by its administrator Eiren. In 2010, 25 films were submitted for the selection.

having been wronged. In J-horror, in general, supernatural attacks are rendered random, thus, it could be scarier.[13]

The last question was a unique one, and concerned with how to cope with handicapped audiences in Japan. The notion of "barrier-free screenings" has only recently emerged in Japan, and some festivals have begun to respond to the requirement for those with impaired hearing and sight. Some film companies have also begun to make film prints with specifically designed subtitles including sound effects described in letters, and run these subtitled prints regularly at commercial theaters. Local government social welfare departments are working in collaboration with outsource services for the needs of handicapped people, sending equipment and staff to accompany the needy to screenings, as well as providing DVD libraries with specific subtitles.[14] I would like to thank the students who asked these stimulating questions.

Acknowledgment:

I would like to express my gratitude for this opportunity to present my paper at the symposium on 6 October 2010, sponsored by Nichibunken, University of Indonesia and The Japan Foundation, and the moderator of my panel, Dr. Bachtiar Alam, my fellow presenters, and participants of the panel. The Japanese names are spelled by their first names first, their family names second.

The list of films made in 2008–2010 included in this article:

Odoru daisōsasen THE MOVIE 3 Yatsura o kaihō seyo! 踊る大捜査線 THE MOVIE 3 ヤツらを解放せよ！, 2010. Directed by Katsuyuki Motohiro. Produced by Fuji TV and INP (talent agency) in association with ROBOT (film production company), and supported by NTT Docomo, Nippon Express, Lawson, and Myojo Foods; and distributed by Toho.

Karigurashi no Arietti 借りぐらしのアリエッテイ, 2010. Directed by Hiromasa Yonebayashi. Produced by Studio Ghibli, Nippon TV, Dentsu, Hakuhodo DYMP (Hakuhodo's movie making section), Disney, Mitsubishi Corporation, Toho and Wild Bunch, supported by MS & Ad Holdings, in association with Lawson and Yomiuri Shimbun; and distributed by Toho.

Catapillar キャタピラー, 2010. Directed by Kōji Wakamatsu. Produced by Wakamatsu Productions.

Kokuhaku 告白, 2010. Directed by Tetsuya Nakajima. Produced by the *Kokuhaku* Production Committee

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[13] When I was Film Curator at the Japan Society of New York, from December 2003 to February 2004, we presented a Japanese horror film series, introducing films spanning from the 1950s to the present. At the panel discussion comparing Japanese and American horror films, Prof. Mitsuhiro Yoshimoto of New York University argued this point about women's revenge in feudal society, in contrast to the random attacks in contemporary horror films. American film critic Kent Jones pointed out that American horror films from the 1940s to 1960s were also often metaphors of social criticism against the Cold War period red scare, the Viet Nam War, and so on, while contemporary American horror films have usually no subtext intended to criticize certain trends or attitudes in the society and culture.

[14] The last information was provided by Mr. Shinkichi Okada of Kawakita Memorial Film Institute in my conversation with him on 14 October 2010, in Kamakura, Japan. The institute often hosts screenings designed for the handicapped.

consisting of Toho, Hakuhodo DY Media Partners, Face Wanda Works (film and entertainment company), Futabasha (publisher), Nippon Shuppan Hanbai (major book distribution company), Sony Music Entertainment, Yahoo! JAPAN and Tsutaya Group (video rental and retail).

Dear Doctor デイア・ドクター, 2009. Directed by Miwa Nishikawa. Produced by the *Dear Doctor* Production Committee consisting of Engine Film, Bandai Visual (video company), Tvman Union (independent TV production company), Dentsu, Eisei Gekijō (Cable TV), Denner Systems (Tsurubei Shōfukutei's agent), and Yahoo! JAPAN.

Okuribito おくりびと, 2009. Directed by Yōjirō Takita. Produced by the *Okuribito* Production Committee consisting of TBS, Sedic International (film production company), Shochiku (film studio), Dentsu, Amuse Soft Entertainment, Shogakukan (publisher), Mainichi Broadcasting, Asahi Shimbun (major newspaper), TV-U Yamagata (local TV station), and TBS Radio.

Hyakuman-en to nigamushi-onna 百万円と苦虫女, 2008. Directed by Yuki Tanada. Produced by the 2008 *Hyakuman-en to nigamushi-onna* Production Committee consisting of Nikkatsu (film studio), Pony Canyon (film and music company). Itō Company (Yū Aoi's agent), WOWOW (cable TV), Dentsu, Gentosha (publisher) and Express (film and TV production company).

Gake no ue no Ponyo 崖の上のポニョ, 2008. Directed by Hayao Miyazaki. Produced by Studio Ghibli, Nippon TV, Dentsu, Hakuhodo DYMP, Disney, Mitsubishi Corporation, Toho, in association with Asahi Soft Drinks, Lawson, and Yomiuri Shimbun; and distributed by Toho.

ROOKIES: Sotsugyō ROOKIES—卒業, 2009. Directed by Yūichirō Hirakawa. Produced by the *ROOKIES* Production Committee consisting of TBS, Toho, Shueisha, S.D.P. (Star Dust Picture, a talent agency/filmmaking company), K Factory, Mainichi Broadcasting, Amuse, Hori Productions, Watanabe Entertainment, Chubu-Nippon Broadcasting, RKB Mainichi Broadcasting, Hokkaido Broadcasting, and Yahoo! Japan; supported by Ito En, Toyota, Lion, and Lotte; and distributed by Toho.

Aruitemo aruitemo 歩いても 歩いても, 2008. Directed by Hirokazu Kore-eda. Produced by the *Aruitemo aruitemo* Production Committee consisting of Engine Films (production company), Bandai Visual, Tvman Union (Kore-eda belongs to this company), Eisei Gekijō, and Cinequanon (film production company).

Tsurugi-dake: Ten no ki 剣岳 点の記, 2009. Directed by Daisaku Kimura. Produced by the *Tusugi-dake* Production Committee consisting of Toei (film studio), Fuji TV, Sumitomo Corporation (trading company), Asahi Shimbun and Kitanippon Shimbun (local newspaper).

Tōkyō Sonata トウキョウソナタ, 2008. Directed by Kiyoshi Kurosawa. Produced by the *Tōkyō Sonata* Production Committee consisting of Entertainment Farm (production company), Hakuhodo DY Media Partners, Pix (film import, distribution and promotion company) and Fortissimo Films (Dutch film company).

Jitsuroku rengō sekigun: Asama sansō e no michi 実録・連合赤軍 あさま山荘への道程, 2008. Directed by Kōji Wakamatsu. Produced by Wakamatsu Productions.

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"Naze wakamono wa kaigai ni dete mushashugyō shinainoka なぜ若者は海外に出て武者修行しないのか [Why Don't Young People Go Abroad and Train Themselves?]" in *WEBRONZA*, 16 October 2010, http://webronza.asahi.com/politics/2010101500001.html. Accessed on 24 March 2011.

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Capturing Ryukyu:
(Re)Interpretations and Receptions of Okinawan Culture and Identity in Cyberspace and the Case of "Shima Uta" on YouTube

Matthew Santamaria

Introduction

This article examines the construction, reception, (re)interpretation and appropriation of Okinawan culture and identity in the space of Youtube.[1] Taking off from the concepts of Arjun Appadurai,[2] the article looks at the processes and the artifacts of culture as largely realized, made possible by the conjunction between the so-called Okinawan "ethno-scape" and the all-pervading presence of the media-scape of the Internet. As in any other spaces, the YouTube hosts contending discourses and, in many ways, encourages encounters between them, which in turn reveal disjunctions in interpreting political as well as cultural realities. Its "hosting" of various (re)interpretations of Okinawan realities via music shows the enigmatic salience and persistence of "culture" as a lens for understanding social reality.

Okinawa and Japan: "Same" and yet "Different"

Both the islands of Japan and Okinawa formed as a result of millions of years of volcanic activity and coral build up. Both areas constitute a continuation of "island Asia" separated only by human imagination, specifically by conceptualizations of what consists "Northeast" and "Southeast," as well as "maritime Southeast Asia." Japanese images of Okinawa, however, place it in the exotic tropics where the Amami Oshima group of islands constitutes its "gateway to difference which is realized in completion in the main Island of Okinawa."[3]

Difference (and oddly, sameness) also pervades discussions over the Japanese and Okinawan languages. "Okinawan" or *Uchināguchi* actually comprises a sub-group that belongs to the Japanese-Ryukyuan language group. This sub-group is further divided into two main categories: the Shuri-Naha dialect and the Southern dialects. Both Japanese and Okinawan are believed to have evolved from an earlier form of Japanese and then started to separate sometime in the sixth century.[4] Although 70 per cent of the vocabulary is supposedly shared, the two languages do not seem to be mutually intelligible.

In terms of social institutions, Japan engaged in significant cultural borrowing from China much

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[2] Appadurai, Arjun. *Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy.* In http://www.intcul.tohoku.ac.jp/~holden/MediatedSociety/Readings/2003_04/Appadurai.html (accessed: 3 December 2010).

[3] Tze M. Loo, expressed during conference discussions, *Appropriating Japan* (QC: Japanese Studies Program, Ateneo de Manila University, 30 January 2010).

[4] The theory of Hattori Shirō is quite well-known in this aspect.

earlier, at the time of Prince Shōtoku, and Ryūkyū sometime later during the Shō dynasty, when investiture ceremonies accompanying Chinese Imperial consent were formalized sometime in the 15th century. Both forms of monarchy are closely related to religion. The Japanese *tennō* is an "emperor" who is at the same time Shinto's highest priest while the Ryūkyūan king shared the symbolic center with his sister (or some other female relative of senior status), who presides as the *kikoe-ogimi* or the a head priestess of the Okinawan ancestor worship-centered religion. Whereas the former evolved into a patriarchal society sharing many similarities with the Northeast Asian mainland societies, the latter evolved into a "bi-archy" sharing this particular aspect of social organization with Southeast Asian societies.[5]

Eventually, the greatest difference is that one became the "conqueror" of "the other." The forces of history fated the primacy of Japan over Ryukyu, first during the conquest led by Satsuma in the early 17th century, followed later by Meiji integration in 1872 and then Okinawa's return to Japanese sovereignty from US military and administrative rule in 1972. Yet, even in an unequal condition, "sameness" once again rears its head. Both societies experienced the horrible ravages of war, albeit the "difference" in their sources of suffering. Mainland Japan, more specifically Tokyo, was subjected to indiscriminate carpet bombing, while Hiroshima and Nagasaki became cities forever associated with the atomic bomb. Meanwhile, Okinawa went through a "storm of steel," the only land battle in Japan during WWII, and more significantly, the experience of suffering under the Japanese Imperial Army as the tales of the Himeyuri brigade and the "caves of salvation and doom" poignantly express.

Presently, many see Okinawa as a part of Japan that is not quite Japanese, a "third world" section of a post-industrial society associated with good baseball players, singers and beer, an "unliberated" part of post-postwar Japan that continues to suffer "post war" conditions of military bases whose imposed presence imply a "third disposal" of Okinawan society, once again asked to sacrifice its general welfare and happiness for the greater good of the larger Japanese society. It therefore does not come as a surprise that discourses surrounding Okinawan artifacts dwell mainly on the narratives of war, marginalization and difference; narratives of suffering and continuing frustration of what appears to be embedded in being one of Japan's eternally internal others. This is apparent in *Shima uta.*

Shima Uta: A Most Ironical Icon

"Shima uta" is a song composed by Miyazawa Kazufumi in 1992 for his band, The Boom. Strictly speaking, as a work of composition, it is a Japanese contemporary song done in the Okinawan style. Its

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[5]   I have been developing this idea of a "bi-archy" during the course of my experience in teaching Southeast Asian culture and society at the Asian Center, University of the Philippines. Indeed, in many Southeast Asian societies, social organization unmistakably veers away from models of patriarchy. Matriarchal models also appear to fail in describing "shared lineage" and "shared social roles" between men and women, husband and wife. As such, a bi-archy provides a convincing although yet undeveloped alternative of a model for social organization. Likewise, I have also identified the existence of "women of prowess" or "matrons," paralleling the patron, who exercise power in an alternative mode that may be described as a "radial and nodal" type of leadership, as opposed to the patron's "pyramidal and sectional" mode. This type of politics I label the "politics of matronage."

lyrics evoke an imagery of the islands starting with the flamboyant beauty of the scarlet blossoms of the *deigo* tree and the powerful force of a coming monsoon season storm. The poetic reverie that proceeds from Miyazawa's text makes for a song that is as beautiful as it is sad:[6]

> でいごの花が咲き 風を呼び 嵐が来た
> でいごが咲き乱れ 風を呼び 嵐が来た
> The storm comes, called by the wind as the *deigo* blooms
> The storm comes as the *deigo* blooms and casts its petals
>   on to the earth
>
> くり返す悲しみは 島渡る波のよう
> Like waves reaching this shore,
>   It recounts a story of sadness
>
> **(Refrain)**
>
> 島唄よ 風に乗り 鳥とともに 海を渡れ
> 島唄よ 風に乗り 届けておくれ私の涙
> Songs of the islands, ride the wind and
>   upon bird's wings, cross the sea
> Send my tears across the waters, and tell my story,
>   songs of the islands
>
> **(Refrain)**
>
> 海よ 宇宙よ 神よ いのちよ このまま永遠に夕凪を
>
> Ocean…heavens…God…life
> Embraced by an eternal evening…we remain…
>
> **(Refrain)**

The title, "Shima uta" which literally means "island song," is by itself an appropriated label. Its original meaning refers to a traditional genre of vocal music accompanied by the *sanshin* sung in the Amami Ōshima group of islands. It appears that Okinawan traditional music was not known as *shima uta* before The Boom's "Shima uta" phenomenon; instead, the label Okinawa *minyō* was used and (is still, although observed mostly by traditionalist artists).

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[6]   Song and original Japanese lyrics by Miyazawa Kazufumi from *Ryūkyūu minyō: Okinawa ongaku tokushū* (Tokyo: KMP Co., LTD., 1997). Translation by this author.

Miyazawa is not from Okinawa. He and the other members of The Boom hail from Yamanashi prefecture. His "Shima uta" can therefore be seen as marvel of trans-national creation. An outsider has appropriated an insider label, fashioned his own version of the insider's artifact, which in turn is accepted by the insider and lauded as a song that is most representative of Okinawan culture. Miyazawa relates his initial encounter with Okinawan culture, which eventually leads to the creation of "Shima uta:"[7]

> "I went to Okinawa to take some photos for the Boom's third album, to a very beautiful and natural area called Yanbaru, and for the first time saw a deeper side of Okinawa. I saw some remains of the war there, and visited the Himeyuri Peace and Memorial Museum and learnt about the female students who became like voluntary nurses looking after injured soldiers. […] I was still thinking about how terrible it was after I left the museum. Sugar canes were waving in the wind outside the museum when I left and it inspired me to write a song. I also thought I wanted to write a song to dedicate to that woman who told me the story. […] There are two types of melody in the song "Shima uta", one from Okinawa and the other from Yamato (Japan). I wanted to tell the truth that Okinawa had been sacrificed for the rest of Japan, and Japan had to take responsibility for that. […]"

Several elements make Miyazawa's tale of trans-creation a most interesting case for study.[8] First, his process of creation was, like most cases of good research, empirically-based. It was spurred by an actual encounter with a historical narrative through the agency of a peace museum constructed on an actual Okinawan war site, and an encounter with an actual person who lived the Okinawan war experience. Second, he appears to be most clear about his intent to commemorate the encounters via the creation of a song. This makes him a conscious agent of memory-making (although, perhaps, an "adopted" son of Okinawan memory-making) as well as an active political agent advocating through his creation an admission of Japanese war responsibility. Third, Miyazawa possesses a rare awareness of hybridity, a realization of being a cultural outsider using an insider genre. Even more remarkable is his pro-active pursuit of sharing his thoughts on issues of cultural ownership with a representative of the insider culture, who is the famous Okinawan singer-song writer, Kina Shōkichi. Miyazawa is aware of his "Japanese-ness" and all the attendant issues that might be linked to it as a result of his appropriation of Okinawan music. As such, it may be said that, as far as "Shima uta" is concerned, Okinawa's processes of memory-making, and struggles against marginalization and identity politics, may be elucidated by an empathizing outsider, Miyazawa. Although the political background of "Shima uta" in its production is quite clear and actively voiced by its creator, its political nature is more subtle if not passively "covert" in the artifact's marketing and consumption by the public. The CD single is most apolitical in form and substance, portraying

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7   "Miyazawa," Interview with *fRoots Magazine*, April 2003. Also accessible through http://www.farsidemusic.com/acatalog/miyazawaFROOTS.html (accessed: 19 November 2010).

8   Transcreation as a process of creating between two cultures is well discussed in Fernandez, Steven Patrick C. "From the Original to the Stage: Transcreating Indigenous Expressions for Show." In *Musika Jornal,* 6 (UP Center for Ethnomusicology, 2010).

"beautiful Okinawa" with Miyazawa sitting on a white sand shore singing his hymn to the azure waters of the islands. Here, indeed, politics often takes on the form of an aura of energy engulfing the artifact of the song invisible yet audible the myriad voices that accompany the oral poetics of its creation and aesthetics. The narrative of the song comes with its own baggage of "lore," allied texts so to speak, providing interstices from which other Okinawan narratives may emerge. These narratives we shall study in the user comments posted in uploaded music videos of the song in the YouTube.

The YouTube: Probing a New Space of Encounters with Okinawan Culture

To say that YouTube is a new space of social and cultural encounter is most probably an understatement. The YouTube as a video-sharing site officially was launched in February 2005.[9] Two aspects of YouTube are relevant to this study of Okinawan culture and identity: first, various versions of a particular song, either be professionally recorded or produced by amateurs, may be uploaded and compared virtually for free via this site; and second, registered users are allowed to post comments either in the form of written messages or video comments. Popular video uploads come with a great volume of posted comments, which range from genial to venial expressions.

In order to study this "thread" of history a purposive sampling of the following video uploads was selected. The video uploaded by *kabuyoushi17again*[10] shows the singer-composer, Miyazawa Kazufumi, wandering and singing in an Okinawan location. The location site for the shooting of this music video is a quintessential Okinawan neighborhood with coral walls and tropical flora framed by a blue sky and the clear waters of the islands. Miyazawa, the non-insider, is "inlaid," both figuratively and literally, in the cultural and geographical site of Okinawa. Association via appropriation of images becomes the vehicle of cultural legitimization of this song that did not originate from the locale.

The video uploaded by *rimit30*[11] shows the singer, Natsukawa Rimi, in what appears to be a television appearance. One clear difference between this video and that of Miyazawa can be seen in the absence of property or artifact that may help cue the viewer in associating the singer with Okinawa. Appropriation notwithstanding, her legitimization is embedded in her identity and public persona as an "Okinawan singer," allowing even for a most "culturally unorthodox" accompaniment by a guitarist!

The following video uploads of *10teko10*[12], *kazuo1970*[13], and *bluesea7walker*[14] all show Natsukawa Rimi singing in a concert. In all of these videos, Natsukawa wears western clothing. She accompanies her singing with her own playing of the Okinawan *sanshin*. This performative device brings the artifact, "Shima uta", into the fold of traditional Okinawan vocal music where the singer accompanies himself or herself with *sanshin* playing. This act of re-appropriation reconstitutes the product of outsider creation

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9   Hopkins, Jim (11 October 2006). "Surprise! There's a Third YouTube Co-founder". In *USA Today*. http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-10-11-youtube-karim x.htm (accessed: 20 November 2010).

10   http://www.youtube.com/watc?v=oFSDyM8whtk (accessed: 27 August 2010).

11   http://www.youtube.com/watch?vAMEsNVcnirA (accessed: 27 August 2010).

12   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4E8XndFHFXQ (accessed: 27 August 2010).

13   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hrgVxRRDNOk (accessed: 27 August 2010).

14   http://www.youtube.com/comment_servlet?all_comments=1&v=yyp41Kc_IdI (accessed: 27 August 2010).

into a form that is closer to home. An insider had just reclaimed the product of an earlier appropriation, thus reversing the direction of its (re)production.

The last two video uploads by *thomasguoan*[15] and *Knuta666*[16] are a music video of a performance by rockstar, Gackt, and traditional Okinawan singer and producer, China Sadao. If the Natsukawa concert videos "sowed" the seed of re-appropriating "Shima uta" as an artifact, this music video realizes it flowering and eventual fruiting. It starts with an inlay of an excerpt of traditional Okinawan singing (and dancing) by members of the popular Okinawan female band, the Nenes, who come in full *bingata* (traditional Okinawan rice paste-resist costume). This is followed by a very traditional rendition of the song by Gackt, and then by China Sadao, who accompanies himself with the *sanshin*. In this video, other Okinawan artifacts frame the non-Okinawan artifact of the song as performed by Okinawans, completing the song's reclamation by cultural insiders. It seems that re-appropriation via performance has made the song "truly Okinawan." It is Okinawan *because the people say so*.

Commentaries as "Linked" Artifacts

The "user's comments" section of the YouTube viewing page may be viewed as a rich lode of allied texts that in turn may be seen as "linked artifacts or ideo-facts" to the uploaded song or video itself. Table 1 presents the general sampling used in this brief study as well as the distribution of comments across categories of comments and uploads. As can be seen in the frequency distribution of categories, the comments surrounding the song in seven uploads indicate, in essence, the makings of an "aesthetic community" through exchanges of views about the song, the singer, advice on other video uploads, greetings, and other forms of social communication. This is apparent in the top four categories presented in Table 1. The category in fourth place, however, touches on the locale of Okinawa and the Okinawan people. This category can very well be understood or equated as the cultural context of the context of the song itself. This is followed by the category on inquiries on the singer in the sixth spot. The set encompassing the seventh (song analyzed) up to the twelfth category (military bases), however, is the most interesting to this researcher. This is because they comprise comments that link the artifact of the song to Okinawa's troubled past concerning war, and its "continuing" past of its troubled present, which is almost always linked to the presence of US military facilities in the prefecture.

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[15]   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v+3xdWZCVIR_4 (accessed: 27 August 2010).

[16]   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cshXwsCk810 (accessed: 27 August 2010).

Table 1. Comment Type and Frequency

Comment	The Boom	N. Rimi 1	N. Rimi 2	N. Rimi 3	N. Rimi 4	Gackt 1	Gackt 2	Sub total
Admiration for song	82	25	4	5	7	1	1	**122**
Admiration for singer	14	27	2	3	10	1	8	**65**
Miscellaneous /Banter	33	12			1	1	1	**48**
Background of singer	20	9	1	1	6	1	2	**40**
Okinawa/Okinawan	7	12			2		1	**22**
Inquiry on singer	7	6			2		2	**22**
Song analyzed	13	6					3	**22**
War/War related	13	1						**14**
Nostalgia	3	1			7			**11**
Peace	6				1			**7**
Military bases	6							**6**
Okinawan music	1	2			1	1		**5**
Japan/Japanese	1	2					1	**4**
Critique of singer	1	1	2					**4**
America/American	2	1						**3**
Okinawan history	3							**3**
Critique of song	1							**1**
Discrimination	1							**1**
Foreign view	1							**1**
Politics	1							**1**
Environment	1							**1**
Null (taken out)	3	7	1		2	1	4	**17**
Sum total	**220**	**112**	**10**	**9**	**39**	**6**	**23**	**419**

Note: The Boom = *kabuyoshi17again*, Rimi 1 = *rimit31*, Rimi 2 = *10teko10*, Rimi 3 = *bluesea7walker*, Rimi 4 = *kazuo1970*, Gackt 1 = *thomasgouan*, Gackt 2 = *knuta666*

Articulating Culture and Identity: A Content Analysis

One of the earliest comments by *tamachanto* posted two years ago shows how the process of re-interpretation allows for the viewer to appropriate the song for societal agenda-setting purposes. Background literature on "Shima uta" and Miyazawa Kazufumi does not appear to reveal any environmental intentions in the composition. Yet, *tamachanto* states that "he intentionally included the current theme of environmental problems" （最近では環境問題にも積極的に取り組んでいるそうです）. It may be said that *tamachanto* over-reads Miyazawa's text and, through suggestion, introduces his or her own agenda or opinion over issue-area of concern.[17]

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[17] The comments from this sub-section taken from the upload made by *kabuyoshi17again* comes from http://www.youtube.com/watc?v=oFSDyM8whtk (accessed: 27 August 2010).

Individual concern or advocacy is once again apparent in the transformation of the very idea as well as in the expansion of the operative range of a particular idea. For instance, *reirei 01201* atates that "Shima uta" sends "a petition(song) to the Japanese mainland"（惨状（歌）を届けて欲しい）which is indeed a very usual interpretation of the song. *microcorin350* however interjects and states that the song sends "not a petition but an aspiration of peace"（惨状じゃなくて「平和への願い」）.

The hermeneutic changes made by the comments reproduced above may indeed be slight, but their significance is perhaps inversely proportionate to their subtlety in expression. It is quite obvious in the *fRoot Magazine* interview mentioned earlier that Miyazawa directed the song to the Japanese mainland, and pointed to Japan as the responsible party for the tragic Okinawan experience. *micorin350's* interpretation may therefore be seen as fundamentally "expansive." The same artifact may indeed hold different semiotic significance for different receivers.

When external recipients of an artifact "meet" and exchange views in a non-synchronic or immediate manner, results such as the following may prove to be more interesting:

> *igedearyapardita* (7 months ago)
> the melody is similar to Javanese and Balinese folksong… (I think it's logic since both Java and Bali are island). Hearing this song the image of my hometown, Bali, popped up in my mind. (translated) Thank you for this song.

> *JeikokuNippon* (7 months ago)
> I like his singing style. Sounds like a hybrid of traditional Japanese singing and modern Western singing

> *asiansands* (8 months ago)
> This is a Japanese song, assimilating Okinawa's folk song aspect. It's beautiful. I feel the nature spirit

Three outsider views all receive the artifact very positively, but in three different ways. *igedearyapardita* associates it with traditional or folk music in Indonesia. "Shima uta" does employ a rolling pentatonic melodic pattern reminiscent of gamelan playing. *JeikokuNippon* looks at it as a Japanese-Western music hybrid. The instrumental bridge which employs the ornamentation of rock compositions, though not mentioned as Western by the composer, may easily be identified or associated with "Western music." *asiansands* recognizes an "Asian hybrid" resulting from elements of Japanese and Okinawan music traditions. These characterizations of "one" song underscore difference, but they do not necessarily constitute opposing views.

The following chain of three comments turns decidedly political with talk of Okinawa's tragic war past and its "continuing past" with the US military bases pricking the people's collective memory:

> *eibonn* (2 months ago)
> (Translated)

Although I understand the anti-US military bases feelings of the Okinawan people, the bases are necessary as a force of deterrence. Its presence is to assure that fighting does not happen.

eibonn
1 か月前
沖縄県民が基地反対って言う気持ちはよくわかるけど、抑止力のため基地はどうしても必要です。また争いをおこさないためにも。

onaga1031 (four weeks ago)
(Translated)
Although I belong to a generation that has not personally experienced war, I feel that this song brings the message of peace. This is for the reason that the present peace is built upon the blood sacrifice of the past.

*onaga*1031
4 週間前
私は戦争を肌で体験していない世代ですが、この歌から平和とはなにかということが伝わってくる気がします。なぜなら事実現代の泰平は先人たちの血と犠牲によって築かれたものなのですから。

hungseki1 (22 hours ago)
(Translated)
Many feel that the Japanese government has forced the (military) bases on Okinawa. However, it is the United States that wants to do so. Okinawa is the first line of defence and best fulfils the requirements of the United States policy towards China…The most important operative condition is Okinawa. Doing without the bases is impossible. In addition, the reason for the existence of the US military also disappears. I believe that it is most ideal to discuss things pragmatically by looking at facts.

hungseki1
22 時間前
無知な人間は日本政府が基地を沖縄に押し付けてると思ってるけど、アメリカが沖縄に基地を置きたいんだよ。アメリカの対中防衛の最前線、最高の立地条件が沖縄。基地をなくすには親中に傾かないと無理だろうね。そうしたらアメリカ軍の存在意義がなくなるから。もっと論理的に物事を見た方が良いと思う。

eibonn's talk about the presence of the bases takes on a pragmatic tone and appears to adopt a "realist" perspective of international relations with its use of the term "deterrence." *hungseki1's* discussion is suffused with pragmatism and adopts the language of strategic studies by talking about "first line of defense" and "checking China" or "measures towards China." *onaga1031's* takes a historical perspective

and relates how the peace of today results from the sacrifices made by earlier generations. In this chain, the political context of "Shima uta"s creation is well-articulated and actively voiced.

From a different video of "Shima uta" performed by Natsukawa Rimi as uploaded by the *rimit30*, the following chain of comments starts with an innocent inquiry made by *Gugugagamyself* about difference between the Japanese people and Okinawans. This triggers a rebuttal-laden debate featuring comments that are well supported by carefully selected and projected data:[18]

> *Gugugagamyself* (3 years ago)
> Hey :) what is the different between being Okinawan and Japanese? Sorry haha… Please email me :) I wanna learn. And I heard a Chinese version of this song… somewhere

> *Hyperaphid* (3 years ago)
> GOD I miss Okinawa.
> "gugugagamysel":
> Japanese and Okinawans are totally different! Before the Japanese took over, Okinawa was an independent kingdom and we had our own language and culture and everything! Even now, the Japanese spoken in Okinawa is very different. Okinawans are also ethnically very dissimilar to japanese, we are indigenous! I think Okinawa has more cultural ties to China, Taiwan, and Malaysia than japan.

> […]

> *Chrisshwada* (3 years ago)
> You do realize that okinawan and all ryukyuan languages are from the proto ryukyu-japnic and are japonic languages. You are making it seem like okinawan is more similar to Chinese when it is not. Okinawan is in the SAME LANGUAGE FAMILY as Japanese. It is 70% lexically similar to japan. The ryukyuans while different then Japanese are very similar people.

Hyperaphid's answer to *Gugugagamyself*'s inquiry takes on an extreme view of Okinawan difference. In this space, this must be considered and important articulation of difference since it purportedly comes from an Okinawan. Indeed, the difference is "totally" overwhelming. It also introduces the idea that the Japanese are actually "outsiders," in contrast to the Okinawans who are "indigenous." This construction of identity is very difficult to support as both present-day Japanese and Okinawans are descendants of both "outsiders" and "indigenous" peoples. *Hyperaphid*'s answer may be seen as an expression of a discourse of difference, while *Chrisshwada*'s rebuttal is an expression of a discourse of same-ness. *Chisshwada*'s irritation is apparent with her use of "all caps" font.

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18   The comments from this sub-section taken from the upload made by *kabuyoshi17* again come from http://www. youtube.com/watch?vAMEsNVcnirA (accessed: 27 August 2010).

The following comment by *Godz92* momentarily breaks the expressions of discourses of difference and sameness:

> *Godz92* (2 years ago)
> It's about the battle of okinawan during WWII. The first line goes: "The deigo flower has blossomed, and it has called the wind, and the storm has arrived." The storm being the American troops on their way to Okinawa is to fight the Japanese. The deigo flower blooming has to do with when the troops came, in spring time.

The comment explains the semiotic imagery of the song's first line. It therefore makes sense to "see" the Japanese device of the *kigo* (seasonal cuing word) in the song. The deigo is the *kigo*, and therefore locates the time-space nexus in Okinawa during the summer months of July and August. The blooming of the *deigo* ominously heralds the start of the only land battle in Japanese territory, one that resulted in a great number of casualties to both sides with the Okinawans helplessly caught in between.[19]

With a different cast of characters, the next three comments seem to continue the earlier chain of expressions relating to discourses of sameness and difference that happened three years ago:

> *Hoehoe1960* (1 year ago)
> Sound like Indonesia sound, any mysterious (relations) between Indonesia and Okinawa

> *Chibuyanchu* (1 year ago)
> I think Okinawans have closer DNA to Indonesia than Japanese. The ancient Okinawans (before being subjugated by Japan) traded throughout SE Asia. We look more like SE Asians than Japanese.

> *P0611010* (1 year ago)
> Okinawa's people's DNA is closer to Yamato race than any other race of the world. Both Okinawa and Yamato race mainly come from Siberia through Sakhalin or Korea. And Okinawa people's DNA are very different from Malay race (south Mongolian). That's why Okinawa's culture is very similar to Yamato. For example language and religion, Japonic languages and Shinto.

Hoehoe1960's comment starts the discussion, just like the earlier one by *igedearyapardita*, with an observation of similarity between Indonesian and Okinawan music. His comment leads to an inquiry about affinity which *Chibuyanchu*, a user who implicitly reveals his Okinawan origin, answers with the notion of the Okinawans having "closer DNA" to Indonesia compared to Japan. This triggers a strong

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[19]   Very well written narratives on, among others, the Okinawan war experience may be found in Arasaki Moriteru and others, *Kankō kōsu de nai Okinawa* (Tokyo: Kōbunken, 1983).

reaction from *P0611010* who expresses the opposite view using the language of physical anthropology.

The move towards a position of nativism is well illustrated in the following "dialogue" taken from another upload:[20]

> *behaitu* (2years ago)
> I love rimi… she is the most adorable singer keeping the Japanese music alive… go rimi go…

> *Ihatomi* (1 year ago)
> Rimi is great and has been my favorite ever since she came on the scene and even when she sang locally but please, she does not keep the Japanese music alive, she keeps Okinawan music alive. Don't confuse the two.

Ihatomi's admonition not to confuse Okinawan and Japanese music appears dissonant given "Shima uta's" provenance. It also implies that Natsukawa Rimi cannot contribute to the idea of "keeping the Japanese music alive."

Some Observations

The data acquired and analyzed in this brief study indicate the salience of culture in music production and consumption. Miyazawa's narration of how he composed "Shima uta" shows that "Okinawan culture" is embedded in the music-making process. The encounter with the Himeyuri Memorial, an Okinawan artifact by itself, spurred his composition of the song. Moreover, Miyazawa is aware of the contrasting (and possibly contending) elements in his composition. He, in fact, identified Okinawan and Japanese melodic lines, downplaying the strong presence of a Western (pop rock) element in the instrumental bridge. The aesthetic tensions his composition created may very well be seen as the wellspring of its expressive force, attracting individuals from different cultures across time (generations) and space (nationality).

"Shima uta" is a product of astute marketing. In the context of rising interests in "ethnic" or "world" musics in 1990s Japan, it may be said that *shima uta* "banked" on its association with Okinawan culture. The design and execution of Miyazawa's "Shima uta" jacket, as well as the music video that eventually evolved out of it and that graced many a karaoke screens, are replete with Okinawan imagery. In this manner production "coats" the artifact with another layer of culture.

When "Shima uta" is (re) appropriated by Okinawan artists and (re)presented as a typically Okinawan song, it again goes through a process of re-interpretation, which further pursues its Okinawan-ness. Sung by an Okinawan in a concert featuring Okinawan songs, it penetrates Okinawan culture through its inclusion in a set of so-called "canon" pieces. When translated and performed in the Ryūkyūan language or Uchināguchi, its re(verse) appropriation, in many ways, becomes complete.

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[20] The comments from this sub-section taken from the upload made by *10teko10* comes from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4E8XndFHFXQ (accessed: 27 August 2010).

The discussion presented above points to the "transnational" quality of "Shima uta". As an artifact, it was produced trans-nationally and consumed trans-nationally. "Shima uta" is generally received as an Okinawan song by both non-Okinawan and non-Japanese. Consumption of one song or any other artifact often leads to consumption. Paralleling this consumption of artifact is the acquisition of knowledge about the cultural context of its creation and place and culture of provenance. In short, consumption leads to acquisition of knowledge about Okinawan music and about Okinawa.

Our familiarity with a certain culture may be seen to be constitutive of strings of artifacts and strings of knowledge that respectively make up the weft and the warp of our fabric understanding of that culture. Ross Poole operationalized culture as a gallery of symbols and meanings, or a process of producing such gallery of symbols and meanings.[21] Cultural membership can therefore also be seen as the ability to interpret this gallery as well as the production of this gallery of artifacts. The artifacts themselves constitute symbols and meaning. Membership therefore requires the ability to make sense of the and the ability to make sence of self in relation to the community via these artifacts. The artifacts themselves constitute symbols and meaning. Membership therefore requires the ability to make sense self in relation to the community via these artifacts. Miyazawa's success in producing "Shima uta", an "Okinawan" artifact as recognized via re-appropriation by insiders, makes him an "agent" of Okinawan culture, albeit not possessing insider status of that culture. Miyazawa's situation is therefore that of an outsider producing an artifact consumed by both insiders and outsiders. This situation best characterizes transnational cuiture, one that is freed from notions of territoriality and notions of the prestige of insider provenonce.

Orthodox thinking normally views traditional artifacts as bound by territory (place) and grouping (ethnicity). However, the world has long evolved away from these rigidities. For instance, ballet, although still largely French in "vocabulary," has for a very long time ceased to be a "French" expression. Via so-called Okinawa Pop or Uchinaa Pop,[22] Okinawan music has gone global. In a sense, the tradition has evolved and come up with creations or specific works that may be called semiotic artifacts. In their processes of creation, semiotic artifacts downplay the importance of provenance defined in terms of place and people. Instead, what are emphasized in their making are the intangibles of the craft or the techniques in production and aesthetics, as well as an "evocation" of culture, of place and of people.

Before concluding this piece, some observations on the creation of Okinawan identity in YouTube should be discussed. In the sampling examined for this piece, three points in the polar construction of Okinawan identity may be observed. The first, which may be called "Uchinanchū-ron (Okinawan-ron), adapts the rather" ideological concept nihonjinron to the Okinawan case, thereby producing a theory of Okinawa and Okinawa-ness. This discourse, above all others, aims to distance Okinawan identity and culture from Japanese identity and culture. It undergoes processes of "othering" through an insistence of uniqueness of the in-group or self. These processes are in descriptive terms "absolute" in insisting on

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[21]   Poole, Ross. *Nation and Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1999).

[22]   For a comprehensive discussion of the genre of Uchinaa Pop, see: Robertson, James E. "Uchinaa Pop: Place and Identity in Contemporary Okinawan Popular Music." In *Critical Asian Studies*, 33:2 (2001), pp. 211–242.

"total difference." Although self-professing a bias for hybridity via the term *champurū* (Uchinagūchi: mixed, and Malay: campur), this perspective favors a southern orientation, seeking to identify with Southeast Asia and not at all with *naichi* or Yamato towards the north.[23] The second point, which may be called the Uchinachū-equals-nihonjnron. This perspective is a variant of nihonjinron that simplistically subsumes Okinawan culture and identity as a sub-category of the Japanese. It subverts the Uchinanchū-ron discourse by adopting the opposite. Its perspective on same-ness is total. Proponents of a variant of this view, which includes the pioneer folklorist Yanagita Kunio, look at Okinawa as a repository of cultural forms that have already vanished from the Japanese mainland. This view harnesses the power of romanticism and nostalgia in its meta-narrative of same-ness based on the idea of lost past present in the margins.[24] The third, "the Diverging-Converging Hybrid-ron", is a derived category from the first and the second. It aims to strike a balance between the two and to portray the fluidity of culture and identity. This view looks at identity and culture as products of encounters, which in turn are either diverging or converging at any certain period of history. Japan's relationship with China shows such twists and turns in culture, converging during the Nara period, diverging shortly after the Heian period, converging again with the restoration of contact during the Kamakura period, going into an almost extreme form of divergence during the Edo period due to a policy of *sakoku*, and so on. Finally, this view orients the processes of diverging and converging towards multiple directions, and thus portraying an idea of multi-cultural exchange that is more complex and sophisticated.

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[23] Uechi Noboru of Okinawa University has expressed a version of this "ron" or theory in his work on Okinawan music in "Okinawa as the Northern Limit of Southeast Asian Music-Culture," paper delivered in "The Transnationalizing Cultures of Japan in Asia: Dramas, Literatures, Musics, Arts and Agencies" [International Conference on Japanese Studies], Japanese Studies Program, Escaler Hall, Ateneo de Manila University (9 February 2008).

[24] Yanagita Kunio apparently first expressed this view in his work *Kaijō no michi* [The Sea Route]. Some of his views are well studied in Mori Kōichi, "Yanagita Kunio: An Interpretive Study." In *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* (1980).

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〈ゆるい〉と〈かたい〉のあいだ：

日本の〈ゆるキャラ〉マスコットを考える

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要旨

　2000年代以後の日本社会で「ゆるキャラ」がブームになっている。「ゆるキャラ」とは、イベントや企業をＰＲするためにデザインされた、「ゆるい」キャラクターのことで、その数は全国で1000種類近くあり、毎月のように増えつづけている。「ゆるキャラ」の特徴は、国や地方公共団体などの「おかたい」公的機関が積極的に作り出していることにある。日本人が政治への信頼を失っているなかで、国民をゆるやかに統治するシステムとして、「ゆるキャラ」は機能しているのではないだろうか。

1.「ゆるキャラ」とは

　2000年代に入ってから、「ゆるキャラ」ブームが日本社会に広がっている。「ゆるキャラ」とは主として行政や公的なイベントの実施主体、場合により私企業が、イベントや商品・サービスの認知度を高め、あるいは自治体や行政機関に親しみやすいイメージを付加するために創作された、「ゆるい」キャラクターのことである[1]。この論文では、日本に広がる「ゆるキャラ」の概要を紹介し、その社会的背景とブームの意味・機能について若干の議論を行う。

　商品やサービスの宣伝のためにキャラクターを用いることは、別に新しいことではない。宣伝のためのキャラクターには、企業が独自に創作したものもあれば、「ドラえもん」や「ポケモン」のような既存の人気キャラクターを商品に付加するものもある。「ゆるキャラ」に特徴的なことは、それが新たに創作されたものであることに加えて、「ゆるい」特徴が付加されていること、そして何よりもその多くが「おかたい」イメージのある行政機関によって利用されていることである。

　「ゆるい」ということばには、「たるみ」や「すきま」があるという意味が含まれる。じっさい、「ゆるキャラ」のデザインには、「たるみ」や「すきま」のあるものが多い。しかし、デザインが「ゆるい」かどうかは多分に個人の主観にゆだねられるものであり、客観

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[1]　伊藤剛の『テヅカ・イズ・デッド』（NTT出版、2005年）以来、記号性の高い「キャラ」と人格的要素の高い「キャラクター」を区別する論調がある。しかし、「ゆるキャラ」の語は伊藤の研究が世に出るまえから流通していたので、この場合の「キャラ」は「キャラクター」の省略以上の含意はないとみるべきだろう。

的な基準はない。したがって、何が「ゆるキャラ」で何が「ゆるキャラ」でないかの厳密な判断は難しい。

「ゆるキャラ」の提唱者であるとされる、マンガ家でライターのみうらじゅん（1958–）によれば、「郷土愛に満ちあふれた強いメッセージ性があること」「立ち居振る舞いが不安定かつユニークであること」「愛すべき、ゆるさ、を持ち合わせている事」「原則として着ぐるみ化されていること」が「ゆるキャラ」の条件になる[2]。そのデザインの傾向を分析すれば、「巨大な頭部」か「短い足」、もしくはその両方の特徴を備えているものがほとんどである。それらの要因が着ぐるみ化された場合の立居振舞の不安定さを生み、巨大な頭部とあわせて愛くるしさを生む源になっている。

「ゆるキャラ」の判断基準は、揺れ動いてもいる。一例として、2010年に奈良で開催された「平城遷都1300年祭」の公式マスコット・キャラクターの「せんとくん」をあげることができる[3]。「せんとくん」は、著名な彫刻家で東京藝術大学教授の籔内佐斗司（1953–）によってデザインされた。鹿の角が生えた童子の姿をしているその姿に、当初は「気持ち悪い」との強い批判があった[4]。ところがその批判報道をとおして「せんとくん」の認知度は高まり、「気持ち悪い」との評価はしだいに「きもかわいい」（気持ち悪いけどかわいい）へと変わっていった。「せんとくん」が「ゆるい」かどうかは判断がわかれるところではあるが、それを「ゆるキャラ」の一種に数えるひとは少なくない。「せんとくん」の登場によって「ゆるキャラ」の概念が広がったことは確かだろう。

イベント・プロモーションなどのためにキャラクターを作るのは、1970年代から行われていた。そういったキャラクターが「ゆるい」属性を伴いながら急速に広がったのは、2000年代に入ってからだといえるだろう。「ゆるキャラ」概念の生みの親とされるみうらは、このことばを作ったのは1990年代末だったといっている[5]。みうらは2002年11月23日に東京・後楽園ゆうえんちスカイシアターで開催された「第1回みうらじゅんのゆるキャラショー」をプロモートした。またみうらは、「週刊ＳＰＡ！」2003年1月14日号から04年6月1日号まで、「ゆるキャラだョ！全員集合」と題する連載を行い、全国の自治体等が続々と採用していた「ゆるい」マスコット・キャラクターを「ゆるキャラ」として紹介した。そしてみうらが監修して2006年4月20日にテレビ東京系列で放映された「ＴＶチャンピオン・ゆるキャラ日本一決定戦」によって、「ゆるキャラ」は広く日本国民に認知されることとなった。

「ゆるキャラ」人気の一大転機になったのが、2007年に登場した「ひこにゃん」である。「ひこにゃん」は、同年に滋賀県彦根市で開催された「国宝・彦根城築城400年祭」のマスコット・キャラクターに採用されたものである。彦根藩の二代目藩主の命を落雷から守ったという伝説の白猫にちなんだもので、その愛くるしい姿から全国的な人気を得て、いわゆる「ゆるキャラ」ブームを決定的なものにした。

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[2]　http://www.oricon.co.jp/news/special/71089/

[3]　「せんとくん」は2011年からは奈良県が管理するマスコット・キャラクターになった。

[4]　この論文で言及した「ゆるキャラ」の画像は、インターネットの画像検索サービスを利用すれば容易に参照できるため、後述する「ひこにゃん」以外の画像引用は割愛した。

[5]　みうらじゅん『全日本ゆるキャラ公式ガイドブック』扶桑社、2009年、350頁。

　2011年2月現在、「ひこにゃん」をあしらった数々のキャラクター商品が販売されている。毎週末には彦根城において「ひこにゃん」の着ぐるみショーが開催され、大勢の家族連れで賑わっている（図1）。2008年からは、彦根市において毎年秋に「ゆるキャラまつり」が行われ、2010年の「まつり」では全国から170体の「ゆるキャラ」の着ぐるみが集結し、2日間で同市の人口の67パーセントに相当する75,000人が会場を訪れ、その経済効果は4億3000万円あったという[6]。

図1　彦根城で行われている「ひこにゃん」の着ぐるみショー（著者撮影）

　では2011年2月現在、日本には何種類の「ゆるキャラ」がいるのだろうか？みうらが編集した『全日本ゆるキャラ公式ガイドブック』（2009年）[7]には、みうら自身が厳選した180種類が収録されている。『日本全国ご当地キャラクター図鑑』（2009年）、『同2』（2009年）には、450種類以上が記載されていて、それらのほとんどが「ゆるキャラ」である[8]。また「みんなのゆるキャラ」[9]というウェブサイトには、2011年2月末現在で923種類が登録されている。ただし、後2者にはみうらがあげた「ゆるキャラ」の条件のうち「原則として着ぐるみ化されていること」が満たされていない例も多い。みうらが「着ぐるみ化」を条件にあげたのは、テレビ映りのよさを戦略的に意識したものと考えられ、「ゆるキャラ」にとって本質的な条件と考えなくてもよいだろう。以上のことから、日本にいる「ゆるキャラ」の種類は、あいまいな表現ではあるがおよそ1000種類といったところだろうか[10]。

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[6]　http://www.47news.jp/localnews/shiga/2010/11/post_20101103112233.html

[7]　みうら前掲書。

[8]　これらの図鑑にはわずかではあるが、「萌え系キャラ」や「ご当地戦隊」も含まれている。

[9]　http://yuru.tips-top.com/

[10]　2011年2月現在、新しい「ゆるキャラ」誕生のニュースはほぼ毎月のように伝えられているので、この数字は今後も増加しつづけるだろう。

2.「ゆるキャラ」の作られ方

　「ゆるキャラ」のデザインにはいくつかのパターンがある。代表的なものをあげると、(1) 動物、(2) 特産品、(3) 自治体の形、(4) モノの形、(5) シンボルの形、(6) 歴史上の人物、(7) 伝統的なキャラクター、などがみられる。それぞれについて実例をあげよう。

　(1) 動物

「ゆるキャラ」名称	制作主体	原　型
ひこにゃん	国宝・彦根城築城400年祭	猫
トリピー	鳥取県	鳥
ホッキーナ&ほきのすけ	青森県三沢市	ホッキ貝

　(2) 特産品

「ゆるキャラ」名称	制作主体	原　型
つつむくん	宇都宮餃子会	餃子
ラッカ星人	ＮＨＫ千葉放送局	落花生
すだちくん	徳島県・東四国国体	すだち

　(3) 自治体の形

「ゆるキャラ」名称	制作主体	原　型
アップリート君	スポレクあおもり2007	青森県
チーバくん	千葉国体	千葉県

　(4) モノの形

「ゆるキャラ」名称	制作主体	原　型
フントー君	静岡県峰温泉	温泉
わたる	本州四国連絡高速道路	橋
たわわちゃん	京都タワー	京都タワー

　(5) シンボルの形

「ゆるキャラ」名称	制作主体	原　型
石川さん	石川テレビ放送局	「石」の字
しゅうちゃん	さわやか信州旅ブログ	温泉の地図記号
カッシー	奈良県香芝市	香芝市章

　(6) 歴史上の人物

「ゆるキャラ」名称	制作主体	原　型
かねたん	山形県米沢市	直江兼続（武将）
ハッスル黄門	ねんりんピック茨城大会	徳川光圀（水戸藩主）
与一くん	栃木県大田原市	那須与一（武将）

（7）伝統的なキャラクター

「ゆるキャラ」名称	制作主体	原　型
ニャッパゲ	デザイン事務所ネコヤナギ	なまはげ（秋田の鬼）
つなが竜ヌゥ	さいたま市	竜
親切な青鬼くん	香川県・観光客を暖かく迎える親切運動	童話『泣いた赤鬼』

3. 日本社会の「かたさ」と「ゆるキャラ」

　「ゆるキャラ」はなぜ現代の日本社会でもてはやされているのだろうか？　日本は概して「かたい」社会であるといってよいだろう。そのさいたるものは、儒教文化の名残のある上下関係である。会社や官公庁においては、年齢と組織への加入年に基づく上下関係が、給与の多寡と人間関係を規定しているといってよい。給与の年功序列は崩れてきているとはいっても、日本社会ではまだまだ年功がものをいう。このことは、日本社会に特有のものといわれる「先輩・後輩システム」というタイトな権力構造と無縁ではない。組織に後から加入した者は、先に加入した者に礼節を尽くさねばならず、その関係はときに組織を離脱した後も生涯にわたって継続する。

　日本特有のあいさつ方法とされる「おじぎ」は、相手との関係によって角度と長さが決まっている。学校を卒業して会社に入ったばかりの新人は、まずそのルールを学び、人間関係が上位にある者に対する心のこもった「おじぎ」のしかたを、社内研修や実地のトレーニングで教えられる。

　日本社会は、時間に厳格でかつ何事にもスピードが求められることでも名高い。ビジネスでは、約束の時間の10分前には訪問先に到着し、時間ぴったりに相手を呼び出すことがマナーとされる。公式の場で、はめを外すことは許されず、きっちりとしていることが評価される。はめを外してよいのは、相互が暗黙に了解している決められた時間と空間の範囲においてのみである。「かたい」上下関係を一時的に解消する非日常的な宴会のことを日本では「無礼講」といい、「無礼講」の空間を共有することによって日常の人間関係はより強固なものになる。

　こうした「きっちりと」した傾向は、日本の伝統芸道といわれるものに共通してあらわれている。たとえば茶道では、各種の道具を置く位置は、畳一目（およそ15ミリ）の精度で厳格に決められている。茶席における主人と客の立ち振る舞いのルールの「かたさ」はいうに及ばない。柔道や剣道などの日本の伝統スポーツが、対戦する相手への礼節を重視していることはよく知られたところである。

　こうした日本社会の、とくに時間面での「かたさ」の原因は、明治時代に作られた鉄道の定時運行システムの影響が大きいといわれている[11]。日本の鉄道運行の厳格さは、世界に類例がないだろう。日本のほとんどすべての鉄道は、分刻みダイヤを正確に守り、しかも車両を停止させる位置までが極めて厳格に決められていて、それを守る。

　日本人はこうした時間的・空間的な厳密さを、よいこととして評価していた。しかし、この種のクレイジーな嗜好が、2005年に起きたＪＲ福知山線の大事故の一因になったとも

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[11]　たとえば、橋本毅彦、栗山茂久編『遅刻の誕生　近代日本における時間意識の形成』三元社、2001年。

いわれている。死者107名、負傷者562名を出したこの事故の原因についてはまだ裁判中であるが、わずか90秒の遅れを取り戻そうとした運転手がスピードを出しすぎて、カーブを曲がりきれずに脱線したとの説が有力である。日本人がこの事故から学ぶべきことは多い。少なくとも鉄道会社においては、時間を守って鉄道を運行することに第一の価値を置かなくなったことはたしかである[12]。全国的に「ゆるキャラ」が増殖していた2000年代のなかばに、このような事故が起きたことは、日本社会に「ゆるさ」が必要なことを象徴しているのではないだろうか。

4. 議論1：「ゆるキャラ」は日本社会への「救済」か？

　つづいて、「ゆるキャラ」の日本社会のなかでの役割についての議論に移りたい。「ゆるキャラ」がひろがった2000年代の日本社会は、どのようなものだったのだろうか？ 1990年代なかばにはじまった、「失われた10年」ともいわれる平成不況によって、バブル時代に築いた不動産・金融資産は価値を減らしてしまった。社会の閉塞感は雇用にあらわれ、1980年から94年まで2％台だった失業率は2002年には5.4％に達した。その後失業率は2007年にいったん3.9％まで下がったが、それからまた急速に上昇し、2010年12月時点で4.9％に達している。先進諸国のなかでは低いとはいえ、この失業率の水準は、高度経済成長後の日本が経験したことのない高さである。

　雇用の悪化は若年層に大きな影響を与えた。大学・短大・高専の最終学年生の10月時点での採用内定率は、1997年には71.2％だったのが急速に下がりはじめ、2003年には57.5％になった。その後は08年の68.3％まで回復したが、09年は61％にまで下落した。この雇用悪化の直撃を受けたのが、1970年代なかば以後に生まれた世代である。彼らの多くは定職に就くことができず「フリーター」や「ニート」あるいは「派遣職員」となって生活している。そのうえ会社や官公庁は、正規職員と違ってかんたんに解雇することができる彼らを、雇用の調整弁として都合よく利用している。そのため、「派遣切り」などの問題を生みながらも、問題の解決に向けての取り組みが遅れている。

　ちまたにあふれる「ゆるキャラ」は、こうした閉塞した状況にある日本人、とくに若年層の心をなごませる「救済」なのだという解釈もできよう。だが、これは安易な解釈であるとの批判はまぬがれない。まず問わなければならないことは、「ゆるキャラ」はほんとうに「ゆるい」だけのキャラクターなのかという点である。

5. 議論2：「ゆるキャラ」は「コントロールされたゆるさ」ではないのか？

　「ゆるキャラ」の姿形の愛くるしさに由来する「ゆるさ」は否定できないが、「ゆるキャラ」の管理実態をみるならば、それは決して「ゆるい」ものではない。何よりも「ゆるキャラ」という単語そのものが、みうらじゅんと扶桑社によって2004年に商標登録されてい

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[12] 東海道新幹線では、かつてはダイヤに遅れが生じたさいには、スピードをあげて遅れを取り戻す「回復運転」に努める旨の車内アナウンスがあったが、この事故を境にそのようなアナウンスはなくなった。

るのだ（登録番号：4821202）。したがって、「ゆるキャラ」は正確には「ゆるキャラⓇ」と表記しなければならない。ただし、彼らが商標権を主張して使用料を請求する事態はいまのところ発生していないようだ。だが、みうらが特別顧問を務める「㈳ゆるキャラさみっと協会」では、「ゆるキャラ」の語を商標として使用する場合は協会員になるよう呼び掛けている[13]。「ゆるキャラ」は、ことばそのものが管理されたものなのである。

　「ゆるキャラ」が「ゆるい」だけのものではないことを実感させる係争が、「ゆるキャラ」の王者である「ひこにゃん」をめぐって起きている。「ひこにゃん」のデザインは、彦根城築城400年祭実行委員会が公募したものであった。それに応募して採択されたのが大阪市のイラストレーター・もへろんが描いた３枚のイラストだった（図２）。その３枚には「ひこにゃん」の「座る」「はねる」「剣をかざす」の３つのポーズが描かれていた[14]。実行委員会は「ひこにゃん」の著作権をもへろんと彼を雇用するデザイン会社から購入し、祭典の期間中は彦根市内の業者が「ひこにゃん」を自由に使ってよいという「コピーフリー」ポリシーをとった。祭典の終了後、実行委員会はその著作権を彦根市に移管した。ところが祭典が終わる2007年11月に原作者のもへろんは、自身の権利を侵害されたとして裁判所に訴えた。彼の主張は、実行委員会が「ひこにゃんは地元特産の近江牛が好き」といった、原作者の想定にない属性を勝手に与えたことが「著作者人格権」の侵害にあたるということ、そして「ひこにゃん」の著作権は祭典の期間中だけの使用を認めたものだという点であった。人気が上昇していた「ひこにゃん」をめぐるこの騒動が全国に報道され、その愛くるしい姿がますます知れ渡ることになった。

図２　「ひこにゃん」のイラスト[15]

　同年12月には和解が成立し、彦根市はもへろんから著作権をあらためて買い取ること、彦根市が使用できる「ひこにゃん」は最初のイラストにあった３つのポーズに限ること、もへろんは自身が創作する絵本で「ひこにゃん」を自由に利用できることになった。ただし、このとき両者は「ひこにゃん」の着ぐるみについては争っていない。

　これで「ひこにゃん」をめぐる争いは落ち着いたかに思えたが、そうはならなかった。もへろんは「ひこにゃん」にそっくりのキャラクターを作り、そのグッズを「ひこねのよいにゃんこ」の名称で販売しはじめたのだ。それに立腹した彦根市は、2009年７月に「ひ

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[13]　http://kigurumisummit.org/

[14]　「ひこにゃん」の名称は、別の公募によって決められた。

[15]　http://www.city.hikone.shiga.jp/kikakushinkobu/150ht/trademark01.htmlより転載。

こねのよいにゃんこ」を売っている市内の土産物店に通達を出し、「よいにゃんこ」グッズを売らないように求めた[16]。

　一連の騒動は「ひこにゃん」の知名度と人気をあきらかに加速した。佐賀県唐津市の「唐ワンくん」、福井県鯖江市の「さばにゃん」などの模倣キャラクターが生まれたばかりか、玩具メーカーのサンリオも「ひこにゃん」を意識した「ご当地ハローキティ」を販売した。

　2010年７月に彦根市は「ひこにゃん」の新たな使用規定を作り、デザインルールを明示し、商業利用については商品の販売総額（販売小売価格（消費税含む））×予定生産数×３％の使用許諾料を彦根市に支払い、またすべての商品に１枚１円の証紙を貼ること、無償利用についてもその許諾番号を使用品に表示することなどを求めている[17]。

　同種の使用規定を定めている「ゆるキャラ」は少なくない。たとえば2010年千葉国体のマスコット「チーバくん」の場合、ロイヤリティの規定はもちろんのこと、着ぐるみの貸し出し規定には「人前で脱がないこと」「声を発しないこと」「頭部は逆さまにして保管すること」などのほか、「チーバくん」をイベントに登場させるときのアナウンス内容までこと細かに示されている[18]。こういった現象をみていると、「ゆるキャラ」はやはりただ「ゆるい」だけのキャラクターではなく、そこには日本社会特有の「かたさ」「細かさ」「厳格さ」が隠されているように思える。これをわたしは「コントロールされたゆるさ」ととらえてみたい。

　日本には「コントロールされたゆるさ」といえる文化がある。時間と空間を区切って日常の「かたさ」を「ゆるめる」システムである。しかし、どの期間、どの場所で「ゆるめて」よいかは暗黙のうちに決められている。先にあげた「無礼講」の伝統が、わかりやすい例といえよう。近年では、2005年にはじまった「クールビズ」が「コントロールされたゆるさ」といえるだろう。これは夏の暑い期間（多くは６月１日から９月30日まで）、職場での冷房費の節約のため、男性職員の「制服」であるスーツとネクタイを着用しないよう、また女性職員にも軽装を勧める運動である。「クールビズ」が実施されている期間は、軽装を奨励している旨を示した来客への断り書きがオフィスの入口に表示される。この職場ではネクタイもせず「ゆるく」みえるが、それは「コントロールされたもの」であり、職場の規律は保たれていることを周知させるためである。

　真夏に「ゆるい」服装で応対するが、しかしその背後には「かたい」ルールがあるという構造は、「ゆるさ」の裏に著作権と使用規定という「かたい」ルールがある「ゆるキャラ」

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[16]　2010年春の調査では、ある土産物店は彦根市の通達を無視して「よいにゃんこ」の販売をつづけていたが、同年秋には店頭から撤去されていた。なお、2011年２月現在、彦根市が「よいにゃんこ」のグッズ販売差し止めを求めた裁判が進行中である。

[17]　http://www.city.hikone.shiga.jp/kikakushinkobu/150ht/trademark.html

[18]　「来年2010年秋、ここ千葉県で国内最大のスポーツの祭典である『国体、ゆめ半島千葉国体』が開催されます。千葉県では、昭和48年開催の若潮国体以来37年ぶり２度目の開催になります。『今房総の風となり この一瞬に輝きを』のスローガンのもと、開会式は千葉マリンスタジアムで行われます。（幟旗、横断幕等で紹介）そして、今日はマスコットキャラクターのチーバくんが、遊びに来てくれました。チーバくんは何と横から見た姿が千葉県の形をしています。（チーバくん登場！手を振る）」……。なお、「チーバくん」は2011年1月から千葉県が管理するマスコット・キャラクターになった。

のそれと似てはいないだろうか？　かりに「議論１」のように「ゆるキャラ」が日本社会にとっての「救済」であったとしても、それは「クールビズ」の軽装のように「コントロールされたゆるさ」で、ひとびとを解放するものなのではないだろうか？

6.　議論３：「ゆるキャラ」は国民統治の新しいスタイルではないか？

　「コントロールされたゆるさ」というみかたは、行政によって利用されてきた「ゆるキャラ」に新しい視点を与えてくれる。それは、「ゆるキャラ」が市民の統治のための新しいスタイルとして利用され、定着してきたという事実である。

　日本の政治は2000年代なかば以後、国民からの安定的な信頼を得られないでいる。５年間のあいだに安倍、福田、麻生、鳩山、菅と首相は交代し、彼らはみな首相就任時に高い支持を得ながら職務の遂行とともに支持率は急激に下落し、ついには辞職に追い込まれるという筋書きを繰り返している（図３）。いまの日本には強い政治家はおらず、マスコミも国民も首相の失態をあげつらって、短期間で権力の座から引きずり降ろすことが習慣化しまったかのようだ。国家レベルでそのような気分が蔓延しているなか、都道府県が実施するイベントへの参加、郷土愛や特産品の消費を、その愛くるしい姿で呼び掛ける「ゆるキャラ」は、強力なリーダーシップとは異なるスタイルで国民を統合へと導いているといえるだろう。


図３　日本の内閣支持率の変化

　たとえば「ひこにゃん」は、「ふるさと納税制度」[19]による寄附を彦根市に呼び込む手

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[19]　好きな自治体に寄附をする制度で、5000円を超える寄附額のほぼ全額が所得税と住民税から控除される。

段として使用されている。2008年10月に彦根市は、「みんなのひこにゃん応援事業」を立ち上げ、「ひこにゃん」を応援するために彦根市に「ふるさと納税」をする呼びかけをはじめた。この事業には2009年度の１年間に276件、191万1000円の寄附が集まった。寄附者には彦根城に１年間無料で入場できる、「ひこにゃん」の写真が入ったパスポートが贈られた[20]。彦根市はこの枠組みをさらに宣伝するために、2010年10月から「ひこにゃん」のファンクラブを立ち上げた。入会の資格は、「ふるさと納税」によって5000円以上を彦根市に寄附した者に与えられる。2010年度は８月までにすでに約400人の寄附者があり、ファンクラブの創設によって来年３月までに合計で約800人からの「ふるさと納税」を見込んでいる[21]。

　特筆すべきは「かたい」イメージの強い検察庁が、積極的に「ゆるキャラ」を使っていることである。2010年現在、全国８つの高等検察庁と50の地方検察庁に72の「ゆるキャラ」がある[22]。検察庁が「ゆるキャラ」を利用するにいたった背景には、2009年に導入された「裁判員制度」がある。これは重大な刑事裁判において抽選で選ばれた一般市民が合議して有罪・無罪を決定する制度で、刑事裁判制度の大改革であると同時に国民に重い義務を新たに背負わせるものであった。この新制度を周知徹底し、国民の関心を集めるために、検察庁は「ゆるキャラ」を戦略的に使った。「かたい」裁判の場での重い負担を、「ゆるい」イメージでくるみ国民に負わせるために、検察庁の「ゆるキャラ」は使われている。

　日本全国に「繁殖」している「ゆるキャラ」は強い政治家、警察、軍隊とは異なる国民統治のシステムとして、日本社会に作用している。そのような側面に着目すれば、「ゆるキャラ」がただの「ゆるい」存在ではないことがみえてくる。

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[20]　京都新聞電子版、2010年４月29日。

[21]　読売新聞電子版、2010年８月31日。

[22]　http://www.kensatsu.go.jp/kakuchou/supreme/img2/kyara.html

マンガというイノベーションとそのグローバルな普及モデル

白 石 さ や

要旨

　戦後日本社会に育ったマンガをコミックのイノベーションとしてとらえ、そのグローバル化の過程をイノベーションの普及理論に拠って世界各地での現地調査の結果に照らして検討した。グローバル化は国家政府とは関係なく進展したものであり、アクターとしては「イノベーター」としてのマンガ家たち、「初期受容者」としてアジアにおける中華書籍ネットワーク関係者と現地マンガ・ファンが、またアメリカにおけるコンピュータ・サイエンス専攻の学生たち、さらにヨーロッパにおける日本語学習の学生達があげられる。彼らはマンガの「視覚的語り」を受け入れ視角的文法にそって創作を始めている。テレビによるアニメ放映によって「初期多数者」による受容が進行する。

はじめに

　「クール・ジャパン」という言葉は、一時期の日本のマスメディアや政府各省庁にブームを巻き起こした。テレビでも新聞でも「世界の若者が日本のクールなポピュラーカルチャーにぞっこんである」という海外各地からの若者文化状況が報道され、国内でも日本語の達者な若い外国人が何人もテレビ・スタジオに招かれて、日本社会における日常性に関して口々に「クール」であると礼賛した。文化庁、経産省、外務省等も、それぞれにポピュラーカルチャー関連の文化政策や文化産業政策を打ち上げた。こうした状況は一般的な日本人の間にある種の軽い興奮をもたらしたようである。中でも日本文化の国際交流の現場にいた人々は、従来は「日本の文化は特異であり、海外では容易に理解されない」という前提で苦労をしてきただけに、当初は衝撃でさえあったようだ。決して伝統文化を捨てるわけではないのだが、新たに「世界に受け入れられるポピュラーカルチャー」が文化交流の項目として華々しく登場した。

　そうしたブームもようやく一段落を迎え、新たな文化交流プログラムの構成も定着してきたと思われる今日、改めて日本のポピュラーカルチャーの世界的な展開と受容の在り方を振り返ってみよう。それは次の段階として、今日のグローバル化の進展する世界における日本のポピュラーカルチャーの位置づけを理解することに繋がり、ひいては学問としてのポピュラーカルチャー研究の基盤構築への細やかな試みともなるであろう。

　本稿では、世界に広がるポピュラーカルチャーの中でも、「日本のマンガのグローバル化」に焦点をおいて、その実態を紹介しつつ、学問的な枠組みモデルを探求する。ある国のポピュラーカルチャーが国境を越えて広がる事例は、主要には100年近く前の映画に始まり、第二次大戦後にはテレビの普及に伴い米国の連載テレビ・ドラマが広く西側諸国の家庭に

入り込むなど、マス・メディアの技術開発と実用化と共に進行してきた。近年では、さらにラテン・アメリカ発のテレノベラや、韓流・華流の映画やテレビ・ドラマや音楽も加わり、日本からもマンガやアニメだけではなく、ファッションや食文化と多岐にわたっている。『Selling Culture』を著したリチャード・オーマンは、20世紀に始まったこの文化的現象に関しての「これは社会にとっていいことなのか、悪いことなのか（Is it good or bad for "society"?)」という問いや、こうした現象に関する原因結果を問うことは、もはや妥当性をもたないと論じている。高度資本主義社会において、人々がさまざまな困難に対処し、あらゆる機会を捉えようと努力する活動の中から生じてきたものであり、ここで意味を持つ問いとして残るのは、人々がある特定のライフスタイルや、関係性や、制度をどうやって創りあげていくのかという社会的文化的な過程を探求し理解することであると言う[1]。ポピュラーカルチャー研究が人々の生き方に関する研究領域であるのならば、それはこれから育てていくべき学問領域であると言えるだろう。日本における「クール・ジャパン」ブームが忘れ去られるときに、ポピュラーカルチャー研究もまた学問領域として確立することなしに消え去ってしまってはならない。

　「日本のマンガのグローバル化」研究として、以下に「グローバル化」に関して論じることから始めたい。今日にみるポピュラーカルチャーのグローバル化という現象を学問的に調査し、議論し、さらには理解をする枠組みを創造するうえでの基礎である。

1.「国際化」と「グローバル化」

　まず「グローバル化」という概念を定義しなければならない。主要にはピーター・カッツェンスタイン（Peter J. Katzenstein）の代表作とされる『A World of Regions』に拠りつつ、それを本稿の趣旨にそって修正を施す形でまとめてみよう。

　カッツェンスタインは、一般的には互換的に使用されることも多い「国際化」と「グローバル化」とを、概念的に明確に区別する。すなわち「国際化（internationalization）」とは国民国家間の境界線を越えて行われる領域的活動であり、それは20世紀的国民国家システムの継続上にあって、あくまでも国民国家が基本的なアクターである。したがって、国家主権が擁護され、ナショナリズムが主要な集団的アイデンティティとして存続し、国民国家間の関係性が引き続き重要性をもつ。国民国家相互間の文化政治経済社会にわたる相違性は維持継続されることが多い。

　他方、「グローバル化（globalization）」は、時間と空間とを超える非領域的なグローバル・プロセスであり、そこでは国民国家に代わる新たなアクターの登場が注目される。つまりグローバル化においては、企業、銀行、NGOやNPO、個々人、ファン・クラブ等が新たなアクターとなり、彼らがさまざまのネットワークによって、個々の利益や、嗜好や、目的関心を追求するために、またときには相互間の競争を衝動として、活動する。このためにグローバル化は我々の日常的な経験においては、マクロというよりはむしろミクロな現

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[1]　Richard Ohmann, *Selling Culture: Magazines, Markers, and Class at the Turn of the Century*, Verso, 1996, pp.11–13.

象として生起する。このプロセスにおいては国民国家間の相違は収斂し、しかしそれと同時にローカルな（国民国家内の）多様性は一層の広がりを見せがちである。こうしたグローバル化は国際関係における新たな変革をもたらす要因であると言える[2]。

　現状においては、この「国際化」と「グローバル化」は、どちらかがどちらかに吸収され消滅するというのではなく、平穏に並存し、利用しあい、ときには緊張関係を生じ、さらには激しく敵対しあうダイナミックな関係として進行中である。世界各地で人道主義的な献身的な活動を展開している「国境なき医師団」も、それとはまったく異なる目的を持って活動してきたアル・カイダも、共にグローバル化というプロセスにおける新しいアクターであるという共通項をもつ。世界に拡散したマンガやアニメのファン・クラブもこのグローバル・ビレッジのメンバーである。この「グローバル化」というプロセスとその新しいアクターの登場によって、従来の世界的な関係は大きく変容している。

　戦後の日本社会に生まれて発展したポピュラーカルチャーの数々は、マンガやアニメに代表されるように、この「国際化」と「グローバル化」が並存する世界においてこれまでは「グローバル化」を進めてきた。つまり国民国家による何らの助力も関与もなく、その初期においてはマンガ家や編集者も気づかない間に、いつの間にか、静かに、日本から海外各地へと浸透していったのであった。そのグローバル化プロセスにおける主要なアクターはだれであったのか、浸透拡散のプロセスはどのように進行したのか、人々のライフスタイルや、関係性や、諸制度の生起において、それはどういうプロセスを踏んだのか。そうしたポピュラーカルチャーのグローバル化を調査研究し、プロセスを理解する枠組みとして、どのようなモデルが構想できるのだろうか。

　近年の日本政府の各省庁は、マンガやアニメといったポピュラーカルチャーを「日本のソフトパワー」として位置づける文化政策論を展開してきた。そのことは上記の「国際化」と「グローバル化」の概念に基づくならば、元来は国民国家の関知しない間にグローバル化のプロセスを進行させていたマンガやアニメを、日本という国民国家が自己の所有する文化的パワーとして回収し、国際社会における国家間の外交や経済取引や国際文化交流の各局面において活用することのできる財産であるとして積極的に介入してきている事態であると理解されよう。

2.　「コミックのイノベーション」としてのマンガ

　マンガを定義することは簡単なことではない。確かにマンガ雑誌や単行本としての実体はそこここに存在するし、本屋に行って書棚に目を通せば、マンガ評論家や研究者やそのほかにも多彩な背景をもつ人々がマンガに関するさまざまの解釈や理解を著した本が並んでいる。実はそうした事実がマンガの定義をいっそう難しくしている。すなわち、（1）すでに多様な定義があること、さらにそれらはマンガ研究ないしポピュラーカルチャー研究というものが、いまだ未成熟であり、学問的に共有された概念や枠組みという基盤が確立

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[2]　Peter J. Katzenstein, *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium*, Cornell University Press, 2005.

していない現状において、(2) 社会学や情報メディア論、サブカル論、地域研究、文化人類学や日本研究、カルチュラル・スタディーズ、都市論、その他の多様な学問領域に属する多数の研究者によって、または文化産業の現場を経験した編集者やマンガ家やマンガ評論家によって、あるいは数多くの国際的文化交流に関連する領域に携わる人々によって、それぞれが(3) マンガとの深い個人的な結びつきや体験からそれぞれのマンガの定義を編み出しており、そのどれもが強い信念や確信、および愛着によって裏打ちされている場合が多いからである。したがって、だれがどう定義しても、必ず反論や批判が投げ返され、さらに異なる定義が生み出されることが予測される。本稿ではそれを承知の上で、現段階ではひとまず以下のように定義を試みて、その上で、その定義に従って論を進めることとする。

　最初に、アメリカで広く一般的に用いられているコミックの定義を検討しよう。「アメリカン・コミックス（American comics）のゴッドファーザー」と呼ばれるウィル・アイスナー（Will Eisner: 1917–2005)は、コミックスは決して単なる子供のためのいかがわしい娯楽(a dubious means of entertainment for children)ではなく、立派な文学であるとして、『Comics and Sequential Art』（1985年）および『Graphic Storytelling and Visual Narrative』（1996年）を著した。その著作において、彼はタイトルの字義通りに「コミックとは複数の視覚的アート作品を、順次に並べ、連続させることで、物語を紡ぎだすもの（sequential art)」であり、これは現代における「印刷美術による語り（graphic storytelling)」であると定義した。アメリカにおける最古で最大のコミックス・コンベンションである Comic-Con International においては、コミックス出版業界の「オスカー賞」を彼にちなんでウィル・アイスナー賞（The Will Eisner Comic Industry Awards）と名付けている[3]。

　アイスナーの影響を受けたスコット・マックラウド（Scott McCloud: 1960–）は、コミック作家であると同時にコミックス理論家として著名であり、彼のことを「コミックスのアリストテレス（Aristotle of comics)」と呼ぶ人もいる。彼の著作の中でも『Understanding Comics』（1993年）は、コミックスを定義し、メディアとしてのコミックスの語彙や歴史について、コミックで論じている。彼によるとコミックは「計算された順序によって配置された視覚的イメージであり、視聴者に特定の情報や美学的な反応をもたらす」ものであるという。

　このほかにも世界には実に多様で多彩なコミックスがある。主要なものだけをあげてみても、新聞の風刺コミックや日曜版コミック、フランスのバンダシネ（Bandes dessinees）、イタリアのフメッティ（fumetti）、アンダーグラウンド・コミックス（underground commix）やエロ・コミックスといった欧米社会に伝統的に存続してきたものもある。世界にまたがった一大マンガ産業として成長しているディズニーコミックもあれば、アジア各地において民衆の間に定着しているお化け物や、植民地宗主国の影響を受けたコミックスなどさまざまである。

　こうしたアメリカにおけるコミックスに関する著作や定義よりも実は一足早く、1983年にすでにフレデリック・L・ショット（Frederik L. Schodt: 1950–）によって『Manga!

Manga! The World of Japanese Comics』[4]が出版されている。同書は日本のコミックスの中心はストーリーコミックであると紹介し、手塚治虫が前書を書いており、日本におけるコミックの歴史やその文化産業としての構造までを含めて論じた本格的なものであり、「英語で出版された最初のマンガ研究」として世界のotaku（ここでは海外における日本マンガの強力なファンを指す呼称として、日本国内のオタクとは区別する）の間のバイブルとなっている。インターネットの登場で急激に世界のotaku人口が増大する今日に於いて、ショットは「otakuの神様」と呼ばれている。ショットによるマンガの定義は『Dreamland Japan: Writings on Modern Manga』[5]（1996年）において「物語を示す吹き出しを伴って順番に並べられたコマによって構成されるもの」であるとされる。特筆すべきことは、ショットは『Manga! Manga!』においてはまだ「Japanese comic」という言葉を使用していたが、『Dreamland Japan』においては日本の「manga」として、アメリカはもとより世界の多様な「comics」と区別して命名し表記していることである。「manga」がいかに他の「comics」とは異なる特徴（様式、内容、歴史、産業構造等々）をもつものであるのかも丁寧に叙述されている。今や「manga」は世界における日本のコミック固有の呼称となっており、本稿においても、日本のコミックを「マンガ」とし、他の世界の「コミックス」の数々から区別することとする。

　以上を参考にしたうえで、本稿では次のようにマンガを定義する。マンガとは戦後日本で生み出された新たなコミックの様式であり、絵（picture）が主になって視覚的語り（visual narration）を構成する[6]。絵本等にみる挿絵は、言語による物語り（storytelling）を装飾し、図解し、補佐するのであるが、マンガでは言語でなく絵が物語るのであり、その結果として言語は絵による語りを装飾し、「図解」し、補佐することもできるし、他方では絵と吹き出しの言葉との矛盾する組み合わせを用いて複雑なメッセージを創造することもできる。空っぽの部屋の絵に「シーン」という言葉がかぶせてあるコマにおいては、言葉が絵を装飾し、「図解」し、補佐しているものと認識できる[7]。

　新たなコミック様式としてのマンガは、戦後日本の若い世代によって生み出され育てられた「新しい語りのメディア」であり、文化的なイノベーションである。ここで「イノベーション」とは、エバレット・ロジャーズ（Everett M. Rogers）による「個人あるいは何らかのユニットによって、新しいと認識され受容されたアイデアや技術や対象物のこと」をさす[8]。

　さらにイノベーションは普及することなしには、存続しないわけであり、ここで言う普及（diffusion）とは、ロジャーズによると「イノベーションが、あるコミュニケーション・

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[4]　Frederik L. Schodt, *Manga! Manga! The World of Japanese Comics*, Kodansha International Ltd., 1983.

[5]　Frederik L. Schodt, *Dreamland Japan: Writings on Modern Manga,* Stone Bridge Press, 1996.

[6]　例えば『スヌーピー』においては、吹き出しの文字を読まなければストーリーは皆目わからないが、マンガの多くは文字部分が読めなくともストーリーの流れは把握できるものが多い。日本語ができなくとも、日本語のマンガを楽しむ世界の読者は多い。

[7]　Saya S. Shiraishi, "Japan's Soft Power: Doraemon Goes Overseas," in *Network Power: Jpan and Asia*, Cornell University Press, 1997.

[8]　Everett M. Rogers, *Diffusion of Innovation*, Free Press, 1995.

チャンネルを通じて、時間の経過の中で社会システムの成員の間に伝達される過程」である。このときの過程に参画するのは、(1) 新たなアイデア等の創造に関わった「イノベーター（innovators）」、(2) 逸早くそのイノベーションを受容する少数の「初期受容者（early adopters）」、(3) 続いて多数の人々に伝達され受容された場合における「初期多数者（early majority）」、そして (4) 一息遅れて大勢に従う「後期多数者（late majority）」が続き、最後には (5)「遅れた人（laggards）」によって受容されることで、当該社会におけるイノベーションの普及が完成する。もちろん、この過程を経る途中で、受容者が増加することがなく、姿を消してしまうアイデアや、技術や、対象物もある。

　さて、マンガをコミックにおけるイノベーションとしてみるならば、その「新しさ」としていくつかの項目があげられる。例えばコマ割りにおいて、マンガではサイズも形状も進み方の順序においても不規則であり、そこにさまざまの工夫の余地がある。コマの中の背景を構成するのは街並みなど場所情報に限らず、キャラクターの心理的状況を背景の描き方で表現する手法もある。つまりあるコマで主人公の女の子がバラの花に囲まれて描かれていても、それは必ずしも花屋やバラ園に居るのだという場所情報ではなく、少女の心が華やいだ瞬間の心理を表現したものであることもある。この背景イノベーションはマンガを読むだけの読者にとっては容易に理解できるものであっても、海外で新たにマンガ様式のコミックを描きはじめた新進マンガ家たちにおいては、再現困難な項目であり、背景が何も描かれていない場合が多い。あるインドネシアのマンガ出版社の編集者は、地元のマンガ作家の育成に務めているが、「背景の描きこみで、そのマンガ家の力量がわかる。いずれにしろ日本人のマンガ家の作品に比べるとインドネシアの新人マンガ家による作品は背景が真っ白なままのものが多い」と語っている[9]。

3. マンガというイノベーションのアジアにおける普及

　東京ビッグサイトで毎年開催されるコミックマーケット（略称：コミケ）においては、イノベーションの誕生の地に相応しく、年を重ねるごとにさまざまの新しいマンガ表現が生まれ、目の肥えた読者によって評価され、受容されて、さらにそこから普及していく。そうした変化に合わせてコミケ開催運営マニュアルの更新も年毎に進んでいる。コミケは世界のマンガの聖地であり、イノベーター達が集う、マンガの革新と普及における原点であり、世界からのotakuの巡礼の地でもある。

　マンガが最初に海外で広く受け入れられたのは、現在までの調査では台湾と韓国である。戦前の日本語教育の徹底により、台湾や韓国には日本語で教育を受け、読書をし、知識を得るという習慣をもつ人々が多く存在し、彼らの中には戦後になって政治的言語的状況が激変する過程においてもさまざまの方法で日本語の文化情報を入手しようとする人たちがいた。彼らは逸早く手塚治虫の「新しいマンガ」に出会い、その魅力を理解し、翻訳および翻案（日本という出自を隠すさまざまな工夫）をして出版し、その過程でマンガ制作法を身に着けた。こうして登場した地元の新人マンガ作家たちにより、1950年代の台湾では

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[9]　インタビューより。2002年、於ジャカルタ他。

第一次マンガブームが到来した[10]。現在の台湾において日本マンガ翻訳出版に携わる出版社幹部や、マンガ評論家として大学講師を務める人たちは、この時のマンガ家世代出身者が少なくない。彼らが台湾における戦後マンガの初期受容者となったことがわかる[11]。

　中国・シンガポール・マレーシアおよびタイにおけるマンガの普及は、この台湾からの中華書籍流通ネットワークによる物品および情報の広がりにそって各都市でも初期受容者が登場したことに始まる。彼ら各地の初期受容者は中国語で翻訳翻案されたマンガ作品を読む華僑華人の子弟であったり、1980年代以降の日本との経済的人的交流の拡大に伴い、研修生や就労者として日本で数年間の滞在経験をもつ人々であったり、さらにはタマサート大学等々の地元の大学の日本語学科で日本語を学ぶ学生であったりすることが多かった。彼らはそれぞれに何らかの経験やきっかけ、家族友人との親密な関係の中で、マンガを発見してファンとなっていった。彼らはアルバイトとしてマンガの日本語からタイ語への翻訳を手掛けたり、自分で翻訳出版の起業をするケースもあった。ベトナムでのマンガの普及はバンコク経由で進行した。やがて都市で急増していた中間層家族がテレビを購入し、日本から輸入された連載アニメ番組がテレビで放映され、そうした家庭の子女がアニメ・ファンとなりマンガにも親しむようになって、初期多数者層が形成されて、社会的受容が一気に進行した[12]。タイにおいて、初期にはマンガ本は華僑華人系読者向けに『三国志』や『水滸伝』等の中国語古典書を販売していた書店で子供向けに少数が置かれていたのであるが、こうした過程においてどんどんその数を増やしていき、1990年代末には中華書籍店が並ぶ通りは「マンガ通り」と呼称され、新たなマンガ専門店が軒を並べるようになった。

　インドネシアは、上に述べたようなアジアにおけるマンガの中華書籍ネットワークによる初期普及の過程からは隔離された状態にあった。これはスハルト政権下での中国語出版物の流通禁止によるところが大きい。したがってインドネシアにおけるマンガの受容は、アジアの他の地域に比べて遅く、1989年のテレビ局の規制緩和により日本から安価な子供向け連載テレビ・アニメ番組が持ち込まれて放映されたことに始まる。最初に放映されたのは『キャンディ・キャンディ』であり、女の子の間に爆発的な人気を得た。今日に至るまでインドネシアではマンガ・ファンの過半が女の子であるという現象はここから始まっている。このころに９〜10歳でアニメと出会った世代はその後もアニメを視聴しマンガを買い集め、中には自分でマンガを描きはじめた者も多く、直に同人誌グループが多数活動を開始し、ネット上に彼らの交流サイトが生まれ、マンガ情報雑誌が発行された。そして2001年〜2002年になると、地元のマンガ作家がプロデビューを果たし、輸入翻訳マンガに加わって彼らの作品が12冊のマンガ単行本として出版された[13]。このようにインドネシアでは、マンガの普及は子どもテレビ番組の商業的放映から始まったものであり、『キャン

[10]　インタビューより。1998年および2006年、於台北。

[11]　白石さや「東アジア大衆文化ネットワークと日韓文化交流」濱下武志、崔章集編『東アジアの中の日韓交流』慶應義塾大学出版会、2007年：白石さや「「ポピュラーカルチャーと東アジア」西川潤、平野健一郎編『東アジア共同体の構築：国際移動と社会変容』岩波書店、2007年。

[12]　バンコクの出版社訪問とインタビュー。

[13]　インドネシアにおけるマンガおよびアニメの受容に関しては、白石さや「マンガのグローバル化を考える」山田奨治編『模倣と創造のダイナミズム』勉誠出版、2003年を参照。

ディ・キャンディ』に続いて『ドラえもん』が大ヒットし、小学生時代にアニメとマンガ
とに出会った世代が初期受容者になるという形をとった[14]。

4. 欧米におけるマンガの普及と大学生の役割

　「コミックのイノベーション」としてマンガを把握すると、それが伝統文化や宗教にお
ける近親性を有するアジア諸国に限らず、コミック文化の基盤をもつ欧米諸国の若い人々
にも受容されて普及していったことが、比較的容易に理解できる。欧米における初期の少
数の受容者となったのは、これまでの調査から大学生と高校生とが浮かび上がっている。
彼らは日本という遠隔地からの文化的イノベーションを受容した人々であり、元来、海外
からの新しい文化文物を受け入れるための情報アクセス網を広く豊かに張り巡らせて、受
容に必要な新奇なものへの好奇心や、基礎的知識教養や、海外経験を有する人々が多い。

　アメリカの場合には海外のインターナショナル・スクールで初等中等教育を受けてそこ
でマンガやアニメに出会った人々、アジア系アメリカ人としてアジア的なものへの関心と
アクセスとをもつ学生、さらには1980年代・1990年代に急速に展開したコンピュータ・サ
イエンスを専攻する学生が初期受容者になっている事例が多い。アメリカにおけるマンガ
受容はこうした大学生によるクラブ活動として始まった[15]。コンピュータ・サイエンスは、
さまざまのルートで日本のアニメとの緊密な関係をもつ領域であった。今日でもシリコ
ン・バレー出身のICT関連で働く人々の間にアニメやマンガの受容者が少なくないことは
よく知られている。これはアジアにおいて中華書籍ネットワークが果たしたようなマンガ
供給システム不在の下で、コンピュータ・サイエンス専攻学生の間には一般社会に先駆け
てインターネット・アクセスが可能となっていたことが大きい。IT革命が急激に進行中
であった時代に、新技術や設備やコミュニケーションソフトが開発されるに伴い、何の目
的で、誰が、どうやってその新技術を利用するのか、まだだれにもわからなかった。そこ
にコンピュータ専攻学生が、勉強のためにコンピュータを使用した後に、放課後に趣味と
してマンガやアニメの視覚的情報を収集交換発信し始めた。マサチューセッツ工科大学で
もカリフォルニア工科大学でもテキサス工科大学でも、早い時期からアニメ・ファンの活
動は活発であった。

　それだけではない。SFクラブに所属する学生や研究者には、未来宇宙を舞台とする日
本のアニメ作品に親しむ人たちもいた。さらにコンピューター・グラフィックスを学ぶ学生
の間では、アニメやマンガにおいて高度に開発され発展した「視覚的語り」の文法に強い
関心を持つものが多かった。グラフィックスによる情報やメッセージ伝達のための「視覚
的文法」を、彼らがゼロから開発するには多大なエネルギーとコストを要するが、アニメ
やマンガ表現においてすでに用いられ共有されている文法を応用することでそのコストは

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[14] マンガとアニメとのコラボレーションによるアジア諸都市への普及に関しては：白石さや「マン
ガ・アニメのグローバライゼーション」五十嵐暁郎編『変容するアジアと日本：アジア社会に浸透す
る日本のポピュラーカルチャー』世織書房、1998年を参照。

[15] アメリカの大学生によるマンガやアニメの受容の実態に関しては：白石さや「アメリカの若者文
化とマンガ・アニメ」『ぱろる11：子どもとマンガ』パロル舎、1999年を参照のこと。

大幅に縮小できる。

　コンピュータ専攻の学部学科のある大学には、次々とアニメ・マンガ・クラブが誕生し、そのメンバーの多くをコンピュータ・サイエンスの学生が占めていた。彼らはジブリに代表されるようなアニメの劇場用名作から、人気連載テレビ・アニメ、さらにはマイナーなアニメ作品まで、万遍なく目を通す。それは彼らがアニメやマンガに求めているものが、文学的感動だけではなく、未来科学的アイデアだけでもなかったからである。日本においては少ない予算と時間と人員とで、アニメ作品を大量生産する過程で、いくつものボタンが生み出されていた。この泣きボタンを押せば、視聴者は泣くだろう、このボタンでは笑うだろう、怒るだろうといった定型化したボタンである。そうしたボタンは低予算の作品におけるほど多用されている。こうしたボタンの存在は日本では批判されることが多いのだけれど、視覚的文法上のわかりやすい語彙としてみたときには、それは貴重な文化的財産である。それはこうした定型化した約束事を持たない開発途上国におけるアニメ制作において、シーンの羅列からなんらの物語も生じて来ないで、限りなく拡散してしまう作品を見ると容易に理解できることである。高度で複層的な視覚的技法を駆使して、登場する個々のキャラクターの個性や、動きや、感情の変化等々を、単純な描線と色彩とによって効果的に表現する手法において、日本のアニメやマンガに勝るものがあるだろうか。

　アニメ・クラブのメンバーの中からアニメやマンガの輸入翻訳流通に関わる仕事に就く者も出てきて、アメリカにおける吹き替え声優の声も、翻訳の質も、1990年代初頭から短期間に大いに進歩していった。やっと1995年に『セーラームーン』が商業的にテレビ放映されることになったとき、アメリカのテレビ局関係者はまだ日本のアニメをマイナーな作品としてしか考えておらず、地方によっては朝の５時半とか６時といった時間帯に放映が行われた。このころのアニメ・クラブのニュースレターは、早起きのために生活時間が狂ってしまったという愚痴が、『セーラームーン』の賛美と共に綴られていた。数年後になると、午後の４時半や５時といった学校帰りの子供たちが一日のうちで最もテレビを自由に見ることのできる時間帯に、放映されるようになっていく。特にアメリカ社会におけるマンガ・アニメ受容の飛躍的進展をもたらしたのは1998年の『ポケット・モンスター』のテレビ放映である。この時までにアメリカ側でもアニメやマンガの面白さや特質をよく理解して、任天堂と小学館に有効な協力のできる人材が育っていたことが指摘できる。キャラクターグッズと併せた『ポケモン』の成功を機会に、一般視聴者が初期多数者として受容者層に加わり、アニメの普及は大きく前進した[16]。

　ヨーロッパにおけるマンガやアニメの受容は、アジア地域よりも遅れて21世紀になってコンピューターによる大量高速ダウンロードが可能になったから活発化した。ここでも大学生の果たす役割は大きい。日本語学科で日本語を学んだ学生達である。彼らのうちには、理系文系共に、マンガやアニメが好きで日本語の勉強を始めた学生がおり、彼らが在学中のアルバイトとしてマンガやアニメの翻訳をするという体制もできあがっており、中には日本語塾で中高生に教えている学生もいる。ポーランドの大学在学中にＳＦアニメやマン

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[16]　マンガとアニメとキャラクターグッズとの連合による売り上げ方法に関しては：白石さや「マンガ・アニメのグローバライゼーション」（前掲書）参照。

ガの翻訳をし、その後に日本の大学院に留学をしてロボット工学を学んでいる若手の研究者たちもいる。ここで初期受容者として重要な役割を果たしているのはこの人たちである。

まとめに代えて

　マンガやアニメのグローバル化は、すでに検討してきたように、国家政府とはなんらの関係もなく進展してきた。この過程におけるもっとも活発なアクターであるのは、戦後日本のマンガというメディア・イノベーションを推進してきた「イノベーター」としてのマンガ家たちであり、次いでは海外各地における「初期受容者」として積極的に受容した各地のファンの人々であり、アジアにおいてはそれは中華書籍ネットワークの関係者や現地の初期のマンガ・ファン及びマンガ作家の貢献が大きく、アメリカにおいてはコンピュータ・サイエンス専攻の学生たちが、さらにヨーロッパにおいては理系文系共に日本語を学習した学生達がその役割を果たした。

　彼らは新しいイノベーションとしてのマンガの「視覚的語り」を受け入れ、楽しみ、自分でも新しい視角的文法にそって創作を始めている。このイノベーションが普及することで、各地で新しい視角的語りが根を下ろし、新しいレジャー時間の使い方が生じ、新しいビジネスの手法が育ってきた。その全貌を叙述することは本稿では紙面の都合でできなかったので、他の機会に譲ることとする。マンガとアニメの受容過程における関連性に関しては、提示している文献を参照いただきたい。

　戦後日本社会に生まれて育ったマンガを、コミックのイノベーションとしてとらえ、そのグローバル化の過程を、イノベーションの普及理論に拠って、世界の各地に追ってみた。まだ課題はいくつも残っているのであるが、マンガに限らず、ポピュラーカルチャーのグローバル化一般の調査研究に関する一つの研究モデルは提示できたと考える。

◆第４セッション◆
若手研究者と大学院生のセッション /
Young Scholars and Graduate Students Session

Spirit Possession as Depicted in Painting Scrolls

Tokunaga Seiko

Abstract

This paper will examine the images of spirit mediums painted on the famous 14th century *emakimono* (painting scroll) known as *Kasuga Gongen genkie*.

Emakimono is an illustrated narrative form created in Japan mainly during the 11th to 16th century. *Emakimono* are composed of both text and pictures. They may depict romances, battles as well as legends of temples and shrines. *Kasuga Gongen genkie* is a collection of legends concerning the Kasuga deity, written and painted in the year 1309. The production of *Genkie* was commissioned by Saionji Kinhira, a powerful court noble; he then dedicated *Genkie* to the Kasuga shrine.

There are 20 scenes which depict possessed mediums in *Genkie*. Both men and women are spirit mediums who convey the oracles, and their occupations are various. Most of them seem entirely normal, but nearly half are painted with fingers pointing. However, mediums in real life often manifested unusual behavior, but finger pointing is hardly an unusual action.

It is probable that the painter of *Genkie* chose these mannerisms as suitable for mediums whose task it was to convey oracles. The painter emphasizes the sacred quality of the mediums, and he avoids painting their actual unusual actions. I argue that these depictions are typical of mediums possessed by deities in medieval Japan.

Key Words; spirit possession, spirit medium, oracle, *emakimono*, *Kasuga Gongen genkie*

Introduction

Spirit possession is the seizure of a human being by an external spirit whether it be a deity, demon, human, animal or something other. Every major cultural tradition has espoused the idea of spirit possession. In Indonesia, Kesurupan is a well known phenomenon of spirit possession. Spirit possession is also the core of Sang Hyang Dedari, a world famous ritual dance in Bali.

The phenomenon is well known in Japan, too. The words *kamigakari* 神がかり (possessed by kami 神, or deity) and *kitsunetsuki* 狐憑き (possessed by *kitsun*e 狐, or a fox) are a part of daily life. Spirit mediums that enter into a trance have historically often been represented in many different artistic forms: paintings, novels, plays, movies and manga. How mediums are represented is indicative of prevalent ideas both about spirit possession, and about supernatural phenomena like kami. This paper discusses the images of spirit mediums painted on *emakimono* 絵巻物 (painting scrolls) in the medieval ages in order to research how the people of that period regarded the phenomenon. The *emakimono* focused on in this paper is *Kasuga Gongen genkie* 春日権現験記絵 (also called *Kasuga Gongen reigenki* 春日権現霊験記),

one of the most famous and outstanding *emakimono*.

Some typical examples of spirit possession in manga provide an introduction to this discussion of *Genkie*. The comparison with today's examples will help to clarify the features of the medieval ages.

Spirit Possession in Manga

Few people have actually seen the phenomenon of spirit possession in today's Japan even though the phenomenon is well known. Scenes of spirit possession often appear in a variety of artistic creations, especially in popular culture: manga, animation and popular novel. This poses an interesting problem. Examples can be found in a popular manga, *Naruto* ナルト.[1] The protagonist, Uzumaki Naruto うずまきナルト is possessed by Kyūbi no yōko九尾の妖狐 (a nine-tailed demon fox).[2] The conflict with this demon spirit plays an important dramatic role in the story. Some of the other characters have their own possessing spirits, and phenomena like spirit possession occur often throughout this manga. The examples in other manga are too numerous to count.

Spirit possession is expressed in a variety of ways in manga. This paper shows two typical cases. Figure1 depicts a scene in which a man enters a trance, possessed by kami. He is jumping, shouting, and his eyes are abnormally wide open. His actions are violent. He seems to be emotionally disturbed. This depiction is based on common ideas about spirit possession. Today's Japanese consider the phenomenon to be a type of madness in general.[3] Figure 2 show a scene in which a boy is possessed by the sprit of an old man. The spirit stands behind the medium, drawn like shadow. The movements of the boy are the same as those of the old man. This expression suggests that the body of the boy is perfectly controlled by the old man's spirit. The same manner of depiction is also used for other invisible spiritual beings, such as ghost and monsters. The type seen in Figure 2 is not found in *emakimono* or other medieval paintings; rather it seems to have appeared during the Edo period (1603–1868).[4] Depicting spiritual beings as a shadow is not a common feature of medieval paintings.

Emakimono

The tradition of the handscroll came to Japan from China in the 6th or 7th century.[5] Painted handscrolls, that is *emakimono*, flourished as an art form in Japan during the 11th to 16th centuries. *Emakimono* are made of paper or silk joined horizontally, and composed of text and pictures. They may

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[1]   *Naruto* ナルト is written and illustrated by Kishimoto Masashi. This manga is being serialized in *Shūkan Shōnen Jump* since 1999 and adapted into anime on TV Tokyo since 2002.

[2]   Kyūbi no yōko (in general, Kyūbi no kitsune 九尾の狐) originated in China, and Korea has the same legend too. Unlike in *Naruto*, this monster transfers a woman in common. For Kyūbi no kitsune in China, see Ninomiya 2006.

[3]   It is also common that the more mediums act violently the more people believe the possession are real. See Blacker 1986, p. 277.

[4]   Many cases like Figure 2 are found in *kusazōshi* 草双紙 (illustrated literature in Edo period: woodblock printing books).

[5]   For *emakimono*, see Murase 1983, pp. 15–28.

Figure 1. Typical Medium in Manga 1

Source: Mizuki Shigeru. *Shinpika retsuden sono san* 神秘家列伝其ノ参. Kadokawa Shoten 2005.

Figure 2. Typical Medium in Manga 2

Source: Takei Hiroyuki. *Shaman king kanzen ban 2* シャーマンキング完全版 2. Shueisha 2008.

express romances, battles or legends of temples and shrines. One of the oldest *emakimono*, *Chōjū giga* 鳥獣戯画 is often introduced as the first manga. Needless to say, *Chōjū giga* is not a manga in the true sense of the word; more precisely it is the first illustrated humorous story in the history of Japanese literature. The relation between manga and *emakimono* is neither simple nor direct. However, Japanese people have loved illustrated stories from ancient times, just as contemporary Japanese love manga. Manga's prosperity today is based on a long history of familiarity with and fondness for illustrated stories.[6]

Originally, only men and women of high social status could see and read *emakimono*, because making them demanded high costs, and so they were treated as treasures. Today, only a limited number of people, specialists of cultural properties, are able to handle real *emakimono*. However, it is now possible for others to have access to famous *emakimono* in color printed books for the last few decades. Moreover, some *emakimono* images are now open to the public on web sites. For example, e-Museum offers images of Japanese national treasures (国宝) owned by national museums.[7] On this site, one can access some of the most famous medieval examples of the genre. The International Research Center for Japanese Studies (Nichibunken) also has an online database of *emakimono* collections.[8] These web sites make it easy for ever larger numbers of people to have access and so to appreciate emakimono.

Kasuga Gongen Genkie

Kasuga Gongen genkie is a collection of legends concerning the deities of Kasuga, written and painted in the year 1309 (Engyō 延慶2).[9] *Genkie* consists of 20 scrolls, which comprise 94 *dan* 段 (a unit used for counting texts and pictures of *emakimono*) .The production of *Genkie* was commissioned by Saionji Kinhira 西園寺公衡, a powerful court noble. He was a descendant of the Fujiwar clan whose kami was none other than the Kasuga Gongen. Kasuga deities are enshrined in the Kasuga shrine located in modern day Nara prefecture. Kinhira dedicated *Genkie* to the shrine, to express his gratitude for blessings received and to seek prosperity.

The text is written by three nobles and one monk of the highest court rank. They belong to Fujiwara clan too. The painter is Takashina Takakane 高階隆兼, the head Court Painter. He was one of the most outstanding painters in the Kamakura period (1185–1333). His painting style is traditional and elegant.

Genkie has especially high artistic and historical value. In its artistic aspect, as stated above, it was composed by artists of the highest caliber. From an historical aspect, it is rare for *emakimono* that the year of composition, the commissioner and the reason of production are well known. This is one reason why *Genkie* is now considered as marking the apogee of *emkimono* in Kamakura Japan. *Genkie*'s style is authentic and typical, and this is the main reason why my focus here falls on it. Researching how a phenomenon is depicted in *Genkie* will help to yield the essence of typical medieval *emakimono*

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[6]   Takahata 1999 explains from the point of view of an anime film maker the relation between *emakimono* and manga, anime.

[7]   e-Museum: http://www.emuseum.jp/

[8]   Nichibunken web page: http://www.nichibun.ac.jp/

[9]   For *Genkie*, see *Kasuga Gongen genkie* 1982, Tyler 1990, and Kōbe Setsuwa Kenkyūkai 2005.

style. Furthermore, *Genkie* has many scenes of spirit possession; in this it is somewhat exceptional. It is necessary now to start our examination of *Genkie.*

Spirit Mediums in *Genkie*

There are 23 scenes depicting mediums in *Genkie.* The details of the spirit mediums in these scenes are listed up on Table 1.[10] Three of these scenes are not painted.[11] In the other 20 scenes, both men and women are serving spirit mediums. Their occupations are various. Professional mediums, *miko* (woman shaman) can be found. At the same time, non-professional beings play the same role in many cases. The possessing spirits are Kasuga deities in almost all cases.

Scroll-*dan*	Possessed person	Possessing spirit	Action
1-1	womman	Kasuga deity	seated, pointing with a finger
1-4	retired emperor	Kasuga deity	seated
3-1	noble man	Kasuga deity	seated
4-2	little boy	Kasuga deity	standing
4-4	miko(woman shaman) of Kasuga shrine	Kasuga deity	
4-5	miko of Kasuga shrine	Kasuga deity	
6-2	miko	Sannō deity *1	seated, one sleeve slipping off
6-3	miko	Kasuga deity	seated, pointing with a finger
8-5	miko of Atsuta shrine *2	Kasuga deity	standing, pointing with a finger
11-2	monk	Kasuga deity	seated, yawning
13-2	young girl	Kasuga deity	seated, pointing with a finger
13-3	miko of Kasuga shrine	Kasuga deity	
13-6	young boy	Kasuga deity	standing, pointing with a finger
15-2	miko	Kasuga deity	seated, playing a drum
15-6	miko	Kasuga deity	seated, pointing with a finger
16-1	monk	Kasuga deity	seated, pointing with a finger
16-2	monk	Kasuga deity	seated, praying
16-3	monk	Kasuga deity	seated, holding censer
16-4	woman	dead monk	seated, one sleeve slipping off
17-1	woman	Kasuga deity	seated on a beam
17-2	woman	Kasuga deity	seated on a ceiling
17-3	woman	Kasuga deity	seated, pointing with a finger
18-2	woman	Kasuga deity	seated, pointing with a finger

Table 1. Mediums in *Genkie*
*1. Sannō 山王 (also called Hie 日吉）shrine is located in Shiga prefecture.
*2. Atsuta 熱田 shrine is located in Aichi prefecture.

Figures 3–6 show examples of these scenes. Figure 3 is the first scene of *Genkie*. The medium here is a woman, possessed by the Kasuga deity. Monks, nobles and others are gathering before her to listen to the oracle. In Figure 4, the medium is a woman in a house; she is a *miko*. The monk, sitting before her, summons the Kasuga deity into her. She is now relaying the oracle. In Figure 5, The medium is an old monk seated at something like a little table (*kyōsoku* 脇息, or armrest); the other monks are his pupils. In Figure 6, the medium is again a woman. It is the spirit of a dead monk not a kami that possess her. He tells about hell through the woman's mouth. The monk in front of her is admonishing the dead monk's spirit.

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[10]   Table 1 was referred to Yamamoto 2006, pp. 27–29.

[11]   In these 3 cases, the mediums are all *miko* of Kasuga shrine. I think it an important problem.

Figure 3. *Genkie* scroll 1, *dan* 1.

Source: *Kasuga Gongen reigenki* (*Genkie*, a part of copy of the original), painted by Maeda Ujizane 前田氏実 and Nagai Ikuma 永井幾麻. Owned by Tokyo National Museum.

Image: TNM Image Archives Source: http://TnmArchives.jp/

Figure 4. *Genkie* scroll 15, *dan* 6.

Source: Ibid.

Image: TNM Image Archives Source: http://TnmArchives.jp/

Figure 5. *Genkie* scroll 16, *dan* 1.

Source: Ibid.
Image: TNM Image Archives Source: http://TnmArchives.jp/

Figure 6. *Genki* scroll 16, *dan* 4.

Source: Ibid.
Image: TNM Image Archives Source: http://TnmArchives.jp/

In these four cases, no mediums show unusual or abnormal behavior like in Figure 1. The other mediums in *Genkie* are passive and quite normal too. Many of them seem to be simply talking. Without understanding the stories, we cannot know who the medium is. Furthermore, the mediums, in three of the figures, are depicted with fingers pointing. In 9 of the 20 scenes, that is nearly half of the cases, mediums are painted with this distinctive gesture.[12] This mannerism is obviously of importance to the artist as a method for expressing a kami-like presence.

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[12] Yamamoto 2006, p. 54.

Why are mediums depicted in this way? One of the notable points is their finger-pointing gesture. Actual mediums, in modern Japan, do not point with their fingers when they relay oracles.[13] The suggestion is that mediums in medieval ages did not either. Evidently the painter chose this mannerism to clarify the conveyer of oracles. In *emakimono*, we can often find characters pointing with their fingers; in many cases, the gesture leads the viewer's eye to important things.[14] In the scenes of spirit possession, the action indicates who is telling, who the conveyer of the oracle is. Figure 6 is significant in this regard. The scene is the only example in *Genkie* in which the possessing spirit is not a kami. The one who is finger pointing in this case is not the medium but the monk. The monk demands the dead monk's spirit, possessing the medium, to leave her. The monk is of higher court rank than both the dead monk and the medium woman in this situation. It is poor etiquette to point directly at a person's face with the finger in Japan.[15] This action denotes the conveying of an instruction from one person to another. The one who can finger point directly is the one who occupies an elevated social position. Mediums are elevated higher than others when they are possessed by the kami, because they temporally become kami. The finger pointing symbolizes this fact.

Figure 6 also holds the clue for another problem, namely the stillness of the mediums. One sleeve of the woman's outer garment has slipped off.[16] The reason is that, possessed by the dead monk's spirit, she has been acting in a violent fashion. In fact, mediums often behave wildly, jump, run or shout, when they are possessed not only by evil spirits but also by divine spirits.[17] The disheveled outfit of the woman intimates the fact of violent action. At the same time, the painter avoids depicting signs of violence in Figures 3, 4, 5 and in the other scenes.

The distinction between Figure 6 and the others is the possessor. In Figure 6 it is the dead monk, namely an evil spirit. The others are Kasuga deities, divine spirits. In the scenes that Kasuga deities enter the bodies of mediums, their outfits are fine, not unusual. The painter chose the placid expression to represent the idea that the being is equivalent to a kami, especially Kasuga deities. *Genkie* was produced in praise of Kasuga deities. No wonder then that the people equivalent to the most divine being in this story, that is the mediums possessed by Kasuga deities, should not be depicted as abnormal.

Conclusion

As explained above, there are 20 paintings of spirit possession in *Genkie*. The spirit mediums in most of these are rendered as usual, and nearly half of them are depicted with fingers pointing. The reason why the painter chose these postures is to represent the mediums as comparable to divine beings.

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[13] See Hagiwara 1977. This book is a collection of *kamigakari* (possessed by kami) photographs.

[14] Chino 1991, pp. 83–84.

[15] Nomura 1996, pp. 150–53.

[16] There is another same case: scroll 6, *dan* 2. In this case, the possessor is kami (Sannō deity) , but not Kasuga deity. See Table 1.

[17] The violent actions of possessed mediums are found in many pre-modern documents. See, for example, *Makura no sōshi* 1980 the second volume, pp. 169–171. For the examples in the last several decades, see Blacker 1986 and Hagiwara 1977.

I think these are images typical of mediums possessed by kami in the medieval ages. In this period, painters emphasized rather the sacred nature of possessed mediums rather than their unusual actions. It will be necessary to research other examples, especially those which feature people possessed by evil spirits. An examination of depictions of people possessed should lead to greater understanding of how such supernatural phenomena were understood in medieval Japan.

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The Concept of Bushidō in Manga *One Piece*

Endah Rukmini Wahyuningtyas

Bushidō

Bushidō is one of the value systems rooted in Japanese culture. It is embedded in Japanese society of the Tokugawa period (1600–1868) whose roots grew in the Kamakura period (1192–1333). Bushidō denotes a standard of ethical conduct that was applied to the samurai class, an elite group in society in the Tokugawa period (Pyle 1996: 32).

The samurai constituted a social class in Tokugawa society which was allowed to wear weapons for the purpose of killing. The samurai indeed enjoyed the highest status during the Tokugawa reign. Only samurai got the privilege of wearing two swords as a symbol of the "soul of the samurai."

Members of the samurai class accordingly had a code of ethics to guide their behavior, and that was bushidō. These guidelines were not written down, but passed from mouth to mouth, learned through the examples of behavior of earlier historical figures, such as Minamoto no Yoshitsune, Uesugi Kenshin, Oda Nobunaga, and so forth.

Bu-shi-do can be understood literally as Military-Knight-Ways. Nitobe Inazō in his book *Bushidō: The Soul of Japan* (1969: 4–5) defines bushidō as "the precepts of Knighthood, the noblesse oblige of the warrior class, ... the code of moral principles the which the knights were the resource persons required or instructed to observe."

According to Nitobe, bushidō code consists of the following eight grades.

1. Rectitude or Justice

Justice is the highest value in bushidō, the reason, the basis for action without hesitation and even death. This value is the backbone of conviction, the application of knowledge and skills possessed by a samurai. Nitobe (1969: 23) states, "Rectitude is the bone that gives firmness and stature. As without bones the head can not rest on the top of the spine, nor hands move nor feet stand." Without justice, neither talent or education can form the skeleton of a samurai. A man who has a sense of justice will be frank and honest at all times; this was an attitude to be upheld at all times by the samurai. Justice is based on the value of *giri* (right reason) that can be interpreted in a simple and straightforward sense as obligation—to parents, employers, community, state, and so on. By adhering to *giri*, samurai will never retreat from their obligations and responsibilities.

2. Courage, the Spirit of Daring and Bearing

Courage is vital to the ethical code of bushidō. Nitobe states (1969: 28), "It would have been turned easily into a nest of cowardice, if bushidō had not a keen and correct sense of courage,

the spirit of daring and bearings." Nitobe (1969: 29) quotes Confucius to define courage as "perceiving what is right and doing it not, argues a lack of courage" or simplified as "courage is doing what is right." Courage gives meaning when applied to justice. This is the courage to be strong in doing the right thing. With courage, a samurai is not afraid to face death for the cause of justice. However, it does not mean a samurai allows himself to die for something unimportant. The courage to die in vain is not courage. True courage is knowing fear and facing it. Courage is essential to living the right way and dying only when the time is right.

3. Benevolence, the Feeling of Distress

Benevolence has the same meaning as generosity. Samurai may wear swords as their social status symbol and have the power to kill other people. Because of that, benevolence and compassion for others are demanded of samurai. Feelings of love, sympathy, and compassion are part of a generous attitude, the highest value in the human soul. This is the flavor of love aspired to by a samurai. *Bushi no nasake* "implied nowhere mercy was not blind impulse, but it recognized nowhere due regard to justice." The bushidō code of ethics is based on duty and the power to kill someone else, especially to protect the weak around them. Feelings of compassion in a samurai do not mean ignoring obligations to themselves and others, but they imply a sense of empathy to other people.

4. Politeness

Courtesy, good manners and politeness are to be based on generosity, expressed as a tribute to the feelings of others, not because of fear of others.

Civility involves a samurai's ability to behave according to the powers he has as a samurai (1969: 54). "By constant exercise in correct manners, one brings all the parts and faculties of his body into perfect order and into such harmony with its environment and itself as to express the mastery of spirit over flesh" (1969: 54). Polite attitude of a samurai is to train his self control, to control himself with mental strength at all times, especially in front of others. Rough treatment is proof a samurai can not control his attitude towards others and his environment. Courtesy trains samurai always to be sensitive to their surroundings and feelings of others. There is no need for a rough attitude or displays of physical strength or prowess.

5. Veracity and Sincerity

A samurai occupies a high social class. He must keep his word, because it will affect public opinion towards him and his position in society. Nitobe (1969: 62) mentions the term *bushi no ichi-gon*—the one word of a samurai. The word of samurai must be kept because it contains the truth. A samurai promise means a promise until death. To uphold this, a samurai must never fear even though his life may be in danger. Honesty must be maintained. By having honesty in saying and acting, the samurai has integrity and is respected by society. Naturally, the samurai shows his true identity through trustworthy words and actions. For a samurai to talk about money is demeaning as it suggests an inability to resist material urges.

6. Honour

Honour does not only apply in relation to martial arts, but also to everyday behavior. Honour is shown by a samurai in how he fulfills his obligations and stands up for his rights and honour. According to Nitobe (1969: 72), honour is "a vivid consciousness of personal dignity and worth." Honour lies in the good name it has. A samurai can be trusted to keep his word and do what is right even though in the midst of conflict.

Disgrace for a samurai is like the scar on the tree, which in time, instead of diminishing, simply enlarges. If a samurai commits a disgraceful act, the impression it leaves endures. The honour of a samurai also relates to an ability to withstand suffering in order to maintain a good name. A samurai is not afraid to risk his life, but that does not mean a samurai would fight for trivial causes. Easy emotions are not appropriate. Feelings of shame are no excuse to fight. A samurai must be able to distinguish what is right, proper, and honourable.

7. Duty of Loyalty

For the samurai, a sense of loyalty is essential to honour. Loyalty makes a real samurai respect, and remain true to, those who provide assistance. Loyalty is upheld hand in hand with honour. Loyalty (1969: 84) is described by Nitobe with the phrase, "who could endure to follow a fall'n lord." A samurai will continue at his master's side and endure all difficulties no matter what the outcomes. A samurai who was only willing to be on the side of his master when victorious has no honour. A samurai loyal to his master sacrifices his soul to maintain honour and perform his obligation. Loyalty is not measured by money or awards, it is measured by his behavior in maintaining the honour of his master even at the cost of sacrificing lives. Loyalty is given with full awareness of the obligations that must be borne.

8. Self Control

By using moral standards as a benchmark, surpassing the logic of thought, a samurai controls himself in any situation. The difference between right and wrong is clear and unequivocal; there is no gray world between them. Only self-control causes a samurai to avoid wrong deeds. Self-control is forged through training and education. The practice of martial arts and military science serves to prepare a samurai to face all challenges and difficulties in the future. Knowledge and wisdom allow a samurai to discriminate between right and wrong. Self-control does not mean the samurai can not feel the softness and the beauty around him. However, a samurai with character is capable of controlling himself in any circumstances. With self-control, a samurai is respected and trusted for his words and deeds.

Manga

Manga is one form of contemporary Japanese popular culture that developed rapidly after World War II. Quantity type of manga and its sales continue to grow at a rapid rate in 1960–1970s. In the 21st century, manga have become one component of Japan's culture exported to many countries, and acting as a cultural ambassador.

According to Schodt, the first manga ever was *Chōjū giga,* the Animal Scroll, written by Reverend Toba in the early 12th century. Initially manga were related to religion. *Chōjū giga* tells of a sect of Buddhism. In the Kamakura period (1192–1333 AD), there was a manga that told the six paths of Buddhism, namely heaven, man, Ashura, animals, hungry demons, and hell. In the Tokugawa period, manga developed in the form of ukiyo-e, print on wood. At this time, works used ridicule or satire to illustrate human weakness. Ukiyo-e became popular because it was cheap, entertaining, funny, rich in expression and had a strong core story, as well as caricatures (Schodt 1997: 33–34).

When Japan entered the Meiji period, changes also occurred in manga. Social themes appeared and the manga form itself changed. Manga began to be used to convey social criticism, propaganda, and express the author's opinion. In the Taishō period, the manga became more simple and economical, but the social themes still appeared. When Japan entered the war, the themes relating to the war were reflected in manga. Manga are different from *komikku*. Manga are comics or printed picture story of Japan's work, while *komikku* are picture stories from the United States and Europe. Manga are comics recognized as a product of Japan.

Manga have characteristics different from the comics made in Western countries: the forms of the face and eyes, the diversity of the story, and most importantly, they are the work of Japanese not of mainstream Western-oriented global society. Manga are not just for children but for adults and people from all walks of life. Manga emphasize the use of monochrome color (black and white) as one of the main characteristics compared to American-style comics in color. In addition, manga have a thickness of more than 200 pages, using recycled paper at a cheaper price.

Schodt states manga were accepted into Japanese society and mass cultures because those who read manga when children were reluctant to give up reading it as an adult. The stories are more diverse and more than simple boy-meet-girl and justice-triumphs-over-evil (1997: 15). The strength of manga rather is less the technology that wins acceptance from all levels of Japanese society, and leads to publication in many countries; rather the diversity of genres and manga story line became the main force of the manga industry.

Collaboration of the manga industry with anime is of long duration. Both industries mutually support the other; support extends to computer games, figure models, and various other merchandise. Many manga titles interest the anime industry and become a hit. About 65% of all anime derive from manga that has had success in the market: *Tetsuwan Atom* in the 1950s and then *Doraemon, Nausicaä, Dragon Ball, Slam Dunk, Pokemon, One Piece*, and *Naruto*. Dozens of titles that became anime out of manga are published in dozens of countries.

In 2007, Japan's total revenues from manga reached 406 billion yen (about $3.6 billion USD) with the number increasing every year to reach $ 4.7 billion USD. The figure does not include income from manga published overseas. The manga market share in Japan has been decreasing since 1995, a problem caused by the challenge of manga from South Korea and China.

One manga published in this diminishing market is *One Piece* (ワンピース). *One Piece* is a Japanese *shōnen* manga series written and illustrated by Oda Eiichirō, that has been serialized in *Weekly Shōnen Jump* since 4 August 1997. The individual chapters are published in *tankōbon* volumes by Shueisha, with the first released on 24 December 1997. Since its release, *One Piece* has become one of the most popular

manga series of all time in Japan, and is the highest-selling manga in the whole history of the magazine, *Weekly Shōnen Jump*. Reviewers have praised the art, characterization, and humor of the story.

The series was adapted into an original video animation (OVA) produced by Production I.G in 1998, and an anime series produced by one of the biggest anime production companies, Toei Animation. The *One Piece* anime premiered in Japan in 1999. Since then, *One Piece* has aired more than four hundred episodes (2010).

Bushidō in *One Piece*

One Piece tells of a group of pirates, named Straw Hat Pirates (麦わら海賊団, Mugiwara Kaizokudan) led by Monkey D. Luffy. They are called the "Straw Hats" after Luffy's signature straw hat, given to him by Red-Haired Shanks. The crew sailed on the Going Merry, their first official Straw Hat ship, as far as Water 7 in CP9 Arc. Next, they obtained a new ship called the Thousand Sunny. The Straw Hats currently consist of 9 members, whose total combined bounties equal ฿700,000,050. Following events on the Sabaody Archipelago, all nine members are separated from one another; it is currently unknown how they will reunite, but they are determined to return to Sabaody Archipelago after 2 years of training.

Each member of this group has a goal to achieve through adventure by sailing the oceans, which in the world of *One Piece* is called the Grand Line. With the adventure together, entwined friendships, personal development, and various events that forge the group into groups, the Straw Hat Pirates were well respected in the world of *One Piece*.

One Piece recorded high sales in Japan. Based on data from sales Oricon it was the best seller in 2007–2009. *One Piece* scored the highest sales figures in the history of publishing *Weekly Shōnen Jump* for 11 years. *One Piece* #59 in 6 August 2010 sold 3.2 million copies.

From the Oricon Chart published on 15 December 2009, manga *One Piece* ranks as the best-selling manga (Table 1).

Table 1. Oricon Chart Manga *One Piece* Sales
12 December 2009

No.	Volume	Copies
1.	*One Piece* #53	2,057,528
2.	*One Piece* #54	1,963,696
3.	*One Piece* #52	1,952,551
4.	*One Piece* #55	1,810,410

Sources: www.oricon.co.jp

One Piece clearly has a huge appeal in Japan. An increasingly complex storyline, and sophisticted characters are the magnet. According to Oricon, volume 57 sold as many as 2.8 million copies in 9 May 2010 within four weeks. Based on data from Oricon, the entire volume of *One Piece* was on the list of the top 200 manga books for 7 to 13 December 2009 in Japan, with all 55 volumes selling over 1.5 million copies.

The storyline of *One Piece* can be divided into as follows:

1. East Blue Arc consists of volumes 1 to 12. This section tells how Straw Hat Pirates were first formed and began an adventure in the East Blue.

2. Work Baroque Arc runs from volume 12 to 24. This arc tells of Straw Hat Pirates adventures when they encounter criminals of the Baroque Work group who wanted to rule the Kingdom Arabasta.

3. Skypiea Arc is an adventure story of Straw Hat Pirates when they visit the Island of Sky. This section consists of volumes 24 to 32.

4. CP9 Arc tell the adventures of Straw Hat Pirates as related a group to World Government dark killers in the World *One Piece*, CP9. This arc runs from volumes 32 to 45.

5. Thriller Bark Arc tells the story of Straw Hat Pirates when it visits the Thriller Bark, fights with Gecko Moria and gains a new member, Brook. This section consists of volumes 46 to 50.

As told by Schodt, bushidō is the spirit of Japan, an ideal value that only exist in Japanese manga. This spirit also shown in *One Piece*. Bushidō in *One Piece* is narrowed to characters that use sword(s) as their main weapon. There are characters in *One Piece* that use sword as their weapon(s) of choice. Their weapon is their trademark. Among those characters are Roronoa Zoro (Three swords style), Juracule Mihawk (Kokutō yoru), Gol D. Roger, Kuina (Wadō ichimonji), Vista (Two sword style), Kōshiro, Red-Haired Shanks (Sabre), Cabaji (Carnival tricks), Hatchan (Six swords style), Arlong (Kiribachi), Tashigi (Shigure), Pell, Dorry, T-Bone (Ship cutter), Kaku (Four swords style), Helmeppo (Two kukris), Brook (Fencing style), Ryūma (Fencing style), Trafalgar Law (Nodachi), X. Drake (One sword style), and Silvers Rayleigh (One sword style).

The best known swordsmen are Roronoa Zoro (ロロノア・ゾロ) and Juracule Mihawk (ジュラキュール・ミホーク). Both had clashed before in East Blue Arc, because Roronoa Zoro wanted to defeat Juracule Mihawk and become number one swordman (#6, chapter 51).

Roronoa Zoro

Roronoa Zoro is a former bounty hunter and member of the Straw Hat Pirates. He was the first member to join the Straw Hat Pirates, and to date is universally considered the largest threat and most dangerous member in the crew after Luffy. He is famed as a master swordsman, user of the *santōryū* (Three sword style), and his great strength sometimes leads others to believe he must be the true captain. As one of the "Monster Trio," he is one of the top three fighters in the crew. Zoro was one of the eleven pirates referred to as "The Eleven Supernovas," who have bounty for their head over ฿100,000,000; Zoro has a bounty of ฿120,000,000 (#45, chapter 435; #51, chapter 498).

Source: *One Piece* volume 50, Oda Eiichirō

Figure 1. Roronoa Zoro illustrated by Oda Eiichirō

Zoro is a muscular young man of average size. He always carries around three swords held by a green *haramaki* over his right hip, allowing him to draw them easily with his left hand. Zoro has three identical gold earrings on his left earlobe, and keeps a black bandanna tied around his left arm. Zoro ties this bandanna around his head when fighting an opponent that he considers strong. His body is covered with scars from his many battles. Most notable is the scar he obtained during the battle at Baratie, a restaurant located in the ship, with the world's greatest swordsman, Juracule Mihawk. This duel he lost. As a result, Zoro was left with a massive scar stretching from his left shoulder to his right hip. In the Little Garden, a forest inhabited by two giants, he tried to free himself from a wax prison by cutting off his feet. Although he did not entirely succeed, he gave himself scars around each of his ankles. These scars are marked by black stitches.

Zoro is a swordsman, able to use one, two, or three swords. He is most comfortable with his *santōryū*, his ability to use a single sword or two swords. He also can use sword style fighting without a sword if necessary. The sword is the soul of the samurai and a symbol of their being. Zoro's swords are his symbols, and are well known in the *One Piece* world. He carries Wadō ichimonji (a sword that formerly belonged to his childhood rival, Kuina), Sandai Kitetsu, and Yubashiri. The last two he got in Logue Town. When Yubashiri was destroyed on Enies Lobby, Zoro had it replaced with Shusui, a sword formerly belonging to Ryūma, in Thriller Bark.

Zoro usually maintains a stern, serious and distant personality, but is often potrayed losing his temper in a goofy and exaggerated comical style. Zoro can also be extremely intimidating, easily frightening weaker opponents with just his glare. He has a monstrous killing intent evident from the fact that he almost drew his sword on one of the Tenryū bito (Celestial Dragon) noblemen. Zoro rarely shows emotion but he has a kind heart, and is willing to risk death for the sake of a little girl he did not know

shortly after his introduction.

He has a strong sense of leadership and reasoning. He consistently refuses to attack an adversary whose back is turned, the only exception being when his friends are in imminent danger of losing their lives. Zoro himself considers a scar on the back to be a swordsman's greatest shame. Whether he agrees with them or not, he will stand by Luffy's decisions, stepping in only to point out the seriousness of a situation where it has been overlooked by his crewmates. This is notable when they wanted to bring Usopp back into the crew after Usopp challenged Luffy to a duel over the Going Merry and lost.

A running gag throughout the series is that while he is very perceptive during battle, his sense of direction is extremely poor, to the point of him getting lost on a straight path. This is often the result of Zoro not understanding directions. In the Arabasta Arc, he mistakes going north for going up. In the Drum Island Arc, he believes he can keep the ship on course by heading toward a large cloud (which can move and change shape). Zoro is unaware of his lack of direction. Every time he gets lost, he always says, "The others are lost again."

While the crew sails from one island to another, Zoro normally spends his time lifting weights or taking naps. He always practices to maintain and upgrade his skill to realise his dream to be number one swordsman. Zoro likes to drink alcohol (sake), and has an inhumanly-high alcohol tolerance. He also reverts to drastic measures to solve simple problems, solutions that others in the crew would normally consider to be their last possible, worst-case-scenario choices. An example is when Zoro, Nami, and Vivi were stuck to a candle stick. He cut his leg to free himself leaving scars on his ankles. At Ennies Lobby, when Zoro and Usopp were accidentally handcuffed together, Zoro's suggested solution was to cut off one of their hands. He also is always one of the first Straw Hat Pirates members to suggest killing someone or threatening to kill someone. This is because he has the skill and strength to do it, while others do not. His determination is strong and stern; he will not bow to others.

Zoro does not believe in God or deities, but he believes in effort and fate and luck . He understands that there are things beyond his control. Examples are when Zoro bought swords in Logue Town, and when he lead a water train to jump on a high fence in Enies Lobby. He does not hesitate to put his life in danger or battle when he has to deal with the group calling itself God Eneru in Skypiea. Zoro never denies the decisions Luffy makes, even if he does not like them. Zoro was the first to take whatever decision his captain makes, even if it meant losing lives. Zoro was willing to take a hit and be laughed at for Luffy's commands.

Zoro rarely talk about Luffy's attitude. However, Zoro truly understands the desire of each crew member without them having to speak. For example, Zoro notices when Luffy is determined to do something. Zoro is also portrayed as very understanding of Luffy's tendency to play, and sometimes act naively. He is always ready to fight, knowing Luffy would always invite trouble. He also understands the strength and ability that Luffy has compared to others. This trust is recriprocated by Luffy. No matter what happens, Luffy understands Zoro's dream and his determination to achieve it. Luffy keeps Zoro's promise never to lose again until they can achieve their dream. That is why Luffy is never worried that Zoro might lose in any battle.

Zoro shows his ability to think rationally and decisively when difficult times come. When in Skypiea and Enies Lobby, Zoro showed his ability to lead the rest of the crew in the face of adversity, while Luffy

had to fight with other enemies. When Zoro takes decisions related to other crew members, everyone listens. For example, there is Zoro's speech about Nico Robin who gone missing in Water Seven. His loyalty to his captain is unwavering. He is willing to throw away his life to protect Luffy, or replace Luffy to face pain. Zoro never wants gratitude for what he does, and he always maintains his integrity in front of others. His sense of danger is acute, something that helps him to protect others.

Source: *One Piece* volume 50, Oda Eiichirō
Figure 2. Zoro is ready to die to replace his captain yet still insists "Nothing happened" in chapter 485.

With his ability to defend himself, Zoro is always trusted not only by other crew members, but also by the captain, Luffy. Zoro never uses his ability to supress others, especially those he considers weak. He dislikes those who use their power in that way. If he sees someone in danger, he will use his ability to protect them. His personal thoughts never interfere with his principle of justice or his loyalty to his captain. Roronoa Zoro exhibits several characteristics of the ethic of bushidō as described by Nitobe.

1. Rectitude or justice, the highest value in bushidō, is the reason, the basis for action. Roronoa Zoro sees justice as based on the value of protection. He will protect anyone weaker than him, even though he may have to rebel against authority and suffer (#1), someone he cared (#5, #11, #20, #31, #37, #50, #51) or someone he did not like or trust (#32, #50). For example, when Nico Robin first join the Straw Hat Pirates, Zoro did not trust her. When she was attacked by Enel in Skypea Island, however,

he protected and defended her even though it may have cost him his life.

2. Courage is valid if applied to upholding justice. The courage to be strong in doing the right thing is valued. It shows when Zoro has to fight with anyone to protect others and follow his captain's command. This is why he never hesitates to kill his enemies during a fight. He has the courage to pursue his dream even though he may have to kill. This is evident, again, when he challenges Mihawk to keep his promise to his friends. He never retreats from his enemy, no matter what his enemy's skills. He is never scared to take chances, however slim they may be, like when he had to fight Daz Bones, whose whole body can change into a sword. He is not scared to get beaten by someone he thinks unworthy of fighting (#1, #24).

3. Benevolence is feelings of love, compassion, sympathy, and generosity. Human beings have the power to order and kill other people, and based on benevolence will not easily use their power to kill, but protect others. Zoro is not a person for soft words or sweet talk. He shows benevolence in action to help others. He is willing to suffer to protect a little girl (#1). He helped a young man he did not know just because he was injured (#50). He will protect others with his ability and care (#29).

4. Politeness and good manners are based on generosity, expressed as a tribute to the feelings of others, not because of fear of others. Zoro respects others because of their own actions and power. He respect his "stupid" captain and is ready to follow him even to death. He will not show good manners to someone who does not respect others or lacks care. He respects other members and helps them to realise their dreams (#17, #22, #45, #50).

5. Veracity and sincerity, rather than satisfying needs for economic reasons, are required as a form of self-discipline. Talking about money is something considered demeaning. That is why Zoro never has money or cares about it. His sincerity shows in helping others without words (#17). He is willing to sacrifice himself without anyone else knowing about it, or showing him gratitude (#1, #50, #59).

6. Honour does not only apply in relation to martial arts, but also to everyday behavior. Honour is exhibited in fulfilling obligations, and enduring all challenges to protect one's honour. Zoro's honour lies in his ability to win a fight, and never be defeated. He puts all his effort in fighting on the path chosen by his captain and his own values (#1, #2, #4, #9, #12, #17, #21, #23, #32, #33, #38, #41, #48 #50, #50, #51, #52, #59). He will do everything to support others, especially his captain.

7. The duty of loyalty, in a community with a subsistence economy, is often overlooked. Loyalty earns a samurai respect. Zoro is always loyal to Luffy. He always reminds Luffy about his position and that of others who trust him. He reminds everyone else that the choices are already made and there are consequences to actions (#45). His loyalty to his captain never changes. He believes in his captain's decision and choices (#2, #4, #9, #11, #12, #21, #23, #32, #33, #38, #41, #50, #52). He will do anything to protect his captain and members of the crew even against his better judgement, as when he stabs one of the Shichibukai from behind to protect his captain (#50). He willing bows to others, in this case Mihawk to become his master, in order to support Luffys dream (chapter 597).

8. Self-control, by using moral standards as a benchmark, surpasses the logic of thought and control in his attitude toward others and his enviroment. The difference between right and wrong is clear and unequivocal, with no gray realm between them. Only self-control prevents a fall into the wrong deeds. Zoro shows this by always standing up for his captain, his friends, and his promises. Most of his spare

time he uses for training, even though he is injured. Self control is important to Zoro. Without correct practices and self control, he can not master the technique of cutting steel. He can cut everything in this world, and control his sword not to cut that which should not be cut (#21). With his self control and practice, Zoro can used his sword with no sword, one sword, two swords. Zoro realises the instinct of a killer, like a wild animal that can not be controlled by others. Zoro realises his own capability and tries to increase it by practice. That is why he allows himself to bow to other men in order to learn more (chapter 597).

Juracule Mihawk

Juracule Mihawk has the nickname "Hawk-Eye" Mihawk. He is one of the Shichibukai, that is Seven Pirates recruited by the World Government to maintain peace; he is also the strongest swordsman in the world. That is why Zoro must defeat him to gain his dream and fulfil his promise. In battle, Mihawk uses a knife that he carries as a pendant around his neck or a sword with a black, single-edged curved blade known as the world's strongest sword, at his back (#6, chapter 51). He only uses his sword to fight worthy opponents, like Zoro, Shanks, and Shirohige. He is also able to slice objects at a distance like Zoro, in what is called the world's strongest slash.

Mihawk wears a wide-brimmed black hat, decorated with a large plume, and a long, open black coat with no shirt underneath, with red, flower-patterned sleeves and collar. He wears black trousers held up by a decorated belt and tucked inside overly large boots.

Figure 3. Juracule Mihawk illustrated by Oda Eiichirō

Mihawk is recognized as above all the world's swordsmen, but he remains grounded. While he has obviously become respected for his superior abilities as a swordsman, he is able to recognize talent. He has a desire to see Roronoa Zoro surpass him, having witnessed Zoro's incredible will and determination

after their battle in front of Baratie. When he speaks to Zoro, he states he will wait for him, no matter how long it takes, and notes that he will continue to be the world's greatest swordsman, showing great confidence in his own skills and abilities.

There are not many Mihawk scenes in this manga. He appears for the first time at #6 and fights with Zoro. He shows respect to Zoro who has chosen his path with courage and honour, although he is weaker than him. He will not fight someone who does not honour him, and so refuses to fight Shanks who has already lost his left arm (#22). To fight someone who is no longer at his prime is an injustice and not a matter for honour. He is never a member of any groups. He is bound to the Shichibukai unclearly; he never exhibits any tendency to harm others.

Conclusion

Attitudes and behavioral characters of Roronoa Zoro and Juracule Mihawk in the manga *One Piece* exemplify the attitude and behavior of the ethical code of bushidō, although not precisely as described by Nitobe. This means there is a change in form or context of bushidō code of ethics. Roronoa Zoro and Juracule Mihawk are swordsman feared by others in the pirate community. Their swords are their mark of prowess and honour. For Zoro and Juracule their swords are symbols of their very existence. Both keep their word, have self control, and honour. Their loyalty is unwavering, although they have to face higher powers. Death is something they do not consider frightening. For both of them, cowardice and death without honour are more shamefull then life.

Given their attitudes and behaviour based on justice, bravery, benevolence, loyalty, honour, and self-control, it can be concluded that Roronoa Zoro and Juracule Mihawk are drawing on the ethical code of bushidō.

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銀座と資生堂:

資生堂初代社長・福原信三の銀座振興策

戸 矢 理 衣 奈

要旨

　日本最大の化粧品メーカー、資生堂は1872年、薬局としての創業当初は「新橋資生堂」として知られていた。創業者の三男で後に社長となる福原信三が化粧品の製造販売に本格的に参入すると、1921年に「東京銀座資生堂」の商標を採用し、銀座と結びついた強力な企業イメージを形成していく。銀座は日本初の西洋風の街並みを持つ商店街で明治の文明開化を象徴する街だが、当時は衰退の危機にあり、信三は銀座の振興策を講じつつ、企業のイメージアップを図った。正式な町名としての銀座を４丁目から８丁目まで拡大する「大銀座」計画や、景観対策、商店街での協同入荷など、様々な画期的な提案を行い、現代の銀座の繁栄の基盤をなしている。いまや「銀座」というイメージは資生堂がもつ最大の無形資産のひとつだが、信三による銀座全体を見据えた活動がその原点となっている。

序

　銀座には数多くの有名店があるが、資生堂はその代表格であろう。「東京銀座資生堂」として親しまれ、現在でも銀座といえば資生堂を思い起こす人は少なくないだろう。実際にその歴史は長く、1872年に日本初の洋風調剤薬局として福原有信が現在の銀座８丁目に創業した。いまや資生堂は化粧品業界で日本では第１位、世界でも五指に入る売上を誇る巨大メーカーであるが、現在にいたるまで創業の地、銀座に本社を構えている。

　資生堂は化粧品メーカーでありながら、女性のみならず、男性にも親しまれてきた。化粧品には関心がなくとも、銀座に来たら資生堂パーラーやギャラリーに寄ろうという人は少なくない。現在も資生堂が経営するレストラン「ロオジェ」や「ファロ資生堂」も美食家たちの人気を誇り、銀座の中心の一角をなしている。

　他方で資生堂は、かつて銀座を闊歩したモダンガールに代表されるように、大正から昭和初期にかけて花開いたモダン都市文化の牽引役としてイメージされる場合も多い。そうしたイメージはすでに戦前に確立されており、1941年に発行された経済誌にも「銀座の資生堂でないと、今の人々にはピンと来ない程銀座と資生堂は離れ難い存在である」と記されているほどだ[1]。

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[1]　『企業』1941年10月号。

　企業のブランド力ということが注目されて久しいが、「東京銀座資生堂」という、銀座と密接に関連した企業イメージは、資生堂の最大の無形資産であるといえる。しかしながらその資生堂が、1872年に西洋調剤薬局として創業して以来、ほぼ半世紀にわたり「東京新橋資生堂」あるいは「京橋区出雲町資生堂」として親しまれてきたことは、あまり知られていない。創業者、福原有信（1848－1924）の三男で、初代社長の信三（1883－1948）が経営を任されると、街の一薬局から全国規模の化粧品メーカーへの拡大が図られると同時に、店舗の立地は変わらないまま新橋のイメージは急速に払拭されていったのである。

　福原信三はいかにして、「東京銀座資生堂」という企業イメージを確立していったのだろうか。そもそも企業が都市のイメージを象徴し、その文化をも牽引するとはいったいどういうことなのか。

　筆者は博士学位論文にて、福原信三が「東京銀座資生堂」という企業イメージを確立していく過程を、従来の文化史、経営史などの枠組みを超えた時代相のなかに位置づけることで、信三の独自性と、それがいかにして発揮されたのかを明らかにしてきた。本論では福原信三が資生堂の全国展開に並行して、銀座振興に際して積極的に関与した、最初期の活動について紹介していきたい。それはモダン都市文化の展開に先駆ける、銀座内部の動きとしても注目されるものだ。

1. 福原有信と新橋資生堂

　1872（明治5）年、現在の銀座8丁目に日本初の洋風調剤薬局「資生堂」が誕生した[2]。創業者は福原有信ら三名で、有信はこのとき24歳の若者であった。安房国出身の有信は、幕府で学んだ後、大学東校を経て海軍薬局長に抜擢されていた。明らかに当時のエリートコースを歩んでいたわけだが、よほど進取の気性に富んでいたのだろう。日本における西洋調剤の導入、そして医薬分業という大志をかかげて民間での起業を決意したという。なお、有信は現在の福原義春・資生堂名誉会長の祖父にあたる。

　社名は『易経』の一節「至哉坤源　万物資生（いたれるかなこんげん　ばんぶつとりてなす）」に由来する。「大地の徳はなんと素晴らしいものであろうか。すべてのものは、ここから生まれる」という意味だ。西洋調剤薬局を開くにあたって、中国の古典から店名を採用したわけだが、これは有信のいわば和魂洋才の精神の表れでもあろう。資生堂は現在、中国でも大変な人気を誇るが、この商標も彼らに親しみを持たせる一因となっている。

　当時はまだ、薬といえば漢方という時代である。現代の日本では考えられないことだが、偽薬も多く出回るなか、信頼できる洋風薬局の開業は、時代に先駆けるものだった。1930年に刊行された小野田素夢のエッセイ『銀座通』では、資生堂が「漢方医の領分を侵略」したとまで記されている[3]。

　資生堂は薬局の二階に診療所を開き、陸軍軍医であった松本良順の回診日を設けるなど、話題を呼んだ。しかし、資金計画が充分ではなく時代も早すぎたのだろう。創業後まもなく、

[2]　創業当時は複数の経営者の存在を反映し、日本橋や室町、牛込などにも資生堂が存在するが、本書では福原有信による新橋資生堂を扱う。

[3]　小野田素夢『銀座通』四六書院、1930年、114頁。

深刻な経営難に陥り、一度は店をたたむほどの窮地に陥ってしまう。この経験から、有信は小売店経営に不安を覚えたのかもしれない。以後は国策会社である大日本製薬や帝国生命の設立などに積極的に関与し、明治の実業界の大立者としての道を歩んでいく。一方で資生堂は有信の夫人、とくの尽力と有信の人的ネットワークに救われた。

例えば、のちにとくは開業しても間もない東京慈恵会病院に日参して、病院の薬局業務の受託に大きく貢献している。同院は有信とは旧知の仲で、後に東京帝国大学教授を務める医学者、高木兼寛が上流階級を対象にして開いたもので、豪華な設備が話題となっていた。これにより、資生堂の知名度も高まり、業績を持ち直していく。資生堂はやがて宮家の御用達をも務めるようになり、当時の新聞には、逗子の福原家の別荘に美子皇后（後の昭憲皇太后）がお立ち寄りになる様子なども報じられている。とくは夫の苦境を支えた「賢夫人」として知られるようになり、後には新聞や最初期の女性雑誌などからたびたび、取材を受けるようになった。

経営が一段落した1880年代には一般向けの製品の販売も増え、その多くは高級品として知られた。1888年には、普及品の約10倍の価格で「福原衛生練歯磨」を発売し、粉が飛び散らないことが評価されて海軍の御用達を務める。艦船では、歯磨粉が飛び散るとたちまち床が滑るため、この問題は思いのほか重要なのだった。蓋の部分には当時の資生堂の商標である鷹があしらわれ、海軍御用達に相応しい雰囲気だ。ちなみにライバル商品には、小林富次郎商店による「獅子印ライオン歯磨」などがあった。

同じく1880年代には「フローリン」（整髪剤）、「ペプシネ飴」（胃薬）、さらにはビタミン製剤である「脚気丸」といった初期の資生堂を代表する製品が登場している。「フローリン」は現在の育毛剤「不老林」の原型となるもので、当初はFLOWLINEと記され、洒落たパッケージに包まれていた。

資生堂初の化粧品が登場するのもこの頃のことだ。「資生堂の赤い化粧水」として有名になる「高等化粧料　オイデルミン」が1897年に発売されている。「医学的見地による処方」が強調され、製品名もギリシャ語の「オイ（良い）」「デルマ（皮膚）」に由来したものだ。現在までリニューアルが続けられている、超ロングセラー製品だ。1902年には薬局内で、日本でははじめてのソーダ水の販売を始め、「オイデルミン」ともあわせて新橋芸妓たちに人気を博した。艶やかな女性客が集う資生堂は銀座に「一種の気分を添えた」と評判になっていく。

1890年代になると、資生堂は東京の名所案内や小説などにも登場するようになった。少し後になるが、夏目漱石『それから』（1909年）には、主人公の長井代助が外国製の歯磨が買いたくて資生堂を訪れたのに、店員がしつこく自家製のものを奨めると困っている様子が描かれている。これが事実だとすれば、よほどの自信作だったのだろう。

森鷗外も資生堂には一目置いていたようだ。『金毘羅』（1909年）では、東大のお膝元、本郷でも入手できない薬が資生堂にあると書かれている。ちなみに先述の海軍軍医、高木兼寛は日本におけるビタミン研究の先駆者で、脚気の原因をビタミン不足によるものと主張して、海軍で対策を進めていた。一方、「脚気細菌説」を唱えて脚気対策に遅れをもたらしたとされるのが、陸軍軍医を務めていた鷗外である。

こうして資生堂は発展を遂げていくが、有信の時代はあくまでも街の一薬局にすぎなかった。先述したように、有信も経営危機の後、活動の舞台を資生堂の外へと拡げるのに熱

心であった。1878年には、日本の近代薬学をリードした研究者で、後に東京帝国大学教授を務める長井長義らとともに、国策会社である株式会社大日本製薬会社の設立に参画した。医薬分業を強調し、全国薬剤師連合会長にも就任するなど、草創期の国内製薬業さらに薬剤師制度の確立にも精力的に関わっていく。

1882年には、日本で２番目となる生命保険会社、帝国生命保険株式会社の設立に加わり、やがて社長に就任する。そうなると有信には帝国生命がいわば本業となり、とく夫人の資生堂への関与がますます高まっていった。当時の新聞には、とくの名前で、新製品のお披露目会が開かれている様子も見受けられる。

有信はその後も、東京商工会議所名誉議員や赤十字社評議員、京橋区会議長、日本電力株式会社取締役などの数々の要職に就き、明治の第１世代の実業界の成功者としての声望を確実なものとしていった。当時の日本の経済界を主導していた渋沢栄一や、その次世代の代表的な実業家となる藤山雷太とも姻戚関係を結んでいる。

多彩な才能を発揮した有信であるが、資生堂は実業家としての彼の活動の原点である。店舗を構えた「場」については、並々ならぬこだわりが持たれていた。

大正末期に「銀座は江戸に栄えずして、東京に繁昌する處」[4]と言われたように、銀座は1872年に政府主導のもとで完成した、日本初の西洋風街区である。同年の大火で一帯の江戸の街並みが焼失してしまうと、当時の井上馨蔵相や由利公正東京府知事が明治に相応しい新街区の構想を練り、英国人技師ウォートルスが設計を担当した。耐火性煉瓦で舗装され、ロンドンのリージェントストリートを模したアーケードのついた西洋風建築が整然と立ち並ぶ街並みは、完成すると「煉瓦地」と称され、「お新しい気分を発散する区域」として評判になっていく[5]。

有信が店を開いたのは、この「煉瓦地」造営直後のことだ。薬剤を通して新時代を開拓しようという、有信の気分ともよく合致したのだろう。当時、この一帯は四方を掘割に囲まれており、入るには京橋、数寄屋橋、三原橋などの橋を渡らねばならなかった。それゆえに一層、独立した雰囲気が保たれたのだろう。水辺にゆらめくガス灯や柳も異国情緒を添え、独特の風情を醸し出した。雨の夜や、朝靄の雰囲気はまた格別だったようだ。いまや周囲の水路は埋め立てられてしまったが、銀座ではお馴染みの「橋」のつく地名は当時の名残である。

この「煉瓦地」一帯には、現在の銀座１丁目から８丁目までが含まれる。しかし、正式な町名としての銀座は現在の銀座１丁目から４丁目のみで、５丁目から８丁目にかけては個別の町名や通称で親しまれていた。

資生堂が創業した出雲町、その後店舗を拡大した竹川町もその一角で、通称として「銀座」とも、新橋寄りの地域では「新橋」とも称されている。そもそも当時の新橋は、1872年の鉄道開通以来、外国情報の発信地である横浜と鉄道で直結する東京の玄関口だ。ここから銀座へと人が流れるため、銀座でも新橋寄りのほうが景気もよかったという。銀座はいわば、新橋のお膝元なのだった。後に銀座の長老達は、「若し新橋停車場がなくば、若しくは他の地点であつたならば、煉瓦地の出現も何とあらうか。まして素早く下町離れし

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[4]　三田村鳶魚「江戸よりも東京」三須裕編『銀座』資生堂化粧品部、1921年、23頁。

[5]　当初は東京市中の家屋を漸次、西洋風耐火煉瓦に改築する計画があった。

た、新しい気持になれたか否か」[6]と回想している。

　当時の新橋は花街としても、その繁栄を謳歌していた。江戸時代を代表する花街といえば柳橋だが、「西国武士の成上がり」などと陰口を叩かれていた明治の元勲たちには、一流意識の強い柳橋よりも新橋芸妓のほうが気安かったらしい。資生堂の裏手にも花街が広がっており、信三も「私は花柳界の真只中で成長した」[7]と語っている。

　このように明治の新橋は、最先端の西洋文化の玄関口、そして新橋芸者のあでやかなイメージの両方を想起する地名であり、最先端の薬品や化粧品を扱う資生堂には銀座よりも相応しかったのだろう。大正初期にいたるまで「本舗　東京市新橋出雲町角　資生堂　福原有信」「東京市京橋区出雲町一番地　福原資生堂」「東京新橋　福原資生堂」などと店名が表記されている。

　実際、商店街としての銀座は、造営当初は決して華やかなものではなかった。江戸時代からの住民は立ち退いていたし、馴染みのない洋風の建物や湿度の高さといった問題から、空き家が目立った。空き家では自殺者も見られ、新橋芸妓らは銀座には幽霊が出ると噂していたという。その一方で、大蛇などを陳列した見世物小屋や、当時の政府が殖産興業の一環として奨励していた、内国勧業博覧会に出品された珍しい品々などを販売する「勧工場（かんこば）」なども立ち並び、現代のテーマパーク的な空間となっていた。

　しかしながら、銀座は何といっても地の利に長けている。1880年代に入ると、皇居や官公庁とも至近距離にあることから、新聞各社が次々とその本支社を構え、自由民権運動をはじめ政治結社等の活動も目立ちはじめる。現在の銀座7丁目には、福沢諭吉による、最初の本格的な社交機関として知られる交詢社も開かれた。

　天賞堂、服部時計店など現在の銀座を代表する専門店も登場し、1890年代には銀座は「都下第一の宏壮都下第一の美麗なり」[8]との評判を獲得する。その繁栄ぶりは、日清戦争後には従来の商業の中心地である日本橋をも凌ぐようになった。

　もっとも、女性で賑わう現在の銀座とは異なり、初期の銀座の顧客は、洋装を早くから必要とした皇族や政府関係者、官僚などの男性が中心であった。服部時計店や明治屋などで売られた舶来の時計や鞄、そして食品などは大変にハイカラなもので、洋行を経験、あるいは夢見ていた彼らにことさらに愛されたのだろう。

　「私の家は鞄商ですが、二十三年の国会開設の時には、抱ヘ鞄が非常に売れました。品物が間に合はない位で、殊に売れたのは四ツ折というやつです。多分新たに議員になった人達が買ったのでせう」

　現在も銀座に店を構える谷澤鞄店の店主（当時）は、1890年の国会開設当時の様子をこのように回想している。ちなみに「鞄」は国字である。同店では当初、「皮包」と書いて洋風の鞄を販売していたが、あるとき「鞄」と書いたところ、それが漢字として定着してしまったのだという。他方で当時の上流階級の女性には、買い物といえば商店の外商が一

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[6]　三田村鳶魚編『伸び行く銀座』銀座二丁目町会、1942年、303頁。

[7]　『経済マガジン』1940年6月1日号。

[8]　岩動景爾編著『東京風物名物誌』東京シリーズ刊行会、1951年、123–124頁。

般的で、外出自体が珍しいことだった。女性客を集めた資生堂の存在が銀座に「一種の気分を添えた」とされるのも、明治の銀座が「男性の街」ゆえのことであった。

2. 福原信三と東京銀座資生堂

福原信三の生い立ち

　福原信三は有信の三男として、1883年に現在の銀座８丁目にあたる京橋区出雲町で生まれ、この地で成長した。信三が通った銀座の泰明小学校の卒業生名簿には、北村透谷や島崎藤村らも名を連ねている。続いて信三は、正則中学を経て千葉医学専門学校（現在の千葉大学医学部）に進学し、薬学を学ぶ。正則中学では２年の留年を経験しているが、どうやら勉強はあまり好きではなかったようだ。妹の野依信によれば、千葉の学校もいやでいやで仕方がなかったという。

　一方で学生時代の信三を知る人々は、彼の食事への強いこだわりを記憶している。中学の同級生によれば、皆がご飯に塩鮭といった弁当だったところ、信三は毎日「ねじった食パンみたいなのに、ストロベリーの瓶詰一箇」を持ってきていた。それを一人で食べるというのでもなく、「おい、どうだい、うまそうだからよこせ」と言えば「ああそうかといってよこす人でしたね」という。妹の信によれば、千葉の学校では「食事が烏賊ばかり」で、それも苦痛の種だったらしい。信三は後に、有信がはじめたソーダファウンテンを、本格的な食事を提供する資生堂パーラーへと発展させるが、食へのこだわりは生来のものだったようだ。

　1908年には洋行し、コロンビア大学薬学部に学ぶ。その後はニューヨークの薬局で見習いとして勤務した。配達に出かけることもあり、ニューヨークの街にはすっかり詳しくなったと、後年まで周囲によく語っている。最後の１年はウィーン、パリ、ロンドンをはじめヨーロッパ各地を遊学し、美術館巡りなどを楽しんだ。

　日露戦争を経て、日本の一等国意識が高揚していた時代であるが、まだまだ洋行者の数は限られていた。アメリカ暮らしの当初、信三は現地の友人もおらず、語学や慣れない生活環境に悩み多い毎日を送ったようだ。もっとも、有信が実業家として成功していたことから、経済的には何の不自由もなかった。見習いとして勤務していた薬局では、服装が豪華すぎると注意されていたほどである。

全国展開と『銀座』刊行

　帰国した信三は1915年から資生堂の経営に参画し、一薬局から化粧品メーカーへと事業展開を本格化していく。ここで、信三が注目したのが銀座という街の魅力だ。それこそが資生堂の企業イメージの中核をなすものと考え、全国展開の最初期から、銀座の振興に積極的に関与していく。一方、1910年代の銀座はそれまでの繁栄から一転して、衰退の危機に見舞われていた。現代の銀座の繁栄を考えるとき、信三はいわば中興の祖としても注目されよう。

　銀座に対する信三の最初期の貢献に、1921年の『銀座』刊行が挙げられる。この書籍は、この街に縁の深い50名を超える文化人から寄稿を得て資生堂が発行したもので、銀座に関する初めてのまとまった文献となった。

　刊行の直接的な契機となったのは、当時の東京市長、後藤新平による東京市全体の都市計画に基づいた市区改正計画である。そこには、銀座通りの拡張工事が含まれていた。東京市は、長らく銀座の人びとに愛されてきた舗道の柳を撤去して公孫樹（いちょう）を植樹し、煉瓦にかわってアスファルトを採用することなどを一方的に決定してしまう。これに対して、信三をはじめとする銀座の住民達が、「銀座の声」を無視した改革であると大いに反発したのである。

　とりわけ柳の撤去は、それを銀座の象徴として捉えてきた銀座の商店主たちの怒りを買った。しかし後藤は後藤で、東アジア原産の公孫樹こそ、日本を代表する大通りに相応しいと考えた。「三千年来盆栽に植え来りたる公孫樹を大陸に移し植えて世界的に繁茂させねばならぬ」[9]という対外政策論すら書いていたほどである。当時は銀座に本社を構える新聞社も多く、公孫樹か柳かという問題は、政府主導か地域の自治かといった問題とも重なり、紙面を賑わせた。ちなみに公孫樹は戦後、東京都の木に制定され、東京大学の徽章にもデザインされている。他方で柳は銀座の人々に愛されつづけた。現在も銀座を歩けば、その名を冠した店舗などが見うけられるだろう。資生堂が運営するレストラン、ロオジェ（l'osier）もフランス語で柳を意味するものだ。

　後藤新平そして東京市という「外圧」は、確実に銀座の商店の団結を強めていった。1919年には日本初の商店街連合会、銀座通連合会の前身となる京新連合会が組織され、市に陳情書を提出している。地元のよしみか、新聞各社はおおむね銀座住民に同情的であったが、『読売新聞』は「哀れっぽい陳情書」（1921年5月15日号）とやや冷淡だった。銀座通連合会は、現在も地域の建物の高さ規制をはじめ、有効に機能している全国有数の商店街連合会として知られるが、その原点には後藤の存在があったことになる。

　こうしたなかで、信三は東宮殿下（後の昭和天皇）に献上するとして『銀座』の刊行を計画し、商店主たちの銀座愛護のムードを、文化人を中心に幅広い人々に広めていく。同書は非売品であったが、新聞でもその刊行が報じられるなど注目を集めた[10]。関東大震災後には、震災前の銀座の貴重な記録としても珍重されるようになる。結局、東京市による工事は遂行されたものの、書籍の刊行を機に、信三はいわば銀座のスポークスマンとして注目を集めることとなった。

銀座衰退の三大要因

　それにしても、なぜこれほどまでに銀座愛護のムードを高める必要があったのか。もちろん、信三がニューヨーク、パリ、ロンドンと欧米の大都市の魅力に触れてきた経験が大きいだろう。対照的に、大正時代のはじめ、銀座は繁栄から一転して、小売商店街としての衰退を深刻に懸念されていた。後藤の市区改正計画は、そこに追い討ちをかけるものだった。信三は『銀座』に、衰退の三大要因を具体的に挙げている。これらは、現代の街づくりにおいても一般化される課題であろう。

　第1の問題は、「銀座らしい」街並みの消滅だ。

9　『実業之日本』1916年1月1日号。

10　『読売新聞』1921年12月24日号。

　「最初に同一形式で建築されました煉瓦作りの二階家の屋根が棟つづきになつて、或程度の統一観があり、何処かしら他所との区別計りでなしに、一定した気持ちがありました。若しあれが一軒々々異なつて、洋風唐造り、土蔵作り、純日本風の店屋などが入交つて立ち並んで居りましたら、あんなスッキリした気持は出なかつたに違ひありません。その証拠には銀座以外の何処の小売店街にも、銀座の気持ちがなかつたのです」[11]

　信三は、建造当初の整然とした街並みを銀座の個性として高く評価している。しかし、その繁栄とともに各商店が自由に建物を増改築するなどしたため、街は様変わりしつつあった。いまや銀座の象徴でもある和光の時計塔も、1895年に服部時計店の初代時計塔として建造された当時は、初期の街並みからすれば大幅な変則となる建築だった[12]。独自の空間にこそ銀座の魅力があると感じていた信三は、景観の乱れに対して「現在の銀座は外の小売店街との区別がない」と手厳しい。

　第2に、新橋駅の閉鎖に伴う新橋、そして銀座一帯の衰退がある。明治のはじめ、新橋は天皇が臨席されての鉄道の開通とともに華々しく、繁栄の時代の幕を開けた。しかし大正時代の新橋は、その後の凋落傾向を象徴するように新橋駅での明治天皇の葬送にはじまった。『読売新聞』の記事掲載数で見ると、明治期に新橋、銀座、丸の内の項目数はそれぞれ2732、884、55であるが、大正期においては916、1091、236となり、新橋の激減、微増の銀座、そして丸の内の台頭が目立つ。

　1914年（大正3年）、東京駅が新たなターミナル駅として開業すると、新橋駅は閉鎖された[13]。これにより、新橋および銀座は、西洋文明の窓口、そして情報の集積地としての特権的な地位を失うこととなった。

　かわって、それまで「三菱が原」と称され、ほとんど開発が進められていなかった丸の内に注目が集まっていく。三菱が開発に携わった煉瓦作りの街並みは「一丁倫敦」と称され、なかでも丸ビルは注目の的となった。高浜虚子は、その建造中から「ホトトギス発行所として部屋を予約した」[14]と高揚感をもって記している。一方、信三は虚子とは対照的に、新橋を眺めながら嘆息をついていた。

　「目を放てば遠く一帯の緑を背中にして、此の世の務めを済ませた顔の旧新橋のステーションを見ても、私には懐旧の念日に新なるものがあるのであります」[15]

　信三は「兎に角、銀座といふものは、東京市の商業中枢区域からいへば少し線を脱しかけていることだけは否むことの出来ない事実であらう」と語り、その将来を危ぶんでいる。
　「此の世の務めを済ませた」のは駅だけではなかった。明治も末となる1910年、当時の

[11]　福原信三「追憶の銀座」資生堂意匠部編・代表高木長葉『御婦人手帳』資生堂、1927年、115頁。
[12]　初田亨が銀座の街並みの変遷のモデルを明瞭に作成している。初田亨「銀座・中央通り　街並み立面図」三枝進他『銀座　街の物語』河出書房新社、2006年、33−40頁。
[13]　新橋は貨物専門の駅となり、近隣地に汐留駅が出来た。
[14]　高浜虚子「丸の内」『大東京繁昌記』毎日新聞社、1999年、8頁。
[15]　福原信三「銀座の編輯について」三須裕編『銀座』資生堂化粧品部、1921年、351頁。

人気作家、松山省三がカフェ・プランタンを銀座に開業した。当時のカフェーは、現代の喫茶店とは大きく異なる。酒を提供し、女給と呼ばれる若い女性給仕の存在が新機軸で、現代のホステスがいるクラブの原点となるものだった。気軽に女性と話が出来る場として、作家や芸術家など主に文化人の社交場として人気を集め、同種の店舗が相次いで開店する。1910年代末には「近頃のカフエー女は私娼化した」[16]といった評判まで流れるほど、その風紀が悪化していった。

　こうしたカフェーの興隆は、新橋のもうひとつの顔でもあった新橋芸妓の凋落を招くことになる。ジャーナリストの村島帰之は『カフエー　歓楽の王宮』（1929年）において、カフェー誕生から10年で、女給の数は千年の歴史を持つ芸妓の数と同等に上ると指摘している。村島はカフェーを「近代感覚の私生児」と称して、その魅力として手軽さやスピード感を挙げている。他方、新橋芸妓を贔屓にした明治の元勲には高齢者、物故者も増えていった。

　そもそも元号が改まると、近しい過去もひどく旧時代的な雰囲気を帯びるようになる。大正期の女性誌でも、旧式だと思われるものに対しては「何うも明治臭がぬけていない」などと容赦がない。平成になると、昭和がどこかレトロな響きを帯びてくるのと同じことであろう。

　1912年の大正の幕開けとともに、新橋はまさに「明治臭」をまとった地名と化していった。化粧品販売に本格的に進出したばかりの資生堂にとっては、一層問題が深刻であったろう。現在でも新橋といえば中年男性という印象が強く、香水や高級化粧品のイメージとは程遠い。また、海外における知名度もほとんどない。

　信三はさらなるイメージダウンを恐れてか、『銀座』では新橋の凋落について詳述はしていない。しかし同じ「煉瓦地」にありながら新橋に対して、銀座にはカフェーをはじめ、新時代の雰囲気が生じていた。信三は「明治の新橋」に悩む一方で、「大正の銀座」という潮流をいち早く見抜いていたのである。

　最後に、信三は銀座の第3の課題として、日本橋のデパートとの競争の激化を挙げている。日本橋と銀座は距離的にも近いうえ、それぞれの江戸、そして東京の中心としての意識から対抗関係にあった。日本橋では、1904年に三井呉服店が「デパートメントストア宣言」のもと、三越として新規開店する。これを機に、近隣の高島屋や白木屋などの老舗呉服店も次々と百貨店へと衣替えしていった。

　三越はシーズンごとに「元禄模様」などテーマ性のあるデザインを提案し、日本人の消費を「流行」を意識したものへと大きく変化させる。1913年には「今日は帝劇、明日は三越」といったキャッチコピーも話題となり、三越の先導のもとで百貨店人気は急速に高まっていった。女性達にとっても、百貨店の登場によって買い物のための外出が新たな娯楽となる。「男性の街」銀座も、女性達の動員を意識せざるを得なくなったことだろう。

　そのうえ、日本橋の至近距離には東京駅が開業している。信三は、銀座の両側にある「二百四十余の総商店」の１日の売上が、こうしたデパートの売上高に較べるとずっと少ないのではないかと懸念を示した。

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[16]　松崎天民『銀座』筑摩書房、2002年、82頁。

信三による銀座改造計画

　信三は資生堂の全国展開と並行して、『銀座』やメディアを通して、こうした銀座の課題を明示し、地域の商店、連合会、さらには行政がとるべき方策を具体的に提案していく。これらは当初は信三の空想にすぎないと思われたが、1923年の関東大震災で銀座全体が倒壊するという事態をうけて、急速に現実性を高めていく。

　なかでも画期的だったのは、正式な町名としての銀座を従来の１丁目から４丁目に加えて８丁目まで拡大するという「大銀座」計画だ。すでに述べたとおり、当初、現在の銀座５丁目から８丁目には個別の町名がついていた。「煉瓦地」一帯は通称として銀座と呼ばれ、地域的特色を共有しながらも、正式な町名も異なることから商店主たちの一体感に欠けていたのだろう。

　すでに1910年代はじめには、銀座に比較的近い三田にある慶応の学生らの間で、銀座をぶらぶらと漫歩する「銀ぶら」が話題になっていた。しかしこれに対して、銀座１丁目から４丁目以外の漫歩は「銀ぶら」ではなく、「出雲町ぶら」や「尾張町ぶら」だとして揶揄する向きもあったという。

　信三は、『銀座』において、地域の連帯によるメリットを説いた。銀座の衰亡は結局のところ各商店の「自分の衰亡」となるばかりでなく、東京市全体の損害にもなると強調している。「小さい自分の利益や主張」はなげうっても、すべての銀座住民が協力して、「此銀座の両側を一つの銀座という小売商店の一大集団としてたたしめたいと、寝ても醒めても考へるのであります」と、次のように述べている。

　「此の意味に於て、私は、京橋から新橋に於ける東西両側の一帯を銀座と見做して、これが丁度一個の小売商店の集合、デパートメントストアのやうな纏った感じの下に、假令へば竹川町出雲町のやうな町名は廃して各人が団結したら面白い商売が出来やうと思ふのであります」

　街全体を、いわばひとつの銀座デパートにしようというわけだ。資生堂も含めて、新橋に近い地域のイメージを刷新しようという計算もあっただろう。銀座という名前は慶長年間から続いており、歴史ある日本橋との対抗に有効だとも語っている。

　信三は掘割に囲まれた銀座を、ニューヨークのマンハッタン島に見立てていたようだ。銀座が８丁目まで増えても、ニューヨークの通りの多さに比べればずっと少ないというのである。銀座の中心をはしる銀座通りについては、将来の方向性として、ブロードウェーかフィフス・アヴェニューかと２案を想定していた。当時、銀座通りには路面電車の都電が通っていたが、銀座が東京市の商業の中心でなくなるのならば、むしろ電車も車も通さずに誰もが自由に散策できる「所謂フィフス・アブェニューのやうな形」に進化させるのが妥当だと述べている。

　信三は持論を、方々で滔々と語っている。しかし、「元祖・銀座」である１丁目から４丁目の住民の、銀座という名称に対するこだわりは大変なものだった。また逆に、馴染みの町名に愛着を持つ者もあり、信三の提案はかなり思い切ったものであった。

①行政との連携

この大胆な構想を実現するために、信三はまず行政との連携を重視している。銀座の商店に行政への協力を求めるとともに、他方では当局者にも積極的に銀座振興の「名案」を出してもらいたい、といった要請も行っている。『銀座』では、後藤新平からも序文を得て、出版を契機に銀座住民と行政との合理的な対話の場を作ろうとしている。

このように信三は一見、中立的な姿勢を保っている。しかしそれにより、己の見解の妥当性を際立たせることに成功しているようにもみえる。後には、自らを「緩衝地帯」に喩え、様々な意見を消化して中庸の立場に立つのは孔子の領分であるが、自らの役割はあくまで意見の異なる人々の間にたつことにある、と述べている[17]。こうした姿勢と一種の合理性は、信三の性格的な特徴として晩年まで保たれた。後に述べるように、「緩衝地帯」としての存在感を放つ信三のもとには、多彩な有識者が集うこととなる。

1923年に関東大震災が起こり、『銀座』の刊行から2年と経たないうちに、帝都復興問題が、政府や都民の喫緊の課題となった。すでに見たように後藤新平は震災前から都市計画に熱心に取り組んでおり、震災復興も比較的すみやかに進んだと考えられている。チャールズ・ビアード元コロンビア大学教授も招聘され、帝都復興に際しても、市政調査会の専務理事として提言を行った。

1924年、信三は後藤主導の帝都復興策に対して、『東京日日新聞』に3回の寄稿をしている[18]。「専門大家」や「ビアード博士の二回の来日でその蘊蓄を傾けた立派な意見」の提示に感謝しつつも、「自分は門外漢だが実際の境遇にある事から推して、かくありたいといふ意見」を述べたいと、銀座の復興のあり方について自らの見解を示したのである。

後藤も、信三をはじめとした「銀座の声」には一目置いたのであろう。復興に際して、信三のいう「フィフス・アヴェニュー」計画のように、銀座通りを走る都電の移転を提案している[19]。

1925年には、銀座から東京市長に宛てて、信三の大銀座計画と同様の「町名改廃と銀座拡充に関する請願」が提出された。「世界大銀座街」の出現は「帝都将来の為め最も緊要」であり、「一銀座の名称下に抱擁すれば百利あって一害なし」という勇壮なものである。そこには信三も、各町代表者の一人として名を連ねた。

そうして1930年、出雲町、竹川町などの町名が消え、銀座5丁目から8丁目を加えた「大銀座」が誕生することとなる。『銀座』刊行にあたり、『読売新聞』は信三の大銀座構想を「進歩的意見」と報じていた。信三自身も、当時は「空想に過ぎぬ」「勝手すぎる」と弁解しながら持論を語っている。しかし10年を経ずして、その「空想」は実現されていった。

②小売店の連携

信三は、行政への働きかけを強める一方、景観保持や日本橋のデパートへの対抗という観点から、銀座の商店主たちの積極的な連携を促した。例えば店舗については、「銀座一

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[17] 福原信三『身辺風景』資生堂、1930年、58−59頁。

[18] 『東京日日新聞』1924年1月16、17、27日号。

[19] 三田村鳶魚編『伸び行く銀座』銀座二丁目会、1942年。

円同じやうな形を追ひ、ウインドから照明の工合まで互に注意して、所謂『銀ぶら』のお客様に十分の快感を与へるやうに」設計すべきだという（『銀座』）。

信三の指摘は細部におよび、しかも具体的だ。歩道の清掃は勿論、銀座全体で協同利用する配達所や休憩所の設営や商品券の発行など、「所謂銀座繁栄のために間接に効果あるもの」に対して十分に配慮したいという。無用の競争で客に不便を与えることなく、銀座の商店は共存共栄を目指すべきだという。同業者による共同仕入れを提案しているほどである。

信三は、小売店がデパートに対して劣勢になるのは、前者がいわば「単細胞生物」であるのに対して、後者は多細胞生物であることからくる「当然の帰趨」だと考えた。小売店がデパートに対抗するには、共同組織化による合理的な経営が不可欠になる。「大銀座」は共同組織の単位としても相応しく、銀座の住人は1日も早くその歩調をあわせるべきだという。信三自身、銀座全体の会合にはよく出席していた。その姿を知る関係者は「単に資生堂だけのことでなく、銀座全体のためという会合に出席するのはお好きだったのでしょう、きっと」[20]と回想している。

この後も、信三は個人と社会の関係性を重視し、一般論としても「共同精神」の重要性を説き続けた。1928年には「日本産業の合理化」と題する5回の新聞連載で、「共同精神」の欠如を国民的な欠点として糾弾したほどだ。

「個人なるものは社会人として、初めて考へられることで、即ち個人の働く事も社会の為め、社会の働くのは個人の為めに外ならず、従つて社会の繁栄は個人に報いられ、個人が社会の繁栄を導く訳で、いひかへれば社会に対する義務を満足に遂行すれば、個人の権利となつてかへる事になるのであるが、日本人にはこの観念が如何にも乏しい」[21]

小売店の共同組織化という発想は、資生堂で1923年に実施され、その全国展開の基礎となるチェインストア制の展開の理論的支柱ともなった。現在も銀座では、銀座通連合会が建物の高さ制限をはじめ、銀座の景観保持のためのルールを定めている。銀座通りの街灯も、女性がもっとも美しく見えるように照度が工夫されているという。街を挙げて訪れる客をもてなすという銀座の伝統が、信三らの主導によって形作られていく。

③小売店の個性化

信三は銀座の繁栄のため、各商店にも努力を求めた。デパートとの差別化が小売店の生き残りには不可欠だとして、各店舗の個性化、特殊化を求めた。そうした姿勢は、1927年に資生堂が発行した『御婦人手帳』など、後の著作でより明確になっている。

「詮じつめますと百貨店は普遍化、小売店は特殊化を理想にして居ります。即ち銀座の

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[20] 矢部信壽による岩松正智へのインタビュー速記録（資生堂企業資料館蔵）。

[21] スクラップブック（資生堂企業資料館蔵）のため、新聞名と発行日の一部不明。1928年5月（新聞番号16138号－16144号）。

[22] 高木長葉編集代表『御婦人手帳』資生堂、1927年、133頁。

商品は百貨店では求められないものでなければなりません。かういふ小売商店が一つ々々細胞となつて大きな銀座を形づくる時銀座は初めて生きて来ると思ひます」[22]

　信三いわく、「一般的なものの一般化は到底特殊的なものの一般化の力に及ぶべくもない」。いわば万人好みのデパートと対照的に、銀座は個々の商店の特殊性のうえに成り立つ街でなければならないというのである。信三はのちに、一般論としても、小売商店街には専門性の深化と共同経営による合理化が重要であると繰り返している。単に「普通商品」の陳列ならば「信用もその程度」であるが、「真に一流の資格あるもの」の集合であるからこそ、信頼度が増すのだという。

　そのうえで、誰にでも開かれていて「新婚の若夫婦でも恋人同士でも、気軽に散歩し、漫歩し得る様な銀座になつたら、銀座は永久に帝都の銀座として繁栄する」という（「日本産業の合理化」）。

　すでに述べたように、1923年に大正時代に入るとともに、新橋は西洋文化の玄関口としての役割を終え、丸の内をはじめ、いたるところに「西洋」が感じられるようになった。もはや銀座だけが西洋を感じさせる、特別な場ではなくなっていく。その後、関東大震災を経て、松屋、三越をはじめ、専門店のライバルでもある、３軒のデパートが銀座に進出した。信三はこれを「銀座の立体化」と称し、時代の変化として柔軟に受け入れる一方で、あくまでも銀座の繁栄の基礎は「特殊な小売商店街」にあると繰り返した。小売店の「特殊なる商品の深さは、百貨店の欠を補ふ線」[23]であり、これこそが銀座人の次なるプライドであるのだという。

　ほぼ30年後にあたる1957年に刊行された高見順編『銀座』には、信三の期待どおりの記述を見ることが出来る。

　「昔は新鮮な西洋の匂いをかがせてくれるのが銀座のおしゃれであった。今はデパートにないような凝ったものを売っているところに銀座のおしゃれがある。おしゃれの意味にも多少こうした変遷がある」[24]

3．結論

　信三はパーラーやギャラリーの開設などを含め、資生堂でもなにより「場」を重視し、「資生堂調」とされるスタイルの確立に尽力することになる。建築やインテリア、ましてや都市が醸し出す雰囲気は、単純に機能面から考えれば資生堂の主力商品である化粧品や薬品とは全く関係はない。しかし信三は「居は人の気を移す」と語り、そうした特色ある空間の効果が、資生堂さらには銀座のイメージに重なっていくことを明確に認識していた。

　そして1920年代末、西條八十らの作詞によって銀座を題材にした流行歌などに象徴され

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[23]　資生堂企業資料館所蔵のスクラップブックより。切抜きのため、新聞名と発行日の一部不明。1928年５月。

[24]　奥野信太郎「若き日の銀座」、高見順編『銀座』英宝社、1956年、15－16頁。

るように、モダン都市銀座は広く人々の注目を集めていく。文芸作品においても1920年代には「新橋も昔日の面影なく、ただ荒涼たるものありだネ」[25]、などと新橋と銀座が一層、対照的に描かれるようになっていく。

　信三による銀座振興への貢献は、こうしたモダン都市文化の隆盛に先駆けるものだ。それは、銀座全体の具体的な将来像を視野にいれた、街の内部からの自発的な運動としても興味深いものである。

　華やかな「帝都」銀座のイメージは、資生堂が同業他社やデパートなどから差別化しうる最大の要因ともなっていく。イメージを重視する海外のプレミアム・ブランドに目を転じても、都市のイメージを自社イメージと重ねて強力に意識し、かつ都市計画にまで先導的に参与した例がない。

　化粧品の開発と同時に都市計画までも視野にいれ、包括的なイメージの構築を推進したところに福原信三の独自性があり、資生堂のブランド力の原点を見ることができる。

25　野村益三『東京見物』帝都教育会、1929年、145頁。

The Concerns and Motivations of Indonesian Nurses and Care Workers in Japan in the Frame of IJ-EPA (Indonesia-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement)

Mutiawanthi Hamzali

Abstract

This study focuses on the factors that influence Indonesian nurses and care workers who migrate to Japan, and their motivations for working in Japan in the frame of Indonesia-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement. This research uses quantitative methods and interviews. From the results of questionnaire analysis and interviews, it can be concluded that the factors which influenced Indonesian nurses and care workers to migrate to Japan are basically economic, namely the chance to get a better economic life. The motivations of nurses and care workers working in Japan are further related to 1) economic security, 2) esteem and 3) self actualization.

Key Words; Indonesia-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement IJ-EPA, migration, working motivation, nurse, care worker

I. Introduction

The Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) is a bilateral or multilateral agreement among states to eliminate customs and domestic regulations other than import/export regulations, in order to harmonize economic systems, and to facilitate the free movement of natural persons, goods, and capital within a region (METI 2005, p. 2). The Indonesia-Japan Economic partnership agreement (IJ-EPA) was signed on August 20, 2007 and was effective on July 2008. Indonesia had a quota to send 600 care workers and 400 nurses to Japan in two years in the frame of the IJ-EPA. The sending of Indonesian nurses and care workers to Japan had been facilitated by the Japan International Corporation of Welfare Service (JICWELS) and the National Agency for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers (BNP2TKI).

Even though the population of Japan is smaller than the population of Indonesia, the number of nurses in Japan per 100,000 of the population is almost 5 times greater than in Indonesia (Table 1). This is because the increase in the number of elderly that need nursing care in Japan. Based on the data from the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare Japan 厚生労働省, in 2005 the numbers of elderly that needed nursing care were 4.17 million people or about 16.6% of the total population of elderly in Japan. In 2010, Japan needs a total of 1,406,400 nurses, and it has presently a shortfall of 15,900 nurses (Matsuno 2008). Based on the estimation of the Japan Aging Research Center, the proportion of elderly people will become 25.2% of the total population in 2013, and this means that the need for nurses in

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Japan will increase in the future.

Table 1. Number of Medical Manpower in Indonesia and Japan (2006)

No.	Medical manpower	Population in Indonesia per 100,000	Population in Japan per 100,000
1	Doctor	19.93	40
2	Nurse	137.87	635.5
3	Maternity nurse	35.4	100

Source: Health Department of Indonesia 2008, p. 111 and Okushima 2010, p. 1

The increasing numbers of elderly has also raised the need for care workers in Japan. Based on the estimation by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, from the year 2000 until the year 2006 the number of care workers in Japan had increased from 550,000 to 1,170,000, and it has been estimated that, in 2014, the need for care workers in Japan will become 1,400,000 to 1,600,000 people (Fuyuno 2007). Besides that, the increasing Japanese need for nurses and care workers is also caused by a large number of resignations in the profession.

The conditions in Japan really contrast with Indonesia, where the demand (need) for nurses is smaller than the supply, so that Indonesia has a surplus number of nurses. As a result, the sending of Indonesia nurses and care workers to Japan in the frame of IJ-EPA is also a good chance to solve Indonesia's problem of surplus.

Table 2. Number of Indonesia Medical Manpower in 2007 (Need and Graduated)

| No.	Medical manpower	Need (demand)	Graduated (supply)
1	Doctor specialist	2,258	615
2	Doctor	6,765	7,576
3	Dentist	3,640	1,116
4	Nurse	18,731	21,589
5	Maternity nurse	33,677	5,582

Source: Health Department of Indonesia 2007, p. 40.

Annex 10 part 1 section 6 of the draft of IJ-EPA implies facilitating the dispatch of Indonesian nurses and care workers to Japan; here the Japanese government refers to qualifications for Indonesians who want to work in Japan as nurses or care workers. First, Indonesians who want to work as nurse or care worker in Japan are required to possess a diploma or higher degree in Indonesia. Secondly, nurses must have nursing qualification in Indonesia, and at least two years of work experience. Nurses must be certified nurses and care workers must be certified care workers in accordance with Indonesia law and regulations. Lastly, Indonesian nurse candidates (assistants) within 3 years of their employment contract have to pass the national board exam to become a certified nurse in Japan, and for Indonesian care workers within 4 years of their employment contract also have to pass the national board exam to become a certified care worker in Japan. If they can not pass this national exam before their employment contract finishes, they are required to return to Indonesia.

When the author conducted this research, the third group (batch) of Indonesian nurses and care workers was about to be sent to Japan. The first group of Indonesian nurses and care workers came to Japan in August 2008 (104 nurses and 104 care workers) and the second group came in November 2009 (173 nurses and 192 care workers). They must take six months Japanese language training, before starting

training and working in Japan as nurse candidates (assistant) or care worker candidates while, at the same time, they try to pass the nurse or care worker national exams in Japan. Only those who pass the national exams can get a professional license and work as nurses at hospitals or as certified care workers at care facilities (see Table 3).

Table 3. The Sending Procedures and Procedure for Qualified Indonesian Nurse and Care Worker in Japan

Source:「全国厚生労働関係部局長会議（厚生分科会）資料：平成21年度経済連携協定（EPA）に基づく外国人看護師・介護福祉士候補者の受入れについて」.

* Indonesian nurses get a 3 chances to take profession national exam in their 3 years employment contract.
* Indonesian care workers only get one chance to take profession national exam in their 4 years employment contract after they do training 3 years in care institution.

II. Focus and Methodology

This study focused on the factors that influenced Indonesian nurses, care workers (first and second groups) to go to Japan, and their motivation for working in Japan within the frame of the IJ-EPA.

This study used quantitative methods and interviews. Quantitative research was done by sending questionnaires to respondents via e-mail; the author sent 106 questionnaires in two phases (24 April and 8 May 2010). Of these, 45 respondents (42.5%) returned the questionnaire. The questionnaire consisted of 2 types of question: 75% closed questions and 25% open questions, such as respondents personal data (Table 4), their opinions about Indonesia-Japan economic partnership agreement, their motivation for working in Japan, their working conditions in Japan, and also their opinions about nurse and care worker licensing in Japan. The interviews were done to the BNP2TKI staffs who are involved in the sending process of Indonesian nurses and care workers through IJ-EPA, Japanese researchers who are also doing

a research related Indonesian nurses and care workers who work in Japan through IJ-EPA, and the two respondents who are now working in Japan, one as nurse candidate and the other one as care worker candidate. To network with Indonesian nurses and care workers currently working in Japan, the author joined the *Indonesia no kangoshi kohosa* (IJEPA I)" and "ijepa2" in Face book (FB).

Table 4. Respondent Data

Respondent: 45 persons

	Gender	Age	Occupation in Japan	Education Back ground	Working experience
Male (31%)	14 persons				
Female (69%)	31 persons				
21―25 year	47%	21 persons			
26―30 year	44%	20 persons			
31―35 year	9%	4 persons			
Nurse candidate		42%	19 persons		
Care worker candidate		58%	26 persons		
Nursing college			80%	36 persons	
Non-Nursing college			20%	9 persons	
Nurse				56%	25 persons
Others				13%	6 persons
No working experience				31%	14 persons

Figure 1. The Respondent Spread in Japan

III. Results of the Questionnaire Survey and Analysis

III. 1. Factors that Influenced Indonesian Nurses and Care Workers to Work in Japan

Migration theory, as proposed by Everett S. Lee, holds that migration is influenced by 4 factors: (1) those associated with a migrant's origin—the push factor, (2) those associated with a migrant's destination—the pull factor, (3) obstacles between the migrants' origin and destination and (4) personal factors.

The majority opinion of the respondents regarding "sending of Indonesian nurses and care workers to Japan in the frame of IJ-EPA" was really positive. More than half of the respondents said that the program was a "very good" or "good" program (Figure 2). Their reasons included the following: "This program at least could minimize unemployment in Indonesia," and "by this program [Indonesians] could get new knowledge and hopefully get new skills." Other respondents (13%) said that this program was not good enough for the following reasons: "Non-nursing education background of care workers recruitment process is not efficient and not good"; "job activities in Japan are not appropriate for nursing"; "insufficient information about insurance, tax in Japan." In general, respondents thought that the conditions in Japan were not better than conditions in Indonesia (Figure 3).

Figure 2

Figure 3

The reasons of the respondents saying that the sending of nurse and care workers to Japan was not good enough and notgood at all

Non-nursing education background care workers recruitment process was not efficient and not good.	3
Job activity in Japan is not appropriate with nurse job.	1
Insufficient information about insurance and tax in Japan	1
In general, the condition in Japan is not better than the condition in Indonesia.	1

The respondents to this study said they were interested and decided to work in Japan for the following reasons: the higher standard of living in Japan (38%); the image of Japan as a developed country, which is modern and has advanced technology (36%). These images were connected with respondents hopes to raise their nursing skill in Japan, and only 13% of the respondents said they were motivated by better working opportunities in Japan (see Figure 4).

Figure 4

Why are you interesting and decided to work in Japan

- Economic factors: Higher wage standard in Japan — 38%
- Image Japan as advanced country: High technology, modern — 36%
- Better working opportunity in Japan — 13%
- The chance only to Japan — 9%
- Others — 4%

Based on Lee's Migration theory, the factors that influence Indonesian nurses and care workers working in Japan can be analyzed as follows:

1. Push factor: (a) Standard of living in Indonesia is lower than Japan

(b) Job opportunities in Indonesia are few

2. Pull factor: (a) Higher standard of living in Japan

(b) Image of Japan as an advanced country with modern, advanced technology

(c) Better working opportunities in Japan

3. Obstacles: (a) Non-nursing education background of care workers recruitment process was not efficient and not good

(b) Insufficient information about insurance and tax in Japan, such that it could deter Indonesian nurses and care workers from going to Japan.

The author did not input as obstacles "job activities in Japan are not appropriate for nurse job" and "in general the conditions in Japan are not better than conditions in Indonesia," because respondents only recognized this situation after they came to Japan.

III. 2. Motivation of Indonesian Nurse and Care Workers Working in Japan on the Frame of IJ-EPA

In this study, the author has used Maslow's motivation theory, according to which humans work to fulfill needs. Maslow's hierarchy of needs which is often depicted as a pyramid consisting of five levels of needs is as follows: (1) Physiological, such as food, water, etc; (2) safety, such as safety of the body, economy security, security of health and mind; (3) social such as friendship and family; (4) esteem such as self esteem, confidence, achievement, respect for and by others; (5) self actualization such as creativity.

Figure 5. Maslow's Hierarchy of Need

Source: Miller, Vandome & McBrewster 2009, p. 19.

Related to their motivation, the respondents of this study said that their motivations for working in Japan were to increase economic ability (33%) and to practice and increase nursing skills (31%), followed by acquiring new knowledge and new experience (27%). 9 % of them gave as motivation their desire to practice and increase Japanese language ability (see Figure 6).

Figure 6

What is Your Motivation Working in Japan

- To increase economic ability (salary) — 33%
- To practice and increase nursing skill — 31%
- To get new knowledge and new experience — 27%
- To practice and increase Japanese language ability — 9%

Based on Maslow's hierarchy of needs, the motivation of respondents working in Japan can be classified and analyzed as follows:

1. The motivation to increase economic ability is related with the effort to fulfill the "safety needs," of which economic security needs are paramount. Based on the questionnaire data, more than half of the respondents felt that their salaries were appropriate for the job they were doing, and they

Figure 7

Is your salary appropriate with the job you are doing? Can you make saving?

- Appropriate, can saving — 62%
- Appropriate, not enough for saving — 2%
- Not appropriate, can save — 36%
- Not appropriate, not enough for saving — 0%

could also save money from their salaries (see Figure 7).

2. The motivation to practice and increase nursing skills, and the motivation to acquire new knowledge and new experience, and also the motivation to practice and increase Japanese language ability are related with the effort to fulfill "self actualization needs."

The respondent motivations and hopes to practice and increase their nursing skills by working in Japan might be very difficult to realize within 3 years of their employment contract. This is because they have to pass the Japan nurse national exams before they can perform medical tasks; till then, they can only work as nurse assistants. These rules are written into the Japan Medical Manpower, Maternity Nurse and Nurse Law (Hokenshi josanshi kangoshi hō).

> Medical Manpower, Maternity Nurse and Nurse Law
>
> (Article 1: General Rules), section 5: In this law, (registered) nurse means persons who hold a license from the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, and engage in providing nursing care to, or assisting in, the medical treatment of persons with injuries and/or illnesses.
>
> (Article 2: License), section 7. 3: The persons who want to work as a (registered) nurse must pass the annual government examination, and obtain a license from the Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare.
>
> (Article 4: Duties), section 31: The person who is not a (registered) nurse is prohibited to engage in operations defined in the article 1, section 5 unless under instruction from medical doctor, dentist.

In addition, Indonesian nurses who work as care workers in Japan also find it difficult to increase their nursing skills because their job activities in care institutions are not related to medical activities (see Table 5). This means that respondents (Indonesian nurses and care workers) cannot fulfill their "esteem needs," such as building confidence (in practicing their skills), achievement (the confession to their skills) and they also cannot fulfill their "self actualization needs."

Table 5. Indonesian Nurses Job Activity at Hospital and Care Workers Job Activity at Care Institution in Japan

Indonesian nurses job activity at hospital in Japan	Indonesian care workers job activity at care institution in Japan
1. Help patients (majority is aging) to fulfill their basic needs such as giving food, helping in toileting activity, etc. 2. Take care of patients and help Japanese nurse such as cleaning the patient room, checking health equipment, bringing patients to the check up room, etc.	1. Help patients doing daily activity such as giving food (feeding), toileting activity, changing diaper and cloth, etc. 2. Cleaning and making the patient room neat. 3. Accompany patients on recreation. 4. Help patient mobility.

Related to their jobs in Japan, 58% of respondents said that their working conditions were not sufficiently appropriate, and not appropriate for what they had imagined before arriving in Japan (see Figure 8). 27% of respondents, who previously had worked as nurses in Indonesia, said that their skills had decreased while working in Japan (see Figure 9).

Figure 8   Figure 9

Do your working condition conform to your image about this work before

- Appropriate
- Not appropriate enough
- Not appropriate
- Others

40%
47%
11%
2%

Did your skill increase while Working in Japan

All have work experience as a nurse

- Yes, increase
- Constant
- Decrease
- Don't know

49%
22%
27%
2%

3. Actually the respondent's unfulfilled "esteem needs" also exert an influence on their target of passing the Japan nurse or care worker national exams. 84% of respondents set the target of passing the Japanedse nurse or care worker national exam, in order to fulfill their "esteem needs." In addition, the respondents' unfulfilled "esteem needs" and "self actualization needs" also exerted an influence on their decision as to whether to continue working in Japan or not, if they pass the national exam. According to Maslow: "As lower level needs become reasonably satisfied, successively higher needs become more influential in motivating human behavior (Maslow 2000, p.2). It has been observed that an individual may permanently lose the higher wants in hierarchy—self actualization—under social conditions" (p. 4). It can see in Figure 10 that 49% of respondents decided not to continue working in Japan, even though they passed the national exams. This might be because they lost their motivation to fulfill their "self actualization needs."

Figure 10

Is it your target to pass the Japan nurse or care worker national exam? If you pass, do you want continue working in Japan

- Yes, yes
- Yes, no
- No, no

51%
33%
16%

IV. Conclusion

From the above analysis, it can be concluded that the factors which influenced Indonesian nurses and care workers to migrate to Japan are basically related to the economy. It was a chance to get a better economic life. Next, the motivation of nurses and care workers for working in Japan was related with the effort to fulfill their "economic safety needs," "esteem needs" and "self actualization needs." In this study, the motivations of respondents to fulfill their needs (physiological safety, social, esteem, self actualization) do not follow the Maslow hierarchy of needs. Nonetheless, the classification of need that Maslow made was of great help to this author in analyzing the motivation of Indonesian nurses and care workers working in Japan.

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アニメーション・イン・アジア：
『千と千尋の神隠し』と『MERAIH MIMPI』の比較において

Marisa Rianti Sutanto & Ethel Deborah Lewerissa

要旨

　　The increasing interests in Japanese Animation particularly for Japanese Students at Maranatha Christian University, motivate writers to compare Indonesian animation and Japanese animation. Animations that were chosen to be analysised are "*Sen to Chihiro no kami kakushi*" (Spirited Away), which was directed by Miyazaki Hayao and "Meraih Mimpi" (Sing to the Dawn), the first Indonesian musical animation. Both animations themed about the nature with different expression. "Meraih Mimpi" was more directly in telling about the nature, whereas in "*Sen to Chihiro no kami kakushi*" the meaning of nature was lead to firstly understand the concept of kami (gods in Japan) which is dominate the whole story.

１.はじめに

　アニメという言葉は、海外では日本のアニメーションを意味し、現代の日本の大衆文化を代表するサブカルチャーの一つである。

　最近、日本だけではなく、インドネシア国内でも、特に若者層においてアニメへの関心が高いと認識されている。実際、西部ジャワ州のバンドン市にあるマラナタ大学の日本文学科の卒業論文には、様々なアニメーションの課題を取り上げる学生が、年々増える傾向にある。インドネシアのアニメ文化は自発的なものではなく、日本のアニメ文化から大いに影響を受けている。全世界の放送局で放送されるアニメーション番組の内、日本アニメは60%を占めており、インドネシアもその枠内に入るからである。

　日本とインドネシアを比較すると、アニメの歴史は日本のほうが長い。山村浩二著『アニメーションの世界へようこそ』から引用すると、1917年に日本で最初の無声アニメーションが制作され、それは漫画家であった下川凹天が制作した『芋川椋三　玄関番の巻』というアニメである（『アニメーションの世界へようこそ』、51頁）。

　現代における日本の代表的なアニメを一つあげるなら、宮崎駿が監督するスタジオジブリの映画がある。青井汎は宮崎駿の作品について「我々はエンターティメントに対して、『その場さえ楽しめれば、後には何も残らなくてもいいもの』と言う先入観を抱いていないでしょうか。……その先入観と、宮崎駿が理想とする作品観の間には距離があります。両者の間には『裂け目』があるのです。それを見出すことで、初めて宮崎アニメが内包する深みが見えてくると思うのです。見過ごしがちなこの裂け目をじっくりと覗き込むと、中は思ったより大きな洞になっています」と述べている（『宮崎アニメの暗号』、13頁）。さらに、

　津堅信之によると宮崎は「映画特有の非現実世界」を描き出す監督である（『アニメーション学入門』、153頁）。そういった裂け目があり、非現実世界を描き出す作品の一つに次に分析する『千と千尋の神隠し』がある。宮崎駿の作品の中には自然に関するテーマがたびたび採用されており、例えば『風の谷のナウシカ』、『となりのトトロ』、『もののけ姫』という作品でも同様である。今回分析の対象にする『千と千尋の神隠し』も自然を表す宮崎作品の一つだといえる。

　前述のとおり、インドネシアにおけるアニメの歴史は日本よりも大きく遅れており、インドネシアで初めてアニメが制作されたのは1980年の『SI HUMA』である。しかし、その後2009年までにインドネシアで制作されたアニメはまったくない。2009年にKALYANA SHIRA FILMSによって制作された『MERAIH MIMPI』というミュージカル・アニメーションはインドネシア全国で最初に上映された劇場用長編アニメである[1]。

　『MERAIH MIMPI』というアニメの英語タイトルは『SING TO THE DAWN』であり、2008年10月にシンガポールで初上映され、インドネシアのバタム島にあるアニメーション・スタジオ（INFINITE FRAMEWORKS）でイギリス人の Pill Mitchel によって制作された。制作者はイギリス人であっても、INFINITE FRAMEWORKSスタジオのクルーの93％（100人以上）はインドネシア人のアニメーターである。この事実から『MERAIH MIMPI』はインドネシア人の作品と言っても過言ではない。このアニメはミン・フン・ホというミャンマーの作家が執筆した小説を翻案したものであるが、舞台は小説と同じく、町から離れた静かで小さな村である。

　インドネシアのKALYANA SHIRA FILMSはINFINITE FRAMEWORKS と協力した。KALYANA SHIRA FILMSのニア・ディナタはインドネシアで上映するために、『SING TO THE DAWN』をインドネシア化し、タイトルを『MERAIH MIMPI』に変えた。そして2009年9月に『MERAIH MIMPI』はインドネシアで上映された。ところが、インドネシア化したと言っても、前年にシンガポールで上映された『SING TO THE DAWN』のバージョンと映像はまったく同じであり、変更されたのは言語と曲のみであった。

　筆者がこれら二つの作品を選んだ理由は二つある。まず『千と千尋の神隠し』と『MERAIH MIMPI』の両作品が表現する自然観を分析の対象にしたいからである。次に、これからインドネシアのアニメーションが世界の映画業界に参入するとの予想に立ち、同じアジアの国である日本とインドネシアの代表的なアニメーション作品をアニメ研究として比較したいからである。

　この論文の目的を達するために、比較文学のアプローチで分析する。方法としては日本のアニメ作品とインドネシアのアニメ作品を同じテーマに基づき、共通点や相違点に着目して分析していく。ここで、比較文学のアプローチを利用するのは、文学作品（小説・詩・戯曲など）とアニメーションは違いがあるものの、両方とも同じ要素（テーマ、キャラクター、プロットなど）から構成されているからである。

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[1]　劇場用長編アニメと呼称されるアニメは劇場で公開される作品であり、おおむね上映時間1時間以上の作品である（『アニメーション学入門』、137頁）。

2. 『千と千尋の神隠し』における神の概念

　『千と千尋の神隠し』は2001年にできた作品であり、ベルリン国際映画祭金熊賞、アカデミー長編アニメーション部門賞を受け、国際的に高く評価されているアニメ作品である。この作品は自然観を表現していると言われており、その自然観を解読するために、まず『千と千尋の神隠し』のシーンによくあらわれる神々の概念を述べたい。

　日本の神というのは唯一全能の神ではないが、人間より上位の神々は多数存在している。日本の神は、クリスチャンのイエス・キリストやイスラム教のアラーのようなたった一つの神ではない。多数の神の存在は宮崎駿の『千と千尋の神隠し』でも見られる。特に、湯婆婆の銭湯を訪れる客達である。その客達は実際には神であることは、次の湯婆婆の言葉「ここはね、人間の来るところじゃないんだ」「八百万の神さまたちが疲れをいやしに来るお湯屋なんだ」からわかる。つまり、千尋がその屋敷（銭湯）で出会う客は人間と違う様々な神々である。前記の「八百万の神」という言葉は神の数ははっきりしないこと、あるいは多数の存在であることを意味する。また、ストーリー中に腐敗した神が銭湯に癒しに来るシーンがある。その神のことを湯婆婆は「腐れ神」と呼んだ。このシーンからわかるのは、神にはいろいろな呼称があり、神は多数存在することである。

　神の姿は人間に見えるものではなく、神の身体は精霊と言われる。霊というものは具体的な形はなく、抽象的な存在である。『千と千尋の神隠し』では湯婆婆の銭湯に来る客の正体は神のことで、描写される神々の形は様々であり、一つの形にまとまることはないが、ほとんど化け物の形で描かれる。日本語には「鬼神」という言葉があり、その神の形は鬼のように恐ろしいものであると語られており、妖怪に近い形と思われる。前述の通り、『千と千尋の神隠し』に出てくる神々の姿は美しい存在だけではなく、鬼神に近い異様なものと考えて間違いない。千尋が神の世界に入ってしまってからは、身体がどんどん透けていき、ハクに助けてもらわないと姿が消えてしまいそうになる。このシーンからわかることは、神という存在は人間に知られることがないので、人間としての千尋は神々と同じ空間に居られるわけではないことである。

　神は山、川、樹木、岩石などいろいろな場所に居る。この"居る"という意味は決まった場所にずっと居るということではなく、神はある所から他の所へ移動できる存在である。神は身体が宿る場所を支配するものというのが適切だろう。このことは「腐れ神」のシーンを通じて理解できる。腐れ神と呼ばれた河の神が雨に濡れて銭湯に向かうシーンからは、神は移動できるものであることがわかる。

3. 『千と千尋の神隠し』における自然観

　日本では神の役目の一つに人間の生活を災難から保護することがある。それと同時に、神は自然を守る存在として昔から人に認識されている。神の身分は人間より上位と考えられ、下位とされる人間が神にそむくと、神によって罰を与えられるのは当然である。与えられる罰の中には死に至るものがあるので、罪を償う必要があると信じられている。その罪はケガレといわれ、人間はケガレを払い捨てるように「ハライ」という行為をする。こういった神の役目を考えると、神という存在は自然と離れていないと思われる。加えて、

上記の通り、神の居場所は様々な自然の現象（山、川など）の中にある、その居場所を支配する役割があり、神は自然と同義の存在である。したがって、論理的には自然が消えたら神の居場所もなくなると考えることができる。

『千と千尋の神隠し』の重要なポイントは自然を愛し、守ることだと解釈できる。それでは、次の三つのシーンを分析し、この点を考察しよう。

　　　１．千尋の両親が豚になるシーン
　　　２．腐れ神のシーン
　　　３．ハクに関するシーン

3.1. 千尋の両親が豚になるシーン

主人公・千尋と両親はある日、町から田舎へ引っ越した。新しい住む場所に向かう道中、千尋の父は道に迷い、不思議なトンネルの前に着いた。そのトンネルは人間の世界と神々の世界を結ぶ通路である。千尋の父は楽天的で好奇心の強い人で、トンネルの入り口に神像があっても、それを無視し、トンネルに入って行った。トンネルを抜けると、千尋達は広大な草原にたどり着いた。父は「ここはバブル時代に出来たテーマパークの跡地だな」と勝手に決めつけ、もっと先へ進んでいく。すると、商店街らしい場所に着き、並んでいる店はすべて食べ物屋で、ある店からおいしそうな食べ物の匂いが漂ってきた。父は何も考えずに店の亭主が見えなくても食べ始めてしまった。そして食べ続けているうちに豚に変形した。実はその食べ物は神々に供えたもので、人間が食べしまったので、神によって罰を与えられたのだ。

千尋は親とは違い、トンネルの入り口で神像と向かい合った時から神像に対して恐ろしい気持ちを抱く。その上、親に店で食べるのを誘われても、千尋は「お店の人に怒られるよ」と断った。千尋と親（特に父）の態度を比較したら、千尋の父は現代人を象徴すると考えられる。なぜかというと、不自然な場所に来ても「大丈夫、お父さんがついてるんだから、カードも財布も持っているし」と楽天的に物事を良い方に考えるからである。その父の言葉は、おそらく資本主義の考え方であろう。彼は私的利潤を重要視するタイプの人である。現代の生活ではお金さえあれば何もかも手に入り、道徳意識をあまり持たずに、世の中はただ金であると彼は思っている。このシーンを見るとその父の考え方がわかる。千尋の父はその不思議なトンネルや不思議な無人の場所に注意せず、また食べ物は誰に供えた物かを気にせず、お金さえあればほかのことに気を配る必要がないと考える人である。

千尋は結局、親の態度のせいでその世界に閉じ込められてしまった。その上、親を助けるために湯婆婆に雇われ、苦労を背負うようになった。この千尋に起こった悲劇は親が起こした罪・ケガレを払い捨てる「ハライ」のような行為と考えられる。

3.2. 腐れ神のシーン

次は腐れ神のシーンを分析する。千尋が湯婆婆の湯屋で働いている間に、腐れ神と呼ばれる客が癒しに来た。なぜその神は「腐れ神」と呼ばれるのかというと、その神は体が泥まみれで腐敗していたからである。しかし、湯婆婆はその神がまだ湯屋に姿を表わす前の、

湯屋に向かう途中の時点でこう言った。「雨にまぎれてろくでもないものがまぎれこんだかな。おかしいね、腐れ神の気配なんかじゃなかったんだが」。この言葉からわかることは、その神が腐れ神と呼ばれても実は腐れ神ではないということで、問題はなぜその神は腐れ神の形に化身したのかということだ。

　その腐れ神が湯屋に来た目的は、癒してもらうことよりも元の姿に戻してもらうことのようであるが、なかなか期待通りにはならなかった。とてもくさいので湯屋の係りの者たちはその腐れ神の世話をいやがり、新入りの千尋にやらせた。心優しい千尋はその神の世話をした。その神のためにお湯を流しているうちに、千尋はつい滑って風呂の中に転んでしまい、神の体に刺さっていた刺に偶然触れた。最後には湯婆婆と力を合わせ、その刺を引っ張り、神の体と同化していた多量のごみを引き抜いた。千尋のおかげで、化身していたその神は元の姿に戻ることができた。映像ではその神は身体が竜に変わった。水神の身体は竜あるいは蛇の形を取ることから、腐れ神と思われたものの本当の正体は河の神とわかる。

　河の神は河を支配する存在である。言い換えれば、自然にある河を守る役である。前述の通りその河の神は腐れ神に化身した。その原因が支配する河が汚染されたことにあるのは、神の体から引き抜かれた多量のごみから理解できる。誰がその多量のごみを河に捨てたのかというと、それはもちろん人間であり、人間が河を汚染したことを意味している。このシーンからわかることは、千尋の父のような人間（現代人的な性格）は自然を大事にせず、自然は人間のものとされ、人間と対等な存在であると認識されないようである。この二つのシーンでは神や河は自然の象徴と考えられる。

3.3. ハクに関するシーン

　ここからはハクに関するシーンを分析する。神の世界に迷い込んだ千尋と最初に出会ったのはハクであり、人間は立ち入り禁止の世界に入ってしまった千尋が消えてしまいそうになったとき、助けてあげたのもハクであった。ハクは千尋にとって大切な友人である。千尋は小さいときにハクを知っていたという。ハクについて釜爺はこういった。「ハクはな、千と同じように突然ここにやって来てな。魔法使いになりたいといいおってな。わしは反対したんだ。魔女の弟子なんぞ、ろくなことはないってな。聞かないんだよ。もう帰る所はないと、とうとう湯婆婆の弟子になっちまった。その内どんどん顔色が悪くなるし、目つきばかりきつくなってな」。釜爺の言葉からわかることは次のことである。ハクはこの神の世界に入って記憶をなくしてしまい、自分の名あるいは正体が思い出せなくなり、湯婆婆の手先になり、ずる賢い彼女の悪事に利用される。

　ところが、千尋はやっと幼い頃にハクと出会ったことを思い出し、結果としてハクは自分の正体に気づた。ハクの正体についての千尋とハクの会話はこうである。「（千尋）私、小さい時川に落ちたことがあるの。その川はもうマンションになって埋められちゃったんだって。でも、今思い出したの。その川の名は、その川はね、コハク川。あなたの本当の名はコハク川。（ハク）千尋、ありがとう。私の本当の名はニギハヤミコハクヌシだ。……（千尋）すごい名前、神様みたい。（ハク）私も思い出した。千尋が私の中に落ちた時のことを。靴を拾おうとしたんだよ」。この会話を分析すると、ハクは神であることがわかる。ハク

はコハク川という川を支配する神であった。ハクの本当の身体は竜であり、伝説では竜は水神として崇拝されている。その身体の形から判断すると、ハクはたしかに川の神である。

　ハクがいた川は現代人によって埋められたので、ハクの居場所はなくなった。なぜ現代人が埋めたとわかるかというと、マンションというものは1960年代後半から普及した集合住宅のことで、現代の町の生活を表すものの一つと認識されるからである。それは、人によって自然はどんどん現代の町に変えられたことを意味している。ハクのシーンと腐れ神のシーンとには繋がりがある。つまり、現代人は自然を自分のものとし、自然を操り、自分のために利用し、自然自体がどうなるのかに気を使わず、自然に対する愛情を持たないのである。

　そのような現代人の活動のせいで、ハクは湯婆婆の手先になった。ハクは湯婆婆に利用され、釜爺が言った通り悪事をさせられ、ハクが死んでしまう危険性がある状態まで陥った。千尋はハクの命を急いで救うために、途中でカオナシという神に金を勧められても断り、ハクのことをなによりも優先する。千尋のおかげでハクはやっと記憶が戻り、自分の正体を思い出し、湯婆婆の支配から逃れた。ハクは自由になってから、おそらく神として自然を守る役を続けるだろう。

　これから、上記の三つのシーンに基づき、『千と千尋の神隠し』における自然観を解読する。主役・千尋に起きた出来事はすべて自然とのかかわり、つまり現代人は自然に対して気を配らないので、自然を壊してしまう。さらに、神という存在は自然と関係し、このアニメで登場している神々、特に腐れ神とハクという神は自然を象徴している。ここでわかることは自然が人間より上位か下位かではなく、対等な関係であるが、人間は自然に注意を払わないと、自然は人間の敵になるということだ。人間は、千尋のように私的な利益を追わず、家族や周りの人に対する愛情を抱きながら、自然や周りのものを守ることが大切だと、この作品は訴えている。

4.『MERAIH MIMPI』における自然観、『千と千尋の神隠し』との比較

　第１節で述べた通り、『MERAIH MIMPI』は2009年９月にKALYANA SHIRA FILMSによって上映された。このアニメはミャンマーの作家が執筆した小説を翻案したものであり、舞台は町から離れた静かで小さい村である。このアニメの制作には三つの国との繋がりがある。では、いったいどこの国の文化をこのアニメは描写しているのだろうか。最初の上映はシンガポールで、次に元の英語の脚本をインドネシア語に翻訳して、インドネシアで上映された。この事実から、このアニメは特定の国ではなく東南アジアにある小さい村の生活を描写していると解釈できる。

　それでは、『MERAIH MIMPI』の下記の三つのシーンを分析しながら、『千と千尋の神隠し』と比較してみる。
　　１．パイロットの欲望に関するシーン
　　２．主役ダナに関するシーン
　　３．ダナの父に関するシーン

4. 1. パイロットの欲望に関するシーン

　『MERAIH MIMPI』の自然観を解読するため、まずパイロットという登場人物を分析する。このアニメでは、最初のシーンで熱帯国の林の風景があらわれる。そのシーンでは林の樹木が倒される表現がある。樹木を倒しているのはパイロットの部下である。そのシーンから、『MERAIH MIMPI』は自然と関わりがあることがわかる。

　『MERAIH MIMPI』でパイロットと呼ばれる登場人物は悪役である。主役・ダナが住んでいる村で彼は一番金や財産を多く所持する人で、村を支配する欲望を抱いている。その欲望を満たすために、村の住民に対して邪悪なことを行なう。パイロットは、すべての村の土地は前の王様が彼の家族に遺産として残したものだと公表した。しかし、実は彼が持っている遺書は偽物である。パイロットは王から認められた村の正当な地主を名乗り、村の住民に高額の地税を払わせ、住民たちを騙し続ける。実はパイロットの最終目的は村の住民たちをその村から追い出し、自然の村を現代の町に建て替え個人資産を増やすことである。なぜ自然の村といえるのかというと、その村は他の町から隔離され、森の中にあり、パイロットの家を除き近代的なビルはまだその村には存在しないと描写されているからである。

　『千と千尋の神隠し』と比較すると、パイロットの思考は千尋の父と似ている部分がある。つまり、両者とも生活面では金や私的利潤を重要視している人間であり、資本主義の考え方を代表するタイプの人間である。『千と千尋の神隠し』の腐れ神とハクのシーンでは、現代人のせいで河の神は腐れ神に化身し、ハクも居場所がなくなった。パイロットの場合も同様に、自然を大事にせず、自分の利益のために自然を操るタイプである。上記の通り、パイロットは住んでいる村を現代の町に建て替え、つまりホテルやカジノが並ぶ町を建築するために、自然を破壊する。

4. 2. 主役ダナに関するシーン

　次に主役ダナを分析する。ダナは千尋と同様に少女であるが、優しい心や勇気を持ち、家族や友達や周りの人を守る役である。ダナは千尋より年齢が若干上で、13〜14歳ぐらいの若い娘である。千尋が神々の世界に閉じ込められるのに対して、ダナは「KUBURAN KERAMAT」という不思議な場所に入り込み冒険をする。二人とも所属する社会の信仰に深く関わりがあると認識できる。

　「KUBURAN KERAMAT」という言葉はインドネシアの地元の信仰の中にある神聖の墓という意味である。その墓に葬られる者はその地方の住民にとって崇拝される者であり、その聖人（葬られる者）の霊はその墓に存在すると信じられている。墓参りで、このような墓に来る人々はたいてい、何かを願うために、精霊に頼んで祈りを捧げる。このアニメではその「KUBURAN KERAMAT」に葬られる者はラメランと称する王様である。

　前述の通り、パイロットはラメラン王の後継者のふりをし、自分が村の地主であることを村中に公表した。しかし、実は彼が持っているラメラン王からの遺書は偽物であり、本物の遺書は王様の墓に残っていると語られる。本物の遺書に書いてある遺言では村の土地の本当の持ち主はその村の全住民である。このパイロットの偽りや悪意はダナに知られ、

ダナは自分が住んでいる村を救うために、本物の遺書を見つけようと決心する。

　ラメラン王の墓は森の中に潜んでいたので、その墓の存在は村の人に知られてはいなかった。つまり、村人たちが滅多に近づかないところにあった。ダナは強い決意で、深い森の中に潜んでいる墓を見つけた。上記の通り、その王様の墓は神聖な墓といわれ、精霊がそこに存在すると考えられる。しかし、ダナは聖なる場所とわかっていても勇敢にそこに入り込む。ダナは宝探しのような冒険を経験し、ようやく無事に念願の遺書を手に入れる。

　このシーンでは、聖なる墓なのになぜダナは無断に出入りしたのかと疑問が生じる。その理由は、ダナに対するベン（パイロットの息子）のシーンから理解できる。ベンの態度がパイロットという父とほぼ同じなのだ。ベンはダナの後について行ったので、その墓の存在は彼にも知られた。彼の狙いは父の不正行為が村の人々にばれないように、本物の遺書をダナの手から奪うことである。ベンもやっとその墓に入り込んだが、ダナとは違い、ベンは逆に墓にある罠に落ちてしまい、ダナに助けてもらわないと墓から無事に出られないようになってしまうのである。ダナとベンを比較すると、ダナはベンと違い、家族やすべての周りの自然を救うために勇敢に墓に入ったのだ。

　千尋は両親を助けるために湯屋で働くようになった。その後、千尋も愛情あふれる心によって河の神とハクを救うことができた。ダナも千尋と同様に優しく純粋な心を持ち、神秘的な世界に接しても、何も悪いことに当たらず目的を果たせた。二人の活躍からは、二人が自然と関わりがあるのは確かであり、二人とも自然を守る役を持つ登場人物であると考えられる。

4.3. ダナの父に関するシーン

　主役・ダナの父はソマッドという者である。優しい人であり、家族をきちんと守るタイプである。ソマッドがパイロットの悪意に気づく前は、両者の仲は良好であった。パイロットについて、ソマッドが思っていたことは、彼が村中で一番金持ちの村の地主だということだった。そんな単純な考え方から、彼は自分の娘（ダナ）の将来を思って、ダナをパイロットの息子（ベン）と結婚させようとした。ダナはベンのことをまったく気に入らないので、父の意志に猛反対し、親子の喧嘩にまで発展してしまう。

　しかし、ソマッドはようやくパイロットの悪意に気づく。パイロットは自分の意志がソマッドにばれてからは、彼の味方になるようにソマッドを説得する。だが、自分の味方になれば有利だと説得されても、ソマッドはパイロットに反対する立場を選んだ。パイロットと比べると、ソマッドには財産はまったくなく、典型的な村人の質素な生活をしている。結局、ソマッドは自分の利益を無視し、彼と決着をつけた。住民たちと力を合わせ、村人のリーダーとして村を守るためにパイロットの一団と戦った。このシーンからわかることは、ソマッドは金や自分の利益より村を愛し、住んでいる自然が現代化されるのを嫌がり、自然を何よりも守る役をしていることである。

　ソマッドの一団がパイロットの一団と戦うシーンを見ると、面白いことに村の周りの林に住んでいる動物たちもソマッドたちを支え、自然を守るためにソマッドたちと共に戦う。このシーンからは、動物たち（熊、猿、鳥など）は自然の一部であり、自然（つまり森か林）と分離できない存在であることがわかる。そのうえ、パイロットのような人間は自然

を壊し、自然に愛情を持たないと自然は人間に対して敵になる。これらのことから、その動物たちは自然を象徴すると考えられる。

5. 共通点と相違点

　『千と千尋の神隠し』と『MERAIH MIMPI』の分析から認識された共通点は次の通りである。まず、両方とも自然観を表す作品である。つまり、現代の生活では自然を守るのが確かに大切だということである。この二つのアニメの自然観には和辻哲郎によって書かれた自然の概念を当てはめることができる。

　和辻哲郎による風土の三類型によると、インドネシアは日本と同様にモンスーン地域に属している。風土的に地球は三つの領域に分けられ、すなわちモンスーン地域、砂漠地域、牧場地域である。モンスーン地域に住む人間にとっては、自然は「恵み」と位置づけられている。モンスーン地域の風土の特性は暑熱と湿潤の結合と言われ、そのおかげで国土は旺盛な植物に覆われる。モンスーン地域の人間にとって、自然は死ではなく「生」である（『風土』、30頁）。その地域の人々は自然に対して対抗的ではなく受容的である。もちろん日本には四季があるから、季節的にインドネシア（東南アジアの国）と若干違い、日本はきわめて変化に富む季節にめぐまれている。しかしながら、上記の両国のアニメを比較した結果、結論として『千と千尋の神隠し』と『MERAIH MIMPI』における自然観は変わりがないといえる。

　自然は恵みであると認められ、『千と千尋の神隠し』では出てくる神が自然を象徴し、自然そのものは人間の生存している場所として、人間と対等な関係であると認識される。そして人間は自然を大事にしないと、自然は人間の敵になると表現されている。この自然の概念は『MERAIH MIMPI』も『千と千尋の神隠し』と同様である。特に、森の動物達がソマッドたちの戦いを支援するシーンにはっきり表現される。その動物達は自己の意志で自然を守るために人間の活動を支援し、動物達の活動は人間によって強制されたものではない。その動物達は自然の象徴と考えられ、人間は自然を支配せず、自然と対等な関係にある。

　第2の共通点はそれぞれの作品は地元の信仰と関わっていることにある。『千と千尋の神隠し』の神の概念と『MERAIH MIMPI』の神聖な墓の概念はアニミズムと考えるのが適切である。アニミズムについてイギリスの人類学者E. B. Taylorは「動物・植物・自然物・自然現象にわたって、それぞれに宿り、それを生かしている精霊があり、その精霊は超人的存在で人間には見ることができないけれども、それはものを離れて独自に動きまわる自体で、人間同様、喜怒哀楽の心意を持つ」と述べている（『日本人の神』、19頁）。

　上記の共通点に対して相違点は次の通りである。第1の相違点は、『千と千尋の神隠し』と比べると『MERAIH MIMPI』のほうが人間と自然との直接的な関わりを表現している。上述の通り、始めのシーンは自然の印象を与え、内容は確かに自然と関連があるとイメージできる。『MERAIH MIMPI』と違い、『千と千尋の神隠し』では逆にその自然観を理解するために神々の概念を最初に理解しておかなければならない。第1節に述べたようにほとんどの観客はこのアニメを一度観ただけでは、日本の自然観と深い関連があることを読み解くことができない、裂け目がある作品である。

　　第２の相違点は、両方とも自然観を表すアニメであるが、『MERAIH MIMPI』では二つのテーマが重なっていると思われる。それは主役ダナの活躍からわかる。主役・ダナは自然を守るほかに、男性が強い社会の中で自由な女性として自分の夢を追いかける。特に気に入らない男との結婚を父に強いられても、ダナが反抗して一所懸命断るシーンからそれがわかる。

6.　終わりに

　　現在、我々が生存しているこの地球に温暖化の問題が迫っており、この『千と千尋の神隠し』と『MERAIH MIMPI』のような作品は教育的に価値があると思われる。特に、このアニメーション作品を通じて、子供の観客に自然に対する愛情を意識させるのが有効であると筆者は思っている。

　　『千と千尋の神隠し』の特性は、舞台になるファンタジー世界には日本独特の文化や考えが明確に表されていることにある。それと比べれば、『MERAIH MIMPI』はストーリーにまだまだ特徴がないと感じられる。もしこの『MERAIH MIMPI』を始め、新たにインドネシア人がアニメを制作するのであるならば、『千と千尋の神隠し』のようにインドネシアの伝統文化や考え方を表し、インドネシアの文化に対する観客の愛情を高める作品が生まれてくることを、筆者は望んでいる。

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◆第5セッション◆
歴史・宗教・文学 / History, Religion and Literature

Mourning and Violence in the Land of Peace:
Reflections on Yasukuni

John Breen

My talk today focuses on the Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo, and seeks to highlight a particular problem that attaches to it. In Japan, in China and in Korea—and in Europe and the USA to some extent—there persists a perception among politicians and intellectuals interested in, and concerned about, Japan that Yasukuni is a problem. In Japanese, it is rare to hear the word "Yasukuni" in isolation; it is invariably paired with the noun *mondai* (problem), as in "Yasukuni *mondai*." Even the shrine's priests and apologists refer to the Yasukuni *mondai*. This perception is almost non-existent in Indonesia for reasons that are, of course, historical. Japan's occupation of Indonesia freed it from its Dutch colonisers and, for all the brutality subsequently recorded under Japanese rule, Japan was the spur to Indonesian independence. There are also, as Dr. Sudung has assured me, reasons eminently practical for Yasukuni not being on the Indonesian radar. Post-war Indonesia and Japan enjoy a fruitful and productive relationship, and there is no reason to let past wrongs undermine it. This situation anyway seems to require that I begin by setting out for you as simply as possible what Yasukuni is and, above all, what it does, before I explore any of the problems that might attach to it.

Figure 1

Yasukuni is a Shinto shrine in the heart of Tokyo, close to the imperial palace. It is one of a small number of shrines especially favoured by the imperial court. To this day, the emperor sends an emissary to Yasukuni twice a year to represent him at the shrine's Great Autumn and Spring Rites.[1] This Yasukuni shrine is a modern invention, created in the wake of the Meiji Revolution of 1868. In symbolic terms, however, it is indistinguishable from other Shinto shrines in the land. Its sacred space is marked by a

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[1]   Shrines so privileged are known as *chokusaisha*. There are sixteen of them today.

sequence of *torii* gates along the main pilgrims' path; the architecture of its buildings is entirely consistent with that found in other Shinto shrines. Like Shinto shrines everywhere, it is served by a community of shrine priests, who wear what shrine priests always wear; they perform rites that are not of themselves remarkable: the rites involve priests making offerings and offering prayers to the kami or gods enshrined in the Main Sanctuary. What does distinguish Yasukuni, however, is that the kami it enshrines are not the kami of the 8th century *Kojiki* or *Nihon shoki* myths; nor are they the kami of mountains or forests or waterfalls or rivers. Rather, they are the Japanese war-dead. They are regular men, and some women, who died in the imperial cause from the mid 19th century to 1945. Among the war dead are Class A war criminals, men condemned at the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, and who were subsequently executed or died in prison. The logic of their enshrinement is that Japan was still at war with America till the Occupation ended in 1952; they are no less war dead than the men who died on the battlefields of Asia. It is important to understand that there are no human remains in Yasukuni at all; it is not a cemetery. Nor is it equivalent to the tomb of the Unknown Soldier. There is, however, such a site—a secular site—not very far from Yasukuni, known as Chidorigafuchi. At Yasukuni, all the war dead enshrined as kami are named. The shrine keeps records for every one of them.

Yasukuni shrine is, thus, a site of mourning and, like all such sites, it is a site of memory too. It is a place to which the bereaved, the sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, of the war dead come to mourn and remember their loved ones. This much it shares in common with all sites of mourning in the democratic post war world, but there are some striking differences, too. One of them, indeed, is that it is a religious and not a secular site. In law it is a religious juridical person (*shūkyō hōjin*). Another—possibly related—difference is that it is a place of violence. Yasukuni is a place of mourning and a place of violence, and that fact needs to be acknowledged, and problematized. I certainly do not suggest Yasukuni is always a place of violence; it is often the place of peace, which is implicit in its name.[2] Of course, I am not saying either that priests engage in violence personally; or that they actively encourage violence. However, I *am* asking whether they and the shrine, however unwittingly, give moral sanction to violence and, if they do, why that might be. I should warn you, though, that I have no simple conclusions to offer. My greater concern is to present a problem that has been overlooked in the voluminous literature on Yasukuni. Let me allude first to some of the other problems that stir about Yasukuni since they define the shrine's space as one of contestation, and are integral therefore to the matter at hand. Contestation at Yasukuni seems to be linked deeply to the fact that the shrine is a religious not a secular site.

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[2]   Yasukuni means "land of peace."

1) The Cluster of Problems That is Yasukuni

Problem 1: Objects and Their Effects

The Japanese Constitution provides for the separation of state and religion, and so the state and its representatives have to keep a distance from religious sites like Yasukuni. This means that Yasukuni, as a private religious juridical person, cannot be a *national* state of mourning, even though this is what it aspires to be. Post war prime ministers naturally enough want to—surely they are obliged to—mourn the men and women who died for Japan but, owing to the Constitution, this is problematic at Yasukuni. What are they to do? One solution is for them to mourn the war dead at another, non-religious site. Nearby Chidorigafuchi is an obvious candidate. The incumbent Democratic Party was quick to make clear its intention to avoid Yasukuni, and commemorate the war dead at this site.[3] Another possibility is to create a new non-religious site; this idea has been discussed since the 1980s and was raised again most recently in the administration of Koizumi Jun'ichirō. A third possibility is, somehow or other, to strip away the religiosity of Yasukuni. This is the most radical proposal since the other options leave Yasukuni untouched. To render Yasukuni "non-religious" is—depending on one's definition of what constitutes religion—to destroy the shrine as it has been for most of its relatively short life. The most recent advocate of such a position was Asō Tarō while he served as Japan's Foreign Minister.[4]

Fourteen post-war PMs have nonetheless venerated the war-dead at Yasukuni, and many others have demonstrated their yearning to do so by sending flowers. Koizumi Jun'ichirō was the boldest and most persistent of Yasukuni patrons in the post war period; his actions, like those of his predecessors, were in clear breach of the Constitution. This, at least, is what plaintiffs in a multiplicity of court cases have claimed. But were they in fact unconstitutional? Matters prove to be far from clear. In the 1970s, a Supreme Court judgement muddied the constitutional waters by establishing the so-called "object and effect standard" (*mokuteki kōka kijun*). The upshot of this was that state-religion separation provided by the post war Constitution is *not* after all to be considered absolute. The state and its representatives *may* engage with religious institutions, so long as the object and effect of their actions do not amount to a privileging of Shinto or any other religion. In fact, of course, prime ministers have been practically free to pay their respects at many other religious institutions Buddhist temples, Catholic churches and even other Shinto shrines without creating a murmur of objection. So the "object and effect standard" served to iron out the contradictions in the system. A new question now arose: when a PM patronises Yasukuni, is his *object* to promote Shinto, and is promotion the *effect* of his patronage?[5]

Plaintiffs have found it impossible to get a ruling on this. Japan does not have constitutional courts, so they cannot challenge the PM's actions directly. They have to sue the Prime Minister claiming infringement of rights. In other words, the plaintiff has to claim that Koizumi's worship at Yasukuni, say, caused them "spiritual damage." Such cases are invariably dismissed and, following a landmark ruling in June 2006, they seem unlikely to recur in the future.[6] What judges can do is issue *obiter dicta*, which are

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[3]   *INDEX 2009*, p. 1. The document can be downloaded at http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/?num=16667 (last accessed 8.8.11). See below n.9.

[4]   On Asō's argument for a non-religious Yasukuni, see Breen, "Popes, Bishops and War Criminals."

[5]   On the object and effect ruling and its ramifications, see Breen, "Voices of Rage."

[6]   Okumura, "Koizumi Yasukuni soshō to wa nan datta no ka," pp. 68–9.

non-binding opinions on the judgement deemed relevant to a case. In 2004, Justice Kamekawa opined in such an *obiter dictum* that Koizumi had, indeed, set out to "aid, assist and promote Yasukuni shrine, a religious institution that disseminates Shinto." He concluded that the Prime Minister's Yasukuni visit was in breach of Article 20.[7] A similar *obiter dictum* was issued the next year. However, *obiter dicta* are *not* rulings. They are not binding and this, of course, explains why Koizumi returned with impunity to Yasukuni in August 2006.[8] In brief, Yasukuni remains an unsolved problem in the realm of state-religion relations. It is so regarded both by those who support the shrine and by those who oppose it.

Problem 2: Worshipping War Criminals

There are 14 Class A war criminals in the Yasukuni pantheon. They are apotheosized at Yasukuni; they are propitiated in daily rites, and worshipped alongside the pantheon's 2.5 million other kami. It is Yasukuni's religious operations that are once more fundamental here. For whom, though, are the Class A war criminals a problem? They are not so for the priests, nor presumably for the five prime ministers who have visited there, following the secret enshrinement in 1978. Nor do they represent a problem for about 50% of Japanese polled. The most significant opposition has come from leaders of the incumbent Democratic Party, whose 2009 manifesto cites the war criminal presence as the reason why no Democratic Party leader will patronise the shrine.[9] It is clear, moreover, that their presence was problematic for the last emperor, Hirohito. Emperor Hirohito had attended Yasukuni rites twice a year from the late 1930s through to war's end. He had been a much less regular patron in the post war, it is true, but he did attend in autumn 1975 to mark the 30th anniversary of war's end, and he is known to have planned a return for 1985. This never came about. His objection to Yasukuni's enshrinement of the war criminals is the reason why.[10]

However, it is above all successive leaders of the Peoples Republic of China who have problematised this issue. After all, among the war criminals are men responsible for terrible wrongs inflicted on the Chinese people. When, say, Koizumi patronised the shrine, was he not approving the actions of the war criminals—however much he may have protested to the contrary? Not all is as it seems, of course. The Chinese problematisation of the issue has always intensified as domestic political issues have become graver.[11] More interesting still is evidence that the Chinese had no substantial objections to the war criminal presence or to the patronage of the shrine by Japanese leaders, until they were visited by a delegation of the now defunct Japan Socialist party.[12] Nonetheless, the Chinese have been instrumental in assuring that state patronage of Yasukuni is a defining issue of post war East Asian diplomacy.

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[7]   Koizumi's payment of offerings out of his own pocket absolved him of breaching Article 89.

[8]   On the use of *obiter dicta*, see Breen, "Voices of Rage."

[9]   *INDEX 2009*: "It is problematic for the prime minister and his cabinet to visit Yasukuni shrine in an official capacity, given its enshrinement of Class A war criminals. We shall work towards the construction of a new national site of mourning with no specific religious character, in order that anybody and everybody can, without ill-feelings, honour the war dead and swear their commitment to non-war and peace."

[10]   On the emperor and the war criminal presence, see Breen, "Introduction: A Yasukuni Genealogy," pp. 2–5.

[11]   *The Guardian*, 15 August 2006.

Problem 3: Amnesia

There is finally the fundamental problem of how Yasukuni remembers the past—and the men and women whose actions gave the past its meaning. This problem too is inherently connected to the fact of Yasukuni's religiosity. The religious rites performed by the Yasukuni priesthood, especially those Autumn and Spring Great rites at which the imperial emissary is the main player, constitute a narrative account of Japan's imperial past. The account is simple and straightforward, appealing and persuasive, and it goes like this:

> Millions of Japanese went to war in the 1930s and 40s on behalf of emperor and imperial Japan; 2,300,000 of them sacrificed their lives in the cause of emperor and empire after heroic struggle. To a man, they died embodying the hallowed imperial virtues of loyalty, patriotism and self-sacrifice. They are thus all heroes, and their deaths are noble and honourable, before they are ever tragic. The war, which created so many heroes, was thus a heroic and noble undertaking.[13]

This uncomplicated narrative is, of course, myth and not history. What matters here is what is banished by the ritual reproduction of the myth. First of all, there are the sacrifices of the common man and woman. Yasukuni is a military shrine, which was created for the purpose of enshrining the military. It enshrines men and women who fit into one of a number of specific categories: *gun, gunzoku* and *jungunzoku* (namely military, quasi-military and quasi-quasi military). It does not mark the sacrifices of the common man or woman.[14] Secondly, the myth's reproduction in ritual form helps erase from memory countless squalid deaths that resulted not from heroic action but from starvation and disease. In New Guinea alone, it is estimated that 100,000 men died of starvation. The New Guinea campaign is widely acknowledged to have been botched from start to finish. And yet the men responsible for the campaign, as well as those who starved to death, are worshipped at Yasukuni as heroes. (This is not, of course, to deny that were men who performed acts of extraordinary bravery in New Guinea.) The narrative, finally, distracts ritual participants from reflection on the brutality and cruelty of all war. At Yasukuni, war is nothing but glorious. It is thus, because those who sacrificed their lives did so on behalf of emperor and country. They embodied the essential virtues of self-sacrifice, loyalty and patriotism. It should be added here that the narrative is told not only in ritual time. For, adjacent to the shrine's Worship Hall there is a war museum called the Yūshūkan. It has a history nearly as old as the shrine itself. In the post war, it finally re-opened in 1985, and was completely refurbished in 2002. The museum in its post war manifestation has animated this same heroic, noble narrative through pictures, relics, textual exposition

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[12] On this point, see Breen, "Voices of Rage."

[13] On Yasukuni as a site of memory, see Breen, "Yasukuni and the Loss of Historical Memory." In revised form, the article is re-published as "Fine Words Indeed: Yasukuni and the Narrative Fetishism of War" in John Nelson and Inge Prohl eds., *The Handbook of Contemporary Japanese Religions,* Brill (Forthcoming.)

[14] The multiple categories of *gun, gunzoku* and *jungunzoku* (military, quasi-military and quasi-quasi military) are helpfully set out in "Senbotsu sha no gōshi" in Yasukuni Jinja ed., *Yasukuni no inori*, p. 186.

and, most powerfully, movies.[15]

2) Yasukuni and Violence

Yasukuni Accommodations

Yasukuni means "land of peace." It is surely an anomaly that a site that is often genuinely a place of peace—despite its displays of military hardware—and always a place of mourning, should have any association at all with violence. But Yasukuni does have such an association. This point was made most articulately in *Yasukuni* (2008), the documentary film by Chinese director, Li Ying. I am not aware that this film was ever screened here in Jakarta, but it stirred much controversy in Japan. Many cinemas refused to show it for fear they would be targeted by right-wing thugs. But it won international acclaim and prizes, and duly became the most viewed documentary film in Japanese history.[16] In the opinion of this author, it is not an especially well-made film. The running theme features the shrine's 90 year-old sword-smith, Kariya Naoji, and endeavours to associate him and his swords with the Nanking massacre of 1937. Swords were, of course, deployed as weapons of slaughter in Nanking, but this theme is contrived. There is little drama to the scenes featuring Kariya; they are labored and often lack clarity. The film does, however, contain a number of striking scenes. One of these displays for all to see the unfortunate connection between Yasukuni and violence.

The date is 15 August 2006. Prime minister Koizumi has kept his promise to venerate the war dead at Yasukuni on this day, which marks war's end. In the precinct of Yasukuni shrine, the Glorious War Dead Society (Eirei ni kotaeru kai) is staging its annual event. The event, styled "200,000 pilgrims to Yasukuni" (Yasukuni nijūman nin sanpai undō), this year features a talk by the ultra-conservative, charismatic governor of Tokyo, Ishihara Shintarō. Ishihara has just finished his keynote address, urging Japan to "stand up, and be strong." He steps down from the stage to rapturous applause. Society members start to close the event with a stirring rendition of *Kimi ga yo*, but just as they do, two young men appear before the stage, shouting "War of aggression!" (*shinryaku sensō*) ; they start to unfurl a banner. Both men are swiftly set upon. One man escapes; a second is wrestled to the ground and strangled. Eventually, he too frees himself, only to be hounded out of the shrine by a snarling mob to the chant of: "Omae wa Chūgokujin darō! Chūgoku ni kaere, Chūgoku ni kaere!" (You are Chinese, yeah?! Go back to China! Go back to China!) The students (both of whom are Japanese) retreat to the periphery of the precinct, where the police become interested. What happens next is difficult to see, but one student is punched in the face, blood seeps from his mouth. The police arrest him, and leave his attacker unchallenged. Peace—of sorts—returns to Yasukuni.

On 15 August 2009, a similar sort of event occurred. Once again, the Glorious War Dead society's "200,000 pilgrims to Yasukuni" event acted as trigger. This time the guest speaker was disgraced General Tamogami Toshio. Tamogami was Chief of Staff of the Self Defence forces, renowned for his unspoken

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[15]   For a thoughtful critique of the presence of a history museum at a site dedicated to mourning the war dead, see Tōgō, *Rekishi to gaikō*, pp. 48–53. For diverse takes on the museum and its exhibits, see Nelson, "Social Memory as Ritual Practice"; Breen, "Yasukuni and the Loss of Historical Memory," and Nitta, "And Why shouldn't the Prime Minister?"

[16]   The film won the Best Documentary Award at the Hong Kong film festival in 2008.

views. In 2008, he published an essay called "Was Japan an Aggressor Nation?" (Nihon wa shinryaku kokka de atta no ka.) His essay, in which he argued that Japan was unequivocally not an aggressor, won him the Fuji Toshio prize. His Yasukuni speech retraced the theme; he duly insisted Japan was innocent of aggression in the last war. As he stepped down from the stage, he was confronted by a Japanese-speaking Canadian peace activist. The Canadian told him calmly that, were he a German giving a talk in Germany, his comments would have got him arrested. The Canadian was then surrounded, manhandled, threatened by an aggressive mob and finally, at the urging of one of the thugs, arrested by the police.[17] He was eventually released, but only after writing a letter of apology to Yasukuni shrine, to General Tamogami and to Sakura Channel—the ultra-conservative TV channel who had been filming the General. These are acts of violence against the person. They happen within the precinct of Yasukuni shrine.

On 14 August 2010, an event of quite a different order—one that is nonetheless related to issues of violence—took place at Yasukuni. It was a visit by a group of ultra-right wing European politicians. Jean-Marie le Pen, founder and former president of the French Front National, and Adam Walker, Staff Manager of the British National Party, were joined there by far-right activists from Austria, Portugal, Spain, Hungary, Romania and Belgium. Le Pen has been convicted of inciting racial hatred and for "minimizing the Holocaust"; Walker was charged with, but later cleared of, racial and religious intolerance, after posting comments on the internet describing immigrants as "savage animals."[18] These men were in Japan at the invitation of the Issuikai, an ultra-right organisation founded in the 1970s to pursue Mishima Yukio's revolutionary agenda for postwar Japan. The organization is anti-American and anti-Democratic, advocates a Heisei Restoration [of power to the emperor], and its president, Kimura Mitsuhiro, must surely be the only Japanese to have organized a rite of commemoration to mark the death of Sadam Hussein. In August last year, Yasukuni priests welcomed these men into the shrine's Main Sanctuary. The press, including BBC reporters, quizzed Le Pen and Walker on what they were doing at a place like Yasukuni. The line of questioning proved unproductive. The question that needed to be asked—and is far more relevant to our present concerns—was rather: Why does Yasukuni shrine, a self-proclaimed place of peace - play host to men whose views are anything but peaceful?

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[17] The incident, which was featured and discussed on the right-wing Sakura TV channel, can be viewed at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YO4DEOhkWYw (last accessed 4.1.11).

[18] *Daily Mail,* 25 May 2010.

Figure 2

Questions of the same order are prompted by these images. Figure 2 depicts a scene from within the Yasukuni precinct on 15 August 2001. It features the police in the midst of a melee attempting to keep apart pro-Yasukuni and anti-Yasukuni elements.[19] Figure 3 shows a group of Neo-Nazi youths parading in front of the Yasukuni Worship Hall on 15 August 2006. They strut with a Nazi-type flag held high, wearing the black uniforms and the boots of the SS, whom they obviously admire.

In Figure 4 is one of a military style truck belonging to Ōshi gijuku (Cherry blossom warrior ethic

Figure 3

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[19] This image is reproduced on the cover of Breen ed., *Yasukuni, the War Dead, and the Struggle for Japan's Past.*

association), one ultra-right wing group whose members invariably clash with the police, and—where possible—with others they identify as unpatriotic, in and around Yasukuni on 15 August. The slogans emblazoned on trucks that circled the shrine on 15 August 2010 included "Protect the *kokutai!*" "Worship the gods and love the nation!" and "Kamikaze attack unit!" These slogans resonate with imperial Japan before its defeat; this is the Japan that these groups idealise. The truck's loudspeakers assault the ear with Imperial Japanese army songs, and shrill declarations of their ultra conservative ideals.

Figure 4

It is clear from these images that violence, and men who advocate violence, are drawn to Yasukuni and, indeed, have found a place there. The priests at Yasukuni shrine could refuse access to neo-Nazis or other ultra right wing groups; they could request the police remove them. They could proclaim their views as abhorrent, and insist loud and clear that what these people stand for—and fight for—is alien to the peace which Yasukuni advocates. The shrine does no such thing. It is difficult, therefore, to counter the impression that Yasukuni—unwittingly at least—gives moral sanction to violence. I asked one influential Yasukuni apologist why the shrine allowed ultra right wing groups privileged access to Yasukuni space, and he responded: "Would you like me to try and get them removed, then?" He was intimating, of course, that it was perfectly possible to remove them, but that neither he nor his fellow apologists had ever thought these men of violence a problem; nor their views abhorrent.

In becoming the "most watched documentary in Japanese history," Li Ying's film overtook a celebrated 1987 film called *Yuki yukite shingun*. In the view of this author, it is an altogether more gripping and important work than *Yasukuni*. It fully deserved to win the Berlin Film Festival award in 1987, and several other awards thereafter. The film is not, in fact, about Yasukuni at all, but on reviewing it recently, I was struck by one scene that is intimately related to Yasukuni. *Yuki yukite shingun* features a war veteran by the name of Okuzaki Kenzō. He is deeply traumatised by his experiences of the hell that was New Guinea. Indeed, the viewer of the documentary sometimes suspects Okuzaki has lost his mind. In the scene in question, he confronts Sgt. Yamada, the former leader of his unit. Okuzaki has tracked

Yamada down nearly 30 years after the war, and now accuses him of murdering his friend all those years ago in New Guinea. The truly shocking thing to emerge is that Okuzaki is convinced Yamada shot him to consume his flesh. Okuzaki anyway knows his murdered friend will never rest in peace until Yamada admits his wrong-doing and apologises.

> Okuzaki: I have brought along the brother of the man you killed. You owe him an apology.
>
> Yamada: Why should I apologise?
>
> Okuzaki (pointing to the companion he has brought with him): You and two others killed his brother.
>
> Yamada: I know nothing about that.
>
> Okuzaki: The truth is the only way to mourn him.
>
> Yamada: I mourn in my way. You mourn in your way. I mourn in my way, and that is why I go to Yasukuni…

Hardly has the word "Yasukuni" left Sgt. Yamada's lips, than Okuzaki yields to uncontrollable rage. Crying "You think there is salvation in being a Yasukuni hero, do you? You …you…," he attacks Yamada, knocking him to the ground, throttling him. Nothing, it seems, stirred the wrath of Okuzaki more than Yasukuni. He subsequently announced to the film's director his attention to go to Yasukuni at the Spring Festival, and cut down the imperial emissary there. To be sure, Okuzaki was a highly unstable man, but Yasukuni provokes in many people feelings of intense anger, which sometimes boil over into violence. Why does it attract men, of whatever political disposition, who are predisposed to violence? What is it about Yasukuni that forces us as a result to make associate this site of mourning with violence?

3) Violence and Mourning

According to the *Oxford English Dictionary* "to mourn" is

> 1) to feel sorrow, grief or regret
>
> 2) to lament the death of someone
>
> 3) to exhibit the conventional signs of grief. [20]

There are many, many visitors to Yasukuni who exhibit or express sorrow, and so quite evidently feel sorrow, and who lament as they stand before the shrine's imposing Worship Hall.[21] Evidently, they mourn, as they remember. But there are many others, such as some we encountered in Section 2 above, who come to Yasukuni with other attitudes, and for other purposes. This is perhaps a consequence of what Yasukuni does, and has always done, beyond the realm of mourning. So, what does it do beyond mourning?

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[20] *Webster's* concurs:

  1) To feel or express sorrow for something

  2) Grieve for someone who has died

  3) Utter in a sorrowful manner

[21] Yasukuni claims to receive 6 million visitors a year.

Part of the answer should be clear enough. Through ritual performance in the Main Sanctuary and the strategy of display in the War Museum, Yasukuni renders all the military war dead indiscriminately heroic. They are heroes because they died glorious deaths, and their deaths were glorious because they embodied the virtues of self-sacrifice, loyalty and patriotism. The sorrow, grief and regret that constitute the heart of mourning are displaced by celebration. Yasukuni celebrates the war dead and their virtues but, in so doing, ends up engaging in a struggle over the meaning of the Japanese past. There is an act of violence perpetrated on the memories of men like Okuzaki in the indiscriminate celebration of all men as heroic paragons of virtue.

This is what seems to have prompted Okuzaki's to assault on Yamada. New Guinea was a hell that both men had experienced. It was intolerable for Okuzaki that Yamada refused to face it. Iida Susumu was another who lived through New Guinea. He was imprisoned in Sugamo as a Class B war criminal, and reflected there on his actions. In recent years, he has written two important and moving books on the war that include reflections on Yasukuni. In the following citation, he directs his anger at the shrine that can transform incompetent military commanders into glorious spirits:

> "We despised the military commanders who planned that New Guinea campaign. Do these men merit honour as the nation's glorious war dead? Words like 'glorious spirits of the war dead' are simply designed to avoid the issue of responsibility…. The [refusal] of these men [to accept responsibility] is insufferable."[22]

Iida wrote that he could hear the war dead as they seethed with rage at Yasukuni's ritual re-writing of their past.

There is another aggressive dynamic here, too. Yasukuni enshrines the war dead as its right; it does not ask the permission of the bereaved. In the military past, when Yasukuni belonged to the state, the military and the bereaved naturally regarded enshrinement as the greatest honor. In the immediate post war, too, it is easy to see that enshrinement served—as it did no doubt for Yamada—to bury the trauma of loss. But enshrinement can also be a violation. Li Ying's film gives a striking example of a group of Taiwanese who so regard it. Accompanied by a Japanese Buddhist priest, they storm the Yasukuni shrine office, demanding—in vain—that their compatriots be set free from the Yasukuni pantheon. Another example concerns Hirota Kōki, the one civilian executed as a Class A war criminal. He was enshrined at Yasukuni in 1978 as a glorious war dead, but his family recently revealed their shock and anger on first learning of this. "If possible, we would like the shrine to cancel his enshrinement. We have no wish for him to be celebrated as a glorious spirit. It gives us no pleasure to know he is so celebrated. We never asked for it or wanted it, and Yasukuni never consulted us either." The shrine issued a statement saying they do not regard approval of the bereaved as a necessary precondition for enshrinement.

Yasukuni celebrates the virtues of self-sacrifice, loyalty and patriotism and it attributes them to all the war dead, as we have seen. However, it is also engaged in their active dissemination. Through their

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[22]   Iida offers further reflections throughout his books *Jigoku no Nihon hei* and *Tamashizume e no michi*. For the former, see especially pp. 175–82; for the latter, pp. 222–28 and 341–60.

dissemination, it seeks to effect a transformation of Japanese society. Ethical dissemination is central to Yasukuni's understanding of its own role in postwar Japan; the understanding is shared by the LDP, and by shrine apologists. Consider the LDP Outline of a proposal for legislation on Yasukuni (*Yasukuni hōan yōkō*), way back in 1956:

> Yasukuni shrine exists to venerate the dead, to honor their posthumous virtue *and thus* to bring about a revival in the ethics of contemporary Japan.

The conjunction is critical for it implies that the shrine, in its post war manifestation, exists first and foremost to regenerate the moral order of Japanese society; that mourning the war dead is in fact now a subordinate function. Similar statements are to be found in the writings of most of Yasukuni's post war Chief priests and in those of satellite groups like the Yasukuni Worshippers Society (1999).

> [We seek] to comfort and honour the glorious spirits, but also to inherit their hearts, establish state ethics (*kokka dōgi*), and contribute to the fashioning of a healthy national ethic (*kokumin dōtoku*).[23]

This is the view of Kobori Keiichirō, perhaps the most prolific of Yasukuni's apologists:

> If only the Yasukuni problem can be solved [so that the PM and emperor both venerate there] the attitude of the young toward Japan will be quite transformed. I believe they will then come round to the belief that Japan is a nation to be proud of, that we Japanese have something of which we can truly be proud.

This "something" refers to the ethical qualities imputed to the war dead. The sorrow, lament and regret that give meaning to mourning are displaced in these authoritative definitions; instead they yield to a new post war agenda. Yasukuni, its priests and apologists have recruited the war dead to fight a new battle, one that hopes to see postwar society refashioned on the model of the society that obtained prewar. There can be no peace for the war dead at Yasukuni; they have ethical battles still to fight. Could it be that there exist here, in Yasukuni's efforts to re-position itself and the war dead in post war Japan, reasons why the shrine might accommodate violence?

Conclusion

I readily admit that I have hardly explained either the physical violence that erupts sporadically at Yasukuni, or the sense of intimidation that is more often in the air. In my defence, I can only claim that I set out with a more limited aim. That aim was to identify the problem, and locate it in the context of certain fundamental operations that Yasukuni carries out as a religious corporation: its indiscriminate

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[23] "Go sōritsu hyaku yonjūnen kinen taisai ni yose" in *Jinja shinpō*, 28-10-09. On the ethical propagation by Yasukuni and its apologists, see Breen, "Voices of Rage."

enshrinement of all the war dead as kami; its attribution to them all of heroic virtues; its proclamation and active dissemination of those heroic virtues. These all amount to the shrine's engagement in a battle over the meaning of the past and of the present. These are the operations that occupy Yasukuni's time and space, and they crowd out the possibilities for mourning and the reflection and sorrow and lament, that give meaning to mourning.

In the final analysis, it perhaps matters less to explain precisely why Yasukuni has this association than that it does have such an association. It strikes me as odd that violence has not been discussed before in the context of Yasukuni and the "Yasukuni problem." After all, this issue is surely one integral to an understanding of Yasukuni in the 21st century.

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あとがき / Afterword

How, in the end, can we hope to understand contemporary Japan? "Understanding Contemporary Japan" was after all the grand theme of our symposium held at the University of Indonesia in early October last year. Did we get anywhere achieving our goal? Reflecting on the conference itself and the conference papers in this collection, it seems to me that we did make some important strides in the right direction. After all, there was abundant evidence at the symposium of the deep reflection and careful research that is essential to furthering understanding. The critical next stage is always writing up our findings and airing them in the form of public presentations, submitting them to the scrutiny of our peers. Of this scrutiny, there was much evidence at our symposium. There was wide-ranging, stimulating and always constructive discussion both in the conference hall and afterwards as well. So far; so good.

Of course, we cannot hope to understand Japan if we confine ourselves to a single discipline, and close our eyes to the work being done in fields not obviously proximate to our own. The symposium was, in this regard, a great success for it was truly multi-disciplinary in nature. There were fascinating papers on a whole range of topics from popular culture to natural history and from sociology to economics. What was particularly impressive to those of us from Nichibunken was the contribution—often from the floor; sometimes in the form of presentations—from young Indonesian scholars and students. They are the future of Japanese studies in Indonesia, and our ability to nurture them, and their linguistic and academic talents, will determine the capacity of the next generation to understand Japan. Their active participation in discussions was a major contribution to the success of the event.

The papers in this collection are a true record of the 17th Overseas Symposium, "Understanding Contemporary Japan" (「日本の文化と社会の潮流」), co-hosted by Nichibunken and the University of Indonesia, 5–7 October 2010. We, the editors, are sure that these papers will convey to the reader a real sense of the intellectual excitement that all the contributors—from Indonesia, Japan and many other countries besides—experienced for the duration of the conference.

John Breen

プログラム / Program

The 17th Overseas Symposium
Co-hosted by Nichibunken and Universitas Indonesia

"Understanding Contemporary Japan"

日本の文化と社会の潮流

Date: 5–7 October 2010
Place: Universitas Indonesia
Official languages: English, Japanese

The Symposium at Center for Japanese Studies Universitas Indonesia

Date: 5 October 2010
Host: Nichibunken & Kajian Wilayah Jepang UI

Program 1st Day		
Opening	MC	
Speeches	Welcome Remarks by Muhammad Anis (Universitas Indonesia)	
	Opening Address by the Japanese Ambassador to Indonesia	
	Welcome Speech by Komatsu Kazuhiko (Deputy Director, Nichibunken)	
Keynote Speech	1st Speaker	Inoue Shoichi (Nichibunken) "The Roots of Ise Shrine and the Folk Architecture of Sulawesi"
	2nd Speaker	I Ketut Surajaya (Universitas Indonesia) "Japanese Culture and Civilization in Globalization: A Theoretical Approach"

Session I : Economy, Business and International Relations Moderator: Sano Mayuko (Nichibunken)		
	1st Speaker	Hirano Kenichiro (Japan Center for Asian Historical Records) "The Question of the US Air Bases in Okinawa and an East Asian Community: A Personal View of Japan's Current International Relations"
	2nd Speaker	Sudung Manurung (Universitas Indonesia) "Financial Integration in Asia"
	3rd Speaker	Sugimura Miki (Sophia University) "Diversification of Transnational Student Mobility and International Cultural Exchange in Asia"
	4th Speaker	Syamsul Hadi (Universitas Indonesia) "Japanese Diplomacy in ASEAN and Its Relevance to Indonesia"
	Discussion	
Session II: Development Policy and Society Moderator: Susy Ong (Universitas Indonesia)		
	1st Speaker	Hendrik Meyer-Ohle (National University of Singapore) "Exploring Shopping Malls and Shopping Arcades in and around Japan's Provincial Cities: Problems, Policies and Perspectives"
	2nd Speaker	Ross Mouer (Monash University) "Finding Japan in the Lost Decade: Facing the Challenges of Japan's Globalization"
	3rd Speaker	Simon Andrew Avenell (National University of Singapore) "The Shimin and Citizenship in Civil Society: Participation, Symbiosis, and Convergence"
	4th Speaker	Nanyan Guo (Nichibunken) "The Ogasawara Islands: Native Species and Environment Protection"
	Discussion	
Meeting (Preliminary Roundtable/Panel Discussion-I) The Current Situation of Japanese Studies in Southeast Asia		
	Moderator 1: John Breen (Nichibunken)	
	Moderator 2: Susy Ong (Universitas Indonesia)	
Closing		

Nichibunken-KWJ UI International Symposium

Date: 6 October 2010

Host: Nichibunken & Kajian Wilayah Jepang UI

Place: Auditorium Center for Japanese Studies, Universitas Indonesia

Program 2nd Day		
Session III : Contemporary Culture Moderator: Bachtiar Alam (Universitas Indonesia)		
	1st Speaker	Hirano Kyoko (Graduate School of Film Producing / Temple University, Japan Campus) "Japanese Film Today"
	2nd Speaker	Matthew Santamaria (University of the Philippines) "The Japanese Reception of Okinawan Culture: Multi-dimensional Aspects of Cultural Exchange"
	3rd Speaker	Yamada Shoji (Nichibunken) "Between '*Yurui*' (Loose) and '*Katai*' (Tight): On 'Yurukyara' (Loose Character) Mascots in Japan"
	4th Speaker	Raphaella Dwianto (Universitas Indonesia) "The Reproduction of Culture in Urban Festivals"
	5th Speaker	Shiraishi Saya (University of Tokyo) "Globalizing Youth Culture: The Case of Manga/ Anime"
	Discussion	
Session IV : Young Scholars and Graduate Students Session Moderator: Kurniawaty Iskandar (Universitas Indonesia)		
	1st Speaker	Tokunaga Seiko (The Graduate University for Advanced Studies) "Spirit Possession as Depicted on Painting Scrolls" (in Japanese)
	2nd Speaker	Endah Rukmini Wahyuningtyas (Universitas Indonesia) "The Concept of Bushidō in Manga *One Piece*"
	3rd Speaker	Toya Riina (The Graduate University for Advanced Studies) "Cosmetics and the City: Shiseidō and the Transformation of Tokyo in the 1920s"
	4th Speaker	Mutiawanthi Hamzali (Universitas Indonesia) "Factors Concerning and the Motivation of Indonesian Nurse and Care Workers in Japan"

	5th Speaker	Marisa Rinati Sutanto & Ethel Deborah Lewerissa (Maranatha Christian Univiersity) "Animation in Asia: A Comparative Study of *Meraih Mimpi* and *Sen to Chihiro no kamikakushi*"
	Discussion	
Closing		

Nichibunken-KWJ UI International Symposium

Date: 7 October 2010

Host: Nichibunken & Kajian Wilayah Jepang UI

Place: Auditorium Center for Japanese Studies, Universitas Indonesia

Program 3rd Day		
Session V: History, Religion and Literature Moderator: Nanyan Guo (Nichibunken)		
	1st Speaker	Ito Naoko (Hiroshima University) "On the Relationship between Tantric Buddhism in Japan and Pre-Islamic Indonesia" (in Japanese)
	2nd Speaker	Saowalak Suriyawongpaisal (Chulalongkorn University) "The Father in *Noh* Plays"
	3rd Speaker	John Breen (Nichibunken) "Mourning and Violence: A Yasukuni Problem"
	Discussion	
Closing	Closing Remarks by Sudung Manurung (Universitas Indonesia)	
	Closing Address by Yamada Shoji (Nichibunken)	
Meeting (Final Roundtable/Panel Discussion) **Conclusion, and the Future of Japanese Studies in Southeast Asia**		
	Moderator: Sano Mayuko (Nichibunken)	
	Conclusion of Meeting	

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