

Diplomacy and Kingship: Trilateral Relationships among Japan, the Chosŏn, and the Ming during the Reopening of the Pusan Trade in 1604

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For the Tsushima Fuchū domain, restoring severed relations with Chosŏn Korea after the Imjin War was a diplomatic priority. This article sheds light on the important role played by Ming China, which actively participated in the post-Imjin rapprochement between Japan and Korea. In particular, the reopening of the Pusan trade in 1604 was realized not only through bilateral Chosŏn-Tsushima negotiations but involved a more complicated multilateral relationship internal to Japan itself—the Tsushima domain and the Tokugawa shogunate as two parties of interest in Japan, as well as Chosŏn and Ming.

Keywords: Tsushima Fuchū domain, Tokugawa shogunate, Imjin War, Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598), Japanese disturbance of Imjin

Introduction

With the death of Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豊臣秀吉 (1537–1598) in Keichō 慶長 3 (1598), the Japanese forces withdrew from the Korean Peninsula, thus ending the Imjin 壬辰 War.¹ Immediately after the war, in 1599, Sō Yoshitoshi 宗義智 (1568–1615), lord of the Tsushima Fuchū 対馬府中 domain, and his retainer Yanagawa Shigenobu 柳川調信 (1539–1605), started peace negotiations with Chosŏn Korea. Due to the high level of discretion in Chosŏn relations, Tsushima dispatched envoys to Chosŏn, repatriated Chosŏn captives, sent letters requesting peace,

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1 In Japan, the war is called “Bunroku, Keichō no eki 文禄・慶長の役” or “Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea.” In South Korea, it is called the “Japanese disturbance of Imjin” and the “Second war of Jeong-yu,” and in China, it is referred to as the “Wanli Korean Campaign” or “Wanli Japanese War.” Recently, the Imjin War is used to refer to a war that involved all three countries, and so in this article, “Imjin War” will be used.

and continued seeking amity.² Finally, diplomatic relations between Japan and Chosŏn were officially restored with the arrival of the first Chosŏn envoy to Japan in Keichō 12 (1607). Chosŏn-Tsushima trade was then re-institutionalized with the conclusion of the Kiyū Agreement (Kiyū Yakujō 己酉約条), a trade agreement signed between the Tsushima domain and Chosŏn Korea in the fifth lunar month of Keichō 14 (1609). The Kiyū Agreement set several stipulations for trade relations: (1) the Japanese envoys were limited to three kinds: the king's (=shogun's) envoy, the Tsushima lord's special envoy, and the appointee of Tsushima island; (2) the number of vessels sent by the Tsushima lord was reduced to twenty; and (3) the vessels were required to carry a sealed document with the Tsushima lord's signature or stamp on it. It is commonly believed that the signing of the Kiyū Agreement officially marked the restoration of the Chosŏn-Tsushima trade, but in fact trade was only actually resumed with the dispatch of the first vessel to the Korean Peninsula in the ninth lunar month of Keichō 16 (1611).³

On the other hand, an edict dated from Wanli 萬曆 32 (1604) was transmitted from the Chosŏn Department of Rites (Yejo 禮曹) to Tsushima by Yujōng 惟政 (1544–1610), a Chosŏn monk, and Son Munuk 孫文彥 (16th–17th c.), a diplomat. Issued before the conclusion of the Kiyū Agreement, this edict suggested that the reopening of the Pusan trade had already been approved by the Chosŏn government. Tashiro Kazui stated that the resumption of private trade between Japan and Chosŏn was already mentioned in an edict from the councilor of the Department of Rites (Yejo Ch'amüi 禮曹參議) to Tsushima brought by the monk Yujōng in 1604, but Chosŏn's intention to resume private trade was not fixed until the third lunar month of Keichō 15 (1610) because of strong concerns of illicit trade and the leakage of confidential intelligence.⁴ Araki Kazunori 荒木和憲 analyzed the negotiation process between Japan and Chosŏn after the Imjin War, as well as the negotiation process regarding the conclusion and implementation of the Kiyū Agreement, and pointed out that the reopening of trade in Pusan in 1604 was only a temporary permission for public and private trade accompanying irregular envoys.⁵

Furthermore, Korean scholar Min Tök-ki 閔德基 evaluated a rescript sent to Chosŏn in the

2 *Tsūkō ichiran* 通航一覽, vol. 1, no. 25, Seibundō Shuppan, 1912, pp. 299–302; Matsuura Masatada 松浦允任, *Chōsen tsūkō daiki* 朝鮮通交大紀, vol. 4, Tanaka Takeo 田中健夫 and Tashiro Kazui 田代和生, eds., Meicho Shuppan, 1978, pp. 147–153.

3 Tashiro Kazui, *Kinsei Nitchō tsūkō bōekishi no kenkyū* 近世日朝通交貿易史の研究, Sōbunsha, 1981, p. 58; Chōng Sōng-il 鄭成一, *Chōsen hugi taeil muyōk* 朝鮮後期對日貿易, Sinsōwōn, 2000, p. 24. Son Sūng-ch'ōl 孫承喆 has also pointed out that trade between Tokugawa and Chosŏn was not immediately resumed according to the Kiyū Agreement; see *Kinsei no Chōsen to Nihon: Kōrin kankei no kyo to jitsu* 近世の朝鮮と日本：交隣關係の虚と実, Akashi Shoten, 1998, p. 164.

4 Tashiro Kazui, *Kinsei Nitchō tsūkō bōekishi no kenkyū*, pp. 67–68.

5 Araki Kazunori, “‘Jinshin sensō’ no kōwa kōshō” 「壬辰戦争」の講和交渉, *SGRA Report* 86, 2019, pp. 54–74; Araki Kazunori, “Kiyū yakujō no teiketsu, shikō katei to Tsushima no ‘hanei’ bōeki” 己酉約条の締結・施行過程と対馬の「藩營」貿易, in Han-Il Munhwa Kyoryu Kigūm 韓日 문화 교류 기금, *Imjin Waeran esō Chōsen T'ongsinsa ūi Kil ro: Chōnjaeng ūi Sangch'ō wa Ch'iyu, kūrigo Hwahae* 壬辰倭亂에서 朝鮮通信使의 길로 : 戰爭의 傷處와 治癒, 그리고 和解, Kyōngin Munhwasa, 2019, pp. 107–142; Araki Kazunori, “Nitchō kōwa katei ni okeru teitanshi no ichizuke” 日朝講和過程における偵探使の位置づけ, in Han-Il Munhwa Kyoryu Kigūm 韓日 문화 교류 기금, *Kūnse Han-Il Kwan'gye ūi Silsang kwa Hōsang: Yakt'al kwa Kongjon, Chōnjaeng kwa P'yōnghwa* 근세 韓日 관계 의 실상 과 허상 : 약탈 과 공존, 전쟁 과 평화, Kyōngin Munhwasa, 2020, pp. 171–200.

fifth lunar month of Seonjo 宣祖 37 (1604) by Ming envoy Zhao Ji 趙澱 (16th–17th c.) as an “autonomy rescript” that announced a shift in the form of the Chosŏn’s negotiations with Japan and the way of reporting to the Ming, from advance report to after-the-fact notification.⁶ Based on Min’s evaluation, Araki Kazunori characterized the period from the ceasefire to the restoration of diplomatic relations between Japan and Chosŏn (the fifth lunar month of 1604 to the fifth lunar month of 1607) as a withdrawal of “Ming interference.” If we follow Min’s assessment and Araki’s periodization, the reopening of the Chosŏn-Tsushima trade in Pusan, which was permitted two months after the issuance of the rescript, should be included in the period of peace negotiations after the dissolution of “Ming interference” and Chosŏn’s report should be considered an after-the-fact notification. However, on the fifth day of the seventh lunar month of the following year, after the issuance of the rescript, which Min evaluated as an indication of the Ming’s non-interference in Chosŏn’s negotiations with Japan, a Ming commander named Shan Jinzhong 單進忠 (16th–17th c.) admonished Tsushima’s envoy Tachibana Tomomasa 橘智正 (16th–17th c.)⁷ regarding Ming authority and suzerainty in Chosŏn’s negotiations with Japan,⁸ which signified that the Ming interfered in Tokugawa-Chosŏn relations. This fact seems to contradict Min’s view. Moreover, regarding the relationship between the resumption of the Tokugawa-Chosŏn trade and the Chosŏn-Ming relationship, Tsuji Yamato 辻大和 focuses mainly on the Ming official’s patrol of Dongnae after the conclusion of the Kiyū Agreement and argues that the background of the Ming’s interference is the invasion of Ryūkyū 琉球.⁹ Tsuji’s viewpoint also contradicts Min’s assessment and defies Araki’s periodization.

Given the political situation around 1604, the political powers of the Tsushima domain, the Japanese central authority (the Tokugawa shogunate), Chosŏn Korea, and Ming China were all involved in the multilateral wrestling behind the reopening of the Chosŏn-Tsushima Pusan trade. It is essential to verify the relationships among the four parties, especially examining when and how Chosŏn gave permission to reopen the Pusan trade to Ming China and whether Chosŏn’s decision was interfered with by the Ming.

In this article, I will attempt to delineate a concrete picture of the intertwining of Ming China, Chosŏn Korea, and Japan (Tsushima and the shogunate) over the reopening of the Pusan trade in 1604 by investigating Tsushima’s manipulations and how Chosŏn reported the reopening of Chosŏn-Tsushima trade to Ming China. It should become clear that the issue is part of the postwar process of the Imjin War and that the role Ming China played in Chosŏn’s foreign policy carried greater weight than has been recognized in previous scholarship. In this sense, the article illustrates that the reopening of trade between Japan and Chosŏn was not a result of bilateral negotiations, but a reflection of the trilateral relationship between Japan (including the Tokugawa shogunate and Tsushima domain), Chosŏn Korea, and Ming China. I will argue that Ming China is an essential element in analyzing the restoration of Japan-Chosŏn relations after the Imjin War.

6 Min Tök-ki, *Zenkindai Higashi Ajia no naka no Kan-Nichi kankei* 前近代東アジアのなかの韓日関係, Waseda University Press, 1994, p. 143.

7 Tachibana appears in Japanese sources as Ide Yarokuzaemon 井出弥六左衛門.

8 *Seonjo sillok*, Seonjo 38 (1605).7.5.

9 Tsuji Yamato, *Chōsen ōchō no taichū bōeki seisaku to minshin kōtai* 朝鮮王朝の対中貿易政策と明清交替, Kyūko Shoin, 2018, ch. 2.

Chosŏn's Permission to Reopen the Pusan Market in 1604

Tokugawa-Chosŏn trade during the Edo period took three different forms: (1) tributary trade with which the Tsushima domain presented gifts to the Chosŏn court, then received presents in return; (2) official trade, whereby the Chosŏn government bought designated items, including copper, tin, and buffalo horns, from Tsushima and paid in cotton, based on a fixed quantity and fixed-price system; and (3) private trade or market trade, conducted between Chosŏn merchants designated by the Chosŏn government and the people of Tsushima domain at the Kaeshi Daech'ŏng 開市大廳¹⁰ in the Japan House in Pusan (Jp. *wakan*, Kr. *Waegwan* 倭館). Trading took place six times a month, with the Tsushima domain mainly exporting silver and importing ginseng, raw silk, etc. from China via Chosŏn. With few exceptions, the Pusan trade was not based on a fixed quantity or fixed-price system but rather on the pursuit of profit. Initially, the market was open three times a month, but from 1610, it opened six times a month.¹¹

As for the reopening of the Pusan trade in 1604, Tashiro Kazui interpreted it as permission to resume private trade between Tsushima and Chosŏn.¹² On the other hand, Araki Kazunori interpreted it as permission for both official trade and private trade, based on the fact that official trade with the Tsushima envoy was tentatively permitted in 1602.¹³ Considering these divergent views, it is necessary to return to the fundamental sources and reexamine them.

Two primary sources are used by historians in determining the nature of the Pusan trade in 1604. One is a letter from a councilor of the Department of Rites (Yejo Ch'amüi Sŏng Imun 成以文 (1546–1618) to Sō Yoshitoshi, the lord of Tsushima domain, dated from the seventh lunar month of Wanli 32 [1604]; hereafter Sŏng Imun letter). The other source is an edict issued by Yejo, Chosŏn's Department of Rites (hereafter Yejo Edict) in the same year. Both were delivered to Tsushima by the monk Yujŏng and Son Munuk.

In the Sŏng Imun letter, the Chosŏn court reported Japan's request for rapprochement to Ming officials and asked for instructions from the Jiliao 薊遼 governor. This was a declaration that Chosŏn could not decide such matters on its own since all issues related to the restoration of Tokugawa-Chosŏn relations were to be decided by Ming China. And the instruction of the Jiliao governor was that Japan's request could not be approved immediately but that Chosŏn could allow the temporary restoration of trade with Tsushima. What Chosŏn allowed here was “the coming and going of Tsushima merchants and the trading of the goods and cargos they carried” (齎來物貨, 往來交易).¹⁴ In other words, the Sŏng Imun letter describes the process that led to the reopening of trade in Pusan.

10 This is the name of a building in Japan House in Pusan.

11 Tashiro Kazui, *Kinsei Nitchō tsūkō bōekishi no kenkyū*, pp. 67–68; Tashiro Kazui, “Tsushima han's Korean Trade, 1684–1710,” *ACTA ASIATICA* 30, 1976, pp. 85–105; Kim Chi-nam 金指南, *T'ongmun'gwan chi* 通文館志, vol. 5, Chosŏn Ch'ongdokpu 朝鮮總督府, 1944.

12 Araki Kazunori, *Kiyū yakujō no teiketsu*, pp. 124, 128; Tashiro Kazui, *Kinsei Nitchō tsūkō bōekishi no kenkyū*, pp. 67–68.

13 Araki Kazunori, “Jinshin sensō' no kōwa kōshō,” p. 73.

14 Letters kept in the Tsushima Sō family documents, such as *Zenrin tsūsho* 善隣通書 and *Chōsen tsūkō daiki*, are frequently used by scholars.

The Sōng Imun letter exists in several altered versions. One version of the letter is found in the shogunate's collections such as *Gaikoku kankei shokan* 外国関係書簡,¹⁵ *Ikoku nikki* 異国日記,¹⁶ and *Ikoku raikan mitome* 異国來翰認.¹⁷ The other is those held in the Tsushima Sō family documents (Tsushima Sōke Monjo 對馬宗家文書), such as *Zenrin tsūsho*¹⁸ and *Chōsen tsūkō daiki*.¹⁹ Araki Kazunori noted that the Sōng Imun letter kept in the shogunate's documents had additional words such as “It is my pleasure to present this idea in detail to the shogunate (幸將此意細陳于内府公),”²⁰ which did not appear in the version found in the Tsushima Sō family documents, and he therefore argued that the Tsushima domain had falsified this letter. However, when comparing the Tsushima version with the *bakufu* version, deletions are very noticeable, rather than the additions pointed out by Kazunori Araki. Five sections were deleted by the Tsushima domain when Tsushima submitted the Sōng Imun letter to the shogunate. In addition to the deletion of trade permission, other details, including the repatriation of Chosōn captives by the Tsushima domain, Tsushima's threat of using the shogunate's force against Chosōn, and the related parts of Chosōn-Tsushima negotiations were redacted. In other words, permission for the reopening of trade in Pusan and Tsushima's negotiations regarding this was kept secret from the shogunate.

In comparison, the Yejo Edict is significant as it contains the permission for the market trade. The first half of the instruction explains the background of this permission. After the Imjin War, the relationship between Japan and Chosōn was severed, and trade was no longer possible, so the Tsushima domain petitioned Chosōn to “trade as before (照旧交市).”²¹ Here, “trade” refers to market trade or private trade. We could say that according to the Yejo Edict, the reopening of the Pusan trade in 1604 only permitted limited restoration of private trade. In addition, the edict also outlines that “market trades could be allowed only when the Tsushima merchants solicited for trade (遇有本島倭子乞要交易物貨者, 許令開市).”²² It is clear that the Yejo Edict only permitted private trade between Tsushima and Chosōn on an irregular basis and did not resume full trading relations.

Regarding the Yejo Edict, there is a reference to the negotiation records on the

15 The Historiographical Institute of the University of Tokyo, Kondō Jūzō Kankei Shiryō S 近藤重藏 関係資料-4-403, <https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/report/view/idata/T34/4/403/00000009>, accessed March 1, 2022).

16 *Ikoku Nikki Kankōkai* 異国日記刊行会, ed., *Eiinbon ikoku nikki: Konchiin Sūden gaikō monjo shūsei* 影印本異国日記：金地院崇伝外交文書集成, Tōkyōbijutsu, 1989, p. 124.

17 The Historiographical Institute of the University of Tokyo (2051.9–120); Library of Graduate School of Letters, Kyoto University (国史: 二 2/5).

18 *Zenrin tsūsho*, vol. 3 (National Institute of Korean History, no. 4750, MF782, <http://library.history.go.kr/dhrs/dhrsXIFViewer.jsp?system=dlidb&id=DK0000004750>, pp.16–17, accessed November 28, 2022).

19 Matsuura Masatada, “*Chōsen tsūkō daiki*,” pp. 154–155; Araki Kazunori, “Jinshin sensō,” p. 68.

20 This sentence appears in *Gaikoku kankei shokan*, *Ikoku nikki*, and *Ikoku raikan mitome*.

21 *Zenrin tsūsho*, vol. 11 (National Institute of Korean History, no. 4786, MF785), *Chōsen tsūkō daiki*, pp. 156–157, Jiun isho 自雲遺書 (National Institute of Korean History, no. 6519, MF954).

22 Ibid.

Tsushima-Chosŏn trade in the eighteenth century named *Kaishi no kakitsuke* 開市の書付²³ in the Tsushima Sō family documents, a note on the market trade which relates to the history of the restoration of the Tsushima-Chosŏn trade. The note first states that in 1604, Yujōng and Son Munuk came to Japan as peace envoys and had an audience with Tokugawa Ieyasu 徳川家康 (1543–1616) and Tokugawa Hidetada 徳川秀忠 (1579–1632) at Fushimi 伏見 Castle. Before Yujōng came to Japan, they received an edict from the Chosŏn court, which clearly stated that Chosŏn had permitted them to reopen the trade with Tsushima because Tsushima had requested it. After that, the conclusion of the Kiyū Agreement is mentioned, but in fact it stated that permission for reopening trade had already been granted in 1604, six years before the conclusion of the Kiyū Agreement. However, since formal diplomatic relations between Japan and Chosŏn had not yet been restored, the decision was made after informal negotiations between Tsushima and Chosŏn and was not reported to the shogunate. Later, in Kan'ei 寛永 12 (1635), an edict brought by Yujōng and a note explaining the instruction were submitted to Tokugawa Iemitsu 徳川家光 (1604–1651). It was only then that the shogunate came to know about its existence for the first time.²⁴ Until 1635, the shogunate did not even know of the Chosŏn's permission to reopen the Pusan market in 1604.

When the Tsushima domain submitted the Sōng Imun letter to the shogunate, it deleted Chosŏn's permission to open trade in Pusan and the details of its manipulation. Moreover, the Yejo Edict, which was evidence of trade permission, had not been submitted to the shogunate until 1635. Instead of reporting to the shogunate immediately, the Tsushima domain chose to deliberately conceal the resuming Tsushima-Chosŏn trade. Since Japan-Chosŏn diplomatic relations had not yet been reestablished at the time when the Pusan trade reopened in 1604, Tsushima not only falsified the Sōng Imun letter but also concealed Chosŏn's permission for the reopening of the Pusan trade to keep the shogunate from knowing what Tsushima had done.

The Chosŏn and Ming's Position on the Reopening of the Pusan Trade

1. The Ming's Narrative on the Reopening of the Pusan Trade

To analyze the Ming interference in the reopening of the Pusan trade, we need to first examine the

23 National Institute of Korean History (No. 4517, MF753), *Pullyu kisa taegang* 분류 기사 대강 II, Kuksa P'yŏnch'an Wiwŏnhoe 국사편찬위원회, 2006, pp. 89–91. This mainly includes the background of the Palpo Incident and correspondence between the translators of the Tsushima domain, Japan House in Pusan, and the Chosŏn court from the fifth lunar month of Kyōhō 享保 2 (1717) to the third lunar month of Kyōhō 3 (1718). In 1715, to control the circulation of silver, the Chosŏn court further tightened the Palpo trade quota policy in the Qing-Chosŏn trade. In response to this, Chosŏn merchants, Japanese translators in Chosŏn, and Tsushima agents of the Japan House in Pusan joined forces to lobby against the tightening of controls in the Qing-Chosŏn silver trade. In addition, there is also a source titled *Happō no kiroku* 八包之記録 (No. 5439, MF872) kept in the Tsushima Sō family documents, National Institute of Korean History. For details on the Palpo Incident, see Cheng, *Kai hentai no Higashi Ajia*, ch. 7.

24 This affair is called the *Yanagawa ikken* 柳川一件; see Kim Sang-jun 김상준 and Yun Yu-suk, 윤유숙, *Kūnse Han-Il kwan'gye saryojip: Yanagawa Sigeok'i Kuji kirok = Yuchōn Chohūng Kongsā kirok* 근세 한일 관계 사료집 : 야나가와 시게오키 구지 기록 = 柳川調興公事記録, Tongbuga Yōksa Chaedan, 2015, p. 79.

Ming sources that recorded the reestablishment of Tokugawa-Chosŏn relations. According to the *Ming shilu* 明實錄 (Ming Veritable Record), Japan and Chosŏn first planned to “open the market trade” in Wanli 37 (1609),²⁵ the year that the Kiyū Agreement was concluded. It is also noted in *Ming shilu* that in Wanli 35 (1607), when the king of Chosŏn reported to the Ming court about Japan’s request for reconciliation by exchanging envoys, the Board of War decided to let Chosŏn make its own decision and showed no intention of interference. From these descriptions, can we conclude that the Ming had nothing to do with the restoration of the Japan-Chosŏn trade?

On the other hand, the king of Chosŏn reported the Japanese situation to the Ming. He permitted the reopening of the Pusan trade in 1609 after receiving Ming approval to handle the negotiation on its own terms. This also means that the Ming side understood that Chosŏn had not yet permitted trade with Japan when the king of Chosŏn reported to the Ming about the Japanese situation in the fourth lunar month of Wanli 35 (1607). It is also stated in *Ming shilu* that the Ming was fully aware of a constant and ongoing private friendship between Pusan and Tsushima even before the reopening of the trade in 1609. In other words, the Ming were also cognizant of the existence of Japan-Chosŏn transactions that had not been reported to it.

The post-Imjin peace negotiations between Japan and Chosŏn are also documented in *Wanli sandazheng kao* 萬曆三大征考 (The Three Campaigns of the Wanli Era) by Mao Ruizheng 茅瑞徵 (16th–17th c.). An unofficial history book, Mao’s work is a primary source with a high historical value. Mao writes, “Later in the third year (1609), the Ming court discussed and approved the opening of trade in the Pusan port. The number of merchant’s vessels from Tsushima was set at twenty each year, and they must return to Tsushima immediately after the transactions (後三年己酉，朝議允于釜山港開市，本島商船歲以二十為率，事竣即回).”²⁶ The Ming court had exerted a powerful influence on the reopening of the Pusan trade and was aware of the number of vessels dispatched from Tsushima to Chosŏn every year, which was of most interest to Tsushima in the Kiyū Agreement.

In both of the abovementioned official accounts and the unofficial history from the Ming side, there is no mention of Chosŏn’s permission to open trade in Pusan in 1604, and it is recorded that “market trade” was permitted in 1609, the year of the signing of the Kiyū Agreement. Furthermore, the *Ming shilu* suggests that the Ming left the restoration of the Japan-Chosŏn trade to the discretion of Chosŏn, but in Mao’s *Wanli sandazheng kao*, it is recorded that the “market trade” was realized with the permission of the Ming in 1609. There is a discrepancy between the timing of the approval by the Ming and the fact that the Chosŏn court had already approved the private trade between Japan and Chosŏn in 1604. Therefore, Chosŏn did not report to the Ming that it had already granted permission for the opening of Pusan trade in 1604 but only reported the conclusion of the Kiyū Agreement to the Ming in 1609.

2. The Report from Chosŏn Korea to Ming China

Since Seonjo 36 (1603), the Chosŏn court had discussed the topic of the reopening of the trade in

25 *Ming shengzong shilu*, Wanli 35 (1607).4.18. *Shengzong* refers to the Wanli Emperor and the *Ming shengzong shilu* is a part of *Ming shilu*.

26 *Beijing tushuguan guji zhenben congkan* 北京圖書館古籍珍本叢刊, vol. 13, Shumu Wenxian Chubanshe, 1988, p. 269.

Pusan and the necessity of reporting it to the Ming many times. In the memorial sent by the Border Defense Command to the king of Chosŏn in the eighth lunar month of Seonjo 36, it was stated that “since cargo trade with Tsushima had been recently allowed (近日已許交易其商物),” “it is appropriate to temporarily allow the opening of the market trade (姑許關市, 似爲便當).”²⁷ Here, “recently” probably refers to the three transactions between Tsushima and the Chosŏn government that took place in Pusan in the winter of Seonjo 34 (1601), the seventh lunar month of Seonjo 35 (1602), and the third lunar month of Seonjo 36 (1603).²⁸ One month later, the king of Chosŏn gathered chief ministers and high officials and solicited their opinion on the reopening of the Pusan trade. In the *Seonjo sillok* (Veritable Record of Seonjo), the statements of twenty-nine officials are recorded, among which the most noteworthy is that of Yun Kŭnsu 尹根壽 (1537–1616).²⁹ Yun’s statement reveals that the Chosŏn had already allowed Tsushima’s goods to be bought and sold, and that the Chosŏn had already inquired with the Ming about the possibility of Chosŏn-Japan relations but had not yet received a reply. It also made clear that the Chosŏn internally recognized that they had to wait for Ming approval before permission could be granted. We can see from Yun Kŭnsu’s statement that the Ming’s opinion was decisive for the Chosŏn regarding the opening of the Pusan trade.

The Chosŏn court was leaning toward resuming trade with Tsushima in Pusan, although no definitive conclusion was reached at the time. In the following month, King Seonjo decided to report it to the Ming. On the twenty-sixth day of the eleventh lunar month (December 28, 1603), Jeong Hok 鄭穀 (1559–1617), a councilor of the Department of Rites, was dispatched to Beijing to present a long rescript, in which Chosŏn first reported the latest developments with Japan and then proposed a compromise measure to allow for the reopening of the Pusan trade, which had long been requested by Tsushima. The rescript also shows that negotiations for the restoration of diplomatic relations between Japan and Chosŏn were not progressing, that Japan would threaten another invasion of Chosŏn, and that with a prevailing drought the weather was not favorable this year. Chosŏn added that the permission for the opening of trade in Pusan was only a temporary solution while the negotiations were in stalemate, and also a measure to mitigate the potential threat of another Japanese invasion. Besides, the Chosŏn also requested that the Ming dispatch a commissioner to Chosŏn to train the Chosŏn army and pretend that the Chosŏn army was the Ming army, thereby fortifying the frontier defense and confusing the Japanese.

With the above rescript, the envoy arrived in Beijing in the second lunar month of Wanli 32 (1604) and had a meeting with officials from the Board of Rites. When Ming officials asked about the purpose of the mission, Jeong Hok replied that it was to express gratitude for the repatriation of the Chosŏn people by Ming China and made a statement regarding the dispatch of a commissioner to Chosŏn.³⁰ Here, it should be noted that Jeong Hok omitted the request for permission to reopen the Pusan trade. In his comments, he repeatedly stressed the urgency of the Japanese situation and skillfully incorporated the details of the approval for the reopening of trade into his

27 *Seonjo sillok*, Seonjo 36 (1603).8.8.

28 *Seonjo sillok*, Seonjo 35 (1602).7.10; *Seonjo sillok*, Seonjo 36 (1603).3.24.

29 *Seonjo sillok*, Seonjo 36 (1603).9.3; *Wŏlchŏng chip* 月汀集 (Hakchawŏn, 2015, pp. 207–208).

30 Jeong Hok, *Songpogong jocheon ilgi* 松浦公朝天日記, Yŏnhaengnok Ch’onggan Chŭngbop’an 燕行錄叢刊增補版, pp. 16–17.

request for the dispatch of a commissioner to Chosŏn. During his stay in Beijing, Jeong Hok repeatedly requested the dispatch of a commissioner to the Board of War, but the Ming refused, pointing Chosŏn to “strengthen itself.” The Ming did not dispatch a commissioner until Yi Sinwŏn 李信元 (16th–17th c.), who left Hansŏng later, brought a rescript reporting the arrival of the Japanese in Pusan again. Due to Jeong’s replies and actions, the Ming did not pay much attention to the approval of the reopening of trade in Pusan. Jeong Hok left Beijing on May 22, returned to Hansŏng on July 25, and then debriefed to the king of Chosŏn.

At the same time, Zhao Yong 趙灝 (16th–17th c.), a Ming imperial commissioner, arrived in Chosŏn bringing instructions on how to handle Tsushima after the Imjin War.

Chosŏn should know the pros and cons [of Japan]. That is to say, Chosŏn should consider countermeasures to deal with the situation as it arises, which is not for the Ming to direct in any way. Whether to conclude friendly relations [with Japan] or not, is a matter to be decided by the countries involved and the dissolving of the alliance has not led to war, so it is not a matter for the Ming to direct [these negotiations].

其是非利害，計惟該國自知之，則觀勢策應，相機區處，亦惟該國自任之，固非天朝所能一一指揮，而講信修睦，事屬與國，消盟弭變，事屬未然，尤非天朝之所可指揮者也。³¹

In this rescript, it is explicit that Chosŏn’s diplomatic relations with Japan (“negotiation and friendship”) should be decided between the two countries and that the Ming had no particular intention to micromanage or mediate. Thus, Chosŏn began to deal with Tsushima on its own. In the following month, Chosŏn decided to dispatch Yujŏng and Son Munuk to Tsushima and sent them with Sŏng Imun’s letter and the Yejo Edict, as described above.

Min Tŏk-ki evaluated the significance of the rescript as an “autonomy rescript” that changed Chosŏn’s negotiations with Japan and shifted the way of reporting to the Ming, from an advance report to after-the-fact notification. Given Jeong Hok’s trip, it is true that the Chosŏn reported to the Ming in advance before permitting the reopening of the Pusan trade. However, since it had already been reported to the Ming before the “autonomy rescript” was issued, it was an advance report rather than an after-the-fact notification. In explaining the necessity of allowing the reopening of the Pusan trade, Chosŏn positioned it as both a temporary compromise in Japan-Chosŏn diplomatic negotiations and as a mitigation measure to prevent another Japanese military invasion. Furthermore, the Chosŏn emphasized the urgency of the situation in Japan and cleverly built the issue of permission to open trade into the issue of requesting a military commissioner. Therefore, while the Ming focused their attention on the issue of dispatching military commissioners, they were not particularly opposed to the issue of reopening the Pusan trade, which was positioned as a temporary compromise measure in Japan-Chosŏn diplomatic negotiations for peace. In other words, while the Chosŏn was bound by the tributary obligation to make advance reports and obtain Ming approval, it nonetheless maneuvered and diverted the Ming’s attention from the Chosŏn’s true intention by mixing two different matters in one rescript.

Moreover, in reviewing the “autonomy rescript,” the purpose was to make sure that the Ming

31 *Seonjo sillok*, Seonjo 37 (1604).5.21.

wanted the Chosŏn to “look at the situation, consider countermeasures, and take action according to the situation, and not just impose responsibility on the Ming and lose the opportunity to make a decision (觀變策應, 相機區處, 毋得專諉天朝, 因循延緩, 致滋兩誤).”³²

In addition, the Chosŏn reported Yujŏng and Son-Munuk’s visit to Tsushima to Ming China,³³ which gave permission for the opening of the Pusan trade but did not report the permission granted for the opening of trade in Pusan in 1604 during this trip. The Chosŏn formally reported to the Ming but granted permission to trade without Ming approval. Perhaps, for this reason, Ming China did not consider the 1604 reopening of the Pusan trade as an issue and considered the conclusion of the Kiyū Agreement as permission to trade. This is the reason why Ming sources did not mention the permission of the Pusan trade in 1604 but only recorded that Chosŏn-Tsushima trade was permitted in Wanli 37 (1609) when the Kiyū Agreement was signed.

Due to the scarcity of extant sources,³⁴ it is not possible to confirm when the Chosŏn reported the conclusion of the Kiyū Agreement to the Ming. Still, it can be indirectly inferred from the following case. In 1609, the Satsuma 薩摩 domain invaded Ryūkyū. In the following year, Mō Hougi 毛鳳儀³⁵ (1558–1623) was dispatched to the Ming to report this invasion to the Fujian 福建 Governor, Chen Zizhen 陳子貞 (16th–17th c.). Upon learning of the incident, the Ming court decided to discuss Chosŏn relations with Japan in connection to the Satsuma invasion of Ryūkyū. The Ming court dispatched Cai Zhongyu 蔡仲宇 (16th–17th c.) from Liaodong 遼東 to Chosŏn to investigate Chosŏn-Japan relations. Hō Chōngsik 許廷式 (16th–17th c.), the Chosŏn receptionist in charge of entertaining Ming officials, sent a report to the Chosŏn court.³⁶ He reported that Cai’s purpose was to investigate communications between Chosŏn and Japan, especially the Japanese in Pusan, since he deliberately set up a camp near Japan House in Pusan after his arrival. Cai then invited eleven Japanese for questioning. After confirming the Tsushima people’s trading activities, which included selling pepper and *tanboku* (*dan mu* 丹木, a sacred tree) to Chosŏn and purchasing rice and salt from Chosŏn, Cai stated that there was no problem because the Ming had already authorized such trading activities between Japan and Chosŏn. As early as the third month of Gwanhaegun 2 (1610), the Ming was aware of the trading activities between the two countries and had authorized them. If this is the case, the “sales activities between Japan and the Chosŏn” that were “permitted” by Ming China here refer to the Kiyū Agreement.

On the other hand, prior to this, in Wanli 34 (1606), a Ming envoy named Zhu Zhifan 朱之蕃 (1558–1626) delivered an edict of the Ming emperor to Chosŏn. The edict recalls the Liaodong military commissioner, who had been stationed in Chosŏn to investigate Japanese affairs for the past three years. The edict decreed that since Japan had not taken any particularly worrisome actions the military commissioner should return to China and that Chosŏn should report the Japanese situation from now on. Chosŏn was required to send a report on the Japanese situation

32 Ibid.

33 On the fourth day of the sixth month of Wanli 33 (1605), the Chosŏn reported to the Ming on Yujŏng’s return. Still, there is no report of the permission for reopening the Chosŏn-Tsushima trade during this mission. *Sadae mungwe* 事大文軌, vol. 45, Chosŏn Ch’ongdokpu 朝鮮總督府, 1944; *Imun dŭngnok* 吏文謄錄, vol. 11 (Jangseogak, Academy of Korean Studies, K2-3497).

34 *Sadae mungwe* ends at the eleventh lunar month of 1608, and *Imun dŭngnok* has gaps from 1605 to 1616.

35 He appears in Japanese sources as Ikegusuku Anrai 池城親方安頼.

36 *Gwanhaegun ilgi* (*T’aebaeksan sago chung’obon*), Gwanhaegun 光海君 2 (1609).3.12.

every two months to military commanders in Zhejiang 浙江 and southern Zhili 直隸 provinces and to make urgent reports on critical incidents.³⁷ The every-two-month report continued to at least Tian'qi 天啓 (1621).³⁸ Considering this, it is possible that the Chosŏn side reported the conclusion of the Kiyū Agreement as a part of the report on Japanese affairs to Ming China, which was implemented in 1606.

Chosŏn's Negotiations with Tsushima

In Wanli 40 (1612), after the Satsuma invasion of Ryūkyū, Zhejiang Military Commander Yang Zongye 楊宗業 (16th–17th c.) and General Shen Youyong 沈有容 (1557–1628) strongly insisted that no Japanese should be allowed into Jeolla 全羅 and Gyeongsang 慶尙 provinces in the southern Korean Peninsula. The Wanli emperor approved their proposal and ordered the king of Chosŏn to do so. Since Japan House in Pusan was under the jurisdiction of South Gyeongsang Province, it was naturally understood that this order would lead to the prohibition of the Chosŏn-Tsushima trade in Pusan. Therefore, on June 28, Wanli 41 (1613), when Joseon envoys Song Yōngku 宋英耆 (1556–1620) and Yi Sangkūp 李尚伋 (1571–1637) departed Hansŏng for Beijing to celebrate the birthday of the emperor and crown prince as Ch'ŏnch'usa 千秋使—a Chosŏn envoy sent to celebrate the birth of the empress or crown prince of China—they carried a rescript by the king of Chosŏn to appeal to the Ming decision.

In the rescript, the king of Chosŏn explained that he had already reported to the Ming both the restoration of diplomatic and trade relations between Japan and Chosŏn and that all negotiations with Japan were conducted under Ming instructions. He also stated that the permission for the reopening of trade in Pusan had been done before the conclusion of the Kiyū Agreement in Wanli 37 (1609). The Song and Yi mission appeared to dispel the suspicions of the Ming court.³⁹

Thus, Chosŏn continued to reject new requests from Tsushima, repeatedly stating to Japan that the Ming authorities permitted opening the trade in Pusan when defending against the Ming's false accusations. For example, when the Tsushima monk Keitetsu Genso 景轍玄蘇 (1537–1611) and the Tsushima domain's retainer Yanagawa Kagenao 柳川景直 (?–1613) were in Pusan to negotiate the Kiyū Agreement, Yanagawa asked the Chosŏn to provide a way for Japan to pay tribute to the Ming, but the official Yi Chiwan 李志完 (1575–1617) refused their request. When Yu Kan 柳澗 (1554–1621), the councilor of the Department of Rites, communicated with the lord of Tsushima domain, Yu referred to the report of Zhejiang Military Commander Yang Zongye and the dispatch of commander Huang Yingyang 黃應暘 (16th–17th c.) to Chosŏn, and stated that “it was very fortunate to continue the Chosŏn-Tsushima trade despite such a situation (此際得保開市往來，亦彼此之幸也)”⁴⁰ and then turned down the request for Japan to travel to and

37 *Ming shengzong shilu*, Wanli 33 (1605).12.14; *Seonjo suchŏng sillok*, Seonjo 39 (1606).4.1.

38 The last verifiable report on the Japanese situation from Chosŏn to Ming is dated Tian'qi 1 (1621).2.30 (*Imun dŏngnok*, vol. 15).

39 *Gwanghaegun ilgi (T'aebaeksan sago chungch'obon)*, Gwanghaegun 5 (1613).5.8.

40 Letter dated Wanli 38 (1610).7.20, *Zenrin tsūsho*, vol. 4 (National Institute of Korean History, no. 4751, MF782).

pay tribute to Ming China through the Korean Peninsula.

The following year, in 1613, Tsushima Lord Sō Yoshitoshi again requested to travel to Ming China via the Korean Peninsula, but Kim Chi 金緻 (1577–1625), the councilor of the Department of Rites, rejected the request. In his reply Kim wrote:

The court considered that Tsushima implored with sincerity for the reopening of the Pusan trade, and we appealed to and urged the heavenly court. Only through effort was the reopening of the Pusan trade finally permitted. The agreement and the number of vessels to be sent to Tsushima were all reported to the heavenly court, and the regulations were set, and even the slightest decision cannot be made without the approval of the Ming.

釜市之設，朝廷以貴島之乞款甚懇，申請於天朝，多費心力，始蒙准許，而開市之約條，歲船之額數，悉報天朝，已定規限，此外絲毫之事，本國不得有所擅便。⁴¹

In addition, in the tenth lunar month of the same year, in a letter to the lord of Tsushima, the councilor of the department of rites, Kim Kae 金闖 (1582–1618), also wrote:

Chosŏn has already reported to the Ming to permit the Pusan trade because Tsushima had respectfully shown its sincerity and earnestly beseeched them. Why are you not satisfied and always complain?

我國以貴島恪修誠款，懇乞不已，具報天朝，許開釜市，德甚盛也，恩至渥也，足下何不知足而忌兮。⁴²

Kim strictly refused Tsushima's further demands, including entering the capital of Chosŏn, traveling to Ming via the Chosŏn, the request to dispatch Chosŏn missions to Japan, increasing the number of ships from Tsushima to Chosŏn, and the demand for a grant stamp (*tosho* 圖書)⁴³ to Tsushima.

In 1615, the Tsushima domain requested that the Chosŏn send a mission to Japan for the celebration of Tokugawa Kazuko's 德川和子 (1607–1678) bridal entry into the Japanese court. Yu Kan explained again that Chosŏn submitted a request to Ming China to restore the Chosŏn-Tsushima trade since Tsushima had shown its sincerity. Then Ming China granted permission and ruled on all maritime agreements, so Chosŏn could only respectfully comply with the Ming's inspection.

From then on, when Chosŏn officials were negotiating with Tsushima, they continued to emphasize that the reopening of trade in Pusan was under the permission of the Ming and turned down requests from Tsushima.

41 Letter dated Wanli 42 (1614).4, *ibid.*

42 Letter dated Wanli 42 (1614).10, *ibid.*

43 A *tosho* was a bronze seal issued by the Chosŏn government to travelers from Japan as proof of permission for diplomatic relations to control Japanese correspondents. It was a private seal; the official seal was called *inshō* 印章.

Conclusion

After the Imjin War, the Tsushima domain continued to negotiate with Chosŏn to reestablish Japan-Chosŏn relations, using measures such as repatriating Chosŏn captives and threatening Chosŏn with another invasion. The reopening of trade in Pusan in 1604 was the first result of Tsushima's efforts. Tsushima falsified its correspondence with Korea so that the shogunate would not be exposed to these various maneuvers to restore Japan-Chosŏn relations and even kept secret from the shogunate that the permission to reopen trade in Pusan had been granted.

While Ming China expressed its position that it would not interfere in Chosŏn's negotiations with Japan, it began to doubt Chosŏn's relations with Japan as the circumstances in East Asia changed due to the Satsuma domain's invasion of Ryūkyū. Under these circumstances, Chosŏn skillfully took measures and temporarily succeeded in making a proactive decision in granting permission to Tsushima for the reopening of trade in Pusan. Later, when the Chosŏn's diplomatic relations with Japan were questioned by the Ming, they were forced to explain the situation of Japan-Chosŏn relations and succeeded in avoiding any problems. From these points of view, Ming China did not particularly object to Chosŏn's policy-making when granting permission to reopen trade in Pusan. Still, when the circumstances in East Asia shifted, the Ming grew suspicious over Chosŏn's actions. This was not necessarily a complete non-interference, and the power to constrain Chosŏn's negotiations with Japan was still in the hands of Ming China. While the "autonomy rescript" indicated the Ming's intention to ease its grip on Chosŏn's affairs with Japan, it was far from a complete withdrawal of Ming influence in the sense of Chosŏn-Japan diplomacy.

Therefore, the reopening of the Chosŏn-Tsushima trade in the early seventeenth century in Pusan resulted not only from Chosŏn-Tsushima bilateral negotiations, but also involved a more complicated multilateral relationship internal to Japan itself—the Tsushima domain and the Tokugawa shogunate as two parties of interest in Japan, as well as the Chosŏn and the Ming.

外交と王権

——1604年釜山開市許可をめぐる日本・朝鮮・明の三国関係——

程 永超*

対馬府中藩にとって、壬辰戦争によって断絶された朝鮮王朝との関係の回復は外交的緊急課題だった。本稿では、その過程において明朝中国が果たした重要な役割について明らかにする。貿易回復の具体的な表れは1604年の釜山開市であるが、その許可は、対馬と朝鮮王朝との間の交渉だけによって実現したのではなく、日本国内の二つの権力（対馬藩と徳川幕府）、朝鮮王朝、

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明朝の四者の複雑な関わりの中かで実現したものであった。

キーワード：対馬府中藩、徳川幕府、壬辰戦争、文禄・慶長の役、壬辰倭乱