

# The Provision of Economic Control Laws and Economic “Crime” in Colonial Korea during the Period of All-out War

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## Introduction

“Modern wars are said to be all-out warfare, but future wars will not only be about weapons, but will also cross into ideas, economics, and all other aspects, and if nation states do not devote all of the power that they have to the fight, winning will be extremely difficult ... The cornerstone of a country’s power is its economic strength, and the longer the battle, the superiority of economic power will affect the outcome extremely greatly.”<sup>1</sup>

In December 1938, Mitsuhashi Kōichirō, the head of the Police Affairs Bureau at the Korean Government-General, in his appeal on the radio, not only broke into “all out war” during the Sino-Japanese war, but also called for authentic military cooperation from the home front of the Korean colony, touching on economic life. In other words, to prevent inflation due to the expanding costs of the military and the shrinking budget in real terms concomitant with this, as well as to plan the effective mobilization of human and material resources, there was configured a command economic system not only in the Japanese mainland but also throughout the Japanese empire and surrounding block.

This paper aims to examine the shape in which this controlled economic system during wartime manifested in Korea from both the aspects of configuration and operation of the restrictive laws, and to analyze economic “crime,” which tried to escape the net of controls. Of these, I have consciously pursued the question of clarifying the restrictive legal system and its operation in Korea during the war in particular, which is the primary issue, from the point of comparisons with the Japanese mainland. This is because I think evaluation is proceeding without sufficient concomitant discussion of the similarities and differences between Korean and Japanese economic controls.

One pioneering research that comprehensively handles the question of

Korea's wartime economic controls is Kim In-ho, *Taep'yŏng'yang chŏnjaengi Chosŏn kong'ŏp yŏn'gu* [Pacific War Period: Research on the Korean Industry], Shinsŏwŏn, 1998. This book explains the need to observe changes in the wartime Korean economy from within the framework of the comprehensive control system, and devotes one chapter to economic controls as well. The book holds the opinions that "Korea was under far greater fascistic state control than Japan proper," and "Japan tried to reinforce the Government-General-centered restrictive policies, which were completely different" (pp. 112–113). The book, however, adds almost nothing to the discussion of the Japanese case, and comes to firm conclusions on the differences with the Japanese mainland, leaving many questions to be verified. In addition, although there are plenty of related research results, such as the control of distributing and shipping the prices and individual goods, and the economic police, who were responsible for arresting violators of the restrictive laws in the last resort,<sup>2</sup> excluding the paper by Hŏ Yŏng-ran described below, awareness of the issue of examining the differences with the Japanese mainland have until now been scarce.

Further, on the other hand, it must be also pointed out that discussion by Japanese living in Korea and of colonial government bureaucrats during the era of economic controls reach the opposite conclusion of the Korean command economy. A column in the May 1941 issue of *Chŏsen kŏron* made the following observation ("Kŏron shunjū," p. 29).

People traveling to Japan all say the same thing: that Korea is rich in commodities, but that the Japanese mainland is considerably impoverished ... Korea's commodity wealth is its simplified administrative mechanisms with no major cities, so all merchandise is distributed uniformly at a single command from above, and there is no mal-distribution between provinces.

During the same period, Isaka Keiichirō, head of the commerce and industry section of the Government-General, cited the following characteristics of the Korean command economy, and emphasized that in Korea, "autonomy" is implemented without necessarily prioritizing the formal development of laws.<sup>3</sup>

I think that the following five points can be cited as the main characteristics of the Korean command economy:

- (1) The total administrative power of controls
- (2) The cooperation of the people with the administrative controls
- (3) The effort to maintain balance with the cultural level of the people in the formal upgrading of the controls
- (4) The use of existing mechanisms and organizations as far as possible
- (5) Legal sanctions are avoided as much as possible.

In the end, however, this ... leads to the conclusion that ... all power is concentrated in the Korean Governor-General, and is not in any way part of the results of we participants in the controls.

As can be seen from this, it is difficult to say that evaluations of wartime economic controls in colonial Korea are sure and certain. When discussing the similarities and differences of wartime economic controls in Korea and the Japanese mainland, setting out by failing to clarify targets and ignoring temporal differences does not make for a rigorous theory. In consideration of this point, this paper limits itself to problems, such as what sort of laws configured wartime economic controls in Korea, and the nature of the actual operation of these laws, and tries to approach these questions by unearthing continuous statistical data as far as possible. In this regard, although limited to the distribution of the materials required for living in the Seoul province, I referenced Hō Yōng-ran’s paper (see Note 2), which discusses the relaxation of the controls due to the lack of conditions for total regulation in Korea with a view to the differences from the Japanese mainland. This paper attempts to depict crudely the overall shape of the economically restricted policy mainly from the legal viewpoint while learning from this aspect.

**Table 1: Trends in the Numbers of Violators of the Economic Control Laws in Korea Accepted by the Prosecutor's Office (1937–1944)**

	Economic Crime (a)		Non-Economic Crime (b)		Total Number of People
	No. of People	Percentage ( $= (a) \times 100 / (a) + (b)$ )	No. of People	Percentage ( $= (b) \times 100 / (a) + (b)$ )	
Jul.–Dec. 1937	109	0.1	166,823	99.9	166,932
1938	765	0.5	155,353	99.5	156,118
1939	3,031	2.1	141,824	97.9	144,855
1940	21,858	14.5	128,747	85.5	150,605
1941	32,578	22.4	112,821	77.6	145,399
1942	30,304	21.7	109,057	78.3	139,361
1943	36,579	25.7	105,636	74.3	142,215
Jan.–Jun. 1944	27,738	27.7	72,320	72.3	100,058

Source: Korean Government-General, *Dai 86 kai teikoku gikai setsumei shiryō* [Explanatory Data for the 86th Imperial Parliament], 1944. (*Chōsen sōtokufu teikoku gikai setsumei shiryō*, vol. 10, reprinted by Fuji Shuppan, pp. 82–83)

Secondly, I would also like to touch briefly on an analysis of the actual conditions of economic “crime,” which is one of the themes of this manuscript. Since the 1980s, of all the great leaps in the development of research into the history of Korea during the colonial era, interest has focused in particular on the era following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, and there can be no objections to saying that research into social and economic history has taken precedence. As can be seen by the quotation, “In future, we should place slightly more emphasis on lifestyle and psychological history”<sup>4</sup> from Kwōn Tae-ōk, who criticized social and economic historical research, and the so-called “theory of colonial modernization” in particular, however, there may also be the aspect of descriptions of the actual economic lifestyles of the people playing second fiddle while citing important results in the macro conceptualizations of changes to the character of Korean society. This paper does not take an overall approach to popular and social history, but its focus on economic “crime” in Korea during the war may be of helping

in burying the flaws of research that are described above.

As can be seen in Table 1, economic “crime,” which manifested concomitant with the economic controls following the Sino-Japanese War, increased sharply, and occupied a high percentage of overall crime during the period in question. There is ample reason to think that part of Korean society of the time is reflected in these economic “crimes.”

Keeping the above problems in mind, this paper discusses in Chapters 1 and 2 the framework of the economic control laws and the overall shape of how violators were dealt with mainly using statistical data, and Chapter 3 attempts to extract the characteristics of economic crime in Korea during the dying days of the war, centering on food and labor-related crimes.

## 1. The Configuration of Economic Control Laws

Economic control laws during the war comprised three systems broadly divided by the basis of the law, as follows:<sup>5</sup>

- (a) Import/export temporary measures and related laws
- (b) Laws based on the National Mobilization Law
- (c) Other individual laws

With regards to (a), the law concerning temporary measures for import/export goods (Act no. 92. Implemented in Japan in September 1937, and in Korea in October 1937. Hereinafter abbreviated to the “Import/export temporary measures law.”) determined the discussion of suitable measures regarding the supply, handover, use, and consumption of goods whose demand and supply needed regulating by import controls, and specified the individual goods restricted in Japan by Ordinances of Ministry of Commerce and Industry Laws and Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and in Korea by edicts from the Government-General (hereinafter called “government edicts”). With regards to (b), the National Mobilization Law (Act no. 55. Passed both in Japan and in Korea in May 1938) was a law that specified the standards comprehensively and in outline, so invocation of its individual clauses were according to detailed implementation edicts. In Korea, the number of (c) increased, starting with the promulgation of “incidents concerning the control of trading for the purpose of excessive profits.” (Government edict no. 60, promulgated May 1937. Hereinafter called the “excessive profits control regulation.”)

It was the economic police who bore responsibility for apprehending violators to assure the effectiveness of the economic control laws. It was decided that the Korean economic police, who were inaugurated in November 1938, somewhat later than the Japanese economic police (est. July 1938) would handle the following:

- (1) Import/export temporary measures and related laws
- (2) Laws based on the National Mobilization Law
- (3) “Any additional laws that determine the handling by the economic police following discussions with the relevant bureaus at the police bureau as necessary.”<sup>6</sup>

Of the three systems of laws described above, only (b) the National Mobilization Law and related laws are not clearly described as handling laws, but given that restrictive laws on prices and on land rents based on the state mobilization law were also implemented in Korea in October 1939, the police bureau discussed the scope of the economic police in relation to these laws, and in the end, decided that “with regard to the two laws, we are involved in all aspects of instruction, crime prevention, and round-ups” as described above, based on the state mobilization law.<sup>7</sup>

Incidentally, what were the differences and similarities between the economic control systems in the Japanese mainland and in Korea? The minister of Colonial Affairs Ōtani Sonzan replied as follows to this point at the plenary session of parliament at which the National Mobilization Law was proposed in March 1938.

In places that are ruled by a somewhat powerful Government-General, such as Korea and Taiwan, the Governor-General is given considerable power, and taking the most appropriate policies in accordance with the circumstances in Korea, Taiwan, etc ... While progressing sufficiently in step with the controls placed on the Japanese mainland, on the other hand, I would like operations to be suited to the colonies. Total unification may be impossible, but it goes without saying that as a direction, we intend to make comprehensive progress over the controls.<sup>8</sup>

Further, Tanaka Takeo, who worked as the vice-Governor-General from 1942 to 1944, looked back as follows: Of course, we cooperated

(with the Japanese mainland) over the price and food controls. Of course, we cooperated, but, the primary focus was always on how the spirits of the native Koreans would be affected,” while affirming, “There is no special pricing system in Korea only differing from Japan in order to cooperate with the war. None at all.”<sup>9</sup>

What can be seen from this announcement from the head of government policy at the time was the introduction of differences in light of local colonial circumstances and the spirit of the local people, while implementing economic controls in Korea based on the same legal system as in the Japanese mainland. To consider the specific details, first of all, let us look at Table 2, which collates trends in the number of restrictive laws in both Korea and the Japanese mainland respectively. Further, this does not show all the economic control laws that were promulgated, but counts only those laws that in reality gave suitable examples and gave rise to violators.

**Table 2: Trends in the Number of Violable Laws (1938–1943)**

	(a) Import/Export Temporary Measures and Related Laws		(b) Laws Based on the National Mobilization Law		(c) Other		Total	
	Korea	Japan	Korea	Japan	Korea	Japan	Korea	Japan
1938	6	32	---	---	1	---	7	32
1939	12	44	4	5	2	---	18	49
1940	31	82	9	6	2	---	42	88
1941	28	106	8	33	3	7	39	146
1942	32	110	9	44	1	10	42	164
1943	34	110	12	53	3	9	49	172

Sources: *Chōsen keisatsu gaiyō*, Korean Government-General’s Police Bureau publication, 1940 edition, 1941, various references pp. 116–119. *Chōsen keizai keisatsu gaiyō*, Korean Government-General’s Police Bureau Economic Crime Division publication, 1942, pp. 24–27. Korean Government-General’s Justice Ministry ed, *Keizai jōhō*, no. 5, 1942, pp. 235–237. “Naimu daijin seigi: Chōsen sōtōkufu bunai rinji shokuin secchi seireichū kaisei no ken,” July 1944, *Kōbun ruishū* 2A–13, type 2822, containing a “Table of Violations and Arrests by Economic Control Law.” Further, for the Japanese mainland, refer to Nishida Yoshiaki, “Senjika no kokumin seikatsu jōken—Senji yamikeizai no seikaku o megutte” in Ōishi

Kaichirō ed., *Nihon teikokushugishi* vol. 3, University of Tokyo Press, 1994, p374 (“Ihan hōreisū no suii”).

What this table makes clear is that first of all, despite all the types of laws (a), (b), and (c) showing a consistent increase throughout the Japanese mainland and Korea, when the types are viewed separately, there is a considerable concomitant time lag. In other words, immediately after the Sino-Japanese War began, (a) import/export temporary measures and related laws increased along with an expansion of the goods subject to controls, followed by somewhat of a delay before type (b) laws started to proliferate following the invocation of the National Mobilization Law in October 1939. The price control law implemented concomitant with this not only restricted prices themselves, but also the elements that comprise prices, such as the cost of fares and storage, damage insurance costs, and rents, etc., thereby depicting a new level of economic controls qualitatively as well.<sup>10</sup> The step-by-step changes in the configuration of the economic sanctions laws as described above can basically be confirmed in both Japan and Korea.

Whether you take law models (a), (b), or (c), however, the number of laws can easily be seen as fewer in Korea than in Japan. A comparison of 1943 shows a total of 172 in Japan ((a) 110, (b) 53, and (c) 9) against a total of 49 in Korea ((a) 34, (b) 12, and (c) 3). Commerce and industry section chief Isaka explained this as described below:<sup>11</sup>

Once other difference from the Japanese mainland is that Korea avoids legal controls as much as possible in its pursuit of controls, and has come up with so-called ‘autonomous controls.’ One aspect of this is to have the business operators take personal responsibility. Of course, the opposite aspect is ... as all authority is concentrated in the Korean Governor-General, even if controls do not depend on the law, and consequently even if there is no sanctioned punishment, it is because it has become an organization that can enforce this from every angle.

In fact, according to Hō Yōng-ran in the paper cited above, as the consumption and enjoyment of goods was unbalanced between the

Koreans and Japanese in Korea, and as there were special circumstances in which medium and small-business mergers did not progress, many products were subject to a special status called “autonomous controls,” which did not depend on the law.<sup>12</sup> As stated in the introduction, the fact that journalists and bureaucrats in the Governor-General at the time felt that the economic controls in Korea were more gentle than those in the Japanese mainland was based on the facts described above.

Just because the number of economically restrictive laws was smaller compared to those in the Japanese mainland, however, does not immediately mean that Korean economic controls were gentler.

Firstly, even in the case of injustice due to the “autonomous controls” that did not depend on economically restrictive laws, as Isaka also touched on, laws on fraud, police crime punishment, and breach of trust were applied to mete out punishments as normal criminal code infractions.<sup>13</sup>

Secondly, it is necessary to examine whether the restrictive laws implemented in Korea were the same as those in the Japanese mainland. Here, I examined forty-three laws for which there were violators in Korea during 1941, as shown in Table 2.<sup>14</sup> For the twenty-eight type (a) laws, twenty clearly used ordinances by the Japanese Ministry of Farming and Forestry and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry,<sup>15</sup> and there were four cases in which, compared to the Japanese laws, there was a partial overlap of the sanctioned products or a striking difference between whether supply alone or supply and demand were restricted. On the other hand, there were also four laws in which laws conforming to those by the Japanese Ministry of Farming and Forestry and the Ministry of Commerce were not evident.<sup>16</sup> In other words, for type (a), Korean restrictive laws were not concerned with the total inclusion of Japanese laws, but sometimes restricted products that they specified uniquely.

Regarding type (b), edicts based on the National Mobilization Law were enforced regionally both within and outside Japan. In some cases, however, part of the law was not applied to Korea. (Regulations regarding the Land and Housing Rent Investigation committees according to the Land and Housing Rent Control Ordinance, etc.)

With the individual laws of type (c), the focus is on the fact that the excessive profits control regulation that this type typifies is partially different while overlapping revisions while working in unison with the

excessive profits control regulation in the Japanese mainland.<sup>17</sup> This law was admonitory with its initial revision in August 1937, and its punitive code was weak. As the number of products subject to controls was increased with the revision in December that year, however, a “price display rule” was enforced everywhere, and with the revision of July 1940, punishments were strengthened, and with the revision of August 1941, cornering the buyout and unwillingness to sell were totally regulated, and so-called “tie-in sales” became prohibited.<sup>18</sup> Meanwhile, the chief of the Production Increase Bureau announced the following conversation with regard to the revision of December 1939.<sup>19</sup>

What I particularly want to pay attention to here is that whereas in the Japanese mainland, a violator is subject to no more than one month’s imprisonment maximum or a maximum fine of 100 yen, in Korea the low price policy is emphasized, and it is necessary to root our malefactors, so they in particular are subject to one year’s imprisonment maximum or a maximum fine payment of 200 yen.

Further, with the revision of August 1941, Hattori, Head of the Police Bureau Economic Police Section explained, as shown below, “Korean revision differs from its equivalent in Japan” (*Osaka Asahi Shimbun, Chōsen furoku, Seisen-ban*, August 3, 1941. Hereinafter called the *Osaka Asahi Shimbun Chōsen furoku*, and its subsequent publications the *Chōsen Asahi*).

“In the Japanese mainland,” refusal to sell and cornering the market are limited to purposes of financial gain or related to one’s own business, but in Korea, cornering the market of consumers is rather more to do with hindering the smooth supply of goods, or to foment social discord, and so all limitations were abolished ... If someone forcibly cornered the market, they would be punished regardless of whether they were a business operator or a consumer.

The excessive profits control regulation was the most applied law

The Provision of Economic Control Laws and Economic “Crime” in Colonial Korea during the Period of All-out War consistently throughout Korea, As described in a later chapter, punishments were harsher than in the Japanese mainland, and the scope of their application was wider.

So, a further important problem when looking at the similarities and differences with the Japanese mainland is not only the focus on the number of economic control laws, but also on the extent to which these laws were actually applied, and the extent to which they caused economic crime. I want to examine this in the next chapter.

## 2. The Operation of the Economic Control Laws

In the previous chapter, we verified that there were overall fewer laws than in Japan, and that there were some differences in their details, although the economic control laws in Korea had improved, while basically taking the same gradual step as Japan. In this chapter, I want to examine the extent to which violators of the economic control laws appeared, and what differences from Japan they displayed, as a problem relating to the operation of the law.

First of all, Table 3 shows the trends in the number of people punished by the economic police and prosecutor’s office for violating the economic control laws while contrasting this with Japan.<sup>20</sup> Several facts can be read from this table.

**Table 3: Trends in Numbers Rounded up and Crackdowns Taken against Violations of the Economic Control Laws (1938–1944)**

	Korea						
	Handled by Economic Police				Handled by Prosecutor’s Office		
	Warning	Admonition	Round up	Total (a)	Accepted (b)	Committed for Trial (c)	Percentage Committed for Trial (=c x 100/b)
Nov.– Dec. 1938	---	198	37	235	765	345	45.1
Total 1938	---	198	37	235	765	345	45.1

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Jan.- Mar. 1939							
Apr.- Jun.							
Jul.- Sept.							
Oct.- Dec.							
Total 1939	361	20,035	795	21,191	3,031	1,440	47.5
Jan.- Mar. 1940	---	5,477	1,103	6,580			
Apr.- Jun.	---	9,491	5,049	14,540			
Jul.- Sept.	---	14,020	9,599	23,619			
Oct.- Dec.	---	23,707	13,308	37,015			
Total 1940	---	52,695	29,059	81,754	21,859	10,921	50.0
Jan.- Mar. 1941	---	18,471	11,100	29,571			
Apr.- Jun.	---	15,079	13,811	28,890			
Jul.- Sept.	---	12,723	13,539	26,262			
Oct.- Dec.	---	15,099	14,125	29,224			
Total 1941	---	61,372	52,575	113,947	32,578	16,688	51.2
Jan.- Mar. 1942	---						
Apr.- Jun.	---						

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Jul.– Sept.	---						
Oct.– Dec.	---						
Total 1942	---	59,820	69,107	128,927	26,444	15,732	59.5
Jan.– Mar. 1943	---	13,555	18,413	31,968	*20,852	*13,153	*63.1
Apr.– Jun.	---	16,141	21,788	37,929			
Jul.– Sept.	---						
Oct.– Dec.	---						
Total 1943	---	46,404	83,850	130,254	36,588	23,680	64.7
Jan.– Mar. 1944	---	14,921	38,343		27,738		
Apr.– Jun.	---						

Notes: 1. The “violation measures and arrests” numbers for 1938 are the total from the inauguration of the economic police (Nov. 1938) to the end of December that same year, and the “committed for trial” figures for that year are the total from January to the end of December 1938.

2. The fact that there are some periods during which more people are being accepted by the prosecutor’s office than arrested by the police is because of the existence of cases known only to the prosecutors, double-counting of removal cases, and the existence of economic crimes handled by the prosecutor’s office alone.

3. Figures marked with an asterisk (\*) for Japan in 1938 are the totals for July to December 1938. The numbers accepted by the prosecutor’s office and committed for trial marked with an asterisk (\*) for Korea in 1943 are the totals for January to August 1943.

4. As the sources of this table differ from those of Table 1, some of the figures do not agree, but have still been used as is. Sources: Korean Government-General Police Bureau ed., *Chōsen keizai keisatsu gaiyō*, 1942, pp. 22–23. Korean Government-General Justice Bureau ed., aforementioned *Keizai jōhō*, vol. 5, pp. 213–215 and 235–237. Aforementioned “Keizai tōseirei betsu torishimari jōkyōhyō.” Korean Government-General Police Bureau, *Dai 84 kai teikoku gikai setsumei shiryō* [Explanatory Data for the 84th Imperial Parliament] (ibid., reprinted, vol. 8, p. 168). Korean Government-General’s Office Police Bureau, *Dai 86 kai teikoku gikai setsumei shiryō* (ibid., reprinted, vol. 10, pp. 82 and 117). High Court Prosecutor’s Office,

*Chōsen keiji seisaku shiryō*, 1943, p. 67. High Court Prosecutor’s Office ed., *Chōsen kensatsu yōhō*, no. 1, pp. 59–67. Further, for Japan, refer to Nishida’s aforementioned paper, “Zenkoku keizai keisatsu jihan torishimari shori jin’inchō,” p. 375.

Japan							
Handled by Economic Police		Handled by Prosecutor’s Office					
Total Handled by Economic Police (a’)	Index Using Korea as 1 (=a’/a)	Acceptance by Prosecutor’s Office (b’)	Index Using Korea as 1 (=b’/b)	Committed to Trial by Prosecutor’s Office (c’)	Index Using Korea as 1 (=c’/c)	Percentage of Committals (=c’ x 100 / b’)	Index Using Korea as 1 (=bc’/b’c)
*96,907	412.4	*11294	14.8	*2,686	7.8	23.8	0.5
*96,907	412.4	*11294	14.8	*2,686	7.8	23.8	0.5
38,062		3,375		629		18.6	
49,344		6,241		1,801		28.9	
53,441		9,155		3,541		38.7	
71,181		9,866		5,082		51.5	
212,028	10.0	28,637	9.4	11,053	7.7	38.6	0.8
121,226	18.4	17,834		2,990		16.8	
155,976	10.7	31,567		9,017		28.6	
219,146	9.3	35,227		14,570		41.4	
225,201	6.1	43,133		24,740		57.4	
721,549	8.8	127,761	5.8	51,317	4.7	40.2	0.8
183,312	6.2	30,187		11,749		38.9	
199,492	6.9	30,749		13,888		45.2	
204,632	7.8	32,587		13,470		41.3	
156,480	5.4	35,587		19,543		54.9	
743,916	6.5	129,110	4.0	58,650	3.5	45.4	0.9
		32,878		11,267		34.3	
		33,551		12,628		37.6	
		39,243		16,093		41.0	
		36,480		23,370		64.1	
		142,152	5.4	63,358	4.0	44.6	0.7
		33,635		12,418		36.9	
		43,143		20,668		47.9	
		43,564		21,611		49.6	
		45,494		28,231		62.1	
		165,836	4.5	82,928	3.5	50.0	0.8

Firstly, when the timeline for the number of roundups and indictments is examined, it rapidly increases from 1940 onwards. The Korean economic police, who were inaugurated in November 1938, initially cited “crime prevention as their primary objective,” and devoted their efforts to instructing business operators through informal meetings while citing as their pressing objective the dissemination of understanding of the economic controls. Further, while the controls were in force, the majority of roundups, admonitions, and warnings (for the excessive profits control regulation only) were “admonitions” in the form of documents at the end of a lecture by the chief of police.

With regards to this policy, however, there was an awareness on-site that the controls were negative and the worker instruction did not necessarily lead to a suppression of economic crime and, as a result, from about 1940, a “harsh policy” was adopted.<sup>21</sup> Namely, as can be seen from Table 3, together with a multiplicity of roundups and an increase in the total number of crackdowns by the economic police (a), the prosecutor’s office also rapidly raised the number of people committed for trial. From 1939 through 1940, the number of people processed by the economic police (a) was approximately 3.9 times higher, and the numbers committed to trial by the prosecutor’s office (c) greatly increased by approximately 7.6 times. This is greatly correlated to the changes in the restrictive policies of the time, the increase in numbers of economic policemen,<sup>22</sup> and the (aforementioned) strengthening of the excessive profits control regulation.

The second point is a comparison with the Japanese mainland. The portrait of the numbers of people processed by the economic police and prosecutor’s office changed with the times. First of all, during the initial period after the establishment of the economic police, application of the law was more reserved in Korea than in Japan, and the number of economic crimes was small. The total for 1938 shown in Table 2 are vastly different in the starting point and cannot easily be compared, but even a comparison with the period from November to December in the same year, 1938, shows that the number of arrests was 193 in Korea and approximately ten thousand in Japan, so without a doubt there was a considerable gap. (*Osaka Mainichi Shimbun, Chōsen-ban*, January 5, 1939.

*Chōsen Asahi*, *Nansen-ban*, January 15, 1939 also carried the same article. Further, the reason for the discrepancy between these values and those in Table 3 is unclear.) Next, in Korea from 1940 onwards, the aforementioned controls were tightened, but the same trend can also be seen in Japan. According to Table 3, from 1939 through 1940, the number of people processed by the economic police (a') increased approximately 3.4 times, and the number of people committed to trial by the prosecutor's office (c') increased approximately 4.6 times.

Nevertheless, the fact that broadly similar phenomena of changes during the period 1939 to 1940 can be seen may indicate great differences between Korea and the Japanese mainland. Namely, that after the switch to "harsh policy," whereas in the Japanese mainland the increase in the number of economic criminals briefly stagnated,<sup>23</sup> Korea showed an almost consistent increase in the numbers arrested and committed for trial. An analysis by the criminal bureau of the Japanese mainland Ministry of Justice also stated, "Attention should be paid to the point that the increase in the numbers committing economic crime in Korea show no signs of abating currently compared to the current stability in the trend in Japan."<sup>24</sup> The Government-General cited the following factors for this increase in economic crime in Korea, although the data came considerably later:

1. Increased dissatisfaction in morale due to austerity in the demand and supply of materials needed for living, such as food and textiles ...
2. Insufficient supply controls, and end user supply controls in particular ...
4. Difference in prices between Korea and Manchuria ...
5. Overall inflationary tendencies.<sup>25</sup>

In addition to the general condition of insufficient goods, it can be presumed that there was also the background of structural problems unique to Korea, such as rising prices and inflation proceeding far more rapidly than in the Japanese mainland,<sup>26</sup> and a more undeveloped mechanism for distribution than in Japan.

Further, as a result, the gap in arrests between the Japanese mainland

and Korea gradually narrowed. As shown in Table 3, the number of people arrested by the economic police in 1939 was approximately ten times greater in the Japanese mainland than in Korea, but in 1941, this difference had shrunk to 6.5 times. The difference in the numbers accepted by the prosecutor’s office between 1939 and 1941 also shrank from 9.4 to 4.0 times, and the difference in the numbers prosecuted shrank from 7.7 to 4.0 times. When the differences in the scale of the economies and the populations between the Japanese mainland and Korea at the time are considered (in 1938, the population of the Japanese mainland was 3.1 times greater than that of Korea, and the gross domestic expenditure was 8.9 times greater), at least from 1941 onwards, it is not necessarily easy to say that control in Korea was more relaxed than that of the Japanese mainland in the application of economic control laws. Further, the numbers committed to trial in Korea was close to 50 percent from the level at the end of 1938, and rose every year thereafter. It is not overstating the case that, regardless of the year, the rates of committal are always higher than in the Japanese mainland. In addition, although not shown in the table, a comparison of the results of the primary trials shows that whereas the number of people sent to prison in the Japanese mainland was 3.8 percent, the overall figure was much higher in Korea at 13.9 percent.<sup>27</sup>

Next, therefore, I would like to examine the character of economic “crime” in Korea using statistics of the numbers of violators by individual laws. Table 4 arranges the numbers of violators by individual law for the main economic control laws by year.

It can be seen from this table first of all that the overall application of the economic control laws is centered on laws related to price controls. In 1938, violators of the two laws, the (aforementioned) excessive profits control regulation, which controlled terminal retail prices, and the ordinance for the regulation of the sale of goods in Korea (a. Government-General edict no. 218, October 1938. Abolished by the promulgation of the price control edict in October 1939), which supplemented the excessive profits control regulation and clarified the level of the excess over officially-determined prices beyond which profits were excessive, accounted for 62.6 percent. Further, when the (aforementioned) prices control law was implemented in 1939, punishments according to that law increased sharply from 1940 onwards, and thereafter, people punished according to price control and related laws,

**Table 4: Violation Crackdowns and Numbers Rounded up by Economic Control Laws (1938–1944)**

		(a) Temporary Import/Export Measures and Related Laws										
		Ordinance for the Regulation of the Sale of Goods in Korea	Orders According to Paragraph 1 of the Same Law	Case Concerning Crackdowns on the Sale of Volatile and Heavy	Case Concerning the Mixed Use of Staple Fibers and	Case Concerning Controls on Leather Distribution	Case Concerning Controls on the Use of Leather	Case Concerning Controls on the Use of Copper	Controls on the Production and Sale of Luxuries	Korean Grains Distribution Adjustment Law	Korean Livestock Distribution Adjustment Law	(a) Others
Nov.–Dec. 1938	Warning							25	1			3
	Admonition	51		22								
	Roundup			36					1			
	Total	51		58				25	2			3
	%	0.3		0.3				0.1	0.0			0.0
Jan.–Dec. 1939	Warning	2,992	40	418	103	63	160	275				338
	Admonition	153	106	129		37	60	40				45
	Roundup											
	Total	3,145	146	547	103	120	220	315				383
	%	10.8	0.5	1.9	0.4	0.4	0.8	1.1				1.3
Jan.–Dec. 1940	Warning	3	329	327	409	101	59	87				697
	Admonition	33	851	44	245	427	89	131				362
	Roundup											
	Total	36	1,160	371	654	528	148	218				1,059
	%	0.1	2.2	0.7	1.2	1.0	0.3	0.4				2.0
Jan.–Dec. 1941	Warning	289	140	173	106	53	53	889	600			891
	Admonition	1,210	60	337	994	150	224	598	437			1,208
	Roundup											
	Total	1,499	200	510	1,100	203	277	1,287	1,037			2,099
	%	2.2	0.3	0.7	1.6	0.3	0.4	1.9	1.5			3.0
Jan.–Dec. 1942	Warning	689		187	136	48	15	268	2,930			447
	Admonition	3,283	14	458	1,481	104	191	259	979			1,242
	Roundup											
	Total	3,972	14	645	1,617	152	206	527	3,909			1,689
	%	4.7	0.0	0.8	1.9	0.2	0.2	0.6	4.7			2.0
Jan.–Dec. 1943	Warning	347		339	230	7	7	96	4,138	1		531
	Admonition	2,494	7	749	2,039	127	82	215	887	26		1,305
	Roundup											
	Total	2,841	7	1,108	2,269	134	89	311	5,025	27		1,836
	%	7.4	0.0	2.9	5.9	0.3	0.2	0.8	13.1	0.1		4.8
Jan.–Jun. 1944	Warning	?	?	?	139	68	16	?	?	14		25
	Admonition	?	?	?	767	1,503	106	?	?	26		1,192
	Roundup											
	Total	?	?	?	906	1,571	122	?	?	40		1,217
	%	?	?	?	1.7	2.9	0.2	?	?	0.1		2.3

Source: Table 2 source data and Korean Government-General, Dai 86 kai teikoku gikai setsuimei shiryō [Explanatory Data for the 86th Imperial Parliament], Dec. 1944, reprinted: vol. 10, p. 118.

Notes 1. All laws that accounted for one percent or more of crackdowns or roundups during each period was picked out, and the number of people subject to crackdown or roundup due to each law is shown. Laws that do not apply to more than one percent are entered under "Other" in columns (a), (b), and (c).

**Reference Table: Numbers of New Prosecutor's Office Recipients in Japanese Mainland by**

		(a) Temporary Import/Export Measures and Related Laws						
		General	Fibers	Steel	Fuel	Non-Ferrous Metals	Leather	Food
Jul.–Dec. 1938		755	7,111	1,240	1,282	123	377	
Jan.–Dec. 1939		11,308	8,657	3,654	1,514	1,696	524	7
Jan.–Dec. 1940		4,015	4,263	2,821	2,044	1,436	714	419
Jan.–Dec. 1941		1,423	4,466	3,817	2,170	1,044	562	4,023
Jan.–Dec. 1942		837	4,272	2,858	1,879	911	707	2,886
Jan.–Dec. 1943			11,568	5,291	2,244	618	296	13,823

Source: Created from Nishida, aforementioned essay, pp. 378–379. The original sources were the Ministry of Justice Prosecutor's Office, Keizai Geppō [Monthly Economic Report], vol. 2, no. 6 (June 1942), and vol. 3, no. 3 (March 1943), etc.

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Subtotal	(b) Laws based on the National Mobilization Law						(c) Other Totals				Total	
	Price Control Edict	Land and Housing Control Ordinance	Industrial Permission Law	Trade Control Law	Labor Regulation Edict	(b) Other	Subtotal	Excessive Profits Control Regulation	Korean Food Control Law	(c) Other		Subtotal
102								96			96	198
37												37
130								96			96	235
0.7								0.3			0.3	1.2
								361			361	361
4,389	1,627	40				166	1,833	13,805		6	13,811	20,033
590	27						27	178			178	765
4,979	1,654	40				166	1,860	13,983		6	14,350	21,189
17.1	5.7	0.1				0.6	6.4	48.1		0.0	49.4	72.9
2,012	17,095	1,385				424	18,904	31,634		147	31,781	52,697
2,162	14,579	475				139	15,193	11,665		39	11,704	29,059
4,174	31,680	1,860				563	34,097	43,299		186	43,485	81,756
7.9	60.3	3.5				1.1	64.9	82.4		0.4	82.7	135.3
3,194	20,436	1,326				503	22,265	35,260		633	35,913	61,372
5,018	20,306	1,266				482	22,054	24,767		736	25,503	52,575
8,212	40,802	2,596				983	44,319	60,027		1,389	61,416	113,947
11.9	39.0	3.8				1.4	64.1	86.9		2.0	88.9	164.9
4,720	16,148	1,058	14,415			549	32,150	22,950			22,950	59,220
3,011	23,042	795	3,712			832	32,401	28,695			28,695	69,107
12,731	41,190	1,833	20,127			1,401	64,351	31,643			31,643	128,927
13.2	49.1	2.2	33.0			1.7	77.0	61.6			61.6	133.8
5,736	12,848	1,043	4,993			23	1,134	20,039	18,480	2,149	20,629	46,404
7,931	32,969	330	6,668			3	1,362	41,332	34,144	433	34,577	83,850
13,667	45,817	1,372	11,661			25	2,496	61,371	52,623	2,582	55,205	130,254
35.6	119.3	3.6	30.4			0.1	6.3	160.1	137.3	67	144.0	339.7
?	4,870	80	733	715	1,036	?	?	5,032	1,499	?	?	11,222
?	16,987	234	1,952	1,960	29	?	?	10,778	1,166	?	?	38,243
?	21,837	314	2,685	2,675	1,065	?	?	15,810	2,663	?	?	53,363
?	41.0	0.6	5.0	5.0	2.0	?	?	29.7	3.0	?	?	100.0

2. Blank fields mean the absence of numbers; ? means the numbers are unclear, and 0.0 means that the value is so small it has been truncated.

3. Error totals corrected. Further, as the sources for Table 3 are different, some of the values do not agree, but have been left as is.

4. For the period January to June 1944, different from the periods until then, only the number of crackdowns is entered for the main economic control laws, so only the cases that can be clearly understood from the tables have been entered. The total number of crackdowns, however, is clear, so those figures are cited.

Type of Economic Control Law (1938–1944)

(a) Other	(b) Laws based on the National Mobilization Law						(b) Other	Subtotal
	Subtotal	Price-Related	Labor-Related	Food-Related	Fiber-Related			
407	11,295							
1,236	28,596	1,378		3	6		1,387	
1,947	17,659	107,799	1,001	1,187			109,987	
2,820	20,325	101,913	2,598	1,368		314	106,193	
1,977	16,327	103,891	3,648	5,147	9,296	1,361	123,343	
2,240	36,080	131,298	8,618			2,423	142,339	

Note: Similar statistics do not apply to type (c) laws. Consequently, the total number of people subject to crackdown or roundup due to the economic control laws overall cannot be calculated.

including the aforementioned laws, came to occupy an even higher percentage of between 70 and 90. This is consistent with the fact that during the judiciary committee meeting in November 1939, amidst the instructions given by high court chief prosecutor Mr. Masunaga specified, "The focus continues to shift from violations of restricted supplies and controls on manufacturing processes to violations of price controls."<sup>28</sup> Moreover, in the Japanese mainland, as there are no statistics based on equivalent classification standards, comparisons are difficult, but according to the reference Table 4, from 1940 onwards, the fact that applications of type (b) price-related laws increased can be viewed as being in common with Korea.

Secondly, let us look at laws other than price control-related laws. Up until the early period of 1940, the application of type (a) laws, in other words, Import/Export Temporary Measures and Related Laws were more common than type (b) laws in both Japan and Korea, but there is a considerable difference in the main materials that gave rise to violators of the law. Namely, whereas in the Japanese mainland many were concerned with textiles related to the forced controls of cotton goods (June 1938), which occupied an outstandingly high percentage of economic controls,<sup>29</sup> in Korea, the top such items were volatile oils, heavy oils, leather, and copper, etc.<sup>30</sup>

After the start of the Asia Pacific War, food-related crimes increased, such as can be seen in the increased applications of the Korean assorted grains distribution law (a. Government-General edict no. 176, July 1940) and the Korean food control law (b. Control Order no. 44, August 1943.) The appearance of violators of labor mobilization-related laws, such as the labor regulation edict (b. Imperial edict no. 1063, December 1941) was also characteristic of that time. Moreover, violators of the industrial permission law (b. Imperial edict no. 1084, December 1941) occupied a fixed percentage, but many of these were due to false reporting of business results. (*Keijō nippō*, April 8, 1942.) Of these, the overall percentage occupied by these food and labor mobilization-related laws in Korea was not necessarily high, but at the time, the authorities were focusing on economic crime, which was increasing sharply. The fact that crimes related to both of these laws had become a problem was also the same in Japan, but differences can also be seen when the details are examined minutely.

Including this fact, let us observe the attitude of the Koreans with regard to the controlled economy, in the next chapter.

### **3. Focusing on the Korean People regarding Economic Controls: Centering on Food and Labor Mobilization-related Economic Crime**

With regard to the various research into the psychology of people in wartime,<sup>31</sup> which has flourished in recent years, the Korean people are thought to have distanced themselves psychologically from the war itself, which was pursued by Japan, and the overall mobilization policies concomitant with war, and it has been pointed out that this also extends as far as the focus on the command economy.

So, how is this attitude of the Korean people tied to violations of the economic control laws in reality? In this chapter, I would like to examine the several problems concerning labor mobilization and foodstuffs that become particularly problematic at the end of the war as a symbolic example. Regarding foodstuffs, problems arose concerning various aspects of economic controls, such as the supply of grains, corruption by the official for supply and people covered with overall movement, and panic buying by urban consumers,<sup>32</sup> but here I want to give an overview on the outdoor market and itinerant traders, who have not been examined before.

Controls on foodstuffs began with the official price notices of some fresh foods by the Government-General in November 1940, and thereafter, each local police department performed sweeping investigations of the retail prices of fresh foods at any time (*Chōsen Asahi*, *Chūsen-ban*, November 15, 1940, *Chōsen Asahi*, *Seisen-ban*, May 17, 1941), but at the end of the war, various sources show that food-related crimes occupied a high percentage.<sup>33</sup> For example, in 1944, the following figure was cited in the parliament explanatory data created by the Government-General: “Violations of prices relating to grains, fresh fruit, fish and shellfish, and meat are the most common, as ever, and account for 35 percent of all economic crime.”<sup>34</sup>

One reason why violators of price control laws on food could not easily be rooted out was that there were many Korean violators working in itinerant and outdoor markets rather than in regular permanent stores. That they were viewed as a “hotbed of the black market” can be seen in the

following report at a meeting of the economic controls cooperation committee, which was a cooperative body between bureaucrats and citizens created in each district where there was a chamber of commerce.<sup>35</sup>

Street vendors are itinerant people who change their locale without having any fixed place and type of business, and are the lowest class of people, who have never had a concept of economic ethics or laws. Consequently, despite the majority of them being people who cannot receive distributions of restricted goods, they are skilled at buying up these distributed goods and other merchandise, and involve themselves in illegal black market trading at excessive prices with consumers for whom these goods are in short supply, and not only do they flout the controls and distributions, but also achieve vast numbers of valuable goods in the hands of hundreds of thousands of people in towns and cities large and small throughout Korea, and the mal-distribution of foods through their actions are quite beyond the scope of imagination.

Further, the people most frequently viewed as being connected with black market trading were street vendors and itinerant peddlers, and according to a survey conducted in mid-1944, of the 22 major cities in Korea, those in which these black market traders were fully active numbered sixteen (72 percent), and those cities in which they were partially active numbered five (22 percent).<sup>36</sup> While being visible on a daily basis in these urban areas, arresting the street vendors and itinerant peddlers, who were of no fixed abode, was problematic, so at the start of the Sino-Japanese War, they were exempted from the obligation to display the official prices set by the excessive profits control regulation, but due to the law's revision in July 1940, they were made to display prices in an attempt to "arrest the lot of them."<sup>37</sup> In addition, they were also subject to arrest using the business licensing laws. For example, in Chöllabuk-do, of the 54,555 people specified by this law, 20,118 were "vendors with no fixed shop," and these were dealt with either by being handed business licenses, or by being made to wear armbands for their police station jurisdiction.<sup>38</sup>

The overall attitude of these Korean street vendors and itinerant peddlers, however, was uncooperative and antagonistic towards the controlling authorities. According to data created by the economic police in 1941, they used a secret language whenever the police came to arrest them, such as “The *chipke* (Korean pliers) have arrived,” “The *kokkwaeng’i* (pickaxes) are coming,” and “The *malshibi watta* (false accusers) are here,” and pretended to sell legally by displaying price tags.<sup>39</sup>

Moreover, as the war neared its end, a tendency for “a remarkable number of women and girls to be involved in so-called black market trading” could be seen. In June 1944, at the police department of Hamgyōngbuk-do, there was a roundup of 932 people in the space of one week, and many of these were female Korean traders selling foodstuffs at black market prices, “abnormal language and actions” could be seen, such as “Arresting black marketers confounds the consumers rather than us” and “We will empty the purses of Japanese women on the Japanese mainland,” etc.<sup>40</sup> This sharp increase in food crime and the expansion of the black market economy was said to be a phenomenon also visible in Japan,<sup>41</sup> and the clearly antagonistic attitude towards the economic police authorities being linked to anti-Japanese rhetoric and actions, most likely reveals the special attitudes of a colony.

Next, I would like to look at labor related law violations at the end of the war. The numbers of such violators do not necessarily account for a large percentage when viewed overall, but the sharp increase in crimes directly connected to the prosecution of the war, such as labor mobilization, was identified as a major problem, and explanatory data for the Government-General’s diet in 1944 specified the “increase in violations of the labor regulation and people’s requisition laws” as trends in economic crime.<sup>42</sup>

After the Sino-Japanese war, that Korean forced labor was used in Japan and Sakhalin, etc., in the guise of “collective recruitment” (started September 1939), “bureaucratic mediation” (started March 1942), and “requisition” (started September 1944) was widely known, and from the start of this mobilization, the Governor-General was involved in mobilization by appointing specialists to the police bureau and some Do (province) police departments.

Initial jurisdiction was in the hands of the high police department, but,

from 1943, was supervised by the economic police department, which “identified as suitable these measures in the economic police, which were conversant with the real situation in the world of industry and economics.”<sup>43</sup> In reality, in October 1944 the economic police division of the police bureau implemented mass arrests of labor mobilization violators, and even after the start of 1945 rounded up people who failed to conform to the bureaucratic mediation and requisition in the provinces.

Mobilizations that depended on such police power, however, became linked to the character of forced “drag hunting,” and contrary to expectation led to the birth of an avoidance tendency in the people being requisitioned. During a police chiefs’ conference in September 1944, Governor-General Abe Nobuyuki pointed out, “The lack of awareness vis-à-vis the importance of the general state mobilization of the people is given to lead inexorably to a taming of this avoidance trend in concert with the clumsiness of the mobilization law of some of the frontline labor administrators.”<sup>44</sup>

This atmosphere for avoiding labor mobilization manifested in the rumors of the populace. In September 1940, when requisitions started, the chief of the high police section of the P’yŏng’annam-do province police department stated, “There are a vast number of rumors concerning requisition,” and of the 1,640 people who were punished by the prosecutor’s office for the crime of sowing verbal dissent during the course of that year, 224 (13.7 percent) were for speaking out regarding requisition.<sup>45</sup> To take several examples, there were the following: “In Pyŏng’yang today, young people are being forcibly requisitioned, and the police are all running around every night between 1:00 and 3:00 a.m. without sleeping, forcibly convening, so the citizens are all afraid” (Pyŏng’yang, textile merchants), and “According to a communication from a senior Korean who requisitioned to Japan, in addition to concerns over food and clothing shortages, Koreans are being used like Manchurian coolie labor ... it is unspeakable, so we feel that being requisitioned is like being led to hell” (Shinūiju, Koreans requisited to the Japanese mainland), etc.<sup>46</sup>

Further, people mobilized as laborers tried various passive and active ways to resist, such as not turning up at the screening site, running away from factories, and committing violence in the factories, but all these can

The Provision of Economic Control Laws and Economic "Crime" in Colonial Korea during the Period of All-out War be left to previous research.<sup>47</sup> At any rate, in the case of people rounded up for violations of the labor control laws in Japan, compared to the many cases in which people who loathed their requisitioned factory were moved to factories with better conditions to work,<sup>48</sup> the Korean case shows a strong tendency towards loathing of the labor mobilization itself as a serious problem concerned with life and death.

## Conclusion

I would like to conclude the argument in this paper as described below.

The wartime system of economic control laws comprised the import/export temporary measures, National Mobilization Law, and other laws, and first of all, the import/export temporary measures and related laws increased alongside the expansion of the number of regulated products from immediately after the start of the Sino-Japanese War, and next followed the promulgation of laws based on the National Mobilization Law concomitant with the launch of the law in 1939. The way in which these laws were introduced in stages can be verified in both Japan and Korea.

No matter what type of the laws you pick up, however, the numbers of laws were fewer in Korea than in the Japanese mainland. In light of this, however, it is necessary to have several reservations regarding the claim that the economic controls in Korea were gentle. Even with "autonomous controls" not dependent on restrictive laws, punishments based on existing laws were pursued, and the restrictive laws implemented in Korea were not necessarily the same as in the Japanese mainland. Some of the goods restricted by the import and export temporary measures law, which controlled individual goods, were different and, further, in the case of the excessive profits control regulation, which was an important law to do with price regulation in particular, punishments were more severe than in the Japanese mainland, and their scope of application was wider.

The difference from the Japanese mainland could be seen in the actual application of the economic control laws. Concomitant with more stringent arrest policies, although from 1940 onwards the phenomenon whereby the numbers of people punished by the economic police and the numbers committed to trial by the prosecutor's office rose sharply could be seen in

both the Japanese mainland and Korea, subsequent developments were different. In the Japanese mainland, the increase in the number of economic crimes stagnated, whereas in Korea on the other hand, they rose consistently. As a result, the sudden reduction in the difference in severity and leniency of arrests for violations of the economic control laws between the Japanese mainland and Korea is worthy of special mention. Besides which, Korea had greater rates of committals to trial regardless of the era.

If we examine the economic control laws violators by the applicable law and compare them to the Japanese mainland, despite a visible difference in the laws applied relating to the import/export temporary measures and related laws, etc., overall the numbers of legal violations relating to price controls using the price control laws and the excess profits control law were common to both. Further, during the Asia Pacific War, crimes related to foodstuffs and labor mobilization increased sharply, and the focus of the authorities was the same as within the Japanese mainland, but the hostility and anti-Japanese sentiments towards arrests in relation to food crimes was striking, and the strong sentiments to avoid the labor control, etc., can all be read as specific colonial trends in the psychology of the violators.

With existing research into economic controls generally, data that clarifies the policy decision-making process have not been discovered, so there is a tendency of the consequent analysis, which tends to be flat, and this paper is also aware that it is not exempt from these problems. With research to date, however, the state of overall application of the economic control laws, which were thoroughly unclear with research to date, has been known. And a rough picture of the similarities and differences between the Japanese mainland and Korea with a look at the changes over time was successfully drawn by using contiguous statistical data. These draw this paper to a close, and I would like to examine the remaining problems another day.

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- the Korean Nationalist Movement]), Nanam, 1997, p. 280.
- 5) Yamauchi Toshihiko, et al., *Chōsen keizai tōsei hō zensho* [A Complete Record of Korean Economic Control Laws], Taiyō Shuppansha, 1945, p. 8 onwards.
  - 6) Proclamation by the Head of the Police Bureau to all prefectural governors, confidential police memo no. 251, “Keizai keisatsu no un’yō ni kansuru ken” [Concerning Economic Police Operations], Nov. 1938 in Police Bureau Economic Police Section ed., *Chōsen keizai keisatsu kanren hōreishū, dai san kai tsuiron* [Collection of Laws concerning the Korean Economic Police, Addendum no. 3], 1944, p. 483. Refer above, and Kim Sang-bōm, op. cit., pp. 118–122, for the overall duties of the economic police. Further, I have also prepared a separate paper, “Sōryokusen-ki no shokuminchi Chōsen ni okeru keizai keisatsu” [The Economic Police in Colonial Korea during the Period of All-out War], so this paper stops at the minimum explanation.
  - 7) Proclamation by the Head of the Police Bureau to all prefectural governors, police document no. 973, “Keizai keisatsu ni oite toriatsukau sōdōinhō kanren hōrei ni kansuru ken” [Cases concerning Laws Relating to the National Mobilization Law Handled by the Economic Police], Nov. 1939 in Police Bureau Economic Police Section ed., op. cit., *Chōsen keizai keisatsu kanren hōreishū dai san kai tsuiron*, p. 524. Also see *Fuzan nippō*, evening edition, Nov. 23, 1939. (Hereinafter called the *Fuzan nippō* 23 Nov 39 evening edition.)
  - 8) The 73rd Imperial Diet House of Representatives National Mobilization Law Committee Records, Development Minister Ōtani Q&A to committee member Kōno Ichirō, March 8, 1938.
  - 9) Miyata Setsuko supervised, *Chōsen sōtoku-fu kankeisha rokuon kiroku* 1 (15-nen sensōka no Chōsen tōchi) [Sound Recordings from the Korean Officers in the Government-General’s Office, pt. 1 (The Governance of Korea under 15 Years of War)], *Tōyō bunka kenkyū*, no. 2, March 2000, pp. 104–105.
  - 10) With the viewpoint of seeing the end of 1939 as a turning point in economic control, Ha Weonho wrote the aforementioned paper on Korea (pp. 829–830), and on the Japanese mainland, see Hara Akira, “Senji tōsei keizai no hatsudō” [The Beginnings of Wartime Controlled Economics] in *Iwanami kōza Nihon rekishi*, vol. 20 (Modern 7),

Iwanami Shoten, 1976, pp. 229–230.

- 11) Isaka, op. cit., pp. 24–25.
- 12) Hō Yōng-ran, op. cit., pp. 326–328. This is mainly an explanation of type (a), which restricted individual products. For type (b), for the time being see “Kokka sōdōinhō kankei hōrei taishōhyō” [Table of Laws concerning National General Mobilization Law] in Development Minister Records Section eds., *Naigaichi hōrei taishōhyō* [Table Comparing Domestic and Foreign Laws], 1941. Incidentally, differing from the Japanese mainland, the autonomously restricted goods were textiles, rubbers, papers, cement, assorted grains, and oils and resins, etc. For details, see “Chōsen ni okeru tōsei keizai hōrei oyobi sono ihan jōkyō chōsa” [Investigations of Economic Control Laws and their Violation in Korea], Ministry of Justice Criminal Bureau, *Keizai geppō*, vol. 1, no. 6, Dec. 1941, pp. 37–45.
- 13) For specific examples, see Yamauchi, op. cit., pp. 378–385.
- 14) For legal contrasts, see Cabinet Printing Office ed., *Hōrei zensho* (Complete Collection of All Laws) all editions; Korean Government-General Justice Bureau eds., op. cit., *Chōsen jikyoku keizai kankei hōrei reikishū dai ichi tsuiroku* [Collection of Laws concerning the Korean Economic Situation Addendum no. 1]; Korean Government-General’s Planning Dept. ed., *Chōsen jikyoku kankei hōki* [Laws concerning the Situation in Korea], 1944, reprinted, Kashiwashobō, 1966, etc.
- 15) In this case, there are slight differences in many clauses. Differing from the Japanese mainland, however, excluding exceptions, such as “On the mixed use of staple fibers in cotton products” in which mixed cotton use has been permitted as continuing in common demand (Government-General edict no. 22, March 1938) and “Regarding sales controls of volatile and heavy oils,” the submission procedures for proof of purchase being more rigorous in Korea (Government-General edict no. 127, June 1938), no difference in the severity of controls between Japan and Korea should necessarily be inferred, so this is not a problem here.
- 16) Ordinance adjusting the distribution of tungsten ore and wulfenite (Government-General edict no. 179, Oct. 1939), ordinance restricting Korean white rice (Government-General edict no. 175, Nov. 1939), concerning prohibitions on the use of powdered rice (Government-General edict no. 206, Dec. 1939), ordinance adjusting the demand and supply of seeds for special

- agricultural products (Government-General edict no. 160, July 1940).
- 17) In the Japanese mainland, the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce had already implemented “Bōri o mokuteki to suru baibai no torishimari ni kansuru ken” [Controls on Sales and Purchases for the Purpose of Excessive Profits] (edict no. 20, Sep. 1917), and imperial proclamation no. 405 “Seikatsu hitsujuhin ni kansuru bōri torishimari no ken” [Controls on Excessive Profits regarding Daily Necessities] in Sept. 1923. Further, for the relationship between these Japanese mainland edicts and Korea, see Iijima Kōzō, “Bōri torishimari o ronzu” [The State of Excessive Profits Control], *Keimu ihō*, No. 233, Sep. 1925.
  - 18) See Ha Wōn-ho, op. cit., pp. 820, 826, and 828. Further, the December 1939 revision was renamed “Bōri kōi tō torishimari kisoku” [Ordinance to Restrict Excessive Profits Actions], but to avoid confusion it has been consistently called the “Bōri torishimari rei” [Excessive Profits Control Regulation] throughout this paper.
  - 19) Commentary by the Head of the Industry Bureau, Korean Government-General, “Bōri kōi tō torishimari kisoku ni tsuite” [Rules Cracking Down on Usurious Actions] in Korean Government-General Justice Ministry ed., *Chōsen jikyoku keizai kankei hōrei reikishū* [A Collection of Legal Examples Concerning Korean Situational Economics], Shihō kyōkai, 1940, pp. 884-1 to 884-2.
  - 20) Further, economic crime in Korea included not only Koreans but Japanese mainland people in Korea, but the overall percentage they occupied was small. People found guilty of violating the economic laws during the first phase of their criminal trials were as follows: 1938: 256 Koreans, 15 Japanese; 1939: 1,110 Koreans, 48 Japanese, and 1940: 7,439 Koreans, 565 Japanese. See Korean Government-General Justice Bureau, *Dai 79 kai teikoku gikai setsumei shiryō* [Explanatory Data for the 79th Imperial Parliament], 1941 in *Chōsen sōtokufu teikoku gikai setsumei shiryō* [Korean Government-General Explanatory Data for the Imperial Parliament], vol. 5, reprinted, Fuji shuppan, 1994, pp. 20–21).
  - 21) For the switch to “harsh penalties” policy by the economic police, see Kim Sang-bōm, op. cit., p. 115. Matsuda (op. cit.) is also scheduled to examine this problem in greater detail.
  - 22) There were 561 economic police officers at inception, but these numbers rose to 601 in February 1940 and 492 in August 1940. See

- Korean Government-General Police Bureau Economic Police Section ed., *Chōsen keizai keisatsu gaiyō* [Outline of the Korean Economic Police], 1941, pp. 4–7).
- 23) On this point, also see Nishida Yoshiaki, “Senjika no kokumin seikatsu jōken—Senji yami keizai no seikaku o megutte” [Living Conditions of the People in Wartime: Concerning the Character of the Wartime Black Market] in Ōishi Kaichirō ed., *Nihon teikoku shugishi* [A History of Japanese Imperialism], vol. 3, University of Tokyo Press, 1994, p. 377.
- 24) Op.cit., “Chōsen ni okeru tōsei keizai hōrei oyobi sono ihan jōkyō chōsa” [Investigations of Economic Control Laws and Their Violation in Korea], p. 48.
- 25) Korean Government-General Statistics Dept., *Dai 85 kai teikoku gikai setsumei shiryō* [Explanatory Data for the 85th Imperial Parliament], 1944 in op. cit., *Chōsen sōtokufu teikoku gikai setsumei shiryō*, [Korean Government-General, Explanatory Data for the Imperial Parliament], vol. 9, p. 258.
- 26) On these points, also see Hō Yōng-ran, op. cit., and Hatori Yoshihiko, “Senjika (1937–45) Chōsen ni okeru tsūka to infureishon” [Currency and Inflation in Wartime Korea (1937–45)] in Inuma Jirō and Kang Chae-ōn eds., *Shokuminchiki Chōsen no shakai to teikō* [Colonial Korean Society and Resistance], Miraisha, 1982.
- 27) Based on statistics from July 1940 to August 1941. Op. cit., “Chōsen ni okeru tōsei keizai hōrei oyobi sono ihan jōkyō chōsa” [Investigations of Economic Control Laws and Their Violation in Korea], p. 60.
- 28) High court prosecutor’s office ed. *Chōsen keiji seisaku shiryō* [Korean Police Policy Data], 1939 edition (1940), p. 29.
- 29) See Nishida, op. cit., p. 373.
- 30) There are several reasons why there were so many violators of the control laws for these goods in Korea. With volatile and heavy oils, the handover and repayment procedures for proof of purchase were stringent compared to in Japan (i.e., to the purchase slip in Japan), and in the case of leathers, as well as being classified as military supplies, approximately half were connected to the production prices of the Japanese Empire. In the case of copper, as the metal was used in brassware, and so the effect on Korean consumers was great. For the demand and supply conditions of these goods, see for the time being the Korean Government-General

- Police Bureau ed., op. cit., *Chōsen keizai keisatsu gaiyō* [Outline of the Korean Economic Police], p. 36 onwards, and “Teikoku hikaku shigen to shite no Chōsen gyūhi” [Korean Cow Leather as an Imperial Resource], *Shokugin chōsa geppō*, no. 2, July 1938.
- 31) Pyōn Ūn-jin, *Ilche chōnshi p’ashijūmgi (1937–45) Chosōn minjung’ūi hyōnshil inshikkwa chōhang* [The Actual Consciousness and Resistance of the Korean People under the Rule of Japanese Imperialism in Wartime (1937–1945)], Korea University Ph.D. Dissertation, 1998; Matsuda Toshihiko, “Sōryoku senki no shokuminchi Chōsen ni okeru keisatsu gyōsei—Keisatsukan ni yoru ‘jikyoku zadankai’ o jiku ni” [Police Administration in Colonial Korea during All-out War—Centering on the “Situational Symposium” by the Police], *Nihonshi kenkyū* [Study of Japanese History], no. 452, April 2000; Chang Shin, “Chosōn kōmch’al yoborūl t’onghae pon t’aep’yōng’yang chōnjaeng malgi (1943–45) ūi Chosōn sahoe” [Korean Society at the End of the Pacific War (1943–1945) Seen through “Korean Prosecutorial Notices”], *Yōksamunjae yōn’gu* [Study of Historical Issues], no. 6, June 2001.
- 32) Regarding these issues, see Kim In-ho, op. cit., pp. 122–124 and pp. 134–142; Hō Yōng-nan, op. cit., pp. 320–323; Higuchi Yūichi, *Senjika Chōsen no nōmin seikatsushi* [A History of Farmers’ Lives in Wartime Korea], Shakai Hyōronsha, 1998, pp. 11–54 and pp. 181–184, etc.
- 33) *Keijō nippō*, Nov. 6, 1942. High Court Prosecutor’s Office ed., *Chōsen keiji seisaku shiryō* [Korean Police Policy Data], 1943 edition (or 1944), pp. 103–104 and 187. Korean Government-General Statistics Dept., *Dai 85 kai teikoku gikai setsumei shiryō* [Explanatory Data for the 85th Imperial Parliament] in op. cit., *Chōsen sōtokufu teikoku gikai setumei shiryō* [Korean Government-General, Explanatory Data for the Imperial Parliament], vol. 9, p. 258.
- 34) Korean Government-General, *Dai 86 kai teikoku gikai setsumei shiryō* [Explanatory Data for the 86th Imperial Parliament], 1944 in *ibid.*, *Chōsen sōtokufu teikoku gikai setumei shiryō*, vol. 10, p. 116.
- 35) Chōsen keizai tōsei kyōryoku renrakukai and Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry, *Keizai tōsei kyōryoku e no shishin* [A Policy for Economic Control Cooperation], 1943, pp. 47–48. This publication collated the opinions expressed (and the opinions of the Government-General) by the Chōsen keizai tōsei kyōryōku renrakukai meeting for all Korea in

- November 1942 and the regional “economic controls cooperation committees” at each regional meeting in February the following year.
- 36) “Zensen yami kakaku tō chōsahyō” [Survey of All-Korean Black Market Prices and Investigations] in High Court Prosecutor’s Office ed., *Kōtō kensatsu yōhō* [High Court Prosecutor’s News Letter], no. 6, August 1944, pp. 26–28.
- 37) Edict from the Head of the Production Bureau and the Police Bureau to the governors of each Do no. 96, “Bōri kōi tō torishimari kisoku chū kaisei ni kansuru ken” [Cases concerning the Revision of the Regulations for Cracking Down on Usurious Actions, Etc.], July 1940, Edict from the Heads of the Production Bureau and the Police Bureau, to governor of each district, edict number unknown, “Bōri kōi tō torishimari kisoku shikō ni kansuru ken” [Cases concerning the Implementation of Regulations for Cracking Down on Usurious Actions, Etc.], August 1940 in Korean Government-General Police Bureau Economic Police Section ed., op. cit., *Chōsen keizai keisatsu kankei hōreishū dai san kai tsuiron* [Collection of Laws concerning the Korean Economic Police, Addendum no. 3, pp. 454–458.
- 38) *Chōsen Asahi*, *Nansen-ban*, Nov. 6, 1942. The methods of controlling street vendors and itinerant peddlers by making them wear armbands were being implemented in Seoul as well. See *Keijō nippō*, Sep. 11, 1942 and *Chōsen Asahi*, *Chūsen-ban*, Sep. 11, 1942.
- 39) *Jōhō shūkan tenbō* [Weekly Information Views], no. 21 (Aug. 2, 1942), f. 928; no.24 (Aug. 23, 1941), f. 957; no. 25 (Aug. 30, 1941), f. 970 (National Archives of Korea, archive number 256–12–1–2).
- 40) “Kenji no shiki ni motozuku issei torishimari jissai ni tsuite” [On the Implementation of Sudden Crackdowns Based on Prosecutor Instructions], *Chōsen kensatsu yōhō*, no. 7, Sep. 1944, pp. 16–19. Female black marketers were also described in “Shinkō shotokushasō no seikatsu jittai” [Lifestyles of the Progressive Income Classes], *ibid.*, no. 10, Dec. 1944.
- 41) Nishida, op. cit., p. 383.
- 42) Korean Government-General Statistics Dept., *Dai 85 kai teikoku gikai setsumei shiryō* [Explanatory Data for the 85th Imperial Parliament], 1944 in op. cit., *Chōsen sōtokufu teikoku gikai setsumei shiryō*, vol. 9, p. 258. For specific numbers of labor regulation law violators, see Table 4

- above. Further, there were 270 national requisition violators in the first half of 1944.) Ref., Korean Government-General, *Dai 86 kai teikoku gikai setsumei shiryō*, *ibid.*, vol. 10, p. 118. )
- 43) For details, see Matsuda, *op. cit.*, “Sōryoku senki no shokuminchi Chōsen ni okeru keizai keisatsu” [The Economic Police in Colonial Korea during All-out War]. Further, the quotation is from “Keizai tōsei ni tomonau keisatsu jimū ni jūji suru mono no zōin setsumei” [Explanation of the Increase in Personnel Engaged in Police Work Concomitant with Economic Control] (“Naimu daijin seigi Chōsen sōtokufu bunai rinji shokuin secchisei chū kaisei no ken” [Request from Interior Minister: About the Amendment to the Law of the Deployment of Korean Government-General Temporary Employees], July 1944 in *Kōbun ruishū*, 2 A-13 class 2822, National Archives).
- 44) “Rinji dō keisatsu buchō kaigi ni okeru sōtoku kunji” [Government-General Edicts during a Temporary Conference of Korean Province Police Department Chiefs] in Mizuno Naoki ed., *Chōsen sōtoku ronkoku/kunji shūsei* [Korean Government-General Orders and Edicts Corpus], vol. 5, Ryokuin Shobō, 2001, p. 622.
- 45) *Chōsen Asahi*, *Hokuseisen-ban*, Sep. 17, 1944. “Shōwa 19-nen ni okeru hantō shisō jōsei” [Conditions of Thought in the Peninsula during 1944], *Chōsen kensatsu yōhō*, no. 13, March 1945, p. 24.
- 46) “Jikyoku kankei fuon genron jihan” [Crimes for Situational Unrest Speech], *Chōsen kensatsu yōhō*, no. 1, March 1944, p. 24. “Senkōjō ni okeru hantōjin no chōyō kihi no jissō” [Actual State of Draft Dodging among Koreans in Wartime Screening Site], *ibid.*, no. 10, Dec. 1944, p. 13.
- 47) For a head-on handling of this issue in comparatively recent research, see Nishinarita Yutaka, *Zainichi Chōsenjin no “sekai” to “teikoku” kokka* [The “World” and “Imperial” Nation of Koreans in Japan], University of Tokyo Press, 1997, pp. 289–306.
- 48) Nishida, *op. cit.*, p. 384.

## Summary

### The Provision of Economic Control Laws and Economic “Crime” in Colonial Korea during the Period of All-out War

This thesis is focused on the structure and operation of the wartime system of economic control established by the Japanese colonial government in Korea during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945). The thesis also aims to provide an overview of the characteristics of the economic crimes committed in the period.

Formed in the late 1930s, the aforementioned wartime system of economic control consisted of three legal documents: Import/export temporary measures and related laws, Laws based on National Mobilization Law, and Other individual laws. The increased import of controlled goods following the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War led to an increase in the number of the Import/export temporary measures law and to the promulgation of further laws and ordinances based on the national mobilization law invoked in 1939. This aspect of the gradual organization of the economic laws and ordinances was a characteristic not only of Japan as motherland but also of Korea as its colony.

Records show that Korea had fewer laws and regulations than Japan in the period, although both had the same or similar types. One may need to exercise a degree of reservation, however, in drawing the conclusion that economic control was comparatively loose in Korea, because even under the “autonomous control” system, which was not based on control laws and regulations, economic activities were effectively managed by them, and because some of the laws and regulations in Korea contained different elements from their counterparts in Japan. The Import/export temporary measures law, for instance, differed according to individual trade goods. As for the excessive profits control law, which was the main legal means for price control in Korea, offenders received a heavier punishment than in Japan, and the Act was applied more extensively.

The difference between the two was also very clear in the way that the laws and regulations were operated. Figures show that the effort to strengthen regulations led after 1940 to an increase in the number of

offenders who were punished by the Economy Police and prosecuted by the Bureau of Inspection in both Korea and Japan, although the situation after that year began to develop in a different direction. The increase in the rate of economic offenses was kept in check in Japan, while in Korea the figure continued to grow. It is also noteworthy that Korea suffered higher prosecution rates regardless of the period.

Records of the economic offenders of the period show that there were differences between Korea and Japan in the application of the import/export temporary measures law, but the number of offenders of the laws related with price control, such as the excessive profits control law, was equally high in both countries. Korea during the Pacific War, like Japan in the same period, suffered a drastic increase in the number of criminals who broke the laws related with food supply and labor mobilization. Interestingly, Korean offenders of the laws related with wartime food supply showed a more hostile reaction to the Japanese food and labor policies.