

## Religious Globalization and Reflexive Secularization in a Japanese New Religion<sup>1</sup>

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This article draws on ethnographic research with a Japanese new religious organization to examine the interconnection between the processes of globalization and contemporary formations of religion and secularity in Japan. By tracing the development of new religions in modern Japan and examining a case study of a Japanese new religion pursuing a globalizing strategy, this article analyzes how leaders are attempting to transform the structure and image of their organization, the responses by members to these changes, and the larger implications of these changes regarding the dynamics of religious globalization and secularization. In line with recent comparative approaches to the secular, it reveals how religious globalization can become a vector for global growth *and* self-conscious institutional change, which draw simultaneously from global and local notions of religion and secularity. Ultimately, the article suggests that the “formations of the secular” in contemporary Japan are inextricably enmeshed with the processes of globalization, which resonate with broader social changes in Japanese society, and which are refracted through the selective yet dynamic interplay of both religion and secularity on local and global levels.

**Keywords:** globalization, internal secularization, Japanese religion, New Religious Movements, religious authority, secularization theory, *shinshūkyō*

In June 2009, the Japanese religious organization Kagamikyō held their “Paradise Festival” to mark a new chapter in their forty-year history.<sup>2</sup> At the festival, held in their newly completed headquarters in the Kansai region, the head of Kagamikyō strode to the podium in their main worship hall and announced: “This festival marks the rebirth of Kagamikyō. The new Kagamikyō is a super-religion (*chōshūkyō* 超宗教), a global religion (*sekai shūkyō* 世界宗教)—it transcends all ways of thinking about Kagamikyō itself.” Recently, grandiose

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2 Kagamikyō is a pseudonym for the organization. I have anonymized the names of the organization and its members as well as certain personal details in order to protect the privacy of my informants, in accordance with research ethics standards in anthropology and the guidelines for the Human Subjects Committee overseeing this research.



Figure 1. Going Global: Sculpture symbolizing Kagamikyō's global expansion at a Kansai worship hall. Photo by the author.

claims such as these have become increasingly common among many new religious movements, but what does this assertion mean in terms of the institutional dynamics and the experience of members within such organizations?

The changes taking place in Kagamikyō typify those occurring in many new religious groups in Japan. Many new religions are engaging in *global* moves toward active overseas

proselytizing, as well as *internal* moves to address contemporary needs of members. These two distinctive but related moves simultaneously challenge conventional categories of religion both in Japan and abroad. In this article, based on fieldwork and interviews conducted from 2007 to 2010 and follow-up interviews in 2015 with members of a new religious organization, I examine the interconnection between the processes of globalization and contemporary formations of religion and secularity in Japan, focusing on both institutional and individual levels. By tracing the development of new religions in modern Japan and examining a case study of a Japanese new religion pursuing a globalizing strategy, I analyze: 1) how leaders are attempting to transform the structure and image of their organization; 2) the responses by members to these changes; and 3) the larger implications of these changes for the dynamics of religious globalization and secularization.

In line with recent comparative approaches to the secular, I suggest that the concept of the secular and the dynamics of secularization are not exclusive to Western societies or to the development of Christianity, but rather should be understood within the broader processes of religious globalization and social change.<sup>3</sup> The case study of Kagamikyō's globalization process reveals how religious globalization can become a vector for global growth *and* self-conscious institutional change, drawing simultaneously from global and local notions of religion and secularity. In other words, unlike the radicalization of religious identity and the intensified frictions between religious and secular institutions that have emerged among many globalizing religions, Kagamikyō has actively refrained from advocating exclusivist religious ideologies and has embraced a range of both inclusive spirituality and secular rhetoric and practices.<sup>4</sup>

Through the case study of Kagamikyō, I show how new formations of religious meanings and practice have emerged out of the selective yet dynamic interplay of both religion and secularity, in a process that I call "reflexive secularization." As I describe below, "reflexive secularization" refers to the effects of intertwined processes of religious globalization and secularization on the transformation of organizational structures

3 Burchardt, Wohlrab-Sahr, and Middell 2015; Calhoun, Juergensmeyer, and VanAntwerpen 2011; Casanova 2006; cf. Asad 2003.

4 For example, see Casanova 1994; Coleman and Collins 2004.

and practices. More specifically, it refers to the process of how religious organizations reflexively—that is, self-consciously and purposefully—transform religious elements including teachings, symbols, rituals, and rhetoric in response to external factors, which include public perceptions of religion, challenges in attracting new members, and interaction with other religions and with nonreligious discourses and practices. Ultimately, I aim to show how the “formations of the secular” in contemporary Japan are inextricably enmeshed with the processes of globalization and resonate with broader social changes in Japanese society.

### Secularization Theory and Religious Globalization

In order to analyze the particular changes occurring within religious groups in Japan today, it is first necessary to define the terms of the debate around the concept of secularization, and how it relates with Japan. Like other post-industrial societies, Japan has experienced the decline of traditional religions of community-based practice and inherited affiliation (for example, Buddhism and Shinto) under the processes of industrialization and urbanization since the late nineteenth century. Initially, such changes were identified as part of a teleological process of secularization—the disappearance of religion under modernization—that was seen as an inevitable and universal truth under early theories of modernity.<sup>5</sup> However, the decline in traditional religious affiliations and practices has come hand-in-hand with new forms of religion in Japan. First during the nineteenth century, and then rapidly following World War II, hundreds of new religious organizations emerged in Japan.<sup>6</sup> Through the work of both Japanese and foreign scholars, Japan’s new religions came to be seen as a counterpoint to conventional secularization theories which posited the decline of religion under the processes of modernization. Anthropologists, sociologists, and religious studies scholars such as Morioka Kiyomi, Winston Davis, Shimazono Susumu, and others have pointed to the new forms of community, the continued practice of “thaumaturgical” rituals, and the diversity of “new spirituality movements” that have flourished with Japan’s modernization.<sup>7</sup> Like new religions in many other modernizing societies, new religious movements in Japan over the past century have contributed to a global rethinking and reshaping of secularization theories.<sup>8</sup>

Crucial to the reshaping of secularization theories among contemporary scholars of religion is the concept of secularization as the “functional differentiation” of social sub-systems, including religious and nonreligious spheres, in modern society. This approach is best exemplified in the work by Karel Dobbelaere, Mark Chaves, and Ugo Dessì.<sup>9</sup> Building on Dobbelaere’s schematization of three dimensions of secularization—laicization, internal secularization, and religious disinvolvement—sociologist Mark Chaves refocuses the

5 Such theories were pioneered by Weber (1958, 1968), as well as by later sociologists (for example, Wilson 1966; Berger 1967).

6 The definition of “new religions” remains contested among scholars of religion. In Japan, the term generally refers to those movements that emerged from the mid-nineteenth century, usually alongside the processes of modernization. See Inoue 1996; Numata 1988; Shimazono 1993; Shimazono 2001; Shimazono 2004.

7 Morioka 1976; Davis 1980; Shimazono 1996.

8 Dessì 2013; Nelson 2012; Partridge 2005; Reader 2007; Stark 1999; Stark and Bainbridge 1985. See also Hardacre 2011 for her application of Taylor’s (2007) concept of secularization as an elite project as a useful way of understanding state-led secularization in the Meiji period.

9 Dobbelaere 1981; Dobbelaere 1985; Dobbelaere 2002; Chaves 1994; Dessì 2013.

conceptual focus of secularization theory not on the decline of religion per se, but on the decline of the scope of religious authority at different levels in societies. Chaves isolates three levels of secularization in terms of religious authority: the societal level, the organizational level, and the individual level.<sup>10</sup> Drawing from Chaves's work, Ugo Dessì defines secularization in terms of the "functional differentiation" of spheres based on the *medium* of authority, meaning the particular ways that claims are legitimated within different "social subsystems" such as politics, science, and religion.<sup>11</sup> Religious authority, in this framework, is characterized by legitimating claims based on the medium of "the authority of some super-empirical agency."<sup>12</sup>

This focus on religious authority in the public sphere is an important step toward refining a sociological analysis of religion and secularization. However, to understand fully the various ways that religion is transforming within contemporary societies, it is also necessary to examine how organizations are negotiating contemporary societal changes. This dimension of organizational transformation, which is often called internal secularization, has usually been analyzed in terms of the decreasing capacity for religious elites to control "organizational resources within the religious sphere."<sup>13</sup> This is driven by the organizational leaders' active transformation of their internal structure, rituals, and even symbolic meanings within their organization toward conformity (or at least complementarity) with another referential world.<sup>14</sup>

The work of Dobbelaere and Chaves is primarily informed by research on societies dominated by a single major religion, such as Christianity or Islam. In this article, I explore the significance of their theories for the Japanese case. How should we analyze non-Western religions that aim to "go global"? In other words, what are the notable features of "referential worlds" in the case of societies with multiple religious traditions such as Japan, especially when they become active on the global stage? My examination of changes in Kagamikyō suggests the more general point that Japanese religions demonstrate a high sensitivity and responsiveness to various secular and religious "referential worlds," including domestic skepticism of religion and global religious and secular discourses. This sensitivity and responsiveness can best be described as "reflexive secularization," which refers to the mutually related processes of internal secularization and religious globalization. I suggest that Kagamikyō is pursuing "reflexive secularization" on two levels. On the global level, Kagamikyō is relativizing aspects of its distinctive religious teachings and practices in order to make them compatible with and complementary to other religious as well as secular practices and discourse. On the domestic level, Kagamikyō is de-emphasizing, and in some cases eliminating, religious teachings and practices in order to avoid the stigma of new religions in Japan and thereby appeal to younger Japanese who may be attracted to nonreligious and cosmopolitan aspects of the organization. The concept of reflexive

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10 Chaves 1994, p. 757.

11 Dessì 2013, pp. 13–16. For example, the legitimacy of political authority is based on the medium of power (in terms of controlling access to political influence as well as the control of violence), and scientific authority is based on the medium of empirical truths.

12 Dessì 2013, p. 16.

13 Chaves 1994, p. 757. On internal secularization, see also Luckmann 1967; Dobbelaere 1985; Dobbelaere 2002.

14 On "organizational resources within the religious sphere," see Chaves 1994, p. 757. On "referential worlds," see Dobbelaere 1985; Dobbelaere 2002; Chaves 1994.

secularization thus highlights the active and agentive processes of secularization, and also brings attention to the ways that religious globalization can become linked with various formations of secularization at global and local levels.

### Challenges and Changes Facing “New Religions” in Contemporary Japan

In Japan, religious organizations and practices have undergone dramatic changes over the past two centuries. These changes have included the decline of “traditional” religious organizations in terms of institutional membership and social relevance to everyday life, as well as the emergence of “new religions,” especially in the postwar period.<sup>15</sup> Unlike “traditional” Buddhist and Shinto organizations, these new religious organizations were strongly influenced by foreign religions, modern sciences, and modern technology. They combined Buddhist, Shinto, and Christian teachings with “simple, direct, and practical beliefs and practices,” the use of group psychology and the modern mass media, and charismatic leaders.<sup>16</sup>

Postwar Japan witnessed what has been described as a “rush hour of the gods.”<sup>17</sup> New charismatic leaders emerged across the country and it seemed that any “spiritually gifted” or “inspired” founder could spread his or her message through the self-production of organizational newspapers, books, and amulets.<sup>18</sup> Especially in the cities and suburbs, new religious and spiritual organizations thrived by offering individuals comfort in their daily lives as well as by rebuilding local communities through the door-to-door activities of members.

These newly resurgent and revitalized religious organizations seemed to mark a new potential for religion in Japan that was neither sponsored nor suppressed by the state, as had been the case during the first half of the twentieth century. Rather, they offered a vibrant force for the formation of new forms of community as well as moral and spiritual direction, meaning, and practice in individuals’ lives. Nearly 180 new religious organizations were founded in the twenty years following Japan’s defeat in World War II, and a further 27,000 unincorporated religious organizations emerged in the first fifteen years alone (according to figures kept between 1947 and 1960).<sup>19</sup> In the cities, the greatest growth occurred during the period 1945–1964 when “some new religions became true mass organizations” comprising a million or more members.<sup>20</sup> By the 1970s scholars estimated that 10 to 20 percent of Japanese were members of such groups.<sup>21</sup>

While these “new religions” were reaching their peak of academic and media attention in the 1970s, they also began to face a number of challenges to their continued growth. The

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15 For a general review on the decline of traditional religious practices and affiliations, see Reader 2012. For the effects of demographic changes on Buddhism, see Covell 2005; Nelson 2012. For the effects of changing funeral practices on Buddhism, see Rowe 2011; Suzuki 2000. For the transformation of Shinto in the public sphere, see Breen 2010; Mullins 2012; Nelson 1996; Porcu 2012; Rots 2015. See also Smith 1974; Dore 1958; and Dorman 2007 on the decline and changing meanings of Buddhist ritual practices in households in the immediate postwar decades (that is, through the maintenance of household altars and ancestor veneration).

16 Davis 1980, p. 8; Hardacre 1986; Nagai 1995.

17 McFarland 1967.

18 See Baffelli 2007; Dorman 2012.

19 Hardacre 2004, pp. 399–400.

20 Hardacre 2004, p. 399.

21 Shimazono 2004.

increase of new religions coincided largely with the growth of Japan's postwar economy and with the mass movement to cities, and as the economy and urban population have faced new challenges since the 1970s, new religions have also been affected. As a result, the religious topography of Japanese society has faced new structural challenges driven by an aging population, changing social gender roles, urbanization, and a growing public skepticism against religious activities.

First, Japan's changing demographics—an aging population and declining birthrate—is one of the most salient structural changes in Japan. As families shrink and current members grow older, many new religions are shrinking and aging. As a result, many organizations are looking for novel ways to attract new members to revitalize their membership and to gain potential sources of income for their maintenance and expansion.

Second, religious participation in Japan is heavily gendered and supported primarily by active female members. Women make up the majority of lay members in most religious groups, and women also occupy many positions as local leaders.<sup>22</sup> In the postwar period in particular, women have been active agents in spreading religious teachings and practices in the growing urban and suburban areas of Japan's major cities. Some estimates suggest that roughly two-thirds of the members of many new religions are women, which was confirmed by my own observations of a range of new religious organizations from around 2007 to 2016.<sup>23</sup> With the growing number of women in the workforce, however, organizations have found the need to adapt their activities to meet the lifestyles and needs of working women. Indeed, by the early part of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the dominant forms of activities in many groups had changed from weekday study groups and daily rituals to evening, weekend, and public holiday events that do not interfere with work or family.

Third, the popularization of new religious organizations during the twentieth century was part of the larger process of urbanization. The height of their growth occurred during the period of rapid urbanization in the 1950s and 1960s, when many newly married couples and young families moved to urban and suburban housing complexes. The expansion of new religious organizations during this time largely relied on door-to-door proselytizing by women targeted at recently arrived female residents removed from previous family and neighborhood connections. By the 1990s it became increasingly difficult to gain new members through door-to-door proselytizing, as smaller neighborhood communities were replaced by compartmentalized mass housing complexes with a more rapid turnover rate among residents, along with growing anonymity among neighbors.

Lastly, in the media and among the public, skepticism toward new religious groups has increased, especially after the infamous Aum Shinrikyō sarin gas attack in 1995. While skeptical public attitudes initially emerged in the late 1960s in response to scandals involving press censorship, aggressive proselytizing, and political activities by major new religious organizations such as Sōka Gakkai 創価学会, the 1995 Aum attacks, in which thirteen people were killed and over six thousand people were injured, became the trigger

22 See for example, Davis 1980; Hardacre 1986; Hibino 2003; Schattschneider 2003; Usui 2003. In some major new religions such as Tenrikyō 天理教, Renmonkyō 蓮門教, Ōmotokyō 大本教, Reiyūkai 霊友会, and Shinji Shūmeikai 神慈秀明会, women have been founders, co-founders, and prominent leaders.

23 For example, Hibino 2003; Numata 1988.



for a powerful and pervasive stigma against new religious groups.<sup>24</sup> Indeed, over fifteen years later, members of various religious organizations recall that the Aum affair produced “allergic” reactions that caused Japanese people to “stay away from anything that sounds like religion.”<sup>25</sup>

### Case Study: The Structure of Kagamikyō

Religious organizations in Japan have responded in various ways to these changes and challenges. Kagamikyō is one such organization. It has responded to the new domestic challenges facing Japanese religion by pursuing a global strategy. Kagamikyō is a “late-comer” new religion that emerged in the 1970s as a splinter group of the Church of World Messianity (Sekai Kyūseikyō 世界救世教), a major new religious organization that was founded by Okada Mokichi 岡田茂吉 in 1935. Okada has been an influential figure for more than thirty splinter groups that have emerged since his death in 1955.<sup>26</sup> Like most of the other splinter groups, Kagamikyō’s teachings and practices are based on Okada’s writings, which combine elements of Shinto, Buddhism, and Christianity.

Organizationally, Kagamikyō consists of a core group of full-time workers who live in the group’s facilities, and a general membership of lay members who attend weekly meetings and monthly ceremonies. After Kagamikyō’s split from The Church of World Messianity, it was led by the founding female leader and her husband, until their deaths in 2006. Up until 2006, when the eldest son took over, the group was characterized by a theological emphasis on the teachings of Okada and an organizational emphasis on the authority of the founder and her husband. In other words, while Okada’s theology and cosmology remained the ultimate religious teachings, the founding leader and her husband exercised their control over the form of ritual practices, membership requirements, and the structure of leadership, and the founder’s husband published a monthly organizational magazine with his own interpretations of Okada’s teachings. In their writings and speeches that were published in various books and pamphlets, the founder and her husband promoted themselves as the legitimate heirs and spiritual equals of Okada. Moreover, until 2010 in every office and meeting room, as well as in all of their ritual facilities, large portraits of the founder were hung alongside pictures of Okada. Under the religious authority of Okada, channeled through the leadership of these two charismatic leaders, the group grew from several thousand members in the 1970s to claim as many as 140,000 members in Japan by the first years of the twenty-first century. Since the early 1990s they have also expanded overseas, building small branch offices in Nepal, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Brazil.

Theologically, Kagamikyō inherited Okada’s complex cosmology of the relationship between the material and spiritual worlds. The souls (*reikon* 靈魂) of all living creatures progress through different “spiritual levels” which determine one’s physical health as well as reincarnation. There are 180 such levels, and one’s soul can move up or down through these levels depending on the “pollution” of one’s body and soul. Such pollution can be

24 On the Aum Affair, see Baffelli and Reader 2012; Hardacre 2003; Mullins 2012; Reader 2001. On Sōka Gakkai, see McLaughlin 2012.

25 As Rots (2013, p. 60) succinctly notes, the concept of religion has undergone “a semantic change—that is, the term ‘religion’ has become contaminated in public discourse, and the amount of people willing to identify with it has decreased.”

26 See Matsuoka 2007.



Figure 2. Group *johrei*: Members performing *johrei* to each other at an annual ceremony in one of their older Kansai facilities. Photo from a promotional pamphlet published by Kagamikyō.

accumulated through a disrespectful attitude and behavior toward others, as well as through material pollutants in the form of pesticides and pharmaceutical medicines. Okada developed this cosmology and theory of pollutants during the 1930s–1950s, when industrial chemicals and epidemics ravaged the country. In response to these modern pollutants, Okada taught that members needed to purify both their body and soul through a specific practice of faith-healing known as *johrei* 浄霊.

Kagamikyō inherited the practice of *johrei*, which is the ritual focus of the religious life of Kagamikyō members. In Kagamikyō, *johrei* is the practice of channelling healing energy to purify mind and body. Members can perform *johrei* to heal themselves and others of both mental and physical illness. The practice involves raising the hand, palm-outward, toward someone (either member or non-member) for between five to ten minutes, or longer if needed. All members acquire this power having completed the initiation ceremony and received an amulet, which is the only material sign of organizational membership.<sup>27</sup>

Like many other new religions, Kagamikyō was founded by a local leader who broke away from an older religious organization. Yet, while Kagamikyō inherited many of the teachings and practices of the previous organization, it did not inherit much infrastructure in terms of facilities or funding. As a result, Kagamikyō does not own (or at least does not openly report) other sources of revenue, such as rentable land, golf courses, or museums, and the leaders do not publish commercially available books for a popular audience. Rather, Kagamikyō has spent the last forty years building its membership base and funds through active proselytizing. Leaders claim that their organizational funds come exclusively from members' initiation fees, monthly membership fees, and voluntary donations. The reliance on funds from members allowed the group to grow quickly during its early years, but it has also become a bottleneck. As the membership is getting older and many are living only on pensions, donations have become a less reliable source of income, and there has been a new push for gaining new, younger members. Against this backdrop, the drive for international growth has become increasingly important for leaders.

### Kagamikyō's Religious Globalization and Restructurings

Faced with the new changes and challenges in demographics, social conditions, and finances as outlined above, Kagamikyō has developed a variety of revitalization strategies to adapt and grow under the rhetoric of "going global." Their moves include consolidating branches within Japan to conserve economic and personnel resources, reforming and revitalizing rituals to reach new young members, and proselytizing to young Japanese and

<sup>27</sup> *Johrei* is usually practiced one-on-one, with both individuals sitting on the floor, or in chairs, although more senior members can perform *johrei* on more than one individual at a time.



non-Japanese in public spaces, rather than relying on their traditional method of door-to-door proselytizing.<sup>28</sup> Altogether, Kagamikyō's move toward "going global" is part of a strategy which includes appealing to global audiences as well as internal restructuring in order to survive in an environment of growing religious skepticism.

Specifically, Kagamikyō's major global push began in 2009 when leaders and members started to talk excitedly about how they would build their overseas headquarters in New York City to initiate their project of "saving America." This project aimed at expanding their membership in the U.S. and gaining recognition as a religious organization among Americans. In fact, this global push is closely tied to domestic revitalization, and was seen as facilitating the future growth of Kagamikyō in Japan through a recursive process of expanding outward to the West and then returning to Japan as an internationally recognized organization.<sup>29</sup>

Kagamikyō had already built small branch offices in Nepal, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Brazil in the early 1990s, but leaders noted that they were unable to achieve a sustainable local membership in these countries. These early attempts at overseas proselytizing were unsuccessful, partly because the teachings and practices were left largely untranslated and unexplained, and also because of the over-reliance on donations from Japanese members to support the overseas members, who were mostly from poor communities. As a result, the local branches had been unsustainable, and leaders said that this had even led to a negative image of Kagamikyō overseas. The assistant director of Kagamikyō explained to me that America is the key frontier because "if we can gain acceptance in the U.S., other Japanese and non-Japanese may be convinced about our mission." America is the first step to "going global." Since the beginning of the twenty-first century Kagamikyō's broader global strategy has thus started from their new U.S. headquarters, while it also includes expanding their existing facilities in Asia and South America.

As Kagamikyō spread overseas, it underwent internal changes as well. Since the spring of 2009, leaders explained to me that Kagamikyō had reached a new chapter as a "global super-religion" (*sekaiteki chō-shūkyō* 世界超宗教), a refrain that they repeated in different ceremonies and pamphlets throughout the following years. Specifically, leaders announced their intention to "change our name from Kagamikyō to the 'Paradise on Earth Research Institute' to show people in the world our true mission." They revealed plans to transform their Japan headquarters into the "Paradise on Earth Theme Park" in five years.<sup>30</sup> More than just a facility for religious rituals, the new theme park would be a place for both education and entertainment. It would include tennis courts, basketball courts, a swimming pool, and other sports facilities; an art museum, sculpture garden, library, and movie theater; and a natural foods restaurant and market where people could dine and purchase organic foods

28 Although their efforts have accelerated over the past fifteen years, Kagamikyō has been a latecomer to overseas proselytizing and expansion, which for many new religions began in the early twentieth century. See Matsuoka 2007; Nakamaki 1991; Robertson 1987; Shimazono 2004.

29 This attempt to harness international appeal in order to gain domestic legitimacy is common in many Japanese new religions. Clammer 2014 (p. 6) also suggests that this is a way that members of Japanese religions create a meaningful identity and sense of community amidst accelerating globalization, noting that, "The local becomes legitimized through its ability to relate itself to the global."

30 The name "Paradise on Earth Research Institute" is also a pseudonym, though the actual name has a similar connotation of being a scientific-like research institute. Likewise, the name for their new theme park has equivalent connotations.

and flowers. It would also include nighttime illumination and live music by their orchestra, who perform their Kagamikyō songs with Händel's Messiah and Disney medleys.

Furthermore, beginning in 2009, the leaders introduced reforms in organizational structure, symbols, and ritual objects. At the 2009 Paradise Festival, changes in the structure and nomenclature of membership were announced by the eldest son of the founders, who was called the chairperson (*kaichō* 会長) of Kagamikyō. While the original structure had been headed by the founder and her husband surrounded by several top ministers and regional ministers, this small group of top-ranking members was now reorganized into a corporate-like structure. The eldest son retained the title of chairperson, but he announced that his own eldest son would be in charge of day-to-day affairs as the acting chairperson (*kaichō dairi* 会長代理). Below them were three tiers of managers, comprising a “managerial staff” (*yakuin* 役員) of fourteen people. The titles of full-time workers and high-level leaders who worked beneath them were restyled from “chief priests” (*kanchō* 管長), “branch leaders” (*shibuchō* 支部長), and “religious teachers” (*kyōshi* 教師) to “chief” (*chīfu* チーフ), “managers” (*manejā* マネジャー), and “staff” (*sutaffu* スタッフ), respectively. Finally, lay members were no longer “believers” (*shinto* 信徒) but “members” (*kaiin* 会員). The changes in titles were less “old-fashioned” and more in line with “global standards” (*sekai kijun* 世界基準), and the corporatized structure reflected the organization's goal of becoming the “construction company of Paradise on Earth” (*chijōtengoku no kensetsu gaisha* 地上天国の建設会社).

In 2009, Kagamikyō also changed its emblem from a simple monochrome star to a multicolored pinwheel symbolizing the five continents of the world, in order to enhance their “cosmopolitan” image. They next introduced a new amulet for members, a gold-colored metallic pendant. While Kagamikyō had used a paper-and-cloth amulet based on the one used by The Church of World Messianity as the symbol of membership and source of *johrei* for over forty years, the new metal amulet was both “more durable” and “attractive.” The new amulet resembled “a beautiful piece of jewelry,” where its predecessor was more traditionally Buddhist.

In the months and years following these changes in 2009, members were continually updated about the changes at home and overseas at their monthly meetings and yearly festivals. As of 2015, construction of the American headquarters in New York City had been completed, and The Paradise on Earth Theme Park project continues to develop, though it is still closed to non-members. Also by 2015, the organizational restructuring, new titles, and new amulet had been incorporated throughout their Japanese and overseas congregations. There was also a new website, and an updated English promotional video. The new online presence highlighted in bold English their more scientific-sounding and cosmopolitan name, “The Paradise on Earth Research Institute,” while avoiding any mention of the word “religion.”<sup>31</sup> Members, too, began to refer to the group as “the research institute (*kenkyūjo* 研究所).” Kagamikyō staff described these changes in various ways. Some called it “getting rid of old-fashioned elements” or “eliminating convoluted religious terms and concepts,” and others expressed the changes as following “global standards” (*sekai kijun*).

31 Nonetheless, when I asked a member if Kagamikyō had officially become a nonreligious organization, she answered that Kagamikyō remained as a religious incorporated organization “because they get tax breaks that way.”

Throughout these drastic changes, the leaders were very careful lest they lose members' support or confuse them about the organization's traditional practices and their future direction. Indeed, at one of their annual ceremonies a top leader announced, "Some of you might be thinking, 'This is not my Kagamikyō. This is not how we should do things.' But this is necessary for our new phase as a 'global super-religion.'" (see CMS 6.11) And yet, the leaders' attempt to remake the organization into a "global super-religion" has not come without a price. The globalizing themes and practices were inherently directed toward shoring up their domestic membership, yet ironically, the costs of Kagamikyō's globalization have been highest for domestic participants and have produced unexpected challenges.

One of the major challenges is the differential treatment that Japanese and non-Japanese receive. Inside Japan, initiation fees have increased from \$100 to \$300 due to the change in amulets, the cost for new construction projects, and an increasing number of overseas members who cannot afford to support the local branches in their countries. There is also increasing pressure on members to participate more actively in proselytizing and ceremonial gatherings. Corporate-like pressures to participate and achieve success in proselytization have been imposed on lay members, and used as a measure for promotion within the ranks of the organization. These new measures of member participation and proselytizing have also become ways for the leadership to better assess the size of their active membership.

Kagamikyō staff members who had worked overseas told me that one of the biggest challenges in recruiting new overseas members are the membership fees, as most new members are poor. As a result, Japanese members are encouraged to contribute more to support their overseas branches, as well as to fund the staff members' overseas proselytizing trips and the new construction of mission branches. Japanese members I have talked to often grudgingly accepted these demands and described these financial pressures on them as something "necessary to adjust for growing overseas"; some justify the new costs of membership as being in line with the demands of being a "global organization." I did not encounter any long-term members who resisted these plans or openly questioned the leadership, although I did hear of some members quitting shortly after joining because of these pressures for donations and proselytizing.

In addition to attracting foreign members outside of Japan, Kagamikyō also tries to attract foreign members within Japan by offering them special treatment. Non-Japanese members are offered a discounted "foreigner price" for the group chartered bus trips to attend ceremonies in the Kansai region. These differences in treatment do not go unquestioned by some Japanese members. One long-time Japanese member admitted to me that, "The leaders are very nice to foreign members, but they are very strict on us Japanese members. There is always a lot of pressure to donate more, to get more international members."

On the individual level, some younger members are excited about new developments like the theme park and the opportunity to meet more foreign members, while older experienced members are more critical. Some members expressed confusion at the pace of Kagamikyō's changes, and the new financial demands on their participation. For example, one seventy-year-old woman tended to share confusion and resignation, confessing: "They used to call it a religion, and now they say it's not a religion. I can't really keep up with the changes. But to be honest, it doesn't matter to me, as *johrei* works and this has kept me

and my husband healthy.” Another middle-aged housewife member conceded, “They ask for more and more money. But of course it costs money to run this religion, so I cannot complain about it.” This sentiment was echoed by many of the older members and younger second-generation members.

In short, while religious globalization can be an important strategy to get more international members and to mobilize domestic members, it also comes with new challenges such as higher costs for domestic members, and can create new tensions among members.

### **The Institutional “Costs” of Religious Globalization**

While Kagamikyō exercised more direct supervision over and applied greater pressure on domestic members, the strategy of going global has also come at a cost to certain aspects of leadership and religious practices. One of the first hints of transformation was manifest in members’ physical experience of the group’s ceremonies. Beginning in 2009, leaders deemed the practice of kneeling on tatami mats (*seiza* 正座), which is widely used in religious rituals in Japan as a method of bodily discipline, as no longer necessary. They explained that foreigners, as well as young Japanese, are not used to this posture, and so they began replacing tatami mats in all of their facilities with chairs or stadium-style seating. In addition, some older members who had back and leg problems were relieved no longer to have to practice *seiza* for rituals and meetings.

Eventually, more radical transformations took place in their meetings and ceremonies. Previously monthly meetings and annual ceremonies had focused on one-on-one *johrei* followed by long sessions of reading from the complex theological writings by Okada and interpretations by the founder’s husband. Beginning in 2010, however, the reading sessions at the monthly meetings were replaced with discussions on the changes and new developments in the organization, as well as reading messages of gratitude from new overseas members.

The annual ceremonies, on the other hand, focused on group *johrei*, singing songs alongside the orchestral performances, and listening to announcements about future changes in the organization and its progress overseas. Meanwhile, the religious texts used by the organization were revised and streamlined. Previously, branch offices had stocked over two-dozen volumes of religious texts written by the founder’s husband for use in instructing new members. In 2010, these were replaced with a new three-volume text, which consisted solely of highly-edited selections from the writings of Okada, and an even more simplified two-volume text in English. These are now the only texts required for members to study.

The dynamics of authority within the leadership were also reformed. The previous hierarchical and parochial membership structure was revised and religious terminology was replaced with corporate-sounding titles, but other more fundamental changes in the structure and display of authority were implemented now too. Before the reforms under the chairperson in 2009, the original founder and her husband had openly demonstrated their control over all aspects of the group through official writings and announcements, and they were the only ones who presided over major ceremonies. Serving under them, several chief priests had been in charge of organizational matters, and branch leaders oversaw the different regional congregations. Under the new leadership restructuring, the authority of the founding family was downplayed. First, while the eldest son inherited the leadership

in 2006, he did not continue the family tradition of presiding over ceremonies, and he only occasionally gave speeches. Instead, he relied on the branch leaders and local religious teachers to run ceremonies. This was part of the broader transformation of the organization away from its previous focus on the charismatic leadership of the founders, and towards a more systematized and corporate-like organization.

In accordance with the leadership restructuring, the chairperson withdrew from visible participation in the organization. Unlike his father, he does not publish writings about religious matters or interpretations of Okada's teachings; and he also has no portraits of himself hung in facilities as his mother had. Moreover, while it had been standard practice to bow to the founder's photo hung in the altar at all facilities, in 2009 members no longer bowed to the photo, and by 2010 the photo was removed from all the altars. When I asked members about this change, older members explained that "the top leaders felt the practice was too old-fashioned, and young people and foreigners might 'misunderstand' Kagamikyō [that is, as a dangerous cult]." Young people saw this change positively, as they had felt it strange to bow to the founder's picture as well as to Okada's portrait. In brief, the charismatic leadership that had marked the founding couple's tenure was replaced with a more "modern" and "rational" form of bureaucratic leadership, with the new chairperson and his son serving more as faithful stewards than as dynamic and charismatic leaders.

In fact, these various changes were part of the strategy for transforming Kagamikyō's image entirely. Faced with initial challenges in gaining members in North America as well as in Asia, leaders had often attributed their difficulties to the highly "Japanese" nature of Kagamikyō, which they felt may be "difficult for non-Japanese to understand." One local leader, Chief Sato, a woman in her late forties, explained that the reason Kagamikyō had difficulty appealing globally was that it had many "traditional Japanese elements and practices," such as archaic prayers and rituals. For example, she pointed out how the main prayer at the beginning of every ritual and ceremony, the Amatsu Norito 天津祝詞, was an ancient Shinto prayer in highly archaic Japanese. Not only was it difficult for foreigners to recite, but it was also incomprehensible for most Japanese. Noting Kagamikyō's global strategies and increasing attention to gaining foreign recognition, she speculated, "Probably in ten years we will replace this archaic Japanese prayer with a simple English prayer," which would be easier for foreigners to learn and which would sound less "old-fashioned" and more "global" to Japanese members.

Indeed, some practices like sitting *seiza* on tatami mats, bowing to the founder's image, or reciting the Amatsu Norito that were marked as distinctly Japanese "religious" practices were suddenly seen as "outdated" and potentially "harmful" for Kagamikyō's globalizing process. At the same time, the group's central practice of *johrei* was revitalized by appropriating the global trend of "spirituality" movements. Many young members told me that the main attraction of Kagamikyō is *johrei*, which they claimed not only healed illness but also improved circulation, prevented dental cavities, improved complexion, and even made food taste better.<sup>32</sup>

Since the latter part of the first decade of the twenty-first century, Kagamikyō also started proselytizing to foreigners in the major parks in downtown Tokyo by offering

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32 In the aftermath of the 2011 nuclear reactor meltdown in Fukushima, both younger and older members also claimed that *johrei* could eliminate radiation in food and protect against the effects of radiation exposure.

*johrei* as a new kind of spiritual practice. While Japanese people often refused the offer immediately, non-Japanese tended to be curious about the spiritual nature of the practice. With her experience in proselytizing in New York city, Chief Sato proposed that while the “religious” claims of this practice may not be easily accepted by younger Japanese, *johrei* could in fact gain acceptance alongside popular Japanese practices like Reiki and Zen among people from countries like Australia, the U.S., and Brazil, where “people were more open to spiritual things.”

Moreover, in the process of proselytizing in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Singapore, and the Philippines, staff told me how they were surprised by local people’s openness to this practice due to perceived similarities with indigenous healing practices such as pranic healing and yoga. Coincidentally, at a 2010 ceremony at Kagamikyō’s Kansai headquarters, I met an Indian Hindu member who expressed his enthusiasm for *johrei*, saying, “Kagamikyō is a lot like Hinduism; it respects many gods everywhere. But the one thing that Hinduism lacks is a healing power like *johrei*.” He added, “However, it is also important to practice Hindu meditation, as this makes *johrei* even stronger.” This suggests that even in many areas of South and Southeast Asia that have vibrant local religions, *johrei* could be accepted by people as a healing technique that complements their local religious practices.

Thus, part of Kagamikyō’s globalization strategy is selectively to choose, relativize, and revitalize the meanings of their healing practice by tapping into local spiritual practices in South and Southeast Asia, as well as by referencing popular Japanese spiritual practices in the West such as Reiki and Zen, which carry a sense of cosmopolitanism.<sup>33</sup> While this may seem contradictory to the leaders’ intention of expanding the authoritative power of their particular practice, leaders explained that as long as local people believe in the healing power of *johrei* and were open to receiving it and practicing it, it was not really “problematic” if they did not fully understand the deeper cosmology or teachings of Kagamikyō. In this way, leaders and members explained *johrei* to non-Japanese by relativizing its distinctiveness as a religious practice rooted in Kagamikyō’s specific theology and cosmology. They made strategic use of local spiritual practices and the ambiguous language of popular forms of spirituality to create familiarity and affinity among non-Japanese people. The ritual efficacy of *johrei* as Kagamikyō’s distinctive religious healing practice is seemingly not undermined by a lack of understanding on the part of recipients, and it was considered entirely appropriate to explain *johrei* in terms of other religious cosmologies and healing techniques.<sup>34</sup>

In short, all of these strategies reveal not only the changing vision of Kagamikyō, but also changing attitudes and images about what “religion” should be within a modern, global society. As Casanova remarks, “Under conditions of globalization, world religions do not only draw upon their own traditions but also increasingly upon one another.”<sup>35</sup> Likewise, as Dessì shows how Japanese religious organizations themselves are “carriers of globalization” in

33 See Dessì (2013) for an analysis of the reception of practices such as Reiki and Zen in the West that play into middle-class and cosmopolitan desires. See also Rocha (2006) for the cosmopolitan attraction of Zen in Brazil.

34 This observation echoes Dessì’s (2013) concept of “glocalization” as part of the process of “religious globalization.”

35 Casanova 2006, p. 17. He further notes: “Inter-civilizational encounters, cultural imitations and borrowings, diasporic diffusions, hybridity, creolization, and transcultural hyphenations are all part and parcel of the global present.”



the spheres of religious dialogue, politics, environmentalism, and humanitarianism, as well as through unintended influence on popular culture and spirituality overseas, Kagamikyō and its members also became agents of globalization as they connected with local populations and merged their own teachings and rituals with local ideas and practices.

Despite the various attempts at reform and revitalization both at home and abroad, the success of Kagamikyō's new global moves is unclear. From my conversations with leaders and members in 2016, I have the impression that domestic

membership is not growing, but it may be stable. Kagamikyō's membership base seems to remain strong in the Kansai region, where the founder is from and where their religious facilities are concentrated, and I met many second and third-generation members from the region who were excited about Kagamikyō's new developments. However, Kagamikyō has faced increasing difficulty outside of the Kansai region; in fall 2010 they closed their Tokyo branch office, indicating continued difficulty in maintaining their membership in the Kanto region. Yet, while their domestic revitalization may be slow, their global strategy seems to be bearing fruit. Beginning in 2009 I began to see more non-Japanese (particularly Nikkei Brazilians and Southeast Asians) attending the Kansai ceremonies. Overseas, I heard that the New York City branch was attracting the regular attendance of immigrants from Latin America and Southeast Asia. Thus, while specific numbers on membership are difficult to obtain, Kagamikyō does seem to be expanding the international dimension of the organization and moving beyond an exclusively Japanese membership base.

Kagamikyō is thus responding to potential sources of tension and the stigma of new religions in Japan by adapting their rituals, materials, and teachings to the contemporary needs of both domestic and international members.<sup>36</sup> Leaders have enabled members to interpret and engage with the organization's teachings and practices in a variety of ways by reframing and reforming Kagamikyō's activities in more "global" language and practice, as well as by linking their rhetoric and ideas with those of other religious and secular movements around the world.<sup>37</sup> Taken together, the institutional changes under their globalizing strategies have facilitated the "softening" of the group's somewhat "old-fashioned" structure and practices by relativizing the leadership's distinctive religious authority over the meanings and mechanisms of its ritual practices like *johrei* both abroad and at home.

Rather than becoming radicalized in their ideology or exclusive in their membership, Kagamikyō has transcended their original religious doctrine and practices through a global and religiously inclusive revitalization strategy and so escaped some of the stigma



Figure 3. International members greeting Japanese members at a 2010 ceremony in the new Kansai worship hall. Photo by the author.

<sup>36</sup> See also Numata 1988; Shimazono 2001; Shimazono 2004.

<sup>37</sup> Certainly, participating in various private religious practices for personal reasons has been long noted as a feature of Japanese religiosity. See for example Reader and Tanabe 1998.

of Japanese new religions. Instead they aim to claim a multicultural and “super-religious” form of “global citizenship” for the organization and its members.<sup>38</sup> These movements of transcending exclusivist religious roles mark one of the key dimensions of the strategic use of globalization among Japanese new religions.<sup>39</sup>

### **The Dynamics of Religious Globalization: Reconfiguring Religion and the Secular**

Through these various changes, Kagamikyō aims to go beyond being a “Japanese religion” and to project itself as a “global super-religion.” This is not unique among Japanese new religions. As Inoue Nobutaka has argued, the increasing interactions between various religious ideas and practices in the context of globalization have contributed to “the increasing fuzziness of discrimination between the realms of the religious and nonreligious or the secular.”<sup>40</sup> He observes, “Since religion enjoys a different status in different places around the globe, the concept of religion itself is forced to undergo transformation as part of the process of globalization.”<sup>41</sup>

New religions like Kagamikyō have developed in response to the increasingly penetrating and intensifying forces of modernization and globalization, and they have often been created out of a combination of religious and secular ideas and practices from around the world. As such, the challenges and transformations experienced by new religions offer important insights into how new forms of religion and secularity are also shaping and shaped by the dynamics of religious globalization. Likewise, in his exploration of Japanese new religions and national identity, Clammer identifies how religious globalization has been tied to internal transformations in Japan: “As the Japanese religions have set about expanding into the world, so their experiences and images of the world have flowed back into Japan, presenting a variety of alternative identities and worldviews.”<sup>42</sup> This case study of Kagamikyō highlights how the increasingly complex interactions between religious institutions, ideas, and practices at both institutional and individual levels also produces a reverse flow of internal changes within the domestic structure, practice, and experience of religious groups and their members back in the home country.

The internal changes triggered by and through Kagamikyō’s global engagement resonate with the concept of “internal secularization.” Luckmann first developed this concept to describe the process in which organizations de-emphasize transcendent or otherworldly aspects.<sup>43</sup> The concept was later used by Dobbelaere, Chaves, and Thomas to describe the internal moves by an organization to relativize their own religious and moral authority by “outsourcing” authority to institutions within broader society.<sup>44</sup> Kagamikyō and other new religious groups that have made moves to identify with “nonreligious” or “super-religious” discourses variously attempt to “eliminate elements that stink of Japanese

38 For a nuanced reading of the cultural dynamics behind such claims to universality, see Dessi’s (2013) discussion of “cultural chauvinism” in some Japanese religions’ global engagements. For a discussion of the rhetoric of pacifism and peace in Japanese religions, see Kisala 1999. On the multinationalization of Japanese religions, see Nakamaki 1991.

39 For example, Cornille 1991; Hurbon 1991; Matsuoka 2007.

40 Inoue 1997, np.

41 Inoue 1997, np.

42 Clammer 2014, p. 3.

43 Luckmann 1967.

44 Chaves 1994; Dobbelaere 1981; Dobbelaere 1985; Dobbelaere 2002; Thomas 2013.

religion.”<sup>45</sup> Building on these discussions, we can say that Kagamikyō’s strategy of religious globalization shows how “internal secularization” must be examined as one of the dynamics within broader processes of religious globalization.

As religious organizations engage with other religious and nonreligious ideas and institutions on the global stage, some organizations may become radicalized and exclusivist. Other organizations, such as Kagamikyō, self-consciously transform their teachings, structures, and practices to de-emphasize distinctive religious aspects and to complement nonreligious attitudes and practices of broader society.<sup>46</sup> Crucially, the Japanese case of groups like Kagamikyō highlights the dynamic, reverberating effects of religious globalization on the internal structures, practices, and meanings of the religious organization in its country of origin—what could be seen as the reflexive influence of global-level secularization at the domestic institutional level.<sup>47</sup>

Kagamikyō’s encounters with non-Japanese overseas have spurred leaders to make their message accessible and acceptable to more people within a global context. At the same time, they have de-emphasized many of the theologically complex aspects of their teachings in favor of more tangible products, such as the construction of new facilities and more “modern”-looking religious paraphernalia, while maintaining and promoting their core ritual practice of *johrei*. These changes reflect a kind of “internal secularization” in which leaders seek to transform the symbolic meanings, social presentation, and ritual practices within their organization.

Furthermore, given the highly self-conscious ways that leaders attempt to distance themselves from negative connotations of religion and to “normalize” their practices, these moves show a high degree of reflexivity among contemporary religious organizations in Japan—what could be characterized as “reflexive secularization.” Resonating with Rots’ concept of discursive secularization that marks contemporary Shinto’s adaptations to shifting public attitudes toward Shinto, “reflexive secularization” refers to the self-conscious aspect of organizational change, which is informed by leaders’ awareness of the reputation and relative repositioning of their organization vis-à-vis other religious groups within secular societies.<sup>48</sup> Rather than emphasizing ideological exclusivity or stressing their distinctiveness as a Japanese religion, leaders explicitly and strategically use nonreligious language and downplay what they see as “religious” (*shūkyō-teki* 宗教的) aspects of their teachings and rituals. In this way, Kagamikyō is able to merge its image and practices both with other religions like Christianity and Buddhism and with nonreligious discourses and practices of

45 Dobbelaere’s broader definition of “internal secularization” also includes “the elimination of religion *per se*” enacted by religious organizations themselves. For example, see Dobbelaere 2002, p. 115.

46 This resonates with recent formulations of secularization theories that examine the transformations in the scope of religious authority within the global societal level and the transformation of religious organizations at the institutional level. For example, see Chaves 1994, Dessì 2013; see also Casanova 2006; Dobbelaere 1981; Dobbelaere 1985; Dobbelaere 2002.

47 This makes an interesting parallel with Casanova’s insight about Hinduism and Buddhism that “The institutional transformation in the immigrant diasporas is in turn affecting profoundly the religious institutional forms in the civilizational home areas” (2006, p. 19).

48 The concept of “reflexive secularization” echoes Taylor’s (2007) notion of “non-naïve” belief as one of the characteristics of the contemporary “secular age.” In the case of Japan, Dessì also notes the increasing reflexive awareness among social actors, including religious actors, under globalization (Dessì 2013, p. 100).

world peace and global citizenship in broader national and global contexts.<sup>49</sup> This reflexive approach to secularization is both enabled and intensified by new discourses of religion and secularity that such organizations encounter as they expand overseas.

## Conclusion

From one perspective, the challenges and changes facing religion in Japan reflect similar dynamics in many parts of the world that are confronting demographic changes, political transitions, and intensifying global capitalism. Such changes have often fed the radicalization of religious ideologies in societies where groups have become increasingly active in redefining the limits and roles of religion in the public sphere. In many regions, religious and secularist identity politics have intensified as individuals clash over the role of religion both in domestic politics and global politics, implicitly problematizing conventional categories of religion and secularity.<sup>50</sup>

Despite the similar challenges and changes confronting religion in Japan, the response by most Japanese religious groups has not been one of radicalization or politicization. This raises an important question: how should we interpret the various dynamics and formations of the religious and the secular in contemporary Japan? Do the particular historical developments and emic meanings of religious and secular forms mean that we should abandon the conventional Western categories of “religion” and “secular,” as some scholars have advocated?<sup>51</sup> Despite the lack of agreement over how to identify and analyze religion and the secular cross-culturally, a range of recent works argue that the secular need not be seen as only a modern, Western creation.<sup>52</sup> Likewise, as this article has also argued, analyzing the concept of secularization from the perspective of religious globalization reveals how in the contemporary, globalized world, all religions are made to confront the notions of religion and secularity as they encounter diverse religious practices and social contexts, regardless of the origin of particular notions of religion and secularity.

Analyzing the formations of the secular in Japan within the context of contemporary globalization is thus instructive in demonstrating one way in which certain groups attempt to find a way out of the secular/religious cul-de-sac in modern society without invoking simplistic teleological arguments about a religious past versus a secular modernity.<sup>53</sup> Like Kagamikyō, many groups in Japan make claims to one form or another of a “super-religious” organization, eschewing classifications of the conventionally religious or conventionally

49 See Rots in this issue. In a similar way, Levi McLaughlin (2013, p. 312) notes that, “since the late 1990s, practitioners of various types of spirituality, from the mystical to the mundane, have almost uniformly identified themselves as something other than religious.” As a broader trend among religious groups and among the public, some have linked this turn away from religious identification to a global shift away from institutionalized religion and a rise in “spiritual business,” “pop spiritualism,” and commodified spirituality in the place of “traditional” religion (for example, Gaitanidis 2011; Sakurai 2011; Shimada 2008; Tsujimura 2008).

50 For example, Casanova 2012; Casanova 2013; Habermas 2008; cf. Furani 2015.

51 For Japan, see Fitzgerald 2003; for a general critique of the concept of the secular, see Asad 2003.

52 Krämer 2013; Paramore 2012; Teeuwen 2013.

53 For an agenda on developing a global comparative analysis of secularization in this vein, see Casanova 2006. See also Teeuwen (2013), who argues against the current trend in dismissing the utility of the concepts of religion and the secular outside of the West. He suggests that “the notion that we can transcend our own cultural context and understand a different time and place on its own terms is ultimately an illusion” (2013, p. 18), and he defends the comparative analysis of religion and secularity in Japan through nuanced historical analysis. For specific case studies, see Mullins 2012; Nelson 2012; Porcu 2012; Rots 2013.

secular. Rather than presenting themselves as either religious or nonreligious, these organizations are skillfully able to claim *both* without clashing with other secular or religious institutions.

Altogether, what I found among members of Kagamikyō was that the challenges and opportunities they were facing were not about the clash of new ideologies of religious radicalism, nor about the disappearance of religion from modern society. Rather, the main conditions shaping Kagamikyō's domestic situation are a shrinking population, socioeconomic and urban changes, and an "allergy to religion." In response to these challenges, the "globalization of religion" has become a useful tool for growth and change. As part of this strategy, leaders feel that in order to increase membership and to respond to Japan's changing society, it is also necessary to restructure the organization and expand abroad by appealing to "global standards" in their rhetoric and practices, and to remake their organization into a more "modern" and "secular" space for leisure and health. As a result, members in Japan have been shouldered with certain increased costs. Yet despite such sudden changes most have become more or less complicit and tried to contribute to the organization's global vision, while maintaining their own private reasons to practice the religion.

Furthermore, unlike struggles over religious identity and religious/ethnic citizenship that emerged among many religions under intensified globalization, Kagamikyō has pursued a strategy of embracing both religious and secular discourses and practices from around the world in the process of becoming a "global super-religion."<sup>54</sup> Indeed, one may say that the cost for Kagamikyō as a Japanese religious organization has been particularly severe as they have sacrificed aspects of their distinctive religious/ethnic identity. However, no member of Kagamikyō during my fieldwork raised this with me as an issue of concern. In fact, they openly embraced different religious ideas and they were enthusiastic about the increasing opportunities for nonreligious engagement with leisure and health activities as part of Kagamikyō's new direction as a global religion. For members in Japan, Kagamikyō's interaction with broader religious and secular forces through "going global" did not make them feel like a minority group caught up in a global competition for religious authority, but rather it connected them to other global movements and gave them a sense of being a part of something greater.

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<sup>54</sup> On issues of religious identity and ethnic citizenship among world religions, see Casanova 1994; Coleman and Collins 2004.

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